CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PRELIMINARY TITLE

CHAPTER 1. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS (ARTS. 1-17)

1. Honasan vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Dept. of Justice, et. al.,
G.R. # 159747, Apr. 13, 2004

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published—OMB-DOJ Joint Circular
No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman,
outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of the
Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation and does not regulate the conduct of
persons or the public, in general.
Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner’s submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 has to be
published.
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation because petitioner is a public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the case
against him falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Considering that
the Court’s finding that the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate charges against
public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself
remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate the charge of coup d’etat against
him.

2. Gatbonton vs. NLRC, et. al., G.R. # 146779, Jan. 23, 2006

Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to “promulgate rules and
regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees,
through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of
sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.” Petitioner’s preventive
suspension was based on respondent MIT’s Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877.
It must be noted however, that respondent published said rules and regulations only on February 23,
1999. In Tañada vs. Tuvera, it was ruled that: . . . all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule
are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application. In fact,
the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in
Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which states that “[T]hese Rules and Regulations
to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
publication by the Committee.” Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioner’s preventive
suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective, and therefore the
suspension had no legal basis.

3. Marcos vs. Judge Fernando Vil. Pamintuan, A.M. # RTJ-07-2062, Jan. 18, 2011

Doctrine of Finality of Judgments; It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable.—It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory,
it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the
court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a
final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to
judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.
Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.

4. People vs. Quiachon, G.R. # 170236, Aug. 31, 2006

Republic Act No. 9346; Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.
—All told, the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of raping his daughter
Rowena pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The special qualifying circumstances
of the victim’s minority and her relationship to appellant, which were properly alleged in the
Information and their existence duly admitted by the defense on stipulation of facts during pre-trial,
warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death on appellant. However, in view of the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section
2 thereof which reads: SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed: (a)
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated
does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. The aforequoted
provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal law,
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given
retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

5. Jarillo vs. People, G.R. # 164435, June 29, 2010

Family Code; Article 40 of the Family Code should be applied retroactively.—As far back as 1995,
in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32 (1995), the Court already made the declaration that
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of
the Family Code itself provides that said “Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.” The Court went on to explain, thus: The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general
rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

6. Atty. Ferrer vs. Spouses Diaz, et. al., G.R. # 165300, Apr. 23, 2010

39
In Tañedo v. Court of Appeals, we invalidated the contract of sale between Lazaro Tañedo
and therein private respondents since the subject matter thereof was a "one hectare of
whatever share the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province
of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac." It constitutes a part
of Tañedo’s future inheritance from his parents, which cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation between the parties.

Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case that the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante
in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any
obligation between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil
Code.

Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioner’s adverse claim, it is provided in Section 70 of PD
1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the registered land adverse
to the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to registration. Here, as no right or
interest on the subject property flows from Comandante’s invalid waiver of hereditary rights
upon petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the registration of his adverse claim. Therefore,
petitioner’s adverse claim is without any basis and must consequently be adjudged invalid and
ineffective and perforce be cancelled.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_165300_2010.html

CHAPTER 2. HUMAN RELATIONS (ARTS. 19-35)

7. Diaz vs. Encanto, et. al., G.R. # 171303, Jan. 20, 2016

Article 19 of the Civil Code “prescribes a ‘primordial limitation on all rights’ by setting certain
standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof.” Abuse of right under Article 19 exists
when the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. This Court, expounding on the
concept of bad faith under Article 19, held: Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the
Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest
purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to
some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

8. California Clothing, Inc., et. al. vs. Quiñones, G.R. # 175822,Oct. 23, 2013

Abuse of Rights; Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing
damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code.—Respondent’s complaint against
petitioners stemmed from the prin-ciple of abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the
chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when
they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their shop despite the
evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issu-ance of the receipt
notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed made
payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not
without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing
damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith.—Under the abuse of rights principle found in
Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith.
He would be liable if he in-stead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Good faith
refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of
the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and in-tentional design to do a wrongful
act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.
A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he
opens himself to liability.—To malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite the
latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not
use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh. In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.

9. Ardiente vs. Spouses Pastorfide, et. al., G.R. # 161921, July 17, 2013

Human Relations; The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm
another.―It is true that it is within petitioner’s right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide
to cause the transfer of the former’s account with COWD to the latter’s name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses’ water supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured
party will attach. In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when
she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water supply without warning or
informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was based
on the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide
to comply with their agreement that petitioner’s account with COWD be transferred in respondent
spouses’ name. If such was petitioner’s only intention, then she should have advised respondent
spouses before or immediately after submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that her
request was simply to force them to comply with their obligation under their Memorandum of
Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook the
disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide’s water
supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner,
COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
Abuse of Rights; The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code
provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.―The principle of
abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.

10. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et. al. vs. Reyes, G.R. # 154259,Feb.28, 2005

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury”) refers to a self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of
 damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so.
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they
cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave
(and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.” The doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-
inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As
formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because
even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not
to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Where the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions
concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, the Supreme Court is left without choice but to
use its latent power to review such findings of facts.
It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves.
Party Gatecrashers; A person who did not abuse her right in asking a person to leave a party to
which he was not invited cannot be made to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code.

11. Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy, et. al., G.R. # 179736, June 26, 2013

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and
provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states: Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1)
Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; x x x x This provision recognizes that a man’s house
is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes
“any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the
consent of the latter.” The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” however, does
not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M.
Tolentino: Our Code specifically mentions “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” This
does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also
“similar acts.” A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x (Emphasis
supplied) Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore,
covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as
his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The
CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (ART. 36)

12. De Zuzuarregui vs. Hon. Villarosa, et. al, G.R. # 183788, Apr. 5, 2010

Same; Civil Law; Prejudicial Questions; The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions.—For a prejudicial question in a civil case to
suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that said civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two (2)
conflicting decisions.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings.—For a civil action to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final
resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity “that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,” the
civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. 44 Neither is there a prejudicial question if
the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each
other.45
As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis
of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the
civil case are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution
of the issues in the civil case would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.
A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that CA-G.R. SP
No. 87222 pending before the Court of Appeals is principally for the determination of the
validity of the compromise agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie
as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are
also biological children of Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos.
343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve the determination of whether petitioner
committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings containing untruthful
statements that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of Bella.
It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal cases
arose out of the claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the legal heirs of
Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that they are not biological children of the
late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more
basis to proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner who could not have committed
falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of her statements
regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled.

13. Pimentel vs. Pimentel, G.R. # 172060, Sept. 13, 2010

Parricide; Prejudicial Questions; Annulment of Marriage; Annulment of marriage is not a

prejudicial question in criminal case for parricide.—Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial
question in criminal case for parricide. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial
question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question
when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
Same; Same; Same; The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related
to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and
the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.—The relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person
“who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” The relationship between the offender and the victim
distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment
of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide.
Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.—The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitate d to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed
the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether
he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted,
will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was
still married to respondent.

14. Tomlin II vs. Atty. Moya II, A.C. # 6971, Feb. 23, 2006

Same; Same; A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts
and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.—Respondent, being a member
of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. The burden of proof in a
criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative case, only preponderance
of evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even
if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.

BOOK I. PERSONS

TITLE I. CIVIL PERSONALITY

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS (ARTS. 37-39)

CHAPTER 2. NATURAL PERSONS (ARTS. 40-43)

15. Geluz vs. CA, G.R. # L-16439, July 20, 1961
 Damages; Unborn foetus without personality; Award for death of a person does not cover
unborn foetus.—The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn
foetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations.

Same; Same; Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf.—Since an action
for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no
such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child.

Same; Same; Nature of damages recoverable by parents of unborn child.—The damages

which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the illegal
arrest of the normal development of the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to
its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if
the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, New Civil Code).

16. Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. vs. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, G.R.
# 182836, Oct. 13, 2009

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section
2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse,
child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to
the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section
4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a
parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g.,
death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the
provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying
Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly
proper interpretation of the terms “death” and “dependent” as used in the CBA. If the
provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to
the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted
that neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for
bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the
legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code,
the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
“Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect,
is acquired and may be lost.”

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical
capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us
whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her
death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement
leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not synonymous with
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even
a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life
of the unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the
mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on another for support; one
not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.” Under said
general definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child
could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its
mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions
in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee;
or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have
acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then
child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the
mother’s womb.