ENRILE v.

SALAZAR
186 SCRA 217, G.R. No. 92163
NARVASA, J.:
Augustus Botrous DV. Guco

FACTS: The plaintiff, then-Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested
in February 27, 1990 based on a warrant issued by the defendant – a judge of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court - for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, acts
claimed to have been done during the failed coup attempt near the last few days of the preceding
year. The following day, however, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging
that he was (1) deemed a criminal for an offense which does not exist in law, (2) denied due
process for being charged with a crime on information for which neither a complaint was
initially filed nor a preliminary investigation conducted, (3) denied the right to bail, (4) denied a
warrant with a judge that personally determined whether or not a probable cause existed before
issuing it for which to be arrested for.
The petition was granted. However, the Solicitor General countered with a return
stating that the information charged the plaintiff and his companions (the Panlilio spouses) with
“murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance of,
rebellion” and not “murder and frustrated murder as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion” as per the ruling in People v. Hernandez. The latter was a complex crime, which is the
subject of the People v. Hernandez ruling, whereas the former is a compound crime, which the
ruling does not involve itself at all, and thus should not applicable. Though the plaintiffs were
granted provisional liberty (conditioned upon filing cash or surety bonds worth P100 000 per
individual), the Court notes that this does not yet constitute their ruling on this case.
The plaintiffs present the Court with the options to: (a) abandon the Hernandez
ruling and adopt the dissent laid therein by Judge Montemayor – who posits that rebellion cannot
absorb more serious crimes, (b) maintain the current course laid by the aforementioned ruling, or
(c) expand the Hernandez ruling to have the crime of rebellion absorb any other offense
committed as it occurs, whether in furtherance or in coincidence. With these above choices,
Court now thus addresses the issues at hand.
ISSUE: WON the Hernandez ruling can be applied in this instance to deny plaintiffs the
right to bail
RULING: The Court rules in the negative. First, it is noted that while petitioner is
technically correct that he was charged for an act which is not a criminal offense – in that the
Court has decided that rebellion may not be complexed with other occasion committed in
coincidence with the event – there is still an offense for which the plaintiffs can be charged –
simple rebellion. Second, evidence now shows that a complaint was indeed filed and for which a
preliminary investigation was thus conducted – thus demonstrating that the plaintiff was given
due process. Third, while the Court concurs that petitioners were truly deprived of bail, it is also
perceived that the petition for writ of habeas corpus was not the appropriate vehicle for the
plaintiff in asserting said right to bail. Fourth, and lastly, it is not the mandatory obligation of a
judge to personal examination as to the existence of probable cause, rather it would suffice for
him to personally evaluate the report and its supporting documents that were submitted by the
prosecutor.
Yet, it is not for this Court to determine the plaintiff’s guilt or innocence, as that is
duly reserved for the trial court. This Court only concerns itself with questions regarding
petitioners’ possible deprivation of rights
The Court once more declares that the People v. Hernandez enunciates a doctrine,
where applied in this instance, charges the plaintiffs only with simple rebellion – which grants
them the right to bail. Thus, the proceedings are to be REMANDED to the respondent Judge to
fix the amount of bail to be posted by the plaintiffs.