IOS NOTES-II

Secondary Rules

1. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS - When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to
the rest of the statute.

Noscitur a Sociis :- Noscere means to know and sociis means association. Thus, Noscitur a Sociis
means knowing from association. Thus, under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" the questionable
meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its association with other words within
the context of the phrase. This means that words in a list within a statute have meanings that are
related to each other. If multiple words having similar meaning are put together, they are to be
understood in their collective meaning. According to Maxwell, "this rule means that when two or
more words susceptible to analogous meaning are clubbed together, they are understood to be
used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each other, i.e. the more
general is restricted to a sense analoguous to a less general".

Example – cows, bulls, goats, sheep and other animals. The expression “other animals” cannot
refer to lions and tigers; it refers only to domestic animals.
Example – old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete machinery stores or vehicles including waste
products. The expression “old” was construed to refer to machinery that had become non-
functional or non-usable.

This doctrine is broader than the doctrine of ejusdem generis because this rule puts the words in
context of the whole phrase and not just in relation to the nearby words. The language of the
phrase can be used as a guide to arrive at the true meaning of the word. This rule is illustrated in
Foster v Diphwys Casson (1887) 18 QBD 428, involving a statute which stated that explosives
taken into a mine must be in a "case or canister". Here the defendant used a cloth bag. The courts
had to consider whether a cloth bag was within the definition. Under Noscitur a sociis, it was held
that the bag could not have been within the statutory definition, because parliament's intention was
refering to a case or container of the same strength as a canister.

In State of Assam vs R Muhammad AIR 1967, SC made use of this rule to arrive at the meaning
of the word "posting" used in Article 233 (1) of the Constitution. It held that since the word
"posting" occurs in association with the words "appointment" and "promotion", it took its colour
from them and so it means "assignment of an appointee or a promotee to a position" and does not
mean transfer of a person from one station to another.

Noscitur a sociis is only a rule of construction and it cannot be used when it is clear that the word
with wider meaning is deliberately used in order to increase the scope. It can only be used when
the intention of the legislature in using a word with wider sense along with the words with narrower
meaning is not clear. Further, this rule can only be used when the associated words have
analogous meaning. It cannot be used when the words have disjoint meanings. For example, in
the case of Lokmat Newspapers vs Shankarprasad AIR 1999, it was held that the words
"discharge" and "dismissal" do not have the same analogous meaning and so this rule cannot be
applied

2. Ejusdem Generis - When a list of two or more specific descriptors are followed by more
general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to
the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them e.g. vehicles in "cars,motor
bikes,motor powered vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense and therefore cannot be
interpreted as including air planes.

Example – Order banning arms, ammunition or gun powder or any other goods. In this order “any
other goods” was construed to refer to goods similar to arms, ammunition or gun powder.
Example – “Any person who entered into or works under a contract with an employer whether the
contract be any way of manual labour, clerical work or otherwise …”. Held that ejusdem generis is
not applicable since “manual labour” and “clerical work” do not belong to a single limited genus.
The ejusdem generis, or ‘of the same genus’ rule, is similar though narrower than the more
general rule of noscitur a sociis. It operates where a broad or open-ended term appears following
a series of more restrictive terms in the text of a statute. Where the terms listed are similar enough
to constitute a class or genus, the courts will presume, in interpreting the general words that
follow, that they are intended to apply only to things of the same genus as the particular items
listed. According to this rule, when particular words pertaining to a class or a genus are followed
by general words, the general words are construed as limited to the things of the same kind as
those specified by the class or the genus. The meaning of an expression with wider meaning is
limited to the meaning of the preceeding specific expressions. However, for this rule to apply, the
preceeding words must for a specific class or genus. Further, this rule cannot be applied in the
words with a wider meaning appear before the words with specific or narrow meaning. In UP State
Electricity Board vs Harishankar, AIR 1979, SC held that the following conditions must exist for the
application of this rule –

1. The statue contains an enumeration of specific words

2. The subject of the enumeration constitute a class or a category

3. The class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration

4. A general term is present at the end of the enumeration

5. There is no indication of a different legislative intent

Justice Hidayatullah explained the principles of this rule through the following example - In the
expression, "books, pamphlets, newspapers, and other documents", private letters may not be
held included if "other documents" be interpreted ejusdem generis with what goes before. But in a
provision which reads, "newspapers or other documents likely to convey secrets to the enemy",
the words "other documents" would include documents of any kind and would not take their
meaning from newspaper.

This was also illustrated in the case of Ishwar Singh Bagga vs State of Rajasthan 1987, where the
words "other person", in the expression "any police officer authorized in this behalf or any other
person authorized in this behalf by the State government" in Section 129 of Motor Vehicles Act,
were held not to be interpreted ejusdem generis because the mention of a single species of "police
officers" does not constitute a genus.

It can be seen that this rule is an exception to the rule of construction that general words should be
given their full and natural meaning. It is a canon of construction like many other rules that are
used to understand the intention of the legislature.

This rule also covers The rank principle, which goes as follows - Where a string of items of a
certain rank or level is followed by general residuary words, it is presumed that the residuary
words are not intended to include items of a higher rank than those specified. By specifiying only
items of lower rank the impression is created that higher ranks are not intened to be covered. If
they were, then their mention would be expected a fortiori. For example, the phrase "tradesman,
artificer, workman, labourer, or other person whatsoever" was held not to include persons above
the artisan class. Similarly, the phrase "copper, brass, pewter, and tin, and all other metals" in a
local Act of 1825 was held not to include precious metals such as gold and silver.

3. Reddendo Singula Singulis - When a list of words has a modifying phrase at the end, the phrase
refers only to the last word, e.g., firemen, policemen, and doctors in a hospital. Here,"in a hospital"
only applies to doctors and not to firemen or policemen

The reddendo singula singulis principle concerns the use of words distributively. Where a complex
sentence has more than one subject, and more than one object, it may be the right construction to
render each to each, by reading the provision distributively and applying each object to its
appropriate subject. A similar principle applies to verbs and their subjects, and to other parts of
speech. A typical application of this principle is where a testator says 'I devise and bequeath all my
real and personal property to B'. The term devise is appropriate only to real property. The term
bequeath is appropriate only to personal property. Accordingly, by the application of the principle
reddendo singula singulis, the testamentary disposition is read as if it were worded 'I devise all my
real property, and bequeath all my personal property, to B'.

This rule has been applied in the case of Koteshwar Vittal Kamat vs K Rangappa Baliga, AIR
1969, in the construction of the Proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution which reads, "Provided
that no bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (b), shall be introduced or moved in the
legislature of a state without the previous sanction of the President". It was held that the word
introduced applies to bill and moved applies to amendment.

4. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: -

The literal meaning of this maxim is that, ‘the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of another.’

Illustration: - It is a general policy that weekend i.e. Saturdays’ & Sundays’ are holidays. Hence,
where a Company expressly provides that Sunday is a holiday, it is implied that Saturday is a
working day.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a Latin phrase that says “express mention and implied
exclusion” which means express mention of one thing excludes the other thing.

When something is expressly mentioned in a statute it leads to a presumption that the things
which are not specified in the statute are excluded. The expressio... rule will not apply where the
intention of the legislature clearly reveals that the express mention of one thing should not exclude
the others. There can be no implied exclusion where the statutory language is plain and the
meaning is clear. The principle is to be used only as a means of ascertaining the legislative intent
where it is doubtful and not as means of defeating the apparent intent of the legislature

5. Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant

Where there is a special provision specifically dealing with a subject, a general provision,
howsoever widely worded must yield to the former. This principle is expressed by the maxim
Generalia specialibus non derogant.
It is a well settled that if a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded
from the general provision. In the event of conflict between a general and a special provision, the
latter must prevail. Differently stated the principle is that general words in a Statute should not be
held to repeal or rip up a specific provision upon a particular matter. A general rule though stated
in wide terms must be taken to be not interfering with matters covered by a special provision

In South India Corporation (P) Ltd. Vs Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivendrum AIR 1964, it was
held that the general provision under Article 372 of the Constitution regarding continuance of
existing laws is subject to Article 277 of the Constitution, which is a special provision relating to
taxes, duties, cesses or fees lawfully levied at the commencement of the Constitution. In this
regard, the Supreme Court observed as follows:-

“With this background let u now consider the following two questions raised before us: (i) whether
Article 372 of the Constitution is subject to Article 277 thereof; and (ii) whether Article 372 is
subject to Article 278 thereof. Article 372 is a general provision’; and Article 277 is a special
provision. It is settled law that special provision should be given effect to the extent of its scope,
leaving the general provision to control cases where the special provision does not apply. The
earlier discussion makes it abundantly clear that the constitution gives a separate treatment to the
subject of finance and Article 277 saves the existing taxes etc. levied by states, if the conditions
mentioned therein are complied with. While Article 372 saves all pre-Constitution valid laws, Article
277 is confined only to taxes, duties, cesses or fees lawfully levied immediately before the
Constitution. Therefore, Article 372 cannot be construed in such a way as to enlarge the scope of
the savings of taxes, duties, cesses or fees. To state it differently, Article 372 must be read subject
to Article 277. We have already held that an agreement can be entered into between the Union
and the States in terms of Article 278 abrogating or modifying the power preserved to the State
under Article 277”.

In Gujarat State Co-operative Land Development Bank Vs P.R. Mankad, (1979), the Supreme
Court applying the maxim generalia specialibus non-derogant held that a general provision must
yield to the special provision. Lord Hobhouse in Barker Vs Edgar (1898) AC 749 opined that when
the legislature had given its consent to a separate subject and made provision for it, the
presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special
provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly.

Beneficial Construction

A general rule of interpretation is that if a word used in a statute excludes certain cases in its
common meaning, it should not be constrained unnecessarily to include those cases. An
exception to this rule is that when the objectives of the statute are not met by excluding the cases,
then the word may be interpreted extensively so as to include those cases. However, when a word
is ambiguous i.e. if it has multiple meanings, which meaning should be understood by that word?
This is the predicament that is resolved by the principle of Beneficial Construction. When a statute
is meant for the benefit of a particular class, and if a word in the statute is capable of two
meanings, one which would preserve the benefits and one which would not, then the meaning that
preserves the benefit must be adopted. It is important to note that omissions will not be supplied
by the court. Only when multiple meanings are possible, can the court pick the beneficial one.
Thus, where the court has to choose between a wider mean that carries out the objective of the
legislature better and a narrow meaning, then it usually chooses the former. Similarly, when the
language used by the legislature fails to achieve the objective of a statute, an extended meaning
could be given to it to achieve that objective, if the language is fairly susceptible to the extended
meaning. This is quite evident in the case of B Shah vs Presiding Officer, AIR 1978, where Section
5 of Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 was is question, where an expectant mother could take 12 weeks
of maternity leave on full salary. In this case, a women who used to work 6 days a week was paid
for only 6x12=72 days instead of 7x12=84 days. SC held that the words 12 weeks were capable of
two meanings and one meaning was beneficial to the woman. Since it is a beneficial legislation,
the meaning that gives more benefit to the woman must be used.

It is said by MAXWELL, that Beneficial Construction is a tendency and not a rule. The reason is
that this principle is based on human tendency to be fair, accommodating, and just. Instead of
restricting the people from getting the benefit of the statute, Court tends to include as many
classes as it can while remaining faithful to the wordings of the statute. For example, in the case of
Alembic Chemical Works vs Workmen AIR 1961, an industrial tribunal awarded more number of
paid leaves to the workers than what Section 79(1) of Factories Act recommended. This was
challenged by the appellant. SC held that the enactment being a welfare legislation for the
workers, it had to be beneficially constructed in the favor of worker and thus, if the words are
capable of two meanings, the one that gives benefit to the workers must be used.

Similarly, in U Unichoyi vs State of Kerala, 1963, the question was whether setting of a minimum
wage through Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the constitution
because the act did not define what is minimum wage and did not take into account the capacity of
the employer to payIt was held that the act is a beneficial legislation and it must be construed in
favor of the worker. In an under developed country where unemployment is rampant, it is possible
that workers may become ready to work for extremely low wages but that should not happen.

Strict Construction

Strict Construction Strict construction refers to a particular legal philosophy of judicial interpretation
that limits or restricts judicial interpretation. Strict construction requires the court to apply the text
as it is written and no further, once the meaning of the text has been ascertained. That is, court
should avoid drawing inference from a statute or constitution. It is important to note that court may
make a construction only if the language is ambiguous or unclear. If the language is plain and
clear, a judge must apply the plain meaning of the language and cannot consider other evidence
that would change the meaning. If, however, the court finds that the words produce absurdity,
ambiguity, or a literalness never intended, the plain meaning does not apply and a construction
may be made. Strict construction occurs when ambiguous language is given its exact and
technical meaning, and no other equitable considerations or reasonable implications are made.
Strict construction is the opposite of liberal construction, which permits a term to be reasonably
and fairly evaluated so as to implement the object and purpose of the document.

Construction Of Penal Statutes

A Penal Statute must be constructed strictly. This means that a criminal statute may not be
enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning of the language used or the meaning
that is reasonably justified by its terms. It is fundamentally important in a free and just society that
Law must be readily ascertainable and reasonably clear otherwise it is oppressive and deprives
the citizen of one of his basic rights. An imprecise law can cause unjustified convictions because it
would not be possible for the accused to defend himself against uncertainties. Therefore, an
accused can be punished only if his act falls clearly into the four corners of the law without
resorting to any special meaning or interpretation of the law. For example, in Seksaria Cotton Mills
vs State of Bombay, 1954, SC held that in a penal statute, it is the duty of the Courts to interpret
the words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense so that they do not become traps for
honest unlearned and unwary men. If there is honest and substantial compliance with an array of
puzzling directions that should be enough, even if on some hyper critical view of the law other
ingenious meanings can be devised.

If a penal provision is capable of two reasonably possible constructions, then the one that
exempts the accused from penalty must be used rather than the one that does not. Whether a
particularconstruction achieves the intention of the statute or not is not up to the court to think
about in case of penal statutes. It is not apt for the court to extend the scope of a mischief and to
enlarge the penalty. It is not competent for the court to extend the meaning of the words to achieve
the intention of the legislature. If a penal provision allows accused to go scot-free because of
ambiguity of the law, then it is the duty of the legislature and not of the courts to fix the law. Unless
the words of a statute clearly make an act criminal, it cannot be construed as criminal. Chinubhai
vs State of Bombay, AIR 1960, is an important case in this respect. In this case, several workers in
a factory died by inhaling poisonous gas when they entered into a pit in the factory premises to
stop the leakage of the gas from a machine. The question was whether the employer violated
section 3 of the Factories Act, which says that no person in any factory shall be permitted to enter
any confined space in which dangerous fumes are likely to be present. The Supreme Court, while
construing the provision strictly, held that the section does not impose an absolute duty on the
employer to prevent workers from going into such area. It further observed that the fact that some
workers were present in the confined space does not prove that the employer permitted them to
go there. The prosecution must first prove that the workers were permitted to enter the space to
convict the accused.

Construction Of Fiscal/Taxing Statutes

Tax is the money collected from the people for the purposes of public works. It is a source of
revenue for the government. It is the right of the govt to collect tax according to the provisions of
the law. No tax can be levied or collected except by the authority of law. In general, legislature
enjoys wide discretion in the matter of taxing statutes as long as it satisfies the fundamental
principle of classification as enshrined in Article 14. A person cannot be taxed unless the language
of the statute unambiguously imposes the obligation without straining itself. In that sense, there is
no reason why a taxing statute must be interpreted any differently from any other kind of statute.
Indeed, SC, in the case of CIT vs Shahazada Nand and Sons, 1966, observed that the underlying
principle is that the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and
unambiguous expression used therein rather than any notions which be entertained by the Courts
as to what is just or expedient. In construing a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of
construction is the literary construction. All that the court has to see at the very outset is what does
the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is
clear, the court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of
construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clearLord Russel in Attorney
General vs Calton Ban, 1989, illustrated categorically as, "I see no reason why special canons of
construction should be applied to any act of parliament and I know of no authority for saying that a
taxing statute is to be construed differently from any other act.

" However, as with any statute, a fiscal or taxing statute is also susceptible to human errors and
impreciseness of the language. This may cause ambiguity or vagueness in its provisions. It is in
such cases, the task of constructing a statute becomes open to various methods of construction.
Since a person is compulsorily parted from his money due to tax, imposition of a tax is considered
a type of imposition of a penalty, which can be imposed only if the language of the provision
unequivocally says so. This means that a taxing statute must be strictly constructed. The principle
of strict interpretation of taxing statutes was best enunciated by Rowlatt J. in his classic statement
in Cape Brandy Syndicate v I.R.C. - "In a taxing statute one has to look merely at what is clearly
said. There is no room for any intention. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption
as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can look fairly at the language
used." If by any reasonable meaning of the words, it is possible to avoid the tax, then that meaning
must be chosen. There is no scope for any inference or induction in constructing a taxing statute.
There is no room for suppositions as to “spirit” of the law or by way of “inference”. When the
provision is reasonably open to only one meaning then it is not open to restrictive construction on
the ground that the levy of tax, is oppressive , disproportionate, unreasonable or would cause
hardship. There is no room for such speculation. The language must be explicit. Similarly, penalty
provision in a taxing statute has to be specifically provided and cannot be inferred.

In A. V. Fernandes vs State of Kerala, AIR 1957, the Supreme Court stated the principle that if the
revenue satisfies the court that the case falls strictly within the provisions of the law, the subject
can be taxed. If, on the other hand, the case does not fall within the four corners of the provisions
of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into
the intentions of the Legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter.

This does not mean that equity and taxation are complete strangers. For example, in the case of
CIT vs J H Kotla Yadgiri, 1985, SC held that since the income from business of wife or minor child
is includable as income of the assessee, the profit or loss from such business should also be
treated as the profit or loss from a businesss carried on by him for the purpose of carrying forward
and set-off of the loss u/s. This interpretation was based on equity. However, it does not permit
any one to take the benefit of an illegality. This is illustrated in the case of CIT vs Kurji Jinabhai
Kotecha,AIR 1977, where Section .24(2) of IT Act was constructed as not to permit assessee to
carry forward the loss of an illegal speculative business for setting it off against profits in
subsequent years. This proves that even a taxing statute should be so construed as to be
consistent with morality avoiding a a result that gives recognition to continued illegal activities or
benefits attached to it.

The rule of strict construction applies primarily to charging provisions in a taxing statute and has
no application to a provision not creating a charge but laying down machinery for its calculation or
procedure for its collection. Thus, strict construction would not come in the way of requiring a
person claiming an exemption. The provisions of exemptions are interpreted beneficially.

Construction Of Remedial Statutes

Remedial statutes are those statutes which have come to be enacted on demand of the
permanent public policy generally receive a liberal interpretation. On constructing a remedial
statute the courts ought to give it ‘the widest operation’ which the language of statute will permit.
Courts exist only to see that a particular case is within the mischief to be remedied and whether it
falls within the language of the enactment. There are various examples of remedial statutes which
are discussed below along with the case laws:
The labour and welfare legislations: These legislations should be construed broadly and liberally
and while construing them due regard to the Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV) of the
Constitution of India and to any international convention on the subject must be given by the
courts. In case of MC Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1991 SC 417, the Child Labour
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 was construed. The Court, having regard to the Directive
Principles in Articles 39(e), 39(f), 4(i), 45 and 47 of the Constitution, the fundamental rights in Art.
24, United nation convention on the rights of the child, not only directed a survey of child labour
and its prohibition but also directed payment in monetary terms as contribution by the employer to
the Child Labour-Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund to the parent/guardian of the child to ameliorate
poverty and lack of funds for welfare of the child.
Social benefit oriented legislations: These legislations are to achieve the purpose of the enactment
but without any violence to the language. If a section of a remedial statute is capable of two
constructions, then that construction should be preferred which furthers the policy of the Act and is
more beneficial to those in whose interest the Act may have been passed. The liberal construction
must flow from the language used and the rule does not permit placing of an unnatural
interpretation on the words contained in the enactment nor does it permit the raising of any
presumption that protection of widest amplitude must be deemed to have been conferred upon
those for whose benefit the legislation may have been enacted. In case there is any exception in
the beneficial legislation which curtails its operation, the Court in case of doubt should construe it
narrowly so as not to unduly expand the area or scope of exception. It has been held that a law
enacted essentially to benefit a class of persons considered to be oppressed may be
comprehensive in the sense that to some extent it also benefits those not within that class, for
example, tenants and landlords. The Control of Rent and Eviction Act which drastically limits the
grounds on which a tenant can be evicted is essentially to benefit the tenants but it is also to some
extent benefit the landlord, who can file a suit for eviction on the grounds mentioned in the Act
even though the tenancy has not been terminated in accordance with the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1956. When contracts and transactions are prohibited by statutes for the
sake of protecting one class of persons, the one from which situation and condition being liable to
be oppressed and imposed upon by the other, the parties are not in pari delicto and a person
belonging to the oppressed class can apply for redress even if he was a party to a contract or
transaction prohibited by the statute.

Interpretation Of Constitution

Introduction Constitution is the supreme and fundamental law of our country. Since it is written in
the form of a statute, the general principles of statutory interpretation are applicable to
interpretation of the constitution as well. As is the case with any other statute, the court tries to find
out the intention of the framers of the constitution from the words used by them. For example, in
the case of State of Bihar vs Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952, SC used one of the standard principles
of interpretation that where more than one reasonable interpretation of a constitutional provision
are possible, that which would ensure a smooth and harmonious working of the constitution shall
be accepted rather than the one that would lead to absurdity or give rise to practical
inconvenience, or make well existing provisions of existing law nugatory, while interpreting the
constitution.However, even if an argument based on the spirit of the constitution is very attractive,
it must be validated with the spirit of the constitution as reflected by the words of the constitution.
In the same case mentioned above, SC observed that spirit of the constitution cannot prevail if the
language of the constitution does not support that view.

It is important to note that the constitution itself endorses the general principles of interpretation
through Article 367(1), which states that unless the context otherwise requires, the General
Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply for the interpretation of this constitution as it applies for the
interpretation of an act of the legislature. Courts have ruled in cases such as Jugmendar Das vs
State 1951, that not only the general definitions given in General Clauses Act, but also the general
rules of construction given therein are applicable to the constitution.

Having said the above, the fact remains that Constitution is a special act. It is a fact that every
provision of the constitution is constitutional and no part of it can be held unconstitutional. This
casts an important duty on the interpreters of the constitution to interpret its provisions such that
the spirit of the constitution is not maligned. In Keshvananda Bharati vs State of Kerala, AIR 1973,
SC identified the basic structure of the constitution that reflects its true spirit and held that nothing
that hurts the basic structure of the constitution, is constitutional. In the same case, SC held that
one should give the freedom to the parliament to enact laws that ensure that the blessings of
liberty be shared with all, but within the framework of the constitution. It is necessary towards that
end that the constitution should not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense.

The letters of the constitution are fairly static and not very easy to change but the laws enacted by
the legislature reflect the current state of people and are very dynamic. To ensure that the new
laws are consistent with the basic structure of the constitution, the constitution must be interpreted
in broad and liberal manner giving affect to all its parts and the presumption must be that no
conflict or repugnancy was intended by its framers. Applying the same logic, theprovisions relating
to fundamental rights have been interpreted broadly and liberally in favor of the subject. Similarly,
various legislative entries mentioned in the Union, State, and Concurrent list have been construed
liberally and widely.

[Article 13:- (1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the
commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions
of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.

(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by
this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the
contravention, be void.

(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification,
custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law;
(b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other
competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this
Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any
part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.

(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under
article 368]
[Article 368:- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its
constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution
in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article.

(2) An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the
purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of
the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of
that House present and voting, 4 [it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to
the Bill and thereupon] the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the
Bill:

Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in— (a) article 54, article 55, article 73,
article 162 or article 241, or
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or

(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or

(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or (e) the provisions of this article,

the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the
States 5 *** by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making
provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.

(3) Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article.

(4) No amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part III) made or purporting to
have been made under this article [whether before or after the commencement of section 55 of the
Constitution (Fortysecond Amendment) Act, 1976] shall be called in question in any court on any
ground.

(5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be no limitation whatever on the
constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of
this Constitution under this article.]

The following are some of the key principles applied specially in interpreting the provisions of the
constitution –

1. Principle of Harmonious construction

Principle of Harmonious Construction The principle of harmonious interpretation is similar to the

idea of broad or purposive approach. The key to this method of constitutional interpretation is that
provisions of the Constitution should be harmoniously interpreted. As per Kelly:

“Constitutional provisions should not be construed in isolation from all other parts of the
Constitution, but should be construed as to harmonize with those other parts.” A provision of the
constitution must be construed and considered as part of the Constitution and it should be given a
meaning and an application which does not lead to conflict with other Articles and which confirms
with the Constitution’s general scheme. When there are two provisions in a statute, which are in
apparent conflict with each other, they should be interpreted such that effect can be given to both
and that construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should not be adopted
except in the last resort.

This principle is illustrated in the case of Raj Krishna vs Binod AIR 1954. In this case, two
provisions of Representation of People Act, 1951, which were in apparent conflict were brought
forth. Section 33 (2) says that a Government Servant can nominate or second a person in election
but section 123(8) says that a Government Servant cannot assist any candidate in election except
by casting his vote. The Supreme Court observed that both these provisions should be
harmoniously interpreted and held that a Government Servant was entitled to nominate or second
a candidate seeking election in State Legislative assembly. This harmony can only be achieved if
Section 123(8) is interpreted as giving the govt. servant the right to vote as well as to nominate or
second a candidate and forbidding him to assist the candidate it any other manner.

Upon looking at various cases, the following important aspects of this principle are evident –

1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and they must
construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in another
unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their differences.
 3. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions,
the courts must interpret them in such as way so that effect is given to both the provisions
as much as possible.
4. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a useless
number or a dead lumbar, is not harmonious construction.
5. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose.

2. Doctrine of pith and substance

Doctrine of Pith and Substance Pith means "true nature" or "essence" and substance means the
essential nature underlying a phenomenon. Thus, the doctrine of pith and substance relates to
finding out the true nature of a statute. This doctrine is widely used when deciding whether a state
is within its rights to create a statute that involves a subject mentioned in Union List of the
Constitution. The basic idea behind this principle is that an act or a provision created by the State
is valid if the true nature of the act or the provision is about a subject that falls in the State list. The
case of State of Maharashtra vs F N Balsara AIR 1951 illustrates this principle very nicely. In this
case, the State of Maharashtra passed Bombay Prohibition Act that prohibited the sale and
storage of liquor. This affected the business of the appellant who used to import liquor. He
challenged the act on the ground that import and export are the subjects that belong in Union list
and state is incapable of making any laws regarding it. SC rejected this argument and held that the
true nature of the act is prohibition of alcohol in the state and this subject belongs to the State list.
The court looks at the true character and nature of the act having regard to the purpose, scope,
objective, and the effects of its provisions. Therefore, the fact that the act superficially touches on
import of alcohol does not make it invalid.

Thus, as held in State of W Bengal vs Kesoram Industries, 2004, the courts have to ignore the
name given to the act by the legislature and must also disregard the incidental and superficial
encroachments of the act and has to see where the impact of the legislation falls. It must then
decide the constitutionality of the act.

Principle of Incidental or Ancillary Powers

This principle is an addition to the doctrine of Pith and Substance. What it means is that the power
to legislate on a subject also includes power to legislate on ancillary matters that are reasonably
connected to that subject. It is not always sufficient to determine the constitutionality of an act by
just looking at the pith and substance of the act. In such cases, it has to be seen whether the
matter referred in the act is essential to give affect to the main subject of the act. For example,
power to impose tax would include the power to search and seizure to prevent the evasion of that
tax. Similarly, the power to legislate on Land reforms includes the power to legislate on mortgage
of the land. However, power relating to banking cannot be extended toinclude power relating to
non-banking entities. However, if a subject is explicitly mentioned in a State or Union list, it cannot
be said to be an ancillary matter. For example, power to tax is mentioned in specific entries in the
lists and so the power to tax cannot be claimed as ancillary to the power relating to any other entry
of the lists.

As held in the case of State of Rajasthan vs G Chawla AIR 1959, the power to legislate on a topic
includes the power to legislate on an ancillary matter which can be said to be reasonably included
in the topic.

The underlying idea behind this principle is that the grant of power includes everything necessary
to exercise that power. However, this does not mean that the scope of the power can be extended
to any unreasonable extent. Supreme Court has consistently cautioned against such extended
construction. For example, in R M D Charbaugwala vs State of Mysore, AIR 1962, SC held that
betting and gambling is a state subject as mentioned in Entry 34 of State list but it does not include
power to impose taxes on betting and gambling because it exists as a separate item as Entry 62 in
the same list

3. Doctrine of Colourable legislation

Doctrine of Colourable Legislation This doctrine is based on the principle that what cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly. In other words, if the constitution does not permit certain
provision of a legislation, any provision that has the same effect but in a round about manner is
also unconstitutional. This doctrine is found on the wider doctrine of "fraud on the constitution". A
thing is Colourable when it seems to be one thing in the appearance but another thing underneath.
K C Gajapati Narayan Deo vs State of Orissa, AIR 1953 is a famous case that illustrates the
applicability of this doctrine. In this case, SC observed that the constitution has clearly distributed
the legislative powers to various bodies, which have to act within their respective spheres. These
limitations are marked by specific legislatives entries or in some cases these limitations are
imposed in the form of fundamental rights of the constitution. Question may arise whether while
enacting any provision such limits have been transgressed or not. Such transgression may be
patent, manifest or direct. But it may also be covert, disguised, or indirect. It is to this later class of
transgression that the doctrine of colourable legislation applies. In such case, although the
legislation purports to act within the limits of its powers, yet in substance and in reality, it
transgresses those powers. The transgression is veiled by mere pretense or disguise. But the
legislature cannot be allowed to violate the constitutional prohibition by an indirect method. In this
case, the validity of Orissa Agricultural Income Tax (Amendment) Act 1950 was in question. The
argument was that it was not a bona fide taxation law but a colourable legislation whose main
motive was to artificially lower the income of the intermediaries so that the state has to pay less
compensation to them under Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952. SC held that it was not colourable
legislation because the state was well within its power to set the taxes, no matter how unjust it
was. The state is also empowered to adopt any method of compensation. The motive of the
legislature in enacting alaw is totally irrelevant.

A contrasting case is of K T Moopil Nair vs State of Kerala, AIR 1961. In this case, the state
imposed a tax under Travencore Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, which was so high that it was many
times the annual income that the person was earning from the land. The SC held the act as
violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) in view of the fact that in the disguise of tax a person's property
was being confiscated.

Similarly, in Balaji vs State of Mysore, AIR 1963, SC held that the order reserving 68% of the seats
for students belonging to backward classes was violative of Article 14 in disguise of making a
provision under Article 15(4).

4) The doctrine of Severability

The doctrine of Severability is also known as the Doctrine of Separability. According to it, if a
provision is inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights, the whole Statute will not be held void. Only
those inconsistent provisions becomes void and not the whole statute.

Article 13(1) is applicable toward any such Laws which seems to be inconsistent with the
Fundamental Right. It restrains the Legislatures to enact any Law which contravenes the
Fundamental Rights of the people. It enables High Courts and Supreme Court to review any
Statute which deems to violate the Fundamental Rights.

If any provision of the Statute which is inconsistent to the Fundamental Right is cardinal to the
functioning of Statute; i.e. without the presence of such disputed provision, the whole Statute
would come to haphazard; then, instead of a particular provision, the whole statute would be
deemed void.

A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras – 1950

The disputed Statute here was Prevention Detention Act, 1950 in the light of Article 19 and 21 of
the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the whole Statute will not be struck off, but
only the unconstitutional provision will be considered void. Conclusively, Section 14 of the Act was
severed and held void, while the other provisions remain intact within the Statute.

State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara – 1951

The disputed Statute here was Bombay Prohibition Act, where the unconstitutional provision was
held void and inoperative while the other part of the Act was intact and the Statute was still be
remaining in the force.

Minerva Mills v. Union of India – 1980

In this case as well, the whole Statute was left intact and only disputed provisions which were
proved to be in inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights were held void.

Doctrine of Eclipse

The Doctrine of Eclipse is a doctrinal principle that advocates the concept of fundamental rights
being prospective. If any law made by the Legislature is inconsistent with Part III of the
Constitution, then that law is invalid and inoperative to the extent of it being overshadowed by the
Fundamental Rights. The laws are hidden by the relevant fundamental rights, and the Eclipse is
said to be cast on it. The inconsistency of the eclipsed law can be removed only when the
corresponding fundamental right is amended. The shadowing is then removed, and the law
becomes automatically valid and operative again.

In other words, a law that violates fundamental rights remains in a moribund condition. It becomes
inoperative, unenforceable and takes the shape of a sleeping provision. It is not a nullity or void ab
initio.

The development took place in three stages:

• Prospective/ Retrospective Nature of Article 13(1): Keshavan

The case of Keshavan had raised several challenging issues concerning the Doctrine, in
response, is the retrospective and prospective nature of Article 13(1) and the meaning of the word
‘void’ in Article 13(1). In the landmark incident of Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay,
the petitioner was prosecuted under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act of 1931 for
publishing a pamphlet without permission. The case was pending when the Constitution of India
had commenced. The main issue raised was if the provisions of the Act violated Article 19(1)(a).
The Court held the relevant regulations to be violating Article 19(1)(a) and that they are ‘void’ to
the extent of its inconsistency. The Court further held that fundamental rights are prima facie
prospective in nature and that the word ‘void’ did not mean repealing the statute or provision.
 • Nexus between Article 13(1) and Pre Constitutional Laws: F.N. Balsara & Behram

Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay was one of the earliest cases that explained the
reasonable nexus between Article 13(1) and the pre-constitutional laws. In this case, the appellant
was accused under Section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act of 1949. Previously, Section 13(b)
of the same Act was declared void in the case of F. N. Balsara, because it was violative of Article
19(1)(f). The appellant took the example of F.N. Balsara as a precedent. Then Section 66(b) was
held inoperative and unenforceable. The Court said that the part of the law would be
unconstitutional and not the whole law. Further held that the onus to prove citizenship and violative
nature of the provision lies on the accused.

• The Genesis and Evolution of the Doctrine of Eclipse: Bhikaji Narain

The concept, principle and applicability of this Doctrine were polished in the case of Bhikaji Narain
Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh. In this case, the C. P. and Berar Motor Vehicles
Amendment Act of 1947 which had authorized the State Government to regulate and take up all of
the motor transport businesses, was challenged because it was violative of Article 19(1)(g) of Part
III. This Amendment Act was a pre-constitutional law, and therefore, the Doctrine of Eclipse
applied, and the provisions of this legislative Act were made inoperative. Soon, in the year 1951,
Article 19(1)(g) was amended by the first Constitutional Amendment Act overturning the Eclipse
and making the law enforceable against citizens as well as non-citizens. The Supreme Court
opined that “the effect of the amendment was to remove the shadow and to make the impugned
Act free from all blemish or infirmity”. The Court also observed that it will still be enforceable
against non-citizens.

• Doctrine of Eclipse and article 368

The debate on the validity and absoluteness of Article 368 started with the case of Golaknath. In I.
C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, the Punjab Security and Land Tenures Act of 1953 was
challenged on the ground that this legislative Act had violated the fundamental right to hold and
acquire property and practice any profession. The judgment left the Parliament Legislature with no
power to break the fundamental rights and provided them with restrictive amending powers under
Article 368. Therefore, Article 368 was eclipsed.

The judgment of I. C. Golaknath was overturned in the legendary case of Keshavananda Bharti v.
Union of India[1], which stated that the Parliament could amend the fundamental rights of the
Indian Constitution but without changing the basic structure of the Constitution and thus, removed
the Eclipse from Article 368.

• Doctrine of Eclipse and Section 309 Of IPC

The Doctrine is seen to extend to the provisions under the Indian Penal Code, as observed in the
cases of Rathinam and Gian Kaur. In the case of Rathinam v. Union of India, Section 309 of IPC
that criminalizes attempt to suicide was challenged. The Court drew a parallel between Article 19
and Article 21 and observed that Article 21 holds right to live, so it also induces right not to live and
holds Section 309 to be unconstitutional, and therefore it was eclipsed. After two years, a five-
judge constitutional bench in the case of Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab reversed the Judgment of
Rathinam case and upheld the validity of Section 309. Thus, the Eclipse on Section 309 was
removed and became operational again.

Doctorine OF Basic Structure:

The Supreme Court recognized BASIC STRUCTURE concept for the first time in the historic
Kesavananda Bharati case in 1973. Ever since the Supreme Court has been the interpreter of the
Constitution and the arbiter of all amendments made by parliament. In this case validity of the 25th
Amendment act was challenged along with the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-ninth Amendments. The
court by majority overruled the Golak Nath case which denied parliament the power to amend
fundamental rights of the citizens. The majority held that article 368 even before the 24th
Amendment contained the power as well as the procedure of amendment. The Supreme Court
declared that Article 368 did not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the
Constitution and parliament could not use its amending powers under Article368 to 'damage',
'weaken', 'destroy', 'abrogate', 'change' or 'alter' the 'basic structure' or framework of the
constitution. This decision is not just a landmark in the evolution of constitutional law, but a turning
point in constitutional history.

Kesavanadabharati Vs S/O Kerala: It is a landmark of the Supreme Court of India, and is the basis
in Indian law for the exercise by the Indian judiciary of the power to judicially review, and strike
down, amendments to the Constitution of India passed by the Indian Parliament which conflict with
or seek to alter the Constitution's basic structure. The judgment also defined the extent to which
the Indian Parliament could restrict the right to property, in pursuit of land reform and the
redistribution of large landholdings to cultivators, overruling previous decisions that suggested that
the right to property could not be restricted.

Internal And External Aids to interpretation of statutes

An Aid is considered as a tool or device which helps in interpreting a statute, the court can take
help from internal aids to interpretation (i.e. within statutes) or external aids to interpretation (i.e.
outside the statutes)

Internal aids to interpretation

Internal aids means those aids which are available in the statute itself, court can interpret the
statute by employing such aids which are as follows:
1) Title of the statute
There are basically two types of title-
I. Short Title:-The short title of the Act is only its name which is given solely for the purpose
of reference and identification.
Short title is mention under Section 1 of the Acts and ends with the year of passing of the
Act.
Example- Section 1 of CPC says, This Act may be cited as Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.'
Section 1 of Indian contract Acts says, This Act may be called as Indian Contract Act, 1872.

II. Long Title:-The long title is mention under certain acts whose purpose is to give a
general description about the object of the act.
However, it is not considered as a conclusive aid to interpretation of statutes as it doesn't
resolve ambiguity arising in words or expression under statutory provision but only provide
a general idea of the act.
Example- The long title of CrPC says, An act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to
the criminal procedure. Also, the long title of CPC says, “An act to consolidate and amend
the laws relating to the procedure of the courts of civil judicature.
2) Preamble
Preamble is a tool for internal aid to interpretation as it contains the main objects and
reasons of the Act.
The rule of interpretation of preamble is that when a language of an enactment is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble has no part to play but if more than one interpretation is
possible, a help can be taken from preamble to ascertain the true meaning of the provision.
The preamble is mention on the very first page of the act but modern acts doesn't pass with
preamble which is declining its importance.
 State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali , the constitutionality of Section 5 of the West Bengal
special courts act, 1950 was challenged on the grounds of violative of Article 14 of the
constitution as the provision in the act authorize state government to select a particular
case which deserved to be tried by special courts having special procedure. The Supreme
Court take help of the preamble of the said Act and held that state government has
discretion to choose such cases.
3) Marginal notes
Marginal notes are inserted at the side of the sections in an act which express the effect of
the section but they are not part of statute.
They are also known as Side notes and are inserted by drafters and not legislators.
The rule of interpretation is that in olden times a help is used to be taken from marginal
notes when the clear meaning of the provision is in doubt but as per modern view of the
court, marginal notes doesn't have any role to play because either they are inserted by
legislators nor does they form the part of the statute.
However, for interpreting constitution many times marginal notes are referred because they
are made by constituent assembly.
Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar [6], the Supreme Court held that the marginal
notes of Article 286 is the part of the Constitution of India which talks about Restrictions as
to imposition of the tax on the sale or purchase of goods therefore, it could be relied on to
furnish a clue to the purpose and meaning of the article.
4) Headings
Headings are prefixed to sections or a group or set of sections.
These headings have been treated by courts as preambles to those sections or sets of
sections.
The rule of interpretation is that the heading can't control the plain words of the provision
but if after the plain reading of the section more than one meaning is possible, only then the
court may seek guidance from the headings.
Tolley v. Giddings [7], interpretation of section 217 of Road Traffic Act was in question
which provides that a person could be held liable of an offence if he allowed himself to be
driven away in a motor vehicle without the consent of its master. The heading of the
provision is Miscellaneous and general' and sub heading is Penalization of taking motor
vehicle without authority'. The court held that headings to the section clearly explain the
intention of the legislature and thus the passenger would be held liable of an offence.
5) Illustration
Illustration are appended to a section of a statute with a view to illustrating the law
explained in the provision.
Such illustration manifest the intention of the legislature and can be referred in the case of
ambiguity or repugnancy.
However, the court emphasis through various judgments that it doesn't explain the whole
principle explain in the section through illustration nor does it curtail the ambit of the section.
In the case of repugnancy between section and illustration, section will prevail.
Example- Section 378 of theft in IPC has 16 illustrations attached to it.
6) Explanation
The explanations are inserted with the purpose of explaining the meaning of a particular
provision and to remove doubts which might creep up if the explanation had not been
inserted.
The purpose of explanations are to explain the meaning and intention of act, to clarify in
case of obscurity or vagueness and to provide additional support to the object of the act.
 However, it doesn't expand or curtail the meaning of the provision but only tries to remove
uncertainty and in the case of conflict between explanation and main section, the duty of
the court is to harmonize the two.
Example- section 108 of IPC defines the word abettor' which has five explanation attach to
it.
7) Definition or Interpretation clause
It define certain words used elsewhere in the body of statute with the purpose to avoid the
necessity of frequent repetitions in describing the subject matter and extend the natural
meaning of some words as per the statute. It also define intention of the legislature in
respect of words mention in statute and avoid confusion.
The rule of interpretation is that whenever the words means or means and include' are used
in definition, it makes the definition exhaustive and don't allow to interpret the definition
widely but if the word includes' is used in the definition it provide widest interpretation
possible to the definition or enlarge the ordinary meaning of the word.
However, if the definition clause will result in an absurdity, the court will not apply such
definitions and the definition clause of one act can't be used to explain same word used in
another statute except in the case of statutes in pari materia.

Mahalaxmi Oils Mils v. State of A.P [8], interpretation of word tobacco was in question
which said tobacco means any form of tobacco whether cured or uncured or manufactured
or not and includes leaf stalks and steams of tobacco plant. The SC held that the definition
is exhaustive and refused to include tobacco seeds under the definition of tobacco.
8) Punctuation
Punctuation are put in the form of colon, semi colon, comma, full stop, dash, hyphen,
brackets etc
In earlier times statutes are passed without punctuations and therefore, the courts were not
concerned with looking at punctuations but in modern times statutes are passed with
punctuations.
The rule of interpretation is that while interpreting the provision in punctuated form, if court
feels repugnancy or ambiguity the court shall read the whole provision without any
punctuation and if the meaning is clear will so interpret it without attaching any importance.
9) Schedules
Schedule are the part of statutes which are mentioned at the end of the act.
It contains details prescribe form of working out policies and contains subjects in the form of
lists.
In the case of clash between schedule and the main body of an act, the main body shall
prevail.
Example- Article 1 of the constitution provides that India shall be union of states and in
schedule 1 name of the states with its territories are mention.
10) Saving Clause
Saving Clause are generally appended in cases of repeal and reenactment of a new
statute. It is inserted in the repealing statute.
By this the rights already created under repealed enactment are not disturbed nor are new
rights created by it.
In the case of clash between the main part of statute and a saving clause, the saving clause
has to be rejected.
11) Proviso
The proviso to a section has the natural presumption that enacting part of the section would
 have included the subject matter of the proviso.
The proviso serve four different purposes- qualify or exempt certain provision, provide
mandatory condition to be fulfilled by to make enactment workable, act as optional addenda
and become integral part of the enactment.
The rule of interpretation of proviso is that it can neither nullify the implication of main
enactment nor can enlarge the scope of main enactment and can only be referred in case
of ambiguity in the section.
In case of conflict between main enactment and proviso, it must be harmoniously construct
or in the view of many jurist proviso will prevail as it is the last intention of the legislature.
Example- Article 16(4) is considered as proviso of Article 16(1) held in T. Devadasan v.
Union of India.
12) Exception
Exception are generally added to an enactment with the purpose of exempting something
which would otherwise fall within the ambit of the main provision.
In case of repugnancy between exception and main enactment, the latter must be relied
upon. However, in many cases exceptions are relied being the last intention of legislature.
Example: Section 300 of IPC has five exceptions attached to it.

Difference between proviso and exceptions:Proviso has a wider function than exception as, an
exception only exempt certain things to fall in the main enactment whereas, proviso not only
exempt certain cases but also provide a mandatory condition, qualification or an optional addenda
to the enactment.
Proviso follows the main enactment whereas exception is the part of main enactment.

External aids to interpretation

External aids are the aids which are not available inside the statute but outside the statute, the
court may seek help to the external aids in case of repugnancy or inconsistency in the statutory
provision which are as follows:
1) Dictionaries
When a word used in the statute is not defined therein or if defined but the meaning is
unclear only in such situation, the court may refer to the dictionary meaning of the statute to
find out meaning of the word in ordinary sense.
The meaning of such words shall be interpreted so to make sure that it is speaking about
the particular statute because words bears different meaning in different context.
Motipur zamindary company private limited v. State of Bihar , the question was whether
sales tax can be levied on Sugarcane.
The applicant argued that it is green vegetable and should be exempted from tax. The
dictionary meaning of vegetable said anything which derived or obtained from the plants.
The SC rejected dictionary meaning and held that in common parlance vegetable is
something which is grown in kitchen garden and used during lunch and dinner and held that
sugarcane is not vegetable.

2) Text Books
The court while construing an enactment, may refer to the standard textbooks to clear the
meaning. Although, the courts are not bound to accept such view.
The court time and again referred to mulla, kautiliya, manu, arthshastra.
Example: in Kesavananda Bharthi case , judges quoted large number of books.

3) Statement of objects and reasons

The statement of object and reasons are attached to the bill which describe the objects,
purpose and the reason for the bill. It also gives understanding of the background, the
antecedent state of affairs and the object the law seeks to achieve.
 The parliament before passing a bill must take into consideration that what object a bill
serve to achieve.
However, it is not considered as conclusive aid to interpretation because doesn't impart the
true meaning to the statutory provision.
4) Constituent Debates/Speech
It shall compromises all such debate which had taken place in the parliament at the time of
formation of Constitution of India.
In case of inconsistency or repugnancy in the Constitution the court can clearly refer to
such debates.

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, the interpretation of the expression backward class of
citizen' used in Article 16(4) was in question before the court. The SC under this case
referred to the speech given by B.R. Ambedkar to understand the context, background and
object behind its use of the given expression.

5) Legislative Debates/Speech
It is referred as to debates or speeches which are made in the course of passing a bill in the
parliament by the parliamentarians to put forth their view.
It is not considered as a conclusive aid to interpretation and is therefore, not admissible
because many times speeches are influenced by the political pressure or maybe incorrect
to rely upon.

6) Committee Reports
Before the framing of the Bill, usually the matter is referred to a committee to consider it in
detail and give its report thereon.
These reports of the commissions and committee have been referred to as evidence of
historical facts or of surrounding circumstances and used for interpreting the Act.
When there is an ambiguity in the meaning of a provision and the act was passed on the
recommendation of a committee report, aid can be taken from that report to interpret the
provision.
Example: the criminal amendment act was based on the recommendation by J.S. Verma
Committee Report such report can be referred in case of any ambiguity in amendment.

7) Foreign laws and decisions

Judges may refer to foreign laws and decision if the jurisprudence of both the countries is
same, similarity in political system and ideology, when there is no domestic law on point
and if the Indian court believe that decision passed by the foreign court is not arbitrary.
However, the foreign courts or decision have only persuasive value as the courts in India
are not bound by the foreign courts.
Example: in Right to Privacy case, judges refer to foreign judgements.

Effect Of Repeal Of Statutes

General Clauses Act, 1897

6. Effect of repeal:-Where this Act, or any 13[Central Act] or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then,
unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder ; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any
enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed
against any enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege,
obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;and any such investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or
punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.

Comment: Applying the Golden Rule of construction as stated by this Court in Garikapatti
Veeraya (AIR 1957 SC 540) (supra) in the amending Act there was nothing to show that the Act
would have retrospective effect. As "the essential idea of a legal system is that current law should
govern current activities". We hold that rate of compensation shall have to be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the Act which was in force at the time compensation was
payable i.e. unamended sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the Act would apply. Moreover, the
amending Act affects the substantive right of the appellant, therefore, it would have prospective
operation. There is also no express or implied provision in the amending Act to indicate that the
Act will have retrospective effect. We, therefore, hold that the amending Act would apply
prospectively. Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo , Appellant v. State of Bihar AIR 1999
SUPREME COURT 3609

In general, the term repeal stands for to cancel or to revoke. But in the context of law, it means to
“abolish statutes”. Repeal of statutes means the abolition of the law, and once if any statute is
abolished then it is considered void and possesses no effects. In addition, there is no basic
difference between amendment and repeal. Both the term amendment and repeal is used for
stating a similar expression that is the substitution or omission or addition.

As per Halsbury’s Laws of England, the term repeal stands for revoking and abolishing an act and
all its effects which cause it to cease to be a part of statutes of books or body of law.

According to the Black’s law dictionary, the term repeal means a legislative act which abrogates or
obliterates an existing statute.

There exist two types of statutes temporary and perpetual. Temporary statutes tend to have
effects for a specific period of time. They have no effects after the expiry of the specific period,
however, the permanent or the perpetual statute is the one in which the statute remains effective
until it is substituted or repealed by the legislative act. The power to repeal a statute is conferred
to the legislature is similar to the powers it has for the enactment of a statute. For example, the
Companies Act, 2013 repealed the Companies Act 1956, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
repealed the previous Criminal Procedure Code, etc. such power of repealing a statute is similar
and coextensive to the power of making or enacting a law. Both the union and the state legislature
are empowered with such power however they are restricted to delegate the power of repealing.

What are the objects of the Repealing Act?

The primary object of this act is to bring necessary changes in the existing law for changing socio-
economic and cultural conditions from time to time. The purpose of this Act is to remove the
outdated or obsolete matter from the body of law. After the removal of obsolete matter, it is the
court that decides whether the new provision meets its goal and has different intentions or not.
This act is the editorial revision by abolishing obsolete and unnecessary matter of the statute and
adding new and proper information in the books of the statute.

There are two types of repeal:

1 Express repeal
2 Implied repeal

Express repeal

Express repeal is an expression which means the abolition of the previously enacted statute by
the newly enacted provisions of a statute through expressed words embedded under the new
statute enacted. The statute which has been repealed is called repealed statute and the one which
replaces the earlier statute is called the repealing statute. In general, when an earlier statute or
some of its provisions are repealed through express words embedded under the newly enacted
statute stating that the provisions are now of no effect is called the express repeal.

What are the essential features that constitute express repeal?

•The first and foremost feature is that there must be a repealing statute.
•The earlier statute must be repealed by the new enacting or repealing statute.
•The enacted statute must have clear intention showing the effect of the repeal.

So it is understood that any earlier statute or provision of the statute can be removed or repealed
by the enacted statute showing incompatibility with the previous one.

R. v. longmead, [(1975) 2 Leach 694: 168 E R 448]

In the instant case, it was held that the legislature in order to pass a repeal or continue any statute
is not restricted to use precise forms of words.

Implied repeal

The term implied means implicit or hinted. So when a statute becomes obsolete and it is inferred
that it is no longer and shall be repealed with the newly enacted statute then this process of
repealing is called implied repeal.
For example, if we enter a car showroom it is intended that we are there to buy cars. It is implied,
similarly, if there arises any inconsistency in the statute and due to certain circumstances it
becomes necessary to repeal the statute with the new one though such situation is not expressly
stated, then it is implicit for the implication of repeal.

When the reference is not direct then the matter is decided through the meaning and nature of the
words enshrined under the repeal clause. During the absence of provisions relating to express
repeal the continuance of any statute or legislation is presumed.

In the case of implied repeal, the burden lies over the person who asserted the implication of
repeal. However, it has also been mentioned that if the newly enacted statute shows no clear
intention or is inconsistent with the provisions of the earlier act then such an assertion or
presumption is rebutted and the act of repeal is done by inferring necessary implications.

The concept of implied repeal is loosely based on the following maxim “Leges posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant”. This means that the earlier or previously enacted law shall be obliterated or
abolished by the new one.

Under the following circumstances, the implied repeal is inferred

•The first circumstance is when both the subsequent and the earlier enacted acts are
inconsistent with each other one of the two can remain effective.
• When the subject of the earlier act is covered by the act and is intended to substitute.

Test of the Implied Repeal

There is the assertion against the repeal by implication. The reason for making such an assertion
is that legislature while making or enacting the law has full knowledge about the current laws on
the subject matters. If the legislature has no provision regarding the repeal of the statute then it is
asserted that the legislature has no intention to repeal the existing statute.

Municipal council, Palari v. T.J. Joseph AIR 1963 3C 1561, p. 1564

In the instant case, it was held that if an act or provision enacted is inconsistent from the act
previously enacted and one of the acts must be obliterated. The presumption, in this case,
rebutted and the implied repeal is inferred.

For the implied repeal of a statute following points are to be considered:

•Whether the previously enacted laws are in direct contradiction to the later enacted laws.
•The conflict between the laws is of such a nature that can’t be resolved and reconciliation
between the laws is not possible.
•Whether the newly enacted act is not consistent with the previously enacted act and one
has to be obliterated.
•When both the laws are of such a nature that occupy and deals with the same field.
Delhi Municipality V. Shivshanker, [AIR 1971 SC 815]:-In the instant case it was held by the
supreme court of India that the test which is applied in case of repugnancy under Article 254 of the
Indian constitution while resolving the conflicts arising between the laws enacted by the parliament
and the laws created by the state legislature, this test of determining repugnancy shall be applied
in case of implied repeal of a statute. This test includes:

•Whether there exists a direct contradiction between the two statutes or provisions.
•When the law tends to occupy the same field.
•When the legislature explicitly focused on the code of the particular subject matter replacing
the earlier law.

Ratanlal Adukia v Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 104):-In the instant case, the Supreme Court
stated that the doctrine of implied repeal is loosely based on the statement that the legislature
assumed the current state of the law did not intend to generate any vagueness by retaining the
conflicting provisions. The court while implicating this doctrine examines the nature and scope of
the two enactments by giving effect to the legislative intent.

Damji V. L.I.C (AIR 1966 SC 135):-In the instant case it was held that section 446 embedded
under the companies act 1956 is a general provision whereas the section 15 and 41 enshrined
under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 are special provision so there exists a difference
and the companies court is not competent or have jurisdiction over the matters which falls under
the ambit of Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.

Repeal Of Temporary and Permanent Statute

As it has been already stated that there are two types of statutes namely temporary statute and
the permanent statute. There exists a very thin line difference between both the statutes. A
temporary statute is enacted for specific purposes and for a specific time period and gets repealed
after the expiry of that particular period or fulfillment of that purpose. A permanent statute which is
also known as a perpetual statute is enacted with a long term goal and gets repealed by the
subsequent statute.

There are certain acts which possess the nature of permanent statute but remains inoperative or
ineffective for a long period of time as they are not applied or taken into consideration by the court
for a long period of time. Due to this, the statute loses its recognition and its applicability. Such
disobedience of act is known as Repeal by Desuetude.

The Municipal Corporation for the city of Pune and another v. Bharat forge Co. Ltd and others (J.T.
1995 (3) S.C. 312):-In the instant case, it was assumed that the perpetrators or the accused who
have committed certain crimes and are punished for violation of certain laws or statute which has
become ineffective can be protected and escape their criminal liability.
What are the effects or consequences of repeal?
The effects of the repeal of a statute have been described under the following heads:

Effects or repeal with respect to common law

•Common law is commonly known as the law made by the judge. It contains the following
effect regarding the repeal of the statute.
•The first effect is that the statute repealed is abolished and obliterated and becomes dead
as if the enactment of the statute.
•All the rights created and enshrined under the repealed act is removed.
•The repealed portion gets resuscitate if the repealing act is repealed by the new
subsequent act and such an act shows its intentions.

General consequences of repeal

•A newly enacted law repudiate the existing one.

•The statute after getting repealed becomes ineffective.
•Statute repealed is abolished by the repealing statute as if it had never been made by the
legislature.
•Except for a saving clause, each and every part of the statute is considered
unconstitutional.
•In order to validate a transaction made under a repealed statute, the law can retrospectively
amend the statute even after it is obliterated.

Effects embedded under the General Clause Act, 1987

If any act made after the incorporation and commencement of this Act, repeals any statute made
until now then until a different intention or object appears between the act and the repeal shall not-
effects the operation commenced under the provision of this Act.

Well, Repeal of statutes means the abolition of the law, and once if any statute is abolished then it
is considered void and possesses no effects. In addition, there is no basic difference between
amendment and repeal. Both the term amendment and repeal is used for stating similar
expression that is the substitution or omission or addition. Both the union and the state legislature
are empowered with such power however they are restricted to delegate the power of repealing.
The primary object of this act is to bring necessary changes in the existing law for changing socio-
economic and cultural conditions from time to time. The purpose of this act is to remove the
outdated or obsolete matter from the body of law. After the removal of obsolete matter, it is the
court that decides whether the new provision meets its goal and has a different intention or not.
This act is the editorial revision by abolishing obsolete and unnecessary matter of the statute and
adding new and proper information in the books of the statute.