, GLOSSARY

Sinn
stu£
=

level [of l concept or function]

(unbestimmt) andeuten1 indicate (inde.finhely)

ungerade (Bedeutung) indirect (reference) [i.e. pertain.ing

BEGRIFFSSCHRIFT

to words in Of'1l/iD obliqull or

vinu.aI. oralio obliqUIIJ
a forrnali..zed Language of pure Thought modelled upon the
ungesattigt;2- ·\lIl.5at\lratOO '
Language of Arithmetic
Vorstdlungl
idea..
pnnte
imar
[regarded :as enentiall~·
First publiilied in I879
Wahrheitnvl':rth truth-value
Werthverkuf value-range, range of v:alues [of a
fimctioo] "1. EXPLANATION OF THE SYMBOlS

1 Th.i.o term ~ applied to pronouw (e.g. relative proooum) :and also to let~ ~ as
nriablC'$. (Frcgc dillihd the term 'variable'; d. his essay W!w il • FomctiV1l lj
I This u frege', term for ouch mgmcntary c:xprc...ions as '__ amque:red Gaul' or
'the ~pi~ 0( _ _'; and Us., (0'< thOr &dnuImg, i.e. wh:lllhcy uand for. He ouy well
htve Iuod in miod unsaturated mokcules, which, wilholU diDOIllbon ollhcir cxistiDS
Icructure, fU Wtt: up more atoms. To cmptwiu.. :as Frese docs, the mefapbori....J ""run:
or the lam, we alwaY' wricC" it in quontion rnuks.
'Conu:uteifWitb Bttriffand ~ (q.v.).
-
indeterminateness, it must be laid down clut a letter retains in a
§I
THB symbols used in the generaJ theory of magnitude WJ into
cwo kinds. The first coruises of the Jenas ; each letter represents
either an indeterminate number or an indeterminate function.
This indeterminateness makes it possible [0 express by means of
letten the gener~1 validity, of propositions; e.g. : (a b)c = .a~ +
be. The other kind contalns such symbols as +, -, V, 0, 1,2,
C2ch. of these has its own proper meaning;'
I aJopt this fimdamefltal iJelt of JisJitlgllishing two kiruls of sym/wts
(which unfortUnately is not strictly carried. out in the theory of
magnirude*) in order to make it generally appliwble in the wider
domain of pllre thought. Accordingly, I divide all the symbols
[ we into those that can be taketl to mean various things and those
that have a fully determinate sense. The first kind are letters, and
their main task is to be the expression of gffltrality. For all their
given context the meaning once given to it.

§ 2 . Judgment

A judgment is always to be expressed by means of the sign

I-­
This stands to the left of the sign or complex of signs in which
the content of the judgment is given. If we omit the little vertical
p.2] stroke at the left end of the horizontal stroke, then the
• Q,ruider the symbob I, lo g, sin, lim.
" I tender BtrlNtullg by 'm~aning' or '$iguitkat'lce' throughout this work, ~ Frege
had not yet ocgun to usc it in his own ' ped al '~me . Vuiow other wordJ, e.g. Btgrijf
('ooncepf) OJId VQrslell,mg ('id."..') are :also uled in I b:s prer:Ue $e!Ue than he later gave
ttl them.
2 TItANSL ATIONS FROM THE WRITINGS Of GOlTLOB PR.£GE
judgment is to be transformed into a mere complex of ideas; the
author is not expressing his recognition or non-recognition of
the truth of this. Thw, lee
I--A*
mean the judgment: 'unlike magnetic poles attract one another.'
In that case
-A
will not express this judg ment; it will be intended just to produce
in the reader the idea of the mutual attraction of unlike magnetic
poles-so that, e.g., he may make jnferen c ~ from this thought
and test its CQrreCOless on the basis of chese. In this case w e
qualify the expression with me words 'the cirwmstanre that' or
',he proposition lhal.'
Not every content can be turned into ~ judgment by ~refucing
1-- to a symbol for the content~ e.g. the idea 'house cannot.
Hence we distinguish COD tents that are, and contents that are not,
possible COIl/ClltS ofjlldgment.t
As a constitue,Y-t of the sign f-- the horizontal stroke combines the
symbolsjolfowiug ir into a who'e; assertion, wlricT! is expressd by tfte
vertical stroke at the left tnd of the horiz ontal olte, felflles to tilt whole
thus fanned. The horizon tal stroke I wish to call the conum-stroke,
and the vertical the judgl'l1e11t-stroke. The content-stroke is aho co
serve the purpose of relating any sign whatsoever to the whole
formed by the symbols following the stroke. TIle CO/I tent of what
follows Ihe cotttent-stroke mJlSt always be d possible cOlltent ofjudgmcnr.
§J
A distinction of subject md predicate finds no plact in my way of
representing a j udg ment. In order to justify this. let me observe
that there are two ways in which the content of cwo judgments
may differ; it may, or it may not, be the case that all inferences
that can be drawn from the first j udgment whcn combined with
"I tlse Greek uncials u I bI're\,j~ tioru; if I give DO lpecial. ex plan~ t:ion of them r wUh
(he .e:ldcr to oupply an ~ pr.opri2U: >C1l5e.
1 On the otbcr h~nd, the cin: ..orut.ltIfr of lhet¢ btoing hollses (or .. bouse) ;., possible
cono:;n, ofjudgmenl. (e£. S12.) BUllhe idca 'house' u unly P"'"lof this. I.. the proposition
'P riam'l house wu ofwood' we (mnOI replace 'house' by 'circul1ll w)cc ufthcre being
a hOll$c.' . ..
BEGRIFFSSCHRIFT 3
p. 3] certain oroer o nes can always also be drawn from the second
when combined with the same o ther judgments. The two
, propositions 'the Greeks defeated the Persians at P!.ataea' and 'the
Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea' differ in the
former way; even if a slight difference of sense is discernible,
the agreement in scnse is preponderant. Now I call the part of
the content that is the same in both the amuptual content, Only
this has significance for our symbolic language; we need therefore
make no distinction between propositions that have me same
conceptual content. When people say '~le ,SUbjilit is thec?n~t
with which the judg,l?ent is concerned,' diiS app 'es equillf'well
to the o bject. Thuiill that can be said is : 'the su~ ect is the concept
with which the j udgment is~.s:.oncemed. In language the
place occupied by the subject mthe word-ordec has the signib­
canee of a specially important place; it is where we put what we
wane the hea", eo ,ttend to specially. (ef. also § 9.) This
may, c.g., have the purpose of indicating a rclarion between this
judgment and others, and thus making it easier for the hearer to
grasp the whole sequence of thought. All such aspects o flanguage
are merely results of the reciprocal action of speaker and hearer;
e.g, the speaker takes account of what the hearer expects , and
tries to set him upon the right track before actually unering
the judgment. In m y formalized l.mgwge there is nothing that
corresponds; only thac part of j udgments w hich affects the
possible inferences is taken into consideration. Whatever is needed
for a valid inference is fully expressed; what is not needed is for
the most part not indicated either; no Slope is left for conjecture.
In this I fullow absolucdy ehe example of the formolized langu>ge
of mathematics; here too, subject and predicate can be
distinguished only by doing violence to the thought. We may
imagine a language in which the proposition 'Archimedes
perished at the capture of Syracuse' would be expressed in the
following way : ' the violent death of Archimedes at the capture
of Syracuse is a fact: You may if you like distinguish. subject
and predicate even here; but the subject contains the whole
p. 4] content, and the only purpose of the predicate is to present
this in the form of a judgment. Such a lallJuafte would have only a
single predicate Jor all judgments, viz. 'is a jat.l . We see that there
is no question here of subject and pred.iC2te in the ordinary sense.
4 TRANSLATIONS FROM THE WRITINGS Of GOrnOB FRECE
Our symbolic language is a language .of this sort j the symbol
is the co,mnON predicate oj41Ljmigmenrs.
In my first draft of a formalized language [ was misled by the
example of or.dinary language into compounding judgments out
of subject and prediQte. But I soon convinced myself that this
was obstructive of my special purpose and merely led to useless
protixity.
§4
The follo'Ni.ng remarks are to explain the ~gnificance. rehrive
to Out purpose, of the distinctions people make as regards judg­
mans. . have the four following possibilities :
People distinguish universal and paniclllar judgments; this is
properly a distinction between contents, not between judgments.
What Ont ought to, say is; 'tJ judgment lI,host colllent is ullill,trsal
(ptJrticular)." For the content has these properties even when
it is presente4. not as a judgment, but as a proposition. (Cf. § 2.)
The same dlln~ hold! ~ood for negation. Thus, in an indirect
proof one says suppose the segments AB and CD were not
teqwl.' There is a negation involved here in the content: the
segmenb All and CD not being equal; but this content, though
sWb-ble matter for judgment, is not presented in the shape of a
judgment. Negation thus attaches to the content, no matter
whether this occun in the shape of a judgment or not. I therefore
hold it more smb-hIe to regard negation as a mark of a possible
content ofjudgment.
The distinction of judgments into categorical, hypothetical,
and disjunctive seems to me to have :l merdy grammatical
significance.·
/" What distinguishes the apodeictic from the assertonc judgment
is that it indicates the existence of gene.ra1 judgments from which
the proposition may be inferred-an indication that is absent in
thc..~~.toric judgment. Ifr term a proposition 'necessary,' then
I am givin~ a hint as to my grouOOs for judgment. Bu; 'his Jo~s
p. s] not 0 eClthe conceptual content of thejuJgmenl;-anJ therefore tile
apockiaic qrm of ajuJgtnClt has not for OUT purposes any significance.
If a proposition is (,resented as possible. wen either the speaker
is refraining from judgment, :md indicating at the same time that
• My grOWlW for IhU will be: brought 001 ~y me wllole of chil work.
BliCRIFFSSCffRIFT 5
r­ he is not acquainted with any laws from which the negation of
the proposition would follow; or dse be is saying that the
negation of the proposition is. in general £Use. In the latter case
we have what is usually termed a pdrtiwlar affin1lctillt judgment.
(Cf. § 12.) 'It is possible that the Emil will Doe day eollide with
another celestial body' is an example of the first case; 'a chill may
result in death,' of the second case.
§ 5. Condilirmality
If A and B stand for possible contents of judgment (§ 2), we
(i A affumed, B affumed;
(ii A affumed. B denied;
(iii A denied, B affumed;
(iv A denied, B denied.
f--c:
stmds foe the judgment that the third possibility is not realiztd. but
one of the other three is. Accordingly, the den.ial of
is
T:
an assertion that the third possibility is realized, i.e. that A is
denied and B allinned.
From among the cases where
--C:
is affirmed, the following nuy he specially emphasized:
(I) A is to be affirmod.-In this case the content of B is quite
indifferent. Thus. let ~ A mean: 3 x 7 = 2 t ; let B stand for
the circumstance of the suu's shining. Here only the fint two
cases OUt of the four mentioned above are possible. A ca.usal
p. 6] connexion need not exist between the two contenC'S.
(2) B is to be d..enied.-In this case rh.e content of A is indif­
ferent. E.g. let B stand for the cirCUIJUta.nce of perpetual
motion's being possible, and A for the CU'CWllStance of the world's
 6 TRANSLATIONS fROM THE WlUTINGS OF GOTI'LOB FREGE
being infinite. Here only the second and fourth of the four cases
are possible. A causal cannexion between A and B need not
exist.
(3) Ooe may form thejudgment
~:
",d the second and fourth by, f - B.
without knowing whether A and B are to be affinned or denied.
E.g. let B stand for the circumstance of the Moon's being in
quadrature with the Sun, and A the circumstance of her appearing
semicircular. 10 this case we may render
f--cA
B.
by means of the conjunction 'if'; 'if the Moon is in quadr'3.tuce
with the Sun, thea she appears semicircular.' The causal
conoexion implicit in the word 'if' is. however, not expressed
by our symbolism; although a judgment of chis SO rt can be made
only on the ground of such a cannexion. For this connex:ion is
something general, and as yet we have no expression for
• gmerality. (C( § 11.)
The vertical stroke joining the two hOrUontal ones is to be
called the corniiootlal stroke. The part of the upper horizouca1
stroke clut occurs to the left of the f ODditionai stroke is the
content-stroke relative to the meaning l,r rhe com.plex symbol
LAB.
which has just been defined; any symbol that is meant to relate to
the content of the expression as a whole will be attached to this
content-$croke. The put of the horizontal stroke lying between
A and Pte conditional stroke is the contenr-stroke of A. The
horizontal stroke to the left of B is the content-stroke of B. ...
p.7J §6
From the explanation given in § 5 it u obvious that from the
two jU'dgmeon
1-[.: and f-B
BECRlFFSSCHR1FT 1
there follows the new judgment r
A. Of the fouc cases
enumerated above, the third is excluded by
f--c~
so clut only the first remains . ...
P.9] Following Aristo tle, logicians enumerate a whole series of
kinds ofinference; I usc just thls one-at an y ratein all cases where
• a DeW judgment is derived from more than ODe single judgmenc.
For the mun implicit in another form of inference c;\Jl be
expressed in a judgment of the form: if M holds and N holds
then A holds ilia; symbolically.
~&
Fmm this judgment. and f - N. and f - M. ~ A will then
foUow as above. An inference, of wh.:atever kind, may he reduced
to our ca5e in this way. Accordingly it is possible to get along
with a single form of inference; and thtrefore penpicuiry denunds
that we should do so. Moreover, if we did not there would be
no reason to confine ourselves to the Ariscotelian forms of
inference; we could go on adding new forms indefinitely....
TJris restriction to a single form of inference ;s hOIl/ever ill no way
mealll to ~9ress a psychological propositiotl; we arc jllSt seul;IIg a
qlff~stio" ofJormulatio'l, willt a view to the greatest cOlwetlicflCe for Ollr
purpOJe. ...
p.IOJ § 7. Negation
If a snWl vertical slroke is :attached to the lower ,side of the
concenc-5n:oke, thls shall express the circumstance of the content's
not being the case. Thus, e.g., the meaning of
h- A
is: 'A is not the case.' I call this small vertical stroke the Jlegalioll­
stroke. The part of the horizoncal strok.e occwring to the righr of
the negation-stroke is the content-stroke of A; the put occurring
B
8 TRANSLATIONS FROM DiE WRJT[N'GS OF GO'ITlOB FR.EGE BEGRIFFSSCIIRlFT 9

to the left of the negarion-stroke is the content--stroke of the i.e. that nothing besides A and B is thinkable. E.g. if a gaseous
negation of A. Here as elsewhere in our symbolism, no judg­ nuss is hea.ted, then either its volume or its pressure increases.
ment is performed if the judgment--stroke is absent. Secondly, the expression
---,- A 'A or B'

merdy requires the formation of the idea that A is not the case, may combine the meaning of
without expressing whether this idea is true. A A
We now deal with some cases where the symbols of con­
ditionality and negation are combined.
L B and that of ---r,:: B
so that (i) there is no third possibility besides A and B. (i.i) A

f-r::~
and B are mutually exclusive. ill that case only the following
two possibilities remain out of the four:
Qleans: 'the case in which B is to be affirmed and the negation of A affirmed, B denied;
A is to be denied does not occur'; in other words, 'the possibility A denied, B affmned.
of affirming both A and B does not exist,' or 'A and B are
mutually exclusive.' Thus only the three following cases remain : Of these two uses of the expression 'A or B' the more impo rtant
is the ftf'S(, which does not exclude the coexistence of A and B;
A affirmed, B denied;
and Wi shall U$l tlu: word 'or' with this "1Ieaning. Perhaps it is suitable
A denied, B allirmed;
to clistillguim between 'o r' and 'either-or,' regarding only the
A denied, B denied.
latter as having the subsidiary meaning of mutual exclusion. In
From what has already been said, it is easy to determine the that ca5e
meaning possessed by each of the three parts of the horizontal --A
stroke preceding A. l,- B
~~

may be rendered by 'A or B' ...

p.IZ) ~~
means: 'the case in which A is denied and the negation of B is
p. I I] affirmed does no t exist'; o r, 'A and B cannOt both be
denied.' There remains only the following possibilities:
A affirmed , B affltmed;
means:
'L:

i~ denied'; or 'the case in which A and B are bach affirmed

A affirmed, B denied; occurs.' Contrariwise, the three possibilities left open by
A denied, B affirmed.
-rrA
A and B between them exluust all possibilities. N ow the words L..B
, are used in cwo ways. In its first meaning,
'or: 'either-or:
are excluded. Accordingly, we may render
'A orB'
means just the same as
~~

---r;: ~,
by 'both A and B are £acts.' ...

10 TRANSLATIONS FROM THE WRlTINGS OF GO'ITLOB FREGE
We have here expressed 'and' by means of the symools for
conditionality and negation; instead, we might conversely
express conditionality by Dleans of a symbol for 'and' and the
symbol for negation. We might, say, ina-oduce
l~
as a ~ymbol foe the combined content of r and .::I, and then
render
p.Il] -C:
by
-riTA
I chose the other way because inference seemed to be expressed
more simply that way. The distinction between 'and' and 'but'
is of slich a kind as not to be expressed in our symbolism. The
speaker uses 'but' when he wants co hint that whac follows is
different from what you might at flISt suppose.
~-B
,A
means: 'the case wh.ece A and B ate both denied occurs.' We
may thus render it as:
I
'neither A not B is a fact.'
Clearly we are here concerned with the words 'or,' 'and,'
'neither ... nor' only in so far as they combine possible contents
of judgment. I.
§ 8. Equality ofcontent
Equality of content differs from conditionality and negation
by [elatiltS to names, not to contents. Elsewhere, signs are mere
proxies for their content, and thus any phrase they occur in
JUSt expresses a relation between their various contents; but
names at once appear in propria persona so soon as they :ne joined
PrEI4 together by the symbol for equality of content; for this
si . es the circumstance of two names' baving the same cootent.
T us, aloog with. the introduction of a symbol for equality
,
BEGRlFFSSCHRIFT 11
of content, all symbols are necessarily given a double mean:ing­
the same symbols stand now for their own content, now fat
mcmsdves. At first sight this makes it appear as though it were
here a matter of something perWning only CO aprasion, not to
thought; as though we Iud no need. of twO symbols for the same
content, and therefore no need of a symbol
for equality of content either. In order to
show the unreality of this appearance, I choose
the following example from geometry. Let a
fixed point A lie aD the circumference of '
a circle, and let a straight..lio.e rotate around
! "'tAo
this. When this straigptline forms a diameter,
let us call the opposite end to A ~e point B A, the line tunu in the
corffiJ.5Orlding to tliis position. ThenJet us direction of the arro~,
go on to call the point of -intersection of the Dlnovuto~sA,till
they eOll>od~.
straight line and-the cir~mference, tlIepoine B
corresponding to th~ posjtion of the_ str~t line at any given
time; this point is giv~Lby the rule that .to cQ.nl;inuous changes
in the position of the straiglii-liiietheremust always correspond
continuous changes in the position of B.' Thus the name B has
an indeterminate meaning until the corresponding position of
the straight line is given. We may now ask: what point corre­
sponds to the position of the straight line in which it is perpen­
dicuJar to dte diameter? The answer will be: The point A. The
name B thus h.u in this case the same content as the name A;
and yet we could D.ot antecedently use jwt one name, for only
the answer to the question justified our doing so. The same
point is determin.ed in a double way:
(I) It is directly given in experience;
(2) It is given as the point B corresponding co the straight line's
being perpendicular to the diameter.
To each of thes.e two ways of determining it there answers a
separate name. The need of a symbol for equality of content
thus rests on the following fact: The same content can be fully
determined in different ways; and tliat, in a particular case, ,he
same content acrually is given by tlllO ways of determining it,
is the content of a judgment. Before this judgment is made, we
must supply, corresponding to the two ways of determinacion,
• We luve 20ddcd a dagnm co help tb~ ~u.

12 TItANSLAnONS FROM TIlE WRmNGS Of 00TI1.0n fREGE
rwo different names for the thing thus determined. The judgment
p. I$J needs to be expressed by means of a symbol for equality
of content, joining the two names together. It is clear from this
that different mmes for the same content are not a1ways jmt a
trivial DUtter of formulation; if they go along with. different
WOlys of determining the contc:nt, they are relevant to the csscntial
narure of the case. In these circumstances the judgment as to
equality of content is, in Kant's sense. synth.ecic. A more super­
ficial re:ason for introducing a symbol for equality of content is
that sometimes it is convenient to introduce an abbreviation in
place of a lengthy expression; we then have to exprcss equality
of content between the abbreviation and the original formula.
HA ~ B)
is to mean: the symbol A and the symbol B have the 5,mu cOllleptllal
cOlltent, so thm A can always be r~plaad by B mId amversdy.
§ 9. The Function
kt us suppose that there is expressed in our formaliud lan­
guage the circwl1stance of hydrogen's being lighter than cubon
dioxide. In place of the symbol for hydrogen we may insert
the symbol for oxygen or nitrogen. This changes the sense in
such a way that 'oxygen' or 'nitrogen' enters into the relations
dut 'hydrogen' stood in before. If an expression is thought of as
variable in this way, it is split up into a constant part representing
the totality of these relations and :l. symbol. imagined as replace­
able by others, that stmds for the object related by the reiaciolU.
By this definition, something ma.y occur in the function
I call the one part a function, the other an argwnent. 'This distinc­
tion bas nothing to do w:ith the concepnuJ content; it concerns
only our way of looking at it. In the UUlmCT of treatment just
mdicared, 'hydrogen' was the argument and 'being lighter than
carbon dioxide' the function; but we em equilly look at the same
conceprual content in such a way that 'carbon dioxide' is the
argument and 'being heavier than hydrogen' is the function.
p. 16] We need in this case merdy to imagine 'carbon dioxide'
as
, rep.l.u:eOlble
. , by other ideas like 'hydrochloric acid gas' or
ammorua .
'The clrc:umstall..ce of carbon dioxide's being heavier than
BECIUR'SSCHRlFT 13
hydrogen' and 'The circumsbllce of carbon dioxide's being
heavier than oxygen' are the same function w:ith. dilfereo.t
ugumcn~ if we treat 'hydrogen' and 'oxygen' as arguments;
on the other hand, they are dilferent functions of the same
a.gument if we regard 'carbon dio.xide' :as the ugument.
Let our example now be: 'the circumstance that the centre of
mass of the soIU" system hu no accderatioD provided that none
but internal forces act on the solar system: \ Here \olar system'
occnn in twO places. We may therefore regard chis as a function
of the aryument 'solar system' in various ways, according as we
imagine soar system' to be replaceable at its first occurrence
or at its second or at both (in the last case, replaceable by the
same thing both times). These three functions are all different.
The proposition 'Cato killed Cato' shows the SWle thing. If we
imagine <Cato' as repl.a.ceable at irs first occurrence, wen 'killing
Cato' is the function; if we imagine 'Cato' as replaceable at its
second occurrence, then 'being killed by Caro' is the function;
finilly, if we imagine 'Cato' as replaceable at both occurrences,
then 'killing oneself' is dle function.
The matter may now be expressed generally as foUo~:
Suppose Ibm a simple or complex symbol oc.curs in one or more
places in an expression (whose content nw! not be apo.ujble conietlt of
judgmtnt). If we imagi"e this symbol as replactable by another (the
same one eac'; time) at one or more olits ocomelUtS, then the part ofthe
expression that shows itself invariant under such replacement is called
the funaion; ami the replaaable part, the drgu~t of the Junction.
,
both as an argument and also at positions where it is not regarded
as replaceable; we must thw distinguish argument-positions .in
the function from other positions.
_.p. 17] I should like at this point to give a warning :ag:Unst a
Wbcy that ordinary language easily leads to. Comparing the
two propositions
• 'the number can be represented as the sum of four
20 sqUllCS'
and
'every positive integer can be represented as the sum of four
squares,'

14 TllANSlATIONS FRO M THE WRITINGS O f GOlTLOB flUGE BECR.!Ff"SSCHRIFT 15

it seems possible to regard 'being representable as the sum of another part of the proposition as the principal argument by a
four squares' as a fM crion whose argument is 'the number 20' choice between inflexions and words, e.g. between
one time and 'every positive integer' the other time. We may active and passive,
see that this view is mistaken if we observe that 'the number 20' 'heavier' ""d 'ligh",,:
and 'every positive integer' are not concepts o f the same rank. 'give' and 'receive';
What is asserted. of the number 20 cannot be asserted in the same
but this ~berty is restricted by lack of words.
sense of (the conceplJ 'every positive integer'; of course it may
in certain circumstances be assertihle o f every positive in teger.
The expression 'every positive integer' just by itself, unlike 'the §10
nwnber 20: gives no complete idea; it gets a sense only through In ordtr to expess all i"detenninate fiWltio1l of the orglll1l(flt A, we
the context of the sentence. put A i" brackets after a ielur, as in
W e acuch no importance to the various ways that the same
conceptual content may be regarded as a (Mcrion of this o r that
<Z>(A)
Similarly
argument, SO long as function and argument are completely
'P(A.B)
determinate. But if the argument becomes indeterminate, as in
dIe judgment : 'wlutever arbitnry positive integer you may means afimctirm (not further de:ermi,lel) of the two arguments A and
take as argument for "being representable as the sum of four B. Here the plam of A mid B within the brackets represetlt the plcues
squares," the proposition alw ays remains true,' men
the distinc­ oco.pied by A am! B in the fimction (whether A md B c:ach occupy
tion between function and argument becomes significant as one phce in it or more). Accordingly ill general
regards the amu,l!. Conversdy, the argument may be determin­ 'P (A,B) and 'P(B,A)
ate and the function indeterminate. [n both ~es , in view of the are diffemu.
contrast aelermilUlte--illdeurmilfate or mort and less determinate, the Indeterminate funcrions of several arguments are expressed
whole proposition splits up into function and arglmlt"t as regards ,itniJ>,ly.
I
its own coment, not just as regards our way of1ooking at it. f---4l(A)
Suppose that a symbol occurring in a function has so far been may be read as 'A has the property ~'.
imagined as not replaceable; if we 'lOW imagine it as replaceable at
some or all oj the positiolls where it occurs,· this way oj looking at it f--'P(A,B)
p. ] 8] gives us aJUt/Cliorl IIIitli a further argumoll besides tile previous may be read as 'B stands in the If'-rehtion to A' or as 'B is a result
one. In this way we get fUfIltions of two or more arglUllems. E.g. of applying the operation If' (0 the object A.'
'ilie circumstance of hydrogen's being lighter th.a.n carbon di­ [n the expcessioo
oxide' may be regarded as a fun ction ofilie arguments 'hydrogen' <Z> (A)
and 'carbon dioxide.'
, p. I9J the symbolrb occun in one place; and we may imagine it
The speaker usually intends the subject to be taken as the replaced. by other symbols lJI, X , so as to express diR"erent func­
principal argument; the next in importance oftm appears as the tions of the argument A; we tl1ay thlls regard ¢ (A) as a junction
object. Language has the liberty of arbitrarily presenting one or of t'~ argumtnt CPo This makes it specially clear that the concept
of f~Ulction in Analysis, which in general I have followed, is far
• O r ag3in: if.ll symbol alrnd )' reptdcd :u r(~bl£ is oow imagiued to be- rcpboe-­
~ u those of ill ocrun~ which"WCte p.rev~udy ttga.nlod II OOClSQU.t. more rcstricted than tht. one developed here.
16 TRANSL....TIONS PROM THE WRITINGS OF GOlTLOB FRl!GE
§ 11. Gen",/ity
In the expression for a judgment, the complex symbol to the
right of r--- may always be regarded as a function of one of
the symbols that occur in it. Let us replace this argmnent with a
Gothic lener, and insert a concavity in tJ~ content-slroke, muJ make
thiJ same Gothic 'mer statu) oller the concallity: e.g .:
~(o)
This signifies the judgment that tfle fimctio1l is a facl whatever we take
ilS argument to be. A letter used as a functional symbol, like f/J
in f/J(A), may itself be regarded as the argument of a function;
accordingly, it may be replaced by a Gothic letter, used in the
sense I have JUSt specified. The only restrictions imposed on the
I A
meaning of a Gothic letter are tbe obvious ones: (i) that the com­
plex of symbols following a content-stroke must still remain
a possible content ofjudgment (§ z); (ii) that if the Gothicletter
occurs as a functional symbol, account must be taken of this
circumstance. All further conditions imposed upon the alfowable
substitutions Jor a Gothic [etrer must be made part of the judgment.
From such a judgment, therefore, we can always deduce any
number we like of judgments with 1m general content, by substi­
tuting something different each time for the GodUc leu.er; when
this is done, the concavity in the content-stroke vanishes again.
The horizontal stroke that occurs to the left of the concavity in
a scopes in the same judgment, and the meaning we may ascribe
hJ-4>(o)
is the content-stroke for [the proposition] that fP(o) holds good
whatever is substiruted for a; the stroke occurring to the right of
p. wJ the concavity is the content-stroke of¢! (a)-we must here
imagine something definite substituted for a.
:By what was said before about the meaning of the judgment­
stroke, it is easy to see what an expression like
bya. It is naturally legitimate to replace a Gothic letter every­
~X(o)
BOCR.JFFSSCHRIFT 17
means. This exp~on may occur as part of a judgment, as in
~-X(o), ~A
L(',-X(o)
It is obvious that from these judgments we cannOt infer less
general judgments by substituting something definite for a, as
we can from
f-~-X(o)
~X(o) serve< to deny that X(o) is .lways a fact wharevcr
we substitute for a. But this does not in any way deny the pos­
sibility of giving a some meaning.d such that X(i1) is a fact.
'1
L~_X(o)
means that the case in whicb .::-~~_(Q1 is affirmed and A
denied does not occuc. :But this Toes no t in any way deny the
occurrence of the case in which X(.:::I) is affirmed and A denied;
for , as we have just seen, X(d) may be affirmed and neverthdess
~X(a) denied. Thus here likewise. we cannot make an
arbi.trary substitution for a without prejudice to the truth of the
judgment. This explains why we need the concavity with the
Gothic letter written on i.t; it delimits the scope nf the generality
signified by the letter. A Gothk letter retains a fixed meaning only
within its swpe; the same Gothic letter may occur within various
to it in one scope does not extend to any other scope. The scope
of one Gothic letter may include that of anomer, as is shown in
p.21J
h°rr-A(o)
. - 1-6- B(o, e)
.
In this case dilJeret1l letters must be chosen; we could not replace e
I
I where in its scope by some other definite letter, provided that
there are still different letters standing where different letters
"

lS TR..... NSLAn ONS FROM THE WRITINGS O F GOTTlOB fREGE BEGRlFFSSCHRiFT 19

stood before. This has no effect on the content. Orher substitu­ occur, Hence we likewise cannot both deny ~(o) and
tions are permissible only if Ihe concavity directly follows the judgment affirm A: i.e.
stroke, so that the scope of the Gothic lener is constituted by the
content of the whole judgment. Since this is a speci:illy imporb.Ilt
~:,(o)
case, I shall introduce the following abbreviation : an italic letter
... Similarly when we have several conditional strokes.
is always to have as its scope the amlent of the whole judgment, and
this scope is not marked out by a concavity in the content stroke.
If an italic letter occurs in an expression not preceded by a judg­ §I2

ment stroke. the expression is scnsdess. Au italic letter may a11/10ys

We now consider certain combinations of symbols.

be replaced by a Gothic tetter that does not yet occur in the judgment;
in this case the concavity must be inserted immediately after l-r-~-X(o)
P·23].
the judgment-stroke. E.g. for
means that we can find something, say.j, such that X(Ll) is denied.
f--X(a) We may thus render it as: 'there are some things that have not
we may put the property X.'
o The sense of
t-v-X(o)
I-~X(o)
since a occurs only in the argument-position within X(a). is different. This means: 'Whatever 0 may be, X(a) mwt always

Likewise it is obvious that from

be denied: o r 'iliere is Dot something with the property or x:
(calling something that has the propcrry x, a X) 'there is no X:
~a) ~
~1I(o) ~ derued by
we may deduce f-~TII(o).
~(o) This may thus be rendered as 'there are /l's.'*

~L P(o)
if A is afl txpression in which t1 Joes 110t ocwr, ami a oWlpies orlly -X(a)
argument-positions in 4'>(0). If ~(a) is denied, we must be
means: 'whatever may be substituted for 0, the case in which
able to specify a meaning for a such that <P(a) is denied. Thus
P(a) would have to be denied and X(a) affirmed does not occur.'
if -~--4>(o) were denied and A affirmed, we should have to
It is thus possible that, for some po$Sible meanings of 0,
be able to specify a meaning for a such that A was affirmed and
\tl(a) denied, But since we have P(a) must be affirmed and X(a) afftrmed; for others,
P(a) must be affirmed and X(o) denied; for others again,
p.2Z] ~a) P(o) m",t be derued ",d X(o) derued.
• Thil must be WldeulOOCi :u iocluding the caoe '(bcrc II a A.' E.8. if A (.~).taads for
the circumltmce that :J( is a house, then
we cannot do so; fat this formula means that whatever a may be ~-,-Il (0)

the case in which $(a) would be denied and A affirmed does not meaDs 'there He h",,,es oc ~I Ie»( One bouse.' a.§ 2, Coomolt:' t .

20 TRANSLATIONS FROM THE WRJTtN'GS OF GOTUOB FREGE

We can tbus give the rendering: 'If something has the property
X, then it,has also the property P: or 'every X is a P: or 'all
X's are P·s.' FUNCTION AND CONCEPT

This is the way Ctwsal ummxivtlS are expressed.

An address given to the jenaiJche Geulluhafi for MeJicin unJ
r--~--rr P(a) NaturUJissttJschafi, January 9. J891
-Pea)
means: 'no meaning can be given to a such that P(o) and 'P(o) RATHER a long time ago* I had the honour of addressing this
p. 24J could both be affirmed.' We may thus render it as 'what Society about the symbolic system that I entitled Begriffiscnrifi.
has the property tp has not the property P' or 'no 'P is a P.' T o-<Iay I should like to throw light upon the subject fro m another
side, and tell you about some supplementations and new con­
h--a~P(a) ceptions, whose necessity has occurred to me since then. There
" - LA(a) em here be no question of setting forth my ideography
[Begriffischrift] in its entirety, but only of elucidating some
denies ~..,- P(a) and may therefore be rendered as 'some As fWldamental ideas.
LA(a) My starting-point is what is called a function in mathematics.
are not Ps.' The original reference of this word was not SO wide as that which
r
it Ius since obtalned; it will be well to begin by de~ with this
~rTP(a) first u...age, and only then consider the later extensions. I shall
I-M(a)
for the moment be speakicg only of functions of a single
denies that no M is a P and thus mews 'some Ms are Ps'* or 'it is argument. The first place where a scienri£c expression appears
possible for an M to be a P: ... with a clear-cur reference is where it is required for the statement
p. 2] of a law. This case arose, as regards the function, upon
• The word 'some' m.ust here a1w~ys Ix: uncl~rstood [<) itu:lude r.hc nse ·one.' One
might :»y more ialglhily : '50m~. or , 1 leu! 0<1(:.' the discovery of higher Analysis. Here for the first time it was
a matter of setting forth laws holding for functions in general.
So we rowt go back to the time when higher Analysis was dis­
covered, if we want to know what the word 'function' was
originally taken to mean. The answer that we are likdy to get
to this question is: 'A function of x was taken to he a mathematical
expression containing x, a formula containing the letter x.'
Thus, e.g., the expression
2.x3+X
would be a function of x, and
2,.2' + 2­
would be a function of 2. This answer cannot satisfy W, for here
no distinction is made between form and content, sign and thing
• Onp.a.UU)' 10, 181'9. a.nd ]a.n\l.lty V, 1882.

"