1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN G.R. No.

187495, April 21, 2014

DOCTRINE: Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the
realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a
home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not
cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also
to protect her from oppression and wrong."
In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law reclassified
rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. Clearly, it is now
acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife
without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to
the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro
City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have
sex with him.
As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He
treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he
started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert
her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she
would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial
bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near
the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to
instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain
due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose
from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified,
KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed
defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his
own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating
her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting:
“Don‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”
Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape
charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to
cover up her extra-marital affairs.

RTC ruled finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate
charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, plus
damages.

CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC in toto. The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since
he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there
must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used
upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external injures is not
indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the
victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only
reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would
accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be a marital rape. (kung pwd ma kasuhan sang asawa ang bana sang
RAPE.)

HELD: Yes.
NOTE: not relevant to the merits of the case, pro basaha lang Man.
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
MARITAL UNITY THEORY – Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with her
husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal property or
write a will.
II. The marital exemption rule
IRREVOCABLE IMPLIED CONSENT THEORY or THE MARITAL EXEMPTION RULE
in rape – The husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon
his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Aricle 335 of the Revised Penal Code adhered to Hale's IRREVOCABLE IMPLIED
CONSENT THEORY, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino, a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in
case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces
his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.
(amo na subong may ara na Rape by Sexual Assault) In 1981, the Philippines joined
180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW). Hailed as the first international
women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on
all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of
promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in
addressing global concerns. The country also committed, among others, to condemn
discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate
means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to
this end.
(tungod sa CDAW) The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender
equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the
RPC. The law reclassified rape as a crime against person amo na ni subong ang rape! and removed it
from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the
law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of
marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That
the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void
ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is
unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship
with his victim.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of
the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of
qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage,
the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the
general definition of “rape”.
The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role
of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality
between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. One of such measures
is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist
because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her
consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly
subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that
constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual
violence.
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual
intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a
fellow human being with dignity equal120 to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to
violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely,
the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule
sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous
and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar
Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He
is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of
damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

2. MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.) vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012
DOCTRINE: In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, this Court ruled that a court-martial case
is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts.
The General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as a criminal court. On
that premise, certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of
War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary.
The application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS:
Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of
violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of
the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to
disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the
year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.
Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President directing his
two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive
confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on
December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially
confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the
Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the Office of the President confirmed the sentence of
the court martial against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2
years, at the maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The Office of
the President stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is
separate and distinct from ordinary courts.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts. Yes.; and
(2) Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance
with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. Yes.
HELD:
In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, this Court ruled that a court-
martial case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other
courts. In the same case, this Court clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court" used in
Section 1732 of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in any
criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office.
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a
criminal and not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to
another prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused
in jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton
vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment
will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which
attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take
cognizance; x x x and restricting our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, we
judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in
error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have
been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction,
proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be subsequently tried for the
same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.
Hence, as extensively discussed above, the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest
sense of the word and acts as a criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the
Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.
This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
Considering that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October 2004, the entire
period of his confinement since 18 October 2004 will be credited in his favor. Consequently, his two
(2) year sentence of confinement will expire on 18 October 2006.
The proper place of confinement during the remaining unserved portion of his sentence is an
official military detention facility. However, the Accused is presently undergoing trial before the
Sandiganbayan which has directed that custody over him be turned over to the civilian authority and
that he be confined in a civilian jail or detention facility pending the disposition of the case(s) before
said Court. For this reason, the Accused shall remain confined at the PNP's detention facility in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. The Armed Forces of the Philippines defers to the civilian authority on this
matter.
Should the Accused be released from confinement upon lawful orders by the Sandiganbayan
before the expiration of his sentence adjudged by the military court, the Provost Marshal General shall
immediately take custody over the Accused, who shall be transferred to and serve the remaining
unserved portion thereof at the ISAFP detention facility in Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon
City.
Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of
War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to
a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
PURPOSE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE is to secure every person within a state's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly-constituted
authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. It, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
TEST OF REASONABLENESS. The test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on
SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS; (2) it is GERMANE to the purpose of the law; (3) it is NOT
LIMITED to existing conditions only; and (4) it APPLIES EQUALLY to all members of THE
SAME CLASS. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." In the present case,
petitioner belongs to the class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is
entitled to the rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between
those who are convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and
the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic
and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. It must be remembered that the provisions of the Articles of
War which the petitioner violated are penal in nature.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major General Carlos F. Garcia,
AFP (Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED. However, applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code, the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the
sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.

3. MAJOR ZOSIMO R. MAGNO, and CAPTAIN ROSARIO J. TAMAYO vs. GENERAL RENATO
DE VILLA G.R. No. 92606 July 26, 1991
DOCTRINE: Courts-Martial are not courts within the Philippine judicial system and are merely
instrumentalities of the executive department. Consequently, the Rules of Court, which this Court adopted
pursuant to its power and authority under the Constitution to govern pleading, practice and procedure in all courts
of the Philippines, is not applicable to pleading, practice and procedure in courts-martial. However, no legal
obstacle bars certain guidelines relating to court-martial proceedings from adopting statutes relating to preliminary
investigations of ordinary criminal cases triable by regular courts.
Procedure in Courts Martial;
1. A CHARGE SHEET MAY CONTAIN MORE THAN ONE CHARGE.
2. THE CHARGES SHOULD BE NUMBERED
3. The specification shall follow under each charge.
4. EACH SPECIFICATION MUST CONTAIN ONLY ONE OFFENSE
5. If more than one offense is alleged in a specification, THE ACCUSED MAY FILE A DEMURRER, which is
equivalent to a motion to quash under the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Major Zosimo Magno is with the
Philippine Constabulary while Captain Rosario Tamayo is with the Philippine Army.
In a Memorandum, Lt. Col. Rodolfo G. Munar, Chief, Military Justice Division of the Judge
Advocate General's Office (JAGO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) made the following
findings and recommendation that there exists probable cause against MAJ. ZOSIMO R. MAGNO PC,
MAJ. ROSARIO J. TAMAYO and others for violation of AW 94, in relation to Art. 217 of the RPC,
AW 95, and AW 96. (damo daw charges sa ila -- sa civil courts daan indi na pwd. Dapat eh “quash
or motion to quash – wlang bisa or eh dismissed” na sa)
During the pretrial investigation, petitioners denied the charges and alleged that the
multiple charges or "shotgun charges" levelled against them are illegal and
unconstitutional since they were deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them and to enable them to answer the said charges squarely.
Trial was referred to General Court Martial No. 6 (GCM 6).
When GCM 6 convened for the arraignment and trial of petitioners and their co-accused,
petitioners questioned the Charge Sheet on the ground that it charges petitioners of more than one
offense." Specifically, petitioners, through their counsel, Atty. Renecio Espiritu, argued that under
the charge sheet they are charged for four (4) offenses, namely: violations of (a) AW 94;
(b) AW 95, (c) AW 96, and (d) Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which is taken in relation
to AW 94 and AW 95, each of which carries a different penalty. Counsel stressed that the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the charges against them
with particularity was violated when the charge sheet charged them with more than one
offense.
After a few legal skirmishes between the civilian counsel, on the one hand, and the Trial Judge
Advocate and the Co-Trial Judge Advocate on the other, and following the pronouncement of the
President of GCM 6 for the parties to go through the proper sequence before entry of a special
plea, the introduction of petitioner's counsel, the statement by the Co-Trial Judge Advocate of the
general nature of the charges and that no member of the court would be a witness, and after asking
the petitioners and co-accused if they challenge any member of the court, counsel for petitioners
reiterated his earlier observation that the charge sheet charges more than one offense.
Unable to adjust his bearing after the confusion however, said counsel did not press for a
quashal of the Charge Sheet. Instead, after confessing that petitioners "really do not know . . .
which of these particular violations of the Articles of War whether 94, 95 and 96 is the
particular offense being charged of the accused (sic)," counsel "ask for a bill of particulars
on the matter. (hahaha…na confused ang abogado sang mga acused, wla sa guro ka basa sang
Articles of War. Ang bill of particulars amo na ang gina file sang lawyer pra ipa claro sa iya ang wla
nya na intindihan. Wla sa b ka tsindi sang AW. hahahahaha)
Thereafter, petitioners, with co-accused Gelvero, were arraigned. The latter, through counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty to each of the three charges and specifications. Petitioners,
through their counsel, announced that in view of their special plea that "there is a multiplication of
charges against them", and that they "are going on certiorari on that particular issue," they will not
enter a plea, and it would be "up for the Trial Judge Advocate to enter the plea there because if there
is no plea, it would be a plea of Not Guilty."
The Law Member then directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not ordering the quashal or dismissal of the charge sheet on
the ground that more than one offense is charged therein. (pursuant to the Rules of Court
promulgated by the Supreme Court) – basi mg ask si sir mo kung ma apply baa ng Rules of Court
sang civil courts sa Court Martial Proceeding – answer is NO – see the doctrine sa babaw.

HELD: No.
Petitioners anchor their plea principally on Section 13 (which they cite as Section 12) of Rule
110 of the Rules of Court on the theory that the Rules of Court should also apply to military personnel
since the "Court Martial proceedings, and the Articles of War, are not and should not be interpreted
(sic) as a (sic) complete, separate, and distinct rules of procedure than those used in the trial of
civilians which is the Rules of Court."
Insistence on this provision of the Rules of Court-is misplaced.
Courts-Martial are not courts within the Philippine judicial system and are merely instrumentalities of
the executive department. Consequently, the Rules of Court, which this Court adopted pursuant to its
power and authority under the Constitution to govern pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of
the Philippines, is not applicable to pleading, practice and procedure in courts-martial. However, no
legal obstacle bars certain guidelines relating to court-martial proceedings from adopting statutes
relating to preliminary investigations of ordinary criminal cases triable by regular courts.
The rule of procedure which shall be applied to petitioners is that prescribed in the
Manual. Section 31 thereof provides that charges and specifications shall be signed and sworn
to substantially as indicated in the form, Appendix 3, which is the CHARGE SHEET. A CHARGE
SHEET MAY CONTAIN MORE THAN ONE CHARGE. However, as provided for in Appendix 4 of the
Manual, THE CHARGES SHOULD BE NUMBERED, using the Roman numerals, viz., 1, II, etc. The
specification shall follow under each charge. When there is one specification under a charge, the
specifications under that charge should be numbered, using the Arabic numerals, viz., 1, 2, etc.
The charge indicates, where the offense alleged is a violation of the Articles of War, the article
alleged to have been violated. The specification sets forth the specific acts and circumstances relied
upon as constituting the violation.
Section 6738 of the Manual expressly provides that in order to prevent confusion and to
guarantee to the accused an intelligent presentation of his defense for each offense
charged against him, EACH SPECIFICATION MUST CONTAIN ONLY ONE OFFENSE. This is
founded upon the constitutional right of an accused person to be properly informed of the nature of
the offense for which he is charged. Accordingly, if more than one offense is alleged in a
specification, THE ACCUSED MAY FILE A DEMURRER, which is equivalent to a motion to
quash under the Rules of Court. Thus, the Manual itself assures protection of this right.
A careful scrutiny of the challenged Charge Sheet, more specifically Charges I, II and III and the
specifications thereunder do not yield the conclusion that GCM 6 had committed grave abuse of
discretion or had acted in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion
of petitioners and in later entering for them a plea of not guilty when they refused to make any plea
after their arraignment. As clearly shown in the Charge Sheet, each specification recites the act
constituting the alleged offense charged. There is no specification which recites the commission of
more than one offense.
It cannot also be successfully argued that the acts for which petitioners have been charged cannot
give rise to violations of more than one article of the Articles of War, unless the rule against double-
jeopardy is available to them. We do not find it to be so, for even conceding for the sake of argument
that the three charges arose out of one transaction or one single act, the requisites of double jeopardy
are not present.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioners.

4. EDUARDO N. ASWAT vs. BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEJANDRO GALIDO

G.R. No. 88555 November 21, 1991
DOCTRINE: As long as the accused is subject to military law, as defined under Article 2, A.W., he shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. No. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and
is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The unique
structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the
right to bail. The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guarantee requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others.
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo N. Aswat and victim Felix B. Nebres were both enlisted men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines ("AFP") respectively holding the ranks Private First Class and Corporal. Aswat
and Nebres were assigned to the Commanding General of the Southern Luzon Command (SOLCOM),
but Aswat was detailed as caretaker of Brigadier General Galido's Baguio rest house while Nebres was
assigned to act as a personal driver of Brigadier General Galido's wife. On 29 December 1988,
petitioner was involved in a shooting incident at Dominican Hills, Baguio City, which resulted in the
death of Nebres. Records disclose that petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police and
was transferred to Southern Luzon Command.
Petitioner was charged before a SOLCOM General Court-Martial ("SOLCOM-GCM") with
violation of Article 94 of the Articles of War ("A.W."), the specification being homicide.
While the court-martial proceedings were going on, petitioner filed the instant petition,
contending: (1) that the specification of homicide with which he was charged was committed
outside a military installation and hence the offense was cognizable by a regular, civilian
court; (2) that he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pursuant to Section 13, Article
III of the Constitution; and (3) that he should be given his due base pay and other pay, aside from the
allowances he has been receiving, computed from the time of commencement of his detention.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the specification of homicide with which he was charged was committed
outside a military installation and hence the offense was cognizable by a regular, civilian court. No.

Whether or not military has the right to bail. No.

HELD:
The distinction upon which petitioner anchors his argument was obliterated sometime ago. As
the law now stands, as long as the accused is subject to military law, as defined under Article
2, A.W., he shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Art 94. Various Crimes.—Any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime,
breach of law or violation of municipal ordinances which is recognized as an offense of a penal
nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal
ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any
 such reservation when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be
more than one) is a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct: In imposing the penalties for offenses falling within this article, the penalties for such
offenses provided in the penal laws of the Philippines or in such municipal ordinances shall be
taken into consideration.
Article 94, A.W., in its original form, did refer only to offenses committed inside a Philippine
military reservation as falling within the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In 1948, however, R.A. No.
242 amended Article 94, A.W. by providing that offenses committed outside a military
reservation shall also be punished as a court-martial may direct, BUT ONLY "WHEN THE
OFFENDED PARTY (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one)" IS
SIMILARLY SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW.
There is no question that both petitioner and the deceased Nebres were subject to military
law at the time the latter was shot and killed. Moreover, when the petitioner asked for the
affirmative relief of bail from the SOLCOM-GCM, he in effect recognized the jurisdiction of the General
Court-Martial. Hence, petitioner is properly deemed estopped to deny such jurisdiction.
There is no question that both petitioner and the deceased Nebres were subject to military law at the
time the latter was shot and killed.
Moreover, when the petitioner asked for the affirmative relief of bail from the SOLCOM-GCM, he in
effect recognized the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial. Hence, petitioner is properly deemed
estopped to deny such jurisdiction.

Petitioner next contends that his right to bail is explicitly guaranteed in Section 13, Article III
of the Constitution.
Although the right to bail applies to "all," the Court has very recently ruled that the
guarantee is not without any exception. In Comendador vs. De Villa, et al., the Court en banc,
speaking through Mr. Justice Cruz, held:
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. No. 95020
has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an
exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested
in Arula, where We observed that the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military where the right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military
men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of the democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities
outside of and against the existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal
protection clause is not acceptable. This guarantee requires equal treatment only of
persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the
treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if
they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have
been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to
civilians.
Petitioner, as already noted, is a person subject to military law, and under Article 70, A.W., "any
person subject to military law charged with crime or with a serious offense under these article shall be
placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Habeas Corpus for lack of merit. No
pronouncement to costs.