CIVIL REVIEW CASES

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS,
in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., Respondents.

SYLLABUS

FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF LAWS MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. — The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made effective seeks
to prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matter of public
concern.

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by
law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication
of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect."

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication" ?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication
means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and,
on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file
a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the interval
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official
Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and
so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example,
as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days
from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as
it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware
of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to
have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such
law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In
fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the
law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of
the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules
laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances
are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the
Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication
could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication
without indicating where it should be made, 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay
down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no
amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it
obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance
with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility,
of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further
comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and
available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored
rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to
the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the
Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr ., and Paras, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court’s opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member
of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective
thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused
to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle
of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number
1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then President’s nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor
vehicle equipped with air-conditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to
basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still.

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at
the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my
understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come
into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional
obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been
throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality
in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of
general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported
and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the
prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent
statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is
in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

REYNALDO V. UMALI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, Secretary of Finance, and HON. JOSE U. ONG, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondents.
G.R. No. 104069 May 29, 1992
RENE B. GOROSPE, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, MANUEL M. SUNGA, PAUL D. UNGOS, BIENVENIDO T. JAMORALIN, JR., JOSE D. FLORES, JR.,
EVELYN G. VILLEGAS, DOMINGO T. LIGOT, HENRY E. LARON, PASTOR M. DALMACION, JR., and, JULIUS NORMAN C. CERRADA, petitioners,
 vs
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
These consolidated cases are petitions for mandamus and prohibition, premised upon the following undisputed facts:
Congress enacted Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN ACT ADJUSTING THE BASIC PERSONAL AND ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO
INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY THRESHOLD LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 29, PARAGRAPH
(L), ITEMS (1) AND (2) (A) OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." It provides as follows:
Sec. (1). The first paragraph of item (1), paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
(1) Personal Exemptions allowable to individuals –– (1) Basic personal exemption as follows:
For single individual or married individual judicially decreed as legally separated with no qualified dependents P9,000
For head of a family P12,000
For married individual P18,000
Provided, That husband and wife electing to compute their income tax separately shall be entitled to a personal exemption of P9,000 each.
Sec. 2. The first paragraph of item (2) (A), paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
(2) Additional exemption.
(a) Taxpayers with dependents. –– A married individual or a head of family shall be allowed an additional exemption of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000) for each dependent: Provided, That the total number of dependents for which additional exemptions may be claimed shall not exceed
four dependents: Provided, further, That an additional exemption of One Thousand Pesos (1,000) shall be allowed for each child who otherwise
qualified as dependent prior to January 1, 1980: Provided, finally, That the additional exemption for dependents shall be claimed by only one of
the spouses in case of married individuals electing to compute their income tax liabilities separately.
Sec. 3. This act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved. 1
The said act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation.
On 26 December 1991, respondents promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
Sec. 1. SCOPE –– Pursuant to Sections 245 and 72 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7167, these
Regulations are hereby promulgated prescribing the collection at source of income tax on compensation income paid on or after January 1, 1992
under the Revised Withholding Tax Tables (ANNEX "A") which take into account the increase of personal and additional exemptions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Section 8 of Revenue Regulations No. 6-82 is amended by Revenue Regulations No. 1-86 is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 8. –– Right to claim the following exemptions. . . .
Each employee shall be allowed to claim the following amount of exemption with respect to compensation paid on or after
January 1, 1992.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. EFFECTIVITY. –– These regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992.
On 27 February 1992, the petitioner in G.R. No. 104037, a taxpayer and a resident of Gitnang Bayan Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for mandamus for
himself and in behalf all individual Filipino taxpayers, to COMPEL the respondents to implement Rep. Act 7167 with respect to taxable income of individual taxpayers
earned or received on or after 1 January 1991 or as of taxable year ending 31 December 1991.
On 28 February 1992, the petitioners in G.R. No. 104069 likewise filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition on their behalf as well as for those other individual
taxpayers who might be similarly situated, to compel the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to implement the mandate of Rep. Act 7167 adjusting the personal and
additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and to enjoin the respondents from
implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92.
In the Court's resolution of 10 March 1992, these two (2) cases were consolidated. Respondents were required to comment on the petitions, which they did within the
prescribed period.
The principal issues to be resolved in these cases are: (1) whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took effect upon its approval by the President on 19 December 1991, or on 30
January 1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) assuming that Rep.
Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income earned or received during calendar year
1991.
In resolving the first issue, it will be recalled that the Court in its resolution in Caltex (Phils.), Inc. vs. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 97282, 26 June
1991 –– which is on all fours with this case as to the first issue –– held:
The central issue presented in the instant petition is the effectivity of R.A. 6965 entitled "An Act Revising The Form of Taxation on Petroleum
Products from Ad Valorem  to Specific, Amending For the Purpose Section 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code, As amended by Republic
Act Numbered Sixty Seven Hundred Sixty Seven."
Sec. 3 of R.A. 6965 contains the effectivity clause which provides. "This Act shall take effect upon its approval"
R.A. 6965 was approved on September 19, 1990. It was published in the Philippine Journal, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
on September 20, 1990. Pursuant to the Act, an implementing regulation was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Revenue
Memorandum Circular 85-90, stating that R.A. 6965 took effect on October 5, 1990. Petitioner took exception thereof and argued that the law
took effect on September 20, 1990 instead.
Pertinent is Article 2 of the Civil Code (as amended by Executive Order No. 200) which provides:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. . . .
In the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 452) we construed Article 2 of the Civil Code and laid down the
rule:
. . .: the) clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period
shall be shortened or extended. . . .
Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for its effectivity and neither can it become effective upon its approval notwithstanding its express
statement, following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, supra, R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen days after September
20, 1990, or specifically, on October 5, 1990.
Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the
"Malaya."
Coming now to the second issue, the Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation income earned or received during
calendar year 1991.
Sec. 29, par. (L), Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not more often than once every three years, the
personal and additional exemptions taking into account, among others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and
bare subsistence levels.
As the personal and additional exemptions of individual taxpayers were last adjusted in 1986, the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance,
could have adjusted the personal and additional exemptions in 1989 by increasing the same even without any legislation providing for such adjustment. But the
President did not.
However, House Bill 28970, which was subsequently enacted by Congress as Rep. Act 7167, was introduced in the House of Representatives in 1989 although its
passage was delayed and it did not become effective law until 30 January 1992. A perusal, however, of the sponsorship remarks of Congressman Hernando B. Perez,
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, on House Bill 28970, provides an indication of the intent of Congress in enacting Rep. Act 7167. The pertinent
legislative journal contains the following:
At the outset, Mr. Perez explained that the Bill Provides for increased personal additional exemptions to individuals in view of the higher
standard of living.
The Bill, he stated, limits the amount of income of individuals subject to income tax to enable them to spend for basic necessities and have more
disposable income.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Perez added that inflation has raised the basic necessities and that it had been three years since the last exemption adjustment in 1986.
 xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, Mr. Perez stressed the necessity of passing the measure to mitigate the effects of the current inflation and of the implementation of
the salary standardization law. Stating that it is imperative for the government to take measures to ease the burden of the individual income tax
filers, Mr. Perez then cited specific examples of how the measure can help assuage the burden to the taxpayers.
He then reiterated that the increase in the prices of commodities has eroded the purchasing power of the peso despite the recent salary increases
and emphasized that the Bill will serve to compensate the adverse effects of inflation on the taxpayers. . . . (Journal of the House of
Representatives, May 23, 1990, pp. 32-33).

It will also be observed that Rep. Act 7167 speaks of the adjustments that it provides for, as adjustments "to the poverty threshold level." Certainly, "the poverty
threshold level" is the poverty threshold level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by Congress, not poverty threshold levels in futuro, at which time there may be
need of further adjustments in personal exemptions. Moreover, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that these personal and additional exemptions are fixed amounts to
which an individual taxpayer is entitled, as a means to cushion the devastating effects of high prices and a depreciated purchasing power of the currency. In the end, it is
the lower-income and the middle-income groups of taxpayers (not the high-income taxpayers) who stand to benefit most from the increase of personal and additional
exemptions provided for by Rep. Act 7167. To that extent, the act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part the present economic plight of the lower income
taxpayers. It is intended to remedy the inadequacy of the heretofore existing personal and additional exemptions for individual taxpayers.

And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions that it provides for shall be available thenceforth, that is, after Rep. Act 7167 shall have become
effective. In other words, these exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax returns which is, under the National Internal Revenue Code, done not
later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, as aforestated, on 30 January 1992, the increased
exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 (though not before 30 January 1992). But these increased exemptions can be available on 15 April
1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991.

The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year; the
tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid, by 15 April 1991 and by 15 July 1991, at which time Rep. Act 7167 had not been
enacted. To make Rep. Act 7167 refer back to income received during 1990 would require language explicitly retroactive in purport and effect, language that would
have to authorize the payment of refunds of taxes paid on 15 April 1991 and 15 July 1991: such language is simply not found in Rep. Act 7167.

The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available only in respect of compensation income received during 1992, as the
implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 purport to provide. Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to
1 January-15 April 1993, and thus literally defer the effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 to 1 January 1993. Thus, the implementing regulations collide frontally with Section 3
of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon its approval." The objective of the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in postponing through Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 the legal effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 is, of course, entirely understandable –– to defer to 1993  the reduction of
governmental tax revenues which irresistibly follows from the application of Rep. Act 7167. But the law-making authority has spoken and the Court can not refuse to
apply the law-maker's words. Whether or not the government can afford the drop in tax revenues resulting from such increased exemptions was for Congress (not this
Court) to decide.
WHEREFORE, Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 which provide that the regulations shall take effect on compensation income earned or received
from 1 January 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE. They should take effect on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991.
Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, the individual taxpayers entitled to the increased exemptions on compensation income earned during calendar
year 1991 who may have filed their income tax returns on or before 15 April 1992 (later extended to 24 April 1992) without the benefit of such increased exemptions,
are entitled to the corresponding tax refunds and/or credits, and respondents are ordered to effect such refunds and/or credits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
 
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I wish to concur with the majority opinion penned in this case by Justice Teodoro Padilla, because I believe that the tax exemptions referred to in the law should be
effective already with respect to the income earned for the year 1991. After all, even if We say that the law became effective only in 1992, still this can refer only to the
income obtained in 1991 since after all, what should be filed in 1992 is the income tax return of the income earned in 1991.

However, I wish to dissent from the part of the decision which affirms the obiter dictum  enunciated in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446, 452) to the effect
that a law becomes effective not on the date expressly provided for in said law, but on the date after fifteen (15) days from the publication in the Official Gazette or any
national newspaper of general circulation. I say obiter dictum because the doctrine mentioned is not the actual issue in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (supra). In that
case, several presidential decrees of President Marcos were issued, but they were never published in the Official Gazette or in any national newspaper of general
circulation. The real issue therefore in said case was whether or not said presidential decrees ever became effective. The Court ruled with respect to this issue (and not
any other issue –– since there was no other issue whatsoever), that said presidential decrees never became effective. In other words, the ratio decidendi in that case was
the ruling that without publication, there can be no effectivity. Thus, the statement as to which should be applied –– "after fifteen (15) days from publication" or "unless
otherwise provided by law" (Art. 2, Civil Code) was mere obiter. The subsequent ruling in the resolution dated June 26, 1991 in Caltex, Inc. vs. Com. of Internal
Revenue cannot likewise apply because it was based on the aforesaid obiter  in Tanada v.  Tuvera  (supra). In the instant tax exemptions case, the law says effective upon
approval, therefore, since this law was approved by the President in December, 1991, its subsequent publication in the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually
immaterial.

Art. 2 of the Civil Code which states:

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
It is very clear and needs no interpretation or construction.

CRUZ. J., concurring:
As the ponente of Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, I should like to make these brief observations on my brother Paras's separate opinion. He says that "the ratio
decidendi in that case was the ruling that without publication, there can be no effectivity." Yet, while accepting this, he contends that, pursuant to its terms, R.A. 7167
became effective upon approval (i.e., even without publication). He adds that "since this law was approved by the President in December, 1991, its subsequent
publication in the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually immaterial." I confess I am profoundly bemused.
 
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I wish to concur with the majority opinion penned in this case by Justice Teodoro Padilla, because I believe that the tax exemptions referred to in the law should be
effective already with respect to the income earned for the year 1991. After all, even if We say that the law became effective only in 1992, still this can refer only to the
income obtained in 1991 since after all, what should be filed in 1992 is the income tax return of the income earned in 1991.
However, I wish to dissent from the part of the decision which affirms the obiter dictum  enunciated in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446, 452) to the effect
that a law becomes effective not on the date expressly provided for in said law, but on the date after fifteen (15) days from the publication in the Official Gazette or any
national newspaper of general circulation. I say obiter dictum because the doctrine mentioned is not the actual issue in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (supra). In that
case, several presidential decrees of President Marcos were issued, but they were never published in the Official Gazette or in any national newspaper of general
circulation. The real issue therefore in said case was whether or not said presidential decrees ever became effective. The Court ruled with respect to this issue (and not
any other issue –– since there was no other issue whatsoever), that said presidential decrees never became effective. In other words, the ratio decidendi in that case was
the ruling that without publication, there can be no effectivity. Thus, the statement as to which should be applied –– "after fifteen (15) days from publication" or "unless
otherwise provided by law" (Art. 2, Civil Code) was mere obiter. The subsequent ruling in the resolution dated June 26, 1991 in Caltex, Inc. vs. Com. of Internal
Revenue cannot likewise apply because it was based on the aforesaid obiter  in Tanada v.  Tuvera  (supra). In the instant tax exemptions case, the law says effective upon
approval, therefore, since this law was approved by the President in December, 1991, its subsequent publication in the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually
immaterial.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code which states:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
It is very clear and needs no interpretation or construction.
CRUZ. J., concurring:
As the ponente of Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, I should like to make these brief observations on my brother Paras's separate opinion. He says that "the ratio
decidendi in that case was the ruling that without publication, there can be no effectivity." Yet, while accepting this, he contends that, pursuant to its terms, R.A. 7167
became effective upon approval (i.e., even without publication). He adds that "since this law was approved by the President in December, 1991, its subsequent
publication in the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually immaterial." I confess I am profoundly bemused.
Footnotes
1 Before the enactment of Rep. Act 7167, Executive Order No. 37 approved by the President on 31 July 1986, provided for the following
personal and additional exemptions for individual taxpayers:
(1) Personal exemptions allowable to individuals. –– (1) Basic personal exemption. –– For the purpose of determining the tax provided in Section
21(a) of this Title, there shall be allowed a basic personal exemption as follows:
For single individual or married individual
judicially decreed as legally separated
with no qualified dependents P6,000
For head of a family P7,500
For married individual P12,000
Provided, That husband and wife electing to compute their income tax separately shall be entitled to a personal exemption of P6,000
each.
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "Head of Family" means an unmarried or legally separated man or woman with one or both parents, or
with one or more brothers or sisters, or with one or more legitimate, recognized natural or legally adopted children living with and dependent
upon him for their chief support, where such brothers or sisters or children are not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and not
gainfully employed or where such children, brothers or sisters, regardless of age are incapable of self-support because of mental or physical
defect.
(2) Additional exemption
(A) Taxpayers with dependents. –– A married individual or a head of family shall be allowed an additional exemption of Three thousand pesos
(P3,000) for each dependent: Provided, That the total number of dependents for which additional exemptions may be claimed shall not exceed
four dependents: Provided, further, That an additional exemption of One thousand pesos (P1,000) shall be allowed for each child who otherwise
qualified as dependent prior to January 1, 1980; and Provided, finally, That the additional exemption for dependents shall be claimed by only one
of the spouses in the case of married individuals electing to compute their income tax liabilities separately.
In case of legally separated spouses, additional exemptions may be claimed only by the spouse who was awarded custody of the child or
children: Provided, That the total amount of additional exemptions that may be claimed by both shall not exceed the maximum additional
exemptions herein allowed:
For purposes of this paragraph, a dependent means a legitimate, recognized natural or legally adopted child chiefly dependent upon and living
with the taxpayer if such dependent is not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and not gainfully employed or if such dependent,
regardless of age, is incapable of self-support because of mental or physical defect.

G.R. No. 173976               February 27, 2009

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
EUGENIO PEÑAFIEL, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of ERLINDA PEÑAFIEL, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 29, 2005 and Resolution dated July 31, 2006. The assailed decision
nullified the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of respondents’ properties because the notice of sale was published in a newspaper not of general circulation in the place
where the properties were located.
Respondent Erlinda Peñafiel and the late Romeo Peñafiel are the registered owners of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (350937)
6195 and TCT No. 0085, both issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. On August 1, 1991, the Peñafiel spouses mortgaged their properties in favor of
petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. The mortgage deed was amended on various dates as the amount of the loan covered by said deed was increased.
The spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation. On July 14, 1999, petitioner instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding under Act No. 3135
through Diego A. Alleña, Jr., a notary public. Respondent Erlinda Peñafiel received the Notice of Sale, stating that the public auction was to be held on September 7,
1999 at ten o’clock in the morning, at the main entrance of the City Hall of Mandaluyong City. The Notice of Sale was published in Maharlika Pilipinas on August 5,
12 and 19, 1999, as attested to by its publisher in his Affidavit of Publication.2 Copies of the said notice were also posted in three conspicuous places in Mandaluyong
City.3
At the auction sale, petitioner emerged as the sole and highest bidder. The subject lots were sold to petitioner for ₱6,144,000.00. A certificate of sale4 was subsequently
issued in its favor.
On August 8, 2000, respondent Erlinda Peñafiel, through her attorney-in-fact, Eugenio Peñafiel, filed a Complaint5 praying that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
properties be declared null and void. They likewise sought (a) to enjoin petitioner and the Register of Deeds from consolidating ownership, (b) to enjoin petitioner from
taking possession of the properties, and (c) to be paid attorney’s fees.
On June 30, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment in favor of petitioner:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage instituted by defendants Metrobank and Notary Public Diego A. Alleña, Jr. over the two parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. (350937) 6195 and TCT No. 0085 is hereby declared VALID; and
2. The counterclaim of herein defendants are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.6
Respondents appealed to the CA, raising, among others, the issue of whether petitioner complied with the publication requirement for an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
under Act No. 3135.
On this issue, the CA agreed with respondents. The CA noted that the law requires that publication be made in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or
city where the property is situated. Based on the testimony of the publisher of Maharlika Pilipinas, it concluded that petitioner did not comply with this requirement,
since the newspaper was not circulated in Mandaluyong City where the subject properties were located. Thus, in its Decision dated July 29, 2005, the CA reversed the
RTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered declaring the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the properties
covered by TCT Nos. (350937) 6195 and 0085 NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 of the decision which the CA denied on July 31, 2006.
Petitioner now brings before us this petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS ON THE
PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL NOTICES UNDER SECTION 1 OF P.D. NO. 1079 TO THE EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE BY
NOTARY PUBLIC OVER THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY TCT NO. (350927) 6195 AND TCT NO. 0085.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT "MAHARLIKA PILIPINAS" IS NOT A
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN MANDALUYONG CITY.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION DATED
JUNE 30, 2003 ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANDALUYONG CITY, BRANCH 208 AND DECLARED THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE SALE OF THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY TCT NO. (350937) 6195 AND TCT NO. 0085 NULL AND VOID. 9

This controversy boils down to one simple issue: whether or not petitioner complied with the publication requirement under Section 3, Act No. 3135, which provides:

SECTION 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the
property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.10
We hold in the negative.

Petitioner insists that Maharlika Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation since it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information, it has a
bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers, and it is published at regular intervals. It asserts that the publisher’s Affidavit of Publication attesting that Maharlika
Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation is sufficient evidence of such fact.11 Further, the absence of subscribers in Mandaluyong City does not necessarily mean
that Maharlika Pilipinas is not circulated therein; on the contrary, as testified to by its publisher, the said newspaper is in fact offered to persons other than its
subscribers. Petitioner stresses that the publisher’s statement that Maharlika Pilipinas is also circulated in Rizal and Cavite was in response to the question as to where
else the newspaper was circulated; hence, such testimony does not conclusively show that it is not circulated in Mandaluyong City. 12
Petitioner entreats the Court to consider the fact that, in an Order13 dated April 27, 1998, the Executive Judge of the RTC of Mandaluyong City approved the application
for accreditation of Maharlika Pilipinas as one of the newspapers authorized to participate in the raffle of judicial notices/orders effective March 2, 1998. Nonetheless,
petitioner admits that this was raised for the first time only in its Motion for Reconsideration with the CA.14

The accreditation of Maharlika Pilipinas by the Presiding Judge of the RTC is not decisive of whether it is a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaluyong City.
This Court is not bound to adopt the Presiding Judge’s determination, in connection with the said accreditation, that Maharlika Pilipinas is a newspaper of general
circulation. The court before which a case is pending is bound to make a resolution of the issues based on the evidence on record.

To prove that Maharlika Pilipinas was not a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaluyong City, respondents presented the following documents: (a)
Certification15 dated December 7, 2001 of Catherine de Leon Arce, Chief of the Business Permit and Licensing Office of Mandaluyong City, attesting that Maharlika
Pilipinas did not have a business permit in Mandaluyong City; and (b) List of Subscribers16 of Maharlika Pilipinas showing that there were no subscribers from
Mandaluyong City.

In addition, respondents also presented Mr. Raymundo Alvarez, publisher of Maharlika Pilipinas, as a witness. During direct examination, Mr. Alvarez testified as
follows:
Atty. Mendoza: And where is your principal place of business? Where you actually publish.
Witness: At No. 80-A St. Mary Avenue, Provident Village, Marikina City.
Atty. Mendoza: Do you have any other place where you actually publish Maharlika Pilipinas?
Witness: At No. 37 Ermin Garcia Street, Cubao, Quezon City.
Atty. Mendoza: And you have a mayor’s permit to operate?
Witness: Yes.
Atty. Mendoza: From what city?
Witness: Originally, it was from Quezon City, but we did not change anymore our permit.
Atty. Mendoza: And for the year 1996, what city issued you a permit?
Witness: Quezon City.
Atty. Mendoza: What about this current year?
Witness: Still from Quezon City.
Atty. Mendoza: So, you have no mayor’s permit from Marikina City?
Witness: None, it’s only our residence there.
Atty. Mendoza: What about for Mandaluyong City?
Witness: We have no office in Mandaluyong City.
Atty. Mendoza: Now, you said that you print and publish Maharlika Pilipinas in Marikina and Quezon City?
Witness: Yes.
Atty. Mendoza: Where else do you circulate your newspaper?
Witness: In Rizal and in Cavite.
Atty. Mendoza: In the subpoena[,] you were ordered to bring the list of subscribers.
Witness: Yes.
xxxx
Atty. Mendoza: How do these subscribers listed here in this document became (sic) regular subscribers?
Witness: They are friends of our friends and I offered them to become subscribers.
Atty. Mendoza: Other than this list of subscribers, you have no other subscribers?
Witness: No more.
Atty. Mendoza: Do you offer your newspaper to other persons other than the subscribers listed here?
Witness: Yes, but we do not just offer it to anybody.17 (Emphasis supplied.)

It bears emphasis that, for the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite publication has the burden of
proving the same.18 Petitioner correctly points out that neither the publisher’s statement that Maharlika Pilipinas is being circulated in Rizal and Cavite, nor his
admission that there are no subscribers in Mandaluyong City proves that said newspaper is not circulated in Mandaluyong City.

Nonetheless, the publisher’s testimony that they "do not just offer [Maharlika Pilipinas] to anybody" implies that the newspaper is not available to the public in general.
This statement, taken in conjunction with the fact that there are no subscribers in Mandaluyong City, convinces us that Maharlika Pilipinas is, in fact, not a newspaper
of general circulation in Mandaluyong City.

The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given
for the purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. 19 The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a "reasonably wide publicity" of the
auction sale. This is why publication in a newspaper of general circulation is required. The Court has previously taken judicial notice of the "far-reaching effects" of
publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation. 20
True, to be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information, that it has a bona
fide subscription list of paying subscribers, and that it is published at regular intervals.21 Over and above all these, the newspaper must be available to the public in
general, and not just to a select few chosen by the publisher. Otherwise, the precise objective of publishing the notice of sale in the newspaper will not be realized.

In fact, to ensure a wide readership of the newspaper, jurisprudence suggests that the newspaper must also be appealing to the public in general. The Court has,
therefore, held in several cases that the newspaper must not be devoted solely to the interests, or published for the entertainment, of a particular class, profession, trade,
calling, race, or religious denomination. The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general circulation. 22

Thus, the Court doubts that the publication of the notice of sale in Maharlika Pilipinas effectively caused widespread publicity of the foreclosure sale.

Noticeably, in the Affidavit of Publication, Mr. Alvarez attested that he was the "Publisher of Maharlika Pilipinas, a newspaper of general circulation, published every
Thursday." Nowhere is it stated in the affidavit that Maharlika Pilipinas is in circulation in Mandaluyong City. To recall, Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135 does not only require
that the newspaper must be of general circulation; it also requires that the newspaper be circulated in the municipality or city where the property is located. Indeed, in
the cases23 wherein the Court held that the affidavit of the publisher was sufficient proof of the required publication, the affidavit of the publisher therein distinctly
stated that the newspaper was generally circulated in the place where the property was located.

Finally, petitioner argues that the CA, in effect, applied P.D. No. 107924 when it cited Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, 25 which
involved an extrajudicial foreclosure sale by a sheriff. Petitioner avers that the general reference to "judicial notices" in P.D. No. 1079, particularly Section 2 26 thereof,
clearly shows that the law applies only to extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings conducted by a sheriff, and not by a notary public. 27 P.D. No. 1079 allegedly applies
only to notices and announcements that arise from court litigation.28
The Court does not agree with petitioner that the CA applied P.D. 1079 to the present case. The appellate court cited Fortune Motors merely to emphasize that what is
important is that the newspaper is actually in general circulation in the place where the properties to be foreclosed are located.

In any case, petitioner’s concern that the CA may have applied P.D. 1079 to the present case is trifling. While P.D. No. 1079 requires the newspaper to be "published,
edited and circulated in the same city and/or province where the requirement of general circulation applies," the Court, in Fortune Motors, did not make a literal
interpretation of the provision. Hence, it brushed aside the argument that New Record, the newspaper where the notice of sale was published, was not a newspaper of
general circulation in Makati since it was not published and edited therein, thus:
The application given by the trial court to the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is, to our mind, too narrow and restricted and could not have been the intention of the said
law. Were the interpretation of the trial court (sic) to be followed, even the leading dailies in the country like the "Manila Bulletin," the "Philippine Daily Inquirer," or
"The Philippine Star" which all enjoy a wide circulation throughout the country, cannot publish legal notices that would be honored outside the place of their
publication. But this is not the interpretation given by the courts. For what is important is that a paper should be in general circulation in the place where the properties
to be foreclosed are located in order that publication may serve the purpose for which it was intended. 29

Therefore, as it stands, there is no distinction as to the publication requirement in extrajudicial foreclosure sales conducted by a sheriff or a notary public. The key
element in both cases is still general circulation of the newspaper in the place where the property is located.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 29, 2005 and Resolution dated July 31, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 79862 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte,
now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

AQUINO, 
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25,
1980, providing for the  confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another.
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf
from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential
Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three
certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from
the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.

In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V.
Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive
Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1).
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000.
The replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later
transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which
superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more
than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section
11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central
Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)

Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted  by this Court because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the
circular.

That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and
fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.

The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by
the respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal regulation.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that
"every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect."

Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations
and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated". (See
Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture
were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.

It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them
to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages.
Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are
ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in
Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275             December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL
VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
 MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A.
JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of
the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes,
allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections.
These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. 1

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set
in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former
NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped
conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually
played in the chambers of the House.2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on
the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.3

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using
these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said
recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.5

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his
discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and
sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo
Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government
entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. 9

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from
conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.11

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7, 12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby
A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings,
moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in
the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.

The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties’ standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 22

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed
to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The
majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing
and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not
other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them." 26

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his
was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings. 27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of
the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will
necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse
constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation. 28

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights
therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings. 29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process, 30 they
satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.

Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s
allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. 32 It should be noted
that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet
the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal profession–which were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional
acts.33

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the
Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes
the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.

- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court
of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not
extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become
stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the
nature of things, cannot be enforced.38

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees
from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House
proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. 39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the
committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. 40 Having been overtaken by these
events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be
done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 41

- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term
of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that
the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid
of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-
half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set
of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are
elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators
to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do
business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority
of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the
term of twelve Senators.47

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
"continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-
to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress
as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular
Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that
the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts
and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending
matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same
status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of
the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may
endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the
majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or
revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
 However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on
unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure
is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the
same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that,
they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. 49

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with
duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the
rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication
in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147387               December 10, 2003

RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 152161
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The
Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the
time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive Secretary,
then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives.

The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a member of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the
COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is a
consolidation of the following bills originating from the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ‘OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE,’ AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;" 1
…
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS
THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES." 2

A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate 3 and sixteen (16) members of the House of Representatives,4 was formed to reconcile
the conflicting provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report, 5 signed by its members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and
approved by the conferees.

During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V. Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F.
Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen
expressed his objection to the proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the return of the report to the Bicameral Conference
Committee for proper action.6
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees 7 to the Bicameral Conference Committee.8 Then again, for unclear reasons,
upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees9 to the Bicameral Conference Committee.10

On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report on the contrasting provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had been recommitted to the Bicameral Conference
Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference Committee.
Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the report until the other
members were given a copy thereof.11

After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and
SB No. 1742. The House approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps. Fariñas and
Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of
Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if this procedure was
regular.12
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.

Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R.
Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as
"the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742," and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001."

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners’ Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its
title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They
point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the
Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other
than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public
office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive
officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should
be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of
the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,13 that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the "Accountability of Public Officers:" 14

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon
the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.

The Respondents’ Arguments

For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no
legal standing to institute the present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the members of the House of Representatives,
the petitioners have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since
the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.

Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners’ allegations that "irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures
of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress,
constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices," is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of
candidacy by elective officials.

They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely
terminating the term of an elective official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is permanently holding, such that he is no
longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed
it fit to remove the "unfairness" of considering an elective official ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective
office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for any
office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity.

The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not
required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general subject which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to find expression in its title. Mere details need not be set forth.

According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67, leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective,
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial
distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive
officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty and property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that the formalities of the law would be
observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the
issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not
excluding from the Rolls those members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No.
9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared otherwise by the Court.

The Court’s Ruling

Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue raised by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal
standing or locus standi to file the petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.

Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement.15 The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy is "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."16
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of "overarching significance to our society," 17 had adopted a liberal stance on
standing. Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,18 this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and
subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of Representatives assailing the constitutionality
of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes).

The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a
provision of Rep. Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos.19 Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the
petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.20
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government
agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,22 Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,23 Albano v. Reyes,24 and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.25
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo 26 as deriving its
existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching
significance" that justifies this Court’s adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven
months away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos:

... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent
multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of
the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six months away, reinforce
our stand.27

Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.29

It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.30 And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the
judiciary’s solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.31
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by the petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32

At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a
consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders,
rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.

The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. 33
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule
that –

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act. 34

The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices."
Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. – The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time and space, and the
equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.35
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content.36

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they
are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one
subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general subject.37

The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:

Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.

So all we’re looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover this provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code], is that correct? That’s all. Because I believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term "fair election practice," it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco,
those conditions inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I think, I’m very comfortable with the title "Fair Election Practice" so that we
can get over with these things so that we don’t come back again until we find the title. I mean, it’s one provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a
limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as the title implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Yes.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
So I would want to beg the House contingent, let’s get it over with. To me, ha, it’s not a very touchy issue. For me, it’s even a very correct provision. I feel very
comfortable with it and it was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that
what you’re ...?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
It’s not the title per se, it’s the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. I’m happy that there is already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us
were also comfortable with it. But it would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that we’re all comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, let’s listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of provisions deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the
complete title is actually one that indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections through fair election practices." But
as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office
that may be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the
effort at leveling the playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it is covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill.
And therefore, I hope that the House contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair election practices because ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a title that is more generic so that then we have less of an objection on
constitutionality. I think that’s the theory. So, there is acceptance of this.
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the special provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...
REP. MARCOS:
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
REP. MARCOS:
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, sige, fine, fine. Let’s a brainstorm. Equal...
REP. PADILLA:
Mr. Chairman, why don’t we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang
Pambansa known as the Omnibus Election Code?"
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Why don’t we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?"
REP. PICHAY:
That’s not an election practice. That’s a limitation.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
REP. MARCOS:
The Fair Election.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, Fair Election Act.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public
service through fair election practices?
REP. PICHAY:
Fair election practices?
REP. MACARAMBON:
Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala nang practices nga.
REP. PICHAY:
Wala nang practices.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.
(Informal discussions)
REP. PICHAY:
Approve na iyan.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act."
The rest wala nang problema ano?
VOICES:
Wala na.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Wala na iyong practices?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
O, wala na? We will clean up.
REP. MARCOS:
Title?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
The short title, "This Act ..."
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
You’re back to your No. 21 already.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." That’s the House version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title "This Act shall be known as
the Fair Election Act."38

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The
executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in
government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.39 It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of
legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the
desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the
legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. 40 Congress is not precluded from repealing
Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra41 upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a
laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of
election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the
public.42 In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and
comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations
regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006

Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution43
The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against
the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. 44 The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection
guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. 45
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. 46 On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure47 while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.48

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any
partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are
obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. 49

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with
respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within
the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant
distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

The Enrolled Bill Doctrine

Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that
irregularities attended the passage of the said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the House during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor without copies thereof being furnished the members;

d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its
senator-members at the time it was presented to and rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report was instantly made and passed around for the signature of the
BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the compromise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20,
2000, were couched in terms that comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in § 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the provision that "This Act shall take effect immediately upon its
approval;"
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not
have the same § 16 as it now appears in RA No. 9006, but § 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for which no objection thereto was
made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments to the subject measure;" and
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the
purported proposed amendment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision states, thusly:

Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. – Any elected official who runs for president and vice-president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of the certificate of candidacy.50

The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.
A review of cases51 reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities
alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is
not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern.52 Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates
its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia,53 viz.:

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’"

The Effectivity Clause

Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall take effect immediately upon its approval," is defective. However, the
same does not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera,54 this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended…. 55
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after
its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the
policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional
grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. 57 No such transgression has been
shown in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984

ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte,
now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25,
1980, providing for the  confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another.

Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf
from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential
Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three
certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from
the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.

In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V.
Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive
Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1).
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000.
The replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later
transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which
superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more
than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section
11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central
Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)

Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted  by this Court because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the
circular.

That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and
fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.

The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by
the respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal regulation.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that
"every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect."
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations
and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated". (See
Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture
were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them
to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages.
Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are
ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in
Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ORDERED.