August 27, 2020

1. Tin vs. People, GR 126480; 10 August 2001

- RTC & CA found petitioners guilty of estafa
- Accused received jewelry worth 220k in trust as collateral of loan
- But accused denied receiving those jewelries (Mady’s Pawnshop; Tin is guarantor)
- 1980 yung loan; 1980-1982 made 19 payments totaling 95.6k
- No expiration as long as interest is paid
- When Santiago wants to settle the loan in 1984, accused said that the jewelries were
sold (3mo; 14%)
- Issue: WON the trial court relied on the weakness of the defense rather than the
strength of the prosecution’s case/// WON Equipoise rule is applicable
- Held: Yes. If the prosecution evidence is not strong, then it becomes mandatory for
the prosecution to present evidence which can help further its case, or explain why
such evidence is not presented. When the sole testimony of the complainant is met by
an equally credible evidence of the defense, then the prosecution must present
credible corroborative witnesses to buttress its case. Its failure to present
corroborative witnesses, without any explanation why they were not produced,
weakens the testimony of the witness who named those corroborating witnesses in her
testimony. 30 In this case, the prosecution’s failure to present the corroborative
witnesses, without any explanation for their non-appearance, makes private
complainant’s testimony weak.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

- Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this
rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which
side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. 31 The
equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. 32 Briefly
stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is
found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner must be declared innocent and set free.
(ACQUITTED)

2. Magno vs. CA, GR 96132; 26 June 1992

- RTC & CA found accused guilt of violation of BP22 (4 counts)
- Magno lacked funds for car repair shop so he went to Mancor, its VP, Teng, referred
him to LS Finance VP Gomez
- But Magno still can’t pay for the warranty deposit totaling 30% of the equipment
purchased so he asked Gomez where he could borrow (29,790)
- Unknown to him, Teng extended the short term loan at 3% to him
- LS Finance will lease the garage equipment to petitioner
- Magno sent postdated checks to Gomez, who in turn, sent it to Teng without telling
Magno.
 - When the check matured, Magno requested Gomez not to deposit the check since he
is no longer banking with Pacific Bank. So Magno replaced it with 6 checks. The first
two were paid but the remaining 4 in the hands of Teng were not since there is
insufficient funds
- Magno can no longer pay for the rentals. He found out about Teng so he went
personally to ask for extension but the payment never came and the account closed
- Issue: WON Accused should be acquitted

- Held: Yes.
- As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals
being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor)
when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints
or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be
charged against the petitioner.
- This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the
penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to
apply the full harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia"
doctrine (the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof of
criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of the accused), the noble
objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest degree

- For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to
shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through
manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law.

- Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that
the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual
and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as
having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged,
but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng
amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at
some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a
vicious transaction

- From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds
with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly
intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this
predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the
lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance Management.

3. Rivera vs. People; GR 166326; 25 January 2006 (ACTS>WOUNDS)

 - RTC(frustrated murder) & CA(attempted murder) held petitioners guilty of attempted
murder
- At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben(victim) went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo
mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented
the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued.
- At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to
look for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo
and his two brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up
on Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the
ground. In that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block
on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling Ruben. People who
saw the incident shouted: "Awatin sila! Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed to
stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on
board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
- The doctor declared that the lacerated wound in the parietal area was slight and
superficial and would heal from one to seven days.
- Issue: WON petitioners should be acquitted
- Held: No.
- In People v. Delim,12 the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes
against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused.
If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
presumed.
- In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben.

- That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not
have produced his death does not negate petitioners’ criminal liability for
attempted murder.
- It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement
towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done
need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however,
that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of
Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense
- In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder
by mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly
missed hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would
surely have died.

4. Fantastico vs. People; GR 190912; 12 January 2015

- RTC & CA held petitioners guilty of attempted murder
- In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open
and saw Isabelita's elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door
holding a rattan stick or arnis. Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of
 his head that forced the latter to bow his head but Salvador delivered
a second blow that hit Elpidio on the right eyebrow. Salvador
attempted to hit Elpidio for the third time but the latter got hold of the rattan
stick and the two wrestled on the floor and grappled for the possession of the
same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two and sprayed something on
Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches of Salvador
and to extricate himself, Elpidio bit Salvador's head.
- Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe
when the latter was about to go out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend
himself but was unable to take the tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio walked
away from Titus but Gary, still armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador,
with his arnis, including Titus, chased him.
- Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of
his head with a lead pipe which caused the latter to fall on the ground.
Elpidio begged his assailants to stop, but to no avail. Salvador hit him
countless times on his thighs, legs and knees using the rattan stick.
While he was simultaneously being beaten up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly,
Nestor, Eugene and Tommy, he tried to cover his face with his arm. Gary hit
him with the tomahawk axe on his right leg, between the knees and the ankle
of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and knees. Rolly hit Elpidio's
head with a lead pipe, while Tommy hit him with a piece of wood on the back
of his shoulder.
- Issue: WON accused should be acquitted since information does not allege all the
elements and necessary ingredients of attempted murder.
- Held: No
- The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements, namely: (1)
That there be external acts; (2) Such external acts have direct connection with the
crime intended to be committed
- In Rivera v. People,12 this Court considered the following factors to determine the
presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature,
location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4)
the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. This Court also considers motive and the words uttered by the offender at
the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors.13 All of
these, were proven during the trial. Needless to say, with or without the phrase,
what is important is that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the
Information
- The Information partly reads: x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of
the execution which should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by
reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries
inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
- In People v. Alvarado,14 we held that greater weight is given to the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witness than the accused's denial and
explanation concerning the commission of the crime. This is so inasmuch as mere
denials are self-serving evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
 - It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of Elpidio is corroborated by the
medico-legal findings

5. Miranda vs. People; GR 234528; 23 January 2019

- RTC & CA disregarded Miranda’s claim of self-defense and held him guilty for
frustrated murder
- In the evening of August 14, 2011, victim Winardo Pilo (Pilo) attended the party of
his niece at Barangay Binonoan, Infanta, Quezon. After the party, he and his friend
Danilo Damaso (Damaso) left. While on their way home, they passed by the house of
Miranda and threw stones at the latter's home.6
- While Pilo was on his way home, Miranda suddenly went outside and started hacking
Pilo. He hit Pilo's right forehead. Again, Miranda tried to hit Pilo, but the latter
parried the attack with his left arm.7
- In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him. Thereafter, Damaso
grabbed possession of the bolo
- Issue: WON prosecution proved Miranda’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
- Held: Yes (still guilty)
- In the case at bar, Miranda's intent to kill was clearly established by the nature
and number of wounds sustained by Pilo. The records show that Miranda used a
bolo measuring 1 ½ feet. The hacking wound was about five inches long, and 1 inch
deep fracturing Pilo's skull in the parietal area.28 Relentless in his attack, Miranda
continuously made several thrusts against Pilo, while the latter was already sprawled
on the ground. This caused Pilo to sustain two additional wounds. These deep gashes
measured four inches long by one-inch deep, and 1.5 inch long by one-inch deep in
Pilo's forearm. In fact, these continuous attacks were stopped only when Damaso
arrived and grappled with the weapon.29 Undoubtedly, the manner of attack and the
injuries sustained show forth a clear resolve to end Pilo's life. Indeed, these injuries
cannot simply be brushed aside as grazing injuries, especially considering that one of
which, was an injury to the head of Pilo, which may have caused the latter's untimely
demise, if not for the timely medical assistance.

- Applying the foregoing doctrines to the case at bar, it becomes all too apparent that
the evidence on record does not support Miranda's contention that Pilo employed
unlawful aggression against him. Miranda himself admitted during the trial that Pilo
did not throw stones at him, much less, utter any invectives, or threatening words
against him. In fact, the stones Pilo threw merely hit Miranda's roof and door.
- It is all too apparent that Miranda's life was not in grave peril. The stones were never
directed against Miranda. More than this, Miranda even believed that Pilo was going
to make peace with him. Obviously, Miranda was certainly not faced with any actual,
sudden, unexpected or imminent danger for him to have the need to defend himself.
- In addition to the fact that there was no unlawful aggression, the Court, likewise,
notes that the means employed by Miranda was not reasonably commensurate to
the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert.
- Certainly, Pilo's act of hurling stones while Miranda's family was peacefully enjoying
their supper falls within this range. Accordingly, the Court shall consider in favor of
Miranda the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.
6. People vs. Abella; GR 198400; 07 October 2013
- Charged with the crime of frustrated homicide committed against his younger brother,
Benigno Abella (with the use of a scythe, hitting the latter’s neck)
- On September 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., Benigno was watching television in his
house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to pacify the
petitioner, who was stirring trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and Amelita found
the petitioner fighting with Alejandro and a certain Dionisio Ybañes (Dionisio).
Benigno was able to convince the petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita
followed suit and along the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro and
Dionisio to apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.
- Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the petitioner arrived bringing
with him two scythes, one in each of his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and
Dionisio to run away and the latter two complied. The petitioner wanted to enter
Alejandro’s house, but Benigno blocked his way and asked him not to proceed.
The petitioner then pointed the scythe, which he held in his left hand, in the direction
of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right hand was used to hack the latter’s
neck once.14 Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken to the
hospital15 while the petitioner ran to chase Alejandro.
- No complications developed from Benigno’s wounds which could have caused
his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a period of 17 days from
September 6, 1998 to September 23, 1998.
- RTC: Frustrated Homicide; CA: affirm w/ modification
- Issue: WON there is intent to kill (Accused: Had there been an intent to kill on his
part, the petitioner could have inflicted more wounds since at that time, he had two
scythes in his hands.)
- Held: YES.
- From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use of
a scythe against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal
intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to
figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be
enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead. While no complications actually
developed from the gaping wounds in Benigno’s neck and left hand, it perplexes logic
to conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal considering the
period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing injury would have
necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.
- This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill
is negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further
hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and
there was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking
incident by reason of a timely medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause
independent of the petitioner’s will.

7. Fernandez vs. People; GR 241557; 11 December 2019

- RTC & CA held petitioner guilty of Frustrated Murder
 - On January 21, 2011 at around 1:00 a.m., Garino and an unknown companion were
seated inside a jeepney which was parked in front of Fernandez's house, when Garino
saw someone go out of the gate.4 When they heard a gunshot, they immediately
alighted from the jeepney, and it was then that Garino saw that the person who fired
the shot was Fernandez, though he did not know the latter's name at the time. As the
two ran away, Fernandez fired his gun a second time, hitting Garino on his right
gluteal area, or "buttocks" in layman's terms. Garino was then brought to the Ospital
ng Makati and resultantly underwent immediate surgery.
- Issue: WON Fernandez is guilty

- Held: The Court acquits Fernandez on the ground of reasonable doubt.

- Even a casual observer can see that almost the entire case for the prosecution rests
exclusively on Garino, the victim, and his testimony. No other witness was presented
to narrate the events of that fateful night, even though Garino had a companion.
- The foregoing makes it highly doubtful that Garino was able to identify Fernandez as
the perpetrator of the crime, While the Court does not question that Garino was
indeed shot, the Court has its misgivings that it was indeed Fernandez who shot him,
especially if the only proof adduced is Garino's testimony.
- Second, the Court finds as a misstep on the part of the lower courts that they did not
question the circumstances or even the identity of Garino's alleged companion during
the night of the shooting. Even putting aside his non-presentation during trial as a
witness, the Court finds it baffling that Garino did not even know his name, or at least
could not identify him. 

- To note, Garino also failed to explain why he and his "companion" were there in the
middle of the night, inside a jeepney, property of someone else, and, by Garino's own
admission, right outside another's property. The logical explanation then is that either
Garino was doing something worthy of suspicion to which he was trying to cover up
the same, or his companion did not exist, which would create doubt as to the veracity
of his testimony.
- Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense
charged.

8. U..S vs. Ah Chong; GR L-5272; 19 March 1910

- The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27,"
Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased,
was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
- No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room.
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means
of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.
 - On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received
for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the
room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and
was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone
bent upon forcing his way into the room. The room was very dark, and the defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you."
- At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which
had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought
that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom
he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the
chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door
against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his
pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out,
was his roommate, Pascual.
- There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of
the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the
defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these
repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
- The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on
friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his
companion with his identity.
- TC: Homicide

- Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of

supposed offense, a sufficient excuse")

- Held: A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us
that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the
firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a
thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time,
he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was
doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts
been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability on account of his act; and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the
facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger
which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.

9. Yapyuco vs. Sandiganbayan; GR 120744-46; 25 June 2012

- That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then
 policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home
Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one
another, and while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said
barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation
to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate intent to take the life of
Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at
the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting
multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the
body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.
- Sandiganbayan: Homicide, Attempted Murder

- Issue/Held: We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this case.

- The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last
resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be
taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to
arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes
find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and
decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment
and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised
neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a
clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates
of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot
countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ
force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in
mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society
must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights.

- At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces
certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a
misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission
which is the subject of the prosecution.118 Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a
defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime.119 It
may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general
intent.120 The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,121 and it does not
look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person.122 A proper invocation of
this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable;123 (b) that it be a
matter of fact;124 and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the
crime125 or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect
to an element of the offense.126

- Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the
firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver – and in fact
 even the driver himself – of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the
least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of
petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to
them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their
natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires
thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we
found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners’ actuations leaned towards the latter.

- This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who
was seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel,
together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the
shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not
attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill. 

- The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the
crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup
and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an
acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with
respect to the unharmed victims.

10. Loney vs. People; GR 152644; 10 February 2006

- Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the
President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager
for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation
("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
- Marcopper had been storing tailings3 from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the
tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a
few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac
and Makalupnit rivers.

- In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the MTC
of Boac, Marinduque with violation of Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of PD
1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines, Section 86 of PD 984 or the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976, Section 1088 of RA 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, and Article 36510 of the Revised Penal Code for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.11

- MTC: Informations for violation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water
Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the
aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of
the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942)
- Branch 94: The different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements
of each crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require proof of an
 additional fact or element which the other does not although they stemmed from a
single act.
- CA: Affirms
- Issue: WON Information is duplicitous

- Held: No

- Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more

than one offense

- Branch 94’s comparative analysis

o In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be

established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the
entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities
concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper
permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the
prosecution for violation the other laws
o In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is
the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the
absence of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this law
although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
o In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused
to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the containment of
run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there
was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved that
Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt
materials, they will not be liable.
o On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365
of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution,
negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent
damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws.
Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mala prohibita in contrast
with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.
 A mala in se felony cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes. What makes
the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa);
what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

- Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple prosecutions

based on a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue
here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted
for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance
and a national statute.
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