Current Affairs: Sunday, November 08, 2015

Current Affairs
Sunday, November 08, 2015 1

Day 4
Sequence
 Water Crisis
 Terrorists’ negotiations
Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 3

Revised Syllabus 2016
 I. Pakistan's Domestic Affairs (20 marks)
 Political
 Economic
 Social
 II. Pakistan's External Affairs (40 marks)
 Pakistan’s relations with its Neighbors (India, China,
Afghanistan, Russia)
 Pakistan’s relations with the Muslim World (Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey)
 Pakistan’s relations with the United States
 Pakistan’s relations with Regional and International
Organizations (UN, SAARC, ECO, OIC, WTO, CW)
Revised Syllabus 2016
 III. Global Issues (40 marks)
 International Security
 International Political Economy
 Human Rights
 Environment: Global Warming, Kyoto Protocol, Copenhagen Accord
 Population: world population trends, world population policies
 Terrorism and Counter Terrorism
 Global Energy Politics
 Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Security
 Nuclear Politics in South Asia
 International Trade (Doha Development Round and Bali Package)
 Cooperation and Competition in Arabian Sea, Indian and Pacific Oceans.
 Millennium Development Goals, Current Status,
 Globalization
 Middle East Crisis
 Kashmir Issue
 Palestine Issue
Motivational Dimension
Terrorism
“positive” societal change
Criminal
TERROR Pathological
Terror financial gain
inflict suffering Terror

Widening the “Target” to ‘Hit the
Mark’
Level 1: Government Leaders

Level 2: Police & Military
Level 3: Government Workers
Level 4: Civilian Supporters
Level 5: All Civilians
Terrorists increase their range of targets

to achieve their goal. Most terrorist
organizations include civilian targets,
Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs
often preferred over hard targets. 10
Intensity of
Terrorist
Attacks in
Pakistan
2013

Terrorists Are Seldom Open to
Compromise
Their demands usually involve radical change in
the status quo
i. Uniting Northern Ireland with the Republic of
Ireland in the south
ii. Formation of the state of Palestine
iii. Overthrow of the secular Egyptian government
iv. Establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq & removal
of Western influence
v. TTP wants shariah in Pakistan.

Responding to Terrorist Demands
(prioritized list)
i. Diplomacy when possible, but
• unlikely to work in most situations
• reinforces terrorist tactics
ii. Undermine terrorist support
iii. Direct physical confrontation
• Hunt and kill
• Neutralize “breeding grounds”
• Target sympathizers and abettors
iv. Temper media coverage
Temper Media Coverage
1. The media are (mostly unwilling) allies of the
terrorists
2. The media need to self-censor coverage and not just

push the most sensationalistic story
i. confirm story & factual information
ii. present clear & balanced perspective
iii. consider impact of coverage
iv. Hakimullah was very fond of Media Coverage

Negotiations
 Negotiations with terrorists were outlawed by
democracies in the past. It was equated with providing
legitimacy to terrorists and undermining the democratic
spirit.
 Yet, numerous established democracies of the world,

confronted with terrorism, negotiated with the
terrorists.

Negotiations
 Negotiations between the governments and:
i. The Red Brigade in Italy
ii. The LTTE in Sri Lanka
iii. The IRA in the UK
iv. PLO with Israel
v. TTP in Pakistan
vi. MNLF in Philippine

Two Types of Negotiating Partners
i. Confrontationists or religious
 They believe more in terror than in negotiations- (TTP)
ii. Accomodationalists or political

 They believe in conflict resolution on the principle of “Give
and Take” (IRA and PLO)

Sponsors of Terrorists
i. Normally, a militant organization is sponsored by a
foreign power.
ii. Authority of the organization depends on its

commitment with that state.
iii. If the organization is exerting its authority by itself

than its sponsoring state, negotiations will be result-
oriented and serious and vice versa.
Timings of Negotiations
i. Neither the terrorist group may be at the verge of

defeat nor success
ii. Thus, Optimal or Strategic Point is very important.

Complex Administrative Structure
 The tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa exhibit complex
and diverse administrative structures with seven tribal
agencies of FATA and six Frontier Regions (FRs); six
Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) districts
and three PATA enclaves, 18 settled districts and one
hybrid area (Malakand Agency)

Metastasis of Militancy
 Militancy refers to the state or condition of being combative
or disposed to fight. It is also the active championing of a
cause or belief.
 Militants are members of warring groups.

 The regions bordering the Durand Line, the Pak-Afghan
border, have been referred to as ‘Terrorist Disneyland’. The
militancy has spread from this region into various directions,
manifesting the following patterns:
 Local-National:
 The militancy has a local-national dimension. It is raging in the seven
tribal agencies, six Frontier Regions, six PATA districts, 18 settled
districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and other parts of Pakistan in
varying shades and intensity.

 Transnational and Regional:
 The Taliban from Afghanistan have found a sanctuary in the
tribal areas where they come to rest and recover, replenish their
revenues, recruit new cadres, hibernate in the winter and
infiltrate into Afghanistan in the summer.
 The insurgency in Afghanistan has great repercussions for
Pakistan. It operates on three fronts.
i. The northern front, where mainly Hizb-e-Islami militants are
active, spans Nurestan, Konar, Laghman and Nangarhar provinces
of Afghanistan as well as parts of Pakistan across the border.
ii. The central front, comprising foreign fighters (Arabs and Central
Asians), covers the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika as
well as Bajaur area of Pakistan.
iii. The southern front, which mainly comprises of Afghan Taliban, is
based in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol and Uruzgan provinces of
Afghanistan as well as parts of Balochistan.
 International Dimension: the Epicenter
i. Militants from Pakistan’s border areas have been linked to a
range of international terrorist attacks and plots, such as the
July 2005 bombings in London.
ii. Until 2008, the number of foreign fighters present in the
tribal areas was estimated to be 500-600. Recent estimates
suggest that the number of foreign militants in FATA is
between 3,500 and 5,000 (2014).
iii. These militants constantly keep changing their locations to
avoid US drone strikes and military operations by the
Pakistan Army.
iv. Chinese Ulghur militants of the East Turkistan Movement,
Uzbek rebels from Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and
Sunday, Chechens
November 08, 2015 are among
Current Affairs those operating in the tribal belt 29
Shakai Agreement

Shakai Agreement
Shakai Agreement
 The signing of peace agreements with pro-Taliban militants
started with the Shakai agreement, which the government
signed with Nek Muhammad and other militant
commanders at Shakai, South Waziristan on March 27,
2004. Nek, a charismatic Yargulkhel Wazir was a battle-
hardened commander of Taliban who provided sanctuary
to the chief of Uzbek militants Tahir Yaldochev in the
military operation in Kaloosha.

Shakai Agreement
 The main clauses of the agreement were:
i. The government would release all individuals taken prisoner
during the military operation.
ii. The government would pay compensation for casualties during the
operation.
iii. The government would pay compensation for collateral damage
caused during the operation.
iv. The government would not take action against Nek Muhammad
and other wanted individuals.
v. The government would allow foreign ‘Mujahideen’ to live
peacefully in Waziristan.
vi. Local ‘Mujahideen’ would not resort to any action against the land
and government of Pakistan.
vii. ‘Mujahideen-e-Waziristan’ (fighters from Waziristan) would not
take part in any action in Afghanistan.
Shakai Agreement
 Fate of the Agreement:
i. The peace accord failed because of disagreements over
registration of foreigners with the authorities.
ii. The government claimed that the militants were required to
register ‘foreign fighters’ in the area and surrender them to
the government. However, the militants claimed that there
was no such clause in the agreement.
iii. On June 11 2004, the military operation was re-launched.
iv. Nek was killed by a missile launched from a US drone on June
19, 2004.
v. The agreement remained in place for less than 50 days.

Shakai Agreement
 Observations:
i. The agreement led to the tribal dissidents morphing into a
powerful militant group which became a permanent feature
of the tribal landscape and further reinforced polarization.
ii. Pakistan’s strong support for the stance of the US in the war
on terror and reliance on the use of military means further
militarized the situation.
iii. In the peace agreement, the militants were given a status
equal to the government.

Sararogha Peace Deal

 The militancy, which was hitherto restricted to areas
inhabited by the Ahmadzai Wazir tribes of South Waziristan,
started spreading to the Mehsud-dominated areas of South
Waziristan by the spring of 2004.
 The two Mehsud commanders spearheading the militancy in
their respective areas were Abdullah and Baitullah.
 The government opted for another peace deal in a bid to
bring calm to the Mehsud territories. The deal was inked
between pro-Taliban militant Baitullah Mehsud and the
government of Pakistan through the mediation of a local
jirga at Sararogha, South Waziristan, on February 22, 2005.
 The agreement was signed by Baitullah Mehsud and
members of the Current
Sunday, November 08, 2015
localAffairs
jirga. 38

 The six clauses of the written agreement were:
i. Baitullah and his group would neither harbor nor support any
foreign fighter in their area.
ii. Baitullah and his supporters would not attack any government
functionary nor damage official property. They would also not
create any hindrance in development activities.
iii. The government would not take action against Baitullah and his
supporters for their past actions. However, they would be dealt
with as per the law if they were found involved in any terrorist or
criminal activities in the future.
iv. Any culprit found in the Mehsud area would be handed over to the
government.
v. All the issues not covered by the agreement would be resolved with
mutual consultation between the political administration and the
Mehsud tribe.
vi. In case of violation of any clause of the agreement, the political
administration was empowered to take legal action.
 Observations:
i. The agreement did not cover cross-border infiltration or
attacks in Afghanistan.
ii. There was no clause concerning the surrender of foreign
fighters.
iii. There was no provision that militants would surrender their
weapons.
iv. The agreement became controversial after reports emerged
that money had been paid to the militants during the
negotiations.
v. Abdullah Mehsud, the second most important militant
commander in the region, opted out of the agreement.

Miranshah Peace Accord
 The militancy that began in the Ahmadzai Wazir territories
of South Waziristan in 2003 spread to the Uthmanzai Wazir
areas of North Waziristan in 2005.
 The government’s writ receded in North Waziristan as the
militants attacked security forces personnel and convoys.
 The political administration was restricted to government
buildings.
 When the cost of military options exceeded the benefits, the
government opted for a 16-point peace deal with the
militants of North Waziristan on September 5, 2006.

 The undertakings by the Uthmanzai Wazirs, including local Taliban,
religious leaders, elders and tribesmen, included:
i. There would be no attacks on law enforcement personnel and
government property. There would be no target killings.
ii. No parallel administration would be established in the area and the
government’s writ would prevail. In case of any problem, the political
administration in consultation with the Uthmanzai tribes would resolve
the issue according to the traditions and the FCR.
iii. There would be no cross-border militant activities in Afghanistan.
However, there would be no restriction on crossing the border for
trade/business and for meeting relatives according to the local riwaj.
iv. There would be no terrorist activity in the districts adjacent to North
Waziristan.
v. All foreigners residing in North Waziristan would either leave Pakistan or
remain peaceful according to the prevailing law and the current
agreement. All the clauses of the agreement would also apply to the
foreigners in the tribal agency.
vi. All captured government property during the operation including
vehicles, weapons or any other equipment would be returned.
 The government’s undertakings included:
i. All individuals apprehended during the operation would be
released and would not be arrested again on the previous charges.
ii. The government would release all political benefits.
iii. The government would remove all newly established checkpoints
on the roads and would post Levies and Khasadar personnel on the
old checkpoints as was done in the past.
iv. The government would return all vehicles, weapons and other
equipment captured during the operation.
v. The government would stop all land/air operations and all issues
would be resolved according to the local traditions.
vi. The government would pay compensation for collateral damage to
the affectees.
vii. There would be no restrictions on carrying weapons as per the
tribal tradition. However, restrictions would continue to be
imposed on heavy weapons.
viii. Implementation of the agreement would begin with the
withdrawal of Current
the army
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from the check posts to the barracks. 45
 As per the agreement, a 10-member committee was to be
established. The committee comprised clerics/elders and
representatives of the political administration. The
committee was to be responsible for establishing a link
between the government and the Uthmanzai tribes and
review and ensure the implementation of the agreement.
 Any individuals or group not abiding by the agreement or
disrupting peace in Waziristan was to be proceeded against.
 The agreement was signed by Hafiz Gul Bahadar, Maulana
Sadiq Noor and Maulana Abdul Khaliq. The peace deal broke
down on May 20, 2007.

 Observations:
i. An unspecified amount of money was transferred from
Pakistani government’s coffers to the militants. A vague term
“foreigners”, a euphemism for Al Qaeda and other foreign
militants, was used. Some 100 mid-level Taliban and Al
Qaeda commanders and foot soldiers were released from
custody.
ii. During the signing ceremony of the agreement in the soccer
stadium of Miranshah, security cover was provided by the
militants while their flag was fluttering over the scoreboard
of the stadium.

Khyber Agency Pact

Khyber Agency Pact
 While the insurgency incubated and matured in Waziristan,
militancy in Khyber Agency had been raging on Deobandi-
Barelvi fault-lines for several years.
 This militancy remained restricted to Bara subdivision and
Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency.
 The main militant outfits in the area were Lashkar-e-Islam,
led by Mangal Bagh; Ansarul Islam, led by Qazi Mehboob;
and Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkir (promotion of
virtue and prevention of vice), headed by Haji Namdar.
These groups were mainly ‘moral brigades’ and not part of
the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the umbrella organization of
Taliban militants in the country.
Khyber Agency Pact
 Khyber Agency, which borders Afghanistan on one side and the
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province on the other, is important
not only because the main supply route of the NATO and US
forces in Afghanistan passes through it, but also because of its
proximity to Peshawar, the KPK capital.
 To counter the impending danger of the militants consolidating
their position in Peshawar and to keep the NATO forces supply
line via Khyber Pass open, the government launched Operation
Siraat-e-Mustaqeem (Right Path) against militant outfits in 2008.
 However, the immediate trigger for this operation was the
abduction of 16 Christians, including two priests, on June 21, 2008
by Lashkar-e-Islam. After several days of military sweeps in the
Khyber Agency, the operation came to an end and a peace deal was
signed by the government, represented by the political agent, and
an 18-member jirga of Afridi tribes.
Khyber Agency Pact
 According to the agreement:
i. Law enforcement agencies and government property would
not be targeted. There would be no target killings.
ii. Armed patrol would be the prerogative of the government.
iii. No parallel administration would be set up. Any problems
that crop up would be resolved through the FCR and as per
the local tradition.
iv. There would be no incursions into Peshawar district and
other settled areas.
v. Any foreigner in Bara sub-division would leave Pakistan.
vi. Government officials and law enforcement personnel would
not be threatened. The tribes and Khasadars would be
responsible for the protection of the roads as per riwaj.
Khyber Agency Pact
 According to the agreement (cont):
vii. Khasadars and government officials would be allowed to
work and would not be threatened or forced to quit their
jobs.
viii. Development work would not be impeded.
ix. No training camp would be operated against Pakistan. Action
against any militant camp including any suicide camp would
be taken by the concerned tribe and the government as per
traditions and the FCR.
x. Display of unlicensed weapons in government offices and
Bara bazaar would be banned except for those authorized by
the Peace Committee of Afridi tribes.
xi. No propaganda against Pakistan and its institutions in the
form of pamphlets or CDs would be allowed.
xii. Heavy weapons
would not be allowed in the tribal territories.
Current Affairs 52
Khyber Agency Pact
 Observations:
i. Lashkar-e-Islam leader Mangal Bagh alleged that the aim of
the operation was to please the US. The timing of the
operation was significant in that regard, launched as it was
before the Prime Minister's upcoming visit to the US.
ii. Mangal Bagh insisted on continuing his struggle against
criminal elements in Bara.
iii. On the day of peace deal, five Frontier Corps personnel were
killed and three wounded in Khyber Agency

Swat Agreements

Swat Agreements
i. The first peace deal in Swat was struck on April 20, 2008
between the Awami National Party-led provincial government
and followers of the TNSM led by Sufi Muhammad.
ii. As per the agreement, the government accepted the right of
every Muslim to ‘peacefully’ work for the enforcement of
Shariah.
iii. The TNSM dissociated itself from the elements attacking the
security forces and a fatwa was issued against attacks on
security personnel which were considered against Islamic
teachings.
iv. The TNSM renewed its pledge to support the state institutions
and enable the state to restore its writ in the region.
v. The agreement paved the way for the release of Sufi
Muhammad, who
had been in jail since February 2002.
Current Affairs 55
Swat Agreements
i. The second Swat peace agreement was inked on May 21,
2008 between Swat militants operating under the
command of Fazlullah and the Awami National Party-led
government. It was a 16-point handwritten accord in Urdu.
ii. The first round of talks was held in Chakdara on May 9, in
which both sides agreed to a ceasefire, and the second on
May 13.
iii. After achieving consensus on several issues, the agreement
was signed on May 21.

Swat Agreements
 Observations:
i. The agreement failed to mention anything about Taliban
commander Fazlullah or whether he had been granted amnesty.
ii. Hard-core Jihadi elements such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and non-
local militants, mostly from Punjab, started violating the
agreement almost instantly. Immediately after the agreement, a
militant commander, Said Jamal, announced establishment of a
Shariah court in Swat for settling local disputes. The militants
continued running training camps in the hills. They carved out ‘no-
go’ areas and nominated their ‘governors’ there.
iii. As many as 400 Swat policemen resigned after the peace deal, most
likely because they feared reprisal attacks by militants. The Swat
militants had reportedly said that they would not abide by the
peace agreement if a similar deal was not reached with the Tehrik-
e-Taliban in Waziristan, a stipulation which was not included in
the Swat peace deal.
Stakeholders in Peace Process
Pakistan
The
Militants
US/Afghanistan
Views of Different Stakeholders
 Militants
i. Every time a peace agreement is at hand, US drones strike the
tribal area.
ii. Pakistan Army is fighting Washington’s war against its own
people, and is killing innocent tribesmen.
iii. ‘Mujahideen’ would continue ‘jihad’ against US-led forces in
Afghanistan and if Pakistan tries to stop them, they would
fight against Pakistani forces as well.

 United States
i. US analysts described the peace deals as tactical moves by the
militants to gain advantage from the government without changing
their violent ways.
ii. Ceasefires were used to erect a parallel system of government
complete with Shariah courts, taxation, and recruitment of
militants’ own ‘police’ force.
iii. Peace deals weaken Pakistani state institutions and prolong the
insurgency rather than curtailing it.
iv. Past peace accords had not resulted in a reduction in violence.
v. The Pakistani government appeared to take a harder stand against
Al Qaeda to please the United States and a more permissive
posture with the Taliban, who in turn worked with other militant
groups to attack US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan.
vi. Pakistan’s policy of “Good Taliban, Bad Taliban” contradicts US
interests in Afghanistan
 Pakistan
i. The four-pronged Pakistani defense concerns are to contain Indian
hegemony; not to permit development of pressures which would
threaten retention of nuclear weapons by Pakistan; and retention
of leverage over political developments in Afghanistan and to have
a pro-Pakistan government in that country.
ii. Pakistan deployed 120,000 forces to take on the militants,
compared to the combined NATO-ISAF force of 50,000 in
Afghanistan. Pakistan established about 680 patrolling posts while
Afghanistan only had 69 posts along the border. Pakistani security
forces suffered more casualties than the 40-nation NATO-ISAF
forces operating across the border.
iii. The US was interested in eliminating only Arab fighters in the
region. US drones did not take action when information about
Pakistani Taliban was shared.
Drawbacks of Past Agreements
 Military Bias:
i. The decisions on the peace agreements in the tribal areas
were made entirely by the military.
ii. The basic flaw with the agreements, both in Ahmadzai Wazir
and Mehsud areas, was that they were between the military
and the militants and focused mainly on areas of concern for
the military, i.e., attacks on security forces personnel.
iii. In return, the militants were offered a free hand in the area.
Such agreements also gave an equal status to the militants as
a party vis-à-vis the state.
iv. The government further undermined its position by signing
the pact in the quarters of the militants which according to
the tribal traditions of Nanawatay meant that the
Sunday, government
November 08, 2015 was
Current responsible
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 Erosion of Local Tribal and Administrative Structures
i. The process of ‘militant-military agreements’ has gradually
eroded the local tribal and administrative structures.
ii. Agreements with the military also bolstered disregard for

other government institutions by the militants, fuelling a
perception among them that if the military could be co-
opted, other government institutions could be conveniently
ignored.

 Negotiations from the position of Weakness
i. The Miranshah agreement of 2006 was signed with the tribal
militants of North Waziristan from a very weak position. The
military had started vacating the check-posts even before the
agreement was inked.
ii. The text of the agreement is also a testimony to the fact,
demanding a lot of the government in exchange for the
militants stopping attacks on military installations.
iii. This agreement signed between the militants and military
appeared to be aimed at appeasement rather than peace.
iv. The Shakai agreement proved to be the first step on a slippery
slope in legitimizing the status of the local militants as power
brokers and further eroded the administrative channels.
 Extreme Secrecy in Negotiating Agreement
i. The initial peace agreements were cobbled together in
extreme secrecy, to the extent that even the names of the
signatories were not known in some accords such as the
Shakai agreement. The text of the agreement were neither
available to the public nor the media.
ii. Since the insurgency has regional and international
implications, various stakeholders, NATO and the US in
particular, were not taken on board regarding peace overtures
with the militants.
iii. Consequently even when an agreement with the militants
was in the works, US drones strikes continued inside
Pakistan. These strikes not only violated Pakistan’s
sovereignty but also undermined the state’s ability to ensure
the promised peace and cessation of hostilities.
 No Verification Mechanisms for Agreements
i. No verification mechanisms were put in place to ensure that
the militants follow through on their commitments, such as
not indulging in cross-border infiltration.
ii. Weak enforcement mechanisms were in place in case the
militants reneged on any promise under a peace agreement.
iii. This was mainly because the militants were armed to the
teeth and the tribes that were expected to enforce the
agreements lacked the capacity and the weapons to match
the militants’ force.
iv. It was obvious from the outset that the local trial elders could
pose little challenge to the militants who were fighting troops
from armies of nearly 50 countries in Afghanistan.
Future Strategy
 The following factors need to be considered in the future to
make any agreement in the tribal areas successful:
i. In most of the previous agreements, the government
negotiated from a position of weakness, demanding too little
and offering too much. Any future agreement would have to
be signed from a position of strength. The government
should remember that the militants would fear a breakdown
of talks as much as the government does.
ii. The local tribes that bore the brunt of collapse of the so-
called peace agreements were not involved in the
agreements. As stated earlier, the agreements were between
the military and the militants. There is a pressing need to
consult the local population as well as civilian institutions in
making the key decisions about the terms of the agreements.
Future Strategy
iii. A glance at past agreements in Waziristan shows that the
only objective that the state wanted to achieve was to secure
an end to attacks on the security forces. A peace that only
aims at a ceasefire between militants and the military aims
too low. The objective must be the welfare of the population
and a state of affairs for the local people where access to
rights such as health, education and a dignified existence are
guaranteed, development takes place and dissent is not
countered by force.
iv. All previous deals with the militants, with the exception of
the Swat agreement, were hammered out under the umbrella
of a dictatorial regime with minimum input from political
forces. Any future peace deal requires political endorsement
for legitimacy.
Future Strategy
v. The military’s presence in civilian areas is a magnet for the
militants. The army should be deployed along the Pak-
Afghan border and at the FATA-KPK boundary. This
deployment should be carried out in a phased manner.
However, the army may be utilized for specific surgical
operations with a precise timeframe and objective.
vi. There should be an independent structure and mechanism to
disarm and demobilize the militants and reintegrate them
into society. The program should involve surrender of all
weapons other than rifles and pistols that the tribal people
traditionally carry.

Holistic Approach for a Viable Peace
 Any peace deal in the future would be short-lived if the context in
which violence is perpetrated remains unchanged. So far, peace
deals have been signed by both parties to gain time, only to
resume fighting a few months later.
 For a comprehensive peace accord, the following steps should be
taken:
i. The government requires strong action to purge the areas of
criminal elements who have found safe havens in the tribal belt in
order to wean off support for the militants, and to prevent them
from setting up their own ‘justice systems’.
ii. Peace can be tenuous at best in any area where human rights are
not respected and the people feel that they do not have a stake in
the system. FATA has long remained a hub of criminal activity and
weapons and narcotics trafficking. The state institutions should be
strengthened to deal with these problems instead of leaving the
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November 08,to
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for themselves.
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iii. The insurgency in Afghanistan is mainly indigenous. The
Ghilzai tribes in southeastern Afghanistan, which are the
main support base of the Taliban, are not represented in the
Afghan government. The Afghan government is mainly
composed of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Durrani Pashtuns. The
insurgency may be difficult to stamp out unless the Ghilzais
are included in the Kabul government.
iv. FATA should be integrated into mainland Pakistan through a
constitutional package involving extension of the Political
Parties Act to the region. In no way should the rights of a
citizen residing in FATA be less than those enjoyed by
Pakistani citizens elsewhere in the country. The state should
not have a separate system for FATA.

v. Writ of the higher judiciary should be extended to FATA.
vi. The powers of the President under Articles 246 and 247 of
the constitution in respect to FATA should be given to
parliament.
vii. Pakistan should effectively demonstrate that FATA is not a
safe haven for militants with extraterritorial aims. For that,
Durand Line should be strengthened and the territorial
integrity of Pakistan safeguarded.
viii. Given the proven failure of the military solutions, it is time to
engage those elements within the Taliban ranks who are
amenable to abandoning violence. The ‘irreconcilables’
should be isolated and forcefully dealt with.

ix. Pakistan needs a comprehensive counter-insurgency policy
based on three pillars: military, political and economic.
Priority should be given to integrate the tribal areas into
Pakistan through political and administrative reforms.
x. Policing and action against criminals and militants should be
the domain of the state and the tribesmen should not be
asked to police or hunt for criminals.
xi. The office of the Political Agent in FATA areas is a declared
corrupt assignment. The government of Pakistan needs to
restore the sanctity of this office.

Class Discussion
Peace deals with the terrorists

are legally justified.
Agree Disagree
Introduction
 Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is in the north
west of Pakistan bordering Pakistan’s provinces of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan to the east and south, and
Afghanistan’s provinces of Kunar, Nangahar, Paktia, Khost
and Paktika to the west and north.
 Tribal areas generally means ‘having a predominance of
tribal population’. They are characterized by geographical
isolation, distinct culture, primitive traits and economic
backwardness.
 The territory is almost exclusively inhabited by the
Pashtuns, who also live in the neighboring Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Afghanistan and are Muslims by faith.
Current Affairs
Introduction
 FATA is spread over an area of 27,220 sq. km (3.4%)
 Population of FATA, according to 1998 census is 3.2 million
but presently it is 4.3 million (2.19%).
 It consist of 07 Tribal Agencies i.e. Bajaur, Mohmand,
Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South
Waziristan.
 It also comprises of six Tribal Regions i.e. Peshawar, Kohat,
Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan.
Current Affairs
Administration of FATA
 Under Article 247 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, the FATA falls under the Executive Authority of
Federal Government i.e. under the M/o States and Frontier
Region (SAFRON), Islamabad. It is financed from the Federal
Budget.
 In terms of article 247 linked with SRO 109 Dated 25th June, 1970,
Administrative powers in respect of FATA vest in the President of
Pakistan.
 The President of Pakistan appointed the Governor of the KP to
act as his representative for FATA to exercise executive authority
in these areas.
 It is represented in the Senate and National Assembly of
Pakistan but not in the Provincial Assembly of KP.
 Political Parties Act has not been extended to FATA and the
jurisdiction of Supreme Court and High Courts has also been
barred in FATA.
Current Affairs
 Each Tribal Agency is administered by a Political Agent, assisted
by Assistant Political Agents, Tehsildars (Administrative Head of
a Tehsil) and Naib Tehsildar (Deputy Tehsildar) as well as
members from various local police (khassadars) and security
forces (levies, scouts).
 Political Agent is also the Chief Judicial as well as Police Officer
for his area of jurisdiction.
 FATA is governed primarily through the Frontier Crimes
Regulation (FCR 1901).
 Political Agent exercises his authority through the tribal elders or
Maliks and their tribal councils or Jirgas.
Current Affairs
 Each Frontier Region is administered by a District Coordinating
Officer (DCO) with the assistance of Assistant Political Agent
and Political Tehsildar.
 Frontier Crime Regulation, 1901 (FCR) is also applicable in the

Frontier Regions (FRs).
 Policing duties are performed by the tribal levies and khasadaars.
Current Affairs
Challenges
1. Physical Features
i. FATA can be divided into three regions i.e. northern, central and
southern regions.
ii. The northern zone consists of the Bajaur and Mohmand agencies.
iii. The central region covers the Khyber, Kurram and Orakzai agencies
and the FRs of Kohat and Peshawar.
iv. The southern region comprises the North Waziristan and South
Waziristan agencies, and the FRs of Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki
Marwat and Tank.
v. FATA lies on the cusp of two major climatic systems, the monsoon to
the east and the Mediterranean towards the west
Current Affairs
Challenges
2. Land use Indicators
Around 82 per cent of total geographic area of FATA is not
available for cultivation. This puts intense pressure on available
farmland, which supports an average of 18 persons per cultivated
hectare and more than 40 persons per irrigated hectare. Some 44 per
cent of farmland is under irrigation, with the remaining cultivated area
relying entirely on rainfall.
Current Affairs
Challenges
3. Tribal and Ethnic Diversity
i. FATA is characterized by a very strong tribal structure and very rich ethnic
diversity and cultural heritage.
ii. There are about a dozen major tribes with several smaller tribes and sub-
tribes.
iii. Uthmankhel, Mohmand, Tarkani and Safi are the major tribes living in
Bajaur and Mohmand.
iv. Afridi, Shilmani, Shinar, Milagros Orakzai are settled in Khyber and Orakzai
while the FRs of Peshawar and Kohat are occupied by Afridi.
v. A good mix of Turi, Bangash, and Masozai inhabit Kurram Agency.
vi. Major tribes of North and South Waziristan are Darwesh Khel Wazirs with a
pocket of Mahsuds in the central part of the region.
vii. Other tribes of the region are Utmanzai, Ahmadzai Dawar, Saidgai, Kharasin
and Gurbaz. Bhittani occupies FR Lakki and Tank.
viii. FR Bannu is Wazir.
ix. Ustrana and Shirani tribes live in FR D.I. Khan.
x. The cultural heritage of FATA is very rich in terms of hospitality, tribal arts
and crafts, historical places, ethnic diversity and natural beauty.
Current Affairs
Challenges
4. Economy and Livelihood
i. There are few livelihood opportunities available to the people.
ii. The local economy is chiefly pastoral, with agriculture practiced
in a few fertile valleys.
iii. Most households are engaged in primary-level activities such as
subsistence agriculture and livestock rearing, or small-scale
business conducted locally.
iv. Others are involved in trade within the tribal belt or with down-
country markets.
v. Women take active part in agricultural activities, collect fuel
wood and fetch water, besides attending to household work and
family duties.
Current Affairs
Challenges
5. War on Terror – A brief Chronology
i. Current militancy in FATA has taken roots from USSR’s invasion
of Afghanistan which ended up in the Afghan civil war.
ii. Soviet invasion pulled the USA into this region.
iii. The USA won the proxy war against the USSR with the
involvement of Pakistan and the USSR was disintegrated.
iv. There were the following factors which made Pakistan the front
line ally of the USA in the war against the USSR:
i. The intelligence sharing between the CIA of USA and ISI of Pakistan
against the USSR
ii. Settlement of Afghan refugees in Pakistan
iii. The strategic location of Pakistan and the cultural links among the
people residing on both sides of Durand Line.
v. The event of 9/11 caused the US to invade Afghanistan
Current Affairs
Challenges
5. War on Terror – A brief Chronology (cont)
vi. This time Afghan Taliban fell into the category of against the USA,
as they harboured Al-Qaeda’s leaderships, who were allegedly
involved in the 9/11 attacks.
vii. Thus; the USA launched global campaign of “war against
terrorism” and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan became its first
target.
viii. The Taliban Government had been uprooted after US invasion of
Afghanistan.
ix. Keeping in view the old relations and considering it a safe
heaven, Taliban entered into Pakistan’s tribal regions. They had
not been supported by the Pakistani Government this time but
the local population of FATA, with whom they had ties since the
Soviet invasion of Afghan gave them shelter to carry out their
activities.
Current Affairs
Challenges
6. Militancy in FATA
i. US invasion of Afghanistan caused upheaval and turmoil in FATA
with Al-Qaeda shifting its bases inside Pakistan.
ii. Pakistan under UN Resolution, obliged to act against Terrorists.
iii. Peaceful FATA became focus of attention due to Al-Qaeda and its
Affiliates.
iv. Cultural Ethos of ‘Pakhtunwali’ diluted to presence of heavily
armed non-Pakhtun militant elements.
v. Militants in Swat exploited the strength and myth of TTP and
joined hands with terrorists of South Waziristan.
vi. Deficit of justice, non existent economic activities and un-
employment in the region frustrated the population who joined
the miscreants.
vii. Weak administrative system could not handle the increasing
militancy and accentuated the issue
Current Affairs
Challenges
7. Damages due to Militancy in FATA
i. Militancy resulted in a huge number of human losses, including military
personnel, civilian, militants and members of peace committees/ civil
militia (Aman Lashkar or Qaumi Lashkar).
ii. About 4275 personnel of the military have fallen prey to the war against
militancy, out of which 1060 were martyred and 3215 were injured.
iii. Cross border clashes and other suicidal attacks by the militants killed
more than 40,000 innocent civilians.
iv. Another risk in FATA is kidnapping for ransom and other demands by
Taliban.
v. Drone attacks, though the US claims targeting militant hideouts only also
affected the civilian population directly and indirectly.
vi. Due to the recent military operations in FATA, hundreds of thousands
tribesmen were displaced as IDPs and the poor people suffered untold
sufferings/ miseries and losses.
Current Affairs
Government’s Steps Towards
Mainstreaming FATA
I. Security Measures:
i. Extension of Political Parties Order to FATA allowing the political
Parties to involve tribesmen in the decision making process for
the entire country.
ii. Major amendment in the FCR, 1901 recasting it to make it
compatible to human rights with an inbuilt mechanism of
judicial oversight.
iii. Conversion of Kala Dhaka, a Provincially Administered Tribal
Area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa into a settled district.
iv. Pushing back the militants from PATA and FATA border with
settled areas to the Pak - Afghan Border.
v. Taking full care of more than 3.5 million internally displaced
persons (IDP) due to floods and militancy ensuring that all of
them are provided shelter, food and health facilities to ensure
that no epidemic spreads in their camps.
Current Affairs
Mainstreaming FATA
II. Development Sector:
i. Increasing development budget continuously, this year ADP
allocation reaching Rs.16 billion which at one time was less than
even one billion.
ii. Different agreements with donor agencies for initiating mega
projects e.g.
i. KFW Grant (Up-gradation/establishment of three Agency level
hospitals),
ii. USAID (Up-gradation to international trade route; Tank to Angoor Adda
road-SWA, Up-gradation of international trade route; Jumrud to
Torkham Road, Khyber Agency, Main Electricity Transmission line to
Wana, SWA) and
iii. World Bank (Upgradation to international trade route; Chakdara to Nawa
pass,Bajaur, Establishment of Urban Hubs with quality services
(TARUCCI), Bajaur, Upgradation to international trade route; Bannu to
Ghulam Khan Road, NWA)
Current Affairs
Mainstreaming FATA
III. Education Sector:
i. Establishment of six Cadet Colleges; two already established
at Wana and Spinkai (South Waziristan Agency), for others
procurement of land in process
ii. Establishment of FATA University, land purchased at FR
Kohat
iii. Establishment of IT University in Kurram, purchase of land
in process
iv. Eleven Colleges established/upgraded
v. About 94357 Scholarships awarded to students
vi. Special seats reserved for tribal students in educational and
professional institutions across the country.
Current Affairs
Mainstreaming FATA
IV. Health Sector:
i. Up-gradation of Six Civil Hospitals/BHU to Category 'D'
Hospitals
ii. Launched anti TB, Polio, Hepatitis Programmes
V. Communication and Works:

i. 490 Km black topped and 48 Km single roads completed
Current Affairs
Mainstreaming FATA
VI. Electricity and Power Sector
i. 154 villages electrified, 213 transformers installed
ii. 222 Km HT and 273 Km LT line laid
VII. Irrigation
i. Three small dams completed, six in progress
ii. 50 Small Hydel Power Station and 408 Dug wells completed
iii. 264 Tubewell/Dug well based Water Supply Schemes
completed
Current Affairs
Conclusion
i. To isolate militants and bring FATA into mainstream, FATA needs
very special attention as it is not in national interest to keep it further
in the present state of isolation and turmoil.
ii. Sustainable peace cannot be achieved by military operation alone as
any degree of success against the militants will remain temporary
until and unless the root causes of violence in FATA such as poverty,
illiteracy, under employment, socio and economic inequality are
properly addressed.
iii. Engage the militants for dialogue and national approach will have to
be adopted in dealing with the militancy.

Conclusion
iv. Moreover, it is easy to make recommendations but very difficult to
implement them. Any decision with regard to FATA will therefore,
have to be implemented in letter and spirit.
v. Success can be achieved in FATA with firm political commitment and

supervision of honest, efficient and dedicated administration.

Recommendations
 The process of bringing FATA into mainstream should be
expedited.
 Posting of Political Agents and Heads of other Line Departments
should only be on merit from wide pool of efficient and honest
officers.
 A High-Powered Cell be established to carryout a rapid but in
depth needs/ damages assessment and redressing the grievances
arising out of fighting between the army and the militants.
 On the basis of assessment, the government must pay
compensation for all the damages to the affectees including
provision of cash money to the returning IDPs for their initial
recovery.
 Massive investment is required in education, health and
communication.
 Amnesty to all the militants except those unwilling to negotiate
and accept the writ of the government recommended.
Recommendations
 The Khasadars are unable to confront the militants and restore
law and order in FATA. The force has become obsolete due to
age-old structure, tribal nature and lack of proper training and
equipment. They may be trained according to the modern
techniques and upto date equipment may be provided to them.
 Development budget of FATA needed to be enhanced many-folds
and its utilization should be strictly monitored and audited.
 Although Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) is the only viable
piece of legislation in FATA, however, principle of collective
responsibility should only be limited to the family and businesses
of the culprit / criminal.
 Executive and judiciary branches may be separated in FATA by
extending the jurisdiction of High Courts to FATA.
 People of FATA may be empowered through representation in
the Provincial Assembly Khyber Pakthunkhwa.

Class Discussion
FATA should be either made the

fifth province of Pakistan or its
areas be absorbed in the province
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
5th Province Inclusion in KP

Drones
 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) system
 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
 Used for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR)
 Most modern technology with wide range of capability without

endangering American marines or pilots
 Attacks areas where American forces cannot operate overtly

e.g. Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan
Sunday, 08 November 2015 Current Affairs 104

Drones
 Attacks on the ISAF and the United States forces
 A plausible prima facie rationale to counter attacks
 Drone is effective because:
i. Least obstructive and most precise mean
ii. Greater surveillance capability
iii. Greater precision to hit the target
iv. Avoiding collateral damage

Control Room for Drone Attacks
Control Room for Drone Attacks
International Attacks
i. International Attacks increasing dramatically
ii. 50 in 2001
iii. 167 in 2002
iv. 33 in 2008
v. 250 in 2009
vi. 7,000 in 2011
vii. Since summer 2011, expanded in Somalia, Libya and Yemen

FATA and Drone Attacks
 First drone on Pakistan’s territory on June 18 2004
 FATA is the most dangerous and isolated region of Pakistan
i. Mountainous
ii. Barren and
iii. Deep valley areas
 Almost 3.3 million population, only 2 percent of Pakistan
 Poorest region of the world
i. Per capita income about US $250 per year
ii. 60 percent living below poverty line
 Code of conduct “Pakhtunwali”
i. hospitality, generosity, honour, equality, pride,
ii. compensation and retaliation

 Sanctuary of Al Qaeda and Taliban
i. Training camps and recruitment centers
ii. Exploiting the ideological and ethnical affiliations
 Pakistan military launched operations in FATA
i. Captured & killed many top leaders of Al-Qaeda and Taliban
ii. Peace agreement to pardon local leaders
 US started Drone attacks because:
i. Central element of defense and counter-terrorism strategy
ii. No prospect of negotiation or compromise
iii. Pakistani forces were not willing or unable to launch an
operation
iv. US forces were prohibited to operate

 First drone on Pakistan’s territory on June 18 2004
 Targeted Nek Mohammad
 Only eight in 4 years from 2004-2007.
 Success of drone caused increase in its number of attacks
 Entrance of Obama
 Frequency of drone attacks proliferated further
 Only one vital success -- Baitullah Mehsud
 From 2004 to 2010, about 60 to 1707 members of Al Qaeda,
Taliban and affiliates groups targeted

Drawbacks of Drone Attacks
 Drawbacks include:
i. Challenges Pakistan’s sovereignty
ii. Their human operators sometimes fail to distinguish
terrorists from civilians
iii. Accuracy, precision depends widely on human intelligence
iv. Killing rather the prosecuting the perpetrators
v. Exact numbers of militants and innocents killed is
unknown
vi. Till June 2015-- 1,500 to 2,500 civilians on unknown killed
vii. Accidental killings -- collateral damage is increased
viii. Tarnishing social fabrics of society in FATA
ix. Each attack increases number of potential terrorists
Drawbacks of Drone Attacks
 Drawbacks include (cont):
x. During Obama regime, less than 13% of drone killed a
militant leaders and only 2% are militant leaders in all
fatalities from drone
xi. Pakistani sources reveal that in last three years, about 700
civilian causalities occurred and @ 2 percent with one
militant for every almost 50 civilian
xii. UK failed to support drone openly
xiii. Germany supports the Pakistani stance
xiv. Causing hostility, resentment across Pakistan
xv. Provoking retaliation against the United States
xvi. Undermining the Pakistan’s territorial integrity
xvii. No transparency and accountability
Public Response
 Initially no resentment
 Enhanced operation caused anti drone and anti US sentiments
i. March 2009 – 61 % (International Republican Institute)
ii. 2010 – 75 % (New America Foundation)
iii. 2011 – 97 % (Pew research Centre)
 2012
i. 17 % supported killing of militants by drones

ii. 94 % considered Drone are killing innocent civilians
iii. 74% considered that it is unnecessary to defend Pakistan from
extremist organisations
Sunday, 08 November 2015 Current Affairs (Pew research Center) 116
Drift in Pak- US Relations
 Pakistan provided Shamsi Air Base for operating Drones
 Wiki leaks cables revealed Pakistani tacit support
 US agreed to notify Pakistan if targeting more than 20 people.
 Pentagon and State department do not favour restrictions
 CIA wants to continue the policy of massive collateral damage

Drone Strikes As Counter Productive
i. Survivors converting into suicide bombers (opinion of local people)
ii. Blowback to US forces NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan

i. Suicide bombing by al-Balawi in Khost
ii. Attempt to explode in Times Square by Faisal Shahzad
iii. Pakistani civilians, army targeted
i. Attacks on Naval base, military headquarters and Air base
iv. No empirical data only anecdotal evidence

v. Suicide attack – retaliatory measure and revenge

Drone Strikes and Suicide Attacks

Deaths from Drone and Suicide
Attacks

Drone Killings Illegal Under UN Charter
 Article 2 (4) of UN Charter prohibits use of force by one
country against another
 Unless in self-defense – Article 51
 Self-defense is not allowed until the UN Security Council
authorizes the use of force of one country against another
i. The use of force is necessary and defensive
ii. The use of force in self-defense is proportionate to the attack
and not punitive in nature.
 If a country is in an authorized armed conflict, it can use
proportionate lethal force to defend itself
 Violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and
International Human Rights Law (IHRL)
 No threat to US from these people
Drone Killings Illegal Under US Law
I. Premeditated Murder
i. Premeditated Murder is a crime in all 50 states of the US
ii. Elements of crime: willful, deliberate, premeditated taking

of life
iii. Drone targeted killings pick out specific individuals and
murder by lethal force
iv. Premeditated Murder is also a federal crime
v. Premeditated Murder violates US Military Code of Conduct

II. Violate Ban on Assassinations
i. Since 1976, it has been illegal for US agents to assassinate
people in other countries
ii. President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905, Section

5 (g): “No employee of the US government shall engage in, or
conspire to engage in, political assassination.”
iii. President Reagan affirmed this in Order 12333. Section 2.11.
Executive order 12333 prohibits the engaging in assassination

III. Violates US Constitution
i. Drones have been used to kill US citizens abroad, including
a 16 year old boy born in Colorado, killed in Yemen.
ii. Every human being is entitled to due process – life, liberty,

and property cannot be taken without due process.
iii. US government could not execute people inside or outside

the US without due process.

Where is US in Authorized Armed Conflict?
 One can argue that US is in authorized armed conflict in
Afghanistan
 (One can clearly also argue that the US has exceeded the
UN mandate for defensive use of force in Afghanistan)

US is NOT in Authorized in Combat
 US is NOT in Authorized Combat in:
i. Pakistan
ii. Somalia
iii. Yemen
Therefore it is illegal to kill there, much less use assassination
by drone
 The use of drones for targeted killings is never likely to be
legal
 The use of drones to kill civilians and militants where there
is no imminent threat to human life is illegal under
international law.
US Anticipatory Self-Defense
 Since attacks on September 11, 2001, the US has claimed all
US attacks are in self-defense or anticipatory self-defense.
 Anticipatory self-defense is illegal unless there is an
imminent threat to life and the use of force is proportionate
to the attack.
 Clearly not the case in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen
 Even if US could argue that drone strikes are within the
context of armed conflict, the common practice of follow
up drone strikes at the scene deliberately target rescuers,
mourners and other civilians, is immoral and illegal
 These “secondary strikes” are war crimes.

Conclusion
 Letter of 26 congressmen to Obama thereby stopping drone
attacks worldwide
 According to the US, Drones are:
i. Strategically important
ii. technical sound
iii. wisdom of using in the area not approachable easily
 However, Collateral damage of drones is:

i. Accelerating violence
ii. Instability in the region
 Creating more enemies than eliminating

Conclusion
 Emergence of Islamic Pashtunistan
 Complicating US policy of withdrawal
 Fragile relationship between US and Pakistan
 Both partners must be eloquent on the issue
 Effective use only
 Minimizing the civilian deaths
 Trust building

Former DG Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Ahmed
Shuja Pasha states that drone hits in Pakistan were
done after getting approval from Pakistan. Shuja
Pasha also accepted that drone strikes were for
some reason useful but it violates Pakistan’s
sovereignty.
Ultimate Question
Would the US allow any
other country to fire
drones into US against its
citizens?
Drone attacks within Pakistan violate its sovereignty and
adversely affect the sovereignty of Pakistan. Please
comment
Write Up
CREATION OF NEW
PROVINCES IN
PAKISTAN

New
Provinces
in Pakistan
Introduction
 Pakistan a federal state in all constitutions (predecessor law
Govt of India Act 1935)
 Inception of Pakistan 1947- 5 provinces
 Creation of one unit in 1955
 Abolition of one unit in 1970- restoration of 5 provinces
 Constitution of 1973 – 4 provinces with federal, provincial
and concurrent lists of subjects for legislation
 Concurrent list abolished and NWFP renamed as KP under
18th amendment in April 2010
 Renaming NWFP as KP gave impetus to Tehreek Sooba
Hazara (led by Baba Haider Zaman)
 Similar demands for South Punjab province
 Restoration of Bahawalpur province movement
Basis of Demand for New Provinces
 Minority ethnic communities feel their rights will be protected
in their separate provinces which are currently threatened by
majority ethnicity in specific cases
 Certain linguistic groups demand new provinces to maintain
separate identity and shape policies according to their
aspirations
 Socio-economic deprivation in some areas generate demand for
new provinces for socio-economic development
 Discrimination in distribution of resources to areas in the
provinces

Procedure for Creation of New
Provinces
 Amendment in the constitution has to be made for
creation of new provinces
 Article 239 of the 1973 constitution - procedure for
constitutional amendment bill
 According to clause (4) of article 239, “A bill to amend
the constitution which would have the effect of altering
the limits of a province shall not be presented to the
president for assent unless it has been passed by
provincial assembly of the province by votes not less
than two third of its total membership”.
Current Affairs
Sunday, 08 November 2015 141
Political Movements for New
Provinces
i. South Punjab
ii. Bahawalpur
iii. Hazara
iv. FATA
v. Jinnah Pur
vi. Gilgit Baltistan
Creation of South Punjab Province
 Introduction
 Consists of three divisions i.e Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan and
Bahawalpur- 11 districts
 Majority of the people of these areas speak Saraiki language
 According to 1998 census population of Saraiki speaking
people is 13.9 millions
 Saraiki movement started in 1960’s not as a political
movement but more as a cultural and linguistic movement
 Saraiki Sooba Movement also known as Saraiki Sooba Mahaz
led by Malik Mumtaz Husain Jai is leading the movement


 Case for:
i. Demand for partition of Punjab on socio-economic grounds
– sense of deprivation
ii. 48.5 % territory and 31.57% population of Punjab justifies
the new province
iii. ADP allocation 17.76% in 2006 & 29.02% in 2010 indicate
allocation disproportionate to population size
iv. 43.11% population living below poverty line in south Punjab
whereas 27.69% below poverty line in central and northern
Punjab.
Current Affairs
• Case for:
v. No industries in the area except a few small
industrial units
vi. Large land holding by few in the agrarian economy
has made the rest dependents
vii. Division of large unmanageable province into two
manageable provinces for prosperity
viii. National assembly passed resolution for creation of
South Punjab province on 2 May,2012
ix. Punjab assembly resolution for creation of South
Punjab and Bahawalpur province May 8, 2012
 Case against:
i. Carving a new province out of Punjab splits identity of
Punjab
ii. Demand is essentially linguistic – South Punjab being
Saraiki area
iii. Alteration of the boundaries of KP if Saraiki community in
D I khan and Lakki Marwat demand to join the new
province
iv. Parallel demand for Bahawalpur province that falls within
South Punjab

 Case against:
v. For people of Bahawalpur supporting the creation of Saraiki
province will be foregoing their demand for Bahawalpur
province.
vi. Multan as capital of Saraiki province will be the center of
power and Bahawalpur region will remain neglected
vii. May increase ethnic tension in Pakistan
viii. Existing political, economic and security environment not
feasible for such political experiment

Restoration of Bahawalpur Province
 Introduction
i. Bahawalpur division was the state of Bahawalpur from 1727
till 1951 when agreement between government of Pakistan
and the ruler of Bahawalpur for provincial status on 30th
April, 1951
ii. During these 228 years ruled by the Abbasi Nawabs
iii. Area is 18,000 sq miles and population of the region is 7.518
million as per 1998 census
iv. Contributes 23% and 10% of the total production of the
country’s cotton and wheat respectively
Current Affairs
 Introduction (cont):
v. Merged into one unit in 1955 with understanding to
restore it as a separate province on termination of one unit
vi. Was made part of Punjab province when one unit was
broken on 30th march, 1970 causing resentment in
Bahawalpur.
vii. The movement known as “Bahawalpur Sooba Movement”
and “Movement for restoration of province of Bahawalpur”
led by Nawab Salah-ud-Din Abbasi
Current Affairs
Current Affairs
 Case for:
i. The demand is essentially for restoration of Bahawalpur province
which was created in 1951 under agreement between Nawab of
Bahawalpur and government of Pakistan
ii. Demand not based on ethnic or linguistic grounds
iii. Largest division of Punjab – 18,000 sq miles
iv. Population 7.518 million (1998 census) 10% of Punjab population
and 5.6% of the total population of the country
v. State of Bahawalpur was a rich and developed state but neglected
after accession to Pakistan (Rs 4 million surplus budget in 1955)
vi. Huge cotton revenue of Bahawalpur is spent elsewhere
Current Affairs

 Case against:
i. Bahawalpur province not feasible due to its small
territory
ii. Demand is on linguistic ground – Saraiki language
iii. Resistance of sizeable Punjabi and Urdu speaking
communities living in Bahawalpur
iv. Falls within the proposed south Punjab province /
Saraiki province
v. Population size does not justify a separate province

Creation of Hazara Province
 Introduction:
i. Hazara is a region in the eastern part of KP
ii. Comprises six districts - Abbottabad, Battagram, Haripur,
Mansehra, Kohistan and Torghar
iii. Population was 4.5 million (2005 estimate)
iv. Area is 18013 sq km
v. Multiethnic population consisting of Hindokwans,
Pashtuns and Kohistanis
vi. Multilingual- speaking Hindko, Pashto, Gujri, Kohistani
Current Affairs

vii. Establishment of Hazara student federation in Karachi in
early 1980- first step towards demand for Hazara province
viii. Demand for separate Hazara province triggered by
renaming of NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by the 18th
amendment-violent protests in Abbottabad
ix. Hazara Tehrik with Baba Haider Zaman as its chief
coordinator
x. Awami national party (ANP) is against Hazara province
Current Affairs

 Case for:
i. Ignored the separate identity of Hazara in renaming NWFP
as KP under 18th amendment
ii. Has a vast area of 18,000 sq KM with a population of 6
million
iii. Hazara division consists 6 of districts to become a viable
province
iv. The province will be financially self-sustaining due to its
natural and mineral resources and tourism in the area


 Case against:
i. Population and area does not justify a separate
province
ii. Heterogeneous linguistic and ethnic population –
Hindko, Pashto, Kohistani are the major communities
iii. Demand by Hindko speaking people only on linguistic
and ethnic grounds
iv. Insecure Pashtuns community demand for Abaseen
division with headquarters at Battagram out of Hazara
division which will reduce the size of Hazara division

Provincial Status for FATA
 Introduction
i. Strategically located between the Durand Line and the
settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
ii. Exclusively inhabited by the Pashtun tribes
iii. 7 tribal agencies and 6 frontier regions.
iv. Area is 27220 sq km and population is 3.18 million (1998
census)
v. 12 members in the national assembly and 8 members in the
senate but remains under the direct executive authority of
the president through governor KP (Articles 51, 59 and
247).
Current Affairs
vi. Under the overall supervision of the ministry of states and
frontier regions (SAFRON).
vii. Laws framed by the national assembly do not apply here
unless so ordered by the president.
viii. The debate to revisit the status of existing provinces has
renewed the concerns about the future of FATA
Current Affairs

 Case for:
i. 7 agencies and 6 frontier regions makes strong case for
separate province
ii. KP assembly passed resolution for FATA representation in
KP assembly in 2012
iii. FATA grand alliance Jirga demanded separate province in
2012
iv. Socio-economic deprivation can be eliminated by granting
the status of province to FATA
v. The political rights not secure due to unique constitutional
status under article 247
vi. No regular courts in the FATA to resolve criminal and civil
disputes and to protect fundamental rights
vii. 08Revulsion
Sunday, November 2015 against frontier crime regulations
Current Affairs 162
 Case against:
i. Two divergent demands - separate province vs merger into
KP
ii. The agencies are geographically contiguous but not
interconnected even to have a central headquarters
iii. The current Taliban insurgency in FATA debars such
initiative
iv. FATA as a province not sustainable without dependence
upon KP in administration and establishment
v. Lack of own economic resources
vi. Separate province not justified due to cultural and
linguistic homogeneity with KP
Creation of Jinnah Pur
 Introduction
i. Areas consisting of Karachi division, Hyderabad division
and Mirpurkhas division
ii. Contains mostly urban population
iii. MQM has time and again demanded the creation of
Jinnah Pur province for the Urdu speaking population of
the Sindh province. But these demands lack forcefulness.

Creation of Jinnah Pur

Provincial
Status for
Gilgit
Baltistan

Provincial Status for Gilgit Baltistan
 The region, together with Azad Kashmir and Jammu and
Kashmir, is disputed between India and Pakistan
 Gilgit-Baltistan is an autonomous self-governing region that
was established as a single administrative unit in 1970, formed
by the amalgamation of the Gilgit Agency, the Baltistan region
and the former princely states of Hunza and Nagar. It covers an
area of 72,971 km² (28,174 sq mi) and is highly mountainous.
 Government of Pakistan abolished State Subject Rule in Gilgit-
Baltistan in 1974, which resulted in demographic changes in the
territory. While administratively controlled by Pakistan since
the First Kashmir War, Gilgit-Baltistan has never been formally
integrated into the Pakistani state and does not participate in
Pakistan's constitutional political affairs.
 On 29 August 2009, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and
Self-Governance Order 2009, was passed by the Pakistani
cabinet and later signed by the then President of Pakistan Asif
Ali Zardari.
Provincial Status for Gilgit Baltistan
 The order granted self-rule to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, by creating,
among other things, an elected Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly
and Gilgit-Baltistan Council. Gilgit-Baltistan thus gained a de facto
province-like status without constitutionally becoming part of Pakistan.
 The Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly is a 33-seat unicameral
legislative body that was formed as part of the Gilgit-Baltistan
Empowerment and Self-Governance Order, 2009 which granted the
region self-rule and an elected legislative assembly. Prior to this, the
region had been directly ruled from Islamabad.
 Officially, Pakistan has rejected Gilgit-Baltistani calls for integration
with Pakistan on the grounds that it would prejudice its international
obligations with regard to the Kashmir conflict.
 Some Kashmiri nationalist groups, such as the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front, claim Gilgit-Baltistan as part of a future independent
state to match what existed in 1947.
 India, on the other hand, maintains that Gilgit-Baltistan is a part of the
Indian controlled state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Political Parties’ Stance
 Non-seriousness of political parties towards the issue.
 PPP resolution in national assembly for creation of
South Punjab province on May 2, 2012. PML(N)
opposed the move.
 PML (N) resolutions in Punjab assembly for creation of
the South Punjab province and restoration of
Bahawalpur province on 8 May, 2012
 Creation of new provinces should only be based on
administrative grounds and not on linguistic or ethnic
basis (Nawaz Sharif told party consultative meeting
held on 27th Jan, 2013 at Lahore)
Political Parties’ Stance
 PTI would establish more provinces if voted to power (Imran
Khan address to a public meeting at Bahawalpur on 26th April,
2013)
 Constitution amendment bill by MQM in Jan, 2013. MQM
seeking creation of new provinces in Punjab and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa
 JI and JUI-F are opposed to creation of new units on ethnic and
linguistic grounds. They support changes for administrative and
management purposes.
Current Affairs
Challenges
i. Amendment of constitutional provisions under Article
239
ii. Political parties sloganeering for vested interests and
political mileage
iii. Creation of new provinces will exacerbate conflicts over
distribution of resources between center and provinces
i. NFC award
ii. Water distribution
iv. Economic implications
i. Increase in non-developmental expenditure over
establishment
ii. Challenge of revenue generation for development

Challenges
v. Serious challenge to national integration
vi. Current economic, regional and political situation

not conducive
vii. Snow ball impact – rise of demand for other new

provinces as chain reaction
viii. Creation of new provinces may create disharmony

among various ethnic groups

Opportunities
i. New provinces on administrative grounds will devolve
power to ignored regions
ii. Improve resource distribution among provinces
iii. Speedy and cost-effective resolution of social, economic
and political problems of remote areas
iv. Diversion of funds towards rural and underdeveloped
areas
v. Elimination of sense of deprivation – deflect criticism of
exploitation by one province or center
vi. Improve accountability, accessibility and ownership
vii. Good governance

Conclusion
i. New provinces on ethnic / linguistic basis for political vested
interests may endanger national integration
ii. May serve as catalyst for demand for new provinces - spill over
effect
iii. May localize politics and create disharmony
iv. May rise to unmanageable conflict among new provinces on
resource distribution
v. Will increase non-developmental expenditure in both short
and long term
vi. New provinces on administrative grounds may improve
governance in longer term
vii. Across the board political consensus a must
Recommendations
i. Provinces must address developmental issues of
underdeveloped areas
ii. The principle of parity in allocation of resources
(underdevelopment, resource generation and population)
iii. New provinces on ethnic / linguistic grounds must be avoided
iv. National debate on the necessity of new provinces – across the
board political consensus necessary
v. Analysis of economic viability of new provinces shall be carried
out
vi. Analysis of implication of new provinces for national integrity
shall be carried out
vii. Research should be conducted on expected improvement in
governance due to new provinces
Recommendations
viii. Purposeful dialogue instead of political sloganeering shall
guide the debate on new provinces
ix. Local government elections should he held for redressal
of the problems at doorstep
x. Extensive debates at the parliament and provincial
assemblies concerned to discuss the matter in detail and
reach a consensus
xi. The decision to create new provinces should not be taken
in haste

Write Up
Would the creation of new provinces in

Pakistan bring about further strength to
the national integration within Pakistan.
Please discuss.

Pakistan and it’s Neighboring
Countries
• Pakistan is bordered by four important countries on all
sides.
i. China in the north with 523 km border.
ii. India in the north-east with 2,912 km border.
iii. Iran in the west with 909 km border.
iv. Afghanistan in the north-west with 2,430 km border.
Current Affairs
Importance of India for Pakistan
 India is the biggest country (area vise and population
vise) in the region.
 Pakistan is sharing its longest boundaries with India
 India is growing economy in the region
 India is an atomic power
 Trade relations with India for live stock and food items
are mutually beneficial
 River heads are located in India
 Sharing common history
 People-to-people contacts
Brief Chronology of Relations
 1947 - Britain divides its Indian empire into secular but mainly
Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan, triggering one of the
greatest and bloodiest migrations of modern history.
 1947/48 - India and Pakistan go to their first war over the
disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir. The war ended with a
U.N.-ordered ceasefire and resolution seeking a referendum for
the people of Jammu and Kashmir to decide whether to become
part of India or Pakistan.
 1965 - India and Pakistan go to war over Kashmir. Fighting
ended after United Nations calls for ceasefire.
 1971 - Pakistan and India go to war a third time over East
Pakistan, which became independent Bangladesh.
 1972 - Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indian
prime minister Indira Gandhi sign agreement in Indian town of
Simla to lay principles meant to govern relations.
 1974 - India detonates its first nuclear device.

 1990 - Indian army opens fire in Kashmir's summer capital
Srinagar during protest against crackdown on separatism, killing
38 and spurring a revolt. India accuses Pakistan of arming and
sending Islamist militants into Indian Kashmir. Pakistan denies
that, saying it gives political, moral and diplomatic support to
what it calls a Kashmiri freedom movement.
 1998, May - India carries out five underground nuclear tests
and announces plans to build a nuclear arsenal. Pakistan
conducts six tests of its own in response.
 1999, Feb - Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee makes a
historic bus ride to Pakistan for summit with Pakistani
counterpart Nawaz Sharif.
 May - The two countries stand on the brink of their fourth war
after India launches major counter-strike against Pakistan in
Kargil in Indian Kashmir.
 2000, July - Summit between Pakistani leader and army chief
General Pervez Musharraf and Vajpayee in the Indian city of
Agra ends in failure.
 2001,Dec - Militants attack Indian parliament. Fourteen
people, including the five assailants, are killed. India blames
Pakistan-based Kashmiri separatist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba
and Jaish-e-Mohammad and demands action against them.
Hundreds of thousands of soldiers confront each other on
the border
 2003 - Pakistan announces ceasefire along the Line of
Control, the de facto border in Kashmir. India welcomes the
move.
 2004 - The two countries launch a peace process that brings
an improvement in diplomatic, sporting and trade links but
no progress on Kashmir. Peace process comes under strain
from occasional bomb attacks in India.
 2008,July - India says Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency was
behind a bomb attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul that
killed 58 people.

Pakistan's Relations with India
 India and Pakistan have shared a feeling of “mutual distrust” ever
since the partition of India and the eventual creation of Pakistan
as an independent state in 1947.
 This distrust was an outcome of the colonial legacy of “divide and
rule.” The colonial policy of divide and rule pitted the Muslims
against the Hindus.
 The policy gave rise, amongst the Muslim, to a sentiment of “Islam
being in danger” in the Hindu dominated Indian society. The
growth of Islamic nationalism and hence the demand for a
separate Muslim state was an outcome of this paranoia.
 On the other side, the belief within the Hindu dominated
nationalist party of India was “secular Indian nationalism”.
According to this belief, the Muslims could coexist with the
Hindus under the Indian secular umbrella and, therefore, there
was no necessity of a separate state.
 Relations between India and Pakistan have been stressed by a
number of other historical and political issues.
 Therefore, even though the two South Asian nations share
historic, cultural, geographic, and economic links, their
relationship has been plagued by hostility and mistrust.
 Soon after their independence, India and Pakistan
established diplomatic relations but the violent partition and
numerous territorial disputes overshadow their relationship.
 Since their independence, the two countries have fought
three major wars, one undeclared war and have been
involved in numerous armed clashes and military standoffs.

 Since the early 1980s, relations between the two nations
soured particularly after the Siachen conflict, the rise of
Kashmir insurgency in 1989, Indian and Pakistani nuclear
tests in 1998 and the 1999 Kargil war.
 There have been numerous attempts to improve the
relationship—notably, the Shimla Agreement 1972, the Agra
summit 2001 and the Lahore Declaration 1999.
 Certain confidence-building measures — such as the 2003
ceasefire agreement and the Delhi–Lahore Bus service —
were successful in deescalating tensions.

 However, these efforts have been impeded by periodic
terrorist attacks. The 2001 Indian Parliament attack almost
brought the two nations on the brink of a nuclear war.
 The 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings, which killed 68
civilians (most of whom were Pakistani), was also a crucial
point in relations.
 Additionally, the 2008 Mumbai attacks carried out by
Pakistani militants resulted in a severe blow to the ongoing
India-Pakistan peace talks.

New Compulsions For India
i. Encirclement By
China
ii. Energy
Requirements
iii. Gas and Other
Raw Materials’
Requirements
iv. American
withdrawal from
Afghanistan in
2014
Internationalization of the India-
Pakistan Conflict
 The conflict between India and Pakistan needs to be
revisited in light of the developing international situation
and its international implications.
 The internationalization of the conflict should be
approached from two perspectives. In the past years, both
India and Pakistan became involved in a race to acquire
more and more nuclear weapons to strengthen their
front against the other.
 This has aided and abetted the international nuclear arms
race. In addition, acts of terrorism have been used as a
potent tool to gain a winning edge in the bilateral conflict.
 Subsequently, international terrorism has grown
manifold ever since the India-Pakistan conflict became
marked by2015
Sunday, 08 November heinous acts of terror.
Current Affairs 192
Internationalization of the India-
Pakistan Conflict
 The spillover effects of nuclear proliferation and terrorism
in the context of the India-Pakistan conflict are briefly
highlighted below.
i. Nuclear Proliferation to rogue states
ii. The Indo-US Nuclear partnership has spurred the nuclear

race
iii. A failed Pakistani state can be a dangerous omen
iv. Terrorism by NSAs
v. Pakistan shifting away from the war in Afghanistan

Trade & People’s Contacts
• Pakistan India Trade
 In 1947 during GATT negotiations, special provision was kept
under article 24 for Indo Pak free trade.
 For first three years, we had unified currency . 65% of Pak
imports and 35% of exports were to India. Till 1955, India was
Pakistan’s biggest trading partner.
 Till 1965 nine land routes for trade and custom checks used to
function . Free movement of people was possible.
 In 1958 Pakistan and Afghanistan treaty permitted transit of
Afghan goods to India.
 From 1947 to 1965 India and Pakistan signed 14 bilateral
agreements . Pragmatism ruled to extent that Pakistan supplied
wheat from Sindh and India gave Atta to East Pakistan from
Calcutta .
Pakistan India Trade
 1965 and 71 wars reduced trade and India accounted for
only 1.6% of Pak Exports and 0.06% of imports in 1975
 In 1990 before Kargil war took place, India’s trade was $88
million (41 export , 47 imports favoring Pak)
 In 2008, when Mumbai took place it was $ 209 m which was
subsequently increased to $ 664 m and is now & 2.6 billion
(2014).
 Has Trade solved any problem in past, so how will it solve
in future ?

Modi Factor in Indo-Pak Relations
 India-Pakistan relations remain fraught with danger and
mistrust.
 Since October 2014, there have been regular exchanges of fire
between their troops across the ‘Line of Control’ which runs
through contested Kashmir.
 Turbulent times could lie ahead.
 Hopes that India and Pakistan could resume talks in earnest
following the electoral victory of Narendra Modi in India last
year have not yet been realized.
 He is currently acting like a man for whom a deal with
Pakistan is desirable but not essential.
 Ufa Agreement on the sidelines of SCO meeting proved
beyond doubt the futility of the exercise of negotiations
between both countries owing to Indian belligerent attitude.
 Recent issues:
I. Renewed tension along the Line of Control:
i. India-Pakistan relations remain fraught with danger and
mistrust.
ii. Since October 2014, there have been regular exchanges of fire
between their troops across the ‘Line of Control’ which has
run through contested Kashmir since Indian independence
and the simultaneous birth of Pakistan in 1947.
iii. Turbulent times could lie ahead.

 Recent issues (contd):
II. Stalled talks:
i. The ‘mood-music’ between the governments was relatively
positive for the first few months after Narendra Modi took
office as India’s prime minister.
ii. Sharif attended Modi’s inauguration.
iii. The foreign ministers of the two countries were due to meet
in August 2014 to resume the talks.
iv. However, India cancelled the meeting after Pakistan’s High
Commissioner to India met with the Kashmiri separatist
leader Syed Ali Saha Geelani shortly beforehand.

III. The BJP becomes part of the state government in
Jammu and Kashmir:
i. Political developments within the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir
could produce a coalition government involving his party, the BJP.
ii. State-level elections took place in Jammu and Kashmir in November-
December 2014. Calls by Kashmiri separatists to boycott the elections
were largely ignored. The ruling National Conference/Congress Party
coalition, led by Omar Abdullah, was heavily defeated.
iii. The largely Muslim People’s Democratic Party (PDP), led by Mufti
Mohammed Sayeed and his daughter, Mehbooba Mufti, emerged as the
largest party with 28 seats, with the BJP performing unprecedentedly
strongly, albeit overwhelmingly in the Jammu part of the state, winning 25
seats and the largest share of the vote.
iv. The armed militant groups – whose influence and reach have waned in
recent years – are likely to be delighted if the BJP shares power, as
increased political polarization could act as a recruiting-sergeant for
them.

IV. Obama’s visit to India:
i. On a three day official visit by President Obama to India that ended on 27
January 2015, observers remarked on an apparent “Romance” with Modi.
ii. During the visit, President Obama endorsed India’s bid for a permanent
seat on the UN Security Council. The two sides also issued a statement
urging Pakistan to crack down on militants and bring the perpetrators of
the 2008 Mumbai attacks to justice.
iii. Obama and Modi also took steps to revive a stalled 2008 US-India civil
nuclear deal. There has long been a proposal on the table for
Westinghouse, a US-based company, to build a nuclear power station in
Gujarat, Modi’s home state. The US is also supporting India’s application
to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
iv. The Pakistan government and its allies have recently renewed their efforts
to ‘internationalise’ the Kashmir dispute, again calling on US President
Barack Obama to become directly involved. India will be gratified that he
shows no enthusiasm for doing so.
V. India’s overt opposition to Pak-China Economic
corridor:
i. India formally registered a protest against the recently signed
$46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in May 2015.
ii. Considers it the encirclement of India by China.

Major Issues Between India and
Pakistan
 In 1997, high level talks were resumed after 3 years. Prime
Minister of India and Pakistan met twice and foreign
secretaries conducted 3 rounds of talks in which they
identified 8 outstanding issues to focus. These 8 issues were
i. Kashmir issue
ii. Water crisis
iii. Sir creek issue
iv. Rann of kutch
v. MFN status
vi. Siachen issue
vii. State sponsored terrorism
viii. Nuclear Deterrence
Pakistan
 In 1997, high level talks were resumed after 3 years. Prime
Minister of India and Pakistan met twice and foreign secretaries
conducted 3 rounds of talks in which they identified following
outstanding issues to focus. These issues were:
i. National Security
ii. Afghanistan is a major source of friction. The two countries have
long competed for influence there and Pakistan is deeply
suspicious of a rise in India's presence there since the fall of the
Islamabad-backed Taliban government in 2001. Pakistan accuses
India of using Afghanistan as a base to create problems inside
Pakistan, including backing separatists in Baluchistan
province. India is worried that negotiations with the Taliban and
the US pullout would give Pakistan an upper hand in Afghanistan
and offer anti-Indian militants a base.
 Main disputes (cont):
Pakistan
iii. Kashmir is at the heart of hostility between the neighbours and was the
cause of two of their three wars since independence from Britain in 1947.
iv. Trade and Visas: Both countries want to boost trade, particularly
important for Pakistan's weak economy, but Islamabad has yet to grant
India a “most favoured nation” trade status over concerns its market will
be flooded with cheap Indian goods.
v. The two countries disagree over use of the water flowing down rivers
that rise in Indian Kashmir and run into the Indus river basin in
Pakistan.Pakistan says India is unfairly diverting water with the
upstream construction of barrages and dams. India denies the charge.
Construction of Baglihar Dam, Tulbul Navigation project became
contentious issues between both countries.
vi. Indian and Pakistani forces have faced off in mountains above the
Siachen glacier in the Karakoram range, the world's highest battlefield,
since 1984. The two sides have been trying to find a solution that would
allow them to withdraw troops, but India says it is unwilling to bring its
forces down until Pakistan officially authenticates the positions they
hold.

Pakistan
 Main disputes (cont):
vii. Sir Creek: The Sir Creek is a 96 km (60 mi) strip of water
disputed between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch
marshlands. The creek, which opens up into the Arabian
Sea, divides the Kutch region of the Indian state of Gujarat
with the Sindh province of Pakistan. The dispute lies in the
interpretation of the maritime boundary line between
Kutch and Sindh. Before India's independence, the
provincial region was a part of Bombay Presidency of British
India.
viii. Terrorism remains top concern in the relationship between
Pakistan and India. Both sides accuse other side of
harboring terrorism against each other.
ix. Both sides accuse each other for waging proxy wars in IHK
and Afghanistan.
Pakistan India Water Disputes
 The Indus Waters Treaty governs the rivers that flow from India
into Pakistan. Water is referred as one possible cause for a
conflict between the two nations.
 Water disputes, for example, could place the Indus Waters
Treaty (IWT) of 1960, which has successfully regulated the
distribution of a precious resource between the two countries for
over five decades, under greater strain.
 India, with its larger population and mushrooming energy
requirements, uses much more of the shared waters, and its
domestic needs are rising, while Pakistan depends increasingly
on them for its agriculture.
 With India constructing several dams in the Indus River Basin,
the Pakistani military and jihadi groups now identify water
disputes as a core issue, along with Kashmir, that must be
resolved if relations are to be normalized.
Analysis of Pak – India relations
 For over six decades, bilateral relations have been
overshadowed by the Kashmir dispute. With political will
on both sides to normalize relations, however, the dialogue
process has resulted in some promising achievements.
 Broader economic ties would provide a more conducive
environment to address longstanding disputes like Kashmir.
Numerous challenges still threaten the chance for peace and
stability.
 There are other some other barriers as India is constructing
several dams in the Indus River Basin, the Pakistani policy
makers now identify water disputes as a core issue, along
with Kashmir, that must be resolved if relations are to be
normalized.
Thank
You
Please contact for Queries
Asmatullah Junejo (PSP)
Senior Superintendent of Police, Rawalpindi
0300-7064608
asmatullahjunejo@hotmail.com

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Current Affairs

Sunday, November 08, 2015 1

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 3

“positive” societal change

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 9

Level 1: Government Leaders

Terrorists increase their range of targets

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 11

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 12

2. The media need to self-censor coverage and not just

ii. present clear & balanced perspective

iii. consider impact of coverage

iv. Hakimullah was very fond of Media Coverage

 Yet, numerous established democracies of the world,

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 15

ii. The LTTE in Sri Lanka

iii. The IRA in the UK

iv. PLO with Israel

vi. MNLF in Philippine

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 16

ii. Accomodationalists or political

and Take” (IRA and PLO)

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 17

ii. Authority of the organization depends on its

iii. If the organization is exerting its authority by itself

i. Neither the terrorist group may be at the verge of

ii. Thus, Optimal or Strategic Point is very important.

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 19

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 21

 Militants are members of warring groups.

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 26

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 27

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ii. Agreements with the military also bolstered disregard for

Sunday, November 08, 2015 Current Affairs 63

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Peace deals with the terrorists

 Frontier Crime Regulation, 1901 (FCR) is also applicable in the

 Policing duties are performed by the tribal levies and khasadaars.

ii. Launched anti TB, Polio, Hepatitis Programmes

V. Communication and Works: