• Pozon, Ira Paolo and Anthony Tupaz, Public Accountability: An Analysis of the Horizontal

and Vertical Accountability Measures in Philippine Law, 57 Ateneo Law Journal 767
• 2012
• Facts:
•

• Issue/s:
• Ruling:
Laurel v. Desierto
April 12, 2002

NCC
• Facts:
• On June 13 1991 President Aquino issued executive order 223 constituting committee for the
preparation of national Centennial celebration in 1998
• subsequently president Ramos issued EO 128 reconstituting the said committee appointed as chair is
Salvador Laurel presidents just that macapagal and Carson Aquino were named as honorary
chairpersons.
• Section 6 of the executive order provides that the committee shall prepare for approval of the
president a comprehensive plan for the Centennial celebration within six months from the effectivity
there off budget will be under office of the president
• Subsequently, Expocorp court was named Laurel being one of the 9 directors and he is elected as the
chief executive officer.
• In August 5 9098, Anna Dominique question cause setting then the word a privilege speech
denouncing allege among anomalies to the construction operation of the Centennial exposition
project at Clark special economic zone
• Franklin drilon referred the case to the Senate blue ribbon committee
• Joseph Estrada the president issued administrative order 35 creating ad hoc an independent citizens
committee
• Senate blue ribbon committee filed with the secretary of the Senate its committee final report with a
recommendation finding doctor Salvador Laurel for a violation or violating the rules on public holding
relative to the rules of public building in awarding to a key or Asia construction Development
Corporation For exhibiting manifest bias in the insurance issue once of NTP notice to proceed to a key
to construct freedom ring even in The absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to
the government .
• Rene Saguisag, its own report referred the investigation to the office of the ombudsman
• A motion to dismiss was filed by Laurel contending that he is not a public officer therefore OMB lacks
jurisdiction over the case. Hence this petition

• Issue/s:
• WON: Chair of NCC is not deemed a public officer?
• WON exporocp is not. A GOCC
• WON NCC is not a public office
• Ruling:
• Yes. Empower in Accordance with EO 128.
• The executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.
• It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." 17 
• The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
• The case of Torrio vs Fontanilla (defense of Laurel) is different from the keys at bar town Fiesta cannot
compare to the national Centennial celebrations Centennial celebrations was meant to commemorate
the birth of our nation after a centuries of struggle against our former colonial master to memorialize
the liberalization of our people from oppression by a foreign power.
• NCC performs sovereign functions Laurel is a public officer being a chairman a public office.
• we need no longer delve at length on the issue whether Expo Corp is a private or public Corporation
assuming Expo Corp is a private Corporation
• He as a CEO his acts or omissions must be viewed in light of his powers and functions an NCC chair.
• What is a public officer:
• RA 3019 sec 2 (b):
• "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal,
from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.
• Under administrative code of 1987 clerk or employee refers to a person whose duties not being a
clerical or manual involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the
government. officer includes any government employee agent or body having authority to do the act
or exercise that function.
• Public officials include elective and appointive officials permanent or temporary weather in the career
or non career service including military and police personnel whether or not they receive
compensation Regardless of the amount under RA6713.

•
• ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Purisima
• August 14, 2008
•
• BIR, BOC RA 9335
• Facts:
• RA9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue generation capability and collection of the IR and your of
customs the law encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of reward and sessions through creation of rewards and incentives fund and
revenue performance evaluation board
• it covers all officials and employees of the IR an BOC with at least six months of service regardless of
employment status the font is sourced from collection of BIR and BOC in excess of their revenue
targets for the year as determined by development budget and coordinating committee
• it composes of secretary of Department of Finance Under Secretary which is the secretary of DBM
nada or his or her deputy Director general commissioner of the A R&B OC or their deputy
commissioners two representatives from rank and file employees and representatives from officials
nominated by recognized organization DOF, DBM NEDA, BIR, BOC and civil Service Commission were
tasked to promulgate and issue IRR of 9335 approved by a joint congressional oversight committee
• petitioners filed this petition alleging its constitutionality as it is a tax reform legislation
• The system of rewards and incentives as they say invites corruption and undermines constitutionality
Mandated duty of these officials to serve the people without most responsibility integrity loyalty and
efficiency
• In addition, they assert that the law and Julie delegates the power to fix revenue targets while section
7B and C of RA9335 provides at the IR and BOC officials may be dismissed from service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5% the law does not however fix revenue targets to be
achieved instead the fixing has been delegated to the president without sufficient standards
• it will therefore be easy for the president to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to
dismiss BIR or BOC personnel
• The OSG questions the petition for being premature as there's no actual case or controversy yet
petitioners did not assert any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this court's jurisdiction
• That responders’knowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues
involved in the case
• OSG believe that petitioners allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is near
speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law
• In addition Under RA9335 the law classified BIR and BOC because the functions they perform are
distinct from those of other government agencies and instrumentality's
• Moreover, the law provides sufficient standard that will guide the executive in the implementation of
the provisions
• The Supreme Court finds petitioners to have field to overcome that presumption of constitutionality in
favor of RA9335 except as that discussed.

•
• Issue/s:
• WON Public officers enjoy presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties?
• Ruling:
• Yes.
• Public offices of public trust it must be discharged by its Holder not for his own personal gain but for
the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust all government officials and employees have the
duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
• Public officers enjoy presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.
• The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it it cannot be overturned
by mere conjecture or denied in advance especially in the case where it is an underlying principle to
advance a declared public policy.
• To justify its nullification There must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution Not a doubt
full and happy vocal one.
• Public service is its own reward . Public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and
exceptional performance.
• A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not Anna thema to the
concept of public accountability.
• As in the case of US vs Matthews, RA9335 in no way violate security of tenure official officials and
employees after BIR/BOC the guarantee of security of the newer only means that an employee cannot
be dismissed from service for class other than those provided by law not under due process is
accorded the employee.
• RA9335 provides a yardstick for removal.this standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service law. Therefore
the petition is partially granted the constitutionality of RA9335 is upheld.

• Figueroa v. People
• August 9, 2006
• BANKEROHAN
• Facts:
• This is a petition for review on the rule 45 of the rules of court on March 24 1994 in RTC for an
information for libel under article 355 to 360 of RPC against Tony Figueroa and Aurelio flaviano that
under the column entitled footprints People’s daily forums of peoples lately for room and they
conspired and help one another with on the following publication Bankerohan public market

• “these days is so different from you as Times Square bullies songs fully guns and giffers room with
impunity some using organizational cloud as a ploy to keep themselves from obvious exposure some
leeches like certain opera neon or Rivera our sources say are lording it over the cities sprawling
vegetables and meat complex has become an apportioned value week”

• Upon arraignment, petitioners entered a common plea of not guilty therefore trial on merits ensued

• RTC in it's decision Found both petitioners guilty and a sentence to suffer five months imprisonment to
one day 2 two years four months and 31 days Christian correctional Moreover pursuant to article 100
in revised Penal Code they are ordered to join jointly and solidarity 50,000 as moral damages 10,000
by way of attorneys fees on CA the CA affirmed in all aspects rtc's decision

• Issue/s:
• Whether or not private complainant is not a public officer hence the published article cannot be
considered to be within the purview of privileged communication
• Ruling:
• NO. While the statements are libelous Rivera cannot be considered a public officer being a member of
the market committee did not vest upon him any sovereign function of the government be its
legislative executive or judicial
• the operation of a public market is not a governmental function but merely an activity undertaken by
the city in its private proprietary capacity rivera's membership in the market committee was in
representation of the Association of market vendors a non government or organization belonging to
the private sector.

• Javier v. Sandiganbayan
• September 11, 2009
• BOOKS
• Facts:
• On June 7 1995, RA 8047 , otherwise known as book publishing industry development act was enacted
into law.
• The state's goal is promoting and continuing the development of book publishing industry through
active participation of private sector and ensure adequate supply of affordable quality produced books
for domestic and export market to achieve this the law created NBDB, or National Book Development
Board which will be under the administration and supervision of office of the president.
• It is composed of 11 members who shall be appointed by the president five of whom shall come from
the government, while the remaining six shall be chosen from the nominees or organizations of private
books publishers printers writers book industry related activities students and private education
sector.
• On February 26 1996 Javier appointed to the governing board Is a private sector representative for a
term of one year.
• During that time she was also the president of book suppliers Association of the Philippines.
• On September 14 1998 she was again appointed on the same position For one year part of her
functions as a member is to attend book fairs and establish linkages with international book publishing
bodies on September 29 1997, she was issued by the office of the presidency travel authority to attend
the Madrid international book fair in Spain She was paid P139.199.00 as travel expenses.
• After, resident auditor Rosario Martinez vice petitioner to immediately return Slash refund her cash
advance considering the trip was cancelled she failed to do so she was issued a summary of this
allowances from which the balance for settlement amounted to 220,349 pesos despite said notice, no
action was forthcoming from petitioner.

• Nelly Apolonio, executive director of NBD be filed at ombudsman a complaint against Javier for
malversation of public funds and properties.

•
• She averred that despite the cancellation of the foreign trip, she failed to liquidate or return to NB DB
her cash advance within 60 days from date of arrival.

• OMB found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3 E avare 3019 and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information.

• It however dismissed for insufficiency of evidence the charge of RA 6713. On February 18, 2020, she
was charged before the ombudsman for violation of RA 3019 and also charged petitioner with
malversation of public funds as penalized under article 217 of RPC, for not liquidating their cash
advance granted to her in connection with their supposed trip to Spain.

• After preliminary investigation, ombudsman found probable costs to indict petitioner for the crime
charge and recommended defining of the corresponding information against her.

• During her arraignment, in the criminal case, she pleaded not guilty.

• She filed a motion to quash information, averring that sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear the
criminal case as it did not allege that she is a public official who is classified as salary grade 27 or
higher.

• The consolidation of criminal case was mean.

• Petitioner aver that doesn't begin by and has committed grave abuse of discretion For not washing the
two informations charging her with violations of RA 3019 be'cause, she's not a public officer an SEC,
she was being charged under to information which is a violation of her rights against double jeopardy.

• Issue/s:
• Is she a public officer?
• Ruling:
• Yes. Petitioner performs public functions in person in accordance to the objectives of RA8047, She's a
public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government whether as an
employee, agent, subordinate official, of any ranked or classes.
• In fact, during her tenure she took part of drafting and promulgation of several rules and every
regulations implementing RA8047.
• Is she under the jurisdiction of sandiganbayan? Yes.
• The director of organization, position classification and compensation Bureau , after Department of
budget and management provided the following informations regarding the compensation and
position classification and or rank equivalency the member of the governing board of NBD
notwithstanding that they do not have any salary grade assignment, the same may be equated to
board members to salary grade 28.

Therefore, the case is dismissed.

Ombudsman v. Regalado
February 7, 2018
ST MARTHA DAY CARE CENTER
• Facts:
• On October 2006, carmelita dormal, the owner and administrator of Saint Martha's day care center
and tutorial center , went to Davao Bureau of immigration, Inquire about its letter requiring her school
to obtain an accreditation to admit for incidents.
• She met regalado, who told her she needed to pay 50,000 pesos as processing fee for the
accreditation.
• Doromal entered that the amount was prohibitive. Regalado responded that she could reduce the
amount.
• Citing the copy of the memorandum order of the Bureau of immigration, through the immigration
regulation division, have the authority to allow the accreditation at in the word amount depending on
her recommendation.
• On January 2017 her assistant headmaster Diaz submitted to Bureau of immigration necessary papers
for the schools accreditation.
• On April 2007, on the letters mobile phone asking if the school was ready. Normal responded in saying
that the school was ready, but not to pay 50,000 as accreditation fee.
• She said that the inspection could soar as high as 100,000 pesos if it were to be done instead by
officers coming from Europe immigration Manila office, as she has to spend for inspectors plane fares,
50,000 honorarium. She even insisted how beneficial it is to pay 50,000 directly to her. However she
explained that if dorma wartet under 50,000 pesos only 10,000 pesos would be covered by receipt.
• Doromal sent regalado a text message, saying she could not be 50 k, regalado replied that if she will
not pay she would have to go through the entire accreditation process all over again.
• Doromal said that she does not mind reapplying as long as she would be relieved from having 50,000
pesos. On April 10 , regalado sent her a text message asking to meet so that the amount being asked
may be reduced.
• In May 3 she sent another text message encouraging her to pursue the accreditation As regalado
allegedly managed reduce the accreditation fee of 10,000 vessels.
• On May 21 regular do came to inspect doctor Martha's when we're glad finished their mother asked if
it was possible to pay 10,000 by check but regularly instead insisted to pay in cash she also reminded
her mother she would have to pay the honorarium. Doromal inquired how much, regularly responded,
ikaw na bahala, ayaw ko na I mention yan baka umatras kapa.
• Doromal could not personally can't regulate this office on May 23 she had to leave for US so the's went
to dormouse said she was accompanied by me the also a kindergarten teacher at Saint Martha's with
her an unmarked Brown envelope containing the white envelope paid 1500 pesos inside as
honorarium upon finding that the contents were only oP1,500, regalado blurted, she exclaimed you
want me to give this amount to my boss ? She asked how much the honorarium should be.
• She replied it should be at least 30,000 pesos. BS ask what the 30,000 pesos was for . Rigoletto report
retorted : it will go to my boss along with your accreditation papers and endorsement letters.
• Doromal ask what that the transaction is illegal what will happen If someone were to cry around.
• Regalado assured them that they will be backed up. Regalado instructed the years to return the
following day with 30,000 passes.
• She then directly told them to pay 10,000 passes with the cashier.
• After payment regalado demanded that they surrendered to her the official receipt before leaving
regular to ask the US about her companion upon finding out that the told so was a teacher of doctor
Martha's record either remark oh better as long as he will not tell anyone.
• On May 29 their media Santa also 5 to the office of ombudsman a complaint against regalado an
administrative case was far for grave misconduct analyzed under the civil Service Commission
resolution, and for violation of RA 6713.
• In her defense, regular dude in aid extorting money and says that they were merely merely in League
with people who had a grudge against her.
• She admitted asking for 50,000 pesos but cited that for office memorandum, this was the amount
properly due from a school accredited to admit foreign students.
• Instead she said the amount may be lowered with good explanations made in good faith but such
were misconstrued.
• On November 5 the office of ombudsman Found so , guilty of grave misconduct and there are a 6713.
• On June 24, acting on goods man cassimiro approved the office of ombudsman for Mindanao decision.
• On appeal, regalado was dismissed for being rude and academic and denied for lack of merit. It was
found out, that St mythos did not even have to seek accreditation As accreditation only apply to write
for education institutions and not to daycare centers like St Martha's. Motion for reconsideration was
filed , but regalado was ruled to be dismissed from service.
• MR was made and the decision was modified because it was just the first time and she has been
credited with good work performance. He was penalized 1 yr suspension without pay. Hence OMB
filed a petition.

• Issue/s:
• Is the dismissal of Regalado proper?
•

• Ruling:
•
• Yes. 1987 constitution provides that Section 1 ., public office is a public trust . Public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable for the people, serve them without most
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, active debate racism injustice an lead modest
lives. The fundamental notion that one's tenure in government Springs exclusively from the
trust reposed by the public means that continue once in office is contingent upon the extent to
which one is able to maintain that trust. No one has a vested right to public office. One can
continue to hold public office only for as long as he or she proves worthy of public trust.
•

• RespondenNt mentioned in her comment to the present petition she actually received or
profited from the solicitation of any amount from her convenience or that she solicited even
after she had completed the inspection St Martha's.
•
• Indeed she was engaged in misconduct that was tainted with corruption and with willful intent
to violate the law into disregard established rules .
•

• The fact that an offender was caught for the first time does not in any way abate the gravity of
what he or she actually committed. Rave misconduct is not a question of frequency, but as its
own name suggests the gravity or weight.
•
• therefore, petition for certiorari is granted.

KAGAWADS JOSE G. MENDOZA et al vs BARANGAY CAPTAIN MANUEL D. LAXINA

G.R. No. 146875. July 14, 2003

Admin case filed: Anti graft and corrupt practices act; falsification of legislative documents.
place: Batasan HIlls, QC
1997 Brgy Elections

Facts:
• On May 27, 1997, barangay captain Manuel Laxina won and assumed office as the duly
proclaimed Barangay captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City in 1997.

• Roque Fermo, his rival, find an election protest with MTC of Quezon City, branch 40.

• COMELEC decision: Fermo was declared as winner in the Barangay elections.

• Laxina filed a notice of appeal with COMELEC,
• Fermo filed a motion for execution pending appeal, MOE (in MTC) which was granted.

• Laxina held the position and relinquished the same two for Fermo.
• Thereafter, Laxina filed a petition with, questioning the order of the trial court.,

• COMELEC issued a resolution annulling the order of the trial court granting the execution of
the decision pending appeal on the ground there existed no reasons to justify execution.
• On October 27, 1999, writ of execution directing Fermo to vacate office for Laxina.

• He was served a copy of the writ of execution but refuse to acknowledge receipt.
• He also refused to vacate the premises of Barangay hall. This did not prevent Laxina from
discharging their functions and from holding office at SK Hall.
• Godofredo L. Ramos was appointed as Barangay secretary and Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay
treasurer.
• COMELEC issued an alias writ of execution (for the annulment of trial court decision) which
was likewise returned and satisfied.
• Laxina took oath of office November 16, 1999, before mayor is Mayor Ismael Mathay Jr.
• The following day, Roque Fermo turned over to respondents all the assets and properties of the
barangay.
• The barangay council issued a resolution #1, ratifying the appointment of Godofredo L. Ramos
is Barangay secretary effective November 1 1999, resolution 2 , ratifying the appointment of
Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay treasurer effective same day. However appointees of rocky for
more to the same position objected to the said resolutions. In order to accommodate the
appointees of Fermo, Laxina agreed to grant them allowances and renumeration for the period
of November 1 to 7, 1999.
• In resolution # 17, Barangay council authorized appropriation of P864,326.00, for November to
December 1 999 salary of each Barangay officials and employees.
• The payroll enumerated the names of respondents and appointed Barangay secretary and
treasurer as among those entitled to compensation for services rendered for November 8, 1999
to December 1, 1999.
• Herein petitioners refused to sign resolution # 17 as well as said payroll.

• Said Barangay councilors filed with Quezon City council a complaint for violation of anti-graft
and corruption practices act and falsification of legislative documents against Laxina and other
brother official , questioning resolution and payroll, for Baragay treasurer and secretary.
• They contended that Laxina made it appear in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered
services starting of 11-8-1999 when, in fact, they serve only 11-17-1999, after respondent took
his oath and assumed office as a Brgy chairman.
• Petitioners in this case further claimed that based on resolution 1, effectivity date must be 11-
16 but Laxina antedated it on 11-1-1999.

• Contention of Laxina et al: taking a new of the oath of office as Brgy chairman was near
formality as is NOT a requirement before he can validly discharge the duties of his office. hey
contended that respondents appointees are entitled to the remuneration for the period stated in
the payroll as they commenced to serve as early as October 28, 1999. It was further added that
they removed the names of petitioners int he payroll to avoid further delays.
• That, appointees are entitled to the renumeration stated in the payroll as we commence to serve
as early as October 28, 1999.
• The names of the three petitioners barangay councilors who refuse to sign the resolution and
daily wage payroll were crossed out to prevent any further delay in the release of the salaries of
all barangay officials and employees listed.
• Special investigation committee on administrative cases of city ruled that Laxina has no power
to make appointments prior to the oath taking November 16, 1999.
• the committee however found Laxina and other Barangay official who signed the resolution as
acting in good faith when they erroneously granted the resolution.
• Nevertheless, Laxina was found guilty of grave misconduct and recommended penalty of two
months suspension.
• The charges against Barangay secretary Ramos and treasure were dismissed it as much as city
counselors discipline in our jurisdiction is limited to elected barangay officials only.
• Charges against the city councilors were dismissed as there was no separate and independent
proof that they conspired with a guy in committing the acts complained.
• On October 3, 2000, Quezon City council adopted the findings and recommendations of the
committee. Laxina filed a motion for consideration. The city Council implemented a decision
on the board appointed Charlie Mangune as a Barangay chairman.
• Laxina filed or the petition for certiorari with RTC Quezon City, seeking to annul the decision
of Quezon City counsel, for a reason that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
•

• Summary judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of Laxina.

• The trial court did not rule on the propriety of the re-taking of the oath office by the latter, but
nevertheless, exonerated him on the basis of the finding of the City Council that he did not act in bad
faith but merely misread the law as applied to the facts.
• Motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense and the motion to drop Councilor banal as
respondent are both denied.
• Hence this petition.
•
•
• Issue/s:
• Will administrative appeals prevent the enforcement of a decision?
• Ruling: Administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions. The decision
is immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless appeal the adverse decision to
the Office of the President or to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as the case may be. Office is a
qualifying requirement of a public office. It is only when a public officer has satisfied the
prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete.
Once proclaimed and duly sworn in office, officers entitled to assume office and exercise the
functions. Tendency of election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoying him from assuming
office or from discharging his functions. Unless his election is an odd by final and executory
decision, invalid execution of an order on setting him pending appeal is issued, he has the
lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the office to which he has been elected.
Respondent was proclaimed as in 1997 elections, he took his office on May 27, 1997 and
assumed office. He is vested with all rights to discharge of functions of the office. Although in
the interim, he was on seated by virtue of a decision in an election protest decided against him,
the execution of the decision was annoyed by, lack in which, incidentally, will sustain by
Supreme Court in Fermo vs COMELEC. It was hell they're in that one, let nullify the writ of
execution pending appeal in favor of Fermo, the decision of MTC proclaiming him as one of
the election was stayed in the status quo or the last actual peaceful uncontested situation
pending the controversy was restored. The status quo referred to as the stage when Laxina
discharged his functions as Brgy captain.
• Fermo is refused to comply with the writ of execution, his supporters prevented it from
happening. Also, Laxina was able to discharge his functions when he assumed office in the SK
Hall.Hence there is no grave misconduct in appointing the secretary and treasurer.
•
• On the fact that petitioners’ names are removed, their names were written but they did not sign
as a sign of protest. Its their fault. Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentire.( he who suffered
injury through his own fault is not considered to have suffered any damage).

Joson vs Ombudsman G.R. Nos. 210220-21

UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT, RA 3019 SECTION 3 (e)

Facts:
• Edward Thomas F. Jason the province of and he represented by governor, entered into a
contract of consultancy with Ferdinand where in he was appointed or employed as a consultant
-technical assistance in the office of the governor. He was reappointed again in 2008. Joson
said that governor appointed Ferdinand despite his knowledge that the latter is disqualified for
appointment or reappointment in any government decision, because he was dismissed as a
senior state prosecutor of DOJ for Conda prejudicial to the best interest of service pursuant to
AO 14 dated August 27,1998, as he was this nice and meted out penalty of dismissal from
 service with all accessory penalties attached to it., In violation of administrative code and civil
service laws, rules and regulations.
•
• The execution of contract of consultancy dated February 28, 2008, was defective because its
affectivity was made to retro act on January 2 to February 28., in violation of the rule, that in
no case shell an appointment take affect earlier than the date of its issuance. There is no
consultancy contract existed from 01-02 to 02-28. Ferdinand should not have been paid any
honorarium of his alleged services during the said period.
•
• Contention of umali: consultancy services rendered by Ferdinand could not be considered as
government service within the contemplation of law and, hence, not governed by the Civil
Service Law, Rules and Regulations. He pointed out that under the twin contracts of
consultancy, Ferdinand had been engaged to render lump sum consultancy services for a short
duration of six (6) months on a daily basis and had not been paid any salary or given any
benefits enjoyed by government employees such as PERA, COLA and RATA, but merely paid
honoraria as stipulated in the contracts.
• Governor Umali cited the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Opinion No. 72 series
of 2004, dated August 23, 2004 6 and DILG Opinion No. 100 series of 2004, dated October 14, 2004, 7
wherein then DILG Secretary Angelo T. Reyes opined that a consultancy service was not covered by the
phrase "any office in the government.”
•
• Also, he said that stamping of 02-28 was simple mistake, It was supposed to be January 2, 2008. Proof:
kay gi renew again ang contract on July 2 (every 6 months).
•
• Contention of Ferdinand: although his dismissal from government service was not yet final as his
motion for reconsideration had not yet been resolved by the Office of the President at the time of his
appointment, there was no way that his service contract with the Provincial Government of Nueva
Ecija could be construed as to create a public office. He alleged that his engagements squarely fell
within the ambit of contracts of service/job orders under Section 2(a), Rule XI of the Civil Service
Commission Circular No. 40 series of 1998
• He insisted that he was not a government employee and the specifics of his contracts were governed
by the Commission on Audit (COA)
•
• Alejandro, Pancho and Roxas stressed that they committed no infraction of the law in affixing their
respective signatures in the obligation requests and disbursement vouchers which authorized the
payment of honoraria in favor of Ferdinand for the consultancy services he rendered. They explained
that the signing of the obligation requests and disbursement vouchers were done in the ordinary
course of business and in the normal processing of the said documents.
•
• Ombudsman ruled: dismissing criminal and admin complaint. MR was filed: denied.
•
• Hence this petition of allegation of GAD.
•
• Issue/s: WON Is a public officer? Did he violate the unlawful appointment (A 244) of RPC?
• Ruling: Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, or on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt, but it certainly demands more than bare suspicion and can never be
left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.
•

• Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, - a contract for consultancy services is not covered by Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations because the said position is not found in the index of position titles approved by
DBM.

•
• A "consultant" is defined as one who provides professional advice on matters within the field of his
specific knowledge or training. There is no employer-employee relationship in the engagement of a
consultant but that of client-professional relationship.
•

•
• grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.
•
• Once the person is exonerated form the charge, the other party has no right to appeal on the said
decision. He is granted the right to appeal but only in case he is found liable and the penalty imposed
is higher than public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or fine a equivalent to one month
salary.

Aquilino Pimentel vs Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita

GR 164978, October 13, 2005
Facts:
President Gloria Arroyo during the commencement of the regular session on July 26, 2004,
issued appointments on 9 senators, on respective departments, in their acting capacity.
1. Arthur Yap - Agri
2. Alberto Romulo DFA
3. Raul Gonzales - SOJ
4. Florencio Abad - Educ
5. Avelino Cruz - National Defense
6. Rene Villa - Agrarian Reform
7. Joseph Durano - Tourism
8. Michael Defensor - DENR
Senators Pimentel, Angara, Enrile, Louise Ejercito - Estrada, Jinggoy, Lacson, Lim and Madrigal
filed the petition as senators of the republic of the Philippines.

On 09-23-2004, Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to appoint the ff senators in their acting
capacities.
Issue/s:
Is the ad interim appointment made by President Arroyo , despite the presence of
undersecretaries while in session proper?
Ruling:Yes.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is
in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it
expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

GOVERNOR EDGARDO A. TALLADO, PETITIONER, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 246679, September 10, 2019

Facts:
01-28-2013 - complainant Edgardo Gonzales filed in OMB admin complaint for misconduct,
oppression/grave abuse of authority as governmor in the 2013 elections. OMB found and
declared him administratively liable and improsed upon him the penalty of 1 yr suspension,
which was immediately implemented by DILG.
On appeal to CA, CA imposed 1yr to 6 months suspension. He reassumed after 6 months there
became a subject of the 3rd OMB case. Under the resolution, CA restored 1 yr suspension of the
petitioner.

Milline Marie B. Dela Cruz, Mark Anthony J. Mago, Maria Joanabelle L. Crisostomo, and Shanta V.
Baraquiel) initiated the second OMB case against the petitioner.
April 18, 2016, decision was approved by OMB Morales, which held that he is guilty of grave misconduct
and oppression/abuse of authority and ordered his dismissal.

Although pending appeal, DILG issued a memorandum ordering him to vacate the position, issued
another memo for VGov Jonah Pimentel directing him to assume as Governor of Cam Norte, that there
was a permanent vacancy in lieu of Governor’s dismissal.
Pimentel took oath as Gov and assumed office.

The 3rd OMB case (6 months reassumption) OMB rendered another decision finding him guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering his dismissal form service

On appeal to CA, it modified the supension to 6 months.

Meanwhile, DILG issued a memo reinstating the governor once he finished the 6 months suspension.

Petitioner took his oath of office as governor.

** He filed his COC for Gov on Cam Norte for May 2019 elections. This prompted petitioner from filing a
separate petition cancelling his COC which petitions were consolidated and predicated on the
applicaiton of the 3 year limit rule.
On March 29, 2019, COMELEC granted the petition and ordered the COC cancellation (petitioner had
fully served three consecutive terms considering that his suspension and dismissals from the service
were not interruptions of his term because he had not thereby lost title to the office).

It is notable that the COMELEC First Division was not unanimous. Commissioner Al A. Parreño dissented
and voted to deny the petitions, opining that the dismissals from the service had effectively interrupted
the petitioner's 2016-2019 term, and that the petitioner had thereby involuntarily lost title to the office.
MR was filed but denied.

Hence this petition.

(OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment,38 averring therein that the COMELEC had
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding and holding
that the petitioner was ineligible to: run for Governor in the May 2019 elections under the three-term
limit rule.

-it must be considered as interruption because it already ceased to exercise the functions and
prerogatives of office.

Lonzanida v. COMELEC - elective official could not be deemed to have served the full term if he was
ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.

COMELEC relied on Section 7, Rule III of OMB rules, petitioner's exoneration from the charge of grave
misconduct rendered the "dismissal" nothing more than a mere preventive suspension, hence walay
interruption na nahitabo.

Issue/s: WON the governor’s term was interrupted in lieu of the 6 months suspension, thereby
completing 3 yr term for governor hence making the cancellation of his 2019 COC proper?

Ruling:
Yes. Interruption is = to involuntary interruption. Therefore, since his term was interrupted, he is
deemed to have not completed 3 terms.
"interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves
no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his
office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if
the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strint intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective
official's continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary
renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term.

temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary,
should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title
to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is
simply barred from exercising the function of his office for a reason provided by law.

On issue of appeal:

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal
and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of
the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented.

Petitioner's dismissals resulted

in permanent vacancy

Section 46 of the LGC textually applied to succession where the local chief executive was "temporarily
incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to, leave of
absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office," the provision was certainly not the proper basis for
the COMELEC to characterize as temporary the vacancy in the office of Governor ensuing from the
petitioner's dismissal

Section 44 of the LGC includes removal from office as one of the instances triggering a permanent
vacancy.

SOFRONIO B. ALBANIA vs COMELEC

GR 226792, June 6, 2017
Facts:
We're both candidates for the position of governor in, Cam Nor. After counting and canvassing
the votes a poco was proclaimed as winner.*Questioned*proclamation by filing with COMELEC
a petition for correction of a manifest error.*Run again in 2010 and 2013 national and local
elections were he won and served as governor of Camarines Norte. On 2015,*filed his certificate
of candidacy as governor of Camarines Norte. On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered
voter of Camarines Norte, file a petition for disqualification for running as governor based on
Rule 25 of COMELEC resolution onto grounds:
(1) he violated the three term limit I rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC); and
(2) respondent's suspension froni office for one year without pay, together with its accessory penalties,
after he was found guilty of oppression and grave abuse of authority in the Ombudsman's Order9
dated October 2, 2015.
Respondent argue that since the petition was based on his alleged violation of three term limit rule the
same should have been filed as a petition to deny do you course two or cancel the candidacy under rule
23 off, let resolution, in relation to section 78 of Omnibus election code as the ground cited affects
candidates in the divinity, that based on section 23 it should have been filed on Novembre 10 2015, but
the petition was filed only on 13th. Hence, it has prescribed and must be dismissed. His suspension of
office is also not a ground for a petition for disqualification. He also denied violating the three turn limit
role as he did not fully serve three consecutive terms since he only served as a governor for 2007
elections from March 22 to June 30, 2010. COMELEC dismissed the petition for being filed out of time.
That the violation of this week term limit rule and suspension from office as a result of an administrative
case are not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under the law. That the three term limit rule is a
ground for in eligibility which constituted false Material representation their section 70 and such, it must
be filed 25 days from the filing of COC. MR was filed but dismissed.

Hence this petition.

Issue/s: Did respondent serve 3 terms? No. Daog Tallado.

SECTION 40. Disqualifications - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; .
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Ruling:
Petitioner filed the petition for disqualification of respondent on the grounds that he allegedly violated
the three-term limit rule provided under the Constitution and the LGC; and that he was suspended from
office as a result of an administrative case.

while respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did not win as such. It
was only after he filed la petition for correction of manifest error that he was proclaimed as the duly-
elected Governor. He assumed the post and served the unexpired term of his opponent from March 22,
2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently, he did not hold the office for the full term of three years to
which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period of time that respondent served as Governor did
not constitute a complete and full service of his term. The period when he was out of office involuntarily
interrupted the continuity of his service as Governor.26 As he had not fully served the 2007-2010 term,
and had not been elected for three consecutive terms as Governor, there was no violation of the three-
term limit rule when he ran again in the 2016 elections.

three-term limit rule" to apply, two conditions must concur:

first, that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
second, that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

since Respondent did not serve the full 2007-2010 term, it cannot be considered as one term for
purposes of counting the three-term threshold. Consequently, Respondent cannot be said to have
continuously served as Governor for three consecutive terms prior to the 2016 elections.

SIMON B. ALDOVINO vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 184836               December 23, 2009

Facts:
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during
his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with
a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In 2007 elections, Aliso filed his COC as counselor. Petitioners sought to denied you course respondent
certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and serve for three terms,
violating the three term limit
rule under section 8 article 10 of the constitution.

COMELEC ruled against petitioners in its resolution. That the three term limit True did not apply as he
failed to render complete service for 2004 to 2007 because of the suspension of Sandiganbayan.

Kamala refuse to reconsider hence this petition.

Issue/s:
WON Asilo reached three term limit rule?Therefore disqualifying him to run again.

Ruling: No.
(This is an inflexible rule)
Renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of
abandonment.
Element of 3 TL rule:
1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
2. 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms) were not present.

it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.

"interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves
no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. elective official must have involuntarily left his office
for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the
thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective
official’s continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary
renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the
functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to
his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and
gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office
holder.

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should
not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms.

URBANO M. MORENO VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006

Facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify petitioner from running for Punong Barangay on the
ground that he was convicted by final judgment of the crime of arbitrary detention
and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four months and one day to two years and four months
by RTC.
Petitioner answered that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted
probation. That the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as incessantly penalties, was
suspended. He added the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore him all civil rights lost
or suspended as a result of convection and fully discharge is liability for any fine imposed.

The case was forwarded to the office of provincial election supervisor for preliminary hearing. After G
proceedings, the investigating officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running.

MR was filed by, COMELEC intending that under section 40 of LGC that does sentence by final judgment
front of the fence punishable by one year are disqualified from running from any elective local position.
Since he was released from probation on December 20, 2020, disqualification shall commence on this
date and then two years then. The grounds of probation
nearly suspend the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an
elective local office.

Issue/s:

Is Moreno DQ from running despite probation?

Ruling:
The accessory penalties on suspension from public office, from the right to follow a professional
calling, and that of her actual special disqualification from the rights of suffrage imposed upon
Moreno were similarly suspended the grants of probation. the probation or is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from
public office is put on hold for the duration of probation. Those who have not serve their
sentence of probation should not be created with service of sentence, should not likewise be
disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two year period of in eligibility
under section 40 does not even begin to run.

Probation long should be construed as an exaction to the local government code. Probation long
is a special legislation which applies only to probationers.

ERNESTO S. MERCADO vs MANZANO

(Date)
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The
results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751

Ernesto Mamaril order the cancellation of certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual
citizen. Under local government code section 40, persons with dual citizen ship are disqualified
from running for any elective position. , COMELEC decided to cancel his certificate of
candidacy. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration the motion remains pending
even after the election on May 11 1998. Accordingly,, COMELEC tabulated the votes that
suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioners up to intervene in the case of this
qualification. Petitioners motion was a post by respondent.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father
and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the
Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien
with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a
voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7,
1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty
three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand
eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275)
votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be
embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before
the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
COMELEC then reverse the decision and manzano qualified. He was also declared as winning candidate
for vice mayor of Makati city.

Hence this petition.

Issue/s: Is Manzano disqualified?

Ruling:
Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years
old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
(Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess
dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's'
country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizen.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship,
the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States,
which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an
election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory."

by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

Manalo v. Sistoza

Facts: In accordance to Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior and Local Government
the President of the Philippines, through then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted the
fifteen respondent police officers herein, by appointing them to positions in the Philippine National
Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took their oath of office
and assumed their respective positions without their names submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present original
petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and
disbursements made.

Petitioner contends that Respondent officers, in assuming their offices and discharging the functions
without confirmation of the Commission on Appointments as required by the Constitution are acting
without or in excess of their jurisdiction.

Supreme Court Ruling: The Petition must fail

The power to make appointments is vested in the Chief Executive by Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are
not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the
case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials
not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

It is Manalo’s submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and therefore, the appointments of police officer whose rank is equal to that of colonel or
naval captain require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This contention is equally
untenable. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. The police force is different from and
independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine
National Police.

Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do
not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.

Digested by : Salman M. Johayr

Subject : PubCorp
Topic : Appointments by the President

Matibag v. Benipayo
G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002

Facts:

In this case, petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV” of the
EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA
also made appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last
one during the pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to act
upon the confirmation of their appointments.
Thereafter, respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum
removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law Department. Petitioner
requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad interim
appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on
the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.

Issue/s:

1. Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the Constitution

2. Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character

Ruling:

1. No.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this provision
should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect
to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – on the nomination of
officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad interim
appointments. The original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad interim
appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session throughout the year except for a
brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential
government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the
1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of
the ad interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital
government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices,
including the three constitutional commissions.

Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to make
ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is
lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in appointing
officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in
session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during the recess
of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to
immediately qualify and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective
appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President
because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the
choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the
instant case.

Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute
temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

2. No.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and

can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that
it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:

“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” Therefore, the ad interim
appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no
longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

It should be noted that while an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as
provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or
revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any
security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits
the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the
COMELEC.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in
the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the
recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

--------------------NOTHING FOLLOWS--------------------

FUNA VS. VILLAR

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. VILLAR

G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

FACTS:

Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of

the COA.

Following the retirement of Carague served(feb 2,2001- feb 2,2008) on February 2, 2008 and
during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008,
Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11,
2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this
recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists
that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to
lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2,
2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office
upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA
Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic.Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman
Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements
for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the
mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following requisites for
the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very
litis mota of the case

ISSUES:

a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having
served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the
term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D)
of the Constitution

HELD:

Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously
has “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the
bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and
allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called
“non-traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.

On the substantive issue:

Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for
five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution
proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second
appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or
upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity
ab initio.

The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word
“reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if
a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be
reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was
appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of
seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from “dominating”
the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from
commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven
years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition,
such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or
the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of
the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of
Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated
circumstances or conditions.

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional appointment as
COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from February 2008 to February
2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past
pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the
import of the word “reappointment,” there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can
one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an
aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the
aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak
havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance,
validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution
decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served
4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said
rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear
purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set
of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like
respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as
chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of
the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as
the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a
fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by
the Constitution.

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or

impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full
term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any
position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of
the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that
the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal
by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to
Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or
office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the
strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting

capacity.

APPOINTMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT

Sarmiento v. Mison
GR No. 79974, December 17, 1987

Facts: Herein Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs by then-President Corazon Aquino.
Thereafter, said appointment made by the President was questioned by herein petitioner
Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both
Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid, since such was not
submitted to the Commission On Appointments (COA) for approval. The parties were also heard
in oral argument on 8 December 1987.
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes
proposed and approved by the Constitutional Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the
appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence of the
section from the same requirement.
Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the
confirmation from COA. This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it
involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of government, the Executive and
Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the Presidential Appointment made by the President without approval
from the CoA is valid.

Ruling: Yes. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are
four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1. F
irst, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
 2. S
econd, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law;

3. T
hird, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

4. F
ourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

The first group of officers are clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination
is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second, third
and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
The Court notes that RA 1937 and PD 34, which allows for the Presidential appointment of
the head of the bureau of customs, were approved during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937( a decree to
consolidate and codify all the tariff and customs laws of the philippines ),
as amended by PD No. 34
have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an
appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Bautista v. Salonga
April 13, 1989

Facts: On 27 August 1987, The President appointed herein petitioner Mary Concepcion
Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second
sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among
the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint."
Bautista took her oath of office on On 22 December 1988.
However, on 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments requesting her to submit to the Commission certain information
and documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment
as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. On 10 January 1989, the Commission on
Appointments’ Secretary again wrote petitioner Bautista requesting her presence at a meeting
of the Commission on Appointments Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and
Human Rights set for 19 January 1989 at 9 A.M. at the Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon
Tower I, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City that would deliberate on her appointment as Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights.
 On 13 January 1989, petitioner Bautista wrote to the Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments stating, for the reasons therein given, why she considered the Commission on
Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights.
Herein, Bautista contends that Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the
President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.
However, the CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the
CHR, in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.

2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

Ruling:
First, No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which
are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President,
vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive
officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited
power to review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that
the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
Second, No. Ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that
are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments
solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments
is needed.

Calderon v. Carale
April 23, 1992
Facts: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code
(PD 442) was approved. Section 13 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding
Commissioners, and other Commissioners of NLRC shall all be appointed by the President,
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
President Aquino appointed Respondents Carale as the Chairman and Commissioners of
the NLRC.
Calderon filed a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality and legality of
respondents’ permanent appointments. Calderon insists that the appointments must be
submitted to the CA for confirmation. He also posits that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on
the appointing power of the executive contained in Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as
Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other
officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor
Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.

Issues:
1. W
hether or not Congress may require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of appointments extended by the President to government officers, additional to those
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, whose
appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
2. W
hether or not RA 6715 is constitutional.

Ruling:
First, No. The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the
government whose appointment are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of
appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint.
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned
in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Second, Yes. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and

2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by
imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise
entrusted only with the President.

It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not
unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the
system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Commission on Appointments exercised
the power of confirmation over almost all presidential appointments, leading to may cases of
abuse of such power of confirmation.

G.R. No. 164978 October 13, 2005

Pimentel et al (Senators) vs Exec Sec Eduardo Angara
Facts:
Case decided: 10/13/2005
Commencement of regular session in congress - 07-26-2004
Commission on Appointment was consulted on (next day)
Composition of Comm on Appts - Senators and Representatives.

President Arroyo issued appts to respondents as acting secretaries on the following:

Appointee Department Date of Appointment

Arthur C. Yap Agriculture 15 August 2004

Alberto G. Romulo Foreign Affairs 23 August 2004

Raul M. Gonzalez Justice (same)

Florencio B. Abad Education (same)

Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. National Defense (same)

Rene C. Villa Agrarian Reform (same)

Joseph H. Durano Tourism (same)

Michael T. Defensor Environment and Natural (same)

Resources

Respondents to their oath of office (no date mentioned)

On the cause of action:

Who filed: senators Aguilino Pimentel Jr. , Enrile, Edgardo Angara, Luisa Estrada,Jinggoy Estrada, Lacson,
Alfredo Lim,Jamby Madrigal and Sergio Osmena III.
Petition for certiorai and prohibition
prayer: to declare the appts of Arroyo as unconsitiutional and to prohibit respondents from performing
the duties of department secretaries.

grounds: the ad interim appt constitutionality without the consent of the Comm on appts and while
congress is in session.

Congress adjourned on 9-22-2004, on the next day, Arroyo issued an ad interim appointent. The
senators believed that this act in unconsitutional, as it the appts made by the President without the
consent of the Comm on Appts and during session.

Issue:
WON President Arroyo’s act of appoiting the acting secretaries without CA’s consent and while congress
is in session allowed?

Held: No. It is constitutional; no law violated.

1. GR: The writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
exception: courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

So? The mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the
President’s appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session will
arise in every such appointment.

2. Nature of the power to appoint: executive in nature. The legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere.
Statcon application:
Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.

The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to
prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty
to appoint any particular person to an office.

Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its
powers is executive and not legislative.

What Comm on Appt is not:

The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold
consent to presidential appointments. The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the
Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is
independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate
directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress.In fact, the functions of the
Commissioner are purely executive in nature.
On issue of legal standing: Not all senators are members of Comm on Appts: only Enrile, Lacson, Angara,
Estrada are members. Therefore, Congress has no standing.

Another contention of Senators: Arroyo cannot appt secretaries as in case of vacancy, USECs will
takeover.

Can Arroyo appoint officials? Yes.

EO 292
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as
provided for in the Constitution and laws.

SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. —

(1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to
which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to
perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy.

(2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position, unless he is already
in the government service in which case he shall receive only such additional compensation as, with his
existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled. The compensation
hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds appropriated for the office or agency concerned.
(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.

In lieu the prohibition (non appt in an acting capacity while congress is in session)., is only for temporary
appts. Ad interim is permanent, therefore, it is allowed.

Quirog vs Aumentado
11/11/2008
GR 163443

Dates:
Appt of Quirog - 05-28-2001
Embodied in: Resolution 2001-199; 06-01-2001
Took oath: 06-1-2001
CSC Resolution invalidate appts 2 mos prior end of term: 06-04-2001
Date of CSC invalidating his appt: 06-28-2001

Facts:
On May 28, 2001, Provincial Governor Rene Relamagos permanently appt Liza M.
Quirog as Provincial Government Department Head of the office of Bohol provincial agriculture
(PGDH-OPA), to which appt was confirmed by Sanguniang Panlalawigan on a resolution 2001-
199 dated 06-01-2001. On even date, he took his oath of office. HOWEVER, prior to that, the
Personnel Selection Board (PSB) of HRMO of Bohol issued a certificate that Quiroy was 1 of 2
candidated qualified for the position of PGDH-OPA. A copy of the monthly report on personnel
actions covering May and June 2001of provincial government was submitted to CSC Cebu.

DECISION: In an order daed 06-28-2001, Director of CSC region 7 invalidated his appt,
upon finding that the same was part of the bulk appts issued by Gov Relampagos after 05-14-
2001 elections allegedly in violation of item 3(d) of CSC Reso 010988 (Midnight appt).

Gov and Quirog moved for recon alleging that he took oath prior to the effectivity of 06-
01-2001 (CSC Resolution was effective 06-4-2001).
That it was not a midnight appt as it was made days prior to the end of Relampagos’
term, and he is already the acting provincial agriculturist a year prior to said appt or since 06-19-
2000.
That since he has taken his oath, he acquired a legal right and assumed all duties and
collect her salary fpr the month of June 2001, and it cannot be take away form her either by
revocation or the appt of by removal except for a cause and with previous notice and hearing.
DECISION: On the decision dated 06-23-2001, CSC denied their MR, lacking legal
personality, CSC said that only appt officer may request recon of the disapproval. Even if
Relampagos is the one who appt Quirog, he could not file MR as his term already expired.
Aggreived, in GR 163443, they appeal to CSC to which CSC granted the joint appeal,
setting aside CSC RO7 order, for a reason that his appt was not midnight as it was not hurried
nor did it subvert the policies of the incoming administration.
DECISION: CSC said that the resolution ordering that appt should have gone thru reguar
screening by PSB before the eleciton ban or is prohibited period form March 30-May 14,2001,
after noting that board only deliberated his qualifications on May 24, 2001 or after election ban,
“the spirit, rather than the said rule shall prevail”. And he was included among 46 post election
appts because there is a need to immediately fill up in a permanent capacity the vacant position
and on the fact that Gov Relampagos declared his trust and confidence in a Memorandum No. 1
(07-2-2001).
On 12-10-2001 Bohol Governor Erico Aumentado filed MR, insisting lack of legal
personality to file by Q and R, that the board who screened his appt was not validly constitued
and that the appt was made more than 6 mos in violation of CSC Reso 010114 (June 10-2001).
Relampagos has 97 not 46 mass appointments on the eve of his term, 95 of which was
invalidated by CSC Bohol including Quirog.

DECISION: CA reversed the order of the CSC and said Quirog’s appeal should be
dismissed (lack of legal personality), MR was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue/s: WON the appointment made by Governor Relampagos is a midnight appointment?
(note: CSC Memo circular 40 says, appt authority may request for recon for CSC disapproved
appts)

Held: No it is not a midnight appointment.

CSCROVII should not have subjected Quirog's appointment to the requirements under said resolution, as
its application is against the prospective application of laws. Having no provision regarding its
retroactive application to appointments made prior to its effectivity, CSC Resolution No. 010988 must be
taken to be of prospective application

Midnight appts (ppt 2 months prior to next presidential elections)., applies only to President/acting
president.

De Rama vs CA provides, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments
during the last days of his or her tenure.

the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing
appointments merely for partisan purposes.

The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight appointment. For it is beyond dispute
that Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties concomitant with the subject position for a
year prior to her permanent appointment thereto.

Ruling:

De Rama vs CA
February 28, 2001
Facts:
Conrado L. de Rama, Mayor of Pagbilao Quezon, wrote a letter to CSC, to cancel the
appointment of the following persons: under Order No. 95-01 (order recalling the 14)
1. Eladio Martinez Registration Officer I June 1, 1995
2. Divino de Jesus Bookbinder III June 1, 1995
3. Morell Ayala Accounting Clerk III June 16, 1995
4. Daisy Porta Clerk IV June 27, 1995
5. Aristeo Catalla Gen. Services Officer June 19, 1995
6. Elsa Marino Mun. Agriculturist June 19, 1995
7. Gracella Glory Bookkeeper II June 27, 1995
8. Ma. Petra Muffet Lucce Accounting Clerk III June 27, 1995
9. Felicidad Orindag Accounting Clerk II June 27, 1995
10. Bernardita Mendoza Agricultural Technologist June 27, 1995
11. Flordeliza Oriazel Clerk I June 27, 1995
12. Jane Macatangay Day Care Worker I June 27, 1995
13. Adolfo Glodoviza Utility Worker II June 27, 1995
14. Florencio Ramos Utility Foreman June 27, 1995

He alleged that the following are Midnight appointees of Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja (former Mayor),
done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution;

SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

During its pendency, Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel filed a claim with CSC as their
salaries were witheld by De Rama.

Their grounds:
Although their appointments were declared permanent by Conrado Gulim, Director II of the CSC
Field Office based in Quezon. On the docs presented by Marino, Ayala and Oriazel, the Legal and Quasi-
Judicial Division of the CSC issued an Order 2 finding that since the claimants-employees had assumed
their respective positions and performed their duties pursuant to their appointments, they are therefore
entitled to receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their positions. Citing Rule V, Section 10 of
the Omnibus Rules 3 which provides, in part, that "if the appointee has assumed the duties of the
position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his
appointment by the Commission," the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division ruled that the said
employees cannot be deprived of their salaries and benefits by the unilateral act of the newly-assumed
mayor.

DECISIONS: April 30, 1996-CSC denied recall of 14 appointees.

GROUNDS:
Rule V, Sections 9 and 10 of the Omnibus Rules, and declared that the appointments of the said
employees were issued in accordance with pertinent laws.The Constitutional provision relied upon by
petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to
apply to local elective officials.

DECISION:CSC upheld the decision as it was already upheld by CSC Lucena City.

OPPOSITION OF DE RAMA: Mayor De Rama posited that the CSC erred in finding the appointments valid
despite the existence of circumstances showing that the same were fraudulently issued and processed.
MR filed by De Rama was denied.
grounds: Mayor de Rama failed to present evidence that subject appointments should be revoked or
recalled because of any of the above-mentioned grounds enumerated. As a matter of fact, said
appointments were even approved by the Head, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena City when submitted
for attestation.

DECISION: CSC DENIED MR

CSC cited the case of Aquino v. Civil Service Commission which says: once an appointment is issued and
the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he
acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but
also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment,
or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.

On appeal to CA,
DECISION: CA upheld the CSC decision, saying it has no GAD.
the appointments of Marino, Ayala, Ramos, Mendoza and Glory were made more than four (4) months
after the publication of the vacancies to which they were appointed is of no moment. Setting aside
petitioner’s suppositions, the Court of Appeals ruled that Republic Act No. 7041 does not provide that
every appointment to the local government service must be made within four (4) months from
publication of the vacancies.

Issue/s: Is the appointment of the 14 appointed officials are considered midnight appointment?
Ruling:No.
He faults the Court of Appeals and the CSC for ignoring his supplemental pleading, while at the
same time arguing that the grounds for recall such as violations of laws and regulations on issuance of
appointments are not new issues because he had timely raised them before the CSC.

Grounds for recall of appointment:

(1) the rules on screening of applicants based on adopted criteria were not followed;
(2) there was no proper posting of notice of vacancy; and
(3) the merit and fitness requirements set by the civil service rules were not observed.

These are grounds that he could have stated in his order of recall, but which he did not.
The fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed following two meetings of the Personnel Selection
Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995. There is no showing that any of the private respondents were
not qualified for the positions they were appointed to.

It was petitioner who acted in undue haste to remove the private respondents without regard for the
simple requirements of due process of law. (notice and hearing requirement)

Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that "an
appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority
and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.”

Section 20 - grounds for recall

(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan;

(b) Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board;

(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to
promotion; or

(d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

Since none was made grounds thereof, they cannot be recalled. Therefore, appointments are legal.

Nazareno vs. City of Dumaguete

527 SCRA 509

FACTS:
· Agustin R. Perdices won over incumbent Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo for the mayoralty
post. He was to assume office on June 30, 2001.
· Before Perdices’ assumption, Remollo made fifteen (15) promotional appointments, and
seventy-four (74) original appointments for various positions in the city government.
· July 2, 2001: Remollo dishonored the appointments made by Remollo.
· Leah M. Nazareno, et al, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a Petition for Mandamus,
Injunction and Damages against the City of Dumaguete, represented by Mayor Remollo.
· Aug. 1, 2001: Director Abucejo of the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSCFO)
invalidated and revoked the questioned appointments as they were issued in violation of the
guidelines set forth by the CSC.
· Aug. 3, 2001: RTC issued a writ of prelim injunction against the City Government pending the
final adjudication of the case. The court reversed Director Abucejo’s on the ground that the
questioned appointments may only be invalidated by the Regional Office upon recommendation
by the CSCFO.
· City of Dumaguete claimed that Director Abucejo’s decision already became final after
petitioner’s failed to move for reconsideration of the same. They moved for the dismissal of the
injunction case. RTC denied the motion to dismiss but agreed with the finality of the decision. It
permanently lifted the preliminary injunction. Hence, appointees asked for their salaries and
moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointees can claim salaries and moral damages to the appointing
authority.

RULING:

· Yes. The Court stresses that Section 3, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions only categorically recognizes the right of the
appointee to payment of salaries from the government, during the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration or appeal of the disapproval of his appointment by the CSC-FO and/or CSC-RO
before the CSC Proper, "[i]f the appointment was disapproved on grounds which do not
constitute a violation of civil service law, such as failure of the appointee to meet the
Qualification Standards (QS) prescribed for the position."
What happens then if the appointment was disapproved for violation of civil service law? In such
a situation, Section 4, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Action applies. It states:
Sec. 4. The appointing authority shall be personally liable for the salary of appointees whose
appointments have been disapproved for violation of pertinent laws such as the publication
requirement pursuant to RA 7041.
It is clear from the afore-quoted provision that when the appointment was disapproved for
violation of pertinent laws, the appointing authority shall be personally liable for the salary of the
appointee. This is in complete accord with the Section 65, Chapter 10, Book V, of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:
Section 65. Liability of appointing authority. - No person employed in the Civil Service in
violation of Civil Service law and rules shall be entitled to receive pay from the government, but
the appointing authority responsible for such unlawful employment shall be personally liable for
the pay that would have accrued had the employment been lawful, and the disbursing officials
shall make payment to the employee of such amount from the salary of the officers so liable.
To recall, petitioners' appointments were invalidated and revoked by CSC-FO Director Abucejo,
in a letter dated 1 August 2001, on the ground that said appointments were made by former
Mayor Remollo in violation of Items No. 3(d) and 4 of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated 4 June
2001, which prohibit the outgoing chief executive from making mass appointments after
elections. The rules laid down by the CSC in CSC Resolution No. 010988, dated 4 June 2001,
are deemed included in what is the "civil service law," it having the force and effect of law.
Upon disapproval by CSC-FO Director Abucejo of petitioners' appointments on 1 August 2001,
for being in violation of civil service law, petitioners may no longer claim entitlement to the
payment of their salaries from the government. There is no doubt that, pending their appeals
before the CSC-RO, then the CSC Proper, petitioners' appointments remained effective and
they could still continue reporting to work and rendering service, but there already arose the
question as to who shall be liable for their salaries during the period, i.e., whether it is the City
Government of Dumaguete (under Section 3, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Action) or former Mayor Remollo who appointed them
(under Section 4, Rule VI of the same Revised Omnibus Rules). Hence, petitioners' right to
salary cannot be firmly anchored as
of yet on Section 3, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Action.

2. Provincial Government of Aurora vs Marco

FACTS:
Governor Ramoncita P. Ong permanently appointed Marco as Cooperative Development
Specialist II on June 25, 2004, five (5) days before the end of her term as Governor of the
Province. On June 28, 2004, Marco's appointment, together with 25 other appointments, was
submitted to the Civil Service Commission Field Office-Aurora (the Field Office). On June 30,
2004, newly elected Governor Bellaflor Angara-Castillo assumed office. The next day, she
called to an executive meeting all the department heads of the Province. During the executive
meeting, Provincial Budget Officer Clemente allegedly manifested that the Province had no
funds available to pay for the salaries of Governor Ong's 26 appointees. She subsequently
issued a Letter recalling the previously issued certification of the availability of funds:
In view of the result of the dialogue of the concerned offices regarding the financial status of the
Provincial Government of Aurora, we hereby recall/retrieve our previously issued certification of
availability of funds relative to the appointments issued by Governor Ramoncita P. Ong. Due to
the recall of the certification, the Field Office disapproved Marco's appointment in the Letter
dated July 5, 2004. The Province, through Human Resource Management Officer Liwayway G.
Victorio, served Marco a copy of the Letter dated July 5, 2004. Marco was, thus, advised to
refrain from reporting for work beginning July 8, 2004, the day he received notice of the
disapproval of his appointment. Marco wrote the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No.
IV (Regional Office), moving for the reconsideration of the disapproval of his appointment. The
Regional Office, however, denied reconsideration in its Decision dated April 6, 2005 and
affirmed the disapproval of Marco's appointment. It said that "[t]he lack of funds for the [26
appointments Governor Ong issued] was established during the meeting of the different
department heads of Aurora Province and their new governor." Through the Letter dated May
17, 2005, Marco appealed before the Civil Service Commission. The Province, through its
Human Resource Management Office, received a copy of Marco's Letter on May 23, 2005.
However, it failed to comment on the appeal within 10 days from receipt as required by Section
73 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. In the Resolution dated
April 14, 2008, the Civil Service Commission granted Marco's appeal and
set aside the Regional Office's Decision dated April 6, 2005. It ruled that Marco's appointment
was valid since it was accompanied by a certification of availability of funds. As to the Letter
withdrawing the certification, the Civil Service Commission ruled that it did not affect the validity
of Marco's appointment because the Province "failed to submit documentary evidence to
support its claim [that it had no funds to pay for the services of Governor Ong's appointees]."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Marco was a midnight appointee.

RULING:

No.
A midnight appointment "refers to those appointments made within two months immediately
prior to the next presidential election. Midnight appointments are prohibited under Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is "duty bound to prepare
for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he [or she] should not do acts
which he [or she] ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his [or her]
successor." An outgoing President should not "deprive the new administration of an opportunity
to make the corresponding appointments." However, the constitution prohibition on midnight
appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply to appointments made
by local chief executives. In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, Mayor Conrado L. de Rama (Mayor
de Rama) of Pagbilao, Quezon sought to recall 14 appointments made by former Mayor Ma.
Evelyn S. Abeja on the sole ground that they were midnight appointments.The Civil Service
Commission denied Mayor de Rama's request, ruling that the prohibition on midnight
appointments only applies to outgoing Presidents. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Civil Service Commission's decision.

DE CASTRO VS JBC
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from
the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days
after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an
ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for
nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they
have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be
vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation,
and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the
Philippine Star.

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing
the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written
report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in
accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list
of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the
prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that
the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62,
Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the
Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by
the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice.

RULING:
Yes. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers,
if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most
likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

1. OMBUDSMAN V. RACHO, JANUARY 31, 2011

 
Facts:
In a letter dated November 9, 2001, reported to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas,
Primo Miro, a concerned citizen’s complaint regarding the alleged unexplained wealth of
Racho, then Chief of the Special Investigation Division of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), Cebu City. The Ombudsman found that Racho did not declare the bank
deposits in his SALN. Accordingly, the Ombudsman filed a Complaint for Falsification of
Public Document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and Dishonesty against
Racho. On review, Director Virginia Palanca, through a memorandum dated May 30,
2003, decreed that Racho’s act of not declaring said bank deposits in his SALN, which
were disproportionate to his and his wife’s salaries, constituted falsification and
dishonesty. She found Racho guilty of the administrative charges against him and
imposed the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and
perpetual disqualification to hold public office. The Appellate court affirmed the decision.
Hence this case. 

Issues:
WON Racho’s non-disclosure of the bank deposits in his SALN constitutes dishonesty. 
Ruling:

Yes.
The Court views it in the affirmative. Section 7 and Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.)
3019 explain the nature and importance of accomplishing a true, detailed and sworn
SALN, thus:

Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. — Every public officer, within thirty days
after assuming office, and thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the
close of every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or
upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of
corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head Department or chief of an
independent office, with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and
family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the
end of the calendar year, may file their first statement on or before the fifteenth day of
April following the close of said calendar year.

Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to Unexplained Wealth. — If in

accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One Thousand Three
Hundred Seventy-Nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his
incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of
property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful
income, that fact shall be ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of
the spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into consideration,
when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown.

Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the

public official, his spouse or any of their dependents including but not limited to
activities in any club or association or any ostentatious display of wealth including
frequent travel abroad of a non-official character by any public official when such
activities entail expenses evidently out of proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise
be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this Section, notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances hereinabove mentioned shall
constitute valid ground for the administrative suspension of the public official
concerned for an indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained wealth is
completed. Complimentary to the above-mentioned provisions, Section 2 of R.A. 1379
states that
"whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired."
By mandate of law, every public official or government employee is required to make a
complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any
questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from non-
disclosure of such matters. Hence, a public official or employee who has acquired
money or property manifestly disproportionate to his salary or his other lawful income
shall be prima facie presumed to have illegally acquired it. It should be understood that
what the law seeks to curtail is "acquisition of unexplained wealth." Where the source
of the undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted, then it is "explained wealth"
which the law does not penalize. 

In this case, Racho not only failed to disclose his bank accounts containing substantial
deposits but he also failed to satisfactorily explain the accumulation of his wealth or
even identify the sources of such accumulated wealth. 

2. LEOVIGILDO A. DE CASTRO v. FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, GR No. 192723, 2017-06-05

Facts:
Leovigildo began working in the Bureau of Customs (BOC) on December 4, 1973 as storekeeper at the
Manila International Airport. Year of Assignment Position 1979 Common Bonded Inspector 1980
Common Bonded Supervisor 1986 Customs Operations Assistant Chief 1989 Supervising Customs
Operations Officer 1996 Chief Customs Operations Officer, Marina Rios (Marina), Leovigildo's wife,...
began working as a clerk in the now defunct Philippine Atomic Energy Commission.[9] Thereafter, Marina
rose through the ranks, until she retired as a training officer sometime in 1988. Based on the Certificates
of Employment and Compensation Leovigildo and Marina's declared income from 1974 to 2004
amounted to P10,841,412.28. Ombudsman, through its Field Investigation Office (FIO), conducted motu
proprio lifestyle checks on government officials and employees.Leovigildo was among those evaluated.
Documents revealed that [Leovigildo] earns primarily from his salary as an employee of the [BOC].
[Leovigildo's] annual salary as of 2004 is estimated at [P]303,052.54, including allowances and bonuses.
[Leovigildo's] [SALN] from 1994 to 2003 showed that neither he nor his spouse had financial connections
and business interests, in his SALN from 1997 to 2003, declared a residential house and lot in
Parañaque, a house and lot in Taal[,] Batangas, and an agricultural land in Laguna. [Leovigildo] also
disclosed that he acquired a car worth [P]625,000.00 in 2002. Records show that there are other
properties and business interests belonging to [Leovigildo] which were not declared in his SALNs such as
his investments amounting to P416,669.00 in Lemar Export and Import Corporation, which was
incorporated on 25 May 1994. There are also properties registered under the name (sic) of [Leovigildo's]
children, which should be considered as part of his undisclosed assets, in view of the fact that during the
time of the acquisition, the children have (sic) no sources of income or means of livelihood of their own
Total Value P23,717,226.89
FIO also found that based on Bureau of Immigration (BI) records, Leovigildo and his family had taken
seventy (70) outbound flights between 1993-2004 to several countries, including Japan, Hong Kong and
South Korea. The FIO pegged the cost of such trips at P30,000.00 each, bringing the De Castros' total
estimated travel cost to P2,100,000.00. FIO concluded that Leovigildo and Marina's assets and expenses
from 1974-2004 amounted to P30,829,603.48,[18] and found that this was manifestly disproportionate to
their declared income of P10,841,412.28.
Proceedings before the Ombudsman, FIO filed a Complaint[20] dated October 5, 2005 before the
Ombudsman, charging Leovigildo of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service,... FIO prayed that (i) a preliminary investigation be conducted against Leovigildo
for violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6713[23] and Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code;
[24] and (ii) forfeiture proceedings. Ombudsman issued an Order placing Leovigildo under preventive
suspension.
In his Counter-Affidavit[27] dated August 28, 2006, Leovigildo maintained that the assets which he and
Marina acquired while in government service were all reported in their respective SALNs. Ombudsman
issued a Decision finding Leovigildo guilty of the administrative charges against him
Proceedings before the CA
Leovigildo filed an appeal (Appeal) before the CA via Rule 43 CA held that the Ombudsman possesses
ample authority to review Leovigildo's SALN pursuant to its Constitutional mandate. Leovigildo filed an
MR on May 22, 2009. The CA denied said MR
Issues:
whether the CA erred in affirming the Assailed Decision and Resolution finding Leovigildo administratively
liable for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.

Ruling:

The Ombudsman possesses sufficient authority to undertake a direct review of Leovigildo's

SALN
Leovigildo claims that he does not question the general authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute erring public officials and employees. However, he submits that
Section 10 of R.A. 6713 vests upon heads of executive departments the specific and direct
authority to review their subordinates' SALNs.
Leovigildo alleges that the review, investigation and corrective action taken by the
Ombudsman collectively constitute a violation of R.A. 6713, an encroachment of the
authority of the Commissioner of Customs,[59] and a blatant disregard of the latter's
guidelines prescribing the review and compliance procedure for the submission of SALNs
governing the employees and officials of the BOC.[
Leovigildo is mistaken.
Section 10 of R.A. 6713 vests upon heads of executive departments the authority to ensure
faithful compliance with the SALN requirement. However, it does not strip the Ombudsman
of its sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon complaint of any
person, any public official or employee for acts or omissions which appear to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Court's ruling in Carabeo v. Sandiganbayan[62] is instructive: True, Section 10 of R.A. 6713
provides that when the head of office finds the SALN of a subordinate incomplete or not in
the proper form such head of office must call the subordinate's attention to such omission
and give him the chance to rectify the same. But this procedure is an internal office matter.
cannot bar the Office of the Ombudsman from investigating the latter. Its power to
investigate and prosecute erring government officials cannot be made dependent on the
prior action of another office. To hold otherwise would be to diminish its constitutionally
guarded independence.
fact that Leovigildo had not been previously placed under a BOC sanctioned investigation
does not make the Ombudsman's acts void or premature,... Leovigildo 's acts do not
constitute Grave Misconduct
Leovigildo's administrative liability primarily rests on his failure to faithfully comply with the
SALN requirement, and the acquisition of assets manifestly disproportionate to his lawful
income. These acts, while undoubtedly inimical to public service, do not constitute Grave
Misconduct.
To constitute Misconduct, the act or omission complained of must have a direct relation to
the public officer's duties and affect not on]y his character as a private individual, but also,
and more importantly, the performance of his official duties as a public servant.
Hence, to hold Leovigildo liable for Grave Misconduct, the acts and omissions for which he
was charged must be of such character as to have had an effect on his duties as Chief
Customs Operations Officer. The Court finds that such is not the case.
Owning properties disproportionate to one's salary and not declaring them in the
corresponding SALNs cannot, without more, be classified as grave misconduct. Even if
these allegations were true, we cannot see our way clear how the fact of non-declarations
would have a bearing on the performance of functions by petitioner Aguilar, as Customs
Chief of the Miscellaneous Division, and by petitioner Hernandez, as Customs Operations
Officer.
There exists substantial evidence on record to hold Leovigildo liable for Dishonesty.
Leovigildo adopts the allegations in his Appeal and asserts that the Ombudsman (i) failed to
attach the BI records which supposedly prove that he and his family had taken seventy (70)
foreign trips while he was in government service,[70] and (ii) glossed over his children's
professional qualifications, as well as other circumstances which prove that they each had
the financial capacity to legitimately acquire the Disputed Assets which were attributed to
him
Court finds that the disputed BI records which serve as the latter's proof of the De Castros'
alleged foreign trips do not form part of the records of the case.
The value the Ombudsman used to quantify the cost of these alleged trips (P30,000.00 for
each trip) was a "conservative estimate"[72] which the latter appears to have arbitrarily
assigned for expediency.
Before a foreign trip taken by a public officer can be considered as proof of unexplained
wealth, it shall be first necessary to establish that the cost thereof is, in fact, manifestly
disproportionate to the latter's lawful income.
the Court finds that the CA erred when it considered the Ombudsman's findings regarding
the De Castros' alleged foreign trips as established facts, in the absence of substantial
evidence showing that such trips were in fact taken, and that it was reasonable to peg the
total cost of these trips at P2,100,000.00.
Nevertheless, the Court still finds that substantial evidence exists on record to hold
Leovigildo guilty of Dishonesty for having acquired assets manifestly disproportionate to his
lawful income, and concealing the same by deliberately placing them in the names of his
children.
Sections 7 and 8 of R.A. 3019[75] spells out the SALN requirement and lays down its
scope. These provisions state:
Section 8. Prima facie evidence of and dismissal due to unexplained wealth. — If in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred
seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency,
whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money
manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be
ground for dismissal or removal.
While mere omission from or misdeclaration in one's SALN per se do not constitute
Dishonesty, an omission or misdeclaration qualifies as such offense when it is attended with
malicious intent to conceal the truth,[76] as Dishonesty implies a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud.
Leovigildo's malicious intent to conceal the Disputed Assets is evident. Leovigildo
deliberately placed the Disputed Assets in the names of his children for the purpose of
concealing the same. While Leovigildo maintains that his children had the financial capacity
to acquire the Disputed Assets, the evidence on record clearly show otherwise.
LEO GERALD, his eldest son, is the registered owner of a condominium unit located in
Makati City which was acquired in 1995 through installment basis and fully paid in 1998 in
the total amount of P3,984,929.75.
As correctly observed by the Ombudsman, it was only on 3 January 1994 when LEO
GERALD was issued his license to practice his dental profession, thus, it is highly incredible
that he could have afforded to comply with the abovementioned terms of payment. Truly,
[the CA] can not come to terms with [Leovigildo's] stance that on LEO GERALD's first year
as a dentist, i.e., in 1994, the latter had earned close to P1.5 million.
Moreover, records show that in 1994 LEO GERALD likewise made an investment with
Lemar Export and Import Corporation worth P208,334.50. Then, a year after LEO GERALD
allegedly paid the last installment for the aforementioned condominium unit, he purchased a
450 square meter property in Muntinlupa in the amount of P3,825,000.00. Thereafter, a
house was built thereon which was valued at P1,883,600.00.
[Leovigildo] argues that the lot acquisition was financed by LEO GERALD's soon-to-be
parents-in-law, while the money used in the investment was advanced by Atty. RODRIGO
STA. ANA. The construction of the house was financed by the proceeds of the sale of LEO
GERALD and his wife's Toyota Land Cruiser on 2 April 2003.
This reasoning is likewise flawed.
the relationship of LEO GERALD and Atty. STA. ANA has never been established in the
instant case, thus, considering that at that time LEO GERALD was not yet financially
capable to undertake such investment, the source thereof is indeed highly suspicious.
Regarding the 450 square meter property in Muntinlupa City, per the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 3 December 1997, LEO GERALD paid the vendor, TAN TIONG, the full amount on
even date. However, the supposed loan, which was said to have financed the
aforementioned acquisition, was undertaken by LEO GERALD with the Spouses AVENA,
his soon-to-be parents-in-law, on 18 December 1997, which was notably 15 days after the
full payment of the property.
Similarly, the subject properties acquired by [Leovigildo's] other children, namely:
LEOVIGILDO, Jr., MARIE ANTOINETTE and MARINA ROSE, were proved by substantial
quantum of evidence [to have been] purchased during the time when the said children were
likewise not financially capable of acquiring the same.
Consequently, since Leovigildo failed to satisfactorily show that his children had the
capacity to acquire the Disputed Assets, the Ombudsman, and thereafter, the CA, correctly
arrived at the inescapable conclusion that the same were acquired by Leovigildo himself.
When a public officer's accumulated wealth is manifestly disproportionate to his lawful
income and such public officer fails to properly account for or explain where such wealth
had been sourced, he becomes administratively liable for Dishonesty.[80] In this case, the
disproportion between Leovigildo and Marina's declared income (P10,841,412.28) and the
acquisition cost of the Disputed Assets (P23,717,226.89) is too stark to be ignored.
Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS) then in force at the time the Complaint was filed, Dishonesty was classified as a
grave offense punishable by dismissal on the first instance, which penalty inherently carries
with it cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government service.[81] This penalty had been
adopted under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service now in force.
Hence, the Court finds that the penalty imposed upon Leovigildo is proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED IN
PART. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated April 29, 2009 and Resolution dated June 23,
2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 99752 are MODIFIED. The charge of Grave Misconduct against
petitioner Leovigildo A. De Castro is DISMISSED. However, his conviction for Dishonesty is
AFFIRMED, and accordingly, he is meted the corresponding penalty of DISMISSAL FROM
THE SERVICE and shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service. SO
ORDERED.
Title: Daplas vs Department of Finance (2017)

Facts:

Daplas, petitioner, joined the government service as clerk of Kawit, Cavite until she
became the Pasay City Treasurer. She was also concurrently holding the position of
Officer-inCharge, Regional Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance in
Cebu City.

Two separate complaints (1st: 2nd: )were filed against petitioner by the Department of
Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service and the Field Investigation Office of the
Office of the Ombudsman the respondent for averred violations of Sections 7 and 8 of
RA 3019, Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, Section 2 of RA 1379, Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code and Executive Order No. 6.
 This is due to her failure to disclose the true and detailed financial position in her SALN
constituting as Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the best
interest of the Service; such as failure in declaring a car, shares in a company, several
properties in Cavite and travelling multiple times abroad without securing a travel
authority.

In particular, petitioner failed to declare (a) a 1993 Mitsubishi Galant sedan registered

under the name of her late husband with an estimated value of P250, 000.00; (b) her
stock subscription in KEI Realty and Development Corp. (KEI) valued at P1, 500,000.00
and (c) several real properties in Cavite and traveled multiple times abroad without
securing a travel authority, which cast doubt on her real net worth and actual source of
income considering her modest salary.

The Ombudsman found her guilty of the said allegations. She filed an appeal with the
CA but the latter upheld the Ombudsman’s ruling.

Issue: Is the petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 8
(A) of RA 6713 for failure to disclose the true and detailed financial position in her
SALN?

Ruling: NO. The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987
Constitution in order to promote transparency in the civil service and operates as a
deterrent against government officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful
means.

By mandate of law, i.e., RA 6713, it behooves every government official or employee to

accomplish and submit a sworn statement completely disclosing his or her assets,
liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests, including those of his/her
spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households, in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth because the
latter usually results from nondisclosure of such matters.

Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer
or employee and would normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized,
however, that mere non-declaration of the required data in the SALN does not
automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to
conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a public officer or employee
becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration results in the
accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and
income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these
sources of income and acquisitions.
Thus, in several cases where the source of the undisclosed wealth was properly
accounted for, the Court deemed the same an “explained wealth” which the law does
not penalize. Consequently, absent any intent to commit a wrong, and having
accounted for the source of the “undisclosed wealth,” as in this case, petitioner cannot
be adjudged guilty of the charge of Dishonesty; but at the most, of mere negligence for
having failed to accomplish her SALN properly and accurately.

Digested by: Salman M. Johayr

Del Rosario v. People

[June 27, 2018]

Parties: Melita Del Rosario (petitioner)

Office of the Ombudsman (respondent)

Facts:

On October 28, 2004, The Ombudsman brought a complaint charging Melita O.

Del Rosario with the violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6713 for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for her failure to
file her SALNs for the years 1990 and 1991. The Ombudsman criminally charged the
petitioner in the MeTC with 2 violations docketed as Criminal Case No. 444354
and444355

On November 19, 2008, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash in Criminal Case
No. 444354 and Criminal Case No. 444355 on the ground of prescription of the
offenses. On September 18, 2009, the MeTC granted the Motion to Quash. The State
moved for the reconsideration of the quashal of the informations, but the MeTC affirmed
the quashal on April 23, 2010.

The State appealed to the RTC praying that the quashal be annulled and set
aside. In its decision dated October 6, 2010, the RTC upheld the assailed orders of the
MeTC. Undeterred, the State elevated the decision of the RTC to the Sandiganbayan,
arguing that the RTC had erred in ruling that the eight-year prescriptive period for
violation of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 commenced to run on the day of the commission
of the violations, not from the discovery of the offenses.

It was ruled that the period of prescription began from the discovery of the
violations; that it would be dangerous to maintain otherwise inasmuch as the successful
concealment of the offenses during the prescriptive period would be the very means by
which the offenders would escape punishment; and that reckoning the prescriptive
period from the date of the commission of the offenses would defeat the purpose for
which R.A. No. 6713 was enacted, which was to temper or regulate "the harsh
compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of
greed and avarice.

Issue:

Whether the period of prescription of the offenses charged against the petitioner
start to run on the date of their discovery instead of on the date of their commission

Ruling:

No. Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 mandates the submission of the sworn SALNs by
all public officials and employees, stating therein all the assets, liabilities, net worth and
financial and business interests of their spouses, and of their unmarried children under
18 years of age living in their households. Paragraph (A) of Section 8 sets three
deadlines for the submission of the sworn SALNs, specifically:(a) within 30 days from
the assumption of office by the officials or employees; (b) on or before April 30 of every
year thereafter; and (c) within 30 days after the separation from the service of the
officials or employees.

R.A. No. 6713 does not expressly state the prescriptive period for the violation of
its requirement for the SALNs. Hence, Act No. 3326 – the law that governs the
prescriptive periods for offenses defined and punished under special laws that do not
set their own prescriptive periods – is controlling. Section 1 of Act No. 3326 provides:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in

such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for
offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one
month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished
by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after
twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or
more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years.
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
 The complaint charging the petitioner with the violations was filed only on
October 28, 2004, or 13 years after the April 30, 1991 deadline for the submission of the
SALN for 1990, and 12 years after the April 30, 1992 deadline for the submission of the
SALN for 1991. With the offenses charged against the petitioner having already
prescribed after eight years in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326, the
informations filed against the petitioner were validly quashed.

The relevant legal provision on the reckoning of the period of prescription is Section 2 of
Act No. 3326:

Section 2. Prescription of violation penalized by special law shall begin to run

from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the violation be not
known at the time from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.
the following guidelines in the determination of the reckoning point for the period of
prescription of violations of RA 3019,

1. A
s a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the
offense.
2. I
f the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form
the date of discovery thereof.
3. I
n determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in
a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the
crime should first be determined.

If the information, data, or records from which the crime is based could be plainly
discovered or were readily available to the public, as in the case of the petitioner herein,
the general rule should apply, and prescription should be held to run from the
commission of the crime; otherwise, the discovery rule is applied.
Secondly, when there are reasonable means to be aware of the commission of the
offense, the discovery rule should not be applied. To prosecute an offender for an
offense not prosecuted on account of the lapses on the part of the Government and the
officials responsible for the prosecution thereof or burdened with the duty of making
sure that the laws are observed would have the effect of condoning their indolence and
inaction.
We fully concur with the observations of the RTC to the effect that the offenses
charged against the petitioner were not susceptible of concealment. As such, the
offenses could have been known within the eight-year period starting from the moment
of their commission. Indeed, the Office of the Ombudsman or the CSC, the two
agencies of the Government invested with the primary responsibility of monitoring the
compliance with R.A. No. 6713, should have known of her omissions during the period
of prescription.
 Thirdly, the Sandiganbayan's opinion that it would be burdensome and highly
impossible for the CSC, the Office of the Ombudsman and any other concerned agency
of the Government to come up with a tracking system to ferret out the violators of R.A.
No. 6713 on or about the time of the filing of the SALNs is devoid of persuasion and
merit.
The CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman both issued memorandum circulars in
1994 and 1995 to announce guidelines or procedures relative to the filing of the SALNs
pursuant to R.A. No. 6713. Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 95-13
(Guidelines/Procedures on the Filing of Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Networth
and Disclosures of Business Interests and Financial Connections with the Office of the
Ombudsman Required under Section 8, Republic Act No. 6713) publicized that the
Office of the Ombudsman would create a task force that would maintain a computerized
database of all public officials and employees required to file SALNs, and that such task
force would monitor full compliance: with the law. The circular further provided that:
"The administrative/personnel division shall likewise prepare a report indicating therein
the list of officials and employees who failed to submit their respective statements of
assets, liabilities and net worth and disclosures of business interests and financial
connections."
Considering that the memorandum circulars took effect prior to the commission of
the violations by the petitioner, it would be unwarranted to hold that the Office of the
Ombudsman could not have known of her omissions on the due dates themselves of
the filing of the SALNs. What we need to stress is that the prescriptive period under Act
No. 3326 was long enough for the Office of the Ombudsman and the CSC to investigate
and identify the public officials and employees who did not observe the requirement for
the submission or filing of the verified SALNs – information that was readily available to
the public.
Hence, the Court reverses and sets aside  the decision rendered on August 16,
2011 by the Sandiganbayan; and AFFIRMS the decision rendered on October 6, 2010
by the Regional Trial Court

G.R. No. 201176, August 28, 2019

ESTRELLA ABID-BABANO, PETITIONER, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
RESPONDENT.
The requirement under Republic Act No. 6713 1 and similar laws that the sworn
statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN) to be filed by every government
official must include assets, liabilities, and net worth of the spouse of the filer is
construed not to include the assets, liabilities, and net worth of spouses whose property
regime during the marriage is by law or by agreement prior to the marriage one of
complete separation of property.

FACTS:
Thru anonymous complaint, the PAGC formally charged Babano for violation of Section
7, RA 3019 and Section 8, RA 6713 arising from her failure to disclose in her Statement
of Assets, Liabilities and [Net Worth] (SALN) certain real properties and motor vehicles,
as follows:

2. T
hat contrary to her declaration that there is only one (1) home lot situated in
Naawan Misamis Oriental, Dir. Babano actually owns three (3) residential lots in
Brgy. Linangcayan, Misamis Oriental.

4. T
hat aside from the above-mentioned, Dir. Babano further failed to declare in her
SALN for the years 2000-2005 the following vehicles to wit: one (1) 1997 Isuzu
Hilander with Plate No. KCC 329 and one (1) 1996 Honda Civic with Plate No.
GHR 999:
Interposing the defenses that the undeclared motor vehicles are not her[s] but of her
husband, Macmod S. Pangandaman, and the fact that she correctly declared the
amount of P400,000.00 in her SALN corresponding to the acquired assets although
their details were inaccurately stated due to inadvertence, [petitioner] denied the
charges.

"[Petitioner] in her SALN, list[s] the property as a 'house and lot' despite the fact that the
property is actually composed of a house and three lots. However, [she] correctly
indicated that the acquisition cost of the said 'house and lot' as Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php 400,000), which is the consideration in the Deed of Sale."

Anent the charge under paragraph 3, PAGC found [petitioner] "guilty of simple neglect
of duty for failing to perform her legal obligation to disclose her assets, liabilities and [net
worth], including that of her spouse as mandated by law. [Petitioner] herself admitted
that her own spouse owns an Isuzu Highlander (sic) and a Honda Civic. These
properties should have been reported in her SALN. Her failure to do so exposes her to
disciplinary actions."
According to PAGC, "Section 8 (A) of R.A. 6713 requires public officials and employees
to file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure
of Business Interest and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households." Also,
PAGC noted that for want of proof of intent to deceive the government, [petitioner]
cannot be held liable for dishonesty and/or falsification.

RULING OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT:

- OP upheld the recommendations and findings of the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) except that on the penalty.

CA:
Petitioner appealed the decision of the OP, namely: (1) both petitioner and her husband
were Muslims whose property regime was that of complete separation of property as
provided by Presidential Decree No. 1083 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws); (2)
petitioner's husband did not live with her in her household but with his first wife in a
separate household; and (3) he was also a government employee who "had or ought to
have filed his own SALN."7
The CA denied the petition for review on October 21, 2011, 8 and affirmed the ruling of
the OP.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE NON-INCLUSION BY PETITIONER IN HER SALN OF THE
VEHICLES OWNED BY AND REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF HER HUSBAND IS
CORRECT OR A NEGLECT OF DUTY OR A MISTAKE IN GOOD FAITH.

HELD:
The requirement of filing the SALN is imposed by no less than the 1987 Constitution,
and its objectives are to promote transparency in the civil service and to establish a
deterrent against government officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful
means
SECTION 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. - Every public officer, within thirty days
after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of
every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon
his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the
corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an
independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the
Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the
corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two
months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first statements in the
following months of January.
The purpose of the law on SALN disclosure is to suppress any questionable
accumulation of wealth that usually results from the nondisclosure of such matters

ADVERSE REVERSAL OF CA RULING:

Both petitioner and her husband were Muslims. She was his second wife. Article 38 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws specifically defines their regime of property relations
as Muslims to be one of complete separation of property, to wit:

Article 38. Regime of property relations. The property relations

between the spouses, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary
in the marriage settlements or any other contract, shall be governed
by the regime of complete separation of property in accordance with
this Code and, in a suppletory manner, by the general principles of
Islamic law and the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 4216 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws lays down the effect

of the regime of complete separation of property for Muslim spouses,
and each spouse fully exercises all acts of ownership and
administration over his or her own exclusive property, without any
need for consent from the other spouse.

As to what are considered the exclusive property of either spouse,

Article 41 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states:

ARTICLE 41. Exclusive property of each spouse. - The following shall be the exclusive
property of either spouse:

(a) Properties brought to the marriage by the husband or the wife;

(b) All income derived by either spouse from any employment, occupation or trade;

(c) Any money or property acquired by either spouse during marriage by lucrative title;

(d) The dower (mahr) of the wife and nuptial gifts to each spouse;

(e) Properties acquired by right of redemption, purchase or exchange of the exclusive

property of either; and

(f) All fruits of properties in the foregoing paragraphs.

In view of Section 38 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, the exemption of petitioner

from the disclosure requirement should be clear and undisputed. As such, petitioner's
non-disclosure in her SALN of the properties pertaining to her husband and held by her
husband outside of her own household with him was not actionable.
THRESHOLD AGE OF UNMARRIED CHILD
The addition of the threshold age for unmarried children under Republic Act No. 6713 in
relation to the SALN disclosure requirement was rationalized by Senator Rene
Saguisag in his sponsorship speech of the legislative proposal, to wit:

On age, since there is a requirement here - that a public official has to report the assets,
liabilities, net worth, business and financial interest of minors living with the public
official, we decided to lower the cut-off age to 18, and he must be living with the public
official. In one of the bills now before us, it is entirely possible even for an 18-year old to
be an acting mayor. If he lives separately from his parent who is a public official, it
seems pointless to require his parents to include him in the reporting requirement. 18

If the rationale for excluding the properties of the public official's emancipated child from
the SALN is the child's legal capacity to hold property independently and separately
from the parents, that rationale should equally apply to a public official's spouse, who by
law or by ante-nuptial agreement, may unilaterally acquire and dispose of his or her own
properties under a regime of complete separation of property. Indeed, the evil sought to
be prevented by our laws on the SALN, i.e. that a spouse would be used to conceal
from the public the full extent of a government employee's wealth and
financial/proprietary interests, does not exist in the case of a public employee and
his/her spouse whose property regime is complete separation of property considering
that whatever properties are held by each spouse is exclusively his/her own and can
only be counted towards his/her own "wealth."