MEMORY AID

Date October 26, 2020

To Atty. Bernadette C. Mendoza
From SIAGAN, Jobelee V.
Class Number #33
Module 6

POSSESSION DOCTRINES

1.
BPI Family v. Franco
G.R. 123498
November 23, 2007

Movable Property
Article 559 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as to movable
property, pertains to a specific or determinate thing. A determinate
or specific thing is one that is individualized and can be identified
or distinguished from others of the same kind. BPI-FB’s argument
is unsound. To begin with, the movable property mentioned in
Article 559 of the Civil Code pertains to a specific or determinate
thing. A determinate or specific thing is one that is individualized
and can be identified or distinguished from others of the same
kind.
In the case at hand, what is involved is not a specific or
determinate property.

Money; Obligation of a possessor of a lost movable

The deposit in Franco’s accounts consists of money which,
albeit characterized as a movable, is generic and fungible. The
quality of being fungible depends upon the possibility of the
property, because of its nature or the will of the parties, being
substituted by others of the same kind, not having distinct
individuality. Money, which had passed through various transactions
in the general course of banking business, even if of traceable
origin, bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership. It bears
emphasizing that money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership,
and this characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant case
which involves money in a banking transaction gone awry. Its
primary function is to pass from hand to hand as a medium of
exchange, without other evidence of its title.
 Considering that what is involved is not a specific or
determinate personal property, BPI-FB’s illustrative example,
where X’s television set is stolen by Y who thereafter sells it to Z,
and where Z unwittingly entrusts possession of the TV set to X, the
latter would have the right to keep possession of the property and
preclude Z from recovering possession thereof, which is ostensibly
based on Article 559, is inapplicable to the instant case.

Better right to the deposits in the account holder’s name

BPI-FB owns the deposited monies in the accounts of
Franco, but not as a legal consequence of its unauthorized transfer
of FMIC’s deposits to Tevesteco’s account. BPI-FB conveniently
forgets that the deposit of money in banks is governed by the New
Civil Code of the Philippines provisions on simple loan or mutuum.
For there is a debtor-creditor relationship between a bank and its
depositor.
Hence, BPI-FB ultimately acquired ownership of Franco’s
deposits, but such ownership is coupled with a corresponding
obligation to pay him an equal amount on demand.

Freezing of the accounts

BPI-FB does not have a unilateral right to freeze the
accounts of Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds
therein were proceeds of the multi-million-peso scam Franco was
allegedly involved in. To grant BPI-FB, or any bank for that matter,
the right to take whatever action it pleases on deposits which it
supposes are derived from shady transactions, would open the
floodgates of public distrust in the banking industry.

Good Faith
The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable
or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable
lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain
its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.

2.
Abadilla v. Obrero
G.R. No. 199448
November 12, 2014
Occurrence of unlawful deprivation of possession in real property
The petitioner's claim of possession had no sufficient basis
and it cannot overthrow the attribute of possession attached to the
respondents' certificate of title. The petitioner failed to show any
competent and convincing evidence of possession or act of
dominion in contrast to the overwhelming proof of actual
possession and occupation proffered by the respondents.
Consequently, it is indubitable that the respondents, as registered
owners, are entitled to and must be restored to the physical
possession forcibly wrested from them by the petitioner. It remains
undisputed that the petitioner and his men unlawfully entered the
land, enclosed it with barbed-wire fence, destroyed the
improvements thereon and excluded the respondents
therefrom. These actions necessarily imply the use of force which
is remedied by the herein proceedings for ejectment.
One type of ejectment is unlawful detainer. A complaint for
unlawful detainer must state that (1) the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession of the real property after the expiration or
termination of his or her right to possess it; and (2) the complaint is
filed within a year from the time such possession became unlawful.

Entitlement of possession of the subject property

The right of possession claimed by both parties is anchored
on ownership. In the case at hand, the respondents are entitled of
possession of the subject property. They have occupied and
possessed it by residing thereon, building structures for
commercial purposes and declaring it for realty tax purposes.  The
respondents also have a certificate of title issued under the
Torrens system which is evidence of indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. A title would mean entitlement to all the
attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes
possession.
Hence, the respondents are considered as holders of the
Torrens title over the subject land, the respondents are entitled to
its possession.
3.
Mercado v. Espinocilla
G.R. No. 184109  
February 1, 2012
Adverse possession side by side with acquisitive prescription on
the matter of acquisition of ownership over real property
Macario’s possession of Dionisia’s share was public
and adverse since his other co-owners, his three other sisters, also
occupied portions of Lot No. 552. Indeed, the 1977 sale made by
Macario and his two daughters in favor of his son Roger confirms
the adverse nature of Macario’s possession because said sale of
225 sq. m. was an act of ownership over Macario’s original share
and Dionisia’s share.
The adverse nature of respondents’ possession with his
assertion that Macario’s fraudulent acquisition of Dionisia’s share
created a constructive trust. In a constructive trust, there is neither
a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called
trustee (Macario) neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the
property for the beneficiary (Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel). The
relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not in fact exist, and
the holding of a constructive trust is for the trustee himself, and
therefore, at all times adverse.
Hence, prescription may supervene even if the trustee does
not repudiate the relationship.

4.
Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc.
G.R. NO. 155110
March 31, 2005

Possession as an issue in ejectment suits

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings which is as
to who is entitled to physical or material possession (de facto) of
the premises. Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are
not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible,
except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.

Prior Possession; Need to prove prior possession of the property

In the case at hand, the petitioner avers that respondent
failed to prove that the latter's predecessor-in-interest had prior
possession of the property while respondent alleges that its
predecessor was in prior physical possession of the property as
the registered owner thereof since June 11, 1981. The court ruled
in favor of the respondent where prior possession of the lot by
respondent's predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of
the execution and registration of public instruments.
 Hence, there is a need to prove prior possession of the
property because possession can only be acquired by juridical acts
such as donations, succession, execution and registration of public
instruments, inscription of possessory information titles, and the
likes.

5.
Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 193426
September 29, 2014

Presumption established when a person is in possession of

personal property
In the case at hand, applying Article 559 of the New Civil
Code, which states:

“The possession of movable property acquired in good

faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost
any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the

owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefor.”
, the respondent had the legal presumption of title to or ownership
of the casino chips. This conclusion springs from respondent's
admission during trial that the chips represented payment by a
Chinese customer for services he rendered to the latter in his car
shop. The Court of Appeals added that since respondent became
the owner of the chips, he could very well have given them to
Ludwin and Deoven, who likewise held them as "possessors in
good faith and for value" and with "presumptive title" derived from
the respondent.