Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a military

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
confrontation between India and Pakistan that
occurred during the liberation war in East Pakistan Part of the Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts and
from 3 December 1971 to the fall of Dacca Bangladesh Liberation War
(Dhaka) on 16 December 1971. The war began
with preemptive aerial strikes on 11 Indian air
stations, which led to the commencement of
hostilities with Pakistan and Indian entry into the
war of independence in East Pakistan on the side
of Bengali nationalist forces. Lasting just 13 days,
it is one of the shortest wars in history.[32][33]

During the war, Indian and Pakistani militaries

simultaneously clashed on the eastern and western
fronts; the war ended after the Eastern Command
of the Pakistan military signed the Instrument of
Surrender[34][35] on 16 December 1971 in Dhaka,
marking the formation of East Pakistan as the new
First Row: Lt-Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, the Cdr. of Pakistani Eastern
nation of Bangladesh. Officially, East Pakistan had
Comnd., signing the documented instrument in Dacca in the
earlier called for its secession from the unity of
Pakistan on 26 March 1971. Approximately presence of Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora (GOC-in-C of Indian
90,000[36] to 93,000 Pakistani servicemen were Eastern Comnd.). Surojit Sen of All India Radio is seen holding
taken prisoner by the Indian Army, which a microphone on the right.
included 79,676 to 81,000 uniformed personnel of Second Row (left to right): Vice Adm. N. Krishnan (FOC-in-C
the Pakistan Armed Forces, including some
Eastern Naval Comnd.), Air Mshl. H.C. Dewan, (AOC-in-C
Bengali soldiers who had remained loyal to
Eastern Air Comnd., Lt Gen. Sagat Singh (Cdr. IV Corps), Maj
Pakistan.[36][37][38] The remaining 10,324 to
Gen. JFR Jacob (COS Eastern Comnd.) and Flt Lt
12,500 prisoners were civilians, either family
members of the military personnel or collaborators Krishnamurthy (peering over Jacob‘s shoulder).
(razakars).[36][39][40][41] Date 3–16 December 1971 (13 days)
It is estimated that members of the Pakistani Location Eastern Front:
military and supporting Islamist militias killed
India–East Pakistan border
between 300,000 and 3,000,000 civilians in
Bangladesh.[42][43][44][45][46] As a result of the Bay of Bengal
conflict, a further eight to ten million people fled
Pasha enclaves
the country to seek refuge in India.[47]

During the 1971 Bangladesh war for Western Front:

independence, members of the Pakistani military
and supporting Islamist militias called the Razakars India–Pakistan border
raped between 200,000 and 400,000 Bangladeshi
Line of Control
women and girls in a systematic campaign of
genocidal rape.[48][49][50] Zero Point
Indian Ocean
Contents Arabian Sea

Result Decisive Indian victory[1][2][3]

Background
Eastern front:
India's involvement in Bangladesh Surrender of East Pakistan military
Liberation War
command
India's official engagement with Pakistan Western front:
Objective Unilateral ceasefire[4]
Naval hostilities
Territorial
Air operations changes Eastern Front:
Indian attacks on Pakistan
Ground operations Independence of East Pakistan as
Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Bangladesh
Command in East Pakistan
Western Front:
Foreign reaction and involvement
United States and Soviet Union Indian forces captured around
China, Iran and Sri Lanka 15,010 km2 (5,795 sq mi) of land in
Arab World the West but returned it in the 1972
Aftermath Simla Agreement as a gesture of
India goodwill.[5][6][7]
Pakistan Territory captured in Kashmir was
Bangladesh retained by both sides and a new
Line of Control defined.
Impact
Pakistan: War Enquiry Commission Belligerents
and War prisoners
India: Indo-Pakistani summits India Pakistan
Bangladesh: International Crimes
Tribunal
Provisional East Pakistan
Long-term consequences Government of
Military awards Bangladesh
Battle honours Commanders and leaders
Gallantry awards Yahya Khan
Civilian awards V. V. Giri (President of Pakistan)
(President of India)
In media Nurul Amin
Indira Gandhi
(Prime Minister of Pakistan)
See also (Prime Minister of India)
Swaran Singh Gen. A.H. Khan
References
(External Minister of India) (Chief of Staff, Army GHQ)
Further reading Jagjivan Ram Lt.Gen A.A.K. Niazi
External links (Defence Minister of India) (Commander, Eastern
Gen Sam Command)
Manekshaw Lt.Gen Gul Hassan
Background (Chief of Army Staff)
Khan
Lt.Gen J.S. Arora
(Chief of General Staff)
The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the (GOC-in-C, Eastern
Command)
Lt.Gen Abdul Ali Malik
Bangladesh Liberation War, a conflict between the
Lt.Gen G.G. Bewoor (Commander, I Corps)
traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the
(GOC-in-C, Southern Lt.Gen Tikka Khan
majority East Pakistanis.[27] The political tensions Command) (Commander, II Corps)
between East Bengal and West Pakistan had its Lt.Gen K. P. Lt.Gen Bahadur Sher
origin in the creation of Pakistan as a result of the Candeth Khan
partition of India by the United Kingdom in 1947; (GOC-in-C, Western
(Commander, IV Corps)
the popular language movement in 1950; mass Command)
MGen Iftikhar Janjua
riots in East Bengal in 1964; and the mass protests Lt.Gen Premindra
Bhagat †
in 1969. These led to the resignation of President
Ayub Khan, who invited army chief General (GOC-in-C, Central (GOC, 23rd Infantry Division)
Yahya Khan to take over the central Command) MGen Khadim
government.[51]:xxx The geographical distance Lt.Gen Sagat Singh Hussain
between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan (GOC-in-C, IV Corps) (GOC, 14th Infantry Division)
was vast; East Pakistan lay over 1,600 kilometres Lt.Gen T. N. Raina VAdm Muzaffar
(1,000 mi) away, which greatly hampered any (GOC-in-C, II Corps)
Hassan
attempt to integrate the Bengali and the Pakistani Lt.Gen Sartaj Singh
(Cdr-in-Chief, Navy)
cultures.[52]:13–14[53] (GOC-in-C, XV Corps)
Lt.Gen Karan Singh RAdm Rashid Ahmed
To overcome the Bengali domination and prevent (GOC-in-C, I Corps) (COS, Navy NHQ)

formation of the central government in Islamabad, MajGen Farj R. RAdm Moh'd Shariff
the controversial One Unit programme established Jacob
the two wings of East and West Pakistan. West (COS, Eastern Command) (Cdr, Eastern Naval
Pakistanis' opposition to these efforts made it MajGen Om Command)
difficult to effectively govern both wings.[51]:xxx Malhotra
RAdm M.A.K. Lodhi
In 1969, President Yahya Khan announced the (COS, IV Corps)
(Cdr, Western Naval
first general elections and disestablished the status MajGen Inderjit
Command)
of West Pakistan as a single province in 1970, in Singh Gill
order to restore it to its original heterogeneous (Dir, Military Operations) RAdm Leslie Norman
status comprising four provinces, as defined at the Adm S. M. Nanda (Commander, Pakistan
time of establishment of Pakistan in 1947.[54] In (Chief of Naval Staff) Marines)
addition, there were religious and racial tensions VAdm S. N. Kohli AM Abdul Rahim
between Bengalis and the multi-ethnic West (Cdr. Western Naval
Khan
Pakistanis, as Bengalis looked different from the Command)
(Cdr-in-Chief, Air Force)
dominant West Pakistanis.[55] VAdm N. Krishnan
(Cdr. Eastern Naval
AVM P.D. Callaghan
The general elections, held in 1970, resulted in Command) (Chief Ins, Pakistan Air Force)

East Pakistan's Awami League gaining 167 out of RAdm S. H. Sarma Air Cdre Inamul Haq
169 seats for the East Pakistan Legislative (Flag Officer Commanding
Assembly, and a near-absolute majority in the 313- Eastern Fleet) (Cdr Eastern Air Command)
seat National Assembly, while the vote in West ACM Pratap C. Lal Gp.Capt. Z.A. Khan
Pakistan was mostly won by the socialist Pakistan (Chief of Air Staff)
Peoples Party.[56]:686–687 The Awami League Rameshwar Kao
(COS, Air AHQ Dhaka)
leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman stressed his (Director of RAW)
political position by presenting his Six Points and Abdul Motaleb Malik
endorsing the Bengalis' right to govern.[51]:xxx Tajuddin Ahmad
The League's election success caused many West (Governor of East Pakistan)
(PM Provisional Government)
Pakistanis to fear that it would allow the Bengalis
Col. M.A.G. Osmani
to draft the constitution based on the six-points and
(Commander, Mukti Bahini)
liberalism.[57]:xlv
Strength
To resolve the crisis, the Admiral Ahsan Mission
was formed to provide recommendations. Its Indian Armed Forces: Pakistan Armed Forces:
findings were met with favourable reviews from 825,000[8] – 860,000[9] 350,000[11] – 365,000[9]
the political leaders of West Pakistan, with the
exception of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the chairman of
the Pakistan Peoples Party.[58]:109–110 Mukti Bahini: 180,000[10] Razakars: 35,000[12]
Casualties and losses

India
2,500[12]–3,843
killed[13][14]
9,851[13]–12,000[15]
injured
1 naval aircraft[16][17]
1 frigate
Okha harbour
damaged/fuel tanks
destroyed[18][19][20]
Map shows Pakistan and East Pakistan; Damage to several
between them was 1,600 km (1,000 mi) of western Indian
Indian territory. airfields[21][22]
However, the military top brass vetoed the Pakistani claims
mission's proposal.[58]:110 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
130 IAF aircraft[23][24]
endorsed the veto,[58]:110 and subsequently
refused to yield the premiership of Pakistan to
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami League Indian claims
called for general strikes in the country. President
45 IAF aircraft[25]
Yahya Khan postponed the inauguration of the
National Assembly, causing a shattering
disillusionment to the Awami League and their Neutral claims[12]
supporters throughout East Pakistan.[59] In
45 IAF aircraft
reaction, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for
general strikes that eventually shutdown the 80 tanks
government, and dissidents in the East began
targeting the ethnic Bihari community, which had
supported West Pakistan.[60]
Pakistan
9,000 killed[26]
25,000 wounded[15]
93,000 captured
2 destroyers[27]
1 Minesweeper[27]
1 Submarine[28]
3 Patrol vessels
7 gunboats
Pakistani main port
Karachi facilities
damaged/fuel tanks
destroyed[27][29]
Pakistani airfields
damaged and
cratered[30]
Pakistani claims
42 PAF aircraft[31]
Indian claims
94 PAF aircraft[25]
Neutral claims[12]
75 PAF aircraft
200 tanks

In early March 1971, approximately 300 Biharis were slaughtered in riots by Bengali mobs in Chittagong
alone.[60] The Government of Pakistan used the "Bihari massacre" to justify its deployment of the military in
East Pakistan on 25 March, when it initiated its military crackdown.[61] President Yahya Khan called on the
military – which was overwhelmingly led by West Pakistanis – to suppress dissent in the East, after accepting
the resignation of Lieutenant-General Yaqub Ali Khan, the chief of staff of the East-Pakistani military.[62][63]

Mass arrests of dissidents began and, after several days of strikes and non-cooperation, the Pakistani military,
led by Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. The
government outlawed the Awami League, which forced many of its members and sympathisers into refuge in
Eastern India. Mujib was arrested on the night of 25/26 March 1971 at about 1:30 am (as per Radio Pakistan's
news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West Pakistan. Operation Searchlight, followed by Operation Barisal,
attempted to kill the intellectual elite of the east.[64]

On 26 March 1971, Major Ziaur Rahman of Pakistan Army declared the independence of Bangladesh on
behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.[65][66][67]
In April, the exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile in Baidyanathtala of Meherpur. The
East Pakistan Rifles and Bengali officers in Pakistan's army, navy, and marines, defected to the rebellion after
taking refuge in different parts of India. The Bangladesh Force, namely the Mukti Bahini, consisting of
Niyomito Bahini (Regular Force) and Oniyomito Bahini (Guerilla Force), was formed under the retired
colonel Mohammad Ataul Gani Osmani.[68]

India's involvement in Bangladesh Liberation War

After the resignations of Admiral S.M. Ahsan and Lieutenant-General Yaqub Ali Khan, the media
correspondents began airing reports of the Pakistani military's widespread genocide against their Bengali
citizens,[69] particularly aimed at the minority Bengali Hindu population,[70][71][32] which led to
approximately 10 million people seeking refuge in the neighbouring states of Eastern India.[70][69][72] The
Indian government opened the East Pakistan–India border to allow the Bengali refugees to find safe shelter;
the governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee camps along the
border.[73]:23–24 The resulting flood of impoverished East Pakistani refugees strained India's already
overburdened economy.[71]

The Indian government repeatedly appealed to the international community for assistance, but failed to elicit
any response, despite the External Affairs minister Swaran Singh meeting foreign ministers of other
countries.[74] Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 27 March 1971 expressed full support of her government for
the independence struggle of the people of East Pakistan, and concluded that instead of taking in millions of
refugees, it was economical to go to war against Pakistan.[72] On 28 April 1971, the Gandhi cabinet had
ordered the Chief of the Army Staff General Sam Manekshaw to "Go into East Pakistan".[75][76][77] Defected
East Pakistan military officers and the elements of Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) immediately
started using the Indian refugee camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas that were to be
trained against Pakistan.[78] In 1971, a strong wave of Indian-supported Bangladeshi nationalism emerged in
the East. Violence and the systematic targeted killings of unarmed multi-ethic Pakistanis living in the East
started.[79]:164 Vehicle bombings on government secretariats became a normal narrative in news reports, and
high-profile assassinations of Bengali politicians loyal to Pakistan became common in the East.[79]:164
According to Jussi Hanhimäki, Finnish historian of terrorism, the Bengali terrorism in the East is a somewhat
"forgotten episode of annals of terrorism."[79]:164 The Hamoodur Rahman Commission endorsed the claims
of Bengali terrorism when it critically penned that the ill-treatment of families of multi-ethnic Pakistanis led to
the Pakistani military soldiers reacting violently to restore the writ of the government.[80]

The news media's mood in Pakistan had also turned increasingly jingoistic and militaristic against East
Pakistan and India when the Pakistani news media reported the complexity of the situation in the East, though
the reactions from Pakistan's news media pundits were mixed.[81][82] By the end of September 1971, a
propaganda campaign, possibly orchestrated by elements within the Government of Pakistan, resulted in
stickers endorsing "Crush India" becoming a standard feature on the rear windows of vehicles in Rawalpindi,
Islamabad and Lahore; this soon spread to the rest of West Pakistan.[83] By October, other stickers proclaimed
Hang the Traitor in an apparent reference to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.[84] By the first week of December, the
conservative print media outlets in the country had published jihad related materials to boost the recruitment in
the military.[83]

India's official engagement with Pakistan

Objective
By the end of April 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had
asked the Indian Army chief General Sam Manekshaw if he was
ready to go to war with Pakistan.[85][86] According to
Manekshaw's own personal account, he refused, citing the onset
of monsoon season in East Pakistan and also the fact that the
army tanks were being refitted.[86] He offered his resignation,
which Gandhi declined.[86] He then said he could guarantee
victory if she would allow him to prepare for the conflict on his
terms, and set a date for it; Gandhi accepted his
conditions.[86][87] In reality, Gandhi was well aware of the
difficulties of a hasty military action, but she needed to get the
military's views to satisfy her hawkish colleagues and the public
opinion, which were critical of India's restraint.[77]

By November 1971, an Indian-Pakistani war seemed inevitable.

The Soviet Union reportedly warned Pakistan against the war,
which they termed as "suicidal course for Pakistan's
unity."[88]:part-3 Despite this warning, in November 1971, Illustration showing military units and
thousands of people led by conservative Pakistani politicians troop movements during operations in the
marched in Lahore and across Pakistan, calling for Pakistan to Eastern sector of the war.
"crush India". [89][90] India responded by starting a massive
buildup of the Indian Army on the western borders; the army
waited until December, when the drier ground in the East made for easier operations and the Himalayan passes
were closed by snow, preventing any Chinese intervention.[91]:174–175 On 23 November, President Yahya
Khan declared a national state of emergency and told the country to prepare for war.[92]

On the evening of 3 December, at about 17:40, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched surprise pre-emptive
strikes on eleven airfields in north-western India, including Agra, which was 480 kilometres (300 mi) from the
border.[93]:82–83 At the time of the attack, the Taj Mahal had been camouflaged with a forest of twigs and
leaves and draped with burlap, because its marble glowed like a white beacon in the moonlight.[94]

These pre-emptive strikes, known as Operation Chengiz Khan, were inspired by the success of Israeli
Operation Focus in the Arab–Israeli Six-Day War. Unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967, which
involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew no more than 50 planes to India.[93]:82[95]

In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Gandhi held that the air strikes were a
declaration of war against India[96][97] and the Indian Air Force (IAF) responded with initial air strikes the
same night.[4] These expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning.[4]

This air action marked the official start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971; Gandhi ordered the immediate
mobilisation of troops and launched a full-scale invasion of Pakistan.[98]:333 This involved Indian forces in
massive coordinated air, sea and land assaults on Pakistan from all fronts.[98]:333 The main Indian objective on
the Eastern front was to capture Dacca, and on the Western front was to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian
soil. There was no Indian intention of conducting any major offensive into Pakistan to dismember it into
different states.

Naval hostilities

Unlike the 1965 war, the Navy NHQ staffers and commanders of the Pakistan Navy knew very well that the
Navy was ill-prepared for the naval conflict with India.[99]:65 The Pakistan Navy was in no condition of
fighting an offensive war in deep sea against the Indian Navy, and neither was it in a condition to mount
serious defence against Indian Navy's seaborne
encroachment. [100]:75–76

In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy's Western

Naval Command under Vice admiral S.N. Kohli, successfully
launched a surprise attack on Karachi port on the night of 4/5
December 1971 under the codename Trident.[27] The naval
attack involving the Soviet-built Osa missile boats sank the
Pakistan Navy's destroyer PNS Khaibar and minesweeper
PNS Muhafiz while PNS Shah Jahan was also badly
damaged.[27] Pakistani naval sources reported that about 720 Pakistan's PNS Ghazi sank off the
Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost fairway buoy of Visakhapatnam near the
reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the eastern coast of India, making it the first
Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict.[100]:85–87 In submarine casualty in the waters around
retaliation, the Pakistan Navy submarines, Hangor, Mangro, and the Indian subcontinent.
Shushuk, began their operations to seek out the major Indian
warships.[100]:86–95[101] On 9 December 1971, Hangor sank
INS Khukri, inflicting 194 Indian casualties, and this attack was the first submarine kill since World War
II.[102]:229[103]

The sinking of INS Khukri was followed by another Indian attack on Karachi port on the night of 8/9
December 1971 under the codename Python.[27] A squadron of Indian Navy's Osa missile boats approached
the Karachi port and launched a series of Soviet-acquired Styx missiles, that resulted in further destruction of
reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships, as well as foreign ships docked in
Karachi.[104] The Pakistan Air Force did not attack the Indian Navy ships, and confusion remained the next
day when the civilian pilots of Pakistan International, acting as reconnaissance war pilots, misidentified
PNS Zulfiqar and the air force attacked its own warship, inflicting major damages and killing several officers
on board.[105]

In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command, under Vice Admiral Nilakanta Krishnan,
completely isolated East Pakistan by a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan
Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports.[100]:82–83 From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrier
INS Vikrant was deployed, and its Sea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan,
including Chittagong and Cox's Bazar.[106] Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarine
PNS Ghazi, which sank off Visakhapatnam's coast, due to an internal explosion, though whether this was
triggered by Indian depth charges, diving to avoid them or some other reason has never been
established.[107][108]

Due to high number of defections, the Navy relied on deploying the Pakistan Marines, led by Rear Admiral
Leslie Mungavin, where they had to conduct riverine operations against the Indian Army, but they too suffered
major losses, mainly due to their lack of understanding of expeditionary warfare and the wet terrain of East
Pakistan.[109]

The damage inflicted on the Pakistan Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3
patrol crafts belonging to the coast guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels; and large-scale
damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships –
Anwar Baksh, Pasni and Madhumathi –[110] and ten smaller vessels were captured.[111] Around 1900
personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dacca.[112] According to one
Pakistani scholar, Tariq Ali, Pakistan lost half its navy in the war.[113]

Air operations
After the attempted pre-emptive attack, the PAF adopted a defensive
stance in response to the Indian retaliation. As the war progressed, the
IAF continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones, but the number
of sorties flown by the PAF decreased day–by–day.[114][115] The IAF
flew 4,000 sorties while the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly
because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel.[27]

This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate

decision of the PAF's Air AHQ to cut its losses, as it had already
incurred huge losses in the conflict in the liberation war in the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikrant
East.[116] The PAF avoided making contacts with the Indian Navy launches an Alize aircraft
after the latter raided the port of Karachi twice, but the PAF did
retaliate by bombing Okha harbour, destroying the fuel tanks used by
the boats that had attacked.[23][117]

In the East, No. 14 Squadron Tail Choppers under Squadron Leader

PQ Mehdi, who was taken as POW, was destroyed, putting the
Dhaka air defence out of commission and resulting in Indian air
superiority in the East.[27]

At the end of the war, PAF pilots made successful escapes from East
Pakistan to neighbouring Burma; many PAF personnel had already
left the East for Burma on their own before Dacca was overrun by the Indian Air Force MiG-21s during the
Indian military in December 1971.[118] war.

Indian attacks on Pakistan

As the Indian Army tightened its grip in the East Pakistan, the Indian
Air Force continued with its attacks against Pakistan as the campaign
developed into a series of daylight anti-airfield, anti-radar, and close-
support attacks by fighter jets, with night attacks against airfields and
strategic targets by Canberras and An-12s, while Pakistan responded
with similar night attacks with its B-57s and C-130s.[119]:107–108
A destroyed aircraft hangar at Dacca
The PAF deployed its F-6s mainly on defensive combat air patrol airfield after an Indian air attack.
missions over their own bases, leaving the PAF unable to conduct
effective offensive operations.[119]:107 The IAF's raids damaged one
USAF and one UN aircraft in Dacca, while a RCAF DHC-4 Caribou was destroyed in Islamabad, along with
the USAF's Beech U-8 owned by the US military's liaison chief Brigadier-General Chuck
Yeager.[119]:107[120] Sporadic raids by the IAF continued against PAF forward air bases in Pakistan until the
end of the war, and interdiction and close-support operations were maintained.[119]:107–108

One of the most successful air raids by India into West Pakistan happened on 8 December 1971, when Indian
Hunter aircraft from the Pathankot-based 20 Squadron, attacked the Pakistani base in Murid and destroyed 5
F-86 aircraft on the ground. This was confirmed by Pakistan's military historian, Air Commodore M Kaiser
Tufail, in his book In The Ring and on Its Feet: Pakistan Air Force in the 1971 Indo-Pak War.[121]

The PAF played a more limited role in the operations. They were reinforced by Mirages from an unidentified
Middle Eastern ally (whose identity remains unknown).[119]:107 According to author Martin Bowman,
"Libyan F-5s were reportedly deployed to Sargodha AFB, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare
Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F-5s from Saudi Arabia."[119]:112 The IAF was able to conduct a wide
range of missions – troop support; air combat; deep penetration strikes; para-dropping behind enemy lines;
feints to draw enemy fighters away from the actual target; bombing and reconnaissance.[119]:107 The PAF,
which was solely focused on air combat, was blown out of the subcontinent's skies within the first week of the
war.[119]:107 Those PAF aircraft that survived took refuge at Iranian air bases or in concrete bunkers, refusing
to offer a fight.[122]

India flew 1,978 sorties in the East and about 4,000 in Pakistan, while the PAF flew about 30 and 2,840 at the
respective fronts.[119]:107 More than 80 percent of IAF sorties were close-support and interdiction and about
45 IAF aircraft were lost.[12]

Pakistan lost 75 aircraft,[12] not including any F-6s, Mirage IIIs, or the six Jordanian F-104s which failed to
return to their donors.[12] The imbalance in air losses was explained by the IAF's considerably higher sortie
rate and its emphasis on ground-attack missions.[12]

Ground operations

Before the start of the war, the Indian Army was well organised
on both fronts and enjoyed significant numerical superiority over
the Pakistan Army.[123]:596 The Indian Army's extraordinary
war performance at both fronts restored the prestige, confidence,
and dignity that it had lost during the war with China in
1962.[124]

When the conflict started, the war immediately took a decisive

turn in favour of India and their Bengali rebel allies militarily and The Indian T-55 tanks penetrating the
diplomatically. [123]:596 On both fronts, Pakistan launched several Indo-East Pakistan border towards Dacca.
ground offensives, but the Indian Army held its ground and
initiated well-coordinated ground operations on both
fronts.[123]:596 Major ground attacks were concentrated on the
western border by the Pakistan Army, fighting together with the
Pakistan Marines in the southern border, but the Indian Army was
successful in penetrating into Pakistani soil. It eventually made some
quick and initial gains, including the capture of around 15,010 km2
(5,795 sq mi)[5][6] of Pakistani territory; this land gained by India in
Azad Kashmir, Punjab and Sindh sectors was later ceded in the Simla
Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill[7] Casualties inflicted to
Pakistan Army's I Corps, II Corps, and Pakistan Marines' Punjab
Tank-55 now at National War
detachment were very high, and many soldiers and marines perished
Memorial in Pune
due to lack of operational planning and lack of coordination within
the marine-army formations against Indian Army's Southern and
Western Commands.[125]:82–93 By the time the war came to end, the
army soldiers and marines were highly demoralised– both emotionally and psychologically– on the western
front and had no will to put up a defensive fight against the approaching Indian Army soldiers.[126]:1–2

The War Enquiry Commission later exposed the fact that for the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Marines, the
arms and training of marines, soldiers and officers were needed at every level, and every level of
command.[127]

On 23 November 1971, the Indian Army conventionally penetrated to the eastern fronts and crossed East
Pakistan's borders to join their Bengali nationalist allies.[128]:156 Contrary to the 1965 war, which had
emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy adopted was a swift, three-pronged
assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on
Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan.[128]:156 Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian Army's Eastern Command, led the full Indian thrust into East Pakistan.
As the Indian Eastern Command attacked the Pakistan Eastern Command, the Indian Air Force rapidly
destroyed the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dacca airfield out of commission.[128]:156 In
the meantime, the Indian Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan.[128]:156

The Indian campaign's "blitzkrieg" techniques exploited weaknesses in the Pakistani positions and bypassed
opposition; this resulted in a swift victory.[129]:802 Faced with insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military
capitulated in less than a fortnight and psychological panic spread in the Eastern Command's military
leadership.[129]:802 Subsequently, the Indian Army encircled Dacca and issued an ultimatum to surrender in
"30-minutes" time window on 16 December 1971.[130] Upon hearing the ultimatum, the East-Pakistan
government collapsed when the Lt-Gen. A.A.K. Niazi (Cdr. of Eastern Command) and his deputy, V-Adm.
M.S. Khan, surrendered without offering any resistance.[128] On 16 December 1971, Pakistan ultimately
called for unilateral ceasefire and surrendered its entire four-tier military to the Indian Army– hence ending the
Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.[128]

On the ground, Pakistan suffered the most, with 8,000 killed and 25,000 wounded, while India only had 3,000
dead and 12,000 wounded.[15] The loss of armoured vehicles was similarly imbalanced and this finally
represented a major defeat for Pakistan.[15]

Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command in East Pakistan

Officially, the Instrument of Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command stationed in East Pakistan, was signed
between the Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the GOC-in-C of Indian Eastern Command and
Lieutenant-General A.A.K. Niazi, the Commander of the Pakistan Eastern Command, at the Ramna Race
Course in Dacca at 16:31Hrs IST on 16 December 1971. As the surrender was accepted silently by
Lieutenant-General Aurora, the surrounding crowds on the race course started shouting anti-Pakistan slogans,
and there were reports of abuses aimed at the surrendering commanders of Pakistani military.[131]

Hostilities officially ended at 14:30 GMT on 17 December, after the fall of Dacca on 15 December, and India
claimed large gains of territory in Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war). The
war confirmed the independence of Bangladesh.[119]:107

Following the surrender, the Indian Army took approximately 90,000 Pakistani servicemen and their Bengali
supporters as POWs, making it the largest surrender since World War II. Initial counts recorded that
approximately 79,676 war prisoners were uniformed personnel, and the overwhelming majority of the war
prisoners were officers – most of them from the army and navy, while relatively small numbers were from the
air force and marines; others in larger number were serving in the paramilitary.[132]

The remaining prisoners were civilians who were either family members of the military personnel or
collaborators (razakars). The Hamoodur Rahman Commission and the POW Investigation Commission reports
instituted by Pakistan lists the Pakistani POWs as given in the table below. Apart from soldiers, it was
estimated that 15,000 Bengali civilians were also made prisoners of war.[133]
 Number of captured Pakistani
Inter-service branch Officer commanding
POWs

Pakistan Army Lieutenant-General Amir Abdullah Khan

54,154
Niazi
Pakistan Navy/Pakistan
1,381 Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff
Marines
Pakistan Air Force 833 Air Commodore Inamul Haq

Paramilitary/East Pakistan
22,000 Major-General Rao Farman Ali
Rifles/Police
Civil government personnel 12,000 Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik
Total: 90,368 ~

Foreign reaction and involvement

United States and Soviet Union

The Soviet Union sympathised with the East Pakistanis, and

supported the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini's incursion against
Pakistan during the war, in a broader view of recognising that the
succession of East Pakistan as Independent Bangladesh would
weaken the position of its rivals— the United States and China. The
Soviet Union gave assurances to India that if a confrontation with the
United States or China developed, it would take counter-measures.
This assurance was enshrined in the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation signed in August 1971.[134]

However, the Indo-Soviet treaty did not mean a total commitment to

every Indian position, even though the Soviet Union had accepted the
Indian position during the conflict, according to author Robert
Jackson.[135]:72–73 The Soviet Union continued its sympathetic
gesture to Pakistan until mid-October 1971, when it stressed Pakistan
to come up with a political settlement and affirmed its continuation of The Blood Telegram
industrial aid to Pakistan. [135]:73 By November 1971, the Soviet
ambassador to Pakistan Alexei Rodionov directed a secretive message
(Rodionov message) that ultimately warned Pakistan that "it will be embarking on a suicidal course if it
escalates tensions in the subcontinent.[88]:part-3

The United States stood with Pakistan by supporting it morally, politically, economically and materially when
U.S. President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refused to use rhetoric in a hopeless
attempt to intervene in a large civil war. The U.S. establishment perceived to the impression that they needed
Pakistan to help stop Soviet influence in South Asia in an informal alliance with India.[136]:281 During the
Cold War, Pakistan was a close formal ally of the United States and also had close relations with the People's
Republic of China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating a rapprochement and where he intended to visit in
February 1972.[137] Nixon feared that an Indian invasion of Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination of
the region, and that it would seriously undermine the global position of the United States and the regional
position of America's new tactical ally, China.[136]:281–282 Nixon encouraged Jordan and Iran to send military
supplies to Pakistan, while also encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to Pakistan, but all supplies
were very limited.[138]:61 The Nixon administration also ignored reports it received of the "genocidal"
activities of the Pakistani military in East Pakistan, most notably the Blood telegram, and this prompted
widespread criticism and condemnation – both by the United States Congress and in the international
press.[69][139][140]

Then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, George H.W. Bush, introduced a resolution in the UN Security
Council calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan.[135]:73[141]
However, it was vetoed by the Soviet Union, and the following days witnessed the use of great pressure on the
Soviets from the Nixon-Kissinger duo to get India to withdraw, but to no avail.[142]

When Pakistan's defeat in the eastern sector seemed certain, Nixon deployed Task Force 74, led by the aircraft
carrier USS Enterprise, into the Bay of Bengal. Enterprise and its escort ships arrived on station on 11
December 1971.[143]:xxxx According to a Russian documentary, the United Kingdom also deployed a carrier
battle group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle to the Bay,[134][144] on her final deployment.

On 6 and 13 December, the Soviet Navy dispatched two groups of cruisers and destroyers from
Vladivostok;[134] they trailed US Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean from 18 December 1971 until 7
January 1972. The Soviets also had a nuclear submarine to help ward off the threat posed by the USS
Enterprise task force in the Indian Ocean.[145][146]

As the war progressed, it became apparent to the United States that India was going to invade and disintegrate
Pakistan in a matter of weeks, therefore President Nixon spoke with the USSR General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev on a hotline on 10 December, where Nixon reportedly urged Brezhnev to restrain India as he
quoted: "in the strongest possible terms to restrain India with which … you [Brezhnev] have great influence
and for whose actions you must share responsibility."[147]

After the war, the United States accepted the new balance of power and recognised India as a dominant player
in South Asia; the US immediately engaged in strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries in
the successive years.[148] The Soviet Union, while being sympathetic to Pakistan's loss, decided to engage
with Pakistan after sending an invitation through Rodionov to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who paid a state visit to the
Soviet Union in 1972 to strengthen bilateral relations that continued over the years.[149]:16

A 2019 study argues "that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to
overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory" in the war, and that they overestimated "the importance
of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger's own framing of the
1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that
Kissinger and Nixon's policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making
errors."[150]

China, Iran and Sri Lanka

During the course of the war, China harshly criticised India for its involvement in the East Pakistan crises, and
accused India of having imperialistic designs in South Asia.[151]:19 Before the war started, Chinese leaders
and officials had long been philosophically advising the Pakistan government to make peaceful political
settlements with the East Pakistani leaders, as China feared that India was secretly supporting, infiltrating, and
arming the Bengali rebels against the East Pakistani government.[152][153] China was also critical of the
Government of East Pakistan, led by its Governor Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, which used ruthless
measures to deal with the Bengali opposition, and did not endorse the Pakistani position on that issue.[153]

When the war started, China reproached India for its direct involvement and infiltration in East Pakistan.[153] It
disagreed with Pakistani President Yahya Khan's consideration of military options, and criticised East Pakistan
Awami League politicians' ties with India.[153] China reacted with great alarm when the prospects of Indian
invasion of Pakistan and integration of Pakistan-administered Kashmir into their side of Kashmir, became
imminent.[96] US President Nixon encouraged China to mobilise its armed forces along its border with India to
discourage the Indian assault, but the Chinese did not respond to this encouragement since the Indian Army's
Northern Command was well prepared to guard the Line of Actual Control, and was already engaging and
making advances against the Pakistan Army's X Corps in the Line of Control.

China did not welcome the break-up of Pakistan's unity by the East Pakistani politicians, and effectively
vetoed the membership of Bangladesh when it applied to the United Nations in 1972.[154] China objected to
admitting Bangladesh on the grounds that two UN resolutions concerning Bangladesh, requiring the
repatriation of Pakistani POWs and civilians, had not yet been implemented.[155] Furthermore, China was also
among the last countries to recognise the independence of Bangladesh, refusing to do so until 31 August
1975.[156][154][157] To this date, its relations with Bangladesh are determined by the Pakistan factor.[158]

During the course of the conflict, Iran also stood with Pakistan politically and diplomatically.[159]:78–79 It was
concerned with the imminent break-up of Pakistan which, it feared, would have caused the state to
fractionalise into small pieces, ultimately resulting in Iran's encirclement by rivals. After the war, however, Iran
began cementing ties with India based on mutual security co-operation.[159]:79 At the beginning of the
conflict, Iran had helped Pakistan by sheltering PAF's fighter jets and providing it with free fuel to take part in
the conflict, in an attempt to keep Pakistan's regional integrity united.[159]:80 When Pakistan called for
unilateral ceasefire and the surrender was announced, the Shah of Iran hastily responded by preparing the
Iranian military to come up with contingency plans to forcefully invade Pakistan and annex its Balochistan
province into its side of Balochistan, by any means necessary, before anybody else did it.[159]:79

Sri Lanka saw the partition of Pakistan as an example for themselves and feared India might use its enhanced
power against them in the future.[160]:7 Despite the left wing government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike following
a neutral non-aligned foreign policy Sri Lanka decided to help Pakistan in the war.[161][162] As Pakistani
aircraft could not fly over Indian territory, they would have to take a longer route around India and so they
stopped at Bandaranaike Airport in Sri Lanka where they were refuelled before flying to East Pakistan.[163]

Arab World

As many Arab countries were allied with both the United States and Pakistan, it was easy for Kissinger to
encourage them to participate. He sent letters to both, the King of Jordan and the King of Saudi Arabia.
President Nixon gave permission for Jordan to send ten F-104s and promised to provide replacements. F-86s
from Saudi Arabia helped camouflage the extent of PAF losses, and some Libyan F-5s were reportedly
deployed to Sargodha AFB, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare Pakistani pilots for an influx of
more F-5s from Saudi Arabia.[119]:112 Libyan leader Gaddafi also personally directed a strongly worded letter
to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi accusing her of aggression against Pakistan, which endeared him to all
Pakistanis.[164] In addition to these three countries, an unidentified Middle Eastern ally also supplied Pakistan
with Mirage IIIs. However, other countries such as Syria and Tunisia were against interfering describing it as
an internal matter of Pakistan.[165]

Aftermath

India

The war stripped Pakistan of more than half of its population, and with nearly one-third of its army in captivity,
clearly established India's military and political dominance of the subcontinent.[32] India successfully led a
diplomatic campaign to isolate Pakistan and skilfully manipulate Pakistan's supporting countries to limit the
extent of support to Pakistan.[123]:596 In addition, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's state visit to United
Kingdom and France further helped break ice with the United States, and blocked any pro-Pakistan resolution
in the United Nations.[123]:596 There was also a meeting between Prime Minister Gandhi and President Nixon
in November 1971, where she rejected the US advice against intervening in the conflict.[123]:596

The victory also defined India's much broader role in foreign politics, as many countries in the world had come
to realise – including the United States – that the balance of power had shifted to India as a major player in the
region.[159]:80[166]:57 In the wake of changing geopolitical realities, India sought to establish closer relations
with regional countries such as Iran, which was a traditional ally of Pakistan.[166]:57 The United States itself
accepted a new balance of power, and when India conducted a surprise nuclear test in 1974, the US notified
India that it had no "interest in actions designed to achieve new balance of power."[148]

In spite of the magnitude of the victory, India was surprisingly restrained in its reaction.[32] Mostly, Indian
leaders seemed pleased by the relative ease with which they had accomplished their goals—the establishment
of Bangladesh and the prospect of an early return to their homeland of the 10 million Bengali refugees who
were the cause of the war.[32] In announcing the Pakistani surrender, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared in
the Indian Parliament:

Dacca is now the free capital of a free country. We hail the people of Bangladesh in their hour of
triumph. All nations who value the human spirit will recognise it as a significant milestone in
man's quest for liberty.[32]

Colonel John Gill of National Defense University, US, remarks that, while India achieved a military victory, it
was not able to reap the political fruits it might have hoped for in Bangladesh. After a brief 'honeymoon' phase
between India and Bangladesh, their relationship began to sour.[167][168] The perceived Indian overstay
revived Bangladeshi anxieties of Hindu control.[169] Many were concerned that Mujib was permitting Indian
interference in the country's internal matters[170] and many in the Bangladeshi army resented his attachment
with India.[171] Whilst India enjoys excellent relations with Bangladesh during the Awami League tenures,
relations deteriorated when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party assumed power. A 2014 Pew Research Center
opinion poll found that 27% of Bangladeshis were wary of India. However, 70% of Bangladeshis held a
positive view of India: while 50% of Bangladeshis held a positive view of Pakistan.[172]

Pakistan

For Pakistan, the war was a complete and humiliating defeat,[32] a psychological setback that came from a
defeat at the hands of rival India.[40] Pakistan lost half its population and a significant portion of its economy,
and suffered setbacks to its geopolitical role in South Asia.[32][40] In the post-war era, Pakistan struggled to
absorb the lessons learned from the military interventions in the democratic system and the impact of the
Pakistani military's failure was grave and long-lasting.[173][174]

From the geopolitical point of view, the war ended in the breaking-up of the unity of Pakistan from being the
largest Muslim country in the world to its politico-economic and military collapse that resulted from a direct
foreign intervention in 1971.[175]:50[176]:1[177][178] The Pakistani policy-making institutions further feared
that the historicity of the two-nation theory had been disproved by the war, that Muslim nationalism had
proved insufficient to keep Bengalis a part of Pakistan.[40]

The Pakistani people were not mentally prepared to accept the magnitude of this kind of defeat, as the state
electronic media had been projecting imaginary victories; however, the privately owned electronic news media
coverage in East Pakistan had reported the complexity of the situation.[40] When the ceasefire that came from
the surrender of East Pakistan was finally announced, the people could not come to terms with the magnitude
of defeat; spontaneous demonstrations and massive protests erupted on the streets of major metropolitan cities
in Pakistan. According to Pakistani historians, the trauma was extremely severe, and the cost of the war for
Pakistan in monetary terms and in human resources was very high.[179]:xxx[180] Demoralized and finding
unable to control the situation, the Yahya administration fell when President Yahya Khan turned over his
presidency to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was sworn in on 20 December 1971 as President with the control of
the military.[181]

The loss of East Pakistan shattered the prestige of the Pakistani military.[40] Pakistan lost half its navy, a
quarter of its air force, and a third of its army.[113] The war also exposed the shortcomings of Pakistan's
declared strategic doctrine that the "defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan".[182] Hussain Haqqani, in
his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military notes,

Moreover, the army had failed to fulfill its promises of fighting to the last man. The eastern
command had laid down arms after losing only 1,300 men in battle. In West Pakistan 1,200
military deaths had accompanied lackluster military performance.

— Ḥaqqānī, p. 87[183]

In his book The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative, Pakistan Army's Major General Hakeem Arshad
Qureshi, a veteran of this conflict, noted:

We must accept the fact that, as a people, we had also contributed to the bifurcation of our own
country. It was not a Niazi, or a Yahya, even a Mujib, or a Bhutto, or their key assistants, who
alone were the cause of our break-up, but a corrupted system and a flawed social order that our
own apathy had allowed to remain in place for years. At the most critical moment in our history
we failed to check the limitless ambitions of individuals with dubious antecedents and to thwart
their selfish and irresponsible behaviour. It was our collective 'conduct' that had provided the
enemy an opportunity to dismember us.

— Qureshi, p. 288[184]

After the war, the Pakistan Army's generals in the East held each other responsible for the atrocities committed,
but most of the burden was laid on Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, who earned notoriety from his actions as
governor of the East; he was called the "Butcher of Bengal" because of the widespread atrocities committed
within the areas of his responsibility.[185] Unlike his contemporary Yaqub who was a pacifist and knew well
of the limits of force, Tikka was a "soldier known for his eager use of force" to settle his
differences.[186]:100[187][188][189]

Confessing at the hearings of the War Enquiry Commission, Lieutenant-General A. A. K. Niazi reportedly
commented on Tikka's actions and noted: "On the night between 25/26 March 1971, [General] Tikka struck.
Peaceful night was turned into a time of wailing, crying and burning. [General] Tikka let loose everything at
his disposal as if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own misguided and misled people. The military action
was a display of stark cruelty more merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and Baghdad by Chengiz Khan
and Halaku Khan... [General] Tikka... resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched earth policy. His
orders to his troops were: "I want the land, not the people..."." Major-General Rao Farman reportedly had
written in his table diary: "Green land of East Pakistan will be painted red. It was painted red by Bengali
blood."[190] Farman forcefully denied writing that comment, and laid all responsibility on Tikka, while
testifying at the War Enquiry Commission in 1974.[191]

Major reforms were carried out by successive governments in Pakistan after the war in the light of many
recommendations made in the Hamoodur Rahman Commission's Report.[192]:254 To address the economic
disparity, the NFC system was established to equally distribute the taxation revenue among the four provinces,
the large-scale nationalisation of industries and nationwide census were carried out in 1972.[193] The
Constitution was promulgated in 1973 that reflected this equal balance and a compromise between Islamism
and Humanism, and provided guaranteed equal human rights to all.[194] The military was heavily
reconstructed and heavily reorganised, with President Bhutto appointing chiefs of staff in each inter-service,
contrary to C-in-Cs, and making instruction on human rights compulsory in the military syllabus in each
branch of inter-services.[195]:62–100 Major investments were directed towards modernising the navy.[100]:100
The military's chain of command was centralized in JS HQ led by an appointed Chairman joint chiefs
committee to coordinate the combined and well-integrated military efforts to safeguard the nation's defence and
unity.[195]:62–63 In addition, Pakistan sought to have a diversified foreign policy, as Pakistani geostrategists
had been shocked that both China and the United States provided limited support to Pakistan during the course
of the war, with the US displaying an inability to supply weapons that Pakistan needed the most.[196]:xxxiii

On 20 January 1972, Pakistan under Bhutto launched the clandestine development of nuclear weapons with a
view to "never to allow[ing] another foreign invasion of Pakistan."[197]:133–135 This crash programme
reached parity in 1977 when the first weapon design was successfully achieved.[198]

Bangladesh

As a result of the war, East Pakistan became an independent country, Bangladesh, as the world's fourth most
populous Muslim state on 16 December 1971. West Pakistan, now just Pakistan, secured the release of Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman from the Headquarter Prison and allowed him to return to Dacca. On 19 January 1972,
Mujib was inaugurated as the first President of Bangladesh, later becoming the Prime Minister of Bangladesh
in 1974.

On the brink of defeat in around 14 December 1971, the media reports indicated that the Pakistan Army
soldiers, the local East Pakistan Police they controlled, razakars and the Shanti Committee carried out
systematic killings of professionals such as physicians, teachers, and other intellectuals,[199][200] as part of a
pogrom against the Bengali Hindu minorities who constituted the majority of urban educated
intellectuals.[201][202]

Young men, especially students, who were seen as possible rebels and recruiters were also targeted by the
stationed military, but the extent of casualties in East Pakistan is not known, and the issue is itself controversial
and contradictory among the authors who wrote books on the pogrom;[203][204] the Pakistani government
denied the charges of involvement in 2015.[205] R.J. Rummel cites estimates ranging from one to three million
people killed.[206] Other estimates place the death toll lower, at 300,000. Bangladesh government figures state
that Pakistani forces aided by collaborators killed three million people, raped 200,000 women and displaced
millions of others.[207][208]

According to authors Kenton Worcester, Sally Bermanzohn and Mark Ungar, Bengalis themselves killed about
150,000 non-Bengalis living in the East.[209] There had been reports of Bengali insurgents indiscriminately
killing non-Bengalis throughout the East; however, neither side provided substantial proofs for their claims and
both Bangladeshi and Pakistani figures contradict each other over this issue.[210][211] Bihari representatives in
June 1971 claimed a higher figure of 500,000 killed by Bengalis.[212]

In 2010, the Awami League's government decided to set up a tribunal to prosecute the people involved in
alleged war crimes and those who collaborated with Pakistan.[213] According to the government, the
defendants would be charged with crimes against humanity, genocide, murder, rape and arson.[214]

According to John H. Gill, there was widespread polarisation between pro-Pakistan Bengalis and pro-
liberation Bengalis during the war, and those internal battles are still playing out in the domestic politics of
modern-day Bangladesh.[215] To this day, the issue of committed atrocities and pogroms is an influential factor
in the Bangladesh–Pakistan relations.[216]

Impact

Pakistan: War Enquiry Commission and War prisoners

In the aftermath of the war, the Pakistani Government constituted the War Enquiry Commission, to be headed
by Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman, who was an ethnic Bengali,[217] and composed of the senior justices of
the Supreme Court of Pakistan.[217] The War Enquiry Commission was mandated with carrying out thorough
investigations into the intelligence, strategic, political and military failures that causes the defeat in the war.

The War Commission also looked into Pakistan's political and military involvement in the history of East
Pakistan that encompasses 1947–71. The First War Report was submitted in July 1972, but it was very
critically opined and penned on political misconducts of politicians and the military interference in national
politics.[218]:22–197 Written in moral and philosophical perspective, the First Report was lengthy and provided
accounts that were unpalatable to be released to the public. Initially, there were 12 copies that were all
destroyed, except for the one that was kept and marked as "Top Secret" to prevent the backlash effects on the
demoralised military.[219]:127 In 1976, the Supplementary Report was submitted, which was the
comprehensive report compiled together with the First Report; this report was also marked as classified.[220]

In 2000, the excerpts of the Supplementary Report were leaked to a political correspondent of Pakistan's
Dawn, which the Dawn published together with India Today.[221][222] The First Report is still marked as
classified, while the Supplementary Report's excerpts were suppressed by the news
correspondents.[223]:288–289 The War Report's supplementary section was published by the Pakistan
Government, but it did not officially hand over the report to Bangladesh despite its requests.[224]

The War Report exposed many military failures, from the strategic to the tactical–intelligence levels, while it
confirmed the looting, rapes and the unnecessary killings by the Pakistan military and their local agents.[225] It
laid the blame squarely on Pakistan Army generals, accusing them of debauchery, smuggling, war crimes and
neglect of duty.[226] The War Commission had recommended public trial of Pakistan Army generals on the
charges that they had been responsible for the situation in the first place and that they had succumbed without
a fight,[227] but no actions were ever taken against those responsible, except the dismissal of chiefs of the
Pakistan Army, Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan Navy, and decommissioning of the Pakistan Marines.[221][227]

The War Commission, however, rejected the charge that 200,000 Bengali girls were raped by the Pakistan
Army, remarking, "It is clear that the figures mentioned by the Dacca authorities are altogether fantastic and
fanciful," and cited the evidence of a British abortion team that had carried out the termination of "only a
hundred or more pregnancies".[228][217][229] The Commission also claimed that "approximately 26,000
persons (were) killed during the action by the Pakistan military"[228][230] Bina D'Costa states that the War
Commission was aware of the military's brutality in East Pakistan, but "chose to downplay the scale of the
atrocities committed."[228]

The second commission was known as Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 Prisoners of War Investigation, conducted
solely by the Pakistani government, that was to determine the numbers of Pakistani military personnel who
surrendered, including the number of civilian POWs.[231] The official number of the surrendered military
personnel was soon released by the Government of Pakistan after the war was over.[231]

India: Indo-Pakistani summits

On 2 July 1972, the Indo-Pakistani summit was held in Simla, Himachal Pradesh, India where the Simla
Agreement was reached and signed between President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi.[232] The treaty provided insurance to Bangladesh that Pakistan recognised Bangladesh's sovereignty,
in exchange for the return of the Pakistani POWs.[94] Over the next five months, India released more than
90,000 war prisoners, with Lieutenant-General A.A.K. Niazi being the last war prisoner to be handed over to
Pakistan.[94]

The treaty also gave back more than 13,000 km2 of land that the Indian Army had seized in Pakistan during
the war, though India retained a few strategic areas, including Turtuk, Dhothang, Tyakshi (earlier called Tiaqsi)
and Chalunka of Chorbat Valley,[233][234] which was more than 804 km2 .[235][236][237] The Indian
hardliners, however, felt that the treaty had been too lenient to President Bhutto, who had pleaded for leniency,
arguing that the fragile stability in Pakistan would crumble if the accord was perceived as being overly harsh
by Pakistanis and that he would be accused of losing Kashmir in addition to the loss of East Pakistan.[40] As a
result, Prime Minister Gandhi was criticised by a section in India for believing Bhutto's "sweet talk and false
vows", while the other section claimed the agreement to be successful, for not letting it to fall into "Versailles
Syndrome” trap.[238]

In 1973, India and Pakistan reached another compromise when both countries signed a trilateral agreement
with Bangladesh that actually brought the war prisoners, non-Bengali and Pakistan-loyal Bengali bureaucrats
and civilian servants to Pakistan.[239] The Delhi Agreement witnessed the largest mass population transfer
since the Partition of India in 1947.[240]

Bangladesh: International Crimes Tribunal

In 2009, the issue of establishing the International Crimes Tribunal began to take public support. The tribunal
was formally established in 2010 to investigate and prosecute suspects for the genocide committed in 1971 by
the Pakistan Army and their local collaborators, Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams during the Bangladesh
Liberation War.[241]:169

Long-term consequences
Steve Coll, in his book Ghost Wars, argues that the Pakistan military's experience with India,
including Pervez Musharraf's experience in 1971, influenced the Pakistani government to
support jihadist groups in Afghanistan even after the Soviets left, because the jihadists were a
tool to use against India, including bogging down the Indian Army in Kashmir.[242][243]
After the war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto authorised the highly secretive and clandestine atomic bomb
programme, as part of its new deterrence policy, to defend itself and never to allow another
armed invasion from India. Many Pakistani scientists, working abroad at the IAEA and
European and American nuclear programmes, immediately returned to what remained of
Pakistan and participated in making Pakistan a nuclear power.
Writing about the war in Foreign Affairs magazine, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stated "There is no
parallel in contemporary history to the cataclysm which engulfed Pakistan in 1971. A tragic civil
war, which rent asunder the people of the two parts of Pakistan, was seized by India as an
opportunity for armed intervention. The country was dismembered, its economy shattered and
the nation's self-confidence totally undermined."[244] This statement of Bhutto has given rise to
the myth of betrayal prevalent in modern Pakistan. This view was contradicted by the post-War
Hamoodur Rahman Commission, ordered by Bhutto himself, which in its 1974 report indicted
generals of the Pakistan Army for creating conditions which led to the eventual loss of East
Pakistan and for inept handling of military operations in the East.[221]
Military awards

Battle honours

After the war, 41 battle honours and 4 theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian Army; notable
among them are:[245]

East Pakistan 1971 (theatre Chhamb Longewala

honour) Defence of Punch Parbat Ali
Sindh 1971 (theatre honour) Dera Baba Nanak Poongli Bridge
Jammu and Kashmir 1971 Gadra City Shehjra
(theatre honour)
Harar Kalan Shingo River Valley
Punjab 1971 (theatre
Hilli Sylhet
honour)
Basantar River
Bogra
Chachro

Gallantry awards

For bravery, a number of soldiers and officers on both sides were awarded the highest gallantry award of their
respective countries. Following is a list of the recipients of the Indian award Param Vir Chakra, Bangladeshi
award Bir Sreshtho and the Pakistani award Nishan-E-Haider:

India

Recipients of the Param Vir Chakra:[246][247]

Lance Naik Albert Ekka (Posthumously)

Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon (Posthumously)
Major Hoshiar Singh
Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal (Posthumously)

Bangladesh

Recipients of the Bir Sreshtho:[248][249]

Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir (Posthumously)

Lance Naik Munshi Abdur Rouf (Posthumously)
Sepoy Hamidur Rahman (Posthumously)
Sepoy Mostafa Kamal (Posthumously)
ERA Mohammad Ruhul Amin (Posthumously)
Flight Lieutenant Matiur Rahman (Posthumously)
Lance Naik Nur Mohammad Sheikh (Posthumously)

Pakistan
Recipients of the Nishan-E-Haider:[250][251]

Major Muhammad Akram (Posthumously)

Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas (Posthumously)
Major Shabbir Sharif (Posthumously)
Sarwar Muhammad Hussain (Posthumously)
Lance Naik Muhammad Mahfuz (Posthumously)

Civilian awards
On 25 July 2011, Bangladesh Swadhinata Sammanona, the Bangladesh Freedom Honour, was posthumously
conferred on former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.[252]

On 28 March 2012, President of Bangladesh Zillur Rahman and the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina conferred
Bangladesh Liberation War Honour and Friends of Liberation War Honour to 75 people, six organisations,
Mitra Bahini and the people of India at a special ceremony at the Bangabandhu International Conference
Centre, Dhaka. This included eight heads of states: former Nepalese President Ram Baran Yadav, the third
King of Bhutan Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, former Soviet General Secretary Leonid IIyich Brezhnev, former
Soviet head of state Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny, former Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Nikolaevich
Kosygin, former Yugoslav President Marshal Josip Broz Tito, former UK Prime Minister Sir Edward Richard
George Heath and former Nepalese Prime Minister Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala. The organisations include
the BBC, Akashbani (All India Radio), International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Oxfam and Kolkata University Shahayak Samiti.

The list of foreign friends of Bangladesh has since been extended to 568 people. It includes 257 Indians, 88
Americans, 41 Pakistanis, 39 Britons, 9 Russians, 18 Nepalese, 16 French and 18 Japanese.[253][254]

In media
Films

Hindustan Ki Kasam, a 1973 Bollywood war film directed by Chetan Anand about Operation
Cactus Lilly.[255]
Aakraman, 1975 Bollywood film set during this war featuring a romantic love triangle.
Border, a 1997 Bollywood war film directed by J.P.Dutta. This movie is an adaptation from real
life events that happened at the Battle of Longewala fought in Rajasthan (Western
Theatre)[255][256]
16 December, 2002 film directed by Mani Shankar
1971 – Prisoners of War, a 2007 Bollywood war film directed by Amrit Sagar. Set against the
backdrop of a prisoner-of-war camp in Pakistan, it follows six Indian prisoners awaiting release
after their capture in the 1971 India-Pakistan war.[255]
The Ghazi Attack, a 2017 war film directed by Sankalp Reddy. It is based on the sinking of
PNS Ghazi during the war.
1971: Beyond Borders, a 2017 Indian war drama film written and directed by Major
Ravi.[257][258]
Raazi, 2017 spy film set before the events of war[259]
Romeo Akbar Walter, 2019 spy film
Bhuj: The Pride of India, upcoming action film set during the war[260]
Short films

Mukti: Birth of a Nation, a 2017 short film directed by Manu Chobe depicts the negotiations
between Major General J. F. R. Jacob and Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi over the Pakistani
Instrument of Surrender.[261]

Miniseries/Dramas

PNS Ghazi, an Urdu (Pakistani) drama based on sinking of PNS Ghazi, ISPR

See also
Post–World War II air-to-air combat losses
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Separatist nationalism in Pakistan
Muslim nationalism in South Asia
Pakistaniat
Conservatism in Pakistan
Socialism in Pakistan
Bangladesh Forces
Timeline of the Bangladesh War
Radcliffe Line
India and state-sponsored terrorism
United States–Pakistan relations before 1990
Soviet Union-Pakistan relations before 1990
Tridev Roy
Operation Searchlight\Barisal
Riverine Warfare
Protest of 1969 in Pakistan
Pakistan Air Force in East Pakistan
Pakistan news media in Indo-Pakistani war of 1971
International Crimes Tribunal (Bangladesh)
Indian Army in East Pakistan
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations
1971 Winter POWs/MIA Investigations, Pakistan
Pakistan military deployments in other countries
Pakistan and its Nuclear Deterrent Program

General:

History of Bangladesh
History of Myanmar
List of conflicts in Asia

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Further reading
Cilano, Cara, ed. (2010). Pakistaniaat: Special issue on 1971 War.
Hanhimäki, Jussi M. (2004). The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign
Policy (https://books.google.com/books?id=3wolOABSg_YC&pg=PP1). Oxford University
Press. ISBN 978-0-19-517221-8.
Hayes, Jarrod. "Securitization, social identity, and democratic security: Nixon, India, and the
ties that bind." International Organization 66.1 (2012): 63-93. online (https://www.researchgate.
net/profile/Jarrod_Hayes/publication/241754960_Securitization_Social_Identity_and_Democra
tic_Security_Nixon_India_and_the_Ties_That_Bind/links/55a50fd008ae00cf99c94313.pdf)
Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (https://books.google.com/b
ooks?id=nYppZ_dEjdIC). United Book Press. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1.
Niazi, General A. A. K. (1999). Betrayal of East Pakistan (https://books.google.com/books?id=n
YppZ_dEjdIC&pg=PP1). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-579275-1.
Palit, D K (1972). The Lightning Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War 1971 (https://books.google.
com/books?id=rPmTAAAACAAJ). Compton Press Ltd. ISBN 978-0-900193-10-1.
Raghavan, Srinath (2013). 1971– A global History of Creation of Bangladesh (http://shibir.info/p
df/1971_a_global_history_of_the_creation_of_bangladesh.pdf) (PDF). Harvard University
Press. ISBN 978-0-674-72864-6.
Raja, Dewan Mohammad Tasawwar (2010). O General My General (Life and Works of General
M A G Osmany). The Osmany Memorial Trust, Dhaka, Bangladesh. ISBN 978-984-8866-18-4.
Saigal, J R (2000). Pakistan Splits: The Birth of Bangladesh (https://books.google.com/books?i
d=gUfaAAAACAAJ). Manas Publications. ISBN 9788170491248.
Warner, Geoffrey. "Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup of Pakistan, 1971." International Affairs
81.5 (2005): 1097-1118.

External links
Video of General Niazi Surrendering (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q8MO52QQ6_o)
A complete coverage of the war from the Indian perspective (https://web.archive.org/web/20050
802085547/http://www.freeindia.org/1971war/)
An Atlas of the 1971 India – Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh by John H. Gill (https://
web.archive.org/web/20081029150607/http://www.ndu.edu/nesa/docs/Gill%20Atlas%20Final%
20Version.pdf)
Actual conversation from the then US President Nixon and Henry Kissinger during the 1971
War (http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xi/) – US Department of State's Official
archive.
Indian Army: Major Operations (https://web.archive.org/web/20050213035604/http://indianarmy.
nic.in/armajop.htm)
Pakistan: Partition and Military Succession USA Archives (http://www.icdc.com/%7Epaulwolf/p
akistan/pakistan.htm)
Pakistan intensifies air raid on India BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/dece
mber/3/newsid_2519000/2519133.stm)
A day by day account of the war as seen in a virtual newspaper. (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0050906140622/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/1971/)
The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEB
B/NSAEBB79/)
16 December 1971: any lessons learned? By Ayaz Amir (http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/20
051216.htm) – Pakistan's Dawn
 India-Pakistan 1971 War as covered by TIME (https://archive.is/20061015201345/http://www.vi
dyasoft.com/interest/war/war71.html)
Indian Air Force Combat Kills in the 1971 war (unofficial), Centre for Indian Military History (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20061020233036/http://orbat.com/site/cimh/iaf/IAF_1971_kills_rev1.pd
f)
Op Cactus Lilly: 19 Infantry Division in 1971, a personal recall by Lt Col Balwant Singh Sahore
(https://web.archive.org/web/20070926234047/http://frontierindia.net/op-cactus-lilly-19-infantry-
division-in-1971/)
All for a bottle of Scotch, a personal recall of Major (later Major General) C K Karumbaya, SM,
the battle for Magura (https://web.archive.org/web/20070926233932/http://frontierindia.net/all-fo
r-a-bottle-of-scotch/)
"The Rediff Interview/Lt Gen A A Khan Niazi" (http://www.rediff.com/../news/2004/feb/02inter1.h
tm). Rediff. 2 February 2004.

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