ag Tard de Ghari's The Phenomenon of Man position in dhese matters been decisively refuted?” But anyone who Adopts this position muse ager that any discussion of Telhards| work by sclentiats must wait wpon the question whether the fnceptual system of Cartesianiem ix selfeonistent or see contradictory And this a manifestly philosophical question, 9 ‘The Homunculus Fallacy In the Philsphical Imestiations, Witgenstein says: ‘Only of a Thumm being and what resembles (behaves He) living human being cam one say: it has sensations; it sees is blind hears dea i consious or unconscious” (1, §281). This dictum soften rejected in practice by psychologists, physiologists and computer expert, chen they take predicates whose normal application eto complete human beings or complete animals and apply them 0 parts of animal, suchas brains, ort electrical systems. This is commonly ‘defended as harmless pedagogieal device 1 wish to argue that tis ‘dangerous practice which may lead to conceptual and methodol ‘Seal confusion Isl all the reckless application of umarebeing Predicates to insuficienly human-like objects the homunculus Elling’ since its most naive frm is tantamount so the posteltion fof fle man within a man to explain human expetience and behavione ‘One ofthe first philovophers to draw attention to the hormancae Tus fallacy was Descartes. In his Dips, he dserbes how “the ‘objects we lok at produce very peeec images in the back of the eyes" He encourages his readers to convince themselves ofthis by taking the eye of a newly dead man, replacing with paper or ‘eagshell the enveloping membranes atthe back, and plating i inside a shutter so ast let igh through ft into an otherwise dark room. "You will sce (I daresay wih surprise and. pleasure) 2 Dietre representing in natural perspective al he objects outside.” You eansot doubt, he continue, that quite similar pete x provduced in a living man’s eye, on the Tning membrane Frther, the images are not only produced in the back of the eye "Daca Dip ell Wy rnd Amo | Gun amas16 The Homes Fallacy but also sent on to the bain... aud when tis thus transite to the inside of our head, the pict sll retains some degree of it fesemblance to the object om which it urginates’ But he concludes with a warning ‘We must not think tht itis by means ofthis resemblance thatthe picture make us aware ofthe abjects~ ts though we had another pair of eyes to see it inside our brain? (op. 245-6) To think ofthe bran as having eyes and seeing the retinal image would be one way’ of committing the homunculus fallacy. Bt in Spite of warning us against the fallacy at this point Descartes himself commits it when he comes to discus the relationship between the soul and the pineal gland: {we se some animal approch the ight reflected fom it aly depicts two images of tone i each of cur eye, and thee 0 images orm two tars, by means ofthe opt nee, in he erie race ofthe brain which faces cavities then fom thee by ‘means of the animal spine with which caves are led thee age 9 radiate towards the He gland which surounded by ‘hese sprite tha the movement eich nach psn of ane fhe lager tens towards the mame ott ofthe land towards which ‘erste movement which se pit of he other age whieh fepresente the same part f this anima By thin means the two Inne which aren the ban fr butane pon the gland, which, cng mediately pn Ue sol, causes it sce the frm of hit To speak of the soul encountering images in the pineal land iso commit the homunculus fallacy for pace Descartes, 4 sot is 90 ‘more a complete human being than a brain i. In ill there nothing philosophically incorrect in speaking of images in the brain; Descartes himself is anxious to explain that they are very schematic images and not petres except in a metaphorical sense No images have resemble the objects they repent in all epee ‘semblance in ew fatre enough, and ery ofen the Paecion oan image depends on tat reeling the abject at 2 Des, Pain he She Mephl Wi of De ES Manet Rn Camo tp rh oe ‘The Homes Fllgy uy much ait mig rinatance, engraving, which consist merely of lik prea over pape, represent ses owns, meh and ‘en bas and semper (Dapp. 248) There would be nothing philosophically objectionable in the suggestion that these schematic images might be observed by a Tain surgeon investigating the gland. What ix misleading it the sggeston that these images are vibe to the sel, whose peep tim of them constitutes secing, What is wrong i that exactly the ‘same sorts of problems arise about Descartes’ explanation as about his sapcandim, To the Arstoelians who preceded Descartes, seeing necessitated a non-mechaniste phenomenon taking place in the eye, Desearesinrexuced new mechanisms, but inhi system the ‘non-mechanisic event in the eye is replaced by 2 new ronmechanistic reading of patterns in the pineal gland. The interaction between mind and mate is philosophically as puzzling 2\fr inches behing the ey a tin the eye tse ‘One danger, then, of the homunculus fallacy is that in problems concerning peteeption and Kindred matters it conceals what i Left to be explained. In the cae of Descartes, we ate put on our guard by the quaintess of some ofthe physnlogy, 30 that we have 20 Aiicaly in discovering the gaps in his account but the phil topical hieus can coexist with much more sophisticated physiol fea information ‘contemporary expert on perception, Profesor R.L. Gregory, sc the beginning ot his bok The Bond he Bra, echoes Descartes ‘warning against the homunculus fallacy We are w familar with sein, tha take eap of imagination to reais that here ae problems to besled, But conser We are ‘Bren tny dored pide down images inthe cjon and we 0 ‘Spare told bjs in suroundn space. Bom the patter of ‘mulation othe retinas me peeve the world ef objet, abd his ‘eohing short of «mice ‘The oe i fen dover tke a camera, but the quite ‘uneamerafike features of preeption which are most intresting How i infrmation fom the ee cde ito newal ens, it he Uioguage of the rain, ad seconsiaed nto experience of ur ‘ouding object? The tak of eye and brain site dillrent omuo The Homa Fllcy citer photographie or # telovton camera converting ajets Ineely info images, Thee ia temptation, which must be voded, tony that the eye rodic pictures nthe bai A pice fa the Train suggest the ocd of sce Kind oir eye ose but cis ‘would need a farther eye tose pitare- and von nan enlee ‘ere of eyes and pictures. This abd What the ye do {eed the bain with nkrmaton ded incur acy = chan ‘Seta impulses ~ which bythe ide and he ptr brain cy, represen object. We may the an analy Irom writen guage the eters nd words this page have tin meng 10 thove who know the language. They aft the reader's bain ppropritly, bat they are not pictures. When we lok 8 sme thing, the ptirs ef acral sey represent the object and tthe brain theaject, No Internal pte inven “The warning against the fllacy is excellent; but the fallacy is itelfmpliedin the suggestion tha the bran know language and thar it has an object Ike the objects of perception, A converse fallacy is committed when itis said that we are given tiny, distorted, upride-down images in the eyes and that we perceive patterns of stimulation on the retina, Heres nota bogus subject of perception which is being aupplid, but 2 bogus object of perception. "The reader may fel that tis is completely uni criticism, The words [have erticzed ae taken fom the fist page of popular ‘book: Whats the harm in personfving parts ofthe body inorder to dramatize aclentf information hich ean be tated in completely neutral metaphoriee Language? Whether dramatization is good pedagogy depends on whether the important events happen on or offstage, The overall paychlo- seal problem of perception could be stated a flows: how dors | human beng cope with the available sensory information, sd how des he act on {0 Or, in one of Gregory's own formulations, how does information control behaviour? Now tis ia problem which ‘would stil remain tobe slved even if we knew every detail of the process of election and storage of information; snd one cri pect of tis the ame whether the information isn the world, in ‘he retinas, inthe CNS. The problem thi what tthe rlation PRL Ge, he En ei Me 3 The Hommel Fallacy 19 between the presence of information in the technical sense of communication theory and the possession of information in the non-technical sense in which one Can acute information about the word by looking? For if having information i the same as knowing, thea contain ing information isnot the same as having information. An airtine| schedule contains the information about sine departures but the rine schedule doesnot knw the time of departes ofthe fights The literate slave on whose shaven scalp the tyrant has tattooed his state secret doce not fnow the information which his head ‘Acategory dierence is involved here. To contain information is to be ina certain stat, while to know something isto possess a ‘certain capacity. A rate (such at being a certain shape ozs, or having a certain multplicty or mathematical structure) is some thing deserbable by its internal properties a capacity (rach asthe bility to an afour minut mile otto speak French) is dscrbable ‘nly by specification of what would count a the exercise of the fapaciy. Sates and capacities are af course connected: in the Simplest case there san obvious connection between being around og (state) and being able to ft into a round hole (eapaciy). But the connections are not always (asin chat ease) analyte and many | Forms of expertise consist in knowing which rates go with which capacities (eg. what types of mushroom are poisonous, which alloys wil stand whieh stains). Knowledge isnot a state but a capacity, and a capacity of a unique ind. The state of containing certain information is no ‘doubs connected with the capacity which is knowledge ofa certain fet but the two are not identieal a the earlier examples show. We ‘may wonder what extra involved inthe knowing that p over and above containing the information that p.-What is Knowing’ a fapaciy to do, and what counts as an exercee ofthat capacity? Clearly, there a no simple answer- One cannot specly behaviour typical of knowing as one can specify behavior typical of anger. (One eannos even specify behaviour typical of knowing that por 3 ven pt owhat behaviour the knowledge that pill lead will ‘depend on vshat one wants. For instance, knowledge that the tvindow is open will lad to different behaviour in the case of130 ‘he Hommenkr Fall someone who want it open and i the cae of someane who wants Ftshut Tobe sure, the verbal utterance of isan aesiity which i "uniquely expressive of dhe knowledge or belie that ps but even x, this doesnot at all mean that anyone who knows that wil ever sa tha ‘There is, chen, no simple way of specifing how knowledge ets ceapresed in behavioue and why some pices of knowledge do not seem to affect one's behaviour a all. Sil, to hnow isto have the Ability to medi one's behavior in indefinite waye relevant tothe pursuit of one's goals. Its because the aiineachedle doesnot hhave any behaviour to be mosified by what is writen on it that i doesnot know what the ight tines are Tet us return rom knowing to secing. Seeing, when not lary, Involves knoving: vision might be defined, erly, icuary, but ‘ot uninformatvely, asthe acquisition of knowledge in the vial ‘mode. Tn the Aristotelian tradition, prior to Descartes, i used tobe ‘id that it wat not the eye that saw, nor the soul, but the whole ‘nganism. This was because the normal way to discover whether an fmunism sees is not just to study ite eye, but to investigate ‘whether its behaviours affected by changes oflight and ealour, te. Consequently, an explanation of seeing mat be an explanation not nly ofthe acquisition and storage of information, but alo of what ‘makes dhe containing of thi information into knowledge eit Felation to behaviour Tn his paper “On how so litle information controle so much behaviour, Gregory well sys Peshaps the most fundamental quotion in the whole Bld of experimental peychaogy it how fare behavior contd. by aren availabe sory nfrmation nd hw far by lormasion ttrady aored in the cental nevus spon?” Bat in that paper he petenta a theory of seting as selection of internal models without ssyng how the fnernal models ar elated ‘Reeach Report 1, Ap 1968p (Te page wan so plied name « Tw! Bog ed Mae es Dey ee) The Home ale ast to behaviour, He speaks of a model “ling up the appropriate Inusle powerlifting a certain weight and fades mediating Spproprate behaviour (p 8), but he sowhere shows how these ieaphors might be toca fot Real language. What he realy txplaneis hw infrmaton of etn ype might reach he ral. Tow let ws suppose that hi expanatin fh proves completly correct. Even he ercial problem remains: and hat stil 0 te dane masked forthe reader, fo fr Gregory Kimsel, by the Ue of homenculs predicates of the brain ad the se of meno tr vepresetaonal or symbolic predates of tems in the bai, Constr th ellowng psrage om the same pape In gener the e's images are inloealy impotan onlin fr 1 honcoptel ature ean be read om the internal model hey ‘Site tmage ae mriey patches fight wich cannon be etn or te dangerous ~ ut they serve at symbole fr seketig eral te which nea te oni fetus wal oso. es (hi reading of bjt characters from mages that al perception 5) Bat even if this mechanism is estentil for visual perception its ‘ot vinual perception. Selection af internal models would. be possible, as sexing would not, in an iolated optical system Incspabie of behaviour, This ot jus the ordinary language pint ree wouldn't call such & thing seeing’ ~ itis methodological point concerning the nature ofthe problems wo be solved and the Feasonableness of extsspolations fran acquired reslts, The sion that what i described i visual perception i encouraged By the use ‘ol langsage sch ae eatores cam be ead" and symbol or selecting Tater inthe same paper Gregory write: ‘On this general vw pescepton tnt dey of sensory informs ‘lo bar rater 0 he neral muse selected by senor informa ‘hn. Inden he cuvent prerpon i the reaing sto modes, ea) Clay timate ein what prepion sy saying that ee perception noe of X but of Y: iC wonder what pectin is how am I helped by being tld that it of ¥ rather than of XPra The Hamncaas Falla Gregory sense thi: dat is why his ist statement of this thesis flowed by indeed” followed by a statement of an incompatible thesis: Pereepsioneannot both be ofthe models and be the models ‘So far my objection to the homuncls mee has ie hat es pedagogically and methodologically dangerous, as helping to cloak the nature of problems tobe solved. But there isa more dangerous tflect ofthe model which alone telly deserves the mame alley [Let us suppose that we waive our objections to the use of sman-bring predicates for on-human-beings ike brains. Let us allow i oe said thatthe brain iP where P i some predicate ‘whose natural application sto whole human beings (It may, afer all, be used in quotes. It usually isthe Bet time) Ther i stil an important temptation to be resisted: the temptation to argue from ‘This man ie P to This man's brain is P or se sea. Gregory doesnot always resist his temptation. At the breinning of the quoted paper he argue that learning or stving particular events always ontogenetic. Naturally stored informa: tion, he says, has two origina ancestral disasters, and previous experince of the individual stored as "memory (1, his quotes). ‘To prove that storage of particular events x always ontogeti, he ‘Whats ceria is hatintrmaton gine phylogenetically always ofthe genera sil! Kind. We aren abe oral nda ett ‘experienced y or ancestors p) ‘And @ propor of learning sills such a tennis and piano playing, he os ‘We maybe able to eal thee particular games or concerts, but sly es ot nda pat vents which are sore bat ater Sppropite behaviour and vente (p 1) Here the homunculus fallacy i committed thus "X remembers ‘hat pis being treated as equivalent to "X has stored the event hat The Home Fallacy 39 P The only reason given for saying that information about parscular events isnot stored phylogenetically is that we cannot Fecal individual events in our ancestors’ lives. But this to argue from “this man is not Po thi man's brain is not P™ which fallacious, even ifthe man’s brain's being Pisa necesary condition for his awn beng P. In another paper, ‘Percept illsons and brain model Gregory considera whether the bran is est regarded a a digital or san analogue device. He writes 1c ot imple pone he aa ci contain tate seston When's as ‘anne supone thatthe strata problems are solved by cor Pos mal ene, ining ep better wo make the lane cai for children and anal: tha hey She pmo ogo by ng anges of met SSeccpeas wht iting sata chs SORT aca h ie tinct Poel tarog SSSy eso seq ering ot mama ree Piet tp ie ella hie Sg is rn pen obec lesa ey rach twit ema ca” Here the homunculus fallacy is committed in the sentence “Perceptual lemming. surely cannot require the learning of mathematics’, Irs the child that i ding the perceptual learning what, if anything, is supposed to be learning mathematics isthe Child's brain, Iti empansible that child building toy bricks Should know advanced mathematics; but fom this noching at all follows abou what information is contained in the chills brain TVeondlude that there is good reason t heed the warning of Wingensten with which this paper began. The moral is no that the human-being predicates cannot have thee use extended at al, ‘bu that they must be extended cautiously and se-consciously, and that Wf they are extended one may not argue fom the aplication of > LG, oop an ei de, Pig of he 8,19 (ot yp tap134 The Homes Fallacy such a predicate to whale hutnan bing othe application of the transferred predicate to anything other than the whole fumaa being In brief postscript, wish to classify some of the points made above, and to disown some ofthe theses atrbuted tome by some of thore who read that part af this evay. Fist 1 do not accuse Professor Gregory of mistaking mechanistic description or concep- ‘ual analysis; nor do Think that ether the philosopher's answer or ‘the neurophysiologis’s answer to the question “what i perception” enjoys a privileged stat. Secondly, To not object to every textension ofthe application af'a predicate ram a sentient whole to 1s part. Thirdly, {took up no position om the general question whether conscious activites canbe said to br (nothing but) the Imicro-trictral processes postulated to explain ther, Twill fxpand each of these points, snd then briely restate why I all the homunculie fallacy a allay. dot think that Gregory i under any illusion tae he is ding conceptual analysis. T think he is engaged in constructing, and testing experimentally, hypotheses about the mechanisie neces sary to explain the phenomena af visual perception. But concep Analysis is relevant o what he s doing in evo ways, Fis, analysis OF the concept of perapin ix necessary to delimit what are the ‘Phenomena to be explained; scondly, analysis of the concepts of qt leguage show that such things a8 secing and decoding annot be done by brains unless we can atte to brsins certain types of behavior which we ean attribute to whole human beings, To ataibute such activities to brane without suggesting how the relevant behaviour might be attributable to brains iT aintaned, {o mask empirial problems which remain tobe solved ‘The moral of my paper, Tsai, was not that human-being predicates cannot have thei we extended a al, but that thir uae Inust be extended cautiously. Consequently, Cam unmoved ite Pointe ot hat hands can grasp and old: such extensions set to ‘me well within the hounds of caution, Moreover, my objection was pot extenialy to predicates of wholes being attached wo predicates Of part, but to predicates belonging to human beings being ‘Te Hommetet Fllgy 135 attached to non-human beings. The same illacy could be commit ted (though my name for it would not be apt) by the ineations pplication of human-being predicate wo wholes of which human bring ae parts, such as communities and states. Populations, like human beings, grow and shrink; but it would abviouly be falleous to angue that a human being was shrinking because the Population he belongs to ie shrinking, or that a population ix rowing becaute every member of it i growing. And states may Ihave intentions which none of thee ciaens have, (Cf. Wittgen stein, Zt, pp. 148) "The question whether perception can be said tobe ida! with plysilogical procestes stems to me to lacks clear sense, and T do rot wish to anwer itone way oF the other. My complaint against Gregory’s identification of vstal perception with bis postalated| selection of internal modes was not based on «general thesis chat peteeption cannot be identical with a brain process. Though tates find capacities sre conerptually diferent, it need nt be misleading to aay, eg: that a pegs ability to Bt imo round holes tris roundness. In the same way it may be that there ia physnlgical procese~ the acquisition of physiological state ~ which can be ‘Said w be visual perception. But no one can claim to have identified such a process ni he has Brought out is connection with the types of behaviour which are the criteria for the occurrence of ‘visual perception. And this Gregory has not done ‘allay, riety speaking, sa orm af argument which can lead from tue premises toa fale conclusion. The inappropriate use of predicates not being form af argument, ot stely a fallacy, as Totserved ny pape. Buti ead toa frm of argument, which T ‘aimed to detect in Gregory's articles, which i fallacious in the frit sense of the word: the argument that because a certain Thuman-being predicate attaches os human being it attaches to his brain, or ee noua The mere inappropriate use of human-being predicates may be calle fallacy im an extended sense, because Inay siggrst conlasions which are unjustified notably the conc ‘lon that more ha been explained by a peyehological theory than has infact been explained ‘Normally, in an adult human being, the ability to see carries with ie the ability to say what ie seen, though of course not136 The Hommel Falay everything which is actualy seen is actually talked about. The wae fof language to report what is seen, like any use of language, is emarkably fee fom stimulus contol ~ a point which har been repeatedly’ made, in general tenms, by Chomsky. No account of human pereepson can approach adequacy unless it inches an explanation ofthis fact. Consequently, even ie knew every detail ‘of physiological proceses by which visual information reaches the brain, and every detail ofthe physiological processes by which the linguistic utterance of visual reports i prduced, the problem of the telationship between the input and the output would be ‘completely untouched, This problem ia major part ofthe problem ‘ofthe physiological explanation of perception, adits existence ‘masked by tall ofthe Bain eading features af jects rom images and calling up appropriste muscle power. 10 Language and the Mind ‘We may ssfly think ofthe lnguage ficult, the number ay tnd eters, as'mentl organ’ napus othe heart othe val ‘atom othe jtem of motor corinatin and plang. There peas ta be 9 clear dcmateaton line between phys organ, perp nd motor ystems, and ent cules nthe respects Ergun! "To view the language faculty as an ongan like the heart involves a cp pilosophial confusion, Chomhy’s description ofthe mental structures that he investigates introduces am ielevant metaphysi- fl element atthe interface betwen physiology and psychology. 1 Intend to justi this complaint by a detailed examination of some ‘cal partages in Chomshy’s latest book, Rules and Repetto But before doing so let me, inorder to avert misunderstanding, list ‘number of points on which pilosopers have picked quarrels ‘with Chomsky and’on which T chink ie he, and not his ‘hilsophical rites, who i inthe right have no quarrel with the iea that thee are faculis of the ‘mind, and thatthe mind in thst sense har = modular structure. 1 have no quarrel with the notion of deep structures, or mental representations, in the only sense in which thee are rally relevant to the exclting empirical inquiries that Choneky and his associates fre engaged in T have no quarrel with the idea that in sing Tanguage we display tacit knowledge, operating rules and prince ples that cannot in the normal way be brought to conscious formulation. Finally, Ihave no objection to innate mental suc tures on the grounds oftheir innateness. Obviously, human Beings are born with certain abies, including abilities to macure aswell, "Nm. ud rts Ce Ua Pel1s Language nd he Mind 4 abilities to learn. Whether the ability to acquire grammars of certain kind isan ability to lara or an ability to matute wade ‘certain conditions seems to me a philosophically open question ‘apable in principle of being sted by empirical ing. Despite this range of agreement, I think that Chomsky employ: in his writing a confued notion ofthe metal. T should perhape bein by explaining what T think a non-confied notin of th mental looks ike "The mind isthe capacity to acquire intellectual sil. The chie and most important intellectual kil is the mastery of language ‘Others, such x knowledge of mathematics, are acquired by humar brings through the anguages tht they have mastered, So the study ofthe aquisition and execs of language the way paral te Study the nature of the human min, ‘Someone who has acquired language dros that language Knowledge of language ivan ability! an ubiity that can be exerised in many diferent ways, for fatance, by speaking the language, by understanding what i std to one inthe language by reading the language, by talking to oneself one’s head in th language. To know a language ut to have the ait to do these And sinilae things. Ti concep truth that to sty a ably {you have to study the exercise of that ability: to investigate what {he ability to is you have wo investigate what ging i, Soto study Inoledge of fanguage you have a conser and examine what the exercise of linguistic knowledge is, The exercise of linguistic Knowledge can be called, you Hike linguistic behaviour. But “behaviour must be vndersiond in broad sense, 30 that, for instance, redting a poem to myself in my head imperceptibly to hers will count as an instance of my lnuinic behaviour ‘We must distinguish between abilities and thelr postessorson the one hand and their veces on the other, The ponsessor of ability is wha he the ability, Lamm the poascsor of my linguistic ability itis T (and not my mind or my brain) who know English nd am exercising this capacity in giving this lecture. Similarys my ar has the expaciy to decrerate can go slower in answe to my touch onthe ot-brake. The sia the ears ability to decelerate Js the brake mechani; similarly, my eye va prt ofthe vehile of ry ability t see. The vehicle of an ability i that part of is Language and te Sting 139 possessor in vet of which i able to exercise the ability. A ‘chil is someting concrete and more or less tangible: a ability, fn the ether hand, has neither length nor breadth nor leston Kt 's,ifyou Tike, an abstraction fom behaviour. An important instance of the distinction between possessor, tility, and vehicle i the distinction between peopl, thir minds, fan their brains, Human beings ar ving bodies of certain Kind, fra have various abilities, The hurnan tind isthe capacity that yhuman beings have to acquire imellectal abiltin: capacity i itself an ably, but @seoned-order aby, the ability to acquire ables. The vehicle of the man mind i, very likely, the human brain. Human beings and heir brain are physical objects hee ‘minds are not, because they ae capacities. This does not mean that they are spirits A round pes ability tf ints round hole sot physical object ike the round piel but no one wl suggests A spirit It isnot any adherence o spiritualism, but simply concern for conceptual clarity, that makes uy insist dht a mind is not 3 physical abject and does no havea length and breadth, a mind tr nota physical object, cami have a stuctare at all? Yes, itean. Theset of abies through which the mental capacity serie have relationships to eachother - there ar relationships, for instance, between the ability to mulply and the ability wo take square roots ~ and these relationships Between abilities form the Hructre of the mind. Not only human beings have abilities that fe structured in tis way: we ean discover the stuctre latent in the operations ofa pocket ealeulator by ieatilying the algorithms thar ie uss, To discover the algorithm that a calelator uses, ay, for the extraction of square roots cals for mathematical, rather than electron, ingury- When considering dhe human mind, the Physiologist isin the postion analogous to the electronic engince, bad the peychologiat sin the poston of mathematician tho i trying to deduce from the form the calculators output takes (what Kind of rounding errors it commits et) what ithe sgorthm that itis using mmsky makes a distinction tween capacities and their vekicles, a2 U have done. He deseribes the objects of his atudy at “human cognitive capacities and the mena structures that seve as the vehicles forthe eneeie ofthese expacien’. But in erm of the40 Language and he Mind Aistnetons that [have drawn the mental structures that Chomsky is imerested in are capacities, not the vices of eapacte ti the physiological hardware characterise of the exerci of the relevant ‘mental capacities that x the vehicle, Tn fact Chomsky's mental suucture sem to belong at times to the world of software, at times tothe world af hardware. The great majority of what he sys, asa linguist, about the knowledge and use ‘of grammar by language uses, s pene itlligible in terms of| mental structures, being particular abilities and ther exercises the ‘xerise ofthe ability to operate an algorithm, to diacover the value fof-a particular grammatical function for a given grammatical Argument. But from time to time Chomsky the philosopher inter ‘ens to tellus that what he alkng about is otto be understood 28 capacity or ability at all Iissomething quit diferent, whic | Undeies the ability and its exercise, and ‘which yet docy not underlie iin the way that the physiological structures and proceses ofthe brain do. “To show that iis ponsibe to know a language without having the expacity o us it, Chomsky ofr the following argument: marines pertan who knows Engish anders cerebral damage doce no at he language eters tl a even we in speech, comprehension, lett supe, even thou Seppe thatthe fle the injury recede and with no forthe ‘experience or exponue the person reeves the iia apa {se the Language In the intervening pred, he had apy peak or understand English, even though, tough the eit {limatly placa) structures that unde that eapacy were ‘damaged: De the penn know English doting the rng prio? (P51) ‘The answer, Chomsky says “yer: that is shown by the fet of| do not wish wo contest the answer that Chomsky gives to his question: what does sem to me surprising is hi lear assumption that there is a fact ofthe mater here, tobe settled by considering empirical evidence. IF it eally were a factual matter whether person inthe condition deseibed by Chomsky knew English or not, Language end ie Mind ua then a thought experiment would be a most inappropriate way to settle the question. A thought experiment snot an experiment and oes not provide empirical evidence: ts fneton in philoxophy i rather to daw atention to the shape and structure of our concept. This Chomsly'silustration eectvely docs: it shows the fuzzy cges of the concept ming Beplish Inthe normal ease, a lange ‘numberof extra for the application ofthe concept ae preset: the person in question can readily speak, understand, and think in English. We imagine the erteria white away, 40 tha all hat lefts thatthe person i going later to use English normally, Shall swe say he knows English n the iterval? Well we ean tay what we Tike a long as we know what we are doing it sup tous to decide whether what islet is sufficient fr us 4 eal “knowledge of Engi’. Perhaps Chomshy i ight thatthe mote natural decision isto say that its suficent. Fine, then, let us say that the person ows English But why should we not alo say that the person retains the capacity to speak English? For exrancous reasons, he ‘cannot te oF exercise the capacity atthe moment, but since, ex yet, he's going to use en ature without any ofthe normal Acquistion processes, sit not natural to sy that hel hed on 0 icin the mean? The concept of espacio ae English has exactly the same fuzzy edges as the concept of Anledge of Bgl and CChomaty’s example does nothing to separate the two concepts ‘Of course, Chomsky denies the presence ofthe eapacity during the intervening period, He says Inthe intervening period he had no capacity tospek or understand Engl, even in though But why should he say that? I iy possibe that he thought that it followed frm something else that on the hypothesis, genuinely He nad no capacity to spakor understand Engl, ven in hough ‘nthe ivervening pei. ‘But, ofcourse, the first proposition doesnot allow rom the second, And if Chomsky hinks th tds he is mistakenMe Language ond the Mind ‘Chomsky goes om to considera sein aphasic who is like the frst but who never recovers speech To deny that his person lacks knowlege of English would be perverse, he argues: we have agreed tha the fret aphasic knew English, and this second one i in exactly the same mental (ltinatly physical) state, as might be shown’ on autopsy, Well, once again this would bea matter for ‘decision, ot fr discovery at surely this ime the natural decision ‘would go the other way. ‘The one remaining peop to support the Application of the concept lanring English — that the unforanate ‘vas later gong to use the language again without relearing ~ has Bren pulled away. So what grounds are left for saying that be [Knows English? ‘But heii the same brain state as somebody who does knove English” But that isto beg peesely the question at Issue that ithe brai state and not the presence of absence the capacity, chat sees whether someone knows English oF nt. “The question berging nate of Chomeky’s procedure ie masked by his tue of expressions auch as ‘mental (alimately physical) structures’ and ‘mental (imately physical) stats. Chomaky ses Such expressions to indicate that his mentalsm doesnot involve ny sort of immateratisms mental structures are simply physical Structures desrbed at a certain level of abstraction, But the ‘expressions are illchosen, whatever one may think of iamaterial- fom, beeause they conceal the fact thatthe criteria a deity for mental state are not the same as those fora physical sate. Two People can be in the same mental state while Being ina dierent ‘Physical state and can be nthe same physical sate while Being ia A diflrent mental state. To say tis doesnot beg any questions About materialism, since is equally re of computers chat there ‘ho one ~ one correlation between software structures and hardware ‘Aw analogy may help here. A monarch is legal person in the sense that whac i sto be a monarch i defined by'a set of legal Felaionships. ‘Bat all actual monarchs, from Hammurabi to Elizabeth MI, are physical persons, human beings af esh and bod: We might therefore, in the style of Choma call momar Tegal (ultimately physical) persone But f we do ao, we invite ‘confusion. Suppose that I met the King of England in 1937 andi royo Tsay, "1 have just met again the same legal (alimatly Language and be Mind ug physical) personas E met in 2937 Whom did meetin 194% the Duke of Windsor or King George VI? The confusion in aking of the same mental (imately physical) sructute less obvi but 10 les serious, Thdeed, the confusion it more serious. For monarchs are indeed persons; whereas states ofthe mind and states of the brain are not Sates of the same Kind of thing. I agree with Chomsky that to describe a state of mind isto describe, at a certain degree of abstraction, a physical objec; but the physial abject so described isa human being and no a brain. The brain state characteristic of speaker of English ifwe go alg with Chomsky in assuming that there are such may, forall we know, be eproicibe in a brain nit. However successfully dhey were reproduced they would not constitte knowledge of English for itis poople, not brains, to ‘whom ic makes sense to attribute auch knowledge etme emphasize ain that Tam not arguing lor immateiaiom ‘orspittualism, The conceptual points that Ihave been making can bbe made about pocket calculators no les than about human beings. My calculator works out che square root of 129436780. Tn a fash, there comes the answer ¢4111.13106, Between my pressing the square-root key and the display appearing, complicated events ook place init electronic innards, Those event, whatever they were, {ould have taken place in a dilrentealeulstor doing dillerent job; and a diferent caleulator doing the same job might well have taken an electronically totally diferent route, Moreover, the hard ‘ware might have been taken out of the case, separated (orn the inpat keys and the output spay. Whatever electronic events then took place inside ie would not have been the working out ofthe square root of 123456789. Forin the sens in which eaeulators can ‘work out square root for us cs only whole calculators and not portions of their electronic anatomy, however sophisticated, that fan do the working out CChomsky’s final argument against the identification of know: ledge of English with the capacity to use it goes ike this: Were we deny capac and knowledge, we would presumably te Tod to say tht the aphase doc not hrow English when the| | Me Langage and the Mind Tall Anowiedge of Engh can aie in mind etally lacking hie Anowledge without any revit experience whatorer a he case recovery sows, something that psy not ioe of he chs ‘mind and cems an exotic ei. fp. 52) Such a claim would indeed be exotic; which makes it more surprising that only forty pages later, on p. 3, Chomsky should ommend Arthur Danto for pointing out the possibility that in principle there might be a "Spanish il” with the property tht by {aking it we should have been caused (adventtiosly) to be master of Spanish without having learned the language’. Such a master of Spanish would undoubsedly know Spanish, Chonky says, hence We cannot rle out in prin right bring aout the men Spanish pl he pty a ing «pi In such a case, of course, knowledge of Spanish would arse in a ‘mind tally Tacking the knowledge withowt any relevant experi "ence whatsoever: the claim that Chomsky dismissed as exotic nthe fares passage. Indeed i sa more exotic aim, for in the ease of the recovered aphasic it might well be claimed that there wat felevant experience the experience at the time when the language ‘eas orginally acquired inthe normal way T think that Chomsky i right not to reject a inconceivable the roton that a pill might give us mastery of Spanish the inconsi tency between this concrasion and his earlier poston merely rings fut further the faiity of his atempe to separate knowledge Enslish rom the ability to se the mastery ofthe language, The idea is indeed exotic, but it iz not literally inconceivable, What ‘would be inconceivable would be the ea tha ill might give one Knowledge of Spanish ata psig oe te coc tne the aguage. ‘The root of Chomsky’'s canfusion is his fur to distinguish betwen two diferent Kinds of evidence that we may have forthe ‘obtaining of states of allaits: 0 diatinguish between crea and ‘smplms (lo use the terminology introduced by Wittgenstein. Where the connection between a certain kind of evidence an the conclusion drawn fiom it is a matter of empirical discovery, Language andthe Mind us ‘hough theory and induction, the evidence may be called amp of the tate of alli; where the relation between evidence and Conclusion isnot something discovered by empirical investigation, bouts something that must be grasped by anyone who ponssrs the concept ofthe state of ais in question, then the evidence nota tere symptom, but sa cerin ofthe event in question. A red sky Ac ight may bea symptom of good weather the along moran: but the absence of los, the shining ofthe sum, ete, tomorrow are ‘ot jst symptoms but criteria forthe good weather. Simulaly, the ‘ccartence of certain electrical brain patterns may be, of may some day come tobe, symptoms ofthe presence of knowledge of English in the person whose brain is in question. But his ready use of English snot just a symptom of tis a criterion of knowledge of English ‘To grasp the importance ofthe distinction berween criteria in symptoms in connection with knowledge af language, consider the folowing case. Suppose that Profesor Chomsky were now to di aad on opening bis skull we disrered that there was vothing inside except sawdust, This i indeed an exotic suggentin: it happened it would be an artonishing miracle. But sit happened it Wwotld noc east the lightest doubt on what we all now know, namely, that Chomsky knows English extremely well But on ‘Chomiy’s view we would have to say that infact i showed he never knew English a al since on his view knowledge of English is lulumately a certain phyical structure. But the supposition that someone can use English as Chomsky does and yet not cw English it not just miraculous supposition isa plee of Biter ‘Chommskys characterization ofthe mental structures tha interest him makes them straddle uncasly the distinction between hard ‘ware and software, They seem to be to ghostly to be hardware (irom time to ie herein us that ti part fhe theory hat they shouldbe in the Brain rather than inthe iver); bu they also ‘scam tobe ton concrete tobe satware, otherwise they could ot be ‘haracterized as ultimately physical structures. Bue though is ‘characterization of mental structures i, T have argued, confured land incoherent, what he is studying when he is studying mental Structures is something genuine, important and fascinating. Tei6 Language ad the Mind precisely the relationship between diferent capacities and sets of apacties, ‘Chomaky would deny this If we eject his conception of mental structures, he says, Weare lft with a deep ty of behavior, potential behavior, Alispasons behave and soon a ty han my epinion anna, in cca be pursued tna eforent wy (09) ‘What in fet we are et with, and what Chomsky in fact studies, re relations between dierent abilities: in particular the ability to render the value of certain functions (eq. linguistic tansorma- tions for given arguments. Its abilities ofthis kind that Chomsky jn studying when he aims to uncover the structures underlying out se of language “There are many inellectwal tasks that we ean perem in more than one way. When we multiply a umber by ten, for instance, we an (a simply add a 0 (4) recite the appropiate part ofthe ten times table () write the number down ten times and add up the result. Now, wherever we havea cae of doing A by doing B thete will be questions to be raised about the relations between the Ability to do-A and the ability eo do Bs we ean only map by ten inthe fret way, for instance, we know the decimal notation, and in the second way fe know the ten mes table, And when we do ‘A by doing B it may well be that we kaow very well hat we are doing A, but do not know without reflection that we are ding By ‘when we return a serve tennis there are many movements of| hand and arm that we are not normaly aware af by which we make the return. Similarly, in performing intellectual tasks ~ including ‘he comparatively modest ones of pronouncing a word or constrict ing a sentence ~ there are many sub-tasks that we perform without conscious advertence. When we atk what rules or principles we tmploy in periorming thes task, we are asking what subabilies| Wwe are exetisng when we exercise the ability fo we language. Tn what sense, then, does the petformance of such tasks have ‘psychological realty’ when itis not conscious? The ability being exercised isa peli veaity inthe sense that tian ability that is being exercised in a tank that isan intellectual one and not a Language en the Mind “7 merely physical one. Ie is a psychological rely in hat its open 10 ‘esting which of the various posible algorithms that T might use in| performing the task i the one that I'am actually using, Tes here that iis evant to study the reaction time of subjects and simile ‘Phenomena to which Chomsky’ attitude has become increasingly cavalier, entirely agree with Chomsky in regarding the consciousness of ‘mental process as Being quite inesenil to the reality of the Process. But this does not mean that payehological reality i {tnimpertant, Once again, the pont can be made in terms of imple ‘non-human machines. It is 8 genie empirical question which particular algorithm is being wsed by a computer or eaeulatr 0 Produce the solution to a problem, and the speed of computation And the nature of rounding errors and the ike sight provide ‘mpircl evidence for oe against the use ofa particular algorithm, Tewould inno way count against this that there was no presenta: tion ofthe algorithm inthe ouput display of the calelator, of in the monitoring file provided by the computer, Tt isthe monitoring fle that isthe analogue, inthe computer context, ofthe conscious ‘count that we can give of the way in which we. perform Jnellectal task. "The philosophical confusions that I ave claimed to detect in ‘Chomaty’s presentation of his theories of knowledge of grams ‘rein no way onganie to the theories themselves, The theories i fave understood them, can be stated in such a way 38 tobe quite fice ofthe particular frm of mental in which they have Been wrapped up and which has provided ineevant distraction to philosophical and pychologia! eis,