6. Spouses Ermino v.

Golden Village
(GR No. 180808; August 15, 2018)
FACTS:

Spouses Ermino are residents of Alco Homes, a subdivision located beside Golden
Village Subdivision in Barangay Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City. On days prior to August 12,
1995 and September 10, 1995, there was continuous heavy rain which caused a large
volume of water to fall from the hilltop subdivision to the subdivisions below. The volume of
water directly hit Spouses Ermino's house and damaged their fence, furniture, appliances
and car.

Spouses Ermino filed a complaint for damages against E.B. Villarosa, the developer
of Hilltop City Subdivision, and GVHAI. The Hilltop City Subdivision is found at the upper
portion of Alco Homes, making it a higher estate, while Golden Village is located beside Alco
Homes, which makes both Alco Homes and Golden Village lower estates vis-a-vis Hilltop
City Subdivision. Spouses Ermino blamed E.B. Villarosa for negligently failing to observe
Department of Environment and Natural Resources rules and regulations and to provide
retaining walls and other flood control devices which could have prevented the softening of
the earth and consequent inundation. They likewise claimed that GVHAI committed a
wrongful act in constructing the concrete fence which diverted the flow of water to Alco
Homes, hence, making it equally liable to Spouses Ermino. Spouses Ermino prayed that
E.B. Villarosa and GVHAI be made jointly and severally liable in the amount of P500,000.00
as actual damages, P400,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. They likewise prayed for attorney's fees and litigation costs and expenses. E.B.
Villarosa argued that the location of the house of Spouses Ermino is located at the lower
portion of the Dagong Creek and is indeed flooded every time there is a heavy downpour,
and that the damage was further aggravated by GVHAI's construction of the concrete fence.
It contended, however, that the damage was due to a fortuitous event. RTC found E.B.
Villarosa and GVHAI jointly and severally liable for the damages to Spouses Ermino's
properties. Only GVHAI appealed to the CA. Thus, the trial court's decision attained its
finality as regards E.B. Villarosa. The CA reversed the RTC's Decision and found no liability
on the part of GVHAI.

ISSUE:

Whether GVHAI is responsible for the damage to Spouses Ermino's properties.

RULING:

No. When GVHAI decided to construct the concrete fence, it could not have
reasonably foreseen any harm that could occur to Spouses Ermino. Any prudent person
exercising reasonable care and caution could not have envisaged such an outcome from the
mere exercise of a proprietary act. Indeed, the act of replacing the steel grille gate with a
concrete fence was within the legitimate exercise of GVHAI's proprietary rights over its
property. In this regard, Hilltop City Subdivision, the immovable in favor of which the
easement is established, is the dominant estate; while Alco Homes and Golden Village,
those that are subject of the easement, are the servient estates. It must be noted, however,
that there is a concomitant responsibility on the part of Hilltop City Subdivision not to make
the obligation of these lower estates or servient estates more onerous.
 7. Spouses Garcia v. Santos
(GR No. 228334; June 17, 2019)
FACTS:

As alleged in the Complaint, the Sps. Garcia are the registered owners of Lot 2, Blk.
1, San Jose Street, Southville Subdivision, Molo, Iloilo City (subject property), covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- 130666. The subject property, which has been
occupied by the Sps. Garcia for about eleven (11) years, has a one-storey residential house
erected thereon and was purchased by them from the Sps. Santos in October 1998. At the
time of the purchase of the subject property from the Sps. Santos, the one-storey house was
already constructed. Also, at the time of the acquisition of the subject property, the adjoining
lot, Lot 1, which is owned by the Sps. Santos, was an idle land without any improvements.
Lot 1 is covered by TCT No. T-114137 registered under the name of the Sps. Santos. Lot 1
remained empty until the Sps. Santos started the construction of a two-storey residential
house therein on January 24, 2009.

Further, the building constructed on Lot 1 is taller than the Sps. Garcia's one-storey
residential house. As such, the Sps. Santos' building allegedly obstructed the Sps. Garcia's
right to light, air, and view. The Sps. Garcia bemoaned how, prior to the construction on Lot
1, they received enough bright and natural light from their windows. The construction
allegedly rendered the Sps. Garcia's house dark such that they are unable to do their normal
undertakings in the bedroom, living room and other areas of the house without switching on
their lights. The Sps. Garcia likewise alleged that the said structure constructed on Lot 1 is at
a distance of less than three meters away from the boundary line, in alleged violation of their
easement. Furthermore, the Sps. Santos allegedly m de excavations on Lot 1 without
providing sufficient lateral support to the concrete perimeter fence of the Sps. Garcia. Hence,
in their Complaint, aside from asking for damages, the Sps. Garcia prayed that: the RTC
declare them as having acquired the easement of light, air, and view against Lot 1; the
respondents be prohibited from constructing any structure on Lot 1 taller than the Sps.
Garcia's one-storey residential house.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouses Garcia have acquired an easement of light and view with
respect to Lot 1 owned by the Spouses Santos

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that spouses Garcia have acquired an easement of light and
view with respect to Lot 1 owned by the Spouses Santos. In the instant case, the records
show that Roberto Planton Baradas (Baradas), the construction project engineer who supervised
the construction of the Sps. Santos' house located on Lot 1, testified that there is a distance
of two meters between fence and the wall of spouses Santos. Simply stated, the distance
between the structure erected by the Sps. Santos on Lot 1 and the boundary line is only two
meters, which is less than the three-meter distance required under Article 673. Therefore, the
Sps. Santos should necessarily demolish or renovate portions of their residential building so that
the three-meter distance rule as mandated under Article 673 of the Civil Code is observed.
 1. Ronquillo v. Roco

(GR No. L-10619; February 28, 1958)

FACTS:

Petitioner Ronquillo’s parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and
Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way through the land of the Respondents, which
they have been using for more than 20 years. On May 1953, however, respondents built a
chapel right in the middle of the road, blocking their usual path to the marketplace. One year
after, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land
where the easement was situated, planted wooden posts and fenced with barbed wires the
road, closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad St. and Naga public market.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

RULING:

No. The court held that the easement of a right of way cannot be considered
continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man. Article 620 of
the Civil Code provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by
prescription.

Easements of right of way may already be acquired by prescription, at least since the
introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of
Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction
as to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and there would appear to be no valid
reason, at least to the writer of this opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road or
right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere tolerance
of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said party a vested right
to such right of way through prescription.
 2. NPC v. Spouses Campos
(GR No. 143643; June 27, 2003)

FACTS:

In the year 1970, Dr. Paulo C. Campos, who was a president of an Electric
Cooperative in Cavite, verbally requested Jose Campos (Petitioner) to grant him a right-of-
way to erect a wooden electric post and transmission for the electrification of Puerto Azul.
The respondent gave authority for the condition that the said installation would only be
temporary in nature. The petitioner assured that the wooden electric post will be relocated as
soon as the permanent post will become available. 23 years had passed the petitioner still
continued the use of the subject property without compensating the respondents. In 1994,
agent of the petitioner allegedly trespassed on the subject property to conduct an
engineering survey but was asked to leave by the caretaker.

The petitioner instituted an expropriation case alleging that the subject property was
selected in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
The petitioner also insinuated that they have exhausted all efforts to negotiate with the
respondent but failed to achieve an amicable agreement. The petitioner contends that it had
already acquired the easement of right-of-way over the portion of the subject property by
prescription, the said easement having been allegedly continuous and apparent for a period
of about twenty-three years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property can be acquired through prescription

RULING:

No. Acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary, in which case the possession
must be in good faith and with just title, or extraordinary, in which case there is either good
faith or just title. In either case, there has to be possession which must be in the concept of
owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Act of possessory character executed in virtue of
license or mere tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purpose of possession.
Acts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner
are clearly not in concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so
continued do not start the running of the period of prescription.

In the case at bar, the petitioner possession of the subject property was due merely
to the tacit permission and tolerance of the respondents. Accordingly this permissive use by
the petitioner of the portion of the subject property no matter how long continued will no
create an easement of right-of-way. NPC never acquired the requisite possession which is
the fundamental basis of prescription whether ordinary or extraordinary.
 3. Laureana Cid v. Irene Javier
(GR No. L-14116; June 30, 1960)

FACTS:

Respondents owned a building with windows overlooking the adjacent lot, owned by
the petitioners. Allegedly, in 1913 or 1914, before the New Civil Code took effect, the
predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner were verbally prohibited by the respondent to
obstruct view and light. When the Court of Appeals adjudicated the case, it found out that the
two estates are covered by Original Certificates of Title, both issued by the Register of
Deeds. The court further observed that in both of the title, any annotation does not appear in
respect to the easement supposedly acquired by prescription which, counting the twenty (20)
years from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by 1937, date of the decrees of
registration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the owners of a building standing on their lot with windows
overlooking the adjacent lot, had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light
and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, to petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by
Torrens titles.

RULING:

No. The law is explicit as it requires not any form of prohibition, but exacts, in a
parenthetical expression, for emphasis, the doing not only of a specific, particular act, but a
formal act. Thus, i would appear that the phrase "formal act" would require not merely any
writing, but one executed in due form and/or with solemnity. That this is the intendment of
the law although not expressed in exact language is the reason for the clarification2made in
Article 621 of the new Civil Code which specifically requires the prohibition to be in "an
instrument acknowledged before a notary public". The law requires solemn formalities
because easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on the servient estate, constituting
as they do, a limitation on the dominical right of the owner of the subjected property.

Hence, they can be acquired only by title and by prescription, in the case of positive
easement, only as a result of some sort of invasion, apparent and continuous, of the servient
estate. By the same token, negative easements cannot be acquired by less formal means.
Hence, the requirement that the prohibition should be by "a formal act", "an instrument
acknowledged before a notary public."