Mactan Rock Industries, Inc. and Antonio Tompar v. Benfrei S.

Germo
G.R. No. 228799 | January 10, 2018 | J. Perlas-Bernabe | Second
Division

Issue:
Whether or not MRII and Tompar, MRII’s president, should be held
solidarily liable.

Ruling: No. A corporation is a juridical entity which is vested with legal and
personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in behalf of, and
from the people comprising it. As a general rule, directors, officers, or
employees of a corporation cannot be held personally liable for the
obligations incurred by the corporation, unless it can be shown that such
director/officer/employee is guilty of negligence or bad faith, and that the
same was clearly and convincingly proven.

LEONARDO C. CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, JRC

POULTRY FARMS OR SPOUSES LEON C. CASTILLO, JR., AND TERESITA FLORES-
CASTILLO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 196118 July 30, 2014 PERALTA, J.

Issue: Whether the interest and penalty charges imposed by SBC are just,
and not excessive or unconscionable.

Ruling: Yes. SBC's 16% rate of interest is not computed per month, but
rather per annum or only 1.33% per month. In Spouses Bacolor v. Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, Dagupan City Branch,29 the Court held
that the interest rate of 24% per annum on a loan of P244,000.00 is not
considered as unconscionable and excessive. As such, the Court ruled that
the debtors cannot renege on their obligation to comply with what is
incumbent upon them under the contract of loan as they are bound by its
stipulations. Also, the 24o/o per annum rate or 2% per month for the
penalty charges imposed on account of default, cannot be considered as
skyrocketing.

Rodrigo Rivera vs. Spouses Salvador and Violeta Chua

G.R. No. 184458 January 14, 2015 J. Perez

PROMISSORY NOTE
120,000.00
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I, RODRIGO RIVERA promise to pay spouses
SALVADOR C. CHUA and VIOLETA SY CHUA, the sum of One Hundred Twenty
Thousand Philippine Currency (P120,000.00) on December 31, 1995.
It is agreed and understood that failure on my part to pay the amount of
(120,000.00) One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos on December 31, 1995.
(sic) I agree to pay the sum equivalent to FIVE PERCENT (5%) interest
monthly from the date of default until the entire obligation is fully paid for.
xxx

Issue: Whether or not demand is necessary for Rivera to be in delay.

Ruling: No, The PN expressly provided that after 31 December 1995,

default commences and the stipulation on payment of interest starts.

Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from

the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the
fulfillment of their obligation.
However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that
delay may exist:
(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or
(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears
that the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the
service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of
the contract; or
(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it
beyond his power to perform.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not
comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent
upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay
by the other begins. (Emphasis supplied)