EN BANC

[G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.]

RODOLFO T. GANZON , petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS , respondents.

[G.R. No. 93746. August 5, 1991.]

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA , petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government,
NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the
Department of Local Government, and SALVADOR CABALUNA, JR. ,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 95245. August 5, 1991.]

RODOLFO T. GANZON , petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Local Government, respondents.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.

Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; LOCAL AUTONOMY,

NATURE OF; LOCAL OFFICIALS REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.
— Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of
administration, not of power, in which local o cials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide. Autonomy does not contemplate
making mini-states out of local government units. Autonomy, in the constitutional
sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution — and as the "supervision clause" itself
suggests — is to wean local government units from overdependence on the central
government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly
self executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government
code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law,
and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that
in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local governments under the general
supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to
include in the local government code provisions for removal of local o cials, which
suggests that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE FEDERALISM. —
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 As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break
up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and
as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of
Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or
otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical
step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however
limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-
government.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHANGED SUPERVISION CLAUSE DOES NOT EXEMPT LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS FROM LEGISLATIVE REGULATION. — The 1987 Constitution provides
in Art. X, Sec. 4 that "[T]he President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments." It modi es a counterpart provision appearing in
the 1935 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that "[T]he President shall . . . exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law." It is the
considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the Charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right — or the
President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation — to provide
administrative sanctions against local o cials. It is our opinion that the omission (of
"as may be provided by law") signi es nothing more than to underscore local
governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' "control" over local
government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline. The change in constitutional language did not exempt
local governments from legislative regulation provided regulation is consistent with the
fundamental premise of autonomy.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN DISCIPLINE LOCAL OFFICIALS. —
Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by
law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local
o cials. In the case at bar, the Secretary of Local Government, the President's alter
ego, in consonance with the speci c legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the existing
Local Government Code, can suspend petitioner Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252
and 95245) and petitioner member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod (G.R. No. 93746).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SUPERVISION" NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY. — "Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. As this
Court held in Ganzon vs. Cayanan, 104 Phil. 484, "in administration law supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an o cer to see that subordinate
o cers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to ful ll them the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO SUSPEND LOCAL OFFICIALS MUST NOT BE
EXERCISED OPPRESSIVELY. — While the respondent Secretary of Interior, as alter ego
of the President, under the existing Local Government Code, has the Power to suspend
the petitioner Iloilo City Mayor, such power cannot be exercised oppressively. Ten
administrative cases have been successively led against the City Mayor. The Mayor
has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension for the rst two cases and
the respondent Secretary has issued another order preventively suspending the former
for another 60 days, the third time in twenty months. We are allowing the Mayor to
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 suffer the duration of his third suspension. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are
concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon nality of this
decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to the Mayor's usual
remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile,
we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those
remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.

DECISION

SARMIENTO , J : p

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting
through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a
member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively. cdasia

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative

complaints, ten in number, led against him by various city o cials sometime in 1988,
on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution,
and arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at
the city health o ce; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant
City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German
Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Peña Redondo, members of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor
are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote:
xxx xxx xxx

In her veri ed complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City
Health, O ce of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported
the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an
excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out
from rightful o ce where her quali cation are best suited and assigned her to a
work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make
matters worse, a utility worker in the o ce of the Public Services, whose duties
are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her
place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from
her permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked
her to perform task not be tting her position as Assistant City Health O cer of
Iloilo City; that her o ce was padlocked without any explanation or justi cation;
that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she led
her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her
leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a
well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint led by Dr.
Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).

On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected Vice Mayor of Iloilo City
and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and
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 Eduardo Peña Redondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City
of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong,
whose key to his o ce was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken
by petitioner. Without an o ce, Councilor Ong had to hold o ce at Plaza
Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and
decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with his fully-armed
security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong
denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and
decided to hold o ce at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so
many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group
could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the remen
using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.
Another administrative case was led by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod,
appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the
bene t of charges led against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite
was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner.
In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries. He
was released only the following day. 3

The Mayor thereafter answered, 4 and the cases were set for hearing. The opinion
of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on
June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional O ce of the Department of Local Government
in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and
the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a
postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by
counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing o cers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and
Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day
hearings but was actually held only on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and
unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the same venue — Iloilo
City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a
postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless,
the hearing o cers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the
parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).

In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and

their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive
suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988 for a period of
sixty (60) days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner
again asked for a postponement to September 26, 1988. On September 26, 1988,
the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective
counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these
hearings which were held in Manila, the petitioner testi ed in Adm. Case No. C-
10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the
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 complainants testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Onginal moved for a
postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which
was granted. However, the motion for change of venue was denied due to lack of
funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present.
Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for postponement
anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in
Iloilo City so the hearing was inde nitely postponed. However, the parties failed to
come to terms and after the parties were noti ed of the hearing, the investigation
was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses
were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The
motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to
present his evidence. LexLib

On December 14, 1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for

postponement and the hearing o cers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988
to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present
evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary
detention case led by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's
second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days.
The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second
preventive suspension was not enforced. 5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for
prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the
Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary
injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the
respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order,
preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty
months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.
Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals,
a petition for prohibition, 6 (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and
hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-
G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-
G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution
certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similarly charged by the
respondent Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the
respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the
enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our
Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252), that the Department of
Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of
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 law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile"
towards him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the
last congressional and local elections; 9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in
Iloilo City. 1 0 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since
it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14,
1988), 1 1 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing — and meted out
two more suspension orders — of the aforementioned cases. 1 2 He likewise contends
that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to
reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 1 3 He states
that he asked for postponement on 'valid and justi able" 14 grounds, among them, that
he was suffering from a heart ailment which required con nement; that his "vital" 1 5
witness was also hospitalized 1 6 but that the latter unduly denied his request. 1 7
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the
Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and
remove local o cials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda
(G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show
very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the
respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis Santos were (are) political
rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and
although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor
Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less
political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a
good excuse in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary
Santos had attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a
lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can
not accept them at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us
accept them, 1 8 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say-
so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public
o cial, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an o cial function, is presumed to be performing
his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be
ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent
Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section
62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court nds the question to be moot and academic since we
have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the
petitioners. 1 9
As to his request, nally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not
given any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found
no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides,
postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing o cer, and based
on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty
of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos'
actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local
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 Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 2 0 no longer allows the
President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of
suspension and/or removal over local o cials. According to both petitioners, the
Constitution is meant, rst, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and
second, by deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law," 2 1 to strip the President of
the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that nds
support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.
The provision in question reads as follows:
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities
and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 2 2

It modi es a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we

quote:
SECTION 10. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or o ces, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. 2 3

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is
signi cant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by
law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. LLphil

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary
of Local Government acted in consonance with the speci c legal provisions of Batas
Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
SECTION 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is
led, the Minister of Local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case
may be, shall require the respondent to submit his veri ed answer within seven
days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation
of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No
investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and
no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive
suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive
suspension shall be lifted. 2 4
SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be
imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or
city o cial, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal
o cial, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective
barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in
o ce of the respondent could in uence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive
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 suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended o cial shall be deemed
reinstated in o ce without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the
case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of suspension. 2 5

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the
1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest
the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local
o cials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local
Government Code? (3) What is the signi cance of the change in the constitutional
language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right —
or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local o cials. It is our opinion that the omission (of
"as may be provided by law") signi es nothing more than to underscore local
governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local
government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local
government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or
Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal
corporations euphemistically to "small republics". 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional
sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution — and as the "supervision clause" itself
suggest — is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central
government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-
executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code,
2 7 a local tax law, 2 8 income distribution legislation, 2 9 and a national representation
law, 3 0 and measures 3 1 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also
noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government
under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy nally, that the Charter
allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local
o cials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the
existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:
SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the
quali cations, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local o cials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. 3 2

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant
to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by
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 severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like
the power of local legislation. 3 3 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and
insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local
Government) to proceed against local o cials administratively, the Constitution
contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It
is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority as this Court has held, 3 4 thus:
xxx xxx xxx

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this
Court had occasion to discuss this scope and extent of the power of supervision
by the President over local government o cials in contrast to the power of
control given to him over executive o cials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things
which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the
Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an o cer to see that subordinate
o cers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to ful ll them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an o cer to alter or
modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate o cer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the
power of supervision of the President over local government o cials does not
include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code. . . . 3 5
xxx xxx xxx

"Control" has been de ned as "the power of an o cer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate o cer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the
other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an o cer to see that
subordinate o cers perform their duties." 3 7 As we held, 3 8 however, "investigating" is
not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at
least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 3 9 Hebron v. Reyes, 4 0 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 4 1
and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. 4 2 In Lacson, this Court said that
the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by
law," 4 3 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the
President "may not . . . suspend an elective o cial of a regular municipality or take any
disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board." 4 4 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically
banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she
did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary
authority. Thus, according to Lacson:

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 The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal o cers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of
public o cers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its
proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. 4 5

In Hebron, we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an o cer is speci ed by
law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence
of express or clear provision to the contrary — which does not exist with respect to
municipal officers. . . . 4 6

In Mondano, the Court held:

. . . The Congress has expressly and speci cally lodged the provincial supervision
over municipal o cials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive
and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal o cers for
neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of
o ce, and conviction by nal judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude."
And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the
matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused
either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the
o cer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
opinion the charge by one effecting the official integrity of the officer in question."
Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . .
municipalities. . . . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the
same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the
Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have
been abrogated by Section 110(1), Article VII, of the Constitution." 4 7
xxx xxx xxx

In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on
local o cials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the
Administrative Code. 4 8
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend
remove) it was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on
account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in
those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan,
found little difficulty in sustaining him. 4 9
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates
of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes
that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner
Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 5 0
Commissioner Blas Ople would not. 5 1
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed
the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are
not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger
expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite
of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 5 2
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive
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 and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." 5 3 The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break
up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and
as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of
Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or
otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical
step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however
limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-
government.
As we observed in one case, 5 4 decentralization means devolution of national
administration — but not power — to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them,
but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has
no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with
his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its contituency. 5 5

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is

albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the
fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact
facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield
prima facie ndings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public o ce
(assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another
question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend
him out of office. As we held: 5 6
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His
term of o ce does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the
suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his
functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of
October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral
process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services
of elective o cials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them
could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be
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 a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A
preventive suspension may be justi ed. Its continuance, however, for an
unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter
he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold o ce had been nulli ed.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the
only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were
deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this
preventive suspension had outrun the bonds of reason and resulted in sheer
oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 5 7

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the
above reasons, 5 8 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in
local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 5 9 is simply "to
prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
in uence and authority over possible witnesses" 6 0 or to keep him off "the records and
other evidence." 6 1 It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in rming up a
case, if any, against an erring local o cial. Under the Local Government Code, it can not
exceed sixty days, 6 2 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a
shorter period is otherwise su cient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted
if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which
the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty. cdphil

Suspension nally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it

may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 6 3 a longer suspension is
unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension — which is not a
remote possibility — on Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him
spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his
suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt
has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say,
the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his
tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent
Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to in ict
on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary
has had su cient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the
Mayor — without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent
Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal — apparently,
to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have
pursued a consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of
Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse
of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under question, and that any
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 talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor
Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of
sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the
Local Government Code) — which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to
suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what
appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his
third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier
issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the
Department of Local Government, upon the nality of this Decision, to undertake steps
to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or
administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the
Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints,
notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resumé, the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization
of administration, not of power, in which local o cials remain accountable to the
central government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision
clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not
exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the
fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the
latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action
against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation"
does not signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far
ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally;
provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect
or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges
are led against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension
shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under
subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary

Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED,
provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future
suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending
against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is
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 ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
cdasia

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C . J ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, G.R. No. 93252, 76; 77.

2. Hon. Bonifacio Cacdac, Jr., J.

3. Rollo, id., 76-77.

4. Id., 77.
5. Id., 77-78.
6. Id., 78. The first suspension was on the Cabaluna and Ortigoza complaints. CA-G.R. No.
1.6417 was on the Erbite complaint. CA-G.R. No. 20736 was a challenge on the
designation of Vica-Mayor Malabor.

7. Id., 21.
8. Id.
9. Id., 27.
10. Id., 28.
11. Id., 30.
12. Id., 31-32.
13. Id., 34-35.
14. Id., 36.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id., 38.
18. Id.
19. By virtue of the Temporary Restraining Order the Court issued on June 26, 1990.

20. CONST., art. X, sec. 4.

21. CONST. (1935), art. X, sec. 10(1). The 1973 Constitution contained no similar provision,
but see art. VII, sec. 18.

22. CONST. (1987), supra.

23. CONST. (1935), supra.

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 24. Batas Blg. 337, sec. 62.

25. Supra, sec. 63.

26. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 64 (1987 ed.).
27. CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.

28. Supra, secs. 5, 6.

29. Supra, sec. 7.
30. Supra, sec. 9.

31. See supra, sec. 14, providing for regional development councils to be organized by the
President.

32. Supra, sec. 3.

33. G.R. No. 95245, id., 53; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.
34. Ganzon v. Kayanan, 104 Phil. 484 (1985). In this concurrence (id., 48-61), Justice
Mendoza cited this case.

35. Supra, 489-490.

36. Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955).

37. Supra, 147.

38. Ganzon v. Kayanan, supra.
39. 92 Phil. 456 (1953).

40. 104 Phil. 175 (1958).

41. Supra.
42. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.

43. Lacson v. Roque, supra, 463.

44. Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.

45. Lacson v. Roque, supra, 462.

46. Hebron v. Reyes, supra, 185.

47. Mondano v. Silvosa, supra, 148.

48. Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.

49. G.R. No. 95245, id., 50-51; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.

50. Id., 23.

51. Id., 53.
52. Bagabuyo v. Davide, G.R. No. 87233, September 21, 1989.

53. CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.

54. Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 786.
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 55. Supra., 794-795.
56. Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, No. 65848, May 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 536.

57. Supra, 541.

58. See supra.
59. Lacson v. Roque, supra.

60. Supra, 469.

61. Batas Blg. 337, sec. 63.

62. Supra.
63. Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

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