Peterson Institute - pb20-14

POLICY BRIEF
20-14 Impact of COVID-19

Lockdowns on Individual
Mobility and the Importance of
Socioeconomic Factors
Julien Maire
November 2020
In March 2020, most countries implemented stringent measures—closing schools Julien Maire was a
research analyst at the
and workplaces, limiting public gatherings, and curbing travel—to reduce the Peterson Institute for
spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which causes COVID-19. Thanks to smartphone International Economics
from November 2019
data from Google, it is possible to measure the impact of pandemic-related
through October 2020.
lockdowns on individual mobility. Understanding the impact of lockdown He worked with C.
measures on individual mobility and how it differed across countries is important, Fred Bergsten Senior
Fellow Olivier Blanchard
because it is the first step in determining the effectiveness of lockdown measures on issues related to
on health outcomes and their impact on the economy. macroeconomic policy.
Previously, he worked
This Policy Brief examines the effects of the stringent measures implemented as a research assistant
in March–May 2020 on individual mobility. The results suggest that stringent at the World Bank on
the World Development
measures were more effective at reducing individual mobility in higher-income
Report 2020. He thanks
countries than in lower-income countries and that the differences reflect Olivier Blanchard,
factors such as extreme poverty, perception of risk, the share of vulnerable Pinelopi K. Goldberg,
and Adam Posen for
employment, number of hospital beds, age distribution of the population, and their invaluable guidance
population density. and support and Egor
Gornostay, Cullen S.
The Policy Brief uses the Oxford Stringency Index (Hale et al. 2020b), which
Hendrix, Edwin M.
is based on nine measures: school closures, workplace closures, cancellation of Truman, and Eva Zhang
public events, restrictions on gatherings, closures of public transportation, stay-at- for their comments.
home requirements, restrictions on internal movement, controls on international

travel, and public information campaigns. It takes values between 0 and 100. The
higher the index, the more stringent the measures.
Individual mobility is measured by Google smartphone data.1 Google uses
GPS data from users who have opted in to storing their location history on their
phone’s Google account to paint a picture of individual movement during the
1. Available at www.google.com/covid19/mobility.
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW | Washington, DC 20036-1903 USA | +1.202.328.9000 | www.piie.com

PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 2
pandemic.2 Individual mobility in this Policy Brief is an average of four dimensions:

mobility associated with retail shopping and recreation, trips to the grocery
store and pharmacy, trips in public transportation stations, and trips to work (see
appendix figure A.1). The values of these indexes are expressed as the percentage
change from the baseline value, which is the median mobility in January 2020
for each country.
DIFFERENCES ACROSS COUNTRY INCOME GROUPS

Data on 118 countries indicate that all of them implemented stringency measures
in March 2020. On average, between March 25 and May 9, middle-income
countries implemented the most stringent measures, followed by high-income
Figure 1
Oxford Stringency Index, by country income group, February 12–May 6, 2020
Oxford Stringency Index
80
60
40
20
0
February 12 March 4 March 25 April 15 May 6
High income Upper-middle income

Lower-middle income Low income
Source: Oxford Stringency Index (Hale et al. 2020b).
and low-income countries (figure 1).

Variations in the effect of stringency measures on individual mobility were
significant across country income groups. Individual mobility decreased most in
upper-middle-income countries, followed by high-, lower-middle, and low-income
countries (figure 2). The correlation between mobility and stringency measures is
stronger in higher-income countries than in lower-income countries. On April 6,
for instance, the Stringency Index for Belgium (a high-income country) was 79 and
individual mobility was 58 percent below baseline. In contrast, in Kenya (a lower-
middle-income country), the Stringency Index was 85 and individual mobility was
just 33 percent below baseline.
The next step is to go to panel regressions. Data cover the period February
15–May 9, 2020. The sample includes 80 countries: 24 high-, 25 upper-middle, 22
lower-middle, and 9 low-income countries.
2 Although smartphone ownership varies widely across countries, mobility data from smart-
phones are robust to potential biases that can arise from different geographic and socioeco-
nomic groups. See Laura Silver, “Smartphone Ownership Is Growing Rapidly around the World,
but Not Always Equally,” Pew Research Center, February 5, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.
org/global/2019/02/05/smartphone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-around-the-world-but-not-
always-equally/. See also Wesolowski (2013).
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Figure 2
Percentage change in mobility relative to January 2020 baselines, by country
income group
a. Unsmoothed data
percentage change relative to baseline
−20
−40
−60
b. Smoothed data
percentage change relative to baseline
−20
−40
−60

Source: Google Mobility data, www.google.com/covid19/mobility/.
One could argue that the direction of causality could go either way: The
decrease in mobility could have been a response to more stringent measures,
or stringent measures could have been taken after an increase in individual
mobility. A Granger causality test suggests that stringency predicts mobility,
however, mobility also Granger-causes stringency (see table A.1 in the appendix).
An instrumental variable (IV) approach is adopted to deal with the issue of
reverse causality. The IV used for the Stringency Index is an average of the
index values of a country’s region excluding the country being measured.3 This
variable is highly correlated with the Stringency Index of the country (correlation
coefficient of 0.89) and uncorrelated with the error term of the first specification
(correlation coefficient of 0.02).
Columns 1 and 3 of table 1 indicate that overall stringency measures are
associated with a decrease in individual mobility: A 1 percentage point increase
3 Regions correspond to World Bank regions: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America, South Asia,
and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 1
Regression results on effect of Stringency Index, number of new COVID-19 cases and deaths on individual mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility
Item (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
–0.726*** –0.750*** –0.808*** –0.814*** –0.682*** –0.690*** –0.673*** –0.762*** –0.769*** –0.759*** –0.765***
Stringency Index
(–102.69) (–125.70) (–96.01) (–126.31) (–93.79) (–95.65) (–95.60) (–85.97) (–88.04) (–95.64) (–103.77)
–0.215*** –0.276*** –0.172*** –0.175***
New COVID-19 cases in region per million people
(–18.10) (–19.19) (–14.00) (–11.62)
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–1.830*** –1.479*** –1.619***

New COVID-19 deaths in region per million people
(–16.94) (–13.29) (–12.79)
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes
14.83*** 30.52*** 20.34*** 21.86*** 14.53*** 14.44*** 29.76*** 19.32*** 19.37*** 17.31*** 17.73***
Constant
(28.70) (14.62) (33.82) (12.31) (28.94) (28.64) (14.73) (32.82) (32.78) (9.78) (10.11)
N 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442
R-squared 0.660 0.814 0.651 0.810 0.679 0.678 0.826 0.672 0.670 0.821 0.822
F-statistic (first-stage regression) — — 14,170.1 33,574.5 — — — 12,032.5 12,464.7 20,923.6 24,157.7
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
— = No value (F-statistics computed only for IV specifications).
Source: Author’s calculations.
4
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Figure 3
Average number of COVID-19 cases and deaths, by country income group
a. New cases of COVID-19

new cases per million inhabitants
40
30
20
10
0
b. New deaths from COVID-19

new deaths per million inhabitants
3
0

Source: Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus.
in the Stringency Index is associated with a decrease in mobility of 0.81

percentage points (IV) (0.73 percentage points using ordinary least squares
[OLS]). The coefficient associated with the Stringency Index remains similar
after country fixed effects are added (column 4). The fact that the coefficients
in columns 3 and 4 are similar suggests that almost all of the relevant variation
in the Stringency Index reflects time variation, that the cross-country variation
is very small.
Adding variables measuring risk perceptions, as proxied by the number of
COVID-19 cases and deaths, reveals whether the decline in mobility reflected
stringency measures alone or people’s increased perception of risk.4 Figure
3 shows that most cases and deaths over the period covered were in high-
income countries.
4 Data are from the Our World in Data website, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus.

PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 6
There may be further concerns about reverse causality, as a decrease in

mobility is expected to lead to a decrease in the number of new cases and
deaths. One way to deal with this issue is to use the number of new cases and
deaths per million inhabitants (seven-day moving average) in the same region
and exclude the country in question. For France, for instance, the mobility
response is a function of new cases and deaths in Europe minus new cases and
deaths in France. The results are presented in columns 5–11 of table 1. Both the
number of new cases and the number of new death per million in the region are
significantly correlated with mobility.5 As columns 10 and 11 (IV and with country
fixed effects) show, a 1 point increase in the number of new cases per million in
the region is associated with a decrease in mobility of 0.18 percentage point, and
a 1 point increase in the number of new deaths in the region is associated with a
decrease in mobility of 1.62 percentage points.
Different regimes were put in place between March 12 and May 9. Between
March 12 and April 1, countries implemented stringency regimes; during this
period the index rose. Between April 2 and May 9, countries maintained their
regimes; during this period the index remained stable. Differences in the
relationship between individual mobility and the Stringency Index in the two
periods was tested by using the same specifications used above but interacting
the Stringency Index with a dummy for each period. The number of new cases
and deaths was also interacted with these dummies. The results are shown
in table A.2. The relationship between individual mobility and the Stringency
Index was slightly stronger in April 2–May 9 (coefficient of –1.33) than in March
12–April 1 (coefficient of –1.29), and the difference, although small, is statistically
significant (see column 3, IV without country fixed effects). The relationship
between individual mobility and the number of new COVID-19 cases was stronger
in March 12–April 1 (coefficient of –0.20) than in April 2–May 9 (coefficient of
–0.10 [see column 8, IV without country fixed effects]). These results suggest
that the effect of stringent measures increased between the two periods and the
effect related to risk perceptions declined.
In table 2, the Stringency Index is interacted with dummies corresponding
to the country income classification. The results show that individual mobility
differed across country income groups. Stringency measures had a stronger
effect on individual mobility in high-and upper-middle-income countries and a
weaker effect in lower-income countries. In high-income countries, a 1 percentage
point increase in stringency is associated with a 0.85 percentage point (column
2, IV). In low-income countries, a 1 percentage point increase in stringency is
associated with a 0.71 (column 2, IV) percentage point decrease in mobility.
Including the variables “new cases” and “new deaths” reduces the
coefficients slightly, but the conclusions remain the same. Adding country fixed
effects (columns 5 and 6) significantly changes the coefficient associated with
the Stringency Index across country income groups. As the degree of collinearity
between the interacted dummies and the country fixed effects may be fairly high,
one cannot conclude whether the different responses in mobility to stringent
measures reflect country fixed effects or interactions with the income group.
5 The number of new cases and the number of new deaths are highly correlated.
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 7
Table 2
Regression results on effect of Stringency Index on individual mobility, by country income
group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility
Item (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV)
–0.754*** –0.845*** –0.671*** –0.785*** –0.736*** –0.784***
Stringency Index x high income
(–89.54) (–87.59) (–66.78) (–65.83) (–78.86) (–78.99)
–0.762*** –0.841*** –0.724*** –0.811*** –0.782*** –0.864***
Stringency Index x upper-middle income
(–99.72) (–97.05) (–91.13) (–87.25) (–78.85) (–80.62)
–0.672*** –0.763*** –0.649*** –0.741*** –0.701*** –0.775***
Stringency Index x lower-middle income
(–82.17) (–80.37) (–79.19) (–76.24) (–50.77) (–50.48)
–0.638*** –0.711*** –0.627*** –0.696*** –0.816*** –0.879***
Stringency Index x low income
(–55.03) (–54.45) (–54.96) (–53.69) (–30.00) (–28.91)
–0.203*** –0.127***
(–14.52) (–8.58)
Country fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Constant 14.76*** 20.50*** 14.15*** 19.63*** 23.24*** 18.57***
(29.11) (34.78) (28.34) (33.25) (7.74) (8.73)
N 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442
R-squared 0.677 0.667 0.688 0.679 0.815 0.811
F-statistic (first-stage regression) — 26,698.3 — 18,510.9 — 11,035.7

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
The specifications in table 2 are estimated by considering two different

periods (see table A.3). The conclusions remain similar: Individual mobility
responded in different ways to stringent measures across country income groups,
and the effects were stronger in the second period (April 2–May 9).
EFFECT OF SOCIOECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Various socioeconomic and demographic factors—including GDP per capita,
the extreme poverty rate, the share of vulnerable employment, the share of
agriculture in employment, the share of the population 65 and older, population
density, and the number of hospital beds per thousand inhabitants—may effect
cross-country variation in the effect of stringency measures on mobility, for the
following reasons:
• Most people in poor countries have no savings, and few safety nets exist; few
people can therefore afford not to work.
• The consequences of COVID-19 are less severe for young people, who may
therefore be willing to take more chances than older people. If a country’s
population is young, the effect of lockdown measures on mobility may
therefore be weaker.
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• If population density favors the spread of the virus, denser countries may
have a stronger mobility response than less dense ones.
• A country with a strong health system can more easily face a health crisis and
avoid overloading its capacity. If people in such a country are therefore more
likely to survive, they may be less willing to restrict their mobility. All else
equal, one might therefore expect a lower decline in individual mobility in a
country with a larger number of hospital beds per inhabitants.
The shares of extreme poverty, vulnerable employment, and employment in

agriculture are very high in lower-income countries (table 3). The share of the
population in extreme poverty is 42 percent in low-income countries and just
0.7 in high-income countries. The share of vulnerable employment is 78 percent
in low-income countries and 10 percent in high-income countries. The share of
workers employed in agriculture is 55 percent in low-income countries and less
than 4 percent in high-income countries. The average number of hospital beds
per thousand inhabitants is almost 10 times higher in high-income countries
than in low-income countries, and the share of the population 65 and older is
five times higher.
Table 3
Description of covariates (average) by country income group (percent except where
indicated otherwise)
Country income level

High Upper-middle Lower-middle Low
Variable income income income income
Share of population living in extreme poverty 0.7 3 15 42
Share of vulnerable employment in total employmenta 10 28 56 78
Share of agriculture in total employment 4 17 37 55
Share of population 65 and older 15 9 5 3
Number of hospital beds per thousand 4 3 2 0.5
a. The International Labor Organization defines vulnerable workers as the sum of own-account workers and contributing
family workers.
Note: Data are for last year available for each country.
Source: World Bank.
Eight panel regressions are estimated, in order to study the effects of

these factors. Table 4 presents the results. Columns 1–4 indicate that GDP per
capita (in current US dollars) and extreme poverty are statistically significantly
correlated with mobility. A 1 percentage point increase in extreme poverty is
associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in mobility. Stringency measures
are less effective in countries with large shares of extreme poverty. Moreover,
introducing additional variables (such as the number of hospital beds per
thousand inhabitants, the share of vulnerable employment, the share of people
65 and older, and population density) reduces the importance of GDP per capita
in explaining the effect of stringency measures on mobility.
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Table 4
Regression results on effects of Stringency Index, new COVID-19 cases and deaths, and country
covariates on individual mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility
Item (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
–0.831*** –0.820*** –0.827*** –0.838*** –0.797*** –0.798*** –0.795*** –0.790***
Stringency Index
(–98.92) (–99.64) (–98.35) (–101.85) (–81.89) (–85.83) (–81.13) (–80.78)
–3.173*** –1.656*** –2.007*** –1.978*** –2.081***
Log(GDP per capita)
(–16.11) (–5.53) (–5.21) (–5.24) (–5.52)
0.234*** 0.144*** 0.195*** 0.196*** 0.200***
Extreme poverty
(16.76) (6.77) (8.82) (9.02) (9.23)
2.078*** 2.116*** 2.175*** 2.092*** 1.970***
Hospital beds per thousand people
(19.05) (19.77) (20.27) (19.29) (18.43)
–0.374*** –0.184** –0.165** –0.243*** –0.288***
Share of population 65 and older
(–7.13) (–3.25) (–2.93) (–4.57) (–5.46)
–0.00287* –0.00488*** –0.00471*** –0.00603*** –0.00555***
Population density
(–2.54) (–4.29) (–4.19) (–5.29) (–4.87)
–0.122*** –0.115*** –0.131***
(–7.89) (–7.32) (–8.33)
–1.213***
New COVID-19 deaths in region per million people
(–8.98)
0.150***
Vulnerable employment
(12.28)
0.158***
Share of employment in agriculture
(11.23)
51.92*** 19.15*** 36.09*** 38.14*** 34.84*** 35.32*** 13.16*** 15.45***
Constant
(25.36) (32.10) (11.44) (10.56) (9.77) (9.95) (12.04) (15.25)
N 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204
R-squared 0.662 0.666 0.666 0.696 0.708 0.709 0.703 0.702
F-statistic (first-
13,764.1 14,300.6 13,806.2 13,752.6 9,458.6 10,325.9 9,241.9 9,308.06
stage regression)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Columns 1–4 show that a 1 percentage point increase in the number of

hospital beds per thousand inhabitants is associated with a 2 percentage point
increase in mobility, that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of people
65 and older is associated with a 0.2–0.4 percentage point decrease in mobility,
and that an increase of 100 inhabitants per square kilometers is associated with
a decrease in mobility of 0.3–0.6 percentage points. Columns 5–8 show results
including several covariates and the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths. The
share of vulnerable employment is associated with greater individual mobility
(column 7).6 A 1 percentage point increase in the share of vulnerable employment
is associated with a 0.15 percentage point increase in mobility, a 1 percentage
6 The variable “extreme poverty” is not included, because the share of vulnerable employment
and the share of extreme poverty are highly correlated (coefficient of correlation of 0.77).
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 10
Table 5
Regression results on effect of Stringency Index, new COVID-19 cases, and
country covariates on individual mobility, by country income group
(1) (2)
Mobility Mobility
Item (IV) (IV)
–0.844*** –0.777***
Stringency Index x high income
(–86.99) (–66.74)
–0.839*** –0.816***
Stringency Index x upper-middle income
(–96.28) (–83.43)
–0.773*** –0.771***
Stringency Index x lower-middle income
(–79.86) (–65.95)
–0.694*** –0.766***
Stringency Index x low income
(–49.09) (–41.02)
0.212***
Extreme poverty
(9.19)
–0.129***
(–8.27)
2.071***
(19.57)
–0.398***
(–6.74)
–0.00561***
Population density
(–4.87)
20.48*** 17.85***
Constant
(34.41) (18.37)
N 5,204 5,204
R-squared 0.675 0.711
F-statistic (first-stage regression) 25,051.9 12,104.8

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
point increase in the share of employment in agriculture is associated with a 0.16

percentage point increase in mobility, and the share of vulnerable employment
and the share of agriculture are highly correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.90).
These results remain robust when the time-varying variables—the Stringency
Index, the number of new cases, and the number of new deaths—are interacted
with dummies for the two periods (March 12–April 1 and April 2–May 9) (see table
A.4). The effects on individual mobility are similar to those shown in table 4. As in
table 4, the effect associated with the Stringency Index is stronger for the period
April 2–May 9.
Once the variables for the share of extreme poverty, the number of hospital
beds per thousand inhabitants, the share of people 65 and older, population
density, and the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths are introduced, the
coefficient differences across country income groups almost disappear (except
for upper-middle-income countries) (table 5). These factors may explain why
mobility declined less in lower-income countries than elsewhere, although it is
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 11
not possible to determine whether the different responses reflect country fixed
effects or interactions with the country income group. Table A.5 does not show
a significant reduction in differences between coefficients associated with the
Stringency Index and the country income group. Thus, although covariates such
as extreme poverty, vulnerable employment, a larger share of young people, and
population density decrease the effect of stringency measures on mobility, it is
not clear how much they explain the different responses of individual mobility to
stringent measures across country income groups.
EFFECT OF QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE

COVID-19 crisis has aroused intense debates about the political response to face
the pandemic and the political environment. Some governments have responded
more slowly than others. Some people have argued that some political systems
were more adapted to respond in an efficient way to this health crisis.
Does the quality of the institutions in a country affect individual mobility
in response to stringency measures? Three measure of governance quality
from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank 2019)
are investigated:
• Political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism, defined as

“perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically
motivated violence, including terrorism.”
• Government effectiveness, defined as “perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation,
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.”
• The rule of law, defined as “perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of the society, and in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”
These data are reported by percentile rank term, ranging from 0 (lowest
percentile) to 100 (highest percentile).
Table 6 shows the effects of these variables on individual mobility. Without the
additional variables presented in table 4, all of the variables measuring the quality
of institutions have a significant negative effect on individual mobility (columns
1–3). When other variables are added, however, only political stability has a robust
significant effect (columns 4–6). If the index measuring political stability increases
by 1 percentage point, mobility decreases by 0.07 percentage points. The rule of
law and to some extent government effectiveness are not as important as other
variables, such as the share of extreme poverty, the perception of risk, the number
of hospital beds, the share of young people in the population, and population
density, in understanding differences in individual mobility across countries. These
results are robust when both periods are considered (see table A.6).
One might posit that the quality of institutions operates through the
Stringency Index. However, regressions of the Stringency Index on the three
governance variables show no significant effects. Hale et al. (2020a) find
the same results.
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 12
Table 6
Regression results on the effects of the quality of institutions on individual mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Item (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
–0.816*** –0.827*** –0.823*** –0.792*** –0.797*** –0.795***
Stringency Index
(–94.76) (–95.24) (–94.01) (–81.88) (–81.56) (–81.21)
Political stability and absence of –0.0771*** –0.0676***
violence/terrorism (–9.24) (–5.97)
–0.0985*** –0.0366**
Government effectiveness
(–12.11) (–3.02)
–0.0770*** –0.0104
Rule of law
(–9.72) (–0.89)
0.268*** 0.259*** 0.266***
Extreme poverty
(15.20) (14.54) (15.03)
–0.121*** –0.115*** –0.114***
(–7.73) (–7.35) (–7.31)
2.248*** 2.090*** 2.084***
(20.16) (19.29) (19.21)
–0.173** –0.235*** –0.312***
(–3.04) (–3.84) (–5.01)
–0.00557*** –0.00409*** –0.00406***
Population density
(–4.82) (–3.60) (–3.55)
24.16*** 27.03*** 25.36*** 17.89*** 18.08*** 17.21***
Constant
(31.92) (32.35) (30.68) (19.27) (18.24) (17.89)
N 5,123 5,123 5,123 5,123 5,123 5,123
R-squared 0.664 0.665 0.663 0.708 0.705 0.705
F-statistic (first-stage regression) 13,102.5 12,782.6 12,709.8 9,414.8 9,314.3 9,358.4

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
CONCLUSIONS
The stringent measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19 that were adopted
across countries in the spring of 2020 decreased individual mobility. But
the response varied across countries, with lower-income countries revealing
weaker responses. This finding can be explained by factors such as extreme
poverty, perception of risk measured by the number of new COVID-19 cases and
deaths, the share of vulnerable employment, the number of hospital beds, the
share of young people in the population, and population density. The results
highlight the importance of considering these factors, regardless of the level of
stringency. Variables measuring the quality of governance, such as rule of law
and to some extent government effectiveness, do not explain the decrease in
individual mobility.
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 13
REFERENCES
Hale, Thomas, Noam Angrist, Beatriz Kira, Rafael G. Goldszmidt, Anna Petherick, and
Toby Phillips. 2020a. Pandemic Governance Requires Understanding Socioeconomic
Variation in Government and Citizen Responses to COVID-19. Available at https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3641927.
Hale, Thomas, Noam Angrist, Anna Petherick, Toby Phillips, and Samuel Webster. 2020b.
Variation in Government Responses to COVID-19. Working Paper 31. Oxford: Blavatnik
School of Government.
Wesolowski, Amy, Nathan Eagle, Abdisalan M. Noor, Robert W. Snow, and Caroline O.
Buckee. 2013. The Impact of Biases in Mobile Phone Ownership on Estimates of Human
Mobility. Journal of the Royal Society Interface. Available at https://doi.org/10.1098/
rsif.2012.0986.
World Bank. 2019. Worldwide Governance Indicators. Washington.
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 14
APPENDIX A
Figure A.1
Changes in individual mobility from January 2020 baseline, by purpose of
mobility and country income group (percentage change from the baseline
value, which is the median mobility in January 2020 for each country)
a. Retail shopping and recreation
−20
−40
−60
b. Shopping at grocery stores and pharmacies

10
−10
−20
−30
−40

figure continues
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 15
Figure A.1 (continued)

Changes in individual mobility from January 2020 baseline, by purpose of
mobility and country income group (percentage change from the baseline
value, which is the median mobility in January 2020 for each country)
c. Public transportation stations
−20
−40
−60
d. Work
−20
−40
−60

Source: Google Mobility data, www.google.com/covid19/mobility.

PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 16
Table A.1
Granger causality test for individual mobility and the
Stringency Index
(1) (2)
Stringency
Item Mobility Index
–0.0352*** 1.005***
Lagged Stringency Index
(–31.17) (427.31)
0.955*** 0.0317***
Lagged mobility
(665.70) (10.62)
0.310*** 1.357***
Constant
(7.37) (15.51)
N 9,834 9,813
R-squared 0.995 0.985

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table A.2
Regression results on effect of Stringency Index and number of new COVID-19 cases and deaths on individual mobility, by period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility
Item (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
–0.757*** –0.773*** –1.289*** –1.140*** –0.704*** –0.709*** –0.681*** –1.216*** –1.222*** –1.048*** –1.054***
Stringency Index (March 12–April 1)
(–54.25) (–60.84) (–42.55) (–59.34) (–49.80) (–50.38) (–54.19) (–38.62) (–38.94) (–52.65) (–53.77)
–0.870*** –0.890*** –1.325*** –1.197*** –0.846*** –0.847*** –0.826*** –1.265*** –1.270*** –1.124*** –1.125***
Stringency Index (April 2–May 9)
(–71.91) (–80.07) (–50.31) (–72.46) (–71.10) (–71.04) (–75.59) (–47.83) (–47.86) (–66.98) (–67.76)
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020
–0.379*** –0.558*** –0.198*** –0.360***

New COVID-19 cases in region per million people (March 12–April 1)
(–14.70) (–24.30) (–6.39) (–13.82)
–0.120*** –0.228*** –0.100*** –0.169***
New COVID-19 cases in region per million people (April 2–May 9)
(–8.98) (–14.07) (–6.51) (–9.48)
–5.343*** –2.761*** –5.176***
New COVID-19 deaths in region per million people (March 12–April 1)
(–13.99) (–6.04) (–14.10)
–0.934*** –0.760*** –1.506***
New COVID-19 deaths in region per million people (April 2–May 9)
(–8.16) (–5.74) (–9.88)
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes
23.60*** 37.88*** 60.62*** 53.19*** 23.65*** 23.28*** 37.23*** 57.48*** 57.47*** 46.83*** 46.93***
Constant
(24.05) (19.97) (28.44) (24.87) (24.81) (24.33) (20.89) (27.19) (27.05) (22.46) (22.59)
N 4,489 4,489 4489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489
R-squared 0.556 0.811 0.405 0.775 0.583 0.580 0.833 0.454 0.449 0.801 0.800
F-statistic (first-stage regression) — — 25,634.3 31,398.4 — — — 15,572.9 17,462 17,662.7 19,617.7

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
17
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 18
Table A.3
Regression results on effect of Stringency Index on individual mobility, by country income
group and period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Item (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV)
Stringency Index x high income –0.804*** –1.326*** –0.707*** –1.265*** –0.985*** –1.485***
(March 12–April 1) (–51.38) (–42.64) (–40.29) (–35.81) (–38.19) (–36.18)
Stringency Index x high income –0.894*** –1.356*** –0.865*** –1.324*** –1.058*** –1.502***
(April 2–May 9) (–66.77) (–49.45) (–58.42) (–44.69) (–44.96) (–40.68)
Stringency Index x upper–middle income –0.761*** –1.252*** –0.721*** –1.215*** –0.835*** –1.317***
(March 12–April 1) (–51.70) (–42.86) (–48.40) (–39.52) (–40.00) (–40.57)
Stringency Index x upper–middle income –0.901*** –1.318*** –0.886*** –1.294*** –0.964*** –1.369***
(April 2–May 9) (–74.12) (–53.07) (–72.44) (–50.41) (–52.42) (–48.76)
Stringency Index x lower–middle income –0.683*** –1.247*** –0.658*** –1.214*** –0.589*** –0.850***
(March 12–April 1) (–40.59) (–37.30) (–39.39) (–35.27) (–25.81) (–24.56)
Stringency Index x lower–middle income –0.803*** –1.262*** –0.794*** –1.239*** –0.728*** –0.934***
(April 2–May 9) (–63.44) (–47.40) (–63.36) (–45.55) (–38.49) (–33.21)
Stringency Index x low income –0.606*** –1.177*** –0.599*** –1.149*** –0.601*** –0.686***
(March 12–April 1) (–25.69) (–29.38) (–25.79) (–28.54) (–14.98) (–11.47)
Stringency Index x low income –0.783*** –1.271*** –0.776*** –1.246*** –0.784*** –0.849***
(April 2–May 9) (–48.42) (–40.47) (–48.75) (–39.20) (–22.87) (–16.94)
–0.336*** –0.127***
New cases per million (region) (March 12–April 1)
(–11.68) (–3.62)
–0.054** –0.0217
New cases per million (region) (April 2–May 9)
(–3.29) (–1.12)
Country fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
22.79*** 59.31*** –30.19*** 57.54*** 16.60*** 30.59***

Constant
(23.73) (28.25) (-48.00) (26.94) (4.72) (10.45)
N 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489
R-squared 0.589 0.445 0.602 0.466 0.819 0.776
F-statistic (first-stage regression) — 11,907.9 — 7,339.53 — 11,374.2
Note: t-statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 19
Table A.4
Regression results on effect of Stringency Index, new COVID-19 cases and deaths, and country
covariates on individual mobility, by period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility
Item (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Stringency Index –.268*** –1.253*** –1.264*** –1.277*** –1.221*** –1.221*** –1.219*** –1.224***
(March 12–April 1) (–42.51) (–40.89) (–40.77) (–39.99) (–35.30) (–35.70) (–36.58) (–36.68)
Stringency Index –1.311*** –1.296*** –1.307*** –1.317*** –1.280*** –1.278*** –1.278*** –1.281***
(April 2–May 9) (–50.65) (–48.85) (–48.60) (–47.51) (–43.83) (–43.77) (–45.25) (–45.29)
–2.544*** –2.266*** –1.922*** –1.949*** –2.003***
Log(GDP per capita)
(–10.64) (–6.08) (–3.98) (–4.15) (–4.27)
0.145*** 0.025 0.0510 0.0654* 0.0676*
Extreme poverty
(8.50) (0.95) (1.79) (2.33) (2.41)
1.796*** 1.869*** 1.903*** 1.849*** 1.754***
(12.93) (13.73) (13.82) (13.56) (13.06)
–0.450*** –0.315*** –0.311*** –0.391*** –0.430***
(–6.74) (–4.16) (–4.07) (–5.56) (–6.14)
0.000870 –0.000510 –0.000414 –0.000669 –0.000443
Population density
(0.61) (–0.35) (–0.29) (–0.46) (–0.30)
–0.156*** –0.141*** –0.151***
(–4.49) (–4.10) (–4.35)
–0.0376 –0.0285 –0.0386
(–1.87) (–1.41) (–1.90)
–2.365***
New COVID-19 deaths in region per million people (March 12–April 1)
(–4.76)
–0.349*
New COVID-19 deaths in region per million people (April 2–May 12)
(–1.99)
0.0947***
Vulnerable employment
(6.18)
0.0924***
Share of employment in agriculture
(5.23)
83.19*** 56.84*** 80.06*** 76.82*** 73.21*** 73.34*** 52.58*** 54.96***
Constant
(28.76) (25.74) (17.08) (14.70) (14.11) (14.19) (19.67) (21.38)
N 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261
R-squared 0.430 0.434 0.433 0.467 0.496 0.497 0.495 0.492
F-statistic (first-
25,509.1 25,504.7 25,518 24,539.5 14,093.6 15,785.2 14,083.9 14,121.6
stage regression)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 20
Table A.5
Regression results on effect of Stringency Index, new COVID-19 cases, and
country covariates on individual mobility, by country income group and period
(1) (2)
Mobility Mobility
Item (IV) (IV)
–1.368*** –1.237***
Stringency Index x high income (March 12–April 1)
(–41.64) (–33.30)
–1.394*** –1.307***
Stringency Index x high income (April 2–May 9)
(–48.02) (–41.77)
–1.288*** –1.192***
Stringency Index x upper-middle income (March 12–April 1)
(–42.01) (–36.76)
–1.345*** –1.273***
Stringency Index x upper-middle income (April 2–May 9)
(–51.50) (–46.49)
–1.302*** –1.208***
Stringency Index x lower-middle income (March 12–April 1)
(–36.69) (–31.97)
–1.308*** –1.238***
Stringency Index x lower-middle income (April 2–May 9)
(–46.45) (–41.29)
–1.243*** –1.179***
Stringency Index x lower-middle income (March 12–April 1)
(–27.56) (–25.61)
–1.314*** –1.259***
Stringency Index x lower-middle income (April 2–May 9)
(–37.95) (–34.68)
0.133***
Extreme poverty
(4.84)
–0.172***
(–4.71)
–0.0307
(–1.43)
1.814***
(13.44)
–0.241**
(–2.83)
–0.000574
Population density
(–0.38)
62.35*** 53.01***
Constant
(27.96) (20.95)
N 4,261 4,261
R-squared 0.435 0.508
F-statistic (first-stage regression) 11,231.4 5,619.59

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
PB 20-14 | NOVEMBER 2020 21
Table A.6
Regression results on effect of Stringency Index and the quality of institutions on individual
mobility, by period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Item (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
–1.323*** –1.322*** –1.320*** –1.215*** –1.212*** –1.207***
Stringency Index (March 12–April 1)
(–41.67) (–41.78) (–41.62) (–35.32) (–35.10) (–34.69)
–1.354*** –1.354*** –1.352*** –1.273*** –1.271*** –1.267***
Stringency Index (April 2–May 9)
(–48.98) (–49.20) (–48.94) (–43.88) (–43.61) (–43.13)
Political stability and absence of –0.0823*** –0.0686***
violence/terrorism (–7.78) (–4.85)
–0.0859*** –0.0254
Government effectiveness
(–8.47) (–1.68)
–0.0741*** –0.00928
Rule of law
(–7.54) (–0.63)
0.133*** 0.127*** 0.133***
Extreme poverty
(5.77) (5.47) (5.78)
–0.153*** –0.146*** –0.146***
(–4.35) (–4.15) (–4.15)
–0.0358 –0.0308 –0.0305
(–1.77) (–1.52) (–1.51)
1.969*** 1.805*** 1.807***
(13.88) (13.09) (13.14)
–0.311*** –0.408*** –0.456***
(–4.14) (–5.02) (–5.54)
–0.00102 0.000195 0.000196
Population density
(–0.69) (0.13) (0.13)
66.47*** 67.45*** 66.50*** 56.57*** 55.90*** 55.09***
Constant
(28.71) (29.44) (28.55) (21.34) (20.72) (20.32)
N 4,204 4,204 4,204 4,204 4,204 4,204
R-squared 0.414 0.416 0.415 0.499 0.498 0.500
F-statistic (first-stage regression) 23,824.5 23,783.4 23,802.6 13,919.8 13,922.4 13,923.4

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
© 2020 Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved.
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analytical quality. The views expressed are those of the author. This publication is part of the
overall program of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, as endorsed by its
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the Board or of the Institute’s staff or management.
The Peterson Institute for International Economics is a private nonpartisan, nonprofit

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POLICY BRIEF

20-14 Impact of COVID-19

home requirements, restrictions on internal movement, controls on international

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW | Washington, DC 20036-1903 USA | +1.202.328.9000 | www.piie.com

pandemic.2 Individual mobility in this Policy Brief is an average of four dimensions:

DIFFERENCES ACROSS COUNTRY INCOME GROUPS

Oxford Stringency Index

High income Upper-middle income

Source: Oxford Stringency Index (Hale et al. 2020b).

and low-income countries (figure 1).

February 12 March 4 March 25 April 15 May 6

High income Upper-middle income

Source: Google Mobility data, www.google.com/covid19/mobility/.

–1.830*** –1.479*** –1.619***

Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes

F-statistic (first-stage regression) — — 14,170.1 33,574.5 — — — 12,032.5 12,464.7 20,923.6 24,157.7

Note: t-statistics in parentheses.

a. New cases of COVID-19

b. New deaths from COVID-19

High income Upper-middle income

Source: Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus.

in the Stringency Index is associated with a decrease in mobility of 0.81

4 Data are from the Our World in Data website, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus.

There may be further concerns about reverse causality, as a decrease in

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Country fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes

Constant 14.76*** 20.50*** 14.15*** 19.63*** 23.24*** 18.57***

(29.11) (34.78) (28.34) (33.25) (7.74) (8.73)

N 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442

R-squared 0.677 0.667 0.688 0.679 0.815 0.811

F-statistic (first-stage regression) — 26,698.3 — 18,510.9 — 11,035.7

Note: t-statistics in parentheses.

The specifications in table 2 are estimated by considering two different

EFFECT OF SOCIOECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

The shares of extreme poverty, vulnerable employment, and employment in

Country income level

Share of population living in extreme poverty 0.7 3 15 42

Share of vulnerable employment in total employmenta 10 28 56 78

Share of agriculture in total employment 4 17 37 55

Share of population 65 and older 15 9 5 3

Number of hospital beds per thousand 4 3 2 0.5

Eight panel regressions are estimated, in order to study the effects of

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

N 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204

R-squared 0.662 0.666 0.666 0.696 0.708 0.709 0.703 0.702

Columns 1–4 show that a 1 percentage point increase in the number of

R-squared 0.675 0.711

F-statistic (first-stage regression) 25,051.9 12,104.8

Note: t-statistics in parentheses.

point increase in the share of employment in agriculture is associated with a 0.16

EFFECT OF QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE

• Political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism, defined as

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

N 5,123 5,123 5,123 5,123 5,123 5,123

R-squared 0.664 0.665 0.663 0.708 0.705 0.705

F-statistic (first-stage regression) 13,102.5 12,782.6 12,709.8 9,414.8 9,314.3 9,358.4

Note: t-statistics in parentheses.

a. Retail shopping and recreation

February 12 March 4 March 25 April 15 May 6

b. Shopping at grocery stores and pharmacies

February 12 March 4 March 25 April 15 May 6

High income Upper-middle income

Figure A.1 (continued)

–1.830* –1.479* –1.619***

Constant 14.76* 20.50* 14.15* 19.63* 23.24* 18.57*

–0.379* –0.558* –0.198* –0.360*

22.79* 59.31* –30.19* 57.54* 16.60* 30.59*