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T1-FRM-4-Ch4-Transfer-Mech-v3.1 - Study Notes
T1-FRM-4-Ch4-Transfer-Mech-v3.1 - Study Notes
T1-FRM-4-Ch4-Transfer-Mech-v3.1 - Study Notes
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COMPARE DIFFERENT TYPES OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES, EXPLAIN HOW EACH ONE TRANSFERS CREDIT
RISK, AND DESCRIBE THEIR ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES. ................................................. 3
EXPLAIN DIFFERENT TRADITIONAL APPROACHES OR MECHANISMS THAT FIRMS CAN USE TO HELP
MITIGATE CREDIT RISK. ............................................................................................................11
EVALUATE THE ROLE OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES IN THE 2007 — 2009 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND EXPLAIN
CHANGES IN THE CREDIT DERIVATIVE MARKET THAT OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE CRISIS........12
EXPLAIN THE PROCESS OF SECURITIZATION, DESCRIBE A SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE (SPV), AND
ASSESS THE RISK OF DIFFERENT BUSINESS MODELS THAT BANKS CAN USE FOR SECURITIZED
PRODUCTS. ............................................................................................................................15
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Explain different traditional approaches or mechanisms that firms can use to help
mitigate credit risk.
Evaluate the role of credit derivatives in the 2007 — 2009 financial crisis, and explain
changes in the credit derivative market that occurred as a result of the crisis.
Explain the process of securitization, describe a special purpose vehicle (SPV), and
assess the risk of different business models that banks can use for securitized
products.
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1 Although the buyer of a credit default swap is not required to have an insurable interest in the underlying
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Credit Events
Typical credit events include:
Payment default;
Bankruptcy;
Insolvency;
A downgrade in the rating of the issuer or in the underlying asset;
A pre-agreed upon trigger if the price of the underlying asset falls below a certain point;
Restructuring, which tends to be the most controversial of the credit events because it
opens the door to a wide range of interpretations;
Obligation acceleration, which addresses the situation where debt becomes due prior to
the formal maturity date. In general, the materiality threshold is $10 million.
Repudiation/moratorium
o When bond (or loan) issuer refuses to meet its debt covenants or obligations; or
o A company is legally prohibited from making a payment because of a sovereign
debt moratorium, such as was the case with the City of Moscow in 1998.
Default Payment
Typical default payments include:
Through a dealer poll, the par price of the asset minus the post-default price of the
underlying asset;
The par price plus a recovery factor, which is the same as a pre-negotiated amount
(digital swap);
Payment of par by the seller in exchange for the physical delivery of the defaulted
underlying asset.
Hedging against risk in bonds issued by corporations or sovereigns is quite common, known
naturally as single-name CDSs. A natural connection with the CDS hedging is arbitrage pricing
the differences in price between the CDS and underlying bond price by taking offsetting
positions. This type of trading is referred to as “basis trading.”
First-to-Default Put
A first-to-default approach to credit risk attempts to plan for risk exposure by purchasing a
hedge against the first loan in its portfolio defaulting.
In the following example, a bank holds a portfolio of five high-yield loans rated B. All five
loans have a par value of $200 million, a maturity of 10 years, and an annual coupon of
LIBOR plus 400 basis points (bps). In a typical portfolio, the bank attempts to have a
diversified loan portfolio by choosing loans that have low correlations. What this means
is that banks choose loans that have a low chance of all five loans defaulting
simultaneously.
The bank wishes to hedge its credit exposure by purchasing a first-to-default put.
Essentially, should one or more of the loans in its portfolio default at any time during the
negotiated period of potential default, the bank will be paid for the first loan to default.
The bank will only be compensated for the first loan.
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Presuming the default events are uncorrelated2, then the probability that the dealer will
need to compensate the bank for its first-to-default put credit derivative is the par value
multiplied by the default probabilities. Assuming a default probability for each loan of 1
percent, then the sum of the default probabilities for the five-loan portfolio is 1 percent
multiplied by $1 billion (5 x $200 million), or $10 million.
Banks sometimes opt for a first-to-default put because insuring the five-loan portfolio is
less expensive than hedging its credit risk for each loan separately.
First-to-default derivatives are pairwise correlation risk reduction strategies. The yield on
first-to-default derivatives is largely a function of (1) the number of loans in the portfolio and (2)
the specific, expected correlation between the loans (also called names in banking circles).
The actual spread on a first-to-default derivative will be somewhere between the loan with the
worst credit and the sum of the spreads for all the loans. The spread will be closer to the sum of
the spread for all loans if correlation is low and closer to the spread for the worst credit loan if
correlation is high.
The first-to-default derivative is a common version of the more general nth-to-default credit
swap.
2The math becomes more difficult when the assets are correlated. For research on the issue, see Jordan
Nickerson and John Griffin’s 2017 Journal of Financial Economics paper: “Debt correlations in the wake
of the financial crisis: What are the appropriate default correlations for structure products?”
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A total return swap is generally the same thing as taking a synthetic long position in the
underlying asset. The buyer of the TRS gets the cash flow and benefits if the value of the
asset rises. Of course, the buyer is also on the hook if losses occur of the value of the asset
falls.
Leverage is unlimited in a LTRS, offering unlimited downside and upside.
No principal is exchanged, there is no change in ownership, and no voting rights change
hands.
What is the difference between a CDS and a TRS? In a TRS, both market and credit risk
change hands. In a CDS, only the credit risk is transferred from the seller to the buyer.
In the case when the buyer collateralizes all the underlying instrument, then there is no
risk of default. In this case, the bank’s floating payment would equate to the bank’s
funding costs.
If the buyer uses leverage, then the floating payment is the funding cost and a spread.
This compensates for the risk of not having the entire asset all collateralized.
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In the example, the bank (on the left) buys the financial asset and puts them into a trust.
The $105 million placed in the trust are purchased by the bank at a cost of LIBOR (the
funding rate for banks) and are assumed to yield LIBOR plus 250 bps.
3Michel Crouhy, Dan Galai, and Robert Mark, The Essentials of Risk Management, 2nd Edition (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2014)
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An investor buys an asset-backed note from the trust for $15 million. This $15 million is
then invested in U.S. government securities, which provide a yield and are used as the
collateral for the basket of loans. In this example, the collateral is $15/$105 = 14.3%; put
another way, the leverage ratio is 7.0 = $105/$15.
The bank sees cash flow of 100 bps. This is the result of the LIBOR plus 250 bps from
the assets in the trust less the cost of funding the assets (LIBOR) and the 150 bps paid
to the trust. The 100 bps is the bank’s compensation for retaining the risk of default for
anything above $15 million.
Presuming a yield of 6.5% on the government securities, the investor gets a yield of
17%. The 17% is the sum of the 6.5% plus the 150 bps on the notional amount paid out
by the bank of the $105 million ($15 million notional amount from the investor
perspective). Additionally, the investor sees the gain from any increase in the value of
the loan portfolio.
In this setup, the investor has a maximum downside of $15 million. If the loan portfolio
loses value more than $15 million, then the investor defaults and the bank is on the hook
for any loss above that $15 million.
In day to day operations of a CLO, the CLO manager is actively buying and selling loans. In
order to purchase new loans, the manager sells parts of the CLO to investors, commonly
referred to as traches. Each tranche has a different risk level associated with it, and as such,
pays a different interest rate to the different tranche investors. Typically, investors that get paid
first receive lower interest payments because their investment has a lower risk of default.
Investors purchasing downstream tranches generally have more risk in their investment, and
therefore typically receive higher interest payments.
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For Banks
Ability to lower credit risk exposure.
Ability to manage the risk profile of a portfolio.
For Investors
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The creation of a wide scale credit derivatives market made this fine-tuning possible. Credit
derivatives allow for two counterparties to buy and sell credit risk without the need to sell the
underlying position. Credit derivatives also allow targeting of a specific type of credit risk (such
as a bond or a certain type of loan) and transfers that risk without client management issues or
funding requirements. Credit derivatives are also off-book.
Credit derivatives come with the just-mentioned set of advantages. They also come with
challenges. Parties to the transaction must understand the nature of the risk that is being
transferred, what events would cause a “credit event”, potential payment obligations, and
liabilities when a credit event occurs, among others considerations. Credit derivatives also have
systemic concentration risk, meaning that because there are a relatively small number of credit
derivative providers, the market could face trouble if even one of the providers experienced
distress.
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In addition to enabling the transfer of credit risk and the ability to tailor pools of credit risk,
securitization is an important source for funding of consumer and corporate lending. The
International Monetary Fund reported that securitized loans increased from almost nothing in
the early 1990s to $5 trillion in 2006.
Perhaps the most important business model change leading up to the 2007 to 2009 financial
crisis was the originate-to-distribute (OTD) paradigm. Credit risk that traditionally would have
been held on a bank’s balance sheet was instead packaged and sold to investors in the form of
an asset backed security (ABS). One of the drivers behind this shift towards an OTD model
was the Basel Accord capital adequacy requirements. Banks got rid of capital-consuming loans
from their books through the OTD model.
The OTD seemed to be a socially beneficial transaction for all parties involved. It:
Offered originators greater capital efficiency and higher and less volatile earnings while
simultaneously distributing credit and interest rate risk across market players.
Offered investors a broader array of investments, allowing for diversification and
targeting of a risk/return portfolio.
Offered greater availability of credit and funding options, in addition to potentially lower
borrowing costs.
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Figure 4.7: Total Private European and U.S. Securitization Issuance (billions $)4
Instead of risk being broadly dispersed under an OTD model, mortgage risk was largely
concentrated in (mostly) large banks. Banks’ effort to skirt mandatory capital requirements
ended up backfiring. In addition to the concentration of risk, banks misjudged the commitments
made to outside investors. Banks also incorrectly assumed that there would be ongoing,
consistent access to easy liquidity. These assumptions turned out to be false.
Overall, the factors that led to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 were bank leverage,
questionable origination practices, and the concentration of risk in the securities generated.
4Segoviano, M., Jones, B., Lindner, P., & Blankenheim, J. (2013, November). Securitization: Lessons
Learned and the Road Ahead(Rep.). Retrieved https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13255.pdf
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Changes in the Credit Derivatives Market in Response to the 2007 – 2009 Crisis
The 2007 to 2009 financial crisis taught the financial industry a few “lessons”:
The OTD model brought about the incentive to focus on short-term profits and weakened
incentives to make business decisions for the long-term.
Investor oversight was weak.
There was a lack of understanding of the complexity of credit derivatives.
The risks of credit derivatives were not transparent, with some investors seemingly
unsure of the risks they were accepting.
Risk management of the securitized products was relatively weak, with stress testing of
market, liquidity, concentration, and pipeline risks barely, if ever, considered.
Investors placed too much weight on the ratings provided by credit ratings agencies,
which was problematic because the ratings agencies failed to provide adequate review
and grossly underestimated the risks of subprime CDO structures.
On the regulatory front, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and federal banking
regulators addressed credit derivatives through Section 15G of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 2014. This bill requires originators of asset-backed securities to hold, without recourse to risk
mitigation, a minimum of 5% of the credit risk. This provision was an attempt to ensure that loan
originators also had “skin in the game”.
The process of securitization starts with what is known as a special purpose vehicle (SPV).
When the SPV is created, it is empty. The SPV then purchases assets from banks, be they
loan portfolios or mortgages or some other assets. Funding for the SPVs is mainly through
classes of bonds and equity tranches. In general, the equity tranche will usually make up less
than 10% of the SPV’s funding.
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8Segoviano, M., Jones, B., Lindner, P., & Blankenheim, J. (2013, November). Securitization: Lessons
Learned and the Road Ahead(Rep.). Retrieved https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13255.pdf
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