Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Criminal Procedure The Bar Lectures Seri
Criminal Procedure The Bar Lectures Seri
Criminal Procedure The Bar Lectures Seri
BY
WILLARD B. RIANO
Bar Reviewer in Remedial Law, Commercial Law and Civil Law
Author: Fundamentals of Civil Procedure; Evidence,
(A Restatement for the Bar);
Civil Procedure (A Restatement for the Bar);
Evidence (The Bar Lectures Series)
Dean, College of Law, San Sebastian College Recoletos-Manila
Member, Remedial Law and Commercial Law Committees,
U.P. Law Center
Professor and Lecturer, Philippine Judicial Academy,
Supreme Court of the Philippines
2011
by
^ulT
WILLARD B. RIANO
ISBN 978-971-23-6158-6
N? 1492
ISBN 978-971-23-6158-6
05-RL-00042
9789712361586
05-RL-00042
9
Printed by
DEDICATION
iii
PREFACE
V
examinations requires a quick recall of the law and the rules. Hence, topics in
this work have been treated with emphasis on the very substance of the Rules
of Court, a treatment traditionally referred to by academicians as a 'codal'
approach.
While the framework of this material is mainly codal- based, it is
supported by cases which mirror, not only the current position of the Supreme
Court on vital issues in the criminal litigation process but also by significant
foreign cases designed to aid the reader to understand a particular rule from a
parallel doctrinal perspective. Cases have been judiciously selected to permit
the reader to appreciate how the Supreme Court grappled with and settled a
wide range of issues arising in the various stages of criminal procedure.
The scope of this book reveals its having no pretensions of being an
exhaustive treatise on criminal procedure. Honest efforts have been taken to
strip it of materials which veer away from what is fundamental and basic to
allow a reasonably wide wiggle room for the reader to focus on procedural
principles and concepts which have a fairly high probability of being utilized by
the examiner in the framing of bar questions.
As he goes through the various concepts of procedural law, the student
is reminded that the principles underlying criminal procedure, like those of any
other procedural rule, are construed liberally to meet the demands of justice.
In our academic life we have always been beset by questions on matters
involving consistency in the application of the rules. We have actually
endeavored to show that there are no inconsistencies, and in order to fully
appreciate the wisdom of Court decisions, the student must be aware that
each case is decided in accordance with the facts and the issues raised by the
parties.
While our concern for the academic needs of our law students supplied
the motivation for us to start and complete this work, the invaluable
participation of Atty. Ernesto C. Salao and Atty. Maria Theresa P. Cabayan in
the publication of this work is sincerely acknowledged for without their
tremendous encouragement, assistance, and editorial skills, this material
would not have seen the light of day.
vi
Lastly, the bar candidate and the law student is asked to consider this
work as a humble recognition of their perseverance and their unwavering
commitment to their future in the legal profession.
WILLARD B. RIANO
vii
CONTENTS
I. BASIC CONCEPTS
Concept of criminal procedure ........................................................................................ 1
The adversarial or accusatorial system........................................................................... 2
Liberal interpretation of the rules.................................................................................... 3
Due process; mandatory .................................................................................................. 3
A. Requisites for the Exercise of Criminal
Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................... 4
Requisites ............................................................................................................................... 4
Jurisdiction over the subject matter versus
jurisdiction over the person of the accused............................................................. 4
Jurisdiction over the territory; venue in criminal
cases (Bar 1997) ........................................................................................................... 5
When a court has jurisdiction to try offenses not
committed within its territorial jurisdiction............................................................. 6
B. Criminal Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter ................................................... 10
Jurisdiction over the subject matter ................................................................................. 10
How jurisdiction over the subject matter
is conferred ................................................................................................................. 11
How jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined................................................................................................................. 12
Statute applicable to a criminal action............................................................................. 13
Use of the imposable penalty............................................................................................ 14
Principle of adherence of jurisdiction or
continuing jurisdiction............................................................................................... 14
Dismissal on jurisdictional grounds; special
appearance................................................................................................................. 15
Raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first
time in the Supreme Court....................................................................................... 16
C. Criminal Jurisdiction Over the Person of The
Accused (Bar 2008) .................................................................................................... 17
ix
D. Injunction To Restrain Criminal Prosecution
(Bar 1999) ................................................................................................................... 19
E. Mandamus to Compel Prosecution (Bar 1999).............................................................. 20
II. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS
A. Criminal Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
and Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)....................................................................... 21
B. Criminal Jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Court (RTC) ................................................................................................................. 23
C. Criminal Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
(P.D. 1606, R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249)...................................................................... 24
Offenses subject to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan (Bar 1997)....................................................................................... 28
Officials and employees with a salary grade
of "27" or higher ........................................................................................................ 29
Officers falling below salary grade '27" .................................................................. 30
Salary grade alone does not determine
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan .......................................................................... 33
A student regent of a state university is a
public officer............................................................................................................... 34
Offenses committed in relation to the office ........................................................ 34
When the actual specific allegations of the
intimacy between the offense and the official duties of the accused need not
appear
in the information ..................................................................................................... 38
Anti-Money Laundering cases................................................................................. 40
Forfeiture cases.......................................................................................................... 40
Summary procedure in criminal cases................................................................... 40
Prohibited pleadings, motions and petitions in summary procedure (Bar 2004); civil
and criminal case ............................................................................................. 42
III. SYNOPSIS OF THE CRIMINAL LITIGATION PROCESS
Initial contact with the criminal justice system ......................................................................... 43
Filing of the information or complaint and other
processes .................................................................................................................... 47
Implied institution of the civil action .......................................................................................... 48
Availment of provisional remedies ............................................................................................ 49
Bail .................................................................................................................................................. 49
Arraignment; bill of particulars; suspension of
arraignment ............................................................................................................... 50
Quashal of complaint or information......................................................................................... 51
XXV
Pre-trial................................................................................................................................ 51
Trial; demurrer.................................................................................................................... 52
Judgment............................................................................................................................ 53
Post-judgment remedies ................................................................................................. 53
Entry of judgment ............................................................................................................. 54
Chapter II
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES (RULE 110)
xi
Extent of the authority given to the private
prosecutor when duly authorized to prosecute
the action ............................................................................................................................. 77
IV. PROSECUTION OF "PRIVATE CRIMES"
Prosecution of adultery and concubinage....................................................................... 77
Prosecution of seduction, abduction and acts
of lasciviousness.................................................................................................................. 78
Effect of R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act) ............................................................................................................. 78
Prosecution of Defamation................................................................................................ 79
V. THE COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION
Meaning of'complaint' ..................................................................................................... 79
In whose name and against whom filed........................................................................ 80
Meaning of 'information' (Bar 1994,1995,1996) .......................................................... 80
Distinctions between a complaint and an
information (Bar 1999)........................................................................................... 81
Infirmity in signature in the information........................................................................ 81
Sufficiency of the complaint or information.................................................................. 81
Test for sufficiency of the complaint or information.................................................... 82
Questioning the insufficiency of the complaint
or information ......................................................................................................... 82
Objections as to form........................................................................................................ 83
Date of the commission of the offense.......................................................................... 83
Determination of the nature and character
of the crime.................................................... ........................................................ 84
How to state the name of the accused .......................................................................... 84
How to state the name of the offended party who
is a natural person................................................................................................... 85
How to state the name of the offended party which
is a juridical person.................................................................................................. 85
Rule if the name of the offended party is unknown
in offenses against property.................................................................................. 85
Designation of the offense ............................................................................................... 86
Effect of failure to designate the offense by the statute
or failure to mention the provision violated...................................................... 87
Effect of failure to specify the correct crime .................................................................. 88
Statement of the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances (Bar 2001)............................................................................. 88
Cause of the accusation.................................................................................................... 92
How to state the date of the commission
of the offense ................................................................................................ 96
Duplicity of the offense (Bar 2005) ................................................................................. 97
xii
VI. VENUE OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS
Rule where offense is committed in a train, aircraft
or vehicle .................................................................................................................. 99
Rule where offense is committed on board a vessel ................................................... 99
Rule when the offense is covered by Art. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code ................................................................................................ 100
How to state the place of the commission
of the offense........................................................................................................... 100
VII. AMENDMENT OR SUBSITUTION OF THE
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
Amendment of the information or complaint
Chapter III
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION (RULE 111)
Implied institution of the civil action with the
criminal action.............................................................................................................................. 107
Purposes of the criminal and civil actions................................................................................. 108
Judgment of conviction includes a judgment on the
civil liability .................................................................................................................................... 109
Who the real parties in interest are in the civil aspect
of the case..................................................................................................................................... 109
Rule applicable.............................................................................................................................. 109
When a civil action may proceed independently; independent civil actions and quasi-delicts
(Bar 2005)...................................................................................................................................... 109
Consequences of the independent character of actions
under Articles 32,33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code ................................................................... Ill
When there is no implied institution of the civil action.......................................................... 112
Reservation of the civil action..................................................................................................... 113
No reservation of the civil action in Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 (Bar 2001; 2002) .......................................................................................... 113
xiii
When the separate civil action is suspended ............................................................................114
Consolidation of the civil action with the criminal action ........................................................115
Suspension of the period of prescription ................................................. ................................116
When no reservation is required; when civil
action is not suspended.................................................................................................... 116
Counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim in a
criminal action ................................................................................................................... 117
Rules on filing fees .........................................................................................................................118
Effect of death of the accused on the civil action ......................................................................118
Novation: extinguishment of criminal liability ..........................................................................120
Effect of acquittal or the extinction of the penal
action on the civil action or civil liability .................................................................... 120
Effect of payment of the civil liability ..........................................................................................124
Effect of judgment in the civil case absolving
the defendant.................................................................................................................... 124
Subsidiary liability of employer....................................................................................................125
Concept of a prejudicial question (Bar 1999).......................................................................... 125
Reason for the principle ................................................................................................................126
Requisites for a prejudicial question (Bar 1999)................................................................ ....... 126
Effect of the existence of a prejudicial question; suspension of the criminal action
(Bar 1995; 1999; 2010).............................................................................................. . 128
Suspension does not include dismissal................................................................................. 129
Where to file the petition for suspension ..................................................................................129
Case illustrations ............................................................................................................................130
xiv
When preliminary investigation is not required even if the offense is one
which normally requires
a preliminary investigation......................................................................................................... 157
Person arrested lawfully without a warrant may ask
for a preliminary investigation................................................................................................... 158
Bail for a person lawfully arrested during the
preliminary investigation............................................................................................................ 159
Questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation..................................................................... 160
Absence of preliminary investigation; effect on
jurisdiction of the court............................................................................................................... 162
Absence of preliminary investigation; not a ground
for motion to quash .................................................................................................................... 162
Inquest proceedings.................................................................................................................................. 162
Possible options of the inquest prosecutor........................................................................................... 163
The inquest must pertain to the offense for which
the arrest was made ................................................................................................................... 164
Who may conduct preliminary investigation and determine
existence of probable cause....................................................................................................... 168
The procedure for preliminary investigation must
be strictly followed ...................................................................................................................... 171
Initial steps in preliminary investigation; filing of the
complaint for preliminary investigation................................................................................... 174
Dismissal of the complaint or issuance of a subpoena........................................................................ 175
Filing of counter-affidavit by the respondent; no motion
to dismiss ...................................................................................................................................... 176
Action to be taken if the respondent does not submit
his counter-affidavit .................................................................................................................... 176
Clarificatory hearing if necessary; no right of cross
examination .......................................................... ...................................................................... 177
Determination by the investigating officer............................................................................................ 177
Discretion of prosecutor in filing of a criminal
complaint or information (Bar 1999)........................................................................................ 177
Resolution of investigating prosecutor; certification
of preliminary investigation ....................................................................................................... 178
Effect of the absence of the required certification
(Bar 1998)...................................................................................................................................... 179
Forwarding of the records of the case for action; need
for approval before filing or dismissal ...................................................................................... 179
Rule when recommendation for dismissal is disapproved ................................................................ 179
Motion for reconsideration ..................................................................................................................... 180
Appeals to the Secretary of Justice; filing a petition
for review...................................................................................................................................... 180
Rules of Court provisions when resolution is reversed
or modified by the Secretary of Justice .................................................................................... 183
XXV
Power of the Secretary of Justice to reverse
resolutions of prosecutors.......................................................................................................... 183
Assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice;
petition for review under Rule 43 not allowed;
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65.................................................................................... 184
Appeal to the Office of the President.................................................................................................... 187
Appeals under Rule 43 and Rule 45 ...................................................................................................... 189
Records supporting the information or complaint
filed in court .................................................................................................................................. 189
Action of the judge upon the filing of the complaint
or information .............................................................................................................................. 189
When warrant of arrest is not necessary ................................................................................191'
Withdrawal of the information already filed in court
(Bar 1990; 2003) ........................................................................................................................... 192
Some judicial pronouncements on preliminary
investigation ................................................................................................................................. 196
Chapter V
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
xvi
Custodial investigation; expanded concept .................................................................. 224
Penalties under R.A. 7438 ................................................................................................. 224
Effect of an illegal arrest on jurisdiction
of the court .............................................................................................................. 224
Effect of admission to bail on objections to an
illegal arrest.............................................................................................................. 225
Waiver of the illegality of the arrest; effect of
illegal arrest (Bar 2000; 2001)................................................................................ 225
Persons not subject to arrest ........................................................................................... 227
xvii
Who may assail the issuance of a search warrant ....................................................... 258
Petition for certiorari for unwarranted quashal
of a search warrant................................................................................................. 259
Exceptions to the search warrant requirement
(Bar 1988; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2008)...................................................................... 260
Search incident to a lawful arrest (Bar 2003) ............................................................... 262
Parameters of a search incident to a lawful arrest;
immediate possession and control rule .............................................................. 263
Searches of moving vehicles............................................................................................ 270
Check points ....................................................................................................................... 271
Buy bust operations; warrant not needed (Bar 2003)................................................. 273
Entrapment and instigation............................................................................................. 274
Applicable tests in a buy-bust operation;
adoption of the 'objective test' ............................................................................. 275
Effect of absence of prior surveillance before a
buy-bust operation................................................................................................. 277
Effect of absence of record in police blotter.................................................................. 278
Plain view doctrine (Bar 2007; 2008).............................................................................. 278
The 'inadvertence' requirement under the plain
view doctrine........................................................................................................... 283
Other cases......................................................................................................................... 284
Terry searches or stop and frisk; history of the
doctrine (Bar 1995; 2003) ...................................................................................... 290
Summary of the Terry doctrine....................................................................................... 293
Terry search vs. a search incident to a
lawful arrest............................................................................................................. 296
Bond to ensure the return of the seized items ............................................................. 297
Consented Searches.......................................................................................................... 298
Effect of an illegal search and seizure; fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine (Bar 2005) .......................................................... 298
Civil damages; criminal liability........................................................................................ 300
Authority of the Executive Judge and Vice
Executive Judge re search warrants in Manila
and Quezon City...................................................................................................... 300
xviii
Purganan case re-examined..........................................................................................................309
Bail in deportation proceedings....................................................................................................310
Who furnishes the bail ...................................................................................................................312
Obligation and right of the bondsman; arrest
without a warrant ............................................................................................................. 312
The applicant for bail must be in custody....................................................................................313
Bail to guarantee appearance of witnesses (Bar 1999).............................................................315
Bail for those not yet charged .......................................................................................................315
Effects of failure to appear at the trial......................................................................................... 316
Court cannot require arraignment before the
grant of bail......................................................................................................................... 317
Forms of bail (Bar 1999) .................................................................................................................320
Guidelines in fixing the amount of bail (Bar 1999) .................................................................... 323
Duration of the bail.........................................................................................................................324
No release or transfer of person in custody; exceptions...........................................................325
When bail is not required ..............................................................................................................325
When bail is not allowed ...............................................................................................................327
When bail is a matter of right (Bar 1999; 2006; 2008)...............................................................328
Remedy when bail is denied ........................................................................................................ 329
When bail is a matter of discretion
(Bar 1999; 2006; 2008) ...................................................................................................... 329
Where application for bail is to be filed when bail is a matter of discretion
and after conviction by the
Regional Trial Court ........................................................................................................... 331
When application for bail after conviction by the RTC
shall be denied ................................................................................................................... 332
Bail pending appeal where penalty imposed exceeds
six years ............................................................................................................................... 333
Hearing of application for bail in offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment;
burden of proof in bail application.................................................................................. 334
Duties of the trial judge in a petition for bail in offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment
or death............................................................................................................................... 337
Evidence in bail hearing are automatically reproduced
at the trial ............................................................................................................................ 339
Capital offenses ...............................................................................................................................339
Effect of Republic Act No. 9346 on the graduation
of penalties ......................................................................................................................... 339
Where application or petition for bail may be
filed (Bar 2002) ................................................................................................................... 341
Increase or reduction of bail ......................................................................................................... 343
Bail for accused originally released without bail ........................................................................343
xix
Forfeiture of bail ............................................................................................................................ 343
Cancellation of the bail; remedy ................................................................................................. 344
Application for or admission to bail not a bar to
objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation........................... 345
XXV
The privilege against self-incrimination
(Bar 1996; 1998; 2004; 2005) ........................................................................................... 396
The privilege applies only to natural persons ............................................................................. 399
The privilege protects a person from testimonial
compulsion or evidence of a communicative nature .................................................. 400
Force re-enactments ...................................................................................................................... 405
Meaning of compulsion................................................................................................................. 406
Writing exemplars or samples...................................................................................................... 406
Questions which the witness may refuse to answer ................................................................ 410
Privilege extends to lawyers advising a witness
to invoke the privilege ...................................................................................................... 411
Persons who are mere custodians of documents
cannot claim the privilege ................................................................................................ 412
Proceedings in which the privilege may be asserted ................................................................ 413
Distinctions between the claim of the privilege by an
accused and by a mere witness ...................................................................................... 414
Waiver of the privilege................................................................................................................... 416
The privilege will not apply when witness is given
immunity from prosecution ............................................................................................ 416
Immunity statutes; examples ....................................................................................................... 418
The right to defend himself; right to be heard ........................................................................... 421
The right to testify as a witness..................................................................................................... 422
The right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him ......................................................................................................................... 423
Right to use testimony of a deceased witness ........................................................................... 425
Right to compulsory process............................................................ ........................................... 425
Right to appeal ................................................................................................................................ 426
xxi
Arraignment after submission of the case
for decision.............................................................................................................. 434
Record of arraignment...................................................................................................... 436
Presence of the accused ................................................................................................... 436
Presence of the offended party....................................................................................... 436
When a plea of'not guilty' shall be entered
(Bar 1992; 1993; 1996)........................................................................................... 436
Plea of guilty is a judicial confession; effect on
aggravating circumstances ................................................................................... 439
Exception to the admission of aggravating
circumstances .................................................... ................................................... 440
Plea of guilty to a lesser offense; plea bargaining
(Bar 1995; 2002) ...................................................................................................... 440
Requisites for a plea of guilty to a lesser offense .......................................................... 441
Plea of guilty to a lesser offense after arraignment;
plea bargaining during the trial proper ............................................................... 442
No need for amendment of information/complaint................................................... 442
When plea of guilty to a lesser offense is
not mitigating ......................................................................................................... 443
Plea of guilty to a capital offense (Bar 1995).................................................................. 443
Meaning of "searching inquiry" ...................................................................................... 445
Plea of guilty to a non-capital offense............................................................................. 448
Improvident plea of guilty ................................................................................................ 448
Production or inspection of material evidence ............................................................. 449
xxii
Absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground
to quash an information................................................................................................... 455
Test in appreciating a motion to quash................................................................................................. 456
Effect of failure to assert any ground of a motion
to quash ........................................................................................................................................ 457
Grounds not waived ................................................................................................................................ 458
Denial of a motion to quash ................................................................................................................... 458
When court shall order the amendment of the
information or complaint................................................................................................. 459
Order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar
to another prosecution; exceptions (Bar 1994) ...................................................................... 459
Double jeopardy....................................................................................................................................... 460
Effects of double jeopardy; on criminal
and civil aspects ........................................................................................................................... 462
Double jeopardy; requisites.................................................................................................................... 465
Court must have competent jurisdiction.............................................................................................. 466
Curing an erroneous acquittal; grave abuse discretion of
amounting to lack jurisdiction ................................................................................................... 469
Preliminary investigation; double jeopardy
not applicable............................................................................................................................... 474
Res judicata and double jeopardy; res judicata
in prison grey (Bar 2010).;........................................................................................................... 475
Administrative cases; double jeopardy not applicable ...................................................................... 475
Valid complaint or information (Bar 2002; 2004) ................................................................... 477
Accused should have pleaded to the charge (should
have been arraigned) (Bar 2002; 2003).................................................................................... 479
The accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or terminated
without
his express consent ..................................................................................................................... 482
Dismissal or termination must be without the express
consent of the accused ............................................................................................................... 485
Dismissals equivalent to acquittal even with the consent
of the accused; speedy trial; demurrer to evidence............................................................... 487
Double jeopardy in quasi offenses ........................................................................................................ 491
When double jeopardy shall not apply despite a prior
conviction (Bar 2005) .................................................................................................................. 495
Meaning of same offense; when not the same
(Bar 1993; 1994)........................................................................................................................... 496
Provisional dismissal; requisites (Bar 2003).......................................................................................... 503
Time bar rule; when provisional dismissal becomes
permanent.................................................................................................................................... 506
Effect of People v. Lacson............................................................................................. .......................... 507
Withdrawal of information distinguished from a
motion to dismiss ........................................................................................................................ 510
xxiii
Chapter X
PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (RULES 118-119)
A. PRE-TRIAL (RULE 118) (Bar 1986; 1989; 2004; 2008)
Courts in which pre-trial is mandatory.......................................................................... 511
Matters to be considered during the pre-trial;
purposes.................................................................................................................. 511
When pre-trial shall be held............................................................................................. 512
Non-appearance in the pre-trial conference;
consequences.......................................................................................................... 512
Duty of the Branch Clerk of Court ................................................................................... 513
Recording of the minutes................................................................................................. 513
Duty of the judge before the pre-trial conference ....................................................... 513
Duty of the judge when plea bargaining is
agreed upon; prosecution and offended party
agree to the plea .................................................................................................... 513
Duty of the judge when plea bargaining fails................................................................ 514
Asking questions during the pre-trial ............................................................................. 514
Pre-trial agreements; signing of admissions made ...................................................... 514
Pre-trial order ..................................................... . ............................................................. 515
Pre-trial in a civil case vs. pre-trial in a
criminal case ............................................................................................................ 515
Effect of pre-trial order...................................................................................................... 516
Judicial dispute resolution (JDR); purposes ................................................................... 517
Stages in the judicial proceeding with JDR;
confidentiality.......................................................................................................... 517
Cases subject to mediation for JDR................................................................................. 518
Salient features of the suggested JDR process .............................................................. 519
Court-annexed mediation guidelines............................................................................. 521
Discovery procedures in criminal cases.......................................................................... 524
B. TRIAL (RULE 119)
When trial shall commence ...................................................................................................... 526
Summary of periods .................................................................................................................. 527
Time to prepare for trial ............................................................................................................ 527
Effect of not bringing the accused to trial within
the prescribed period....................................................................................................... 528
Delays to be excluded from computing the period for
commencement of the trial;
some examples ................................................................................................................. 528
When delay or suspension of trial is justified
by reason of the absence of a witness........................................................................... 529
xxiv
Continuous trial.................................................................................................................. 530
Trial period.......................................................................................................................... 530
Postponement or continuance ....................................................................................... 531
Factors to be considered for granting
continuances or postponements ......................................................................... 531
Prohibited grounds for a continuance............................................................................ 531
Conditional examination of witnesses even
before trial................................................................................................................ 531
How to secure appearance of a material witness
(Bar 1994; 1999) ...................................................................................................... 532
Discharge of accused to be a state witness;
requisites (Bar 1988; 1990; 1994; 2006)............................................................... 533
Evidence adduced during the discharge
hearing...................................................................................................................... 534
Effect of discharge of an accused to be a
state witness; acquittal........................................................................................... 534
Mistake in charging the proper offense ......................................................................... 534
Order of trial ....................................................................................................................... 535
Modification of the order of trial; reverse trial
(Bar 2007) ................................................................................................................. 535
Reopening of the proceedings......................................................................................... 535
Trial in absentia (Bar 1998)............................................................................................... 536
Instances when the presence of the accused
is required................................................................................................................. 537
Some rules on witness' credibility................................................................................... 538
Comments and questions of the judge during
the trial...................................................................................................................... 538
Corpus delicti in criminal cases; murder
or homicide .............................................................................................................. 539
Lack of formal offer of evidence during the trial........................................................... 540
C. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (RULE 119)
Demurrer to evidence (Bar 1991; 1994; 1996; 2001;
2003; 2004; 2007; 2009)................................................................................................... 540
Demurrer to evidence with leave of court
(Bar 2003) ........................................................................................................................... 541
Demurrer to evidence without leave of court ........................................................................ 542
Not every motion to dismiss is a demurrer
to evidence......................................................................................................................... 543
Granting of demurrer is an acquittal ........................................................................................ 544
Demurrer to evidence in a civil case vs. demurrer
to evidence in a criminal case (Bar 2007)....................................................................... 545
XXV
Chapter XI
JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
I. JUDGMENT (RULE 120)
Meaning of judgment ...................................................................................................... 546
Requisites of a judgment ................................................................................................. 546
Contents of a judgment of conviction; contents
of judgment of acquittal ........................................................................................ 548
Rule when there are two or more offenses in a single information or
complaint (duplicitous
complaint or information) .................................................................................... 549
Judgment rendered by judge who did not hear
the case..................................................................................................................... 550
Variance doctrine; variance between the allegation
and proof (Bar 1993; 2004)................................................................................... 550
When an offense includes or is included in another.................................................... 551
Variance in the mode of the commission of the offense... 551
Promulgation of judgment (Bar 1997)........................................................................... 552
How accused is to be notified of the promulgation..................................................... 552
Rule if the accused fails to appear in the
promulgation of judgment.................................................................................... 553
Modification of judgment (Bar 1989) ............................................................................ 554
When judgment becomes final ...................................................................................... 554
Entry of judgment ............................................................................................. ............... 554
II. NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION (RULE 121)
Filing a motion for new trial or a motion for
reconsideration ....................................................................................................... 554
Grounds for a new trial .................................................................................................... 555
Requisites for newly discovered evidence .................................................................... 555
Grounds for reconsideration of the judgment ............................................................. 556
Form of the motions; notice............................................................................................ 556
Notice of the motion ........................................................................................................ 556
When hearing of the motion is required....................................................................... 557
Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration ........................................................ 557
The Neypes rule ............................................................................................................ 557
III. APPEALS (RULES 122,124,125) (Bar 1991; 1992; 1993; 1998)
Appeal not a natural right.......................................................................................................... 558
Who may appeal......................................................................................................................... 559
Subject matter for review on appeal ....................................................................................... 560
xxvi
Change of theory on appeal ............................................................................................ 561
Factual findings; credibility of witnesses......................................................................... 561
Where to appeal ................................................................................................................ 563
How to appeal .................................................................................................................... 564
When appeal is to be taken.............................................................................................. 565
Service of notice of appeal................................................................................................ 566
Transmission of the papers to appellate court (RTC).................................................... 566
Withdrawal of appeal ....................................................................................................... 566
Appeal not mooted by accused's release on parole..................................................... 567
Effect of appeal by any of several accused (Bar 1998)................................................. 567
Appeal from the civil aspect ............................................................................................. 568
Period to apply for probation........................................................................................... 568
Stay of execution............................................................................................................... 569
Power of the Court of Appeals to receive evidence ..................................................... 569
Dismissal of appeal by the Court of Appeals................................................................. 569
Ground for reversal of judgment or its modification.................................................... 570
Review of decisions of the Court of Appeals.................................................................. 570
Applicability of the rules on appeal in the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.............................................................. 570
Rule if the opinion of the Supreme Court
en banc is equally divided .................................................................................. 570
When preliminary attachment is available.................................................................... 572
xxvii
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
I. BASIC CONCEPTS
l
2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
inquisitorial system have a less active role than in the adversarial system.
Liberal interpretation of the rules
1. The rules on criminal procedure, being parts of the Rules of Court,
shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding" (Sec.
6, Rule 1, Rules of Court).
2. In a case, petitioner's former counsel erroneously appealed her
conviction to the Court of Appeals instead of to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
pleaded that Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court which mandated the
dismissal of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of Appeals be relaxed and
the Court 6f Appeals be directed to forward the records of the case to the
Sandiganbayan. The Supreme Court, in granting petitioner's prayer held that
since the appeal involved a criminal case and the possibility of a person being
deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse is great, a relaxation of the Rules
was warranted. The rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict application thereof which
results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be
avoided (Cenita M. Cariaga v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180010,
July 30, 2010).
Due process; mandatory
Due process in criminal proceedings is mandatory and indispensable and
cannot be met without the proverbial "law which hears before it condemns
and proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." (Quotation
from Albert vs. University Publishing House, G.R. No. L-19118, January
30,1965)
Monte v. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA 245, enumerates the requirements
of due process in a criminal proceeding, to wit:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
Requisites
A reading of jurisprudence and treatises on the matter
discloses the following basic requisites before a court can
acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases (Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, 388 SCRA 72):
(a) Jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) Jurisdiction over the territory; and
(c) Jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
When a court has jurisdiction to try offenses not committed within its
territorial jurisdiction
The rule that the offense must be prosecuted and tried in the place
where the same was committed admits of certain exceptions.
1. Where the offense was committed under the circumstances
enumerated in Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is cognizable
before Philippine courts even if committed outside of the territory of the
Philippines. In this case, the offense shall be cognizable by the court where the
criminal action is first filed (Sec. 15[d], Rule 110, Rules of Court).
Under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code shall be enforced not only within
CHAPTER I 7
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
the Philippine Archipelago but also outside of its jurisdiction against offenders
who:
Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into
these Islands of the obligations and securities mentioned above;
While being public officers and employees, should commit an
offense in the exercise of their functions; or
Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the
law of nations.
Included in crimes against national security are the crimes of (i) treason,
(ii) conspiracy and proposal to commit treason, (iii) misprision of treason, (iv)
espionage, (v) inciting to war and giving motives for reprisal, (vi) violation of
neutrality, (vii) correspondence with hostile country, and (viii) flight to enemy's
country (Articles 114-121, Revised Penal Code).
Crimes against the law of nations are piracy and mutiny described under
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code and qualified piracy under Article 123
thereof.
2. Where the Supreme Court, pursuant to its constitutional powers
orders a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice
(Section 5[4J, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines).
3. Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public
or private vehicle in the course of its trip, the criminal action need not be
instituted in the actual place where the offense was committed. It may be
instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where said train,
aircraft, or vehicle passed during its trip. The crime
8 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
may also be instituted and tried in the place of departure and arrival (Section
15[b], Rule 110, Rules of Court).
4. Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of
its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried not necessarily in the
place of the commission of the crime. It may be brought and tried in the court
of the first port of entry, or in the municipality or territory where the vessel
passed during the voyage (Section 15[c], Rule 110, Rules of Court).
5. Where the case is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the
jurisdiction of which depends upon the nature of the offense and the position
of the accused (Subido v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122641, January 20,
1997), the offense need not be tried in the place where the act was
committed but where the court actually sits in Quezon City.
Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 8249 (An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan), when the greater convenience of the accused and of
the witnesses, or other compelling considerations so require, a case originating
from one geographical region may be heard in another geographical region.
For this purpose, the presiding justice shall authorize any divisions of the court
to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila and, where the
interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial boundaries of the
Philippines.
6. Where the offense is written defamation, the criminal action need
not necessarily be filed in the RTC of the province or city where the alleged
libelous article was printed and first published. It may be filed in the province or
city where the offended party held office at the time of the commission of the
offense if he is a public officer, or in the province or city where he actually
resided at the time of the commission of the offense in case the offended party
is a private individual (Article 360, Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 1289 and Republic Act No. 4363; Bar 1995J.
7. The case of Agbayani v. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699, restated Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code (written defamation) as follows:
CHAPTER I 9
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the
offending website. For the Court to hold that the amended information
sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the
defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel
suit being filed in all other locations where the x x x website is likewise accessed
or capable of being accessed" (Bonifacio, et al. v. Regional Trial Court of
Makati, et al., G.R. No. 184800, May 5,2010).
Merely alleging that "the newspaper is a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" did not
establish that the said publication was first printed and first published in Iloilo
City (Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9,2009).
Also, merely alleging that the offended party is a physician and medical
practitioner in a particular place does not clearly and positively indicate that
said person is residing in such place at the time of the commission of the crime.
One who transacts business in a place and spends a considerable time thereat
does not render such person a resident therein (Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No.
167764, October 9,2009).
fall within the jurisdiction of the court (U.S. v. Jimenez, 41 Phil. 1; U.S. v.
Mallari, 24 Phil. 366).
4. In cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, both the nature of the
offense and the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non
before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case (Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, 312 SCRA 77).
5. In complex crimes, jurisdiction is with the court having jurisdiction
to impose the maximum and most serious penalty imposable on the offense
forming part of the complex crime (Cuyos v. Garcia, 160 SCRA 302; Bar 2003;.
tion of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The
applicable law therefore, in the case against the public officer is Presidential
Decree 1606 as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 on May 16,1995 and as
further amended by Republic Act No. 8249 on February 5,1997 (People v.
San- diganbayan and Victoria Amante, G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009).
ceased to be in office during the pendency of the case. The court retains its
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges
or declare him guilty thereof.
2. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue
to exercise such jurisdiction until the final determination of the case and it is
not affected by the subsequent legislation vesting jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal. A recognized exception to this rule is when the
statute expressly so provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate upon actions pending before its enactment. However, when no such
retroactive effect is provided for, statutes altering the jurisdiction of a court
cannot be applied to cases already pending prior to their enactment (People v.
Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267; Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 647; Palana
v. People, 534 SCRA 296).
As a result of the above rule, once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or continuance rests on
the sound discretion of the court (Jalandoni v. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107;
Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 292) and even if the prosecution
files a motion to withdraw the information, the court may grant or deny the
same in the faithful exercise of judicial prerogative (Pilapil v. Garchitorena,
299 SCRA 343).
The Court has been steadfast in declaring that when a court has already
obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the case is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on
actions pending before its enactment (Palana v. People, 534 SCRA 296,
September 28, 2007).
may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal (Fukuzume v. People, 474 SCRA 570; Foz, Jr. v.
People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009).
2. A special appearance before the court to challenge the jurisdiction of
the court over the person is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver of the
objection and is not a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court
(Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12,2009).
Raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the Supreme Court
1. An accused is not precluded from raising the issue of jurisdiction of
the trial court over the offense charged because the issue may be raised or
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on
appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot
be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise,
since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized
the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law
(Fukuzume v. People, 474 SCRA 570; Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764,
October 9,2009).
2. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Antiporda, Jr. v.
Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551). After voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court. While the jurisdiction of a
tribunal may be challenged at any time, sound public policy bars one from
doing so after their having procured that jurisdiction, speculating on the
fortunes of litigation (People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278).
The rule is the same as in civil cases. In Tijam v. Sibong- hanoy, 23 SCRA
29, the Court earlier ruled that a party may be estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the court
CHAPTER I 17
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
for reasons of public policy as when he initially invokes the jurisdiction of the
court and then later on repudiates that same jurisdiction.
However, the doctrine of estoppel laid down in Tijam is an exception and
not the general rule and the rule still stands that jurisdiction is vested by law
and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. Hence, even on appeal, and
even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing
court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over
the case (Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51).
"Estoppel in questioning the jurisdiction of the court is only brought to
bear when not to do so will subvert the ends of justice. Jurisdiction of courts is
the blueprint of our judicial system without which the road to justice would be
a confusing maze. Whenever the question of jurisdiction is put to front, courts
should not lightly brush aside errors in jurisdiction especially when it is liberty of
an individual which is at stake" (Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51).
For Tijam v. Sibonghanoy to be applied to a criminal case, the factual
circumstances which justified the application of the bar by laches, must be
present in the case (Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009
citing Fukuzume v. People, supra).
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction
preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more
reason will injunction not lie when the case is still at the stage of preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation. However, in extreme cases, the Court laid the
following exceptions:
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3)
when there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice; (4) when the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under
an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; (7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it
is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there
is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied (Camanag v. Guerrero, 335 Phil. 945, 970-971
[1997], citing Paderanga v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86 [1991]; Brocka v. Enrile, 192
SCRA 183; Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 [1987]; Mercado v. Court of
Appeals, 245 SCRA 594, 598 [1995] cited
20 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years if
jurisdiction is vested by law either in the RTC or Sandiganbayan.
Based on Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, the MTC has jurisdiction
over offenses punishable by up to the maximum of prision correccional which
shall not exceed six (6) years. There are however, offenses which even if
punishable by prision correccional are not cognizable by the MTC because of
an express provision of law like libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code. Under this provision, libel by means of writings or similar means
shall be punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods or a fine ranging from P200 to P6,000 pesos or both. Nevertheless,
under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the criminal action as well as the
civil action for such offense shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
CFI (now RTC).
Also, some forms of direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code which are punishable by prision correccional in its medium period, are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of
P.D. 1606 as amended. Indirect bribery, a felony punishable by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods under Article 211 of the
Revised Penal Code are likewise cognizable by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to
Sec. 4(a) of P.D. 1606 as amended.
3. Where the only penalty provided for by law is a fine, the amount
thereof shall determine the jurisdiction of the court under the original
provisions of B.P. 129 (Sec. 32[2]) which provided that the MTC shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses punishable with a fine of not more
than Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos;
4. Exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence (B.P. 129, Sec. 32[2]; RA. 7691);
5. Violations of B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) (A.M. No.
00-11-01-SC, March 25,2003);
CHAPTER I 23
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Code of the Philippines. The Court held in the affirmative, citing the provisions of R.A. 8249 and
those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law.
In resolving the issue in favor of the People, the Court explained:
"Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-governors, members of the sang- guniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city
mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic
service occupying the position as consul and higher, Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent
and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of govern-
ment-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law
provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" (People of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan and Rolando Plaza, G.R. No. 169004,
September 15,2010).
3. The earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 167304, August
25, 2009, was decided under facts substantially similar to those in the other case of People
v. Sandiganbayan cited in the immediately preceding number.
The issue presented to the Court for resolution in the case involving the respondent was
whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under salary grade 26 who
was charged with violation of the Auditing Code of the Philippines for failure to liquidate cash
advances falls within the juris
CHAPTER I 33
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
said court (Geduspan v. People, G.R. No. 158187, February 11, 2005; Serana
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008; People u.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, September 15,2010).
and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code
{Montilla v. Hilario, 90 Phil. 49), like direct bribery, frauds against the public
treasury, malversation of public funds and property, failure of an accountable
officer to render accounts, illegal use of public funds or property or any of the
crimes from Articles 204 to 245 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Public office is not an element of the crime of murder, since
murder may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a private
citizen (Cunanan v. Arceo, 242 SCRA 88). Public office is not the essence of
murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done
by a private citizen or public servant (Montilla v. Hilario, 90 Phil. 49).
There is also no direct relation between the commission of the crime of
rape with homicide and the office as municipal mayor because public office is
not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand
independently of the office (Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627).
3. However, even if the position is not an essential ingredient of the
offense charged, if the information avers the intimate connection between the
office and the offense, this would bring the offense within the definition of an
offense "committed in relation to the public office" (Sanchez v. Demetriou,
227 SCRA 627).
4. An offense maybe said to have been committed in relation to the
office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender
and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions even
if public office is not an element of the offense charged. It is important
however, that the information must allege the intimate relation between the
offense charged and the discharge of official duties because the factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information. If the information lacks the required specific factual averments to
show the intimate connection between the offense charged and the discharge
of official functions, it was ruled that the
36 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
that he organized armed patrols and civilian commandos and provided them
with arms. Also acting as the city mayor and leader of the patrols, he ordered
the arrest and maltreatment of the victim who died as a consequence. While
public office is not an element of murder, the offense as alleged shows its
commission while the accused was in the performance of his official functions
and that the offense could not have been committed had he not held his office.
Public office is not, of course, an element of the crime of murder, since
murder may be committed by any person. However, the averments of the
information could bring the offense within the meaning of an "an offense
committed in relation to the public office'' and thus, the offense would fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Cunanan v. Arceo, 242 SCRA
89).
7. The previously cited cases require that the information must contain
the specific factual allegations that would indicate the close intimacy between
the discharge of the official duties of the accused and the commission of the
offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in
relation to public office.
This requirement however, was not met in Lacson v. Executive
Secretary, 301 SCRA 298. While the amended information for murder against
the several accused was alleged to have been committed "in relation to their
official duties as police officers," it contained no specific allegations of facts that
the shooting of the victim was intimately related to the discharge of the official
functions of the accused.
Lacson held that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction
of the court. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information.
Declared the Court in lucid terms:
"The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is
alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not
38 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
(c) taking up such other matters to clarify the issues and to ensure a
speedy disposition of the case (Sec.
14, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure).
6. If the accused refuses to stipulate or fails to do so, such refusal or
failure shall not prejudice the accused. Also, any admission of the accused
made during the preliminary conference must be reduced to writing and
signed by the accused and his counsel. If this requirement is not met, such
admission shall not be used against him (Sec. 14, The 1991 Rule on Summary
Procedure).
7. During the trial, an actual direct examination of the witnesses is
not required because the affidavits submitted shall constitute their direct
testimonies. The witnesses however, may be subjected to a
cross-examination, re-direct examination or re-cross examination.
Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as
competent evidence for the party presenting the affidavit. However, the
adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose (Sec. 15, The
1991 Rule on Summary Procedure).
8. The court is mandated not to order the arrest of the accused
except where the ground is his failure to appear when required by the court. If
he is arrested, he may be released on bail or on recognizance by a responsible
citizen acceptable to the court (Sec. 16, The 1991 Rule on Summary
Procedure).
9. Where a trial has been conducted, the court shall promulgate the
judgment not later than thirty (30) days after the termination of the trial (Sec.
17, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure).
offended party or a peace officer directly with the court on the basis of the
affidavit of the party or arresting officer or person. Under existing rules of the
Department of Justice, the inquest prosecutor may, instead of filing the criminal
action, release the person for further proceedings. This occurs when for
instance, the prosecutor finds that the arrest made does not comply with the
rules on a valid arrest. The person arrested is then released to be notified later
on of a subsequent preliminary investigation.
The rule that a complaint or information may be filed against the person
lawfully arrested without need for a preliminary investigation is not absolute
because before such complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may
ask for a preliminary investigation after validly signing a waiver of the provisions
of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may
apply for bail even before he is charged in court.
Even after the filing of the complaint or information, the rule allows the
person arrested to ask for a preliminary investigation within five (5) days from
the time he learns of the complaint or information being filed and with the
same right to adduce evidence in his defense.
7. The wheels of the criminal justice system could also start grinding
when law enforcement authorities are in possession of information on possible
criminal activities. The authorities may initiate a search and a seizure by virtue
of a search warrant duly issued. The search and seizure may also be conducted
without a warrant under well-recognized exceptions to the rule requiring a
warrant. When the search yields property or effects constituting a crime or
subjects of a crime or are means to commit a crime, the appropriate criminal
action shall be instituted.
under the control and direction of the public prosecutor although in special
cases, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the chief of the
prosecution office or the regional state prosecutor to prosecute the case
subject to the approval of the court
2. The complaint or information is required by the Rules to be in writing.
The caption of a criminal case contains at least two names. The first name
refers to the party that brought the action and this party is denominated as the
"People of the Philippines." This is because a crime is deemed to have been
committed against the "People" and under whose name a crime must be
prosecuted. The second name refers to the person named as offender. He is
the party against whom the action is brought.
The complaint or information must state the name of the accused (or
under a fictitious name when his true name is alleged to be unknown), the
name of the offended party, the designation of the offense, the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and the specific qualifying and aggravating
circumstances involved.
The complaint or information must also state the cause of the accusation
against the accused so he may know the offense for which he is charged and
also to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The cause of the accusation
necessarily includes the attendant qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
The date of the commission of the offense which need not be the precise date
unless the same is a material ingredient of the offense, shall be stated in the
complaint or information.
2. Also not deemed instituted are those civil actions which although
may arise from the same acts constituting the offense charged, are
denominated as independent civil actions because they do not legally arise
from the offense charged and are independent sources of liability.
3. After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil
action arising from the offense, cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action. Also, if the criminal action is filed after the
civil action has already been instituted, the civil action shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found. Independent civil actions however, are not
suspended and shall proceed independently of the criminal action.
4. The suspension of the civil action when the criminal action is
commenced does not also apply to a situation which poses a prejudicial
question. Instead, it is the criminal action which may be suspended upon a
proper petition on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. This
question exists when the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Bail
1. A person under the custody of the law may gain his release from
confinement by availing of the constitutional right to bail which may be given in
the form of corporate
50 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. He may apply for bail
before or after he is formally charged and as a rule, the application shall be
made in the court where his case is pending but no bail shall be allowed after a
judgment of conviction has become final. If before such finality, the accused
applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail.
2. It is not however, correct to assume that bail may be availed of
only after the filing of the complaint or information. A person in custody who is
not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city,
or municipality where he is held.
3. An application for bail shall not bar the accused from challenging
the validity of his arrest.
4. Bail may be a matter of right or a matter of judicial discretion. Even
a person charged with a capital offense may be allowed bail when evidence of
his guilt is not strong. That the evidence of guilt is strong is one which the
prosecution has the burden of proving.
Arraignment; bill of particulars; suspension of arraignment
1. Whether or not the accused is under detention or out on bail, the
court shall thereafter set the case for arraignment. Arraignment is the formal
mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Without
arraignment, the accused is not deemed to have been informed of such
accusation. If before his arraignment, the accused escapes, the court has no
authority to try him in absentia.
2. The accused is to be arraigned before the court where the
complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. It is made in open court
by the judge or clerk and consists of furnishing the accused with a copy of the
complaint or information and the reading of the same in a language he
understands. He is then asked whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
3. During the date set for arraignment, the accused need not enter
his plea outrightly because before the arraign
CHAPTER I 51
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
ment and plea the accused has several options. The accused may move for a
bill of particulars if there are defects in the information or complaint which
prevent him from properly pleading to the charge and preparingfor trial. He
may also move for the suspension of the arraignment when justifiable reasons
do exist for its suspension as when among others, the accused appears to be
suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. The accused may likewise, at any time before entering his plea, move
to quash, i.e., to dismiss the complaint or information.
Quashal of complaint or information
An accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the grounds provided for by the Rules. For instance, he may move to quash on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense or that the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person
of the accused. A motion to quash is a written motion signed by the accused or
his counsel which is supposed to distinctly specify both its factual and legal
grounds. The motion is filed before the accused enters his plea. If the complaint
or information is not dismissed or quashed, and a subsequent plea of not guilty
is entered, the machinery of the criminal justice system shall proceed to its
natural course.
Pre-trial
1. After the arraignment of the accused and within thirty (30) days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the accused, the court shall
order the mandatory trial conference to consider certain matters including plea
bargaining, stipulation of facts, the marking of the evidence, the waiver of
objections to admissibility, a possible modification of the order of the trial and
such other matters that will help promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
2. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting
the actions taken, the facts stipulated and
52 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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the evidence marked. The pre-trial order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial,
unless modified to prevent manifest injustice. All agreements or admissions
made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing
and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used
against the accused.
Trial; demurrer
1. Within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the pretrial order, trial
shall commence. The rule is that once the trial is commenced, it shall continue
from day to day as far as practicable until terminated but it may be postponed
for a reasonable period of time for good cause.
2. Normally, the trial begins with the prosecution presenting its
evidence but when the accused admits the act or omission charged but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
3. When the prosecution rests its case, the accused may now
present his evidence to prove his defense and the damages he may have
sustained arising from any provisional remedy issued in the case. However, the
accused may, instead of presenting his evidence, opt to move to dismiss the
case by presenting a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. This demurrer may be presented with or without leave of court. The
court may, for the same reason, dismiss the case on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard.
If the demurrer filed with leave of court is denied, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense but shall waive the right to present evidence if
the demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court is denied.
The prosecution and the defense may, in the same order present
rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence. Upon admission of the evidence of the
parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court
directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.
CHAPTER I 53
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Judgment
1. After trial, the judgment of the court shall follow. A judgment is the
adjudication by the court on the guilt or innocence of the accused and the
imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It is required to
be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the
judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of
the facts and the law upon which it is based.
2. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered unless it is for a
light offense in which case the judgment maybe pronounced in the presence of
his counsel or representative.
Post-judgment remedies
1. Before the judgment of conviction becomes final or before an
appeal is perfected, the accused may file a motion for the modification of the
judgment or for the setting aside of the same.
2. Also, at any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final,
the accused may move for a new trial or a reconsideration. A motion for new
trial shall be predicated upon errors of law or irregularities during the trial and
the discovery of new or material evidence. Within the same period, a motion
for reconsideration may also be filed on the grounds of errors of law or fact in
the judgment. The court also may, on its own motion with the consent of the
accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.
3. Before the finality of the judgment, the accused may also appeal
from a judgment of conviction in accordance with the procedure set forth in
the Rules. Notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the court may allow
the appellant, upon proper motion to withdraw the appeal already perfected
before the record has been forwarded by the clerk of court to the proper
appellate court. An appeal may even be withdrawn upon proper motion of the
appellant before the rendition of the
54 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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judgment of the case on appeal in which case the judgment of the court of
origin shall become final and the case shall be remanded to the latter court for
execution of the judgment.
4. Cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or the Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall be
appealed to the Regional Trial Court. Cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
shall be appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in
the proper cases provided for by law. Cases decided by the Court of Appeals or
the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.
5. The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from.
6. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
petition for review under Rule 42.
7. The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the RTC is
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be by notice of appeal to the
Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 122. A review of the case by the
Court of Appeals is necessary before the same is elevated to the Supreme
Court.
8. Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Entry of judgment
When all remedies have been exhausted and the judgment has become
final, the same shall be entered in accordance with existing rules.
- oOo -
Chapter II
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES (Rule 110)
55
56 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
No direct filing in the Regional Trial Court and Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila and other chartered cities
1. There is no direct filing of an information or complaint with the
Regional Trial Court under Rule 110 because its jurisdiction covers offenses
which require preliminary investigation.
A preliminary investigation is to be conducted for offenses where the
penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day (Sec. 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court). The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
over an offense punishable with imprisonment of more than six (6) years, a
period way above the minimum penalty for an offense that requires a
preliminary investigation. On the other hand the Municipal Trial Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years (Sec. 32[2], Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 [B.P.
129]). Note: Please refer however, to the last sentence of the first
paragraph of Sec. 6 of Rule 112.
2. There is likewise no direct filing with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila because in Manila, including other chartered cities, the complaint, as
a rule, shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor, unless otherwise
provided by their charters (Sec. 1, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Although in
Manila and other chartered cities the complaint shall be filed with the office of
the prosecutor, in case of a conflict between a city charter and a provision of
the Rules of Court, the former, being substantive law, shall prevail.
CHAPTER II 57
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
(Rule 110)
Act No. 3326 says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person," the proceedings referred
to are "judicial proceedings" and not administrative proceedings.
Accordingly, the prescriptive period in these cases is governed by Act No.
3326 and is interrupted only by the institution of judicial proceedings because
Sec. 2 of the law provides that prescription begins from the commission of the
crime or from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment. Zaldivia further declared that if there be
a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the latter
must yield because the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not
allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under the
Constitution and that"... Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right."
2. Recent cases however, appear not to strictly adhere to the line toed
by Zaldivia in cases involving violations of special laws.
For instance, Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662,
February 19, 2008, a case involving a violation of the Intellectual Property
Code, a special law, ruled differently from Zaldivia.
The case involves as the petitioner, Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese
corporation which owns the copyright of various animated characters such as
"Hello Kitty," "Little Twin Stars," "My Melody," "Tuxedo Sam" and
"Zashikibuta" among others. While it is not engaged in business in the
Philippines, its products are sold locally by its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate
Incorporated (GGI).
Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of counterfeit Sanrio products, GGI
asked IP Manila Associates (IPMA) to conduct a market research. The
research's objective was to identify those factories, department stores and
retail outlets manufacturing and/or selling fake Sanrio items. After conducting
several test-buys in various commercial areas, IPMA confirmed
CHAPTER II 61
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
(Rule 110)
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same may not be known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy, (underscoring for em-
phasis supplied).
The Court of Appeals ruled that because no complaint was filed in court
within two years after the commission of the alleged violation, the offense had
already prescribed.
The petitioner disagreed, and in the Supreme Court, petitioner averred
that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the alleged violations of the
Intellectual Property Code (IPC) had prescribed because it had actually filed a
complaint with the corresponding Task Force of the DOJ. It contended that said
filing tolled the running of the prescriptive period for the offense.
The Supreme Court found the contention meritorious. It likewise
confirmed that under Section 2 of Act 3326, the prescriptive period for
violation of special laws starts on the day such offense was committed and is
interrupted by the institution of proceedings against respondent (i.e., the
accused). It also found that the petitioner in this instance filed its
complaint-affidavit with the TAPP of the DOJ before the alleged violation had
prescribed. The Court categorically ruled that the prescriptive period for the
prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner's timely
filing of the complaint-affidavit before the TAPP.
3. In Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008, the
issue raised was whether or not the filing of a complaint for violation of B.P.
Big. 22 before the Office of the Prosecutor interrupts the running of the
prescriptive period for the offense. Here, the Assistant City Prosecutor dis
CHAPTER II 63
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
(Rule 110)
missed the complaint against the respondent because the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that
violations of laws as those penalized by B.P. Big. 22 shall prescribe after four (4)
years. Accordingly, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were
dishonored and the filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor
did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law
contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering
that more than four (4) years had already elapsed from the dishonor of the
check and no information had as yet been filed against the respondent, the
alleged violation of B.P. Big. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.
The DOJ affirmed the resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor and held
in favor of the respondent. Subsequently, the DOJ, this time through the
Undersecretary, ruled in favor of the petitioner/complainant declaring that the
offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3)
separate informations against the respondent for violation of B.P. Big. 22. The
informations were filed. Later, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent, ruled that the subject offense had
already prescribed and ordered the withdrawal of the three (3) informations
for violation of B.P. Big. 22. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained
that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a
prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Big. 22, as a special
act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes,
Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which gov-
erns the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. The DOJ also cited the
case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., 211 SCRA 277, wherein the Supreme Court ruled
that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial
proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
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Aggrieved, the petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals assailing the latest resolution of the DOJ but the petition was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals on technical grounds. In the Supreme Court,
the DOJ reiterated its earlier argument that the filing of a complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City did not interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Big. 22. It argued that under B.P. Big.
22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period,
offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326. The
respondent also claimed that the offense of violation of B.P. Big. 22 has already
prescribed per Act No. 3326.
On the other hand the petitioner assailed the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia
v. Reyes, a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring
that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court.
According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan, 338 Phil. 1061, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation
suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also noted that the
Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In resolving the issue, the Court declared:
X X X
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Big. 22. An
offense under B.P. Big. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No.
3326, a violation of B.P. Big. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of
the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof.
Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court
can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
CHAPTER II 65
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
(Rule 110)
The Court also explained, that when Act No. 3326 was passed,
preliminary investigation could be conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment x x x."
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's
filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor x x x
signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused and thus, effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses
they had been charged under
3. Note however, that pursuant to said provision, only the civil liability
of the accused arising from the offense charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal
action. Those not arising from the offense charged like the independent civil
actions referred to in Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are not deemed
instituted with the criminal action. These actions, according to Sec. 3 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court shall proceed independently of the criminal action.
Thus, the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of
reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately
from criminal actions because they are separate, distinct and independent of
any criminal prosecution even if based on the same act which also gave rise to
the criminal action.
4. Thus, it was ruled that as one of the direct consequences of the
independent character of actions brought under Arts. 32,33,34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, even if a civil action is filed separately, "the ex delicto civil liability in
the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may — subject to the
control of the prosecutor — still intervene in the criminal action, in order to
protect the remaining civil interest therein" (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v.
People, G.R. No. 147703, April 14,2004).
over the actual conduct of the trial (People v. Tan, G.R. No. 177566, March
26,2008).
The executive department of the government is accountable for the
prosecution of crimes. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide
range of discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors (Gonzalez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, G.R.
No. 164904, October 19,2007).
2. The power to prosecute includes the initial discretion to determine
who should be utilized by the government as a state witness (People v.
Fajardo, 512 SCRA 360, January 23, 2007).
3. The prosecution is also entitled to conduct its own case and to
decide what witnesses to call to support its charges. The non-presentation of a
witness by the prosecution cannot be construed as suppression of evidence
where the testimony is merely corroborative (Ritualo v. People, G.R. No.
178337, June 25, 2009).
4. Not even the Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case — the only possible exception to the rule is
where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the prosecutor (Chua v. Padillo, G.R. No. 163797, April 24,2007).
5. In one case, three informations were filed against the petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
One information pertains to allegations that petitioner employed
manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation
(BW) shares. The other informations involve the alleged failure of petitioner to
file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of
his beneficial ownership of BW shares.
d.- Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges.
CHAPTER II 71
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
(Rule 110)
Subsequently, the trial court ruled that the delays which attended the
proceedings of one of the petitioner's cases were vexatious, capricious and
oppressive, resulting in violation of the petitioner's right to speedy trial and
hence, ordered its dismissal. The dismissal was later on reversed by the Court
of Appeals and reinstated the. case previously dismissed.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals and filed a motion for inhibition of the Justices who decided the case
but both motions were denied.
The petitioner hence, filed a petition for review on certiorari, raising
among others the issue that the certificate of non- forum shopping attached to
the People's petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals should have
been signed by the Chairman of the SEC as complainant in the cases instead of
Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez.
The Court found the petitioner's argument futile holding that the Court
of Appeals was correct in sustaining the authority of Acting DOJ Secretary
Merceditas Gutierrez to sign the certification. The Court went on to say that it
must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping is required to be
executed by the plaintiff. Although the complaint-affidavit was signed by the
Prosecution and Enforcement Department of the SEC, the petition before the
Court of Appeals originated from Criminal Case No. 119830, where the plaintiff
or the party instituting the case was the People of the Philippines. Section 2,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court leaves no room for doubt and establishes that
criminal cases are prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines, the
offended party in criminal cases. Moreover, pursuant to Section 3, paragraph
(2) of the Revised Administrative Code, the DOJ is the. executive arm of the
government mandated to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute
offenders and administer the probation and correction system. It is the DOJ,
through its prosecutors, which is authorized to prosecute criminal cases on
behalf of the People of the Philippines. Prosecutors control and direct the
prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary
investigation, subject to
72 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
review by the Secretary of Justice. Since it is the DOJ which is the government
agency tasked to prosecute criminal cases before the trial court, the DOJ is best
suited to attest whether a similar or related case has been filed or is pending in
another court or tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez, being
the head of the DOJ, therefore, had the authority to sign the certificate of
non-forum shopping for the criminal case which was filed on behalf of the
People of the Philippines (Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009).
6. In a case, the accused argues that he can no longer be charged
because he was left alone after either the death or acquittal or the failure to
charge his co-conspirators. The accused likewise argues that his prosecution, to
the exclusion of others, constitutes unfair discrimination and violates his
constitutional right to equal protection of the law. He says that the dismissal of
the case against his co-accused was not appealed by the prosecution and
some who should be accused were not charged.
The Court considered the argument erroneous. A conspiracy is in its
nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends
upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that
one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. As long as the acquittal or death
of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one
defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
The Court also held that the accused was not unfairly discriminated
against and his constitutional right to equal protection violated. The Court
explained that the manner in which the prosecution of the case is handled is
within the sound discretion of the prosecutor, and the non-inclusion of other
guilty persons is irrelevant to the case against the accused. A discriminatory
purpose is never presumed. The facts show that it was not solely the
respondent who was charged, but also five others. Further, the fact that the
dismissal of the dase against his co-accused was not appealed is not sufficient
to cry discrimination. This is likewise true for the non-
CHAPTER II 73
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
(Rule 110)
Adopting the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator, the Court
ruled that a violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the
Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he
being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account, held the Court, that
the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to
protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the
rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. The act of allowing the
presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public
prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a clear
transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving
the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
Added the Court:
5. There are however, cases where the criminal action also gives rise
to an independent civil action as in crimes involving physical injuries, fraud or
defamation or when the act constituting a crime also constitutes a quasi-delict.
These situations give rise to distinct civil liabilities to wit: The one arising from
the offense charged under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and the civil
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts or independent civil actions. Worthy of note
is the principle that the latter sources of civil liabilities do not arise from the
offense charged.
By virtue of its independent character as a distinct source of civil liability,
the filing of a suit based on a quasi- delict theory during the pendency of the
criminal proceeding, should not prevent the intervention by the offended party
in the prosecution of the offense because there still exists a civil liability under
the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the civil liability arising from the offense charged
which would be the basis for the intervention. This is because the civil liability
arising from a quasi-delict "is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code" (Article 2177, Civil Code of the
Philippines). Also, in the case of independent civil actions, they "may proceed
independently of the criminal action" (Sec. 3, Rule 111, Rules of Court).
6. It needs to be emphasized that the civil liabilities arising from
independent civil actions and a quasi-delict do not arise from the felony or
crime, and have distinct sources from the law or the Civil Code. They are not
hence, covered by the provision of the Revised Penal Code declaring that
persons liable for a felony are also civilly liable. Such civil actions "may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter" (Article 31, Civil Code of the Philippines).
110, Rules of Court). Since the rule does not distinguish, the consent or pardon
may be either expressed or implied.
Prosecution of defamation
1. The defamation under this rule (Sec. 5, Rule 110) consists in the
imputation of the offenses of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and
acts of lasciviousness (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
2. The criminal action for defamation under the rule shall be brought
at the instance of and upon the complaint filed by the offended party (Sec. 5,
Rule 110, Rules of Court). This rule clearly provides that only the offended
party can initiate the criminal action.
Meaning of 'complaint'
1. A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with
an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public
officer, charged with the enforcement of the law violated (Sec. 3, Rule 110,
Rules of Court).
2. A complaint is not a mere statement. It is a statement charging a
person with an offense. As a statement it must be "sworn" and "written." Be it
noted too that the complaint is subscribed only by any of the persons specified
in the rule, namely, the offended party, any peace officer, or other public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated.
80 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
Objections as to form
Objections relating to the form of the complaint or infor-
mation cannot be made for the first time on appeal. The
accused-appellant should have moved before arraignment
either for a bill of particulars or for the quashal of the infor-
mation. Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed
to have waived his objections to any formal defect in the
information (The People of the Philippines v. Romar Teodoro y
Vallejo, G.R. No. 172372, December 4,2009).
How to state the name of the offended party who is a natural person
The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the
offended party or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been
or is known. However, if there is no better way of identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious name. If later on, the true name of the offended
party is disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be
inserted (Sec. 12, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
How to state the name of the offended party which is a juridical person
If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name
or any name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be
identified, without need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is
organized in accordance with law (Sec. 12[c], Rule 110, Rules of Court).
L-51745, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 680, the Court ruled that in case of
offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is
not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the
complaint or information can be properly identified (Cited in Ricarze v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9,2007).
Designation of the offense
1. It is settled that it is the allegations in the information that
determine the nature of the offense, not the technical name given by the
public prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of
view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him
in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be directed, and
in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts
alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of
the information in the manner therein set forth (Matrido v. People, G.R. No.
179061, July 13,2009).
The specific acts of the accused do not have to be described in detail in
the information as it is enough that the offense be described with sufficient
particularity to make sure the accused fully understands what he is being
charged with. The particularity must be such that a person of ordinary
intelligence immediately knows what the charge is. Moreover, reasonable
certainty in the statement of the crime suffices (Guy v. People, G.R. Nos.
166794-96, March 20,2009).
2. In designating the offense, the following rules must be observed:
(a) The designation of the offense requires, as a rule, that the
name given to the offense by statute must be stated in the complaint or
information.
If the statute gives no designation to the offense, then reference must
instead be made to the section or 1 subsection punishing it (Sec. 8, Rule
110, Rules of Court).
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Revised Penal Code, it nonetheless narrates that the accused stabbed the
victim with a bladed weapon during the incident which caused the latter's
death. The allegations, according to the Court, unmistakably refer to homicide
which is the unlawful killing of any person other than murder, homicide or
infanticide.
The Court likewise held in the same case that the sufficiency of an
information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the
crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of
facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently ap-
prises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The Court in the case asserted that the character of the crime is
determined neither by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in
the information
The rationale for the requirement was elucidated in a much earlier case.
In People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 132923-24, June 6, 2002, the accused was
found guilty by the trial court of two counts of rape, each qualified by the use of
a deadly weapon. The informations however, did not allege that the rapes
were committed with the use of a deadly weapon. The Court was emphatic
when it declared that the accused cannot be convicted of rape qualified by the
use of a deadly weapon and be made to suffer a higher penalty since that
circumstance was not alleged in the information. Not having been alleged and
having been charged with simple rape only, the accused cannot be convicted of
qualified rape. He cannot be held liable for an offense graver than that for
which he was indicted. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due
process, if he is charged with simple rape, on which he was arraigned, and be
convicted of qualified rape punishable by death.
2. In one information for arson, there was no allegation that the house
intentionally burned by petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the
information merely recited that "accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of
the [offended party] to the latter's damage and prejudice." Under the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the information or complaint must state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and
generic aggravating circumstances, otherwise stated, the accused will not be
convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in
the information Hence, he can only be liable for simple arson and not arson of
an inhabited dwelling which carries a higher penalty (Buebos v. People, G.R.
No. 163938, March 28,2008).
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts
generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have
attended the
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commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information.
However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts could no longer
consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the
determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an
aggravating circumstance had been proven, but was not alleged, courts will
not award exemplary damages. Also, even if the guilt of the accused was
proven beyond reasonable doubt, the accused cannot be convicted of
qualified rape but only with simple rape because the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the
information (People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009;
People v. Alfredo, G.R. No. 188560, December 15, 2010).
3. The qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive
words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by7' to properly qualify an offense. It is
not the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a
higher category, but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which
adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category (People v.
Rosas, G.R. No. 177825, October 24, 2008).
4. In one case brought to the Supreme Court, both the accused
contend that the information did not contain any allegation of conspiracy,
either by the use of the words conspire or its derivatives and synonyms, or by
allegations of basic facts constituting conspiracy that will make them liable for
the acts of their co-accused.
The Court considered the contention untenable. It is true as it is settled,
declared the Court, that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred in the
information. The Court however, found that while a perusal of the information
readily shows that the words "conspiracy," "conspired" or "in conspiracy with"
do not appear in the information, this however, does not necessarily mean
that the absence of these words would signify that conspiracy was not alleged
in the information. After carefully reading the information, the Court
concluded that indeed conspiracy was properly
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alleged in the information. The accusatory portion reads in part: "all the
above-named accused, with evident intent to defraud the government of
legitimate taxes accruing to it from imported articles, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly participate in and facilitate the
transportation, concealment, and possession of dutiable electronic
equipment and accessories with a domestic market value of P20,000,000.00
contained in container van No. TTNU9201241, but which were declared in
Formal Entry and Revenue Declaration No. 118302 as assorted men's and
ladies' accessories x x x." The Court ruled that "We find the phrase "participate
in and facilitate" to be a clear and definite allegation of conspiracy sufficient for
those being accused to competently enter a plea and to make a proper
defense." Both accused were charged because they assisted in and facilitated
the release of the subject cargo without the payment of the proper duties and
taxes due the government by omitting certain acts in the light of glaring
discrepancies and suspicious entries present in the documents involved in the
subject importation (Francisco v. People, G.R. No. 177430, July 14, 2009;
Ojeda v. People, G.R. No. 178935, July 14, 2009).
5. A similar pronouncement was made by the Court in a fairly recent
case. In People v. Ubifia, G.R. No. 176349, July 10, 2007, the Court declared
that the twin circumstances of minority and relationship under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are in the nature of
qualifying circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and
increase the penalty. As special qualifying circumstances they must be
specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information. "If the offender
is merely a relation — not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or
common law spouse of the mother of the victim — the specific relationship
must be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is "a relative by consanguinity
or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree."
The Court found that the information in Ubifia only mentioned
accused/appellant as the victim's uncle, without specifically stating that he is a
relative within the third civil
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degree, either by affinity or consanguinity. Even granting that during trial it was
proved that the relationship was within the third civil degree either of
consanguinity or affinity, still such proof cannot be appreciated because
appellant would thereby be denied of his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Appellant cannot be charged with
committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and
convicted of rape in its qualified form. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
disregarded the qualifying circumstance of relationship.
Cause of accusation
1. The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are
substantial matters and an accused's right to question his conviction based on
facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived. No matter how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is
tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict him of a ground not alleged
while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly
be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation
in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal
case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his
substantial rights (Matrido v. People, G.R. No. 179061, July 13,2009).
2. In informing the accused of the cause of accusation against him, it
is not necessary to employ the words used in the statute alleged to have been
violated. It is sufficient for the complaint or information to use ordinary and
concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know the following (Sec. 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court):
What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against the
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint, and
not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint, nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated they being
conclusions of law (Nombrefia v. People, G.R. No. 157919, January 30,
2007).
3. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form
as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper
judgment. The information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of
the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the
specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements of
the crime in the information is to inform an accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare for his defense.
Another purpose is to enable the accused, if found guilty, to plead his
conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense (Serapio v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 29,2003).
4. The accused will not be convicted of the offense proved during the
trial if it was not properly alleged in the information. If the information charges
a violation of a law (Sec. 3, Par. 2 ofP.D. No. 1613) that requires an intentional
burning of a house or dwelling but the same information does not allege that
there was an intentional burning of such dwelling, there cannot be a conviction
under the said law because of an insufficiency in the allegations of the
information. The failure to make the required allegations is fatal to a charge of
arson under the applicable law (Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March
28,2008).
5. In another case, the victim was raped by the accused while she
was under the custody of law enforcement authorities who were members of
the PNP-CIDG at the time of the rape. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, the
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those charged in the information and proven during the trial (People v.
Quemeggen, G.R. No. 178205, July 27,2009).
Rule when the offense is covered by Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Art. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal
action is first filed (Sec. 15[d], Rule 110, Rules of Court).
nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense
or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. Thus,
the substitution of the private complainant is not a substantial amendment
where the substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to the other party. More so if the
documentary evidences involved in the case remained the same, and all are
available to the other party before trial (Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
160451, February 9,2007).
2. On the other hand, the following have been held to be mere
formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from
that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter
the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which
does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an
amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states
with additional precision something which is already contained in the original
information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged (Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9,2007).
3. One case which illustrates the distinction between a formal and
substantial amendment particularly well is Pacoy v. Judge Afable Cajigal, G.R.
No. 157472, September 28,2007. Here, upon arraignment, the accused, duly
assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide.
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge
issued another order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
information to murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank alleged in the information which the judge considered as having qualified
the crime to murder.
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(Rule 110)
"The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information
or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the
information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of
the information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they
differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes,
while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original
charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected
without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court
as the original information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for
another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in
substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the
accused has to plead anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the
original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information
after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused,
for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke
double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the
new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double
jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under
the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under
the
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second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves
the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient;
otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and
different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support
a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the
other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the
second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information.
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in
the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to
be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter."
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Chapter III
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION (Rule 111)
107
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The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the
accused is the defendant is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The law
allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of
suits. Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended
party benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to
him (Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
169711, February 8,2010).
3. The rule on implied institution of the civil action does not apply before
the filing of the criminal action or information. Hence, it was ruled in one case
that when there is no criminal case yet against the respondents as when the
Ombudsman is still in the process of finding probable cause to prosecute the
respondent, the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted along with the
criminal action unless the offended party: (a) waives the civil action, (b)
reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action, is not applicable (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, October 15,2008).
Who the real parties in interest are in the civil aspect of the case
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the
offended party and the accused. Hence, either the offended party or the
accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the
accused. The public prosecutor generally has no interest in appealing the civil
aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The
case is terminated as far as he is concerned (Hun Hyung Park v. Eun Wong
Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007).
Rule applicable
One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused
arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the
initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit (Hun Hyung Park v. Eun Wong
Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12,2007).
law. The civil actions arising from these articles do not arise from the acts or
omissions constituting a felony hence, are not impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. Only the civil action to recover the civil liability flowing from or
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
4. The civil actions arising from Articles 2176, 32, 33 and 34 of the
Civil Code may be filed independently and separately from the criminal action
because they do not arise from the offense charged. What the law proscribes is
double recovery. Article 2177 of the Civil Code declares that "the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant
The same prohibition on double recovery is reiterated in the Rules of
Court (Sec. 3, Rule 111), thus:
"x x x In no case however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged
in the criminal action."
of Court) and regardless of the results of the latter (Article 31, Civil Code of the
Philippines). (Bar 2005)
2. The quantum of evidence required is preponderance of evidence
(Sec. 3, Rule 111, Rules of Court).
3. (a) The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed
included therein.
(b) The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate
civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right
to bring an independent civil action.
(c) Even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil
liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may
— subject to the control of the prosecutor — still intervene in the
criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein
(See also Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703,
April 14,2004).
158177, January 28, 2008). Quoting the earlier case of Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp. (465 SCRA 454) the Court
noted in Lo Bun Tiong:
w
x x x This rule [Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure] was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22
cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing
fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the
intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit grab's and sometimes,
upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the
civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of
cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also
expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two
separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed
and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the
reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of
the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil
and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for
the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove
to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further
delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.
Where petitioners' rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the
trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted." (Emphasis supplied)
111, Rules of Court). The rule indicates that preference is given to the
resolution of the criminal action.
2. It is submitted that even if the right to institute the civil action
separately has been reserved, the separate civil action cannot however, be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action
previously instituted.
Also, if the civil action was commenced before the institution of the
criminal action, the civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found before judgment on the merits, once the criminal action is filed. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action (Sec.
2, Rule 111, Rules of Court). This rule however, does not apply to independent
civil actions discussed earlier and covers only civil actions arising from the
offense charged.
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action" (Sec. 3, Rule 111,
Rules of Court).
because no final judgment of conviction was yet rendered by the time of his
death. Only civil liability predicated on a source of obligation other than the
delict survived the death of the accused, which the offended party can recover
by means of a separate civil action CPeople of the Philippines v. Bringas Bunay
y Dam-at, G.R. No. 171268,, September 14,2010). Thus, the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability and
the civil liability based solely thereon {People v. Jaime Ayochok y Tauli, G.R.
No. 175784, August 25,2010).
Effect of acquittal or the extinction of the penal action on the civil action or
civil liability
1. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
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exist (Sec. 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court). The civil action based on delict may,
however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Wong Choi, G.R. No. 165496,
February 12, 2007).
2. In case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability
of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The
civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where such acquitted is based on
lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since only preponderance of evidence
is required in civil cases (Ching v. Nicdao, 522 SCRA 316, April 27, 2007; Box v.
People, 532 SCRA 284, September 5, 2007).
3. Similarly, it was again held that when the trial court acquits the
accused or dismisses the case on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not
automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be
determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party
may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied
dismissal of his claim for civil liability (Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos, G.R.
No 169711, February 8,2010).
4. Thus, under Section 2 of Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, a trial
court, in case of acquittal of an accused, is to state whether the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove his (accused) guilt or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, and in either case, it shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. If after a perusal
of the decision of the trial court it shows that it found that the acts or omissions
from which the civil liability of respondents might arise did not exist,
122 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
there is no basis to award any civil liability to the private complainants (Ramon
Garces v. Simplicio Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 180761, August 18,2010).
5. A more recent case is illustrative of the principle subject of this topic.
Here, the petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with
damage to property in the Municipal Trial Court.
After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime
charged. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the
heirs of the victims actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages,
temperate damages and loss of earning capacity.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court contending that the
Municipal Trial Court erred in holding him civilly liable in view of his acquittal
but the Regional Trial Court affirmed the judgment appealed from in toto.
Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
Left with no other recourse, petitioner now argued in the Supreme Court
that his acquittal should have freed him from payment of civil liability.
Emphatically, the Court declared: "We disagree.
"The rule is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal
liability will give rise to civil liability only if the felonious act or omission results in
damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.
Every crime gives rise to (1) a criminal action for the punishment of the guilty
party and (2) a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage,
and indemnification for the losses.
However, the reverse is not always true. In this connection, the relevant
portions of Section 2, Rule 111 and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
provide:
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(Rule 111)
Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will
not necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of
civil damages in the same case. It is not even necessary that a separate civil
action be instituted.
In this case, the MTC held that it could not ascertain with moral certainty
the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus in view of
the condition of the highway where the accident occurred and the short
distance between the bus and the taxi before the collision. However, it
categorically stated that while petitioner may be acquitted based on
reasonable doubt, he may nonetheless be held civilly liable.
The RTC added that there was no finding by the MTC that the act from
which petitioner's civil liability may arise did not exist. Therefore, the MTC was
correct in holding petitioner civilly liable to the heirs of the victims of the
collision for the tragedy, mental anguish and trauma they suffered plus
expenses they incurred during the wake and interment.
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UPDATED EDITION
In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, we agree with
the conclusion of the CA that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not
commit the crime charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not
ascertain with moral conviction the wanton and reckless manner by which
petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. Put differently, petitioner
was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and
damages arising from the collision is another matter.
While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his
negligence was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly
liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence. In other
words, the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty
does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was
preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him
civilly liable.
Thus, the MTC (as affirmed by the RTC and the CA) correctly imposed
civil liability on petitioner despite his acquittal. Simple logic also dictates that
petitioner would not have been held civilly liable if his act from which the civil
liability had arisen did not in fact exist" (Romero v. People, G.R. No.
167546July 17,2009).
Effect of payment of the civil liability
Payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability (Cabieo v.
Dimaculangan-Querijero, 522 SCRA 300, April 27, 2007). While there may be
a compromise upon the civil liability arising from the offense, such compromise
shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty
(Art. 2034, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Effect of judgment in the civil case absolving the defendant
A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving a defendant from
civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same
act or omission subject of the civil action (Sec. 5, Rule 111, Rules of Court).
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(Rule 111)
instituted prior to the civil case. It does not arise because the rule does not
merely refer to an instituted civil action but specifically to a "previously
instituted* civil action. Neither does it refer to a previously instituted criminal
action. That the civil action must have been instituted ahead of the criminal
action is confirmed by the same rule which makes reference to a "subsequent
criminal action "
4. It was affirmed that under the amendment to the Rules of Court, a
prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be
rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected.
The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
If the criminal information was filed ahead of the complaint in the civil case, no
prejudicial question exists (Torres v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 153666,
December 27,2002).
5. The tenor of Sec. 7 likewise presupposes that the issue that leads
to a prejudicial question is one that arises in the civil case and not in the criminal
case. It is the issue in the civil case which needs to be resolved first before it is
determined whether or not the criminal case should proceed or whether or
not there should be, in the criminal case, a judgment of acquittal or conviction.
6. In unmistakable terms, it was stressed that a prejudicial question
comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed. The issue raised
in the civil action would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case (Sy Thiong Siou v. Sy Chim, G.R.
No. 174168, March 30, 2009).
7. Another vital element of a prejudicial question is one which has
something to do with the issues involved. It is worth remarking that not every
issue raised in the civil action will result in a prejudicial question. The rule clearly
implies that
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it is not enough that both cases involve the same facts or even the same or
similar issues to make the civil case prejudicial to the criminal case. The mere
claim that the issues in both cases are intimately related will not necessarily
make the issue in the civil case prejudicial to the resolution of the issue in the
criminal case. It is critical to show that the issue in the civil case is
'determinative' of the issue in the criminal case. In the words of the rule: "x x x
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed" (Sec. 7, Rule 111, Rules of Court).
It is apparent that the exact parameters of what is 'determinative* has
not been defined by the rule thus, leaving to the court the task of adjudicating
upon the existence or non-existence of that vital factor in the application of the
principle. Nevertheless, one consequence appears quite clear: If the resolution
of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of
the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, the civil case does
not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the
civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other, that is, the criminal action can proceed without waiting for the
resolution of the issues in the civil case.
Effect of the existence of a prejudicial question; suspension of the criminal
action (Bar 1995; 1999; 2010)
1. A petition for the suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed (Sec. 6, Rule
111, Rules of Court). Under the clear terms of Sec. 6, it is worth remembering
that the rule requires the filing of a petition before the suspension of the
criminal action. The rule therefore, as it appears, precludes a motu proprio
suspension of the criminal action.
2. The need for the filing of a petition finds support in jurisprudence
which declares that since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action
may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or the
investigating prosecutor, the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of a
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Case illustrations
1. The case oiPimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13,
2010, lucidly illustrates when the principle of prejudicial question does not
apply. Here, the private respondent filed an action for frustrated parricide
against the petitioner. Several months after, the private respondent filed an
action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage. The petitioner filed an
urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the court where the criminal
case was pending on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. The
petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against him.
When the case reached the Court of Appeals, the court concluded
against the existence of a prejudicial question. The Court of Appeals ruled that
in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender
commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts
and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the
issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The Court of Appeals continued that even if the marriage
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land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever
on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of
loss.
3. Another case on the other hand, demonstrates the application of the
concept of "determinativeness" as a critical element under the principle of
prejudicial question.
In Omictin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2009, the
petitioner, operations manager of a corporation filed a complaint for two
counts of estafa against the private respondent. He alleged that the private
respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two company
vehicles entrusted to him when he was still the president of the corporation.
The private respondent avers that the demands are not valid demands, the
petitioner not having the authority to act for the corporation in view of the
invalidity of his appointment. The investigating prosecutor however,
recommended the indictment of the private respondent and was charged with
the crime of estafa.
The private respondent then filed a motion to suspend proceedings on
the basis of a prejudicial question because of the then pending case with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (later transferred to the RTC), a case
involving the same parties. It appears that earlier, the private respondent filed a
case for the declaration of nullity of the respective appointments of the
petitioner and other individuals as corporate officers. The case likewise
involved the recovery of share in the profits, involuntary dissolution and the
appointment of a receiver, recovery of damages and an application for a tem-
porary restraining order and injunction against the corporation and some of its
officials.
The case filed by the private respondent also alleged that the
appointment of certain officers were invalid because it was in derogation of the
corporate by-laws requiring that the president must be chosen from among
the directors, and elected by the affirmative vote of a majority of all the
members of the board of directors. Since the appointment of the officer
responsible for appointing the petitioner was
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When the checks were dishonored, the private respondents then filed civil
actions to collect sums of money with damages against the petitioner in the
RTC. Subsequently informations were also filed against the petitioner for
violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22.
In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend
proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil
cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved. The main contention of the
petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence,
exists because the civil cases for collection earlier filed against him for collection
of sum of money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. He further argued that, in the pending civil
cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from
the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that is a logical
antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. For if
the court rules that there is no valid consideration for the check's issuance, as
petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be held
liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. The court denied the motions for
lack of merit. The subsequent motions for reconsideration were likewise
denied.
Ruling on the issue on appeal to it, the Court explained t h a t " x x x The
issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating Batas
Pambansa Big. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the private respondents
are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks
that they have rediscounted from the payee." For the Court, the resolution of
the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that
the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases. Citing the
earlier case of Lozano v. Martinez (146 SCRA 323), the Court added that in a
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, it is the mere issuance
of worthless
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petitioners. The suspension order issued by the lower court was later on
upheld by the Court of Appeals which concluded that if the checks subject of
the criminal cases were later on declared null and void, then said checks could
not be made the bases of criminal prosecutions under Batas Pambansa Big. 22.
In other words, ruled the Court of Appeals, the outcome of the determination
of the validity of the said checks is determinative of guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prejudicial question
theory of the respondents must fail. For the Court, the prejudicial question
posed by respondents is simply whether the daily interest rate of 5% is void,
such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest are likewise
void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for Batas Pambansa Big.
22 will no longer prosper.
The Court stressed that the validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not
determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal cases because the
reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal
culpability under Batas Pambansa Big. 22. What Batas Pambansa Big. 22
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of
issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of
the offense are properly proved. Thus, whether or not the interest rate
imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos
mores will not affect the outcome of the Batas Pambansa Big. 22 cases because
what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In
fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing the Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached, that is, if a
bouncing check has been issued.
6. A similar result was reached in yet another more recent case, where
the High Court rejected respondent's' contention that the novation of the credit
line agreement was a prejudicial question in the prosecution for violation
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of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. According to the Court, the mere act of issuing a
worthless check, even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by Batas
Pambansa Big. 22. The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored
checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22,
the gravamen of the offense being the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Thus,
even if it will be subsequently declared that a novation took place between
respondents and petitioner, respondents are still not exempt from prosecution
for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 for the dishonored checks (Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Ramon P. Jacinto, G.R. No. 154622, August 3,2010).
7. The earlier case of Sabandal v. Tongco, G.R. No. 124498, October 5,
2001, involves a petition to suspend the criminal proceedings in the court
where the petitioner is charged with eleven counts of violations of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 filed in 1992. It appears that three years sifter the institution
of the criminal actions, the petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint against the
private respondent a case for specific performance, recovery of overpayment
and damages.
The issue raised reaching the Supreme Court is whether a prejudicial
question exists to warrant the suspension of the trial of the criminal cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 against petitioner until after the resolution
of the civil action for specific performance, recovery of overpayment, and
damages.
The Court predictably rejected the posturings of the petitioner. There is
no prejudicial question wrote the Court, because the issue in the criminal cases
for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 is whether the accused knowingly
issued worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for specific performance,
overpayment, and damages is whether the petitioner overpaid his obligations
to the private respondent. If, after trial in the civil case, the petitioner is shown
to have overpaid respondent, it does not follow, added the Court, that he
cannot be held liable for the bouncing checks he issued for the mere issuance
of worthless checks with knowledge of the
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PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
(Rule 111)
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, observed the Court, any decision in the
civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. The Court then
concluded that a decision in the civil case was not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question
(Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 336 SCRA 747).
A case decided before the Family Code became effective had a
substantially similar holding. Landicho v. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, February
23,1968, a frequently cited case, held that a party cannot judge by himself the
nullity of his first marriage to justify a second marriage before the dissolution of
the first marriage and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared by
the courts can it be held as void.
9. An action for a declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial
question to a concubinage case. This was the gist of the holding of the Court in
one remarkable case.
The facts of the case began when the petitioner married his wife in 1973.
In 1997, the petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Alleging that it
was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with another
woman, the wife of the petitioner subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. Petitioner then filed a
motion to defer the proceedings in the criminal case arguing that the
pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner likewise harped on the possibility that two conflicting decisions
might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal
case for concubinage.
The Court rejected the contentions of the petitioner when the issue was
presented before it for resolution. Unequivocally,
CHAPTER III 141
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
(Rule 111)
the Court ruled that the pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil
case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
"With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the
charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it
to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void is not
a defense" (Beltran v. People, G.R. No. 137567 June 20,2000).
10. Another interesting case involved a petitioner and a private
respondent who were married in 1988. In 1990, while the marriage was still
subsisting, the petitioner contracted a second marriage with another woman.
When private respondent learned of the marriage, she filed a complaint for
bigamy and on the basis of her complaint an information charging bigamy was
duly filed. The month before however, the petitioner had already filed an
action to annul his marriage with the private respondent on the ground that he
was merely forced to marry her, that she concealed her pregnancy by another
man at the time of the marriage and that she was incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.
Subsequently, the private respondent also filed with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) for the revocation of engineering licenses of the
petitioner and the second woman. Petitioner then filed with the PRC a motion
to suspend the administrative proceedings in view of the pendency of the civil
action for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and the bigamy
case.
Although the matters raised had become moot and academic when the
Supreme Court finally decided the case
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Chapter IV
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
143
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are better ventilated during the trial proper" (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135703, April 15,2009).
3. In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does
not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
respondent. A prosecutor merely determines the existence of probable cause,
and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so (De Chavez v.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 168830-31, February 6, 2007). Probable cause implies
probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence to justify a conviction (Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October
28,2009).
4. Stated otherwise, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation
does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof
(Spouses Balanguan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008;
The Presidential AD-Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans [FFCBL] v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 136225, April 23,2008).
For instance, whether the facsimile message is admissible in evidence
and whether the element of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters
best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not during the preliminary investigation. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of the prosecution's evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon after a fullblown trial on the merits. In fine, the validity and merits of a
party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during
CHAPTER IV 145
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level (Samuel Lee, et al. v.
KBC Bank N.V. [Formerly Kredietbanky N.V.I G.R. NO. 164673, January
15,2010).
5. The purposes of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether
(a) a crime has been committed; and (b) there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof (Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October
28,2009).
However, the ultimate purpose of a preliminary investigation "is to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless
and expensive prosecutions" (Sales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802,
November 16, 2001; Albay Accredited Constructions Association, Inc. v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 133517, January 30 2006, 480 SCRA 520). It is designed to
free a respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of
defending himselfTherself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable
probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon in a more or less summary
proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose
(Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656).
vestigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does
not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused,
not the fiscal. Bautista further holds that the Office of the Prosecutor is not a
quasi-judicial body. Necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal
complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 as are the
decisions of quasi-judicial bodies enumerated therein.
Bautista however, concedes that there are cases which held that a
prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial
function and that the power to conduct preliminary investigation is
quasi-judicial in nature. Bautista clarified that this statement holds true only in
the sense thatr like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. But here is
where the similarity ends. A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary
investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings.
4. A similar pronouncement was made a few years later, in Santos v. Go,
G.R. No. 156081, October 19,2005. This case held that a public prosecutor
does not perform acts of a quasi-judicial body. The Court described a
quasi-judicial body as an organ of government other than a court and other
than a legislature which performs adjudicatory functions. Said body affects the
rights of private parties either through adjudication or rule-making. Its awards,
when performing adjudicatory functions, determine the rights of the parties
and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a
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court. Such is not the case, according to the Court, when a public prosecutor
conducts a preliminary investigation.
The main issue for resolution in Santos v. Go was whether a petition for
review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the
Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal
case. In the course of this determination, the Court had to consider whether
the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a quasi-judicial
function. Note that Rule 43 is the mode of appeal from the awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agencies enumerated in said
Rule in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions.
The Court observed that Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions
and final orders or resolutions of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among the agencies
enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Thus, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
Reiterating its ruling in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Court
proceeded to declare that it cannot agree with petitioners' submission that a
preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a
quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the
findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. Since
the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose
decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to
indict petitioners is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review under Rule 43.
5. Also, a much later case affirmed previous rulings that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a
quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the
findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause
(Spouses Balanguan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008).
149
opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the
investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies
probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence to justify a conviction (Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October
28, 2009). Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has
been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that respondents are probably guilty
thereof. The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the
prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon
complaint of an offended party. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to
believe that the offense charged in the information, or any offense included
therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested (Manebo v.
Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October 28, 2009; Roberto B. Kalalo v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 158189, April 23,2010).
2. Probable cause need not be based on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. While probable cause demands more than "bare
suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction." A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspects to stand trial. It is not
a pronouncement of guilt (De Chavez v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 168830-31,
February 6,2007; Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174350,
August 13,2008; Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October 28, 2009).
3. Probable cause implies only probability of guilt and requires more
than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect. It does not call for
the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this
stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not
require
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the accused" (People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 171188, June 19, 2009).
2. Probable cause to warrant an arrest which is made by the judge refers
to "facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person to be
arrested. Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable caution or the
term ordinarily prudent and cautious man. The terms are legally synonymous
and their reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a
prosecutor or a judge but the average man on the street. It ought to be
emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of
evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of
common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance" (Webb v. De
Leon, 247 SCRA 652; Domalanta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125586, June 29,
2000).
R.A. 7691, certain offenses formerly within the jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts came under the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts. Consequently,
some offenses which before were not covered by the required preliminary
investigation are now subject to preliminary investigation even if such offenses
are cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts as long as the same are punishable
by at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day.
Procedure for cases not requiring a preliminary investigation
1. Where a preliminary investigation is not required because the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense involves an imprisonment of less than four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day, there are two ways of initiating a
criminal action.
(a) First, by filing the complaint directly with the prosecutor; or
(b) Second, by filing the complaint or information with the
Municipal Trial Court; (Sec. 8, Rule 112, Rules of Court; Tabujara v.
People, G.R. No. 175162, October 29,2008).
If the judge still finds no probable cause, despite the additional evidence,
the judge shall dismiss the case within ten (10) days from the submission of
additional evidence or expiration of said period (Sec. 8[b], Rule 112, Rules of
Court).
4. If the judge finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. If
the accused has already been arrested, the court shall instead issue a
commitment order. A warrant of arrest may not also be issued if the judge is
satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, in
which case, the court may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest (Sec.
8[b], Rule 112, Rules of Court).
The issuance of a warrant of arrest is not mandatory and is to be issued if
there is a necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody but a
judge gravely abuses his discretion if he issues a warrant based solely on the
statement of a witness who was not even personally examined in writing and
under oath and in the form of searching questions and answers (Tabujara v.
People, G.R. No. 175162, October 29, 2008).
if the penalty for robbery is more than four (4) years, two (2) months, and one
(1) day. Under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code, the minimum penalty
for robbery is prision correctional in its maximum period which is six (6) years
under Article 27 of the same code. The offense is one which involves a penalty
higher than four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day and the arrested
person would normally be entitled to a preliminary investigation. In this case
however, a preliminary investigation does not apply because he was validly
arrested.
2. If he has been arrested in a place where an inquest prosecutor is
available, an inquest will be conducted instead of a preliminary investigation. In
the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be
filed directly with the proper court by the offended party or a peace officer on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person
(Formerly Sec. 7, now Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court as amended by A.M.
No. 05-08-26-SC, August 30, 2005). Note: The direct filing under this rule
may be deemed an additional situation in which a direct filing in court may
be done.
he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
(Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court). This Revised Penal Code provision imposes a
penalty upon a public officer or an employee who, although having detained a
person for some legal ground, fails to deliver the person arrested to the proper
judicial authorities within the periods of twelve (12), eighteen (18) or thirty six
(36) hours as the case may be.
2. Be it noted that by virtue of R.A. 7438, any waiver by the person
arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing, signed
by such person in the presence of his counsel, otherwise such waiver shall be
null and void (Sec. 2, RA. 7438).
3. Observe that the person lawfully arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation before the filing of the information. This is not
however, to be taken to mean that the filing of the complaint or information
bars him from asking for a preliminary investigation. Under current rules, if an
information or complaint has already been filed, the person arrested who is
now an accused, may still ask for a preliminary investigation within five (5) days
from the time he learns of its filing, with the same right to adduce evidence in
his defense under Rule 112 (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court).
It is evident that because the complaint or information has already been
filed, the court has now assumed jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the accused
should address the motion for the holding of a preliminary investigation to the
court. While lawyers traditionally call the motion a "motion for
re-investigation," the term seems to be a misnomer because it presupposes
that a prior investigation had been held. A "motion to conduct a preliminary
investigation" appears to be a more appropriate term, although the title is of
lesser significance when compared to the essence of the motion.
preclude him from applying for bail (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court).
Note that while a preliminary investigation is undertaken, the person
arrested is still under detention. To effect his release, he may apply for bail
notwithstanding the waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court) and even if no information has yet been
filed against him. His right to bail is supported not only by Sec. 6 of Rule 112 but
also by Sec. 17(c) of Rule 114 which declares:
application for or admission of the accused to bail does not bar him from raising
such question (Sec. 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Failure to invoke the right
before entering a plea will amount to a waiver (People v. Gomez, 117 SCRA
73).
2. The rule on waiver is not new. The Court has consistently held long
ago that after a plea of not guilty is made, an accused is deemed to have
forgone the right to raise the absence of a preliminary investigation or any
irregularity that surrounds it (People v. Monteverde, 142 SCRA 668; Zacarias v.
Cruz, 30 SCRA 728, People v. Beltran, 32 SCRA 71; People v. Arbola, L-16936,
Aug 5, 1985; All cases cited in People v. Bulosan, 160 SCRA 492; People v.
Buluran, 325 SCRA 476).
3. A motion to quash is not the proper remedy because the absence
of a preliminary investigation is not one of the grounds for a motion to quash
under Sec. 3 of Rule 117.
It was thus, held that if there is no preliminary investigation and the
accused before entering his plea calls the attention of the court to his
deprivation of the required preliminary investigation, the court should not
dismiss the information. It should remand the case to the prosecutor so that
the investigation may be conducted (Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA
581).
For instance, in an early graft case, where the accused were deprived of a
full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the informations
against them, the Court emphasized that such fact does not warrant the
quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the proceedings already
had. Neither is the court's jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely
affected by deficiencies in the preliminary investigation. Instead, the
Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further proceedings therein and to
remand the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for the completion of the
preliminary investigation, the outcome of which shall then be indorsed to the
Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action (Vasquez v. Hobilia-Alinio, 271 SCRA
67).
162 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
shall not proceed with the inquest proceedings. Instead, he shall recommend
the release of the detainee, note down the disposition on the referral
document, prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action
he took and forward the same together with the record of the case, to the Gity
of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action (Sec. 9, Part II, Manual for
Prosecutors).
When the recommendation is approved, the order of release shall be
served on the officer having custody of said detainee so the latter may be
released. The officer shall also serve upoi^the detainee a notice of preliminary
investigation if the evidence on hand warrants the conduct of a regular
preliminary investigation. In such an event, the detainee shall be also released
for further investigation. The detainee shall be furnished copies of the charge
sheet or complaint, affidavits or sworn statements of the complainant and his
witnesses and other supporting evidence (Sec. 9, Part II, Manual for
Prosecutors).
3. Should it be found that the arrest was properly effected, the inquest
shall proceed but the Inquest Officer shall first ask the detained person if he
desires to avail himself of a preliminary investigation and if he does, he shall be
made to execute a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code with the assistance of a lawyer. The preliminary investigation may be
conducted by the Inquest Officer himself or by any other Assistant Prosecutor
to whom the case may be assigned (Sec.10, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors).
If the Inquest Prosecutor finds that probable cause exists, he shall
prepare the corresponding information with the recommendation that the
same be filed in court (Sec. 13, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). If no probable
cause is found, he shall recommend the release of the detained person (Sec.
15, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors).
The inquest must pertain to the offense for which the arrest was made
The inquest conducted must be for the offense for which the detainee
was arrested. This basic rule is exemplified by the case of Beltran v. People
(G.R. No. 175013, June 1,2007).
CHAPTER IV 165
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
The panel of prosecutors from the DOJ which conducted the second
inquest subsequently issued a resolution finding probable cause to indict
Beltran and San Juan as "leaders/ promoters" of the alleged rebellion. The
panel then filed an Information with the RTC Makati.
Beltran moved that the RTC make ajudicial determination of probable
cause against him but the court sustained the finding of probable cause against
Beltran. Beltran sought reconsideration but the Judge like the first judge of the
court in which the case was originally filed, also inhibited herself from the case
without resolving Beltran's motion. The new Judge of the court to which the
case was re-raffled denied the motion for reconsideration of Beltran. Hence,
the petition to set aside the orders finding probable cause and the denial of the
motion for reconsideration and to enjoin the prosecution of Beltran. The
petition likewise raised the validity of the inquest proceedings against Beltran.
The Supreme Court held that the inquest proceedings against Beltran for
rebellion is void. Inquest proceedings, declared the Court are proper only when
the accused has been lawfully arrested without a warrant. This is clear from
Sec. 6 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
The joint affidavit of Beltran's arresting officers states that the officers
arrested Beltran, without a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for
Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted — as he did
conduct — an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently,
when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the
second inquest void. None of Beltran's arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in
their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge
of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient
to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What
these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and^heard
Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on a certaifi date
CHAPTER IV 167
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
but the affidavits did not make reference to acts constituting rebellion.
The Court pointed out that under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21
September 1993, the initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine if the
arrest of the detained person was conducted in accordance with the provisions
of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sec. 5, Rule 113. If the arrest was not properly
effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61
which provides:
*Where Arrest Not Properly Effected. — Should the Inquest Officer find
that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action
taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City
or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
"Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is
approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant
the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be
served on the officer having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said
officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary investiga-
tion, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence."
ing to matters under its investigation. The grant of this authority, however, is
not unlimited, as the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by the
terms of the Constitution and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable
jurisprudence on the issuance, service, validity and efficacy of subpoenas.
Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena
duces tecum, operates under the requirements of reasonableness and
relevance. For the production of documents to be reasonable and for the
documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the
first place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate
and rule upon (Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11,2010 of Acting
Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C Office of the Ombudsman, AM. No. 10-
1-13-SC, March 2,2010).
(c) The Presidential Commission on Good Government with the
assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government
agencies is empowered to investigate, file and prosecute cases
investigated by it (Executive Order No. 14, May 7,1986).
the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail
term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus,
we have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not "a mere
formal or technical right" but a "substantive" one, forming part of due process in
criminal justice. This especially holds true here where the offense charged is pun-
ishable by reclusion perpetua and may be non-bailable for those accused as
principals (Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, June 1, 2007; Maza v.
Gonzalez, G.R. Nos. 172074-76, June 1,2007).
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses and other evidence he may
present. The motion however, should be done before the prosecutor has
issued a resolution in the case. Further, such motion should contain an
explanation for the failure to timely file the counter-affidavit
Clarificatory hearing if necessary; no right of cross-exami- nation
1. Within ten (10) days from the submission of the counter-affidavit,
other affidavits and documents filed by the respondent, or within ten (10) days
from the expiration of the period for their submission, a hearing may be set by
the investigating officer, if there are facts and issues to be clarified either from a
party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but do not have
the right to examine or cross- examine each other or the witnesses. If they have
questions to ask, they shall submit the questions to the investigating officer
who shall ask the questions to the party or witness concerned. The hearing shall
be terminated within five (5) days (Sec. 3 [e], Rule 112, Rules of Court).
2. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary
investigation. Under Sec. 3(e) of Rule 112, it is within the discretion of the
investigation officer whether to set the case for further hearings to clarify some
matters (De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71; Racho v. Miro, 567
SCRA 213; Sierra v. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 7549, August 29,2008).
petition must be verified and copies of the same must be furnished the adverse
party and the Prosecution Office issuing the appealed resolution (Sec. 4,
Department Circular No. 70). The petition must contain the matters
mandated under Sec. 5 of Department Circular No. 70 and failure to comply
with the same shall constitute sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition
(Sec. 6, Department Circular No. 70).
Within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
copy of the petition, the adverse party may file a verified comment. The
investigating/reviewing/approving prosecutor need not submit any comment
except when directed by the Secretary of Justice (Sec. 8, Department Circular
No. 70).
If no comment is filed within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be
resolved on the basis of the petition (Sec. 8, Department Circular No. 70).
Note: The appeal does not hold or prevent the filing of the corresponding
information in court based on the finding of probable cause in the appealed
resolution, unless the Secretary of Justice directs otherwise, but the appellant
and prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the
proceedings in court are held in abeyance (Sec. 9, Department Circular No.
70).
Note also that the party filing a petition for review is allowed to file a
motion for the suspension of the arraignment. Under Sec. 11(c) of Rule 116,
upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended, among
others, if a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending.
4. If the Secretary of Justice finds the same to be patently without merit
or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration, he may dismiss the petition outright
(Sec. 7, Department Circular No. 70).
If pursuant to the appealed resolution, an information has already been
filed and the accused has already been arraigned prior to the filing of the
petition, the petition shall
182 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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(b) New and material issues are raised which were not
previously presented before the Department of Justice and were not
hence, ruled upon;
(c) The prescription of the offense is not due to lapse within six
(6) months from notice of the questioned resolution; and
(d) The appeal or petition for review is filed within thirty (30)
days from notice.
If the appeal does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of
the President, the appeal shall be dismissed outright. If the lack of jurisdiction is
not readily apparent, the appellant/petitioner shall be ordered to prove the
necessary jurisdictional facts.
3. In the event of an adverse decision against the appellant, a verified
petition for review may be taken to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the final order of the Office of the President and following
the procedure set forth under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
In De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147932, January 25,
2006, the OSG contends that instead of filing a Rule 65 petition with the
Supreme Court, the petitioner should have availed of Rule 43 in the case under
consideration. Thus, the OSG argues that the petition should be dismissed
outright for being a wrong mode of appeal. On the other hand, assuming Rule
65 applies, the OSG points out that the petition for certiorari should be filed
with the Court of Appeals.
De Ocampo held that based on Memorandum Circular No. 58 the
resolution of the DOJ Secretary is appealable administratively to the Office of
the President since the offenses charged in this case are punishable by
reclusion perpetua. The Court further explained that even assuming that the
DOJ Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed resolutions, the petitioner
should have filed the instant petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the remedy sought by petitioner,
the petition for certiorari must fail.
fin
CHAPTER IV 189
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
(Elvira O. Ongv. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009).
When warrant of arrest is not necessary
1. A warrant of arrest is not required in the following instances:
(a) When a complaint or information has already been filed
pursuant to a lawful warrantless arrest, i.e., if the accused is already
under detention and was lawfully arrested without a warrant and a
complaint or information has been filed pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 112 (Sec.
5[c], Rule 112, Rules of Court); also when a warrant has already been
issued by the MTC judge pursuant to Sec. 5[b] of Rule 112 and the
accused is already detained (Sec. 5(c), Rule 112).
(b) When the accused is charged for an offense punishable only
by fine (Sec. 5[c], Rule 112); or
(c) When the case is subject to the Rules on Summary
Procedure (Sec. 16, 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure).
2. It is within the discretion of the judge to issue a warrant for the
arrest of an accused in a criminal case. A judge is required to personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. However, if he finds probable cause, then he is mandated by
law to issue such warrant. While before it was mandatory for the investigating
judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused if he found probable
cause, the rule is that the investigating judge's power to order the arrest of the
accused is limited to instances in which there is a necessity for placing him in
custody "in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." The arrest of the accused
can be ordered only in the event that the prosecutor files the case and the
judge of the RTC finds probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest
(Pangan v. Ganay, 445 SCRA 574 citing Concerned Citizens of Maddela v. De
la Torre-Yadao, 39&SCRA 217).
192 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
merits of the case and the evidence on record of the prosecution (Santos v.
Orda, Jr., 437 SCRA 504). The dismissal cannot be merely based on the findings
of the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed. Reliance cannot be
placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that there is no sufficient
evidence against the accused. The grant of the motion to dismiss cannot be
based upon considerations other than the judge's own and personal conviction
that there was no case against the accused. In other words, the judge himself
must be convinced that there was, indeed, no sufficient evidence against the
accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the
evidence in the possession of the prosecution (Martinez v. Court of Appeals,
237 SCRA 575; Gandarosa v. Flores, G.R. No. 167910,17July 2007,527 SCRA
776; Co v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 164669-70, October 30,2009; Harold V. Tamargo v.
Romulo Awingan, Lloyd Antiporda and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., G.R. No.
177727, January 19, 2010; Leonardo U. Flores v. Hon. Raul S. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 188197, August 3,2010).
3. The trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of
the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed
(Santos v. Orda, Jr., 437 SCRA 504). The trial court has the option to grant or
deny the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,
278 SCRA 656).
It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an
abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie
case (Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No.
163741, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 274).
4. Once a criminal action has been instituted by the filing of the
Information with the court, the latter acquires jurisdiction and has the authority
to determine whether to dismiss the case or convict or acquit the accused.
Where the prosecution is convinced that the evidence is insufficient to establish
the guilt of an accused, it cannot be faulted for
194 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
gross ignorance of the law against certain prosecutors. The complainant raised
the following questions of law: (1) whether the parties must appear together
before the investigating prosecutor during preliminary investigation; (2)
whether the counter-affidavits of the respondents should be sworn to only
before the investigating prosecutor; and (3) whether the investigating
prosecutor erred in denying the request of the complainant for clarificatory
questioning.
Ruled the Court:
- oOo -
Chapter V
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
201
202 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
take the witness stand. But instead of taking the witness stand, the petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the documentary evidence
already sufficiently established the existence of probable cause. The petitioner
contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. She argues that the respondent should
have taken into consideration the documentary evidence as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes which sufficiently established the existence of
probable cause.
The respondent judge in his comment submitted to the Highest Court,
argued that the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor is not
binding or obligatory upon him. He claimed that he was justified in requiring
the petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order to
determine probable cause since under Section 2, Article HI of the 1987
Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause "to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce " He
contended that the refusal of the petitioner to sit on the stand and be
examined negated the existence of probable cause.
The records, as discovered by the Court, disclosed that the respondent
judge dismissed the case without evaluating the evidence in support of the
resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the convened Panel of
Prosecutors, and the Department of Justice which all sustained a finding of
probable cause against the accused. The respondent judge's finding of lack of
probable cause was premised only on the complainant's and her witnesses'
absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial
determination of probable cause.
The Supreme Court found the respondent to have committed a grave
abuse of discretion for dismissing the criminal case on the ground that
petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to take the
witness stand.
CHAPTER V 205
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.
X X X
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge's
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be
emphasized that such personal examination is not mandatory and
indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the
evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may
rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise
evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof." (underscoring
supplied)
Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of
the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004, we
stressed that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating
prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties,
the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the
Information. If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is
sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted, x x
x."
3. Talingdan v. Eduarte, 366 SCRA 559 declares in categorical terms:
"Interpreting the words personal determination ... it does not thereby
mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses themselves, x x x. Rather what is emphasized
merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
CHAPTER V 207
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Court explained that the duty of the judge to determine probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest as mandated by Sec. 2, Article HI of the
1987Philippine Constitution does not mandatorily require the judge to
personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to
personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. What the law requires as
personal determination on the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely
on the report of the investigating prosecutor. This means that the judge should
consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the
affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of
the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes
taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the information (People of the
Philippines v. Gray, G.R. No. 180109, July 26,2010).
6. If the complaint or information is directly filed with the MTC under
Sec. 8(b) of Rule 112 in relation to Sec. 1(b) of Rule 110, the judge shall
personally evaluate the evidence or personally examine in writing and under
oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers.
(c) the giving of the information will imperil the arrest (Sec. 7, Rule 113, Rules
of Court).
3. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time
of the arrest. However, after the arrest, the warrant shall be shown to him as
soon as practicable, if the person arrested so requires (Sec. 7, Rule 113, Rules
of Court).
4. The officer assigned to execute the warrant of arrest has the duty
to deliver the person arrested to the nearest police station or jail without
unnecessary delay (Sec. 3, Rule 113, Rules of Court).
No unnecessary violence
An underlying rule whenever an arrest is made is that no violence or
unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall
not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention (Sec. 2,
Rule 113, Rules of Court).
After entering the building or enclosure, he may break out from said place if
necessary to liberate himself from the same place (Sec. 12, Rule 113, Rules of
Court).
When a warrantless arrest is lawful (Bar 1988; 1989; 1996; 1997; 2000;
2004; 2010)
1. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a
warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those
effected without a validly issued warrant (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283
SCRA 159). Hence, the doctrine is that a warrant of arrest is required before an
arrest is made. A warrantless arrest is the exception.
2. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provide for the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:
ing to commit an offense (People v. Garcia, 529 SCRA 519, August 8,2007).
3. Section 5 of Rule 113 provides three (3) instances when
warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a
crime which had just been committed (called hot pursuit.); (c) arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending.
There is another ground for a warrantless arrest other than those
provided for under Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. That ground is
when a person previously lawftdly arrested escapes or is rescued. Under the
Rules, any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at
any time and in any place within the Philippines (Sec. 13, Rule 113, Rules of
Court).
4. A bondsman may arrest an accused for the purpose of
surrendering him to the court. Also, an accused released on bail may be
re-arrested without a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines
without permission of the court where the case is pending (Sec. 23, Rule 114,
Rules of Court).
Who may make the warrantless arrest; duty of officer; citizen's arrest
1. The warrantless arrest may be made not only by a peace officer
but also by a private person. When the latter makes the arrest under the
circumstances provided for under the Rules, the arrest is called "citizen's
arrest"
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (People v. Garcia,
529 SCRA 519, August 8,2007).
2. When an accused is caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers
are not only authorized but are duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant.
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ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
On the other hand, the prosecutor may insist on the application of the
"plain view" doctrine to convince the Court to render a verdict of guilty. A
hypothetical situation like the above indicates that sometimes a thin line exists
between a legal and an illegal arrest and search.
2. Thus, it was ruled that a flagrante delicto arrest is not justified
when no one among the accused was committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers, more so if the police officers did not have personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had
committed an offense. The searches conducted cannot be said to be merely
incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition,
that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007).
3. A 1988 case, People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, demonstrates
the legal infirmity of an arrest for noncompliance with the requisites of the
flagrante delicto exception. Here, more than two days before the arrest,
constabulary officers received a tip from an informer that the accused was on
board an identified vessel on a particular date and time and was carrying
marijuana. Acting on the information, they waited for the accused and
approached him as he descended the gangplank of the ship and arrested him.
A subsequent inspection of his bag disclosed the presence of three kilos of
marijuana leaves. The Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana
found in the possession of the accused as a product of an illegal search since it
was not an incident to a lawful arrest. Emphatically, the Supreme Court
declared that the accused was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so.
He was merely descending the gangplank of the ship and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any
of the other
216 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. The court added that from
the information received by the officers, they could have obtained a warrant
since they had at least two days to apply for the same but the officers made no
efforts to comply with the bill of rights. They chose to ignore the law.
Then too, in People v. Molina, 352 SCRA 174, the conviction by the trial
court was reversed and set aside when the Supreme Court declared as invalid
an arrest made merely on the basis of reliable information that the persons
arrested were carrying marijuana. The accused were arrested while inside a
pedicab despite the absence of any outward indications of a crime being
committed.
Similarly, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, the Supreme
Court declared that a warrantless arrest cannot be justified where no crime is
being committed at the time of the arrest because no crime may be inferred
from the fact that the eyes of the person arrested were "moving fast" and
"looking at every person" passing by.
4. A classic case that illustrates an invalid arrest and a subsequent illegal
search and seizure is People v. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174. The issue on the
legality of the arrest, search and seizure stemmed from a telephone call to the
police from an alleged informer that suspicious looking men were at a street
corner in Tondo shortly before noon. The police operatives dispatched to the
place saw three men one of whom who turned out to be Mengote, was
"looking from side" to side clutching his abdomen. The operatives approached
the three men and introduced themselves as policemen. Two of them
accordingly tried to run away but the attempt was foiled. The search yielded a
revolver in the possession of Mengote and a fan knife in the pocket of another.
Mengote contends that the revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because its seizure was a product of an illegal search and made not
as an incident to a lawful arrest.
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Speaking through Justice Isagani A. Cruz, the Court ruled that the
requirements of a warrantless arrest were not complied with. There was no
offense which could have been suggested by the acts of Mengote of looking
from side to side while holding his abdomen. Observed the Court: "These are
certainly not sinister acts. * * * He was not skulking in the shadows but walking
in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that
street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun. * * * By no stretch of
the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had
just been committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence."
5. A much later case People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, March 16,
2007, and which drew much from the ruling in Aminnudin likewise aptly
illustrates the application of the doctrine. In this case, two men were arrested
while they were about to hand over a bag of shabu to a policer officer.
Questioned, the arrested men told the officers that they knew of a scheduled
delivery of shabu by their employer, WW early the following morning and that
he could be found at a certain apartment building in Malate, Manila. The police
operatives decided to look for WW to shed light on the illegal drug activities of
his alleged employees and proceeded to the location of the apartment and
placed the same under surveillance.
When WW came out of the apartment towards a parked car, two other
police officers approached him, introduced themselves to him as police
officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was WW, immediately
frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the car. When
frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of WW an unlicensed
pistol with live ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the
operatives searched the car and found inside it were the following items: (a)
transparent plastic bags with shabu; (b) cash in the amount of P650,000.00; (c)
electronic and mechanical scales; and (d) another unlicensed pistol with
magazine. Then and there, WW resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
218 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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The Supreme Court, in very lucid terms, declared that the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case did not manifest any suspicious behavior
on the part of WW that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He
was merely walking from the apartment and was about to enter a parked car
when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and
commanded him to open the compartment of the car. He was not committing
any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in
flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled, said the Court
that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest (Citing People v. Binad Sy Chua, 444 Phil 757 and People v.
Molina, 352 SCRA 174).
What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers
said the Court, is that WW was arrested mainly on the information that he was
the employer of the two men who were previously arrested and charged for
illegal transport of shabu. They did not in fact identify WW to be their source of
the shabu when they were caught with it in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo's
declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the
following day and that WW may be found in an apartment building in Malate,
the arresting officers conducted what they termed was a "surveillance"
operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person who will match
the description of WW, the employer of the arrested men.
The conclusion of the trial court that the warrantless arrest was illegal
and that ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is
likewise unlawful, was sustained by the Supreme Court.
6. Warrantless arrests were upheld in some cases. The much earlier case
of People v. Anita Claudio, 160 SCRA 646, is an example of a warrantless
arrest made under the in flagrante delicto exception. Here the accused who
was carrying a woven
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buri-like plastic bag which appeared to contain camote tops, boarded a bus
bound for the province. Instead of placing the bag by her side, which is the
usual practice of a traveler, she placed the same on the back seat where a
trained anti- narcotics agent was seated. Since the act of the accused was
unusual for a traveler, the suspicion of the agent was aroused. Feeling that
something was unusual, the agent inserted his finger inside the bag where he
felt another plastic bag in the bottom from which emanated the smell of
marijuana. Right after she got off the bus, the agent arrested the accused.
7. Not all cases were however, decided in the mold of Amminudin.
People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220, is a case with facts which do not fall
squarely with the standards set by Amminudin, because of the differences in
circumstances. In this case, two police officers together with a barangay tanod
were conducting surveillance operations in a bus station allegedly to check on
persons who may be "engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on
information supplied by informers." They noticed a person carrying a red
travelling bag who "was acting suspiciously." When asked to open the bag, the
accused did so only after the officers identified themselves. Found in the bag
were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic and weighing about one kilogram.
Upon these facts, it was ruled that there was a valid warrantless arrest and a
valid warrantless search. The Court pronounced Tangliben to be different from
Aminnudin. In the latter, the "urgency" presented by Tangliben were not
present. In Tangliben, the Court found that the officers were faced by an
"on-the-spot" information which required them to act swiftly.
In People v. Maspil, G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990, because of
confidential reports from informers that two persons would be transporting a
large quantity of marijuana, officers set up a checkpoint in Benguet to monitor,
inspect and scrutinize vehicles bound for Baguio City. A couple of hours after
midnight, a jeepney was flagged down in the checkpoint. On board were the
persons identified by the informers who were also with the policemen manning
the checkpoint. When the sacks and tin cans inside the jeepney were opened,
220 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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away the officers went to the crime scene and found a piece of wood with
blood stains, a hollow block and two pouches of marijuana. A witness told the
police that the accused was one of those who killed the victim. They proceeded
to the house of the accused and arrested him. The Court ruled that based on
their knowledge of the circumstances of the death of the victim and the report
of an eyewitness, in arresting the accused, the officers had personal knowledge
of facts leading them to believe that it was the accused who was one of the
perpetrators of the crime.
police station or jail (Sec. 5, last paragraph, Rule 113). (Bar 2007)
illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest (People v. Martinez, G.R.
No. 191366, December 13, 2010).
Effect of admission to bail on objections to an illegal arrest
An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued,
provided that he raises the objection before he enters his plea. The objection
shall be resolved by the court as early as practicable but not later than the start
of the trial of the case (Sec. 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
Waiver of the illegality of the arrest; effect of illegal arrest (Bar 2000; 2001)
1. A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection to it
is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any
objection. If the appellants are questioning their arrest for the first time on
appeal, they are, therefore, deemed to have waived their right to the
constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches (People v.
Aminola, G.R. No. 178062, September 8,2010).
The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing
the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the information
against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the
procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is
deemed waived (Zalameda v. People, G.R. No. 183656, September 4, 2009;
Sec. 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court). It has been ruled time and again that an
accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he
fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him
on this ground before his arraignment. Any objection involving the procedure
by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
226 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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accused voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without
previously invoking his objections thereto. There must be clear and convincing
proof that the accused had an actual intention to relinquish his right to
question the existence of probable cause (Jose Antonio C. Leviste v. Hon. Elmo
M. Alameda, et al., G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010; Borlongan v. Pena, G.R.
No. 143591, May 25,2010).
5. In one case, the petitioner claimed that his warrantless arrest is illegal.
However, nowhere in the records can it be found in which the petitioner
interposed objections to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It
has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of
the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his
plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived (Salvador Valdez Rebellion v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175700, July 5,2010).
In the above case, the records disclosed that the petitioner was duly
arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial.
Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and
effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At
any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside
a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused
(Salvador Valdez Rebellion v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175700, July
5,2010).
John Doe proceedings (United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574 citing
Bevington v. United States, 35 F2d 5841929; State v. Keiffer, 187 NW164
1922).
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of
discovery employed by the state to procure relevant evidence of a crime. It is in
the nature of a criminal process restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A
search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power (United
Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574 citing Lodyga v. State, 179
NE1641931; C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 63).
It has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil
rights or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the public at large as
distinguished from ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons
and may only be applied for the furtherance of public prosecutions (Ibid.; citing
State v. Derry, 56 NE 482 1908; Lodyga v. State, 179 NE 164 1931)
3. The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial
judges in the exercise of their judicial functions (Skechers, USA v. Inter Pacific
Industrial Trading Corporation, 509 SCRA 395).
applicant and the witnesses he may present. The applicant or his witnesses
must have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense being complained of. "Reliable information'' is
insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in
writing the complainant and his witnesses (Yao, Sr. v. People, 525 SCRA 108)
because in the determination of probable cause, the court must resolve
whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance of the search warrant
(Skechers, USA, Inc. v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation, 509 SCRA
395).
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it
import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable
cause is not concerned with the question of whether the offense charged has
been or is being committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, but only whether the affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief.
The requirement is less than certainty of proof, but more than suspicion or
possibility (Kho v. Lanzanas, 489 SCRA 445).
3. There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since the same must be decided in light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon
the findings or opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Skechers,
USA, Inc. v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation, 509 SCRA 395). It is
presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a
showing to the contrary. A magistrate's determination of a probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant is. paid with great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination (People v.
Mamaril, G.R. No. 171980, October 6,2010).
Although the term "probable cause" has been said to have a
well-defined meaning under the law, the term is exceedingly difficult to define
with any degree of precision and one which would cover every state of facts
which may arise. As to what acts constitute probable cause, there is no exact
test (Kho v. Lanzanas, 489 SCRA 445). The question whether or not probable
cause exists is one which must be decided in the light
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cause. The Court disagreed because in quashing the search warrant, it would
appear that the trial court had raised the standard of probable cause to
whether there was sufficient cause to hold petitioner for trial. In so doing, the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less
than evidence which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.
However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him
nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc.,
G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007).
Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the
complainant and his witnesses (Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19,
2007). An application for a search warrant if based on hearsay cannot,
standing alone, justify issuance of a search warrant. It is necessary for the
witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the
applicant's claims (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687).
3. Section 5 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
prescribes the rules in the examination of the complainant and his witnesses
when applying for search warrant, to wit:
"SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing under oath, the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted."
The foregoing provisions require that the judge must, before issuing the
warrant make a personal examination under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce in accordance with Sec. 5 of Rule 126.
"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus, not
sufficient. Aside from the examination under oath, "...The examining judge has
to make searching questions and elicit answers of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce in writing and to attach them to the record." Thus,
in Balayon v. Dinopol, 490 SCRA 547, the Court found an RTC judge guilty of
gross ignorance of the law for failure to observe the mandate of the rules
because the Court found that there was no record of searching questions and
answers attached to the records of the case.
4. The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the
witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no
hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should conduct his investigation, it is
axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
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routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma. The judge must not
simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on
the intent and justification of the application (Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No.
168306, June 19, 2007; Betoy, Sr. v. Coliflores, 483 SCRA 435).
5. In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules
of Court require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination
must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search
warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy
the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant (Uy v. Bureau of
Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36).
Mandaue City" The Court did not consider the discrepancy as sufficient to
consider the warrant constitutionally infirm. It was not shown that there was a
street with the same name in Cebu City nor was it established that the officers
enforcing the warrant had difficulty locating the premises of the petitioner. Uy
explained that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement.
7. A John Doe warrant which does not name the person subject of
the same, is the exception rather than the rule. Hence, in one case, a warrant
was voided to the extent that it was issued against fifty (50) John Does none of
which could be identified by the witnesses (Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA
599).
8. The police on the other hand, should not be hindered in the
performance of their duties by superficial adherence to technicality or
farfetched judicial interference. While the rule requires it necessary to express
the name or give some description of a party subject of a warrant, the principle
does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose
name is unknown. In such a case, the best possible description of the person is
to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom
it is to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and
peculiarities, the place of his residence or other circumstances by which he can
be identified. The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper
person upon whom the warrant is to be served.
Thus, in the early case of People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, the search
warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the
building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this
John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the Club, the police
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ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
could identify John Doe. Further, the affidavit for the search warrant and the
search warrant itself described the building to be searched and the description
was a sufficient designation of the premises.
9. The person to be searched must be described with reasonable
particularity (Lohman v. Superior Court, 69 Cat. App. 3d 894). He can even be
identified by a name which others use in calling him, even if it is not his real
name (People v. Mclean, 56 Cal. 2d 660) because the standard for
determining the legality of a warrant directed against a person is whether the
person has been sufficiently described with particularity sufficient to identify
him with reasonable certainty. Even if his name is unknown or erroneously
written, the description of the person with certainty to identify him and set him
apart from others is enough to lend validity to the warrant (United States v.
Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381, 3rd Cir. 1971). Nowhere in Section 4, Rule 126 or any
other provision of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is it required that
the search warrant must name the person who occupies the described
premises (Quelnan v. People, 526 SCRA 653, July 6,2007).
10. There is also compliance with the law when the person although
not particularly named, is described as the one occupying and having control of
a specific address (People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169).
with the required particularity have been traditionally called general warrants.
2. The requirement of particularity is said to be satisfied if the
warrant imposes a "meaningful restriction" upon the objects to be seized
(Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238; People v. Tockgo, 145 Cal. App.
3d 635). A "meaningful restriction" is one that leaves nothing to the discretion
of the officer who conducts the search (Marron v. United States, 275 US,
192,196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 Ed 231). Corollarily, "a warrant may not authorize a
search broader than the facts supporting its issuance." Hence, a warrant
authorizing the search and seizure of "papers showing or tending to show the
trafficking of cocaine9 is invalid because the affidavit supporting the issuance
made no reference to the existence of such papers (People v. Holmsen, 173
Cal. App. 3d 1045).
3. The Philippine Supreme Court declares that the purpose of this
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those described in the search
warrant and to leave the officers of the law no discretion regarding what
articles they shall seize so abuses may not be committed (Uy Kheytin v.
Villareal, 42 Phil. 886).
4. The common denominator among decisions on "particularity"
regard descriptions of a generic nature as failing to impose a meaningful
restriction on the officer conducting the search.
Descriptions of the things to be searched and seized as "stolen goods,"
"obscene materials," or "other articles of merchandise too numerous to
mention," have been held inadequate (Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S.
717, 81 S.Ct. 1708, L.Ed. 2d 1127). The phrase, "any and all other stolen
items" was impermissibly vague (United States v. Townsend, 394 F. Supp. 736
E.D. Mich, 1975). In People v. Tockgo, 145 Cal. App. 3d 635, the officers had
information about certain unique markings of stolen cigarettes, but the
description did not include the markings to permit the officers to differentiate
the object of the search from those which were not stolen. The words:
*cigarettes... and any and all goods..." were deemed inadequate.
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The above articles and appliances, said the Court, are generally
connected with or related to a legitimate business not necessarily involving
piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Including
them without particularity makes the search warrant too general which could
result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store.
7. A high degree of particularity is required for items such as books,
films, recordings, or other materials that have not yet been adjudged obscene.
Since these materials are at this stage, still deemed to be constitutionally
protected, the requirement of particular description "must be accorded the
most scrupulous exactitude" and when the bases for their seizure are the ideas
which they contain (Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325, 99S.Ct.
2319, 2324, 60 L. Ed.2d
248 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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920, 9271979; Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S. Ct. 506, 511-12,13
L.Ed.2d 431, 4361965).
8. Some decisions (State v. Brown, 470 P.2d 815, 819- 20 Kan.
1970), in the United States have sometimes allowed a general description
when specificity is difficult and where a technical description would have
required the experience of a trained surgeon. For instance, the following
description for purposes of a warrant was upheld: "Various instruments and
tools in performing abortion, which were instrumentalities of such offense "
In People v. Schmidt, (473 P. 2d 698, 700, Co. 1970), the court allowed
a description reading: "marijuana...dangerous drugs, stimulant drugs and
hallocinogenics...together with such vessels, implements, furniture in which
drugs are found and the vessels, implements and furniture used in
connection with the manufacture, production and dispensing of such
drugs..."
In United States v. Appoloney, 761 F. 2d 520 (9th Cir. 1985), the validity
of the following description of gambling paraphernalia was allowed:
"wagering paraphernalia such as betting slips, bottom sheets and owe
sheets, and journals and schedules of sporting events"
A warrant describing the property to be seized as "deer or elk meat
illegally possessed" was considered adequate because a more particular
description was not possible. The meat to be seized had no brand names or
serial numbers (Dunn v. Municipal Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 858).
9. In the Philippines, general descriptions have likewise been allowed
in some cases when dictated by the nature of the things to be seized on the
theory that the description must be specific insofar as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384). The law does not require that
the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities (Too, Sr. v.
People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19,2007).
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But the use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is allowed only when a
more specific description of the things to be seized is not available. Thus, the mere use of terms
like "multiple set books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash
register books, sales books or records" and similar general descriptions, is unacceptable
considering the circumstances where the petitioner is alleged to have committed tax fraud and
smuggling. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of the documents
because he was furnished copies of the documents sought to be seized. As regards the terms
"unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase and sales invoices," these need not
be identified specifically. It is not possible to do so considering these are unregistered. Taking into
consideration the nature of the articles described, no other more adequate and detailed
description could have been given because of the difficulty in describing the contents of the same
(Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36).
10. In Kho v. Makalintal, 306 SCRA 70, the petitioners claim that the search
warrants issued were general warrants prohibited by the constitution because the things to be
seized were not described and specified. One warrant for instance, directing the search and
seizure of firearms, did not list the firearms to be seized and were not classified as to size, make,
caliber. The subject warrant merely stated:
Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and ammunitions for the
said firearms..."
In brushing aside the contention of the petitioner, the Court observed that the law
enforcement officers could not have been in the position to know beforehand the exact caliber or
make of the firearms to be seized. In the process of surveillance conducted at a distance, they had
no way of knowing the caliber and make of the firearms unless they get a close view of the
weapons and thus, could not be expected to know the detailed particulars of the objects to be
seized including the communications equipment. The court likewise considered the use of the
words, "and the like" of no moment and did not make the warrants in question, general
warrants.
250 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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11. In Yao v. People, the petitioners argued that the search warrants did not indicate
with particularity the items to be seized since the search warrants merely described the items to
be seized as LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE without specifying their
sizes.
The contention found no merit with the Court holding that a search warrant may be said
to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of
law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the
things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.
which pertain only to the production, sale and distribution of the GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and (4) Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527, XAM-
970 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or
conveyances being used or intended to be used for the purpose of selling and/or
distributing GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders. Additionally, since the described
items are clearly limited only to those which bear direct relation to the offense, i.e.,
violation of Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293, for which the warrant was issued,
the requirement of particularity of description is satisfied.
"Given the foregoing, the indication of the accurate sizes of the GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary" (Yao v. People, G.R. No.
168306, June 19,2007).
June 19, 2007). In an American decision involving a search of newspaper offices, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant is directed to the seizure of things and not the seizure
of persons and hence, the critical element is not ownership but whether there is a reasonable
cause to believe that the things to be seized are located in the place to be searched (Zurcher v.
The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,556,98 S.Ct. 1970,1977,56 L.Ed.2d 525,
535).
defined. If the warrant is to search a vehicle, every part of that vehicle which may contain the
object to be seized may be searched. In other words, the lawful search of the premises
particularly described extends to the areas in which the object may be found (United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798).
3. It has been held that when a search warrant authorizes the search of a place
particularly described, a justified search would include all the things attached to or annexed to the
land if the place described be land (United States v. Meyer, 417 F. 2d 1020, 8th Cir.
1969). Courts have also generally allowed a search of vehicles owned or controlled by the
owner of the premises and at the same time found in the premises (United States v.
Percival, 756F.2d 600 7th Cir. 1985).
ments of Sec. 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were complied with by the police authorities who
conducted the search.
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
3. The officer seizing the property must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful
occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the
absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized
property (Sec. 11, Rule 126, Rules of Court).
Duties of the officer after the search and seizure; delivery and inventory
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant;
(b) The officer must, together with the delivery of the property also deliver a
true inventory of the property seized. Such inventory must be duly verified under oath
(Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court).
(c) Note: A violation of the above rules shall constitute contempt of court
(Sec.12, Rule 126, Rules of Court).
in reversing the order of the trial court granting the motion to quash, erred in ordering the return
of the seized items to respondent.
The Court held that Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly mandates the delivery of the seized items to the judge who issued the search warrant
to be kept in custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings against petitioner. The
delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and
accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the
substitution of said items by interested parties. The judge who issued the search warrant is
mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for
(1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received,
(2) delivery of the seized property to the court, together with
(3) a verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the foregoing constitutes
contempt of court.
A violation of the above rules shall constitute contempt of court (Sec.12, Rule 126,
Rules of Court).
to a buy-bust operation which is a valid form of entrapment of felons in the execution of their
criminal plan; and that the search conducted on appellant was incidental to a lawful arrest
(People v. Maeatingag, G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009).
Where to file a motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence
1. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained by
virtue of the warrant may be filed and acted upon only by the court where the action has been
instituted.
2. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved
by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion
and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the
latter court (Sec. 14, Rule 126, Rules of Court).
The corporation does not have the exclusive right to question the seizure of items
belonging to the corporation on the ground that the latter has a personality distinct from the
officers and shareholders of the corporation. Assuming arguendo that the corporation was the
owner of the seized items, petitioner, as its manager had the authority to question the seizure of
the items belonging to the corporation. Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform
physical actions only through properly delegated individuals; namely, their officers and/or agents
(Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007).
civil action for certiorari from a trial court's quashal of a search warrant (Santos v. Pryce
Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007).
2. The application of the above rule presupposes that the person searched was
previously arrested lawfully. Hence, a person illegally arrested cannot be validly searched without
a warrant under this provision. For an arrest to be lawful, the arrest may either be by virtue of a
warrant lawfully procured or by virtue of a warrantless arrest authorized under Sec. 5 of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court and other applicable provisions such as Sec. 13 of the same rule.
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus, we have to determine first
whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. If what prompted the police
to apprehend the accused, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that
appellant would arrive carrying shabu, this circumstance gives rise to another question of
whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt
act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. There is no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine (People v.
Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3,2010).
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter
might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right
of the arresting officer to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but
also within the permissible area within the latter'8 reach, x x x a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within
the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control"
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence. A gun on a table or in the drawer in front of the person arrested can be as dangerous to
the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested x x x " (People v.
Leangsiri, 252 SCRA 213; People v. Cubcubin, Jr., 360 SCRA 690; People v.
Estella, 395 SCRA 553; Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815,
September 3,2009; emphasis supplied).
Thus, when the person arrested was brought out of the room with his hands tied, a
cabinet which is locked could no longer be considered as part of "an area within his immediate
control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that
could be used against him (Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815,
September 3, 2009).
4. A search and a seizure incident to a lawful arrest is not limited to things related to the
reason for the arrest. If for instance, a person is legally arrested for illegal possession of drugs, the
search is not confined to things used in the commission of the crime. To protect the arresting
officer, the search extends to weapons like a gun or a knife with no actual connection to the
crime of illegal possession of the drugs. If in the course of the search, evidence is found
constituting proof of another offense, like an illegally possessed weapon, *it is
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submitted that the phraseology of the rule does not prevent the seizure of the evidence.
The provisions of Sec. 13 of Rule 126 are consistent with the ruling in Adams v.
Williams, 47 U.S. 143, that a person arrested may be searched for weapons and all unlawful
articles in his person and within his immediate control may be seized.
American decisions categorically declare that an arresting officer may seize evidence of
crimes other than the crime which was the reason for the arrest. In one case, the accused was
arrested pursuant to a warrant for possession and transportation of explosives but during the
search there was discovered an item the possession of which is illegal. The discovery of objects
unrelated to the arrest does not render the seizure invalid (United States v. Simpson, 453
F.2d 102810th Cir. 1972).
5. Sec. 13 of Rule 126 allows the warrantless search of the "person lawfully arrested" as an
incident to a lawful arrest in a manner similar to American rulings allowing a full search of the
body of the person. The cases of United States v. Robinson (414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct.
467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, (414 U.S. 260, 94
S.Ct.488,38 L.Ed.2d 456 1973), allowed the search of the cigarette case of a person
arrested for a traffic violation. Illegal drugs were discovered in both instances. A full search means
searching any property associated with the arrestee's body like clothing, jewelry, watches and
others attached to the person in a permanent or semi-permanent capacity. The search includes
inspecting the clothing of the person arrested for bloodstains, fingerprints or even serial numbers.
Others cases have similarly held that the right without a search warrant to
contemporaneously search persons lawfully arrested and to search the place where the arrest is
made to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or by the means it was
committed, as well as weapons and other things to escape from custody is not to be doubted
(Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 making reference to Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 and Weeks v. United States,
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232 U.S. 383, 392). But while the U.S. Supreme Court had broadened the search from the
"person" to the "place," such place should be one where the arrest was made. The house for
instance, where the arrest was made may be searched when such searches and seizures
naturally appertain to and attend such arrests. Thus, in Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, the Court ruled that because the officers had made a valid search and arrest in the
premises, they had a right without a warrant to contemporaneously search the place for
evidence of the criminal enterprise. In Marron, the Court suggested that the search should be
confined to the offender's immediate possession and control, a concept made clearer in
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752.
But the right does not extend to other places such as a house several blocks away from
the place where an arrest was made. In this case, the search would no longer be incident to a
lawful arrest (Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 citing Silverthome
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391; People v. Conway, 225 Mic.
151 and Gamble v. Keyes, 35 S.D. 645, 650).
6. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the
extent of a search incident to a lawful arrest. In this case, the police officers, armed with an arrest
warrant but not a search warrant, were admitted to petitioner's home by his wife, where they
awaited petitioner's arrival. When he entered, he was served with the warrant. Although he
denied the officers' request to "look around," they conducted a search of the entire house "on
the basis of the lawful arrest." The officers looked through the entire house including the attic,
the garage and a small workshop. At petitioner's trial on burglary charges, items taken from his
home were admitted over the objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. His
conviction was affirmed by the California appellate courts, which held, despite their acceptance
of petitioner's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid, that, since the arresting officers had
procured the warrant "in good faith," and since, in any event, they had sufficient information to
constitute probable cause for the
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arrest, the arrest was lawful. The courts also held that the search was justified as incident to a
valid arrest.
The U.S. Supreme Court found the search of the entire house unreasonable. It
categorically ruled in Chimel that assuming the arrest was valid, the warrantless search of
petitioner's house cannot be constitutionally justified as an incident to that arrest. An arresting
officer may search the arrestee's person to discover and remove weapons and to seize evidence
to prevent its concealment or destruction, and may search the area within the immediate
control of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. For the routine search of rooms other than that in which an
arrest occurs, or for searching desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself,
absent well recognized exceptions, a search warrant is required. A reasonable distinction is to be
made between a search of the person arrested and the area within his reach and immediate
control on one hand and more extensive searches in other areas on the other.
The ruling in Chimel clarified previous cases (like United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 US. 56) which made vague references to the search of areas considered to be in the
"possession" and "control" of the person arrested allowing searches of places not necessarily
within the actual physical control of a person but within his constructive control and giving free
reign to law enforcers in determining what to be searched. Chimel limited the search to the
arrestee's person and "within his immediate control."
Thus, following Chimel, the arresting officers validly seized two revolvers within the
reach of the person arrested for being involved in an armed robbery (People v. Spencer, 99
Cal.Rptr 681 Col. App. 1972).
7. The Chimel tradition found expression for instance, in the Philippine case of People v.
Leangsiri (252 SCRA 213). Here Leangsiri was arrested at the NAIA for bringing heroin into
the country. Later, the persons involved in the smuggling of heroin were arrested in the hotel
room of Leangsiri in an
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entrapment operation. Questioning of the persons arrested disclosed that one of them was
occupying a room in the same hotel where Leangsiri was billeted. Without a search warrant, the
other room was searched and incriminating evidence was seized. Clearly said the Court, citing
Chimel, the search of the latter room was illegal and the evidence obtained therein is
inadmissible, the place searched being not within the immediate control of the person arrested.
8. In a leading Philippine case, Nolasco v. Patio, 139 SCRA 152, the accused who
were at large for rebellion and subversion, were arrested by constabulary officers at the
intersection of two streets in Quezon City at 11:30 A.M. On the same day at 12:00 noon, another
team of officers searched the house of one of the accused under a warrant procured earlier in the
day.
After charges were filed against one of the accused for illegal possession of subversive
documents, a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the house was filed.
The motion was anchored on the alleged void character of the search warrant for its failure to
particularly describe the things to be seized and for lack of searching questions propounded to
the applicant's witnesses. The Supreme Court held the warrant void in a later proceeding but did
not order the return of the items confiscated because the search of the house could have
accordingly been validly effected even without a warrant. Accordingly, considering that the
accused has been charged with rebellion, which is a crime against public order, the warrant for
her arrest not having been served for a considerable period of time, and the search having been
made just within half an hour after her arrest, "we are of the opinion" said the Court, that the
search . . . did not need a search warrant: this, for possible effective results in the interest of public
order." What must be considered according to the Court is the balancing of the individual's right
to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals.
To the majority pronouncement which justified a warrantless search as an incident to a
lawful arrest, a dissenting
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opinion was interposed by Justice Teehankee, calling the majority decision "patently against the
constitutional proscription and settled law and jurisprudence." While the Rules of Court allows a
warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested, the rule, in the opinion of Justice
Teehankee, is limited to his person at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. "Such
warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest...To hold
that her dwelling could be searched without a warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if not
nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Justice Cuevas and Justice Abad Santos likewise lodged strong dissents. Justice Cuevas,
with whom Justice Teehankee concurred, on his part opined that the lawful arrest justifying the
validity of the warrantless search must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time
and place of the arrest. "As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect
to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous
weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof for the commission of the offense. . .With
respect to the time and place of the warrantless search.. .it must be contemporaneous with
the lawful arrest. ...to be valid it must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or
immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested." Justice Cuevas
added: " . . . in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest
and the search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise it is not incident to the arrest"
(citations omitted).
Acting on a partial motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision, the Court
reconsidered and ordered the return of the items seized to the petitioner. In doing so, the Court
adopted the rationale in the dissent of Justice Teehankee CNolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA
509).
9. Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558, is one of the cases which drives
home the point on the concept of a
270 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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search incident to a lawful arrest. Here, police officers arrested the accused in flagrante
delicto selling marijuana in a street corner. The search of his person yielded two cellophane
bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more, he admitted he had marijuana in his house. The
policemen then proceeded to the house of the accused and made a search which yielded ten
more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. The Court held that the articles seized from the accused
during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of a search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The
search may extend beyond the person of the person arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. The warrantless search however, of the house of the
accused which yielded marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with
a search warrant at the time. Moreover, the house of the accused was beyond his reach and
control.
10. Earlier in People v. Lua, 256 SCRA 539, a similar pronouncement was made by
the Court. The accused in Lua was arrested outside his house in flagrante delicto in a buy-
bust operation. The Court found nothing objectionable in the body search of the person arrested
and the confiscation of the bags of marijuana and a paltik revolver in his person. However, the
subsequent search of the house of the arrestee was found invalid and the marijuana found
therein considered inadmissible. The search of the house according to the Court is not within the
contemplation of a "search incident to a lawful arrest." The house, at the time of his arrest was
not within the reach and control of the arrestee.
to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe prior to the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched (People v. Tuazon, 532 SCRA 152, September 3,
2007; See Carrol v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132).
3. "Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving
vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search
of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile
and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright
harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles
does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the
possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in
order to justify the warantless search of a vehicle (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424
Phil. 224 as cited in People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 175783, September 3,2007).
Check points
1. In the famous case of Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24,
1990, the Court declared that nowhere in its decision did the Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e.
at all times and under all circumstances and what it declared was that the checkpoints are not
illegal per se. The Court went on to hold that "under exceptional circumstances, as where the
survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people
are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this
proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will
have absolutely no reason to remain, x x x For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search."
272 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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are even less intrusive (Abenes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156320, February
14, 2007).
a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(People v. Michael Sembrano y Castro, G.R. No. 185848, August 16,2010;
People v. Araneta, G.R. No. 191064, October 20, 2010). The accused is caught
in the act and must be apprehended on the spot. (People of the Philippines v.
Elizabeth Marcelino y Reyes, G.R. No. 189278, July 26,2010).
3. In one case where the accused assailed the validity of a buy-bust
operations, it was ruled that from the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the
absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal. The illegal drug seized is
not the "fruit of the poisonous tree" as the defense alleges. The seizure made
by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under
Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Since the buy-bust operation was
established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a
warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it (People of the Philippines v.
Elizabeth Marcelino y Reyes, G.R. No. 189278, July 26,2010).
to commit an offense originated from the inducer and not the accused who
had no intention to commit the crime and would not have committed it were it
not for the initiatives by the inducer. In entrapment, the criminal intent or
design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused;
the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal
by employing ruses and schemes. In instigation, the law enforcers act as active
co-principals. Instigation leads to the acquittal of the accused, while
entrapment does not bar prosecution and conviction (People v. Dansico, G.R.
No. 178060, February 23, 2009; Suggested related readings: People v.
Naelga, G.R. No. 171018, September 11, 2009; People v. Lazaro, G.R. No.
186418, October 16, 2009). In the Philippines, entrapment is not a defense
available to the accused. It is instigation that is available as a defense and is an
absolutory cause (People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 694).
[1979]). The government agent's act is evaluated in the light of the standard of
conduct exercised by reasonable persons generally and whether such conduct
falls below the acceptable standard for the fair and honorable administration
of justice (Keaton v. State, 253 Ga. 70, 316 S.E.2d 452 [1984]; Bruce v. State,
612 P.2d 1012 [Alaska 1980]).
3. It appears that Philippine courts have leaned towards the
adoption of the "objective" test in upholding the validity of a buy-bust
operation. In People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, the Court stressed that, in
applying the "objective" test, the details of the purported transaction during
the buy-bust operation must be clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, and
the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the
sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. It is further
emphasized that the "manner by which the initial contact was made, whether
or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of
the 'buy-bust' money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the
informant alone or the police officer, must be subject of strict scrutiny by courts
to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense" (People v. Lim, G.R. No. 187503, September 11, 2009; People v.
Cortez, G.R. No. 183819, July 23,2009).
4. The "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the
details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown.
This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration
until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of
the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not
through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the
"buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the
informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by
courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit
an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time,
however, examining the
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conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's
predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of
habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also
be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition
of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine
the validity of the defense of inducement (People v. Araneta, G.R. No. 191064,
October 20, 2010; People of the Philippines v. Victorio Pagkalinawan, G.R.
No. 184805, March 3,2010).
one, is not necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied
by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police
work and that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the
need for prior surveillance (See also People of the Philippines v. Danilo Cruz y
Culala, G.R. No. 185381, December 16,2009).
2. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure (Judge Felimon Abelita, III v. P/Supt. German Doria and SP03 Cesar
Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009; Zalameda v. People, G.R. No.
183656, September 4, 2009).
Stated in another way, the plain view doctrine permits an officer, while
lawfully engaged in an activity and lawfully present in a particular place, to seize
an apparently illicit object without first obtaining a warrant authorizing him to
do so. It is founded on a common sense rule that when a police officer has seen
or observed an object in 'plain view,' to require the officer to secure a warrant
would be to engage in a needless exercise because failure to seize the object
once observed might involve danger to the public and to the officer. The rule
allows a law enforcement officer to make a seizure without obtaining a search
warrant if evidence of criminal activity or the product of a crime can be seen
without entry or search. As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Katz v. U.S., 389
U.S. 347 (1967), "whatever a person knowingly exposes to public view, even in
their own home or office, is not private." In the context of searches and
seizures, the principle provides that objects perceptible by an officer who is
rightfully in a position to observe them can be seized without a search warrant
and are admissible as evidence.
3. In one case, the police authorities were in the area because that
was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the
firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting
incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the
incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the fire
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arms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the
firearms (Abelita v. P/Supt. German Doria and SP03 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No.
170672, August 14,2009).
4. In another case, the police were investigating a reported homicide.
The police looked into the car of the accused and from the window they saw a
pillowcase, backseat and a briefcase, all covered with blood. The police secured
a warrant to search the car. In the course of enforcing the warrant, they saw
inside the car a blood-soaked sock and a floormat. They took the things. The
accused assailed the validity of the taking of the items as have been illegally
taken since they were not mentioned in the affidavit supporting the
application for the warrant. The Court ruled that the seizure was constitutional.
The items seized were in plain view found during a search supported by a
warrant (Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706
1973).
5. Foreign cases have frequently given as an example of the
applicability of the 'plain view* doctrine, a situation in which the police have a
warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the
search come across some other article of incriminating character (Cf. Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 [51 S.Ct. 153,158, 75 L.Ed.
374 (1931)]; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 [52 S.Ct. 420, 423,
76 L.Ed. 877 (1932)]; Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 [45 S.Ct. 414, 69
L.Ed. 757 (1925)]; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 [89 S.Ct. 1243,
1251,22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969)]).
6. The doctrine has been applied to a situation where the police
officers inadvertently come across evidence while in 'hot pursuit' of a fleeing
suspect (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,87 S.Ct. 1642,18 L.Ed.2d 782
(1967)]; cf. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 [44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898
(1924)]).
The doctrine has also been applied when an incriminating object comes
into view during a search incident to a lawful arrest and thus, could be
searched without a warrant (Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 [89
S.Ct. 2034,2039-2040 (1969)]).
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7. The 'plain view' doctrine has been applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object (Harris v. United States, 390 US. 234 [88
S.Ct. 992,19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968)]; Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 [89 S.Ct.
1420,22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969)]; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. [23J 43 [83 S.Ct.
1623,1635,10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963)].
Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is
not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. If the
package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance
that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view
(People v. Nuevas, 516 SCRA 463, February 22, 2007).
8. The fact that the evidence is in plain view is not alone sufficient to
justify a warrantless seizure. American courts which have extensively discussed
the principle have held that the seizure be based also on the "immediately
apparent" element. This means that the officer must have probable cause to
believe that the object is evidence of a crime. Probable cause exists when "the
facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which he had
reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the object is evidence of a crime
CBrinegar v. U.S. 338 U.S. 160,175-176 [U.S. Supreme Court 1949]). Not only
must the item be in plain view. Its incriminating character must also be
"immediately apparent" (Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321).
This principle has also been followed in Philippine decisions (Abelita v.
Doria, G.R. No. 170672, August 14,2009).
9. The principle is well illustrated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443,91 S.Ct. 2022,29L.Ed.2d 564, where the State endeavored to justify
the seizure of the automobiles in plain view and their subsequent search at the
police station. The cars were obviously in plain view, but whether or not they
were evidence of a crime remained uncertain until after the interiors were
swept and examined microscopically. The incriminating nature of the car was
not therefore immediately
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apparent. The Court hence, held that the police, in seizing two automobiles
parked in plain view on the defendant's driveway in the course of arresting the
defendant, violated the constitutional right of the accused and accordingly,
particles of gunpowder that had been subsequently found in vacuum
sweepings from one of the cars could not be introduced in evidence against
the defendant.
10. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347, is
equally illustrative. Hicks fired a bullet into the floor of his apartment. The bullet
struck a person in the room apartment directly below. Responding police
officers entered the apartment of Hicks and though they did not find him, they
found three weapons and a stocking-cap mask.
An officer noticed two sets of expensive stereo equipment, which
seemed out of place inside the squalid, rundown and ill- appointed four-room
apartment and suspected that the stereo components were stolen. He
recorded their serial numbers. In the process,he had to move a turntable
which was in the way. That they were stolen and taken during an armed
robbery were later confirmed. Hicks was subsequently arrested.
The state trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals granted the
motion to suppress all the evidence seized on the ground that the seizure was
unconstitutional. When the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, the United
States Supreme Court accepted the prosecutors' request for a hearing.
In Arizona v. Hicks, the Supreme Court first ruled that the warrantless
entry by the officers, under the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement, was valid. Next, the Court held that the mere recording
of serial numbers of appliances and equipment did not constitute a seizure
under the constitution, since it did not meaningfully interfere with
respondent's possessory interest in either the numbers recorded or the stereo
equipment. However, the moving of the equipment was a "search" separate
from the search that was the lawful objective of entering the apartment. That
the items were stolen were not immediately apparent and that there exists no
separate justification for moving the equipment.
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the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to
have been within Valeroso's immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the
bounds of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain
view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches
and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely
to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
x x x What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view"
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object
to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso's
children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against
Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a prior justification for the
intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may
be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not just
accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched
for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso's right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in
violation of said
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Terry searches or stop and frisk; history of the doctrine (Bar 1995; 2003)
1. Suppose a police officer is on a routine patrol duty and he
observes two people outside a variety store. Both his experience and training
tell him that their acts are consistent with acts of people with criminal designs
although he has no concrete facts showing probable cause that a crime has
been committed or that it is actually being committed. He knows that mere
suspicion is not sufficient to make a valid arrest but his instincts honed by years
of experience in the streets tell him something untoward is imminent. May he
briefly stop the persons, ask them questions and engage in a protective search
for a concealed weapon short of a full scale arrest? The Supreme Court of the
United States addressed a similar situation in 1968 in the landmark case of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.
2. In the middle of the afternoon of October 31, 1963, veteran Police
Officer Martin McFadden was in his usual beat in downtown Cleveland, a place
he had covered for 30 years as member of the Cleveland police force.
McFadden saw two unknown men who later were identified as Terry and
Chilton, and who by their acts appeared to him to be engaged in an elaborate
yet casual reconnaissance of a store. At one point, a third man, later on
identified as Katz, came to confer with the first two, then disappeared and
then rejoined the other two. Suspecting them to be armed, and fearing that
the three were preparing to rob the store, McFadden approached the men,
identified himself as a police officer and asked them to identify themselves.
When they simply mumbled an answer and did not get a clear and audible
response, he patted down the outer garment of Terry and felt a gun in his
pocket and removed the same. A gun was also recovered from Chilton. Terry
was subsequently convicted for carrying a concealed weapon. The Ohio Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined to
hear the case, claiming that no
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The Court held that the acts of Officer McFadden were acts which a
reasonably prudent man would have done in believing that Terry was armed
and that he presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating
his suspicious behavior. The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with
McFadden's hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery
which reasonably would have been carried out with a deadly weapon. Nothing
in their conduct from the time he first noticed them until the time he
confronted them and identified himself as a police officer gave him sufficient
reason to negate that hypothesis. Mumbling an unclear response to the
officer's distinct question did nothing to clear up the suspicion. The record,
observed the Court, evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the
course
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surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests
unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him.
Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest
of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with
a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer" (Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010) To
repeat: A stop- and-frisk situation is limited to the person's outer clothing, and
should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.
evidence, any fruit of a crime or of things which may provide the person
arrested with the means of escape.
3. A Terry stop and frisk has a limited scope compared to a full scale
arrest and search. The Terry doctrine therefore, is not judged by the more
stringent requirement of probable cause which concededly applies only to an
arrest and a search. What applies in a Terry stop and frisk is the reasonableness
of the act of the officer. This "reasonable standard" while not sufficient to
validate an arrest or a search, justifies a "terry stop and frisk."
Consented Searches
1. The consent to a warrantless search must be voluntary, that is, it
must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. It is the State which has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given (Valdez v. People, 538
SCRA 611, November 23,2007).
2. Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or
waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obstrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right (People v. Nuevas, 516 SCRA 463, February 22,2007).
A peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy
of the law (People v. Nuevas, 516 SCRA 463, February 22,2007).
Effect of an illegal search and seizure; fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
(Bar 2005)
1. The effect of an illegal search and seizure is expressed in the
following constitutional provision:
to quash the search warrant. Also, when evidence is illegally obtained, a motion
to suppress the evidence is in order.
3. The general rule is that all searches and seizures made without a
warrant are invalid. The illegality of a search and a seizure occurs not only from
the failure to obtain a warrant when required but also from the failure to
comply with the procedures for obtaining a warrant and in the execution of the
same. Such failure will result in the application of the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule prevents, upon proper motion or objection, the
admission of evidence illegally obtained. Thus, the most important effect of an
illegal search and seizure is the exclusion of the evidence obtained from being
used against the person whose rights were violated by the search, the evidence
being the proverbial and jurisprudential "fruit of the poisonous tree " The
violation of an individual's rights also inevitably result into civil, criminal and
administrative charges against the officer responsible for the violation. (Bar
2005)
4. The prior rule embodied in Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 2,
held that the unconstitutionality of the searches and seizures does not affect
the admissibility of the evidence obtained because "the criminal should not be
allowed to go free because the constable has blundered." The
non-exclusionary rule in Moncado was anchored on the theory that the citizen
is protected by other provisions of the laws and has means of redress other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained such as actions for damages
against the erring officers and the person who procured the warrant. This
theory however, was subsequently rejected in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA
383).
As Stonehill declared:
" . . . the non-inclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but
also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
X X X
"We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must
be, as it is hereby, abandoned..."
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be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts (A.M. No.
99-20-09 SC, January 25,2000).
2. Although A.M. No. 99-20-09 SC provides a personal endorsement of
the application by the "Heads" of the agencies mentioned, it was held that
nothing in the rule prohibits such heads from delegating the ministerial duty of
endorsing the application for search warrants to their assistant heads (Marimla
v. People, G.R. No. 158467, October 16,2009).
-oOo-
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302
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maintained that the granting of bail would, among others, be consistent with Section 4 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court which provides when bail is a matter of right.
On the other hand, the petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine
Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and
arrest warrant.
The Court agreed with the petitioner and advanced the following reasons:
(a) The use of the word "conviction," in the constitutional provision on bail in
Section 13 of Art. Ill of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, suggests that bail applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
(b) The constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence
in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter
he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It
follows, ruled the Court, "that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case
like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue."
(c) Extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature but sui generis, a class
in itself. Since it is not a criminal proceeding, it will not call into operation all the rights of an
accused under the Bill of Rights and does not involve a determination of guilt or
innocence.
The Court however, did not hold that bail never applies in extradition cases. It instead
explained that" x x x bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has
the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to pro
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tect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is
broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process
extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable
to every situation calling for its application."
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt
(Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741).
6. Since bail is the security for the release of a person under custody of the law (Sec.
1, Rule 114, Rules of Court), it is evident that it is not intended to cover the civil liability of
the accused in the same criminal case.
The money deposited as bail may however, be considered not only as bail. It may also be
applied to the payment of fines and costs while the excess if any shall be returned to the accused
or to whoever made the deposit (Sec. 14, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
7. The question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action,
preventing him or her from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its
denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final
judgment (Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos v. Court of Appeals and Johnny
Co y Yu, G.R. No. 169711, February 8,2010).
8. When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the
case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while
in detention (People v. Honorable Maceda, 323 SCRA 45 cited in Trillanes IV v.
Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471).
9. The presumption of innocence is not a reason for the detained accused to be
allowed to hold office or practice his profession. Such presumption of innocence does not carry
with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights (Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., 556
SCRA 471, G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008).
331 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
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the right to bail becomes meaningless. Thus, in an old case where the amount required as bail
could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the
other information for frustrated murder and that the Department of Justice itself did
recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses, nothing can be clearer, therefore,
that fixing the amount of PI,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted is clearly violative of the
constitutional provision (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1).
"First, that the exercise of the State's power to deprive an individual of his liberty
is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second,
to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention
during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation
of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights."
Noting that bail had in the past been granted in deportation proceedings, the Court
reasoned that if bail can be granted in deportation cases, it sees no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of
the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, explained the High Court, "the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in
this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion, and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to
liberty of every individual is not impaired."
bail, unless that right is granted expressly by law (Bengzon v. Ocampo, et al, 84 Phil
611). Section 37(9) (e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 (Com. Act No. 613, as
amended) provides that:
"Any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released
under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the
Commissioner of Immigration."
"Note that this provision confers upon the Commissioner of Immigration the power and
discretion to grant bail in deportation proceedings, but does not grant to aliens the right to be
released on bail. The use of the word 'may* in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is
merely permissive and not mandatory or obligatory on the part of the Commissioner. The
exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (U.S. ex rel Zapp et al. v. District Director
of Immigration and Naturalization, 120 F. 2d. 762; Ex parte Perkov, 45 F.
Supp 864; Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17). The determination as to the propriety of
allowing an alien, subject to deportation under the Immigration Act, to be released temporarily
on bail, as well as the conditions thereof, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commissioner, and not in the courts of justice. The reason for this is that the courts do not
administer immigration laws" (Go Tian Chai v. Commissioner of Immigration,
L-20645, September 22,1966).
2. In the case of In The Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Harvey, et al. v. Defensor-Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, the denial by the respondent
Commissioner of Immigration of the petitioners' release on bail, was challenged by them. The
denial was found to be in order by the Court because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail
is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation.
"Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien
under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other
conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of
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the accused before considering the application for bail (Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 215
SCRA 421; Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377).
As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be
posted before custody over him is acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest
or voluntary surrender. It would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free (Paderanga
v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 241). The rationale behind this rule is to discourage and
prevent the practice where the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance (Miranda v.
Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377).
4. A person is said to be in custody if he is arrested by virtue of a warrant or even
without a warrant pursuant to the Rules of Court or if he voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court as when he surrenders to the proper authorities (People v. Gako, Jr.,
348 SCRA 334).
A person is deemed to be under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested
or has surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court. The accused who is confined in a
hospital may be deemed to be in the custody of the law if he clearly communicates his
submission to the court while confined in a hospital (Paderanga v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 115407, August 28, 1995; Defensor-Santiago v. Vazquez, 217 SCRA
633).
5. In Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633, the petitioner who
was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
filed through counsel what purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious
physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly
sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings." On the basis of said
ex-parte motion
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and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized
petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal
appearance in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.
"When the court is satisfied, upon proof or oath, that a material witness will not testify
when required, the court, may, upon motion of either party, order the witness to post bail in such
sum as may be deemed proper." If he refuses to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison
until he complies or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken.
2. Also, "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper offense" as long as the accused is not placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial (Sec. 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
person of suitable age and discretion upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the
undertaking (Sec. 23, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
ingly, it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition for bail and if he pleads
guilty to the charge, there would be no more need for him to file said petition. The prosecution
further argued that "since it is during arraignment that the accused is first informed of the precise
charge against him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him from later
assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of the
charge against him, especially considering that, under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court, evidence presented during such proceedings are considered automatically reproduced at
the trial. Likewise, the arraignment of an accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the possibility
of an accused's flight from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may
be had only if an accused escapes after he has been arraigned." It was likewise argued that "the
conduct of bail hearings prior to arraignment would extend to an accused the undeserved
privilege of being appraised of the prosecution's evidence before he pleads guilty for purposes of
penalty reduction."
The contention of the accused petitioner that the arraignment of an accused is not a
prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail was sustained. It was ruled that a
person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest
or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for
bail.
It is not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted
bail even prior to arraignment. The Court stressed that its ruling in Lavides also implies that an
application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that
the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted
provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be "authorized"
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under the circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding
with the hearing of his petition for bail
The Court in Serapio however, clarified that its pronouncements in Lavides should not
be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment,
because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or
information is filed against him. The Court cautioned that its pronouncements in Lavides should
be understood in the light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as
a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, the ruling that to condition the grant
of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to
choose between filing a motion to quash and foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he
can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail would undermine his constitutional
right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.
Another related issue decided in Serapio was whether or not a motion to quash may be
filed during the pendency of a petition for bail, that whether or not the motion and the petition
are not inconsistent and may proceed independently of each other. Ruling on the issue, the Court
finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and the filing
of a motion to quash.
" x x x Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required
under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional
liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his
appearance at the trial. As stated earlier, a person may apply
320 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its
face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. An accused
may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment.
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other.
Certainly, the right of an accused to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an
offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to
be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the Information charging him with
such offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or
Information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is
dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become
moot and academic."
conditions before corporations could be allowed to act as sureties for bonds and undertakings.
3. Property bond — A property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien on the real
property given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days from the approval of
the bond, the accused shall cause the annotation on the certificate of title on file with the Registry
of Deeds. If the land is unregistered, it is annotated in the Registration Book on the space
provided therefore in the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. The
registration is likewise made on the corresponding tax declaration in the office of the provincial,
city and municipal assessor concerned. Within ten (10) days from the performance of the above
acts, the accused shall submit his compliance to the court. His failure to do so shall be sufficient
cause for the cancellation of the property bond, his re-arrest and detention (Sec. 11, Rule
114, Rules of Court).
The sureties in a property bond must have the following qualifications:
(a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines;
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the
amount of the undertaking;
(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than
that expressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be
equivalent to the whole amount of the bail demanded.
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over
and above all just debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution (Sec. 12, Rule
114, Rules of Court). Every surety is also required to justify by affidavit taken before the
judge that he possesses the qualifications of a surety also describing the property and all relevant
matters required to be so stated by the Rules of Court. No bail shall be approved unless the surety
is qualified (Sec. 13, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
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4. Cash deposit — Bail may also be in the form of a cash deposit. The accused or
any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue
or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer or the clerk of court where the case is pending, the
amount of bail fixed by the court or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed
the case. The accused shall be discharged from custody upon submission of the certificate of
deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of the Rules of
Court. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and
costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit
(Sec. 14, Rule 114, Rules of Court)
The deposit must be made with the persons enumerated in the rule. Irrefragably, only the
collector of internal revenue, city or provincial, city or municipal treasurer is authorized to receive
bail in cash. A judge is not one of those authorized to receive a deposit of cash bail; nor should
such cash be kept in the judge's office, much less in his own residence (Agulan v.
Fernandez, 356 SCRA 162; Naui v. Mauricio, 414 SCRA 11; Lachica v. Tormis,
470 SCRA 206).
5. Recognizance — This is an obligation of record entered into before some court
or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act, the most
usual condition in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for trial.
A person in custody may be released on recognizance whenever allowed by law or by the
Rules of Court (Sec. 15, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The release may be either on the
recognizance of the accused himself or that of a responsible person (Sec. 15, Rule 114,
Rules of Court).
6. Release on recognizance may be ordered by the court in the following cases:
(a) When the offense charged is for violation of an ordinance, a light felony, or a
criminal offense, the impos- able penalty of which does not exceed six (6) months im
CHAPTER VI 323
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(Rule 114)
accused has no means to bail himself out, any amount fixed, no matter how small would fall into
the category of excessive bail (Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312).
2. The judge who issued the warrant or who granted the application for bail shall fix
a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail (Sec. 9, Rule 114,
Rules of Court).
3. The existence of a high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond
confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an amount as
would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount
to be subject, of course, to the provision that excessive bail shall not be required (San Miguel
v. Maceda, 520 SCRA 205).
good standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final decision of his
case, to report to the Clerk of the Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court
may, in its discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further that he be
placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the community
who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case, the affidavit herein mentioned
shall include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of
the citizen so appointed by the Court. The Clerk of Court shall immediately report the presence of
the accused person to the Court. Except when his failure to report is for justifiable reasons
including circumstances beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any violation of this
sworn statement shall justify the Court to order his immediate arrest unless he files bail in the
amount forthwith fixed by the Court."
or life imprisonment, bail may or may not be given depending upon the strength of the evidence
of guilt.
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter to be determined by the court
after a hearing to be conducted (Sec. 8, Rule 114, Rules of Court) with notice of the
hearing to the prosecutor or a requirement for him to submit his recommendation (Sec. 18,
Rule 114, Rules of Court).
The prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong (Sec. 8, Rule
114, Rules of Court).
4. The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused
charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. The court
should first conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court to
determine the existence of strong evidence or the lack of it. This hearing is to enable the judge to
make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented and merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. In a bail hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits of the case
(People v. Plaza, G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009).
5. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (Valerio v.
Court of Appeals, 535 SCRA 453).
the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for
bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court"
4. If the application for bail is granted, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail. This rule is however,
subject to the consent of the bondsman 6Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The consent of
the bondsman shall be required to have provisional liberty under the same bail because of the
rule in Sec. 2(a) of Rule 114, that the "undertaking shall be effective x x x until promulgation of
judgment of the Regional Trial Court x x x."
When application for bail after conviction by the RTC shall be denied
1. If the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
should be denied since the conviction indicates strong evidence of guilt based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt (People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283).
2. Even if the penalty imposed by the trial court is not any of the above but merely
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail already
allowed shall be cancelled, if the prosecution shows the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist or a quasi-recid- ivist, a habitual delinquent
or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
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(Rule 114)
The court is not authorized to deny or cancel the bail ex parte. The rule requires "notice
to the accused" (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
The resolution of the Regional Trial Court denying or cancelling the bail may be reviewed
by the appellate court motu proprio or on motion of any party after notice to the adverse
party in either case (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach
(Jose Antonio Leviste v. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. 189122, March
17,2010).
3. The appellant has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the tried court's
judgment where his conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years and there is a
justification for the cancellation of his bail pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and
(e) of Rule 114. The inexcusable non-appearance in court of the appellant not only violated the
condition of his bail that he "shall appear" before the court "whenever required" by the court or
the Rules. It also showed the probability that he might flee or commit another crime while
released on bail (Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140842, April 12,2007).
the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself
to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
examination and cross examination."
Reliance by the judge on the alleged "voluminous records" of the case does not suffice
because the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since
he knew that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in
that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth stressing that the
prosecution is equally entitled to due process.
Another compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to determine
the amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Sec. 6 (now Sec. 9), Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. Without the required hearing, the bail which may be granted to the accused would be
(People v. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334; See also for
arbitrary and without basis
suggested reading, People v. Cabral, 303 SCRA 361; People v. Dacudao, 170
SCRA 489; Basco v. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220).
3. A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can determine whether the evidence
for the prosecution is strong.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings
in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of
objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases. The judge has no
right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the
case because it has the effect of ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion
to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. The duty to exercise discretion on the
matter is not reposed upon the prosecutor because judicial discretion is the domain of the judge
(Narciso v. Santa Romana-Cruz, 328 SCRA 505).
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(b) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not
the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(c) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
(d) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond. Otherwise, the petition should be denied.
"x x x The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the
duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a
hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial
apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof.
Additionally, the court's grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary
thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail" (Narciso
v. Santa Romana-Cruz, 328 SCRA 505; People v. Cabral, 303 SCRA 361;
People v. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334).
2. Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the
evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great
(People v. Sandiganbayan, 529 SCRA 764).
3. A grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts from making a final assessment
of the evidence after full trial on the merits (People v. Sandiganbayan, 529 SCRA 764,
August 10, 2007).
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BAIL
(Rule 114)
Capital offenses
1. A capital offense is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and of the application
for admission to bail, may be punished with death (Sec. 6,
Rule 114, Rules of Court).
2. It is clear from the Rules of Court that the capital
nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed
by law and not the penalty to be actually imposed (Bravo v. De
Borja, 134 SCRA 466).
3. The imposition of the death penalty is now prohibited
by R.A. 9346 enacted into law on June 24, 2006. Sec. 2 of R.A.
9346 provides that "in lieu of the death penalty, the following
shall be imposed:
"(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law
violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code; or
"(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code."
attempted qualified rape committed against a minor by a relative mentioned in the law. The
sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which
ended the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines.
The concern of the accused-appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape,
which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified
rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua. This is because Sec. 2 of R.A.
No. 9346 provides that instead of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment when appropriate shall be imposed.
The Court found no doubt as to the validity this sentence at the time it was meted prior to
the enactment of R.A. No. 9346. The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim
duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is
death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two
degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is
reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on
appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible
periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
The critical question according to the Court is whether R.A. No. 9346 intended to delete
the word "death" as expressly provided for in the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.
The Court ruled in the affirmative and found R.A. No. 9346 to unequivocally bar the
application of the death penalty, as well as to expressly repeal all such statutory provisions
requiring the application of the death penalty. Such effect explained the Court, necessarily
extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Hence, the
CHAPTER VI 341
BAIL
(Rule 114)
Court added, that it cannot find basis to conclude that R.A. No. 9346 intended to retain the
operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws.
People v. Bon, however, stressed that the debarring of the death penalty through R.A.
No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as "heinous." The
amendatory effects of R.A. No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but not
to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been
downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law
that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves.
Accordingly, R.A. No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and other
damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
Having pronounced and determined the statutory disallowance of the death penalty
through R.A. No. 9346 and the corresponding modification of penalties other than death through
that statute, the penalty of "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no
longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. Hence, in the case of
accused-appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not
from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua.
Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by
the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
Where there is no showing that the judge of the court where the criminal case is pending
is unavailable, another judge who entertains a bail application despite knowledge of the
pendency of the case in another court is clearly in error (Savella v. Ines, 521 SCRA 417).
Judges who approve applications for bail of accused whose cases are pending in other
courts are guilty of gross ignorance of the law (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit in RTC
Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, 536 SCRA 313).
2. Where the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than
where the case is pending, the application for bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court
of said place. If no judge thereof is available, then with any Metropolitan Trial Court judge,
Municipal Trial Court judge or Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge in the said place (Sec. 17[a],
Rule 114, Rules of Court).
When bail is filed with the court other than where the case is pending, the judge who
accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers,
to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reasons, require a different one to be
filed (Sec. 19, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
The failure of a judge who granted the bail to transmit the order of release and other
supporting papers to the court where the case is pending constitutes violation of the rules
(Savella v. Ines, 521 SCRA 417).
3. Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be
released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is
pending, on trial, or appeal (Sec. 17[b], Rule 114, Rules of Court).
4. When a person is in custody but not yet charged, he may apply for bail with any
court in the province, city or municipality where he is held (Sec. 17[c], Rule 114, Rules of
Court).
In Ruiz v. Beldia, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1731, February 16, 2005, the
Certificate of Detention of the person lawfully arrested without a warrant issued by the
PNP-TMG-SOD
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BAIL
(Rule 114)
shows that he was detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. The application for bail should have
been filed before the proper Quezon City court and not in Marikina City.
Increase or reduction of bail
1. Even after the accused is admitted to bail, the amount of bail may either be
increased or reduced by the court upon good cause (Sec. 20, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
2. The increased amount must be given within a reasonable period if the accused
wants to avoid being taken into custody. The rule is c l e a r : " x x x When increased, the accused
may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a
reasonable period" (Sec. 20, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
Forfeiture of bail
1. One of the conditions of the bail is for the accused to appear before the proper
court whenever required (Sec. 2[b], Rule 114, Rules of Court). When his presence is
required, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and
time (Sec. 21, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
2. If he fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited. The
bondsmen shall be given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show
cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of the bail.
The bondsmen must, within the period:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the
reasons for his non-production; and
344 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to
do so. Failing in these two requirements, a judgment shall be rendered against the
bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail (Sec. 21, Rule 114,
Rules of Court).
If the bondsmen move for the mitigation of their liability, the court is required not to
reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted (Sec. 21, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
3. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded
by an order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to
adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so. An order of forfeiture is interlocutory and
merely requires the bondsmen "to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against
them for the amount of the bond." The order is different from the judgment on the bond which
is issued if the accused was not produced within the 30-day period (Mendoza v. Alarma,
G.R. No. 151970, May 7,2008).
3. Sec. 5 of Rule 114 allows the cancellation of bail where the penalty imposed by
the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years if any of the grounds in the said section is
present as when the circumstances indicate the probability of flight. The same section authorizes
the appellate court to motu proprio or on motion of any party review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
CHAPTER VI 345
BAIL
(Rule 114)
4. It was held in Chua v. Court of Appeals, 520 SCRA 729, that from the last
paragraph of the above provision, the appropriate remedy against the trial court's order canceling
the bail is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same regular
appeal proceedings which the appellant himself initiated, such motion being an incident to his
appeal. The filing of a separate petition via a special civil action for certiorari before the
appellate court is proscribed and contravenes the rule against multiplicity of suits and constitutes
forum shopping (Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140842, April 12, 2007).
arrest, has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest
after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial,
without previously invoking his objections thereto (Borlongan v. Pena, G.R. No.
143591, May 5,2010).
— oOo —
Chapter VII
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Rule 115)
Rights of the accused at the trial (Bar 1992; 1996; 1998; 2004)
1. The rights of the accused are normally treated in Constitutional Law specifically
under the topic on the Bill of Rights. The discussion in this treatise shall be confined to selected
rights of an accused.
2. Sec. 1 of Rule 115 enumerates the rights of the accused "at the trial."
It provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following
rights:"
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused however,
may waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless
his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence
of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be consid-
ered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes,
he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates
until custody over him is regained. Upon motion,
347
348 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
doubt. This constitutional guarantee cannot be overthrown unless the prosecution has
established by such quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption of innocence
and prove that a crime was committed and that the accused is guilty thereof. Under our
Constitution, an accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. And this presumption prevails
over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty (People v. Sy, G.R. No.
185284, June 22, 2009; People v. Frondozo, G.R. No. 177164, June 30, 2009;
See People v. Alivio, G.R. No. 177771, May 30,2011 for related reading).
3. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should not by itself prevail
over the presumption of innocence (People v. Ong, 432 SCRA 470; People v.
Paloma, G.R. No. 178544, February 23, 2011). Sec. 3(m) of Rule 131, establishes the
disputable presumption that"official duty has been regularly performed"
Hence, as a general rule, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the
accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have
performed their duties regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is tainted with
irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed. While the law enforcers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail
over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity is merely just
that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by evidence
cannot be regarded as binding truth (People v. Cantalejo, G.R. No. 182790, April 24,
2009; See People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176350, August 10,2011).
found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act x x x."
An answer to the question may be gleaned from a case decided several years ago. In
that case, the petitioners were convicted of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnox-
ious or poisonous substance penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries
Decree of 1975. They challenge the provision of P.D. No. 704 which provides:
Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree violates
the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.
Citing previous pronouncements, the Court held that the validity of laws establishing
presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is generally conceded that the legislature
has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the
guilt of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. To avoid any
constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other must not be arbitrary and
unreasonable. In fine, the presumption must be based on facts and these facts must be part of
the crime when committed.
The challenged provision of P.D. No. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved
and hence, is not con
CHAPTER VII 351
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
substance coupled with the fact that such possession is not authorized by law. Essential,
however, in a drug-related case is that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and
the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction, it behooves upon the prosecution to
establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence
against the accused is the same item recovered from his possession (Julius Cacao y Prieto
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180870, January 22,2010).
7. Does the presumption of innocence end upon conviction by the trial court even if the
conviction is appealed?
This was answered by the Court in the negative in one case. Here, the RTC of Quezon
City rendered a decision convicting a judge, the respondent in this case, for two counts of child
abuse or violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610. The convictions were however, appealed to
the CA.
A Senior State Prosecutor of the DOJ wrote a letter to the then Chief Justice inquiring
whether it is possible for the Supreme Court, in the public interest, to motu proprio order
the immediate suspension of the judge in view of the aforementioned RTC decision. The letter
argued that "Although the conviction is not yet final, the presumption of innocence x x x
enjoyed during the pendency of the trial has already been overcome by its result. The
presumption today is that she is guilty and must clear her name of the charges."
The matter was referred by the Court for comment and recommendation to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA), before which an administrative complaint against the same
judge was pending.
The OCA recommended that the administrative case be given due course and that the
respondent judge be indefinitely suspended pending the outcome of the case. The Second
Division of the Supreme Court through a Resolution, approved the recommendations, thus,
suspending the respondent judge from performing judicial functions while awaiting the final
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resolution of the criminal convictions appealed from or until further orders from the Court.
The respondent judge filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned Resolution. The motion claimed that the suspension order was issued without
affording respondent judge the opportunity to be heard and that the suspension is essentially
unjust because the two criminal cases are still on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not
yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of
innocence and the suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a pre-
judgment of her guilt.
The Court ruled that it cannot fully agree with the recommendations of the OCA. The
fact of respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant the suspension. Since
the convictions are currently on appeal before the CA, the same have not yet attained finality.
As such, the respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be
remembered, explained the Court, that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of
the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or
explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is
shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues and until a promulgation
of final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate prevails (Re: Conviction of
Judge AAA, AM. No. 06-9-545-RTC, January 31, 2008).
once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to
show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused (Mupas v. People, G.R. No.
172834, February 6,2008).
2. For example, in reviewing rape cases, the Supreme Court has constantly been guided
by certain principles among which is that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense
(People v. Lagarde, G.R. No. 182549, January 20, 2009; People v. An, G.R.
No. 169870, August 4, 2009).
On the other hand, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued
that findings of fact of the trial court are generally upheld on appeal and the accused- appellants
are assailing the correctness of the findings of fact of the trial court by impugning the credibility
of the prosecution witness. The prosecution claimed that contrary to the accused-appellants'
claim that the police officers taught the witness to point to them as the perpetrators, her
testimony is straightforward and direct.
After review, The Court found that the accused-appellants should be acquitted.
Declared the Court:
"It is settled that when the issue is the evaluation of the testimony of a
witness or his credibility, this Court accords the highest respect and even finality
to the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that it committed palpable
mistake, misappreciation of facts or grave abuse of discretion. It is the trial court
which has the unique advantage of observing first-hand the facial expressions,
gestures and the tone of voice of a witness while testifying.
"The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the trial court affirmed by the
appellate court are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court,
absent clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or
misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the
same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.
"Factual findings of trial courts, when substantiated by the evidence on
record, command great weight and respect on appeal, save only when certain
material facts and circumstances were overlooked and which, if duly considered,
may vary the outcome of the case.
"In this case, the material fact and circumstance that the lone alleged
eyewitness, x x x was not able to identify the accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime, varies the outcome of this case.
"One, they were not arrested for the crime of robbery with homicide but
were arrested during a buy-bust operation.
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
The Court held that what is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs
is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of corpus delicti. Prosecutions for illegal sale of prohibited drugs necessitate that
the elemental act of possession of prohibited substance be established with moral certainty,
together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction. Therefore, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
shown beyond doubt by complying with the law. In this case, declared the Court, the arresting
officers failed to strictly comply with the procedures for the custody and disposition of
confiscated dangerous drugs as prescribed by R.A. No. 9165. The arresting officers did not mark
the shabu immediately after they arrested the accused. Further, while there was testimony
regarding the marking of the shabu after it was turned over to the police investigator, no
evidence was presented to prove that the marking thereof was done in the presence of the
accused. Also, fatal in the prosecution's case is the failure of the arresting officers to take a
photograph and make an inventory of the confiscated materials in the presence of the accused
or there was no mention that any representative from the media, DOJ or any elected public
official had been present during the inventory or that any of these persons had been required
to sign the copies of the inventory. Clearly, none of the statutory safeguards mandated by R.A.
No. 9165 was observed. Hence, the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedure
in the custody of the seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins.
Nevertheless, while the seized drugs may be admitted in evidence, it does not
necessarily follow that the same should be given evidentiary weight if the procedures provided
by
CHAPTER VII 359
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with. The admissibility of the seized dangerous drugs in
evidence should not be equated with its probative value in proving the corpus delicti. The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
Finally, ruled the Court, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
relied upon by the lower courts cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As a rule, the testimony of police officers
who apprehended the accused is accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that
they have performed their duties regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is
tainted with irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed (See also Mallilin v.
People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30,2008; People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No.
181492, December 16, 2008; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February
25, 2009; People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494; Catuiran v. People, 175647,
May 8, 2009; People v. Barba; G.R. No. 182420, July 23,2009; People v.
Gatlabayan, G.R. No. 186467, July 13,2011).
Court); to state the designation of the offense given by statute unless there is no such
designation in which case it is sufficient to make reference to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing the offense (Sec. 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
(d) To state also in ordinary and concise language, the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances attending the acts imputed to the accused (Sees. 8, 9,
Rule 110, Rules of Court);
(e) To sufficiently allege that the crime was committed or its essential
ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court (Sec. 10, Rule
110, Rules of Court);
(f) To allege the date of the commission of the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, which date may be one as near as possible to the actual date of the commis-
sion of the offense, except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense
(Sec. 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court);
(g) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is
unknown, the property must be described with such particularity to properly identify the
offense charged (Sec. 12[a], Rule 110, Rules of Court).
2. It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellant's basic
right to due process if he is charged with simple rape and consequently convicted with certain
qualifying circumstances which were not alleged in the information (People v. Lagarde,
G.R. No. 182549, January 20,2009).
3. In Lagarde, the accused-appellant was charged with rape in an information
which reads:
"That on or about the 27th day of December, 2001, in the municipality of
San Miguel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent with
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lewd designs and by use of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA], 11 years old,
against her will to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
The RTC found AAA's testimony credible, noting that at her age, it is inconceivable for
her to concoct a tale of having been raped. Thus, the trial court convicted accused-appellant of
rape aggravated by minority of the victim, use of bladed weapon and force, and uninhabited
place in view of the location of the offense.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings of fact and judgment of conviction.
With regard to the penalty, however, the CA ruled that the trial court erred when it imposed
the death sentence on the basis of the following aggravating circumstances: minority, use of
bladed weapon, and uninhabited place. Aside from the abolition of the death penalty, the CA
held that:
Accused-appellant also questioned the death penalty imposed on him, arguing that the
aggravating circumstances of minority, use of a bladed weapon, and uninhabited place were
not specifically alleged in the information.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, agreed with the judgment of
conviction but not with the death penalty for the same reasons submitted by
accused-appellant.
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
4. May the accused be convicted of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 if the check
described in the information is not the check allegedly issued and admitted in evidence?
In Dico v. Court of Appeals, 452 SCRA 441, the accused was charged with
three (3) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (B.P. Big. 22) involving among other
checks, FEBTC Check No. 364903 for P100,000 as described in the information. Dining his appeal
to the Supreme Court following his conviction by the lower courts, the Court discovered a
discrepancy between the checked marked as exhibit and the check described in the
information.
The information filed by the public prosecutor described the check as FEBTC Check No.
364903 dated 12 May 1993 in the amount of P100,000 payable to Equitable Banking Corpo-
ration. However, the parties, including the lower courts, overlooked the fact that the check
being identified in court was different from that described in the information. The prosecution
marked as its Exhibit "B" FEBTC Check No. 369403 (not FEBTC Check No. 364903), dated 12 May
1993 in the amount of P100,000 payable to Equitable Banking Corporation.
The issue as to the identity of the check, though not raised as an error, should according
to the Court, be considered in favor of the accused. The variance in the identity of the check
nullifies the conviction of the accused. The identity of the check enters into the first element of
the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Big. 22 — that a person draws or issues a check on account
or for value. There being a discrepancy in the identity of the checks described in the information
and that presented in court, petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the
offense charged will be violated if his conviction is upheld.
5. Where the date of the check and the amount thereof as stated in the
information vary with the exhibits submitted by the prosecution, the inconsistencies violate the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed. Without a sufficient identification of the
dishonored check in the information, the
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
conviction of the accused should be set aside (Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA
465).
6. A violation of the right under discussion is exemplified by Gutierrez v.
Hernandez, 524 SCRA 1, June 8, 2007, where the judge set a criminal case for
arraignment and hearing knowing fully well that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted and no information had yet been filed before his court. He justified his actions as
"pursuant to his judicial functions as presiding judge..." Calling the act as "a clear display of x x
x," the Court declared said act as having clearly violated the right of the accused to due process,
to be informed of the accusation against him, and to have a copy of the Information before
arraignment (Gutierrez v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1628, June 8, 2007).
7. In yet another case, the petitioners were charged with violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1992) before the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan. The
information did not allege that the alleged felonious act of the petitioners was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things. In other words,
the information was only for simple carnapping the penalty for which under Sec. 14 of the law
shall not exceed seventeen years and four months.
After trial, petitioners were sentenced to suffer the penalty of seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months to thirty (30) years imprisonment, a penalty in excess of that provided for
simple carnapping. The penalty meted is actually equivalent to the imprisonment imposable
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person,
or force upon things;
The petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision with modification,
as follows: x x x "MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants shall suffer the indeterminate
prison term of SEVENTEEN YEARS AND FOUR MONTHS, as minimum, to THIRTY YEARS, as
maximum."
The petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied their motion. In
the Supreme Court, the petitioners
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raised as error, among others, the imposition upon them of the penalty of seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years. The petitioners also contended that assuming they
were guilty of the crime charged, the penalty imposed by the lower courts was erroneous. They
argue that the information failed to allege any circumstance that would warrant the imposition
of a higher penalty.
The Court agreed with the petitioners with respect to the erroneous penalty imposed.
The Court noted that the information charging the petitioners with violation of R.A. No. 6539, as
amended, did not allege that the carnapping was committed by means of violence against, or
intimidation of, any person, or force upon things. While these circumstances were proven at the
trial, they cannot be appreciated because they were not alleged in the information. Thus, the
lower courts erred when they took these circumstances into account in imposing the penalty
which they pegged at seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years
imprisonment. In the absence of these circumstances, the charge against the petitioners is
confined to simple carnapping whose imposable penalty should have been imprisonment for
not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and not more than seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months (Andres v. People, G.R. No. 185860, June 5,2009).
8. In implementing the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him, the Rules of Court specifically require that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense, including the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language, not necessarily the language
used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged and the attendant qualifying and aggravating
circumstances present, so that the accused can properly defend himself and the court can
pronounce judgment. To broaden the scope of the right, the Rules authorize the quashal, upon
motion of the accused, of an information that fails to allege the acts constituting the offense
(Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23,2009).
CHAPTER VII 367
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed
not only of such specific crime, but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein. (People
of the Philippines v. Joselito Noque y Gomez, G.R. No. 175319, January
15,2010).
10. When the counsel of the accused actively participated in the proceedings this
indicates that the accused was fully aware of the charges against him, otherwise, his counsel
would have objected and informed the court of the blunder (People v. Pangilinan, 518
SCRA 358). But the failure to file a motion to quash the information cannot amount to a
waiver of the constitutional right to be informed (Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 413 SCRA
385).
2. Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7438 has however, redefined the concept of 'custodial
investigation' and has extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual
has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. Specifically, Sec. 2
of R.A. 7438 provides that "custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the 'inviting' officer for any violation of law
(Sec. 2[ff, R.A. 7438).
Rights of persons under custodial investigation; custodial investigation
report
1. Republic Act No. 7438 provides for the following requisites for a valid custodial
investigation report:
(b) If the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write,
it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting
counsel in the language or dialect known to such arrested
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Failure to inform the suspect of her right to counsel during custodial investigation attains
significance only if the person under investigation makes a confession in writing without aid of
counsel and which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during the trial. In such
case, the tainted confession obtained in violation is inadmissible in evidence against the accused
(Eugenio v. People 549 SCRA 433).
4. The suspect must also be advised that he has the option to reject the counsel
provided for him by the police authorities, which fact must similarly appear in the extrajudicial
confession. Where the participation of a lawyer in the proceedings was confined to the
notarization of the suspect's confession, the same is not considered, in legal contemplation, the
kind of legal assistance that should be accorded to the suspect (People v. Rapeza, 520
SCRA 596).
5. Aside from the rule that the counsel must be competent and independent and
preferably the choice of the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, the
assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer is "any lawyer, except those directly
affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged
with the prosecution of crimes" (Sec. 3, RA. 7438).
6. Jurisprudence supports the view that a mere inquiry on the commission of a
crime by law enforcement authorities does not automatically trigger the application of the right
to counsel.
"x x x It is only after the investigation ceased to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
that the Miranda Rule begins to operate, though R.A. No. 7438 has extended this constitutional
guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely
been "invited" for questioning" (Aquino v. Paiste, 555 SCRA 255, June 25, 2008).
The moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information
from a suspect, the
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latter should, at this juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in
the presence of counsel (People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596).
7. A police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest since the accused at that stage
is not yet being investigated. In the line-up, the right to counsel does not yet attach (People v.
Tolentino, 423 SCRA 448).
8. It has also been held that a barangay chairman is not deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Art. Ill of the Philippine
Constitution. Thus, a suspect's uncounselled statement before the barangay chairman is
admissible (People v. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374).
9. The right to counsel applies in certain pre-trial proceedings that can be deemed
"critical stages" in the criminal process like in a preliminary investigation. This investigation can
be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in
a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes
intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution
(People v. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624).
2. The right to counsel may be waived but to insure that the waiver is voluntary and
intelligent, the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of the counsel of the accused
(People v. Del Castillo, 439 SCRA 601). The right to a competent and independent
counsel is one of the rights of the accused guaranteed under Sec. 12(1) of Art. Ill of the Philippine
Constitution. As the proviso declares: " xx x These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel."
Competent and independent counsel
1. The meaning of "competent counsel" and its standards were explained in People v.
Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 as follows:
areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic.
x x x The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present
from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising cau-
tion reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in
a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to
remain silent or terminate the interview CPeople v. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431,
April 3,2007).
2. Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010
states: "The modifier competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an
empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him
by a diligent and capable lawyer (People v. Suela, 373 SCRA 163; People v.
Deniega, 251 SCRA 626, People v. Santos, 283 SCRA 443). An effective and
vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise
and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer
should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under in-
vestigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in
relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent" (People v.
Labatan, 320 SCRA 140).
Citing previous decisions, Lumanog further declares: "The right to counsel has been
written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in
extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being
that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated
compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective,
vigilant and independent
CHAPTER VII 375
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
counsel. Where the prosecution failed to discharge the State's burden of proving with clear and
convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he
extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative
value (People v. Peralta, 426 SCRA 472, citing People v. Binamird, 277 SCRA
232; People v. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673; People v. Rodriguez, 341 SCRA 645,
653; People v. Rayos, 351 SCRA 336, 344; and People v. Patungan, 354 SCRA
413; Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7,2010).
3. An extrajudicial confession executed by a suspect assisted by a counsel who
failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and competent counsel is deemed an
un- counseled confession and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence (People v. Tomaquin,
435 SCRA 23).
4. In the case of People v. Bermas, 306 SCRA 135 three PAO lawyers were
assigned to an accused who was charged with raping his own daughter. The records show that
the first lawyer without sufficient reason did not cross-examine the private complainant and
thus, effectively waived the right to cross-examination. He subsequently asked to be relieved of
his duties as counsel. The second lawyer who was appointed by the court, missed several dates
and could no longer be located. A third reluctant lawyer was appointed by the court and later
ceased to appear for the accused.
This Court held that:
"The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to
counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the
trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being
well-versed on the case and his knowing
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the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an
accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty
of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance
and not a simple perfunctory representation" (People v. Nadera 324 SCRA
490).
5. Where the participation of the lawyer in the proceedings was confined to the
notarization of the suspect's confession, the same is not considered, in legal contemplation, the
kind of legal assistance that should be accorded to the suspect (People v. Rapeza, 520
SCRA 596).
6. The right to counsel involves more than the mere presence of a lawyer. It means
an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation (People
v. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624).
Lastimoso v. Asayo, 517 SCRA 522 and Ampong v. Civil Service Commission,
CSC-Regional Office No. 11,563 SCRA293).
3. The extrajudicial confession must also be tested for voluntariness, that is, if it was
given freely by the confessant without any form of coercion or inducement (People v.
Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596, April 3,2007).
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its
face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details — which could only
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(c) In the event of a valid waiver, it must be signed in the presence of any of the
parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge,
district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him.
If there is any waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the waiver
must:
(a) be in writing; and
en without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the
absence of such coercion, the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence,
even if such confession were gospel truth (People v. Ador, 432 SCRA 1).
7. Summarizing jurisprudential and statutory pronouncements, the Court has
consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the
following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with
the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice;
3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing (People v.
Bagnate, 428 SCRA 633; People v. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431, April 3, 2007;
People v. Tuniaco, G.R. No. 185710, January 19,2010).
8. Assuming that all constitutional and statutory safeguards have been complied
with, "An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for convic-
tion, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti" (Sec. 3, Rule 133, Rules of
Court).
9. While the Supreme Court has consistently stricken out the extrajudicial
confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights and declared it
inadmissible in evidence, the accused will not be entitled to an acquittal if his conviction was
not based on the evidence obtained during such custodial investigation and if even without
the extrajudicial confession of the accused, the testimonial and documentary evidence on
record could establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Lumanog, G.R. No.
182555, September 7, 2010).
10. The accused's confession to a "bantay bayan" is inadmissible in evidence if
the same was done without the assistance of his lawyer and without waiver of his right to
counsel (People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010). The Supreme Court
held in this case that fcarangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as
in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at
the barangay level and any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under
Section 12, Article III, of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without counsel was inadmissible in
evidence (People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010).
Right to speedy trial; speedy disposition of cases (Bar 1996; 2002; 2007)
1. The right to a speedy trial is explicitly guaranteed by Section 14(2) of Article III of
the Constitution. Thus " x x x In criminal cases, the accused shall x x x enjoy
the right x x x to have a speedy, impartial and public trial x x x" (See People
v. Anonas, G.R. No. 156847, January 21,2007).
The same right is echoed and reinforced in Sec. 1(h) of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court
declaring that one of the rights of an accused at trial is "To have a speedy, impartial and
public trial."
Nowhere is the guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases more significant
and meaningful than in criminal cases where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the
accused as well, are at stake (Cabarles v. Maceda, 516 SCRA 303).
On the other hand, the right to a speedy disposition of cases is provided for under
Section 16, Article III, of the Constitution which provides that, "all persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies."
2. This right to a speedy trial has consistently been defined by the Court
substantially "as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its purpose being to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation
or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
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determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose."
It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy
disposition of cases, it is a flexible concept. Due regard must be given to the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
trial," "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
(Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No.
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory
154155, August 6,2008; Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555,
September 7,2010).
The right does not preclude justifiable postponements and delay when warranted by
the situation. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right, particular regard
must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case (Domondon v.
Sandiganbayan, 476 SCRA 496).
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it
should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate
consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial. A
genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration before ruling on important
questions, and a zealous regard for the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a
good trial judge, which are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases
(Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong, A.M. No. 08- 19-SB-J, April 12, 2011 citing State
Prosecutors v. Muro, 251 SCRA 111). +1
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
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3. Under the Constitution, the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited
to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence,
under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials
who are tasked with the administration of justice (Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No.
154155, August 6,2008).
4. The essence of the judicial function is that justice shall be impartially
administered without unnecessary delay (Re: Complaint Against Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion of the Court of Appeals, 518 SCRA 512).
shabu, a regulated drug, and that he was in possession of an unlicensed .38. caliber revolver.
Two separate informations were filed against the respondent, one for illegal possession
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and another for illegal possession of firearm. Respondent
filed with the trial court a motion for reinvestigation on grounds that he was apprehended
without a warrant of arrest and that no preliminary investigation was conducted. The trial court
granted the motion and a prosecutor was designated to conduct the reinvestigation who was
later appointed judge of the RTC in Iloilo. Apparently, he did not inform the prosecutor who
took his place about the pending reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained in
detention.
Almost five years after, the respondent filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the
informations, contending that the delay in the reinvestigation violated his right to due process.
The trial court heard the motion to dismiss. It turned out that the prosecutor who took over the
case was not aware of the pending reinvestigation. The trial court then directed him to
terminate the reinvestigation within thirty (30) days. Within the period granted him, the
prosecutor manifested before the trial court that the reinvestigation had been terminated and
that evidence exist to sustain the allegations in the informations against respondent. The trial
court then issued an Order denying respondent's motion to dismiss the informations. His
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying his motion to dismiss both informations. The Court of Appeals granted
the petition and set aside the Order of the trial court and dismissed the criminal charges against
respondent.
The Court of Appeals ruled that having been made to wait for the resolution of his
motion for reinvestigation for almost five years while being detained, the right of respondent to
due process was violated. The Court of Appeals
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
then ordered that respondent be released from custody. The Government, represented by the
Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same.
Citing previous cases, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that accused persons are
guaranteed a speedy trial by the Bill of Rights and that such right is denied when an accused
person, through the vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting officers, is forced to wait
many months for trial. It called on all courts to be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of the courts
to see to it that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be
immediately discharged from the custody of the law.
"The preliminary investigation of the respondent for the offenses charged took more
than four years. He was apprehended for the offenses charged on November 19, 1996. Having
been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not having been afforded a formal investigation,
he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial court, in an Order dated January 28,1997
ordered a reinvestigation which was terminated only on February 16, 2001. In fact, even the
Solicitor General admitted it took some time for the City Prosecutor to terminate and resolve
the reinvestigation.
There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by the delay, having to be
confined for more than four oppressive years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to
comply with the law on preliminary investigation. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals,
respondent's right to due process had been violated."
3. In Angcangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA. 301, the Court found
the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of
the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases (Cited in People v.
Anonas, supra).
4. In Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, 307 SCRA 149, it was held that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discre
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tion in not quashing the Information filed six years after the initiatory complaint, thereby
depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case (People v. Anonas,
supra).
5. Similarly, in Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, 307 SCRA 104, the Court
ruled that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on
complaints before him. The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of an
accused violates his constitutional right to due process. Thus, in Roque v. Sandiganbayan,
307 SCRA 104, the Court, restating the pronouncement in Ta- tad v. Sandiganbayan,
159 SCRA 70, held:
tual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny as would justify a
delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other
two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving [of] unwarranted
benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues,
certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the
Tanodbayan to resolve the case (Emphasis supplied; People v. Anonas, supra).
6. A judge's illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render the
corresponding decision or resolution within the prescribed period. The demands of public
service cannot abide by his illness. In case of poor health, the judge concerned needs only to ask
the Supreme Court for an extension of time to decide cases, as soon as it becomes clear to him
that there would be delay in his disposition of cases (Balajedeong v. Del Rosario, 524
SCRA 13).
7. Also, the designation of a judge to preside over another sala is an insufficient
reason to justify delay in deciding a case (Bernaldez v. Avelino, 527 SCRA 11). A heavy
work load due to additional work, as acting presiding judge in other courts, is not sufficient
justification for the delay because judges are allowed, upon motion or letter-request, extensions
of the reglementary period in deciding cases (Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial
Audit Conducted in MTCs of Bayom- bong & Solano & MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe,
Nueva Vizcaya, 535 SCRA 224).
8. The absence of a branch clerk of court should not affect the prompt disposition of
cases. It is the duty of the judge to recommend to the Supreme Court the immediate
appointment of a branch clerk of court (Office of the Court Administrator v. Laron,
527 SCRA 45). Even the non-submission of the transcript of stenographic notes by
stenographers would not relieve judges of their duty to render a decision within the required
period as judges are directed to take down notes of salient portions of the hearing and proceed
in the preparation of decisions without waiting for the transcribed stenographic notes (Office
of the Court Administrator v. Janolo, Jr.
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534 SCRA 262). The incompleteness of the transcript of stenographic notes is not a ground
for delay (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, 536 SCRA 313).
9. The defects in a motion are not reasons for a judge not to act on the same. If a judge
believes that the motions pending before him were defective, he could have simply acted on
the said motions and indicated the supposed defects instead of just leaving them unresolved
(Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2170, December 16,
2009).
Purpose of time limits set by law or the rules; principle of speedy trial is a
relative term
As a general principle, rules prescribing the .time within which certain acts must
be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the preven-
tion of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business
(Balajedeong v. Del Rosario, 524 SCRA 13; Galanza v. Trocino, 529 SCRA
200).
As a rule, failure to resolve cases within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious
violation of the Constitution (Petallar v. Pullos, 419 SCRA 434). It is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions (Office
of the Court Administrator v. Legaspi, Jr., 512 SCRA 570; Re: Complaint
Against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals, 518 SCRA 512;
Pacquing v. Gobarde, 521 SCRA 464; Office of the Court Administrator v.
Go, 534 SCRA 156).
An unwarranted slow down in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence
of the people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute (Biggel v.
Pamintuan, 559 SCRA 344).
Various decisions like Olbes v. Buemio, G.R. No. 173319, December
4, 2009, have held that the principle of "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily
involves a degree of flexibility. Thus, in spite of the prescribed time limits,
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of "speedy trial" is a relative term
and must necessarily be a flexible concept and that while justice is administered with dispatch,
the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. The Court explained that it
cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift,
but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to
the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice hence, a balancing test of
applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to
approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not preclude
justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation (Olbes v.
Buemio, G.R. No.173319, December 4, 2009).
The Supreme Court in Jacob v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162206,
November 17, 2010, emphasized that "the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure also
include provisions that ensure the protection of such right" like Section 1(h) of Rule 115 which
provides that the accused shall have the right to a "speedy, impartial, and public trial." Also, Sec.
2 of Rule 119 further provides that "x x x Trial, once commenced, shall continue from day to day
as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for
good cause."
Citing previous decisions, the Court however, cautioned that the concept
of speedy trial "is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In
determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, the
delay should be considered, in view of the entirety of the proceedings. Indeed,
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the
realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all,
do not exist in a vacuum."
In Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009, no objection was
interposed by his defense counsel when at
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the preliminary hearing the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would
be only for the other two cases against the petitioner and not on the case where he claims a
violation of his right to speedy trial. His failure to object to the prosecution's manifestation that
the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. In fact, petitioner's acquiescence is evident from
the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the People's evidence in
the other cases.
In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his
failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his
claim to the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely
objection to the prosecution's manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be
tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his
objection thereto. The Court hence, found that there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude
that the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioner's right to speedy trial (Tan v. People,
G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009).
motion for postponement is denied, then the accused should move for the dismissal of the case,
such dismissal amounting to an acquittal (People v. Cacdac, L-45650, March
29,1982).
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), a case in which the United States Supreme Court
concededly made the most comprehensive discussion of the right to speedy trial. Here, the
petitioner and his alleged accomplice, were accused and tried with the murder of an elderly
couple in a county in Kentucky. Since the prosecution believed that it had a stronger case
against the petitioner's co-accused, it presented evidence against the latter first who was tried
ahead of the petitioner. It was the hope of the prosecution that after his conviction he would be
utilized as a witness against the petitioner. The co-accused was tried several times because of
hung juries and a series of appeals. When he was convicted and it was time to hold the trial for
the petitioner, the chief investigating officer became ill and could not testify. In all, the petitioner
had waited more than five years for his trial. He then raised the issue of the violation of his right
to a speedy trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that determinations of whether or not the right to a
speedy trial has been violated or denied must be made on a case to case basis. Accordingly: "A
defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial can be determined only on an ad hoc basis in
which the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant are weighed and balanced; among
factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been
deprived of his right are length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant." It proceeded to explain that none of the factors
mentioned is by itself determinative. All must be considered and weighed together under what
is now known as the "balancing test."
While it appeared that in Barker, the delays were due to continuances or
postponements initiated by the prosecution, the petitioner failed to timely assert his right to a
speedy trial. The records show that he raised his right only after a series of sixteen (16)
continuances made by the prosecution. Coupled with the absence of a showing that he was
actually prejudiced, the U.S. Supreme Court held that despite the delays, the petitioner's right to
a speedy trial has not been violated.
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
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3. In Perez v. People, G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008, the accused
claimed a violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case because the decision of the
Sandiganbayan was handed down after the lapse of more than twelve years. "The years that he
had to wait for the outcome of his case were allegedly spent in limbo, pain and agony."
The Court rejected the contention of the petitioner finding no serious prejudice caused
upon him by the alleged delay. The Court likewise found that the petitioner himself did not want
a speedy disposition of his case. Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de parte in all
stages of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan until his conviction The records do not
however, show that petitioner has filed any motion or manifestation which could be construed
even remotely as an indication that he wanted his case to be dispatched without delay. For this,
the Court concluded that the petitioner "has clearly slept on his right." The Court further
explained that "the matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those twelve
years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at
least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that he was not
waiving that right."
The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the
other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the
right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily
dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the
delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a
serious, complex conspiracy charge.
Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify
the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason
such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a
valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. We
have already discussed the third factor, the defendant's responsibility to assert his right.
Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we
have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to
some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice,
which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the
deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant's assertion of his
speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether
the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right
will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.
A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be
assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was
designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration;
(ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
(iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the
prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected
in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown."
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als, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the
system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English
criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial
opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But,
however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American
jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the
minds of the American colonists that the states, with one accord, made a denial of the right to
question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England
was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a
constitutional enactment CBrown v. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 819,
821)."
Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in
England in the early days "in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack."
An old Philippine case [1904] speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older than the
Government of the United States;" as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial
methods of interrogating the accused person;" and as having been adopted in the Philippines
"to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons
to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses with which
they were charged."
So it is then that this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which
is left to the discretion of the court;' it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and
substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. Just a few months ago, the
Supreme Court of the United States (January 29,1968), speaking thru Mr. Justice Harlan warned
that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as
the innocent and foresighted."
xxx
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an
admission of his guilt. Nor may
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a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against
him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a
crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will" (Cited in
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169, August 19,1968; Citations
omitted; Underscoring supplied).
4. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection
does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a
failure to claim it at the appropriate time (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July
7,1989; U.S. v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424).
The assertion of the privilege against self incrimination must be raised in response to
each specific inquiry or it is waived. Each assertion of the privilege rests on its own cir-
cumstances. Blanket assertions of the privilege are not permitted (See, United States v.
White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1979).
5. The right prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and
not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the
right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which
has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only
when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot
be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The
witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and
answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which
may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the
constitutional guaranty (People v. Ayson, G.R. Nol 85215, July 7,1989).
CHAPTER VII 399
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
The U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694 has construed the right in
the following terms: "The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a
personal one, applying only to natural individuals." Because it is a personal privilege, the papers
and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the
privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity.
Hence, stated U.S. v. White, a labor union official cannot refuse to produce books and
records of the union in his custody and required by the court to be produced. He cannot invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination by contending that the production of the books and
records would tend to incriminate himself and the organization.
2. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 had a similar interpretation when
it ruled that since corporate existence implies amenability to legal powers, a subpoena duces
tecum may be directed to a corporation which is under a duty to produce records, books, and
papers in its possession when they may be properly required in the administration of justice. An
individual may not invoke the privilege to refuse to produce corporate records when the
subpoena is directed to the corporation.
Wilson adds that a subpoena duces tecum which is suitably specific and properly
limited in its scope does not violate the unreasonable search and seizure provisions of the
constitution; the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be raised by a corporate officer
having possession of corporate documents for his personal benefit.
A case decided after U.S. v. White sustained the conviction for contempt of the
petitioner who testified that she had been the Treasurer of the Communist Party of Denver and
had
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been in possession of its records, which she later had turned over to another person. When
asked to identify the person to whom she had delivered the records, she refused the order of
the court. When she was charged with contempt, she asserted her privilege against
self-incrimination. Her claim of privilege was overruled and she was convicted of contempt
(Rogers v. United States, 340 US. 367).
Rogers held that since the privilege against self-incrimi- nation is solely for the benefit
of the witness, petitioner's original refusal to answer could not be justified by a desire to protect
another from punishment, much less to protect another from interrogation by a grand jury.
Also, books and records kept in a representative, capacity cannot be the subject of the privilege
against self-incrimination, even though production of them might tend to incriminate their
keeper personally since the books were not held in a personal capacity.
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle
would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in
proof."
3. In U.S v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, the accused was placed in a lineup in which each
person was made to wear strips of tape on his face, as the robber allegedly had done, and, on
direction, repeated words like those the robber allegedly had used. Two bank employees
identified the accused as the perpetrator both in the line up and in the trial. Urging that the
conduct of the lineup violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination the
accused sought for his acquittal. The trial court convicted the accused.
The Wade court explained that neither the lineup itself nor anything required therein
violated respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since merely
exhibiting his person for observation by witnesses and using his voice as an identifying physical
characteristic involved no compulsion of the accused to give evidence of a testimonial nature
against himself. "The Fifth Amendment protects an accused only from being compelled to
testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature...."
The Court explained further that the prohibition compelling a person to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communica-
tions from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material and that
"compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution witness
prior to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial
significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not
compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have. It is no different from compelling
Schmerber to provide a blood sample or Holt to wear the blouse, and, as in those instances,
is not within the cover of the privilege. Similarly, compelling Wade to speak
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
tected by the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Citing Holt, the Court
explained that "the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material." Citing Schmerber, the Court once again declared that the privilege
offers "no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or
measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture."
5. The early case of Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62, decided by the
Philippine Supreme Court was decided on the theory that "the kernel of the privilege" was the
prohibition against "testimonial compulsion and rejected the arguments of a woman accused
of adultery that to compel her to submit to a physical examination to determine her pregnancy
was a violation of her right against self-incrimination.
6. In United States v. Ong Siu Hong, (36 Phil. 735), the Court admitted
in evidence morphine that was forced out of the mouth of the accused because it involved no
testimonial compulsion.
7. In U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145, the Supreme Court rejected a claim of
the privilege when the accused in a criminal action for acts of lasciviousness was stripped of his
clothing after his arrest and in his body was found a substance consistent with gonorrhea, a
disease from which his alleged seven-year old victim was suffering from.
8. In People v. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244, it was held that there is no
infringement of the privilege when a person is required to put on clothings or shoes for size or
for measuring or photographing. Neither is it a violation of the privilege to require a person to
place his foot over a footprint found in the crime scene as held in U.S. v. Zara, 42 Phil.
308.
9. In Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA 197, the Court emphasized that obtaining
DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case, will
not
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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
violate the right against self-incrimination since the privilege applies only to evidence that is
*communicative" in essence.
10. Philippine decisions on the privilege against self- incrimination basically mirror those
of their American counterparts although the former have been found to be more succinct and
less susceptible to misinterpretations.
Forced re-enactments
People v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, September 30, 1987, for instance, is an
exemplar of a very lucid summary of the essence of the privilege when it declared that forced
re-enact- ments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self-
incrimination. Thus, all evidence based on such a re-enactment are to be deemed in violation of
the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence.
Justice Sarmiento in People v. Olvis goes on to declare that the "constitutional
privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion, but this has since
been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature" acquired under circumstances of
duress. Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and
recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other
case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This was the lesson learned
from the ancient days of the inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt. Thus, an act,
whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is
covered by the inhibition of the Constitution.
People v. Olvis continues: "This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from
mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to
ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. This includes requiring the
accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his body, or compelling him to expectorate
morphine from his mouth or making her submit to a pregnancy test or a footprinting test, or
requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases. In each case, the accused does not
406 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore, that he be provided with the guiding hand of
counsel.
But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not merely
required to exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal
responsibility against his will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled
confession" (People v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, September 30,1987).
Meaning of compulsion
Compulsion as it is understood does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may
be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, dis-
able him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment
would be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of
the defendant." (State v. Wolfe, 266 N.W. 116,125 cited in Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968).
Beltran stemmed from an order of the respondent judge requiring the petitioner to
appear before the provincial fiscal to take a dictation in his own handwriting. The purpose of the
order was for the court to have a basis for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and of determining whether or not it was he who wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified. In a petition for prohibition, the petitioner sought to prevent the
enforcement of the order by seeking refuge in the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.
The court explained in Beltran that as to its scope, the privilege is not limited precisely
to testimony, but extends to the giving or furnishing of evidence.
It went on to declare:
"The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man
accused of crimes shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the
pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the
evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to construe the
prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any
steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well-established
doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to
giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of
evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of
any fact which the accused has a right to hold.
xxx
"Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the
body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention: and in the case at bar writing
means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is
the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Here the witness is
compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which
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does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier (Beltran v. Samson, 53
Phil. 570; Underscoring supplied).
Comparing Beltran with Villaflor, the Court ratiocinated:"
"In the case of Villaflor v. Summers (41 Phil. 62), it was plainly stated
that the court preferred to rest its decision on the reason of the case rather than on
blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the case there consisted in that it was
the case of the examination of the body by physicians, which could be and doubtless
was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner therein to
furnish evidence by means of testimonial act. In reality she was not compelled to
execute any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only enjoined from
something preventing the examination; all of which is very different from what is
required of the petitioner of the present case, where it is sought to compel him to
perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his
handwriting for the purpose of comparison. Besides, in the case of Villamor v. Sum-
mers, it was sought to exhibit something already in existence, while in the case at bar,
the question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to
compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in
existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him."
3. Not every act of affixing one's signature is within the protection of the privilege
against self-incrimination as the Court found in Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
109242, January 26,1999.
In a petition for review after his conviction, the petitioner raised, as one of the issues on
appeal the fact that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed by him
because he was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel and that his affixing of this signature during custodial investigation violated the
constitutional provision that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
CHAPTER VII 409
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
Petitioner's counsel argued that the signing of petitioner's and his co-accused's names
was not a mere mechanical act but one which required the use of intelligence and therefore
constitutes self-incrimination presumably having in mind, said the Court, the ruling in Beltran
v. Samson "to the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against
himself extends to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting
for the purpose of comparing it with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for
falsification. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention."
The Court however, made a distinction between the use of the specimen handwriting in
Beltran. In that case, the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting matched the
handwriting in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby show that the accused
was the author of the crime (falsification). In Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, the purpose for
securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes
as the ones seized from him..." Thus, the invocation of the right against self- incrimination was
not upheld.
In Marcelo however, the Court explained that when the signatures of the accused
were affixed, such signatures were actually evidence of admission obtained from petitioner and
his co-accused under circumstances constituting custodial investigation. Under the Constitution,
among the rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, that he must be provided with one. It is on this ground that the letters with the
signature of the accused could be excluded.
"However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The Letters were
validly seized from petitioner x x x as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioner's
admission that the letters in question were those seized from
410 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
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him and his companion x x x is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from
evidence of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of the
crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the
possession of petitioner and his companion and seized from them was shown by the
testimonies x x x." Thus, in effect the Court meant that the signatures affixed were irrelevant to
the admissibility of the letters as the items seized from the accused.
would incriminate himself. What he says does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination.
It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if "it clearly
appears to the court that he is mistaken. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, is
to be required to prove the hazards posed by his answers he would actually be compelled to
surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the
privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it
is asked. The privilege should be sustained unless it clearly appears that the claim is mistaken,
i.e., unless it is perfectly clear from careful consideration of all circumstances that the witness is
mistaken and the answer cannot possibly have incriminating effect."
2. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, is an authority of the rule that it is not necessary
that a witness explain how his answer will tend to incriminate him, since this would compel him
to surrender the protection to which the privilege is designed to guarantee. The test for
determining if the privilege is validly asserted was clearly set out in Malloy. It is: "To sustain the
privilege, it need only be evidenced from the implication of the question, in the setting in which
it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosures would result. In applying that test,
the judge must be perfectly clear from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the
case that the witness is mistaken and that the answers cannot possibly have such tendency to
incriminate."
privilege against self-incrimination the means of its own implementation, since, when a witness
is so advised the advice becomes an integral part of the protection accorded the witness by the
Fifth Amendment (Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449).
Neither does the subpoena implicate a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination of the
taxpayer since the subpoena and the demand for the information sought was directed to the
accountant and not the taxpayer. In the present case, no "shadow of testimonial compulsion
upon or enforced communication by the accused" is involved.
which may tend to show that he himself has committed a crime (Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547; Italics supplied).
"xxx The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding
in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal
proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him
who gives it (McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34; Underscoring
supplied).
The Court in Chavez observed that in compelling the accused to take the stand, the
judge also compelled the petitioner to create evidence against himself. Emphatically, the Court
held that under the circumstances, the petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in
full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. Thus, it could not be considered that the
petitioner has waived his right since he did not volunteer to take the stand and even in his own
defense he did not offer himself as a witness. If the petitioner, observed the Court, nevertheless
answered the questions, this was because of the fear of being accused of perjury or being put
under contempt. His testimony therefore, was not of his own choice. In declaring that the
circumstances clearly presented a case of compelled submission the Court described Chavez
as "a cowed participant in the proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him
under contempt had he chosen to remain silent" (Underscoring supplied).
2. The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness
against himself signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the
criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so
even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness
either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself." In other words — unlike an
ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena,
having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put
to him — the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether.
He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question.
And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any
manner prejudice or be used against him" (Italics supplied).
xxx
"It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a
question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some
other crime, distinct from that of which he is accused, he may
416 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against self-incrimination
x x x . Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in his behalf,
he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might
be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular question
which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say, estafa" (People v. Ayson,
G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989).
The privilege will not apply when witness is given immunity from
prosecution
1. Under American common law, a witness maybe immunized from prosecution.
Immunity from prosecution occurs
CHAPTER VII 417
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
when the government, under an authorizing law, grants immunity to a witness in exchange for
a testimony favorable to the prosecution. This immunity embodies an understanding that the
prosecutor essentially agrees to refrain from prosecuting the witness.
The government may grant immunity in one of the two following two forms: (a)
Transactional immunity also known as "blanket" or "total" immunity completely protects the
witness from future prosecution for crimes related to his or her testimony; (b) "Use and
derivative use" immunity prevents the prosecution only from using the witness's own
testimony or any evidence derived from the testimony against the witness. However, should
the prosecutor later on acquire evidence of a crime committed by the witness, independently of
the witness's testimony, the witness may then be prosecuted for the crime (See Kastigar v.
United States 406 U.S. 441).
2. Recognized in this jurisdiction is the American common law concept of statutory
criminal immunity available to a witness. A Philippine Supreme Court decision categorizes the
forms of immunity into:
(a) transactional immunity; and
(b) use-and-derivative-use immunity.
Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness
can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction to
which the testimony relates. In contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a
witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not
be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution (Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 141675- 96, November 25, 2005).
3. Transactional immunity derives from common-law tradition, which gives greater
deference to the weight of judicial precedents since the codification of laws by the legislature is
atypical in practice. In our jurisdiction though, the definition of crimes and provision of criminal
penalties are in-
418 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
eluctably within the sole province of the legislative branch of government. It thus follows that
this prerogative necessarily empowers the legislative to enact conditions under which a class of
persons may be immune from criminal or civil prosecution. Since the legislature possesses sole
discretion to enact statutes to such effect, it is not obliged to conform with judge- made
standards, or even traditional modalities concerning the grant of criminal immunity. The solitary
limitation on legislative grant of immunity, as with all other legislative acts, is adherence to the
Constitution (Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141675-96, November
25,2005).
'Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from
criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and
production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in
any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its
authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and
statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding
paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false
testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
"Any refusal to appear or testify pursuant to the foregoing provisions shall be
subject to punishment for contempt and removal of the immunity from criminal
prosecution."
(e) Sec. 5, Executive Order No. 14 as amended grants the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) the authority to grant immunity to informants or witnesses, thus:
"Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to
grant immunity to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation
conducted by such Commission, to establish the unlawful manner by which any
respondent, defendant or accused has accumulated the property or properties in
question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or
prove his guilt or civil liability. The
420 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
immunity granted thereby shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats the
testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the
commission."
(f) P.D. 749 provides immunity from prosecution for informants, thus:
Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Articles 210, 211,
212 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 3019, as amended; Section 345 of the Internal
Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other provisions of the said
codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned; and other
laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse;
and who willingly testified, such violator shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for
the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were given, and may plead
or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided,
That this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the information and the testimony are
given against a person who is not a public official but who is a principal or accomplice, or
accessory in the commission of any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further,
That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he
offered or gave bribe or gift to the public official or is an accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving;
And, Provided, finally, That the following conditions concur:
i. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the
above-mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations;
ii. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the
accused public officer;
iii. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the
State;
iv. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material
points; and
CHAPTER VII 421
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
cause provided he had prior notice of the said trial (Sec. l[c], Rule 115, Rules of Court).
4. In case the accused is under custody and he escapes, his act shall be deemed to
be a waiver to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained (Sec.
lie], Rule 115, Rules of Court).
5. If the accused is absent during the trial after his arraignment, trial may proceed
despite his absence provided that he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear
is unjustified (Sec. 14[2], Art. Ill, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines).
6. When the accused filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which
was granted by the trial court, and the demurrer was eventually denied the trial court should
give the accused the opportunity to present his evidence. To be denied the opportunity to be
heard is procedurally unfair and a miscarriage of justice (People v. Alcanzado, 428 SCRA
681). Be it noted that under Sec. 23 [2nd par.] of Rule 119, "If the court denies the demurrer to
evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense."
the witness, his freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse. The witness may even be asked
questions for the purpose of eliciting all important facts bearing upon the issue even if they
were not covered by his direct examination as long as the question has relevance to the issues
of the case.
3. If the accused does not want to testify in his behalf and choses to remain silent, his
silence "shall not in any manner prejudice him" (Sec. l[d], Rule 115, Rules of Court).
2008; People v. Abatayo, 433 SCRA 562). The waiver to cross- examine may take
various forms but jurisprudence suggests that a waiver may occur when the party fails to
cross-examine the witnesses against him despite opportunity to do so.
Thus, it was held that where a party has had the opportunity to cross examine a witness
but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in
the record (Vertudes v. Buenaflor, 478 SCRA 210) because the right to cross-
examination requires not really an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to
exercise the right to cross examine if desired (People v. Escote, Jr., 400 SCRA 603).
4. Under the present Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right of confrontation does
not apply in a preliminary investigation. The investigating officer during preliminary
investigation may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or
witness. However, while the parties are allowed to be present at the hearing, they are "without
the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned" (Sec. 3[e], Rule 112,
Rules of Court).
5. Where the adverse party is deprived of the right to cross-examine the persons
who executed the affidavits, said affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay (Estrella
v. Robles, Jr., 538 SCRA 60).
In the absence of a cross-examination, the direct examination of the witness should be
expunged from the records. If the witness is the lone witness, the trial court would not have a
basis to deny a demurrer to evidence (People v. Ortillas, 428 SCRA 659).
6. If one is deprived of the opportunity to cross- examine without fault on his part,
it is generally held that he is entitled to have the direct examination stricken from the record
(People v. Sefieris, 99 SCRA 92).
CHAPTER VII 425
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(Rule 115)
Right to appeal
1. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by law (Hilario
v. People, 551 SCRA 191; Sec. l[i], Rule 115, Rules of Court).
2. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review and the appellate court may correct even unassigned
errors (Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February
28, 2005; Guy v. People, G.R. Nos. 166794-96, March 20,
2009; People v. Montinola, 543 SCRA 412; People v. Jabiniax),
Jr., 553 SCRA 769; Lao v. People, 556 SCRA 120; People v.
Tambis, 560 SCRA 343).
The above rule is in contrast to the rule in a civil case.
In a civil case, as a rule, an unassigned error will not be con-
sidered by the appellate court unless such error affects the
jurisdiction of the court, affects the validity of the judgment
appealed from, or the error is closely related to or dependent
upon the assigned error properly argued in the brief, or when
the error is simply plain or clerical (Sec. 8, Rule 51, Rules of
Court).
3. An established rule in appellate review is that the
trial court's findings, its assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as
well as the conclusions drawn from the actual findings, are
accorded respect, if not conclusive effect (People v. Casta, 565
SCRA 341) unless there appears in the record some facts
or circumstances of weight and influence which have been
CHAPTER VIII 427
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
(Rule 116)
overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result (People v. Sison, 555 SCRA 156;
People v. Tormis, 574 SCRA 903).
Generally, the findings of the trial court relative to the credibility of the witness are
normally respected and not disturbed on appeal (People v. Coja, 555 SCRA 176).
- oOo -
CHAPTER VIII
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA (Rule 116)
A. BASIC CONCEPTS
428
CHAPTER VIII 429
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
(Rule 116)
(a) Bill of particulars — The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill
of particulars to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall (a)
specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information, and shall (b) specify the
details desired (Sec. 9, Rule 116, Rules of Court). If the accused for instance,
finds the information defective as it bears only the month and year of the incident
complained of, he should file a motion for bill of particulars, as provided under Rule 116,
before he enters his plea (People v. Jalbuena, 526 SCRA 500, July 4, 2007).
(b) Suspension of arraignment — Upon motion, the proper party may ask for
the suspension of the arraignment in the following cases:
(i) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order
his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
Aside from suspension of the arraignment, the trial court is mandated to
order the confinement of an accused who is mentally unsound at the time of the
trial in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted
(People v. Mala, 411 SCRA 327).
(ii) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(iii) There is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor
which is pending at either the Department of Justice, or of the Office of the
President. The period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office (Sec. 11, Rule 116,
Rules of Court).
Section 11(c), Rule 116, which directs the trial court to suspend the arraignment
where there is a pending pe
CHAPTER VIII 431
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
(Rule 116)
tition with the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Office of the President (OP), is qualified by the
proviso stating that the period of suspension shall not exceed 60 days counted from the filing
of the petition with the reviewing office (See Adasa v. Abalos, 516 SCRA 261,
February 19, 2007 for related reading).
Jurisprudence is clear that with the arraignment of the accused, the DOJ
Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or petition for review because petitioner
had already waived or abandoned the same (Gandarosa v. Flores, 527 SCRA
776, July 17,2007).
(c) Motion to quash — At any time before entering his plea, the accused
may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the grounds provided for
under Sec. 3 of Rule 117, in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 117.
(d) Challenge the validity of arrest or legality of the warrant issued or assail
the regularity or question the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge (Sec.
26, Rule 114, Rules of Court) — An objection against an arrest or the procedure
in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused should be
made at or before the arraignment, otherwise the objection is deemed waived
(People v. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494; People v. Bagsit, 409 SCRA 350). The
principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during the trial,
without previously invoking his objections thereto (Borlongan, Jr. v. Pena, G.R.
No. 143591, May 5,2010 cited in Leviste v. Alameda, G.R. No.
182677, August 3,2010).
The arraignment of the accused constitutes a waiver of the right to preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of probable
cause (Adasa v. Abalos, 516 SCRA 261; Gandarosa v. Flores, 527 SCRA
776).
2. In a case, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner's contention that his second motion
for reconsideration before
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UPDATED EDITION /
the Ombudsman should have suspended his arraignment. According to the Supreme Court, the
Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman allows the filing of an information in court pending a
motion for reconsideration of the finding of a probable cause; hence, if the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the
corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the
normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information.
Petitioner failed to show any of the grounds for suspension of arraignment as provided
under Sec. 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided
under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded
with petitioner's arraignment, as mandated by Sec. 7 of R.A. 8493 (Brig Gen. [Ret.] Jose
Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
172476-99, September 15,2010).
Plea made before a court with no jurisdiction
A plea made before a court that has no jurisdiction over the criminal action does not
give rise to double jeopardy (Zapatos v. People, 411 SCRA 148).
rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the appellant when he was arrested x x x . His arrest, not his arraignment,
conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional
right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of
freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the
very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against
him.
Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision.
The question is: Were appellant's rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was
arraigned only at this stage of the proceedings?
We do not think so. Appellant's belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This
procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising
any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even
cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel's active participation in the hear-
ings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise,
his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no
protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not
question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being
convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his
constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect.
This Court will not allow it. x x x Since appellant's rights and interests were not
prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated"
(People v. Pangilinan, 518
436 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
SCRA 358 citing People v. Cabale, 185 SCRA 140, People v. Atienza,
86 Phil. 576; Underscoring supplied).
Record of arraignment
The arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect
the validity of the proceedings (Sec. l[b], Rule 116, Rules of Court).
2. In case the offended party fails to appear despite due notice, the court may
allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone (Sec. l[f], Rule 116,
Rules of Court).
When a plea of 'not guilty' shall be entered (Bar 1992; 1993; 1996)
1. Aside from an actual plea of not guilty, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for
the accused if (a) he refuses to plead; (b) he makes a conditional plea (Sec. l[c], Rule 116,
Rules of Court); (c) when he pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence in which case
the guilty plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered (Sec. l[d],
Rule 116, Rules of Court).
2. The accused, by entering a plea of not guilty, submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest (People v. Pua, 415 SCRA 540).
CHAPTER VIII 437
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
(Rule 116)
3. When the accused admits the facts in the information but alleges that he
performed the acts as charged because he feared for his life, it is proper to enter a plea of not
guilty (People v. Baetiong, 2 Phil. 126).
4. When the accused pleads guilty but it can be inferred from the arguments made
by his counsel and in his appeal brief that the accused is asking that a certain penalty be
imposed upon him in view of some mitigating circumstances, this is a conditional plea and is
equivalent to a plea of not guilty (People v. Madraga, 344 SCRA 628). It appears that
this holding presupposes that the plea of guilty is conditioned upon the imposition of a lesser
penalty due to mitigating factors and not a mere request to be meted a lesser penalty after a
plea of guilty. It is submitted that the latter is not a conditional plea but is to be construed as an
emotional appeal for leniency in the imposition of a penalty.
Thus, in People v. Comendador, G.R. No. L-38000, September 19, 1980,
the accused pleaded guilty to robbery with homicide but asked the court to impose upon him a
lesser penalty other than death. The Court held that while it is true that accused-appellant
requested for a lesser penalty, such does not make his plea of guilty conditional. It remains to be
an admission of the facts alleged in the information charging robbery with homicide. At most,
said plea for a lesser penalty is an appeal to emotion as it does not assail, restrict or qualify the
information.
The Court observed that the accused-appellant intended his plea of guilty to be
unconditional because he did not bother to adduce any evidence in his favor and merely
submitted the case for decision. Although he had an opportunity to do so after the prosecution
rested its case, he did not avail of the same. He remained resolute in his decision to own the
crime. His claim, therefore, that his plea of guilty is conditional is inconsistent with his candor,
spontaneity and insistent admission of guilt in the trial court. Clearly, added the Court, this
change in his stand is merely a belated and unconvincing effort to avoid conviction.
438 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
5. When the accused pleads guilty and bargains for a lesser penalty, it is not a plea
to a lesser offense. It is a plea that made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. It is the
essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally his guilt and
responsibility for the offense imputed to him. Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional
plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted
unto him. Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial
court should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of
guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent
to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment may be
rendered (People v. Magat, 332 SCRA 517).
6. An accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court in the sense
that he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. Likewise, a
formal plea of not guilty should properly be entered if an accused admits the truth of some or
all the allegations of the information, but interposes excuses or additional facts which, if duly
established would exempt or relieve him in whole or in part of criminal responsibility (People
v. Albert, 251 SCRA 136; People v. Bello 316 SCRA 804).
7. In People v. Stephen Douglas Strong, L-38626, March 14,1975,
the Court observed that although the accused pleaded guilty to the charge, every time he was
asked about the specific allegations of the information, he denied the specific allegations about
the killing of the victim. When interrogated further to explain why he answered in the negative
considering that he had entered a guilty plea, he manifested that he did not do any of those
acts attributed to him. He consistently answered "no" every time to each question on whether
or not he did the acts mentioned in the information. It is well-settled, continued the court, that
when a plea of guilty is not definite or ambiguous, or not absolute, the same amounts to a plea
of not guilty.
CHAPTER VIII 439
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
(Rule 116)
8. In People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119, the accused had first entered a plea of
guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating
circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore had the effect
of vacating his plea of guilty and the trial court should have required him to plead anew on the
charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. Since this was not
done, it follows that in effect there was no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered
its judgment of acquittal. There can be no double jeopardy since there was no plea.
offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge (Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
163972-77, March 28,2008).
equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy (People v.
Magat, G.R. No. 130026, May 31, 2000).
plea, (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability, and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to
present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires (People v.
Gumimba, 517 SCRA 25, February 27, 2007; People v. Ernas, 408 SCRA
391).
The court must still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing
the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant because a plea of guilty is only a
supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability (People v. Espidol, 442
SCRA 360).
3. As the rule now stands, "even in cases in which the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the prosecution is still required to present evidence to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of his culpability." In other words, notwithstanding the plea of guilty, evidence must be
adduced to determine the precise participation of the accused in the perpetuation of the capital
offense—whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory—as well as the presence or absence of
modifying circumstances. And "the accused may also present evidence in his behalf either to
rebut the prosecution's evidence or to show the presence of mitigating circumstances (People
v. Francisco, G.R. No. 192818, November 17,2010).
An earlier case likewise held that when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea (People v. Baun, 562 SCRA 584, August 20,2008).
judge must conduct a 'searching inquiry,'" but nevertheless came up with the following
guidelines:
(a) Ascertain from the accused himself (1) how he was brought into the
custody of the law; (2) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and (3) under what conditions he was detained
and interrogated during the investigations. This is accordingly intended to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of
the judge's intimidating robes.
(b) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.
(c) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his
age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trust-
worthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
(d) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the
penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not in-
frequently, observed the Court, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient
treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a
lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a
plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but
also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
(e) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully
explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure
CHAPTER VIII 447
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
(Rule 116)
the sole basis of the judgment (People v. Ceredon, 542 SCRA 550, January
28, 2008).
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any written statement
given by the complainant and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by
the prosecution or other investigating officers, as well as any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things not otherwise privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case and which are
in the possession or under the control of the prosecution, police or other law investigating
agencies (Sec. 10, Rule 116, Rules of Court).
2. The production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the
prosecution shall be allowed upon motion of the accused with notice to the parties (Sec. 10,
Rule 116, Rules of Court).
3. The purpose of the rule in allowing the production or inspection of material
evidence in possession of the prosecution is to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration of
the evidence (Sec. 10, Rule 116, Rules of Court).
- oOo -
CHAPTER IX
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
451
452 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
Court) and hence, presupposes that the accused has already entered his plea and is in fact
already going through a trial.
Rule 117 does not require a prior leave of court for the filing of a motion to
quash. Under Rule 119, a demurrer to evidence may be filed by the accused either with leave or
without leave of court.
The grounds for a motion to quash are not grounds for a demurrer to evidence.
Under Sec. 23 of Rule 119, the ground for a demurrer to evidence is "insufficiency of evidence."
Such ground is not a basis for filing a motion to quash.
The ground for a motion to quash may be based on the matters found on the
face of the complaint or information as when it is alleged that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense or that the complaint or information does not conform to the prescribed
form. A demurrer to evidence would necessarily be predicated upon matters outside of the
complaint or information such as the evidence or lack of it.
When a motion to quash is granted, a dismissal of the case will not necessarily
follow. The court may even order the filing of a new complaint or information because an order
sustaining the motion is generally not a bar to another prosecution (Sec. 5, Sec. 6, Rule
117). The grant of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is, by
jurisprudence, deemed an acquittal and would preclude the filing of another information or an
appeal by the prosecution (Condrada v. People, 398 SCRA 482; People v. Laguio,
Jr., 518 SCRA 393).
If the court, in denying the motion to quash acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies (Lazarte v.
Sandiganbayan [First Division], G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009; Javier v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009). As expressly
provided under the last paragraph of Sec. 23 of Rule 119, the order denying the motion for
leave to file a demurrer or the demurrer itself "shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment." This is however, only a general rule.
CHAPTER IX 453
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
Motion to quash; grounds for a motion to quash (Bar 1987; 1990; 1991;
1992; 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005;
2009; 2010)
1. A complaint or information may be subject to a motion to quash on any of the
following grounds (Sec. 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court):
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (Bar 1987)
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(Bar 2000)
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment
for various offenses is prescribed by law; (Bar 1996; 2005)
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
454 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse
or justification;
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent (Sec. 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court). (Bar 2002;
2004; 2010)
R.A. No. 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, should be treated only
in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on
the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the
should be limited to an inquiry
validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground,
whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute
the elements of an offense punishable under R.A. No. 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code (Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636).
2. However, since, Sec. 2 of Rule 117 requires that a motion to quash shall distinctly
specify not only its legal but also factual grounds, it "is clear from this Section that a motion to
quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and
double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Sec. 3 of the new
Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to
prove such grounds ..." (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 678).
(b) the accused filed a motion to quash but failed to allege the ground in said
motion (Sec. 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court).
2. Failure of the accused to interpose an objection on the ground of duplicity of the
offense charged in the information constitutes waiver (People v. Tabio, 544 SCRA 156,
February 6, 2008; Sec. 3, Rule 120, Rules of Court).
458 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
Double jeopardy
1. Sec. 21, Art. Ill of the Constitution of the Philippines
emphasizes that:
tion for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information." (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court).
3. "Jeopardy" in the legal sense, is the "danger of conviction and punishment which
the defendant in a criminal action incurs when a valid indictment has been found..." (Han- ley
v. State, 83 Nevada 461 cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, p. 749).
The constitution does not prohibit placing a person in jeopardy. What it prohibits is putting an
accused in "double jeopardy" in which he is put in danger of punishment for the same offense
more than once.
The constitutional provision against double jeopardy guarantees that the state shall not
be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing that possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty (Co v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 164669-70, October
30,2009).
At the heart of the policy on double jeopardy is the concern that permitting the
sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the
government with a potent instrument for oppression (Co v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 164669-70,
October 30,2009).
4. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense, suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecu-
tions (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009). Also
called as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy prohibits the
prosecution for a crime of which he has been previously convicted or acquitted (Caes v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54). (Bar 2010)
Hence, double jeopardy presupposes that a first jeopardy has already attached prior to
the second jeopardy and such
462 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
jeopardy has already been terminated either because the accused has already been convicted,
or acquitted or the case against him has been dismissed or terminated without his express
consent. If despite the termination of the first jeopardy or danger, he is put in danger anew for
the same offense as in the first, then double jeopardy arises. This is the very situation
prohibited by the Constitution. Hence, if the accused has been acquitted of frustrated
homicide, he can no longer be accused of the same offense or of an offense necessarily
included in frustrated homicide like attempted homicide. Similarly, a person convicted of
attempted homicide can no longer be tried, as a rule, under an information for frustrated
homicide against the same victim, because the second offense includes the offense charged in
the first information.
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal
defendant's culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of
conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies
and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant's already established innocence
at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and
prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all
the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the
government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the
defendant's guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a
process where the government's power and resources are once again employed against the
defendant's individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not
make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.
Thus, the absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from appealing the
judgment of acquittal through either a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an
appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules (People v.
Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009).
3. The accused may appeal from a judgment of conviction but when the accused
appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his right to the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to review by the appellate court
(People v. Caraang, 418 SCRA 321; Oriente v. People, 513 SCRA 348; G.R.
No. 155094, January 30,2007).
Also, when an accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment against him, double jeopardy cannot be invoked by him
because by filing the motion, he waived his right not to be placed in double jeopardy (People
v. Astudillo, 401 SCRA 723).
464 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
4. Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception is when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion orf when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can
assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was deprived of
a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. The rationale behind this exception is that a
judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without
jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy (Castro v.
People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23,2008).
5. A reading of jurisprudence discloses the rule that the acquittal of the accused
does not affect the right of the offended party to appeal the civil aspect of the case. Hence, it
has been said that while a judgment of acquittal cannot be appealed by the prosecution, "either
the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the
acquittal of the accused" (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 72).
While the prosecution cannot appeal from a judgment of acquittal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy, the aggrieved party who may be the offended party or the accused
or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case (Salazar v. People,
411 SCRA 598).
6. The offended party and the accused may appeal the civil aspect of a judgment
because the concept of double jeopardy evidently has reference only to a criminal case and has
no effect on the civil liability of the accused. The employment of the terms, "punishment,"
"offense," "conviction" and acquittal" in the Constitution (Sec. 21, Art. Ill), and the
employment of the words "convicted," "acquitted," "information," "prosecution" and
"attempt to "commit or frustration thereof in Sec. 7 of Rule 117, leave no doubt as to the
concept's non-application to a civil case.
Thus, in the same vein, the extinction of the criminal liability will not necessarily give rise
to the extinction of the
CHAPTER IX 465
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
civil liability. Under Sec. 4 of Rule 111, if the accused dies before his arraignment, while the
criminal case shall be dismissed because of its extinction, such dismissal is without prejudice and
shall not be a bar to any civil action which the offended party may file against the estate of the
deceased. The estate therefore, cannot invoke double jeopardy. Similarly, under the same
provision, even if the civil liability arising from the delict or criminal act is extinguished when the
accused dies after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action, the independent
civil action arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate of the
deceased.
Assume that a criminal action for robbery that occurred in the City of Makati was filed in
a Quezon City court. Because the Quezon City court realized that it had no jurisdiction over the
action, it dismissed the case over the objections of the accused. A subsequent information filed
before the proper Makati court will not successfully give rise to a defense anchored on double
jeopardy because the first court, the Quezon City court, had no jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, no jeopardy attached when the case was filed in Quezon City.
acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the principle of
double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place (People v. Joven de Grano, et
al, G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009). There can be no double jeopardy where the
accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction (Zapatos v. People, 411 SCRA
148).
3. A case decided during the early period of the American occupation of the
country and "which recognized the application of the principle of double jeopardy in the
Philippine Islands," ruled that "A person is not put in second jeopardy unless his prior acquittal
or conviction was by a court having jurisdiction to try him for the offense charged" (Grafton v.
United States, 206 U.S. 333).
For instance, where an information for murder was filed and tried in the Municipal Trial
Court and the case was later on dismissed despite objections from the accused, a subsequent
indictment for the same offense in the Regional Trial Court will not constitute double jeopardy.
The Municipal Trial Court which earlier tried the case is bereft of jurisdiction over the offense of
murder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. The accused therefore, could not claim being "twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense" because there never was a first jeopardy. One could not be validly convicted or
acquitted by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter.
4. If a case which pertains to the Sandiganbayan was filed in the Regional Trial
Court, jurisdiction never attached to the latter court. It follows that as a rule the filing of a
complaint or information with one court which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the
prosecution from filing the same complaint later with the competent court. There is no estoppel
from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In
such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put the accused in double
jeopardy even though there was a plea of "not guilty" to the information earlier filed in the
468 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent
jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that
had no jurisdiction. The remedy therefore, \yas not to move for the quashal of the information
pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy. The remedy was to
move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction (Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65).
5. It is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction because
jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. However, the first
jeopardy could not attach if the action was filed in a court of the place which was not the proper
venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element
of jurisdiction. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
(Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173 citing
ingredients thereof took place
People v. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77 and Agbayani v. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699).
6. A court initially with jurisdiction may, in the course of the proceedings, be ousted
of that same jurisdiction, an event which would bar any invocation of double jeopardy.
Illustrative is one case where the prosecution informed the court that it had other
witnesses to present. The court, aside from not allowing the other prosecution witnesses to
testify, also prematurely terminated the presentation of further evidence for the prosecution
and dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence. In sustaining the order of the Court
of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial court, the Court ruled
that the reinstatement of the case does not violate the rule on double jeopardy. It went on to
hold that one of the elements of double jeopardy is a competent court but the trial court in this
case was ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process by aborting its right to complete
CHAPTER IX 469
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
the presentation of its evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had not been terminated.
Explained the Court: "Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
"The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.
xxx
"Respondent Judge's dismissal order x x x being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy"
(Saldana v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88889, October 11, 1990 citing
People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166; Serino v. Zosa, 40 SCRA 433; People v.
Gomez, 20 SCRA 293; People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119; Aducayen
v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78).
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a
sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the
petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice (People v. Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010). A judgment rendered with
grave abuse of discretion or without due process of law is void, does not exist in legal
contemplation and thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal (People v. Sandiganbayan
[Fourth Division], 559 SCRA 449).
2. In our jurisdiction, availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an
erroneous acquittal may be allowed in cases where petitioner has clearly shown that the public
respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, but if the petition merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the
court a quo, we would run afoul of the constitutional right against double jeopardy (People
v. Terrado, 558 SCRA 84, July 14,2008).
3. A more recent case unequivocally ruled that a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or
at the appellate level.
In People v. Asis, G.R. No. 173089, August 25, 2010, the accused was
charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder in the
Regional Trial Court. The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, in its
decision, the RTC held the accused liable only for serious physical injuries for shooting one
victim and less serious physical injuries with regard to the other victim. It also appreciated four
(4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused. With respect to the complaint of
smother victim, the accused was acquitted.
The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA assailing as
constituting a grave abuse of discretion the findings of the RTC for holding the accused guilty of
lesser
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MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
crimes than for which he was charged and acquitting him on the other charge as well as in
appreciating four (4) mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused.
The CA, dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate court, the filing of the
petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State was questioning the verdict of
acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy, declared the CA should
have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorari placed the accused in double
jeopardy.
The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition
outright. Held the Court in no uncertain terms:
"A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question
a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdic-
tion, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is
final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the
Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused
in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy,471 SCRA 668,
the Court has held:
Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute.
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
[Underscoring supplied].
In People v. Laguio, Jr., 518 SCRA 393, where the acquittal of the
accused was via the grant of his demurrer
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to evidence, the Court pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition for
certiorari. Thus:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review
dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused's demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being
considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the
order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an
original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused
against double jeopardy is not violated."
The Court explained further that in the petition, the OSG claimed that the acquittal of
the accused was improper. Since appeal could not be taken without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy of the accused, the OSG was correct
in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It
was a serious error by the CA, ratiocinated the Court, to have deprived the petitioner of its right
to avail of that remedy. However, while holding that certiorari may be availed of to correct
an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Citing the significant
case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43, the Court reiterated that the
rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse
of discretion was issued without jurisdiction and for this reason, the judgment is void.
Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
Note: While the Court finally set aside the resolution of the CA dismissing the petition
for certiorari, it denied the petition upon ruling on the same on the merits because the
prosecution failed to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process and
that the petition raised errors of judgment.
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MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
4. In yet another case, from the decision of the RTC acquitting the accused of the charge
of murder after a motion for reconsideration of an earlier judgment of conviction, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA
arguing, among others, that the petitioner had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy,
considering that the State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. Petitioner alleged and
argued that a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a showing by the petitioner that the lower
court, in acquitting the accused, committed not only reversible errors of judgment, but also
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process,
thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Consequently, the accused cannot be considered at
risk of double jeopardy. The prosecution hinged its arguments, among others, in the fact that
when the earlier decision of conviction was promulgated, only one of the several accused was
present and the other accused were not. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and
explaining the reasons for their absence, they joined the present accused in a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration, an act done in clear disregard of the rule in Sec. 6, Rule 120 that in case of a
judgment of conviction and the accused failed to appear without a justifiable cause, he loses the
remedies available under the Rules and the court shall order his arrest. Accordingly, the RTC not
only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of
the joint motion. They were in fact later acquitted.
The prosecution was sustained by the Supreme Court holding that by way of exception,
a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower
court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In which event, the accused cannot be
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considered at risk of double jeopardy (People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, June
5,2009).
5. When the trial court, in allowing the withdrawal of the information, glaringly failed to
conduct its own determination of a prima facie case, to independently evaluate and assess
the merits of the case against the accused and simply adopted the resolution issued by the
Secretary of Justice, there is a violation of the complainant's right to due process and constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The accused was not acquitted
nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite
on the conviction and acquittal of the accused in the dismissal of the case, without the approval
of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in (Summerville
General
Merchandising & Co., Inc. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 163741, August 7,2007).
Res judicata and double jeopardy; res judicata in prison grey (Bar 2010)
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings
(Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415) even if double jeopardy has
u
been described as res judicata in prison grey" (Caes v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 74989, November 6,1989; Trinidad v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166038, December 4, 2007).
3. It is submitted that the charges are not to be deemed valid because conviction
will not be possible where the formal charges for adultery and concubinage are not subscribed
by the offended party but by the public prosecutor. Section 5 of Rule 110 clearly mandates that
"The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party.
Also, unless the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated and she has no known
parents, grandparents or guardians, a public prosecutor cannot subscribe to or sign the formal
charge for seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness. These offenses by express provision
of the Rules, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or
her parents, grandparents or guardians" (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Similarly, a
criminal action for defamation consisting in the imputation of any of the offenses of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction or acts of lasciviousness shall not be brought except upon
a complaint filed by the offended party.
4. Likewise, the accused will not be placed in jeopardy of conviction where the facts
alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an offense. This defect is in fact, a
ground for a motion to quash under Sec. 3(a) of Rule 117.
5. Thus, the Court once declared that there must have been a valid and sufficient
complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information
was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it
could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be
pleaded. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment
that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution (Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA
173).
6. Where the officer who filed the information has no authority to do so, the
information is indeed defective and could not sustain a conviction. In Cudia v. Court of
Appeals, 284 SCRA 173, for instance, the Court found that an information
CHAPTER IX 479
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
was filed by the City Prosecutor of Angeles City for a crime committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Citing the pertinent provisions of P.D. 1275 in relation to the Administrative Code of 1987, the
Court ruled that the City Prosecutor had no authority to file an information in a place beyond the
jurisdiction of his office. It is the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor,
according to the Court, who should prepare the information for an offense committed within
Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public
prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the
prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction. (Bar 2002; 2004)
Accused should have pleaded to the charge (should have been arraigned)
(Bar 2002; 2003)
1. The application of the rule against double jeopardy requires that the accused
"had pleaded to the charge." The rule on arraignment and plea in Rule 116 governs this re-
quirement.
Hence, if before arraignment, the prosecutor withdrew an information charging theft
and later on filed another information for theft or robbery against the same accused, double
jeopardy cannot be invoked because, the accused was never arraigned under the first
information. (Bar 2002)
It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy
(Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 77).
2. It has always been the rule that the accused should have been arraigned and
had pleaded to the charge. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not
been arraigned. Hence, there is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case
dismissed before arraignment and upon his express motion (Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No.
158763, March 31, 2006 citing People v. Montiero, 192 SCRA 548).
3. For double jeopardy to attach, the plea must be valid. An invalid plea is
demonstrated in People v. Magat, G.R. No.
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130026, May 31, 2000. Here, the accused pleaded guilty to the rape of his
daughter but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant's
mother and the public prosecutor, agreed with the plea bargain. He was
sentenced to ten years for each count of rape.
After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the
complainant on the ground that the penalty imposed was "too light." As a
consequence, accused-appellant was re-arraigned and he entered a new a
plea of guilty. After the required proceedings for capital offenses and
convinced of accused's voluntariness of his plea of guilty, the court rendered a
judgment of conviction and imposed the death penalty.
On appeal, the accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in
re-arraigning him and proceeding into trial despite the fact that he was
already convicted based on his plea of guilty. He also argues that when the
court rendered judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor
move for reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently,
the conviction having attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified
even if the prosecution later realizes that the penalty imposed was too light.
Accused- appellant likewise posits that the re-arraignment and trial on the
same information violated his right against double jeopardy.
The Court disagreed with the accused-appellant. The order of the trial
court convicting the accused-appellant on his own plea of guilty and
sentencing him to a light penalty was void ab initio on the ground that
accused-appellant's plea was not the plea bargaining contemplated and
allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance where a plea
bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a
lesser offense. Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the
plea of guilty to a lesser penalty.
The Court emphasized that under the facts, the accused- appellant did
not plead guilty to a lesser offense but pleaded
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MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
guilty to the rape charges as alleged in the information. He only bargained for a lesser penalty. In
short, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is
erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. It is the essence of a plea of guilty, explained the
Court, that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the
offense imputed to him. Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the
court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him.
The accused-appellant's plea of guilty was undoubtedly a conditional plea. Since it was a
conditional plea, the trial court should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty
and which would require a full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered.
In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for the
simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment
of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will not lieJVofe: In
Magat, the accused was re-arraigned and he entered a new plea, thus
correcting the procedural infirmity.
4. The much earlier but more famous case of People v. Balisacan, G.R. No.
L-26376, August 31, 1966, demonstrates an error in the procedure followed by the trial
court which justified an appeal by the prosecution without violating the rule against double
jeopardy.
In Balisacan, the accused was charged with homicide and upon being arraigned,
entered a plea of guilty. Before the sentencing, he was allowed to prove mitigating
circumstances but ended up justifying the killing by showing that he acted in self-defense.
Convinced by the facts, the court rendered a verdict of acquittal. The people appealed from the
judgment of acquittal contending that the accused should not have been acquitted.
482 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, the appeal was sustained.
The Court then described a plea of guilty as "an unconditional admission of
guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend
oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to
impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances (People v. Ng Pek,
81 Phil. 563)." Since the accused was only allowed to testify in order to
establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty, the
testimony could not be taken as a trial on the merits to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The Court however, added that since the accused
asserted self-defense in his testimony, said assertion of self- defense had the
effect of vacating his plea of guilty. The trial court should have required him to
plead anew to the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be
entered for him and conducted a trial on the merits. This was not done. It
follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court
a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy
with respect to the appeal of the prosecution. In deciding the case upon the
merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not only erred in procedure
but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard (People
v. Balisacan., G.R. No. L-26376, August 31,1966 citing People v. Ferrer,
L-9072, October23,1956; People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29, 1959;
People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30,1960; People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121;
21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. 2d. 445).
The accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or terminated without his express consent
1. For the accused to invoke double jeopardy, it must be shown that in
the prior charge, he had been either convicted or acquitted. He may also
show that the case against him had been dismissed or terminated without his
express consent (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court).
The meaning is clear from the very tenor of the rule. The application of
the rule presupposes that the first case
CHAPTER IX 483
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
had been validly terminated in any of the following ways: (a) conviction, (b) acquittal, or (c)
dismissal or termination without the express consent of the accused. In other words, the rule
contemplates that the first jeopardy had been validly terminated and because of such
termination, the accused could no longer be exposed to another jeopardy.
Since the rule against double jeopardy is intended to shield the accused from a second
trial for the same offense, the rule suggests that when the first case has not yet been
terminated, double jeopardy cannot be invoked in a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. It is the jeopardy of being convicted anew that precludes the further prosecution of the
accused for the offense. Hence, even if two sets of information for homicide are filed involving
the same victim and the case under the first information has not yet been terminated either by
conviction, acquittal or dismissal, it is highly doubtful for the filing of the second information to
give rise to double jeopardy.
Thus, it was once held that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging
the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that
he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary
basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or
acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his express consent. It is
the conviction or jeopardy of being convicted or the acquittal of the accused or termination of
the case that bars further prosecution of the same offense or any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Tangan v. People, 155 SCRA
435; Citations omitted).
2. It has been repeatedly ruled that a verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a
reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused
in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal
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doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal
processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with
accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an
acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And
finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope
of securing a greater penalty. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal (People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
159261, February 21, 2007).
The above rule however, assumes that the judgment of acquittal was made in
accordance with law and procedure because where the proceedings were rigged, and a sham
and a mock trial held with a pre-determined judgment of acquittal, the proceedings are
unlawful and void ab initio. It is a settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against the setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. Any
judgment or decision rendered may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head." In effect the first
jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing
and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144
SCRA 43).
3. Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 of Rule 117 presupposes a
definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. And for the dismissal to be a bar
under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.
In one case, the order of the judge was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
information from homicide to murder but not to dismiss the same. The facts show that it was
the same original information that was amended by
CHAPTER IX 485
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
merely crossing out the word 'homicide' and writing the word 'murder,' instead, which showed
that there was no dismissal of the homicide case. There was no change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Despite
the arraignment of the accused to the information for homicide, there is no double jeopardy
(Pacoy v. Judge Cajigal, 534 SCRA 338).
Dismissal or termination must be without the express consent of the
accused
1. For the protection against double jeopardy to inure in favor of the accused, the
case against the accused must have been previously "dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent" As a general proposition therefore, a
dismissal or termination of the case with the express consent of the accused will not prevent
another prosecution for the same offense. This conclusion is plain from the phraseology of Sec.
7 of Rule 117 and does not call for any other construction.
Hence, if an accused moves for the dismissal alleging that the crime was not committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the same was dismissed, the dismissal is with
the express consent of the accused and cannot be the basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The
dismissal must be without his express consent for double jeopardy to operate (People v.
Salico, 84 Phil. 722). The motion by the accused which indicates express consent operates
as a waiver of his constitutional right against double jeopardy for the reason that he effectively
prevents the trial court from proceeding to trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of
conviction against him. The same reasoning applies when the accused moves for dismissal
because of the insufficiency of the information to sustain a conviction (Caniza v. People,
G.R. No. L-53766, March 18,1988,159 SCRA 16; People v. Salico, 84 Phil.
722).
2. Jurisprudence holds that the consent that would preclude another prosecution in
order to be deemed an express one should be "positive, direct, unequivocal and requiring no
inference or implication to supply its meaning" (People v. Vergara, 221 SCRA 567).
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3. The rule is not a new one. In Andres v. Cacdac, L-45650, March 29,
1982, for instance, all the accused claimed that the provisional dismissal of their case should
be considered a bar to the subsequent filing of another information against them for the same
offense on the ground of double jeopardy. The Court did not find their stance tenable because
the records disclose that the accused and their counsel not only consented but also asked for
the provisional dismissal of the case. Their act operates as a waiver of their defense of double
jeopardy in the second prosecution for the same offense. The Court explained that "When a
criminal case is dismissed upon the application and express consent of the accused and his
counsel, the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his
action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional prerogative against
double jeopardy as he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits
and rendering judgment of conviction against him."
Also, where it appears that the trial court's initial order of dismissal was upon motion of
petitioner's counsel hence, made with the express consent of petitioner and that the dismissal
was not predicated on a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the accused
cannot invoke the right against double jeopardy (Almario v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 127772, March 22,2001).
4. People v. Espinosa, G.R. Nos. 153714-20, August 15, 2003, well
illustrates a successful invocation of the right against double jeopardy because of a dismissal
without the express consent of the accused.
The antecedent facts disclose that the accused before his arraignment, sought the
permission of the court to travel abroad pending the results of the reinvestigation of his cases
before the Ombudsman. Before granting its permission, the court required that the accused be
"conditionally arraigned." The accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty and thereafter the
court granted his Motion to Travel. Subsequently, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
the Ombudsman moved to withdraw ex parte the two cases against the accused. The
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MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
court granted the motion to withdraw. When the cases were sought to be reinstated through
the filing of informations for malversation, the accused filed a motion to quash invoking double
jeopardy and arguing that he had already been arraigned in the previous estafa cases and that
the withdrawal of those cases had been granted without his express consent. He also proved
that he learned of the motion to withdraw only after the cases had been dismissed. That the
accused was not notified of the motion was not disputed by the People. To these arguments,
the People countered that the arraignment for the two previous cases was merely
"conditional," because it was made solely for the purpose of accommodating the request of the
accused to travel abroad while the cases were pending reinvestigation and that by the
conditional plea, the accused has waived his right to invoke double jeopardy.
The anti-graft court dismissed the criminal cases against the accused on the ground of
double jeopardy.
In resolving the issue of double jeopardy brought before it by the People, the Supreme
Court stressed that a waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear,
categorical, knowing and intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions attached to an
arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Otherwise, the plea
should be deemed to be simple and unconditional. The Court found that the plea of the accused
during arraignment was simple and unconditional punctuated with no other unusual ceremony
and stating further that the practice of allowing a conditional plea is not part of the Rules.
It is clear, declared the Court unequivocally, that since the dismissal was secured by the
People without the express consent of the accused, there is no waiver of the right against
double jeopardy in the case.
guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an
acquittal of the defendant (Andres v. Cacdac, L-45650, March 29,1982).
In this regard, Esmeha v. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, February 20, 1981, is a
classic. In Esmeha, the counsel for the accused told the court that his clients, the accused, are
insisting that the case be heard on that day and that they are invoking the constitutional right of
the accused to a speedy trial of the case. Because the fiscal could not present evidence and since
the case "had been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" the judge
issued an order dismissing the case "provisionally" as to the accused present but not as to the
accused who did not appear at the hearing.
Twenty-seven days later, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case arguing that
a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks "the impress of finality" and,
therefore, the case could be revived without the filing of a new information. The judge granted
the motion to revive the case but the accused who benefited from the earlier order of dismissal
filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. They pointed out that they
did not consent to the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the provisional dismissal
amounted to an acquittal. Its revival would place them in double jeopardy. The court denied
the motion to dismiss.
When the order denying the motion to dismiss was assailed by the accused, the Solicitor
General agreed with the accused that the revival of the case would place the accused in double
jeopardy since the provisional dismissal of the case without their consent was in effect an
acquittal.
The Court made the observation that in Esmeha, the accused were insisting on a trial.
They relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not ready because
his witness was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the
case. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy but even if the accused, after
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UPDATED EDITION /
invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore,
consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word
"provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Citing Es- guerra v. De la
Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela v. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299).
3. The discharge of an accused to be a state witness shall amount to an acquittal
and shall be a bar to a future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or
refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the
basis for his discharge (Sec. 18, Rule 119, Rules of Court).
4. When the court grants a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, the dismissal amounts to an acquittal. Hence, it was ruled in an early case that
"Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is made with the express consent of the
accused, or upon his own motion, only if it is predicated on either of two grounds, i.e.,
insufficiency of the evidence or denied of the right to a speedy trial. In both cases, the dismissal
will have the effect of an acquittal. Since the dismissal in this case does not fall under either of
these two instances and it was made with the express consent of the accused, it would not
thereby be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense" (People v. Declaro, 170
SCRA 142; Condrada v. People, 398 SCRA 482).
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, is "filed after the prosecution had
rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of
the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may
not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict
(People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
being one of acquittal, the case ends there
164577, July 5,2010; People v. Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010).
CHAPTER IX 491
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(Rule 117)
reconsideration but as of the filing of the petition in the Supreme Court, the motion remained
unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, the respondent moved to dismiss the
pending petition for certiorari in the RTC on the ground of the loss of standing of the
petitioner to maintain the suit due to his arrest. Petitioner contested the motion but the RTC
dismissed the petition narrowly grounding its ruling on the petitioner's forfeiture of standing to
maintain the petition and thus, effectively affirmed the MeTC. The petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
In the Supreme Court, the petitioner lamented the RTC's failure to decide on the merits
of his petition for certiorari. The petitioner argued that his constitutional right not to be
placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense barred his prosecution in the
second information having been previously convicted in the other criminal case for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
The respondent argues that there is no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC's decision
forfeiting petitioner's standing to maintain his petition for certiorari. On the merits, the
respondent calls the Court's attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g., slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or
less grave felonies (e.g., homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge
for the slight physical injuries from the charge for homicide and damage to property.
One issue sought to be resolved in the Supreme Court was whether or not the
petitioner was placed in double jeopardy. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner:
The Court explained:
"The accused's constitutional right not to be 'twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense' protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid infor
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MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
mation. It is not disputed that petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns
on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve
the 'same offense.' Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding
that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property 'as
the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.'"
In Ivler, the Court emphasized that the two charges against petitioner, arose from the
same facts and were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Art. 365 defining and penalizing qua- si-offenses. The doctrine is that reckless
imprudence under Art. 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes. Hence, conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts. Relying on early cases starting
with People v. Diaz, 94 Phil. 715 decided in 1954, the Court as in People v. Diaz
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a
prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which
the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same
legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of
reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative.
The court explained that its consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection
of double jeopardy in quasi offenses is not new. And that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not
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be prosecuted again for that same act because the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
he punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act
and not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty and it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different
crimes and prosecutions.
2. The ruling in Ivler is not novel. In People v. Diaz, L-6518, March 30,
1954 (also cited in Ivler), the riding was that the dismissal by the Municipal Court of the
information alleging acts constituting reckless driving, barred a second information of damage
to property through reckless imprudence based on the same negligent act of the accused.
3. In People v. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, "where as the result of
the same vehicular accident one man died, two persons were seriously injured while another
three suffered only slight physical injuries, [th]e [Court] ruled that the acquittal on a charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for
homicide through reckless imprudence" (Cited in People v. Buan, L-25366, March
29,1968).
In People v. Buan, L-25366, March 29,1968, the accused was indicted for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court. The
charge resulted in his acquittal after a trial on the merits. Before his acquittal, he was charged
with serious physical injuries in the Court of First Instance and damage to property through
reckless imprudence. There was a consensus that both charges referred to the same incident.
The accused moved to quash the information in the CFI on the ground that since he had already
been previously acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court, he is now
under the protection of
CHAPTER IX 495
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
the rule against double jeopardy. The CFI did not quash the information to which the Court
disagreed.
Ruled the Court in Buan:
"Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that
same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions, x x x In People v. Belga,
100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information for physical injuries through needless
imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles was declared, to block
two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless imprudence and
another for multiple physical injuries arising from the same collision. The same doctrine
was reasserted in Yap v. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30,1959. In none of the
cases cited did the Supreme Court regard as material that the various offenses charged
for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of differing category, or that the
complainants were not the individuals."
When double jeopardy shall not apply despite a prior conviction (Bar
2005)
1. The rule against double jeopardy precludes another prosecution "for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged." Hence, as a rule a conviction for attempted
murder will bar a subsequent
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prosecution for frustrated murder of the same person. This is however, only the general rule.
2. Under Sec. 7 of Rule 117, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to
another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the
former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from
the same act or omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were
discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made without the consent
of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as otherwise provided in Sec. 1(f) of
Rule 116.
3. If the accused has already served in whole or in part the judgment under the
previous complaint or information, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction
for the graver offense (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court).
4. For instance, if the accused had been convicted of serious physical injuries but
after the conviction, the victim died as a result of the very same injuries for which the accused
was convicted, double jeopardy cannot be raised as a defense in the prosecution for a graver
offense because of Sec. 7(a) of Rule 117. For this provision to apply the graver offense which
"supervened" must have arisen out of the same act or omission constituting the former charge.
Double jeopardy does not exist because one cannot be in jeopardy for an offense which did not
as yet exist at the time of the filing of the first information.
Meaning of same offense; when not the same (Bar 1993; 1994)
1. To be in jeopardy, the case against the accused must be terminated by means of a
final conviction, acquittal or
CHAPTER IX 497
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
dismissal without his express consent. If the case is not yet terminated, then jeopardy does not
set in. After the accused has been put in jeopardy, the filing against him of another charge for
the same offense or for an attempt or frustrated stage thereof or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is included in the offense originally charged places him in double jeopardy
(In the Matter of Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Bernabe
Buscayno, Jose Maria Sison and Juliet Sison v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2,
6 and 25, G.R. No. L-58284, November 19,1981).
The pronouncements in the cited case are mere reiterations of the principle enunciated
in the Rules of Court that the bar under the rule on double jeopardy refers to "another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court).
2. In the context of the rules, "same offense" means the offense charged, or an
attempt to commit it or a frustrated stage thereof, or "any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." (In the
Matter of Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Bernabe Buscayno, Jose
Maria Sison and Juliet Sison v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, G.R.
No. L-58284, November 19,1981).
3. A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense, x x x Two or more offenses arising from the same act are not the same" "if one
provision of law requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x.
Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the
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other"(Loney v. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006 citing other
cases; Italics supplied).
4. In Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408, January 31, 2005, the Court
stressed that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects from a second
prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one. Thus, even if the case arose out of
the same incident or transaction, the dismissal of one case would not constitute double
jeopardy against the accused in the other case if the quantum of evidence required to sustain
both cases are not similar.
For instance a prosecution under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code and under Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. 3019 would not infringe the rule against double jeopardy because a comparison of the
elements of the crime of falsification of a public document, provided for in Art. 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, and those of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 shows that there is
neither identity nor exclusive inclusion between the offenses. Among others, the latter case
requires the element of damage while in Falsification of Public Document, damage is of no
consequence (Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408, January 31, 2005).
5. The following are some examples of identical acts but constitute different
offenses:
(a) Theft of electricity under the Revised Penal Code and
violation ofP.D. 401 as amended —
Two separate criminal actions were instituted against the accused, one for theft
of electricity, and the other, for Violation ofP.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Big. 876. Theft
of electricity is a felony defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, while
Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Big. 876, is an offense punished by a special
law.
What generally makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence {culpa); what makes the latter a crime is the special law enacting it. In
addition, the elements of the two (2) offenses are different from one
CHAPTER IX 499
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
another. In theft, the elements are: (1) intent to gain; (2) unlawful taking; (3) personal
property belonging to another; (4) and absence of violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things. On the other hand, the crime of Violation of P.D. 401, as
amended by B.P. Big. 876, is mala prohibita. The criminal act is not inherently
immoral but becomes punishable only because the law says it is forbidden. With these
crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not
necessary.
While the institution of separate criminal actions under the provisions of P.D.
401, as amended by B.P. Big. 876, and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
theft may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof
cannot be limited to one offense because a single criminal act may give rise to a
multiplicity of offenses; and where there is variance or difference between the elements
of an offense in one law and another law, as in the case at bar, there will be no double
jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of
elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not
(Nierras v.
prohibited; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.
Dacuycuy, G.R. Nos. 59568-76, January 11,1990 cited in Diaz v. Davao
Light and Power Co., Inc., G.R. No. 160959, April 3, 2007).
(b) Illegal recruitment and estafa (Bar 1994)
would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the
check by the other party. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an
inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in
payment of a preexisting obligation.
Under B.P. Big. 22, the mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to
the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same
without sufficient funds and hence, punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA
523) which is not so under the Penal Code.
Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a
dishonored check may be convicted under B.P. Big. 22 even if he had issued the same for
Si pre-existing obligation, while under Art. 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in
each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation
of B.P. Big. 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire
banking system; (4) violations of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se,
while those of B.P. Big. 22 are mala prohibita (Nierras vs. Daeuycuy, 181
SCRA 1).
While the filing of the two sets of information under the provisions of B.P. Big. 22
and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer
to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to
one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and
where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law
and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the
rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses.
Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.
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/
What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.
Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information
does not itself give rise to double jeopardy (Nierras v.
Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 citing People v. Miraflores, 115
SCRA 570; People v. Crescencia, 228 SCRA 13).
(d) Direct bribery defined and punished under Art.
210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of
Section 3(b) ofRA. 3019
One may be charged with violation of R.A. 3019 in
addition to a felony under the Revised Penal Code for the
same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subse-
quent to being charged with a felony under the Revised
Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy if a person is
charged simultaneously or successively for violation of
Section 3 of R.A. 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice
placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with
the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration
thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section
7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense charged
necessarily includes that which is proved when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the
latter.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct
bribery defined and punished under Article 210 of the Re-
vised Penal Code and those of violation of Section 3(b) of
R.A. 3019 (Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself
or for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to in-
CHAPTER IX 503
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
tervene under the law), shows that there is neither identity nor necessary
inclusion between the two offenses.
The violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily
inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all the essential
elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the
other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or
benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019, acceptance of a
promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the
ambit of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions
involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene
under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope:
(a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does
not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is
his official duty to do.
Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same
transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No double
jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of the offenses
charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy proceeds from a second
prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one (Meren- cillo v. People,
G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13,2007).
Time bar rule; when provisional dismissal becomes permanent under Rule
117
1. The dismissal shall become permanent if:
(a) the case is not revived within one (1) year after the issuance of the
order of provisional dismissal with respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount or both; or
(b) the case is not revived within two (2) years after the issuance of
the order of provisional dismissal with respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years (Sec. 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court).
Thus, within the periods stated, the prosecution has to revive the case if it desires to
prevent the provisional dismissal becoming permanent and the revival of the case being time-
barred.
2. The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Art. 90 of
the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive
a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline
under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its
right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto
permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily
included therein. He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new
indictments. The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year periods
provided that there
CHAPTER IX 507
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
is a justifiable necessity for the delay (People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April
1,2003).
(b) "Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereofwithout
the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order
of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the
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criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply
with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
(c) Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in
writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication
to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a
provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writ-
ing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.
The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express
consent."
Note: Lacson and his co-accused, according to the Court, could not benefit
from the "time-bar" under Sec. 8 of Rule 117 because Sec. 8 of Rule 117 was not
complied with. Hence, there was no provisional dismissal to speak of. The respondent
did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise. Neither did he ever agree,
impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. Not even the
prosecution filed a motion to dismiss. What the accused filed was a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses. This
motion cannot be construed as indicative of an express consent to the dismissal.
Notably, the Court found that the heirs of the victims were not even notified thereof
prior to the hearing on the motion filed by respondent.
(d) "A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an
express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed
with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the
periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new
rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed
periods
CHAPTER IX 509
MOTION TO QUASH
(Rule 117)
subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double
jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
(e) "The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the
refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or
an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation." However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their
testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the
State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an
Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is
also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new
criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a
new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new
criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an
accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit
counter- affidavits and evidence. After all, "the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to
wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute" (People v. Lacson,
G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003) Suggested readings: Sy v. Court of
Appeals, 113 SCRA 334; Lava v. Gonzales, 11 SCRA 650; Bandiala v.
CFI of Misamis Occidental, 35 SCRA 237; Luciano v. Mariano, 40 SCRA
187; Teehankee v. Ma- dayag, 207 SCRA 134.
(f) "x x x Sec. 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should
be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit
retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would
violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce,
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- oOo -
Chapter X
PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
(Rules 118-119)
(c) Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court).
511
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UPDATED EDITION /
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case (Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court; Sees. 2 and 3,
Cir. 38- 98).
proper sanctions or penalties, if the counsel or prosecutor absent does not offer an acceptable
excuse for his lack of cooperation (Sec. 3, Rule 118, Rules of Court; Sec. 4, Speedy
Trial Act of1998).
Duty of the Branch Clerk of Court
During the preliminary conference, the Branch Clerk of Court shall (a) assist the parties in
reaching a settlement of the civil aspect of the case, (b) mark the documents to be presented as
exhibits and copies thereof attached to the records after comparison, (c) ascertain from the
parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of
documents marked as exhibits, and (d) consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the case (I-B[3], A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective
August 16, 2004).
Recording of the minutes
The proceedings during the preliminary conference shall be recorded in the Minutes of
Preliminary Conference to be signed by both parties and counsel. The minutes and the exhibits
shall be attached by the Branch Clerk of Court to the case record before the pre-trial (I-B[3],
AM. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16,2004).
All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded, the transcripts prepared and the
minutes signed by the parties and/or their counsels (I-B[9], AM. No. 03-1-09-SC, July
13, 2004, effective August 16,2004).
2. The same rule is embodied in Sec. 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. Under said
provision all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall (a)
be reduced to writing, (b) signed by both the accused and counsel, and (c) must be approved by
the court if the agreement covers the matters under Sec. 1 of Rule 118 (Sec. 2, Rule 118,
Rules of Court). If these requirements in "a" and "b" are not complied with, said agreements
or admissions cannot be used against the accused (Sec. 2, Rule 118, Rules of Court).
Pre-trial order
Within ten (10) days after the termination of the pretrial, the trial judge shall issue a
Pre-trial Order setting forth the actions taken during the pre-trial conference, the facts
stipulated, the admissions made, the evidence marked, the number of witnesses to be
presented and the schedule of the trial.
The Pre-trial order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and
control the course of the action during the trial unless modified by the court to prevent manifest
injustice (I-B[10J, AM. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16,
2004; Sec. 4, Rule 118, Rules of Court; Sec. 5, Speedy Trial Act of1998).
and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court
(Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court).
3. The purposes of pre-trial in a civil case are not identical with the purposes of a
pre-trial in a criminal case, the most significant of which is the purpose of considering the
possibility of amicable settlement or of submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution
(Sec. 2[aJ, Rule 18, Rules of Court). Such is not a purpose of a pre-trial in a criminal case
under Sec. 1 of Rule 118.
4. In a civil case, the sanction for non-appearance is imposed upon the
non-appearing party (Sec. 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court). In a criminal case, the sanction is
upon the counsel or the prosecutor upon whom "proper sanctions or penalties" may be
imposed for non-appearance in case of failure to offer an acceptable excuse for lack of
cooperation (Sec. 3, Rule 118, Rules of Court).
5. In a civil case, the parties are required to file and serve their respective pre-trial
briefs (Sec. 6, Rule 18, Rules of Court). In a criminal case, Rule 118 does not mention the
submission of pre-trial briefs.
6. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, issued on July 13, 2004, and made effective on
August 16, 2004, all proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded. The minutes of each
pre-trial conference shall contain matters taken up therein more particularly admissions of facts
and exhibits and shall be signed by the parties and their counsel. In a criminal case, there is a
strict warning. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 118, all agreements or admissions made or entered shall not
only be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel but it further provides
that"otherwise, they cannot he used against the accused"(I-B[8], A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC).
the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice (Sec. 4,
Rule 118, Rules of Court; Sec. 5, Speedy Trial Act of1998).
As a mediator and conciliator, the judge facilitates the settlement discussions between
parties and tries to reconcile their differences. As a neutral evaluator, the judge assesses the
relative strengths and weaknesses of each party's case and makes a non-binding and impartial
evaluation of the chances of each party's success in the case. On the basis of his neutral
evaluation, the judge persuades the parties to reconsider their prior reluctance to settle their
case amicably. The entire process comprises JDR (A.M. No. 04-1-12-SC- Philja. — Re:
Philja Resolution No. 06-22, Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of
an Enhanced Pre-Trial Proceeding under the JURIS Project, as Amended,
August 29,2006).
3. The mediation process is designed to be confidential. In order to safeguard the
confidentiality of mediation proceedings, the JDR judge shall not pass on any information
obtained in the course of conciliation, early neutral evaluation, or mediation to the trial judge or
to any other person. All JDR conferences shall be conducted in private. The JDR judge may,
however, confer in confidence with the mediator who previously mediated the case, merely for
the purpose of determining unresolved issues (A.M. No. 04-1-12-SC-Philja. — Re:
Philja Resolution No. 06-22, Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of
an Enhanced Pre-Trial Proceeding under the JURIS Project, as Amended,
August 29, 2006).
4. If the judge feels that the lawyers are not fully convinced about the settlement
process but there is a great chance of settlement, the judge may talk to the parties first without
their lawyers. Talking to each party separately (caucus) may also be employed if the parties
seem to be reaching an impasse.
5. The plaintiff (preferably, and in his own words) would tell his side of the story
and the defendant (preferably, and in his own words) would tell his side of the story.
6. Based on their stories, the judge would try to summarize the main issues in
contention, and try to probe the various interests of the parties at play. The judge could facili-
tate the creation of options that would provide solutions to the dispute, or even actively
propose solutions or options.
7. Where a settlement is reached, the parties immediately comply with the
agreement. This usually happens if the dispute involves a money claim and the defendant opts
to pay the sum in full at once. In this event, the parties through their counsel may choose to
submit a manifestation on the satisfaction of claims and the mutual withdrawal of the
complaint and counterclaim. The judge could then dismiss the case based on this fact.
8. Where the parties agree to settle and comply in the future and compliance of
the settlement is for compliance at some future date, then a compromise agreement is
secured. The following steps may be followed:
a. Drafting of a compromise agreement by the parties, with the assistance
of their lawyers;
b. Prior to the signing, the judge may opt to explain the contents to the
parties and make sure that they understand what they are signing, to obviate
repudiation at some future date;
c. Signing of the compromise agreement and the filing of a joint motion to
approve the compromise;
d. Judge approves the compromise agreement and renders a judgment
based on compromise;
CHAPTER X 521
PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER
(Rules 118-119)
is called for that would view the dispute as a problem-solving opportunity for lawyers to assist
the parties resolve their differences in ways that are productive for their future lives.
After understanding and accepting his new role in the mediation process, he must help
the client also comprehend and appreciate the mediation process and its benefits, as well as the
client's greater personal responsibility for the success of mediation in resolving the dispute.
9
3. " Preparation for participation in mediation
"Upon receipt from the trial court of the order to proceed to mediation, counsel shall
confer and discuss with his client the following:
(ii) study of the other side's position in relation to the issues with a
view to understanding the underlying fears, concerns and needs underneath said
position.
(iii) information or facts to be gathered or sought from the other side
or to be exchanged that are necessary for informed decision making.
(iv) possible bargaining options but stressing the need to be
open-minded about other possibilities.
(v) the best, worst, and most likely alternatives to a negotiated
agreement.
4. *Participation in the mediation sessions"
During the initial mediation session (before the court- accredited mediator) when the
mediator introduces the parties to the process of mediation, it is helpful for the lawyers to give
support to the mediator so that their clients fully understand the rules and processes of
mediation.
To contribute to the success of mediation, the lawyers must allow their clients to take
responsibility for making decisions during the negotiations within the mediation process. The
lawyers must restrain themselves from dominating the process and instead allow their clients
to take the initiative in discussions and create various options that are relevant to their own
personal interests.
However, if the client is unable to bargain effectively and it appears that he is on the
short-end of the power imbalance, and the mediator is not doing enough to even up this
imbalance, the lawyer may have to take a somewhat more active role in the process.
Where necessary, a lawyer may ask for a recess, as often as may be necessary, in order
to give advice or suggestions to client in private.
Should mediation before the court-accredited mediator fail, and the case is referred
back to the Court, the lawyer may have to take a more active role during the mediation
proceedings before the judge.
524 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
unsound mental condition. Where one issue in the criminal case is the mental condition of the
accused, an examination could be conducted under the spirit of Rule 28, another mode of
discovery. The tenor of Sec. 11 of Rule 116 clearly confers an authority upon the court to order a
mental examination of the accused and to order his confinement if necessary. Determining the
mental condition of the witness through an examination is no doubt a discovery procedure.
A further examination of the Rules of Court will likewise reveal that the rule on
depositions in Sec. 1 of Rule 24 allows the perpetuation of one's own testimony or that of
another person regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of the Philippines.
The terms, "any matter" are sufficiently broad to cover criminal proceedings cognizable by Phil-
ippine courts. To claim that such matters have reference to civil cases only is to stretch the rules
of logic too far.
2. In the case of People v. Hubert Webb, 312 SCRA 573, the Court ruled that
the taking of depositions in criminal cases is addressed to judicial discretion.
In this case, the respondent filed a motion to take the testimony by oral deposition of
several witnesses in the United States but the motion was denied by the trial court on the
ground that the same is not allowed by the Rules. The subsequent motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied. Dissatisfied, respondent elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals.
In a decision predicated upon the constitutional grounds of due process and the right of
an accused to present his evidence and for the production of evidence in his behalf and also on
the theory that the modes of discovery likewise applies to criminal cases, the CA set aside the
ruling of the trial court.
The Supreme Court did not directly make pronouncements on whether or not the
modes of discovery apply to criminal proceedings. Neither did it also declare that the modes of
discovery cannot be employed in criminal cases.
The Court's decision initially centered on the reasoning that the depositions proposed to
be taken from the U.S. based
526 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
"The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge. The deposition taking cannot be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons.
Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit
of the law. There is no indication in this case that in denying the motion of
respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive
manner. Grave abuse of discretion . . . implies such capricious, and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of law"
(Underscoring supplied).
B. TRIAL
(Rule 119)
2. If the accused is to be tried again pursuant to an order for a new trial, the trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from notice of the order granting a new trial. This period may
be extended to one not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days from notice of the order if the
period becomes impractical due to unavailability of witnesses and other factors (Sec. 5, Rule
119, Rules of Court).
Summary of periods
1. Arraignment — Within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the accused but the time of the pendency of the motion to quash or for a bill of
particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in
computing the period (Sec. l[g], Rule 116, Rules of Court). When the accused is under
preventive detention, his case shall be raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the
complaint or information. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the date of
the raffle (Sec. I[B]I, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, Sec. 1(e), Rule 116).
2. Pre-trial — After arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in
special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court (Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court). If the
accused is under preventive detention, the pre-trial shall be held within ten (10) days after
arraignment unless a law provides for a shorter period (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, IB[1]).
3. Trial — The general period applicable is thirty (30) days from receipt of the
pre-trial order (Sec. 1, Rule 119, Rules of Court).
Effect of not bringing the accused to trial within the prescribed period
1. If the accused is not brought to trial in accordance within the time limit set by the
Rules of Court, the information may be dismissed upon motion of the accused. The ground for
the dismissal is the denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall however, have the
burden of proving the ground for his motion. On the other hand, the prosecutor shall have the
burden of going forward with the evidence to establish that the delay belongs to the exclusion
of time mentioned in Sec. 3 of Rule 119. Note that in case of dismissal on the ground of denial of
the right to speedy trial, the dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy (Sec. 9,
Rule 119, Rules of Court).
2. The motion for dismissal must be made prior to trial, otherwise the failure to do
so shall be deemed a waiver of the right to have the charge dismissed (Sec. 9, Rule 119,
Rules of Court).
commence. These exclusions would actually justify suspension of the trial. One of these
exclusions refers to the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an
essential witness as described in Sec. 3, (b) of Rule 119.
2. To justify the delay, the witness cannot be just any witness. The rule describes
such witness as an "essential" witness.
"Essential" means 'indispensable,' 'necessary' or 'important in the highest degree'
(Black's Law dictionary, 5th Edition, p. 490).
3. "Absence" and "unavailability" are not considered synonymous. The rule in Sec.
3(b) of Rule 119 considers an essential witness absent in either of the following situations:
(a) his whereabouts are unknown; or
Trial period
In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the
first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court (Sec. 2, Rule 119,
Rules of Court).
CHAPTER X 531
PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER (Rules 118-119)
Postponement or continuance
A continuance may, among others, be granted if continuing the proceeding is impossible
or would result in a miscarriage of justice (Sec. 4[a], Rule 119, Rules of Court).
there are other circumstances that exist that would make him unavailable during the trial or
prevent him from attending the same.
Under any of above conditions, the accused may file a motion, with notice to the other
parties, to have his witness conditionally examined. The motion shall state: (a) the name and
residence of the witness; (b) the substance of his testimony; and (c) the reason or reasons for his
inability to attend the trial.
If the court is satisfied that the examination of the witness is necessary, it shall issue an
order to that effect and a copy of said order shall be served on the prosecutor at least three (3)
days before the scheduled examination. If the prosecutor does not appear despite notice, the
examination shall proceed notwithstanding his absence. The examination shall be taken before
a judge, or if not practicable, before a member of the bar in good standing so designated by the
judge in the order. It may also be taken before an inferior court if the order is made by a court of
superior jurisdiction. A written record of the testimony shall be taken (Sec. 12, 13, Rule
119, Rules of Court).
2. The prosecution may also have its witness conditionally examined if it satisfactorily
appears that the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial, or has to leave the Philippines
with no definite date of returning. The conditional examination shall be made before the court
where the case is pending and shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the
trial. It shall be made in the presence of the accused who shall be notified of the same. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after due notice shall be considered a waiver
and the statement taken therein may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused (Sec.
15, Rule 119, Rules of Court).
How to secure appearance of a material witness (Bar 1994; 1999)
1. Either party may, upon motion, secure an order from the court for a material witness
to post bail for such sum as
CHAPTER X 533
PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER
(Rules 118-119)
may be deemed proper, if the court is satisfied upon either (a) proof, or (b) oath that a material
witness will not testify when required (Sec. 14, Rule 119, Rules of Court).
2. If the witness refuses to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he
complies or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken (Sec. 14, Rule 119,
Rules of Court).
Discharge of accused to be a state witness; requisites (Bar 1988; 1990;
1994; 2006)
1. When two or more accused are jointly charged for an offense, they shall be tried
jointly, unless the court upon motion of the prosecutor or any accused, orders a separate trial
for one or more of the accused (Sec. 16, Rule 119, Rules of Court).
2. One or more of the accused tried jointly with the others, may however, be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state. For this purpose, the
prosecutor shall comply with the following: (a) file a motion for the discharge of the accused;
and (b) file the motion before the prosecution rests its case (Sec. 17, Rule 119, Rules of
Court).
3. The court upon receipt of the motion shall require the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness. The court shall conduct a
hearing in support of the discharge. The court, after hearing may direct that one or more of the
accused be discharged, if the court is satisfied that: (Bar 2006)
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) That there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
534 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
Order of trial
The trial shall proceed in the following order:
1. The prosecution shall present its evidence first (a) to prove the charge, and (b) to
prove the civil liability in the proper case.
Note: In Dangerous Drugs Cases, it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete
picture detailing the buy- bust operation—from the initial contact between the poseur- buyer
and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale (People v. Ong, 544
SCRA 123, February 6,2008).
2. The accused will then present his evidence to prove his defense and the
damages he sustained, if any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case;
3. The prosecution may present its rebuttal evidence unless the court the court
allows it to present additional evidence bearing on the main issue;
4. The accused may present sur-rebuttal evidence, unless the court allows him to
present additional evidence bearing on the main issue;
5. Upon submission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written
memoranda (Sec. 11, Rule 119, Rules of Court).
miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the
order granting it (Sec. 24, Rule 119, Rules of Court).
2. A motion to reopen the case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules
but it was nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from
long, established usage. This lack of a specific provision was remedied by the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Sec. 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following
requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment
of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the
order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage
of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated
within thirty days from the issuance of the order (Cabarles v. Maceda, 516 SCRA 303,
February 20,2007).
3. Participation by the defense counsel in cross-examining the witness for the
prosecution and in the proceedings after the case was reopened by the judge without prior
hearing does not amount to a waiver of the accused's objection to the order reopening the case
— to be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal (Cabarles v. Maceda, 516
SCRA 303, February 20,2007).
of the offense and the very person named or described in the complaint or information
because rights during the trial are not designed to be for the accused alone. Due process is
meant for both the People and the accused and identification of the accused in open court is
one of the essential elements in proving the People's case.
"The Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses
with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during
the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only should his examination be limited
to asking clarificatory questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for
the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor
intervening in the conduct of trial... hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for
the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta.... The °cold
neutrality of an impartial judge* requirement of due process was
certainly denied Tabuena and Peral-
I
CHAPTER X 539
PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER
(Rules 118-119)
ta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of
magistrate and advocate... A substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated in
the majority opinion not to focus on "numbers" alone, but more importantly to show
that the court questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart
from the common standard of fairness and impartiality." (emphasis added)
2. In a case, the accused contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to an
impartial tribunal, quoting extensively the sarcastic remarks that the trial court made during the
hearing. However, the Supreme Court stated that although the trial judge might have made
improper remarks and comments, the same did not amount to a denial of his right to due
process or his right to an impartial trial. A perusal of the transcript as a whole would show that
the remarks do not reflect any partiality on the trial court. The remarks were not made out of
context. Most probably, the trial judge was peeved at the strategy adopted by the accused. The
trial judge cannot be faulted for having made those remarks, notwithstanding the sarcastic tone
it impressed. Sarcasm alone cannot lead to the conclusion that the judge had taken the side of
the prosecution (People of the Philippines v. Benancio Mortera, G.R. No.
188104, April 23,2010).
C. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
(Rule 119)
Demurrer to evidence
(Bar 1991; 1994; 1996; 2001; 2003; 2004; 2007; 2009)
1. A demurrer to evidence, is actually a motion to dis-
miss that is filed by the accused after the prosecution has rest-
ed its case. (Bar 1994)
CHAPTER X 541
PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER
(Rules 118-119)
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. The order denying the demurrer shall not be reviewable by
appeal or certiorari before judgment (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court).
The issue presented before the Court is whether or not the motion to dismiss before the
trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the effect that he
waived his right to the presentation of his evidence.
The Court held that in order to determine whether the motion filed is a demurrer to
evidence or just a motion to dismiss, the following must be considered: (1) the allegations in it
must be made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the
primary objective of the party filing it.
In resolving the issue, the Court noted that the pertinent portions of the petitioner's
motion to dismiss took pains in pointing out how the trial in the case had painfully dragged on
for years. The gap between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of
the prosecutor's absence. This was further compounded by the prosecution's repeated motions
for extension of time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within such time. The RTC and
the CA
544 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
chose to ignore the extensive averments in the motion on how the case was unduly delayed
and treated the same as a demurrer merely because of a few observations made by petitioner
in some paragraphs regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against him. The motion to
dismiss did not even contain references to the evidence of the prosecution to show in what
respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. The so-called
"demurrer" did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. It cited no
documentary exhibit. In effect, the motion did not contain matters so fundamental to a
demurrer to evidence.
The Court likewise observed that a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution
has already rested its case. Here, the prosecution's motion for extension of time to make its
formal offer was granted by the court before the motion to dismiss by petitioner was filed. The
prosecution has not hence, rested its case.
In sum, the Court found that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
violation of his right to speedy trial and not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot therefore, be
declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense (Cabador v. People,
G.R. No. 186001, October2,2009).
- oOo -
CHAPTER XI
JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Meaning of judgment
A judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any (Sec.
1, Rule 120, Rules of Court).
Requisites of a judgment
1. The following are the formal requisites of a judgment:
546
CHAPTER XI 547
JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
" x x x The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial court. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted,
should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how
it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal" (Lumanog, et al. v. People,
G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010).
4. In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, 375 SCRA 81, the
Court had the occasion to state:
and the objection can no longer be raised on appeal (Abalos v. People, 389 SCRA 135).
Variance doctrine; variance between the allegation and proof (Bar 1993;
2004)
1. The variance referred to in Sec. 4 of Rule 120 is a situation where (a) the offense
proved is different from the offense as charged in the complaint or information, and (b) the
offense as charged is either included in the offense proved or necessarily includes the offense
proved (Sec. 4, Rule 119, Rules of Court).
2. The accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the
offense charged. He may also be convicted of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved (Sec. 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court).
Under Sec. 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved (Con-
CHAPTER XI 551
JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
awoke to find the male organ of the accused inside her mouth. This variance is not fatal to the
conviction of the accused for rape by sexual assault. A variance in the mode of commission of
the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime
was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. In this case, the accused did not
object to the presentation of evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different
manner than what was stated in the information. The variance is not a bar to his conviction of
the crime charged in the information (People v. Corpuz, 482 SCRA 435; People v.
Abello, G.R. No. 151952, March 25,2009).
escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address (Sec. 6, Rule
120, Rules of Court).
"An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation
of the judgment in a criminal case. If the accused fails to appear before the trial court,
promulgation of judgment shall be made in accordance with Rule 120, Section 6,
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to'wit: In case the
accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against
554 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at
the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice"
(People v. Taruc, G.R. No. 185202, February 18, 2009).
Entry of judgment
After a judgment has become final, it shall be entered in accordance with Rule 36 (Sec.
8, Rule 120, Rules of Court).
2. If the accused files a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration, he should
file the motion at any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final (Sec. 1, Rule
121, Rules of Court). From the phraseology of the rule, it is evident that a motion for new
trial or a motion for reconsideration applies when the judgment is one of conviction and it is the
accused, not the prosecution which avails of the same.
(d) If introduced and admitted, it would probably change the judgment (Sec. 2,
Rule 121, Rules of Court).
2. Elaborating on the requisites, jurisprudence held that for new trial to be granted on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following conditions must
obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have
been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect
the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted. Evidence, to be considered
newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been
discovered before the trial in the court below. The determinative test is the presence of due or
reasonable diligence to locate the thing to be used as evidence in the trial (Briones v.
People, G.R. No. 156009, June 5, 2009).
Grounds for reconsideration of the judgment
A reconsideration of the judgment shall be granted on any of the following grounds:
(a) Errors of law in the judgment which requires no further proceedings; and
(b) Errors of fact which also requires no further proceedings (Sec. 3, Rule
121, Rules of Court).
Form of the motions; notice
The motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds
on which it is based. If based on newly-discovered evidence, the motion must be supported by
affidavits of witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given or by duly authenticated
copies of documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence (Sec. 4, Rule 121,
Rules of Court).
Notice of the motion
I. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor (Sec.
4, Rule 121, Rules of Court).
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JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
added the Court, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal
period from notice of the judgment.
The court held:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
"Henceforth, this 'fresh period rule' shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution"
(Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14,2005).
2. On February 9, 2011, the Supreme Court held in the case of Judith Yu v.
Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170179, February 9, 2011, that the Neypes Rule applies
to appeals in criminal cases. Please refer to Synopsis of Selected Cases.
prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case (People v. Duca, G.R.
No. 171175, October 9,2009).
Hence, the conformity of the Assistant City Prosecutor to a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals is insufficient as the rule and jurisprudence mandate that the same should be
filed by the Solicitor General who is solely vested with the authority to represent the people in
the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court. Also, while a private prosecutor may be allowed
to intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, his
participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence, he cannot be permitted to
adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General (Carino v. De Castro, G.R. No.
176084, April 30,2008).
In lieu of the death penalty, the law imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal
Code or life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Code (Sec. 2, RA. 9346; People v. Abon, 545 SCRA 606,
February 15, 2008).
6. When the appeal is from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the appeal is generally
made by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court (Sec.
3[e], Rule 122, Rules of Court), because the procedure for the review by the Supreme
Court of decisions in criminal cases rendered by the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in civil
cases (Sec. 2, Rule 125, Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of
Court).
In cases however, where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, the judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals (Sec. 13[c], Rule 124,
Rules of Court).
Hence, the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the Court of
Appeals imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
is by petition for review on certiorari. A petition for review raises only questions of law and
should raise the errors of the CA and not those of the RTC (Batistis v. People, G.R. No.
181571, December 16,2009).
Under Section 3(e), Rule 122, of the Rules of Court, "except as provided in the last
paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45" (Sable v. People, G.R. No. 177961, April
7,2009).
Withdrawal of appeal
1. If an appeal has been perfected from the Municipal
Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the appeal may be
CHAPTER XI 567
JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
withdrawn when so allowed by the Municipal Trial Court as long as the record has not been
transmitted or forwarded to the appellate court (Regional Trial Court). When the appeal is
withdrawn, the judgment becomes final (Sec. 12, Rule 122, Rules of Court). The court
which approves the withdrawal at this stage is the Municipal Trial Court. Note: Same rule
applies to the RTC.
2. If the withdrawal is sought when the case is already on appeal, the Regional Trial
Court may allow the appellant to withdraw his appeal provided (a) a motion to withdraw is
filed, (b) the motion is filed before the Regional Trial Court renders judgment on the appeal.
Note that at this stage, the court which allows the withdrawal is the Regional Trial Court and the
withdrawal is addressed to the sound discretion of the court (Sec. 12, Rule 122, Rules of
Court). Note: The judgment of the court of origin will now become final and
the case shall be remanded to the court of origin for execution.
2. "Although the rule states that a favorable judgment shall benefit those who did not
appeal, we have held that a literal interpretation of the phrase 'did not appeal* will not give
justice to the purpose of the provision. It should be read in its entirety and should not be
myopically construed so as to defeat reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the
appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable.
"In fact, the Court has at various times applied the foregoing provision without
regard to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was
favorable to him. In such cases, the co-accused already withdrew his appeal, failed to file an
appellant's brief, or filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but eventually withdrew the
same. Even more, in these cases, all the accused appealed from the judgment of conviction but
for one reason or another, their conviction had already become final and executory.
Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused
x x x * (Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140656, September 13,
2007).
be availed of in connection with the civil action in so far as they are applicable.
5. For instance, in a criminal action where the civil liability includes support for the
offspring as a consequence of the crime, and the civil aspect thereof has not been waived, re-
served or instituted separately, the accused may be ordered to provide support pendente
lite to the child born to the offended party (Sec. 6, Rule 61, Rules of Court).
6. For reasons connected with the offended party's availment of a provisional
remedy, the accused, during the trial, may prove not only his defense but also the damages he
may have sustained arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case (Sec. ll[b],
Rule 119, Rules of Court).
erning civil cases are anchored on some other grounds aside from those cases provided for in a
criminal case under Sec. 2 of Rule 127.
3. In letter "b" of Sec. 2, preliminary attachment may be availed of without the need for
a showing that the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property or is about to
do so. Instead, what need to be shown are the following:
(a) The criminal case is founded upon a claim that money or property was
embezzled, fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused; and
(b) That the accused occupies any of the positions mentioned in Sec. 2 of
Rule 127 or that he committed a willful violation of duty (Sec. 2, Rule 127, Rules of
Court).
— oOo -
SYNOPSIS OF SELECTED CASES
Lejano v. People, G.R. No. 176389 People vs. Webb, G.R. No. 176864 January 18,2011
Facts
On December 14,2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA)
and acquitted the accused, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong, on the ground of lack
of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
"On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the
victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due
process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted
in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses."
Issue
X X X
574
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 575
capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the
accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
xxx
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But
the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of
such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
(Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 676, 683-684).
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to
bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court
"must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion
in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence." But he has not specified the violations of due
process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His
claim that "the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious
doubts the validity of the decision" is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal
perception.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court's appreciation of the
evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses' credibility. He ascribes grave error on
the Court's finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the
Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to
review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is
not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt
576 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
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to secure Webb, et al.'s conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al. is final and can no
longer be disturbed" (Citations of the Court were inserted).
Facts
An information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC which convicted
the petitioner as charged on May 26,2005.
Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9,2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial
with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her
of the crime for which she was convicted. The respondent judge denied the petitioner's motion
for new trial for lack of merit in an order dated October 17, 2005 but which was received by the
petitioner on November 3,2005.
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging she
had a "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion
for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. On December
8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being belatedly filed, arguing
that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. It then filed a motion for execution of
the decision.
The petitioner filed a petition in the SC for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting
on the prosecution's motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision.
The petitioner argued that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution's motions
when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the
Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes. The People through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that
Neypes applies to criminal actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to
set a uniform appeal period provided in the Rules.
In view of the OSG's manifestation, the Court required the private complainants to
comment on the petition. In their comment,
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 577
they averred that "the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period
rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the pronouncement of
"standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the interpretation of the appeal
periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure among
others. They contended that nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases,
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned."
Issue
Does the "fresh period" rule apply to appeals in criminal cases? Rilling
Speaking through Justice Brion, the Court ruled in the affirmative.
Thus spoke the Court:
X X X
"The raison d'etre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the
appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when
the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is
no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court's
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period
for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of
Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case
a
and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he
period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen
(15) days counted from the notice of the final B
578 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we
(this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial
difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned —
the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said
motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes
addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases
cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal
period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing
appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal
cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure x x x."
xxx
"Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are
the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in , Neypes and make it
applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and
encourage em
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 579
absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal
than an accused in a criminal case - a situation that gives undue favor to civil
litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a
double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property
interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced.
We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being
contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic
adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law — Quod est
ineonveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.
"Thus, we agree with the OSG's view that if a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with
more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking
the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the
accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters
of liberty cannot be overstated.
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed
her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her
motion for new trial" (Citations omitted).
The Court directed the trial court to "cease" and "desist" "from further exercising
jurisdiction over the prosecution's motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision."
The respondent Judge was also directed by the Court "to give due course to the petitioner's
appeal and x x x to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the
appealed decision on the merits."
It appeared that during the preliminary investigation, one of the accused mentioned
their plan to kill the victim. Hie admission was made without the assistance of counsel.
Issue
One issue brought before the Supreme Court was whether or not an admission made in
the preliminary investigation requires the assistance of counsel in order for the admission to be
admissible against the accused.
Ruling
Referring to the early case of People vs. Sunga, 447 Phil. 776 (2003), the Court
held:
X X X
"x x x the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can
be deemed 'critical stages' in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation
can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect
who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the
State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who
might be liable for criminal prosecution." In said case, Sunga made an
uncounselled admission before the police. He later acknowledged the same
admission before the judge in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into
the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the tatter's
lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually denied his
right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held inadmissible. In the
instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco
because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession was
taken before a judge."
Facts
In a rape case, the accused disputes the validity of the complaint for allegedly having
grossly violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 581
because it failed to state the exact date or at least the approximate date when the alleged rape
was committed. Because of such omission, he argues that "he was not able to intelligently
prepare for his defense and persuasively refute the indictment against him."
Issue
Is the statement of the precise date of the commission of the crime an essential
requirement for the validity of an information?
Ruling
xxx
"Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, we are reproducing here Section 11, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
It is clear from the foregoing that the requirement of indicating in the complaint or
information the date of the commission of the offense applies only when such date is a material
ingredient of the offense. In People v. Espejon, 427 Phil. 672 (200), we elucidated on this rule,
to wit:
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the
offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the
commission of a crime is not an essential element of it. Thus, in a prosecution for
rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the
rape, not the time of its commission. The failure to specify the exact date or time
when it was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on
its face.
In People v. Cantomayor, 441 Phil. 840, we explained when the time of the commission
of the crime becomes relevant:
A case with a related principle involved is that of People vs. Cristobal, GM.No. 159450,
March 30,2011. Here the petitioner submits that the information charged her with qualified
theft that allegedly transpired on December 29,1995, but the evidence at trial could not be the
basis of her conviction because it actually proved that the taking had transpired on January 2,
1996; and that the discrepancy would unduly prejudice her rights as an accused to be informed
of the charges as to enable her to prepare for her defense.
The Court considered the petitioner's submission as untenable. The Court held:
the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
xxx
"Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. — It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed as the information or complaint will permit.
Conformably with these rules, the information was sufficient because it stated the
nd
approximate time of the commission of the offense through the words "on or about the 2 of
January, 1996, and the accused could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with
which she was charged from a reading of its contents as well as gather by such reading
whatever she needed to know about the charge to enable her to prepare her defense.
The information herein did not have to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, considering that the date was not a material ingredient of the offense. As such, the
offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission."
The evidence, according to the trial court, did not show that the petitioner intended to
defraufl the private respondents. On the contrary, the evidences indicate that he extended a
loan to the
584 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
private respondents and that after the latter failed to pay their obligation, the petitioner
prepared a deed of absolute sale which the private respondents actually signed although the
deed of sale was notarized without the spouses personally appearing before the notary public.
Hence, the trial court held, that the petitioner can only be held guilty of falsification of a public
document by a private individual and not estafa through falsification of public document as
charged in the information. Civil liability was however, imposed upon the petitioner.
On appeal, the petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted of
the crime charged may nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not specifically
charged and alleged and which is not necessarily included in the crime or offense charged. The
Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that the petitioner cannot be held guilty of a crime that is
different from that charged in the information since to so hold would infringe on the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The civil liability imposed by the trial court was however, affirmed by the appellate
court.
Issue
The petitioner, in a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, raised the
lone issue of whether he could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal of the
crime charged.
Ruling
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious and did not agree with the finding of
the Court of Appeals imposing civil liability against the accused.
Citing the early case of Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., 240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987), the Court
explained that a felonious act gives rise to a civil liability "not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that
what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x
"Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence,
for petitioner to be civilly liable to the spouses ... it must be
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 585
proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses."
The facts reveal, observed the Court, that no damage was caused to the spouses,
private respondents. The petitioner did not commit fraud against the private respondents
because contrary to the allegations of the information, the private respondents indeed signed
the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged. Even if it is to be assumed
that they did not personally appear before the notary public for the notarization of the deed of
absolute sale, "the same does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties'
transaction. Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the
truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed."
of Philippine Independence and thereby created the Committee for the National Centennial
Celebrations in 1998 (Committee). In 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive
Order No. 128 (EO 128), entitled "Reconstituting the Committee for the Preparation of the
National Centennial Celebrations in 1998." EO 128 renamed the Committee as the "National
Centennial Commission" (NCC). The mandate of the NCC was to "take charge of the
nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the
Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress." The late
Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as NCC Chairman.
On March 10, 1996, the NCC and the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)
organized the Philippine Centennial Expo '98 Corporation or Expocorp whose primary purpose
was to operate, administer, manage and develop the Philippine Centennial International
Exposition 1998 (Expo '98).
The Philippine Centennial project was allegedly marred by numerous allegations of
anomalies. The investigation that followed resulted in the filing in 2001 of an Information by the
Ombudsman's Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau against respondent Luis J. Morales
(Morales), the acting president of Expocorp for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, Morales moved for the dismissal of the
case for lack of jurisdiction over his person and over the offense charged. He alleged that
Expocorp is a private corporation and that he is not a public employee or official. He also alleged
that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over his person or the offense charged as he is a
private individual who has not been charged jointly with other public officials or employees. He
added that Expocorp is not a government-owned or controlled corporation because it was not
created by a special law, it did not have an original charter, and a majority of Expocorp's capital
stock is owned by private individuals. He claimed that he did not receive any compensation
from the government as defined in Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 3019, and the compensation he
received as Expocorp's acting president was paid from Expocorp's funds.
In its comment to Expocorp's motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, representing
the People, insisted that Expocorp is a government-owned corporation sinfce its articles of
incorporation showed that of its ten listed subscribers, BCDA held stocks valued at
588 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
P99,999,100.00, while the stocks held by the rest of the subscribers had a total value of
P900.00. The People further argued, that NCC Chairman Laurel was a public officer; thus,
Morales was likewise a public officer since his appointment flowed from the former's exercise
of his authority as chairman of both NCC and Expocorp.
In his reply, Morales averred that upon Expocorp's incorporation, BCDA owned
essentially all of Expocorp's stocks. Two months after its incorporation, however, the Board of
Directors of Expocorp issued a resolution declaring all its unissued and unsubscribed shares
open for subscription. Global Clark Assets Corporation (Global) subscribed to essentially all of
these unissued and unsubscribed shares; thus, Global became the majority owner with 55.16%
of Expocorp's stocks, while BCDA was left as minority stockholder with 44.84% of Expocorp's
stocks. Morales concluded that since Expocorp is a private corporation and an entity distinct
from NCC, he, as its president, is not a public officer.
Issues
Is Expocorp a government owned- or controlled corporation? Is the case against the
accused within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?
Ruling
"Expocorp is a private corporation. It was not created by a special law but was
incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It is also not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Although BCDA,
which owned 999,991 shares of its shares, was one of Expocorp's original incorporators, the
Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed Global to buy 1,229,998 of its unused and unsubscribed
shares two months after its incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp
cannot be characterized as a government- owned or controlled corporation. In Dante V.
Liban, et al. v. Richard J. Gordon, 593 SCRA 68, we pointedly said:
"A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its
capital stock must be owned by the government.
xxx
"Since Expocorp is a private corporation, not a government-owned or
controlled corporation, Morales,
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 589
as Expocorp's president who now stands charged for violating Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 in this capacity, is beyond the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction."
Issue
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA and the trial court erred in
finding that the accused raped the victim despite the existence of doubt as to the identity of the
rapist.
Ruling
Where the victim shows uncertainty in the identity of the rapist, the accused cannot be
convicted.
Facts
After the State rested its case against the accused, in a case of qualified theft, the defense
counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the
dismissal of the charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not suffice to establish
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence
and deemed the case submitted for decision
590 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
and because the demurrer to evidence was filed without express leave of court, the accused
had waived the right to present evidence. Thereafter, a decision was rendered finding the
accused guilty. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Did the CA err in affirming the ruling of the trial court that the accused had waived her
right to present her evidence-in-chief despite the expressed motion to defer its presentation
when the demurrer to evidence was filed?
Ruling
"x x x As to whether or not the trial court correctly ruled that appellant waived the
presentation of her evidence when she filed her "Demurrer To Evidence and Motion to Defer
Evidence" without prior leave of court, We rule in the affirmative.
Appellant's theory that prior leave of court had been requested because her demurrer
was, at the same time, also a motion to defer defense evidence, cannot be sustained. A motion
to defer evidence does not constitute a request for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In fact,
such motion indicates that appellant wanted the Trial Court to consider the demurrer before
proceeding to hear her evidence. Furthermore, there is nothing in appellant's Demurrer from
which it can be inferred that appellant was asking the Trial Court permission to move for the
dismissal of the case.
Section 15 (now Sec. 23), Rule 119 of the Rules' of Criminal Procedure provides:
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without
express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the
case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis
supplied.)
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 591
Clearly, when the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court,
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. In such a case, the waiver of the right to present defense evidence
is unqualified."
Facts
The information charged the accused, a bank teller with qualified theft of money
belonging to the bank, the employer of the accused. The evidence against the accused included
a handwritten letter written by her to the bank president explaining the loss of the various
amounts on various occasions to a man who approached the counter and threatened her
safety and those of her children.
Issue
One issue concerns the admissibility of the accused's letter explaining the shortage of
her dollar collection as bank teller. The accused submits that the letter was inadmissible for
being in reality an uncounselled extrajudicial confession, and for not being executed under oath.
Ruling
xxx
"The submission lacks persuasion.
The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being
executed with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party
admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that was admissible against her.
An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to
presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter's fault if the
admission does not. By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent
primary evidence against the admitter.
Worth pointing out is that the letter was not a confession due to its not expressly
acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft. Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the
offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein.
592 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she
wrote the letter because she spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation.
Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid and better appreciated had she
made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial investigation, or under coercion by the
investigating authorities of the Government. The distinction of her situation from that of a
person arrested or detained and under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense
derived from the clear intent of insulating the latter from police coercion or intimidation
underlying Section 12 of Article III {Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
To reiterate, the rights under Section 12, supra, are available to "any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense." The phrase does not cover all kinds of
investigations, but contemplates only a situation wherein "a person is already in
custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet
deprived in any significant way of his liberty * The situation of the accused was not
similar to that of a person already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if
she is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty."
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 593
xxx
594 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
X X X
Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that
accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon
being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their
leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellants — who were caught in flagrante delicto of
possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA
6425, as amended — is valid.
x x x we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears
the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest
without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is
deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In the instant case, it can plausibly be
argued that accused- appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were in
the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted by
the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the
contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the
arresting officers."
Note: The accused appellants in this case, raised the issue of illegality of their arrest after
their plea thus, the "accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their
arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea."
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 595
the President. The petition was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals, among others, for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Issues
1. Was the petition for review filed by the petitioner in the OP assailing the orders
of the DOJ the proper remedy?
2. Was the petition filed in the CA assailing the orders of the OP, filed out of time?
Ruling
1. "After petitioner's receipt of the DOJ Secretary's resolution denying her motion
for reconsideration of the resolution dismissing her petition for review of the prosecutors'
resolutions dismissing her complaint for libel, she filed a petition for review before the Officer of
the President (OP) on the pretext that she should first exhaust administrative remedies.
Unfortunately, such action was fatal to her case, since Memorandum Circular No. 58 (MC No.
58) prohibits the filing of such petition with the OP. As provided under MC No. 58, no appeal
from or petition for review of decisions/orders/ resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on
preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President,
except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua te death.
Clearly, there was no need for petitioner to file her petition with the OP.
xxx
2. The facts show that petitioner filed an appeal with the DOJ Secretary, but the
appeal was dismissed. The motion for reconsideration which the petitioner filed was also
dismissed. As there was no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of
law, the remedy "was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.-However. petitioner failed to file a petition for certiorari
within 60 days from receipt of the DOJ resolution denying her motion for reconsideration.''
Hence, declared the Court, the petitioner's "filing of the petition for review with the OP,
x x x did not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing a petition with the CA." and
the DOJ resolutions became final and executory after the lapse of the period for assailing the
same in the CA. Thus, no reversible error could be
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 597
attributed to the CA in dismissing the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period.
Facts
The public prosecutor charged the accused with two counts of rape before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.
When the RTC found the accused guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced him
accordingly, the accused challenged the Benguet RTC's jurisdiction over the crimes charged, he
having testified that their residence when the alleged offenses took place was in Pucsusan
Barangay, Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that the testimony that their residence was in
Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction since he waived the jurisdictional
requirement. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC holding that
the prosecution has sufficiently established the jurisdiction of the RTC through the testimony of
the witnesses.
Issue
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases of rape against the
accused?
Ruling
"x x x Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor subjected to
stipulation. The right venue must exist as a matter of law. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to
attach, the criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality,
city, or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
took place.
"The Informations filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were
committed in the victim and the offender's house in City Limit, Tuding, Municipality of Itogon,
Province of Benguet. This allegation conferred territorial jurisdiction over the subject offenses
on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies of the witnesses as well as the affidavit of
arrest point to this fact. Clearly, the uncorroborated assertion of the accused that the subject
offenses took place in Baguio City is not entitled to belief. Besides,
598 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad that had
jurisdiction to hear the case. Taken altogether, the RTC's jurisdiction to hear the case is beyond
dispute.
The petitioners as corporate officers of a corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, a petition for Suspension of Payments and Rehabilitation. The court, finding
the petition sufficient in form and substance issued an order staying all claims against the
corporation.
At the time of the filing of the petition for rehabilitation, there were a number of
criminal charges pending against petitioners initiated by the respondent, Social Security System
for alleged violations of the SSS Law. Consequently, petitioners filed with the court handling the
criminal cases a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings arguing that the stay order
issued by the rehabilitation court should also apply to their pending criminal charges. The
petitioners prayed for the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the petition for
rehabilitation was finally resolved.
The trial court denied the motion to suspend the proceedings ruling that the stay order
issued by the rehabilitation court did not cover criminal proceedings. The subsequent petition
for certiorari filed by the petitioners in the Court of Appeals was dismissed holding that the
violation of the provisions of the SSS law was a criminal liability and was, thus, personal to the
offender. The appellate court held that the criminal proceedings against the petitioners should
not be considered a claim against the corporation and, consequently, not covered by the stay
order.
Issue
The issue as put by the Court: "xxx does the suspension of "all claims" as an incident to a
corporate rehabilitation also contemplate the suspension of criminal charges filed against the
corporate officers of the distressed corporation?"
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the negative with the following pertinent declarations:
xxx
APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES 599
RULE 9
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
SECTION 1. Who may file. — Any offended party, peace officer or any public officer
charged with the enforcement of an environmental law may file a complaint before the proper
officer in accordance with the Rules of Court.
SEC. 2. Filing of the information. — An information, charging a person with a
violation of an environmental law and subscribed by the prosecutor, shall be filed with the
court.
SEC. 3. Special prosecutor. — In criminal cases, where there is no private offended
party, a counsel whose services are offered by any person or organization may be allowed by
the court as special prosecutor, with the consent of and subject to the control and supervision
of the public prosecutor.
RULE 10
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged,
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the complainant waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Unless the civil action has been instituted prior to the criminal action, the reservation of
the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made during arraignment. In case civil
liability is imposed or damages are awarded, the filing and other legal fees
600
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASPECT OF THE RULE 601
OF PROCEDURE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
shall be imposed on said award in accordance with Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, and the fees
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award. The damages awarded in cases where there
is no private offended party, less the filing fees, shall accrue to the funds of the agency charged
with the implementation of the environmental law violated. The award shall be used for the
restoration and rehabilitation of the environment adversely affected.
RULE 11
ARREST
SECTION 1. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or an individual
deputized by the proper government agency may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense; or
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
Individuals deputized by the proper government agency who are enforcing
environmental laws shall enjoy the presumption of regularity under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court when effecting arrests for violations of environmental laws.
SEC. 2. Warrant of arrest. — All warrants of arrest issued by the court shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the information filed with the issuing court.
RULE 12
CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF SEIZED ITEMS, EQUIPMENT, PARAPHERNALIA, CONVEYANCES
AND INSTRUMENTS
SECTION 1. Custody and disposition of seized items. — The custody and disposition of
seized items shall be in accordance with the applicable laws or rules promulgated by the
concerned government agency.
SEC. 2. Procedure. — In the absence of applicable laws or rules promulgated by the
concerned government agency, the following procedure shall be observed:
602 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
(a) The apprehending officer having initial custody and control of the seized items,
equipment, paraphernalia, conveyances and instruments shall physically inventory and
whenever practicable, photograph the same in the presence of the person from whom such
items were seized.
(b) Thereafter, the apprehending officer shall submit to the issuing court the return
of the search warrant within live (5) days from date of seizure or in case of warrantless arrest,
submit within five (5) days from date of seizure, the inventory report, compliance report,
photographs, representative samples and other pertinent documents to the public prosecutor
for appropriate action.
(c) Upon motion by any interested party, the court may direct the auction sale of
seized items, equipment, paraphernalia, tools or instruments of the crime. The court shall, after
hearing, fix the minimum bid price based on the recommendation of the concerned
government agency. The sheriff shall conduct the auction.
(d) The auction sale shall be with notice to the accused, the person from whom the
items were seized, or the owner thereof and the concerned government agency.
(e) The notice of auction shall be posted in three conspicuous places in the city or
municipality where the items, equipment, paraphernalia, tools or instruments of the crime
were seized.
(f) The proceeds shall be held in trust and deposited with the government
depository bank for disposition according to the judgment.
RULE 14 BAIL
SECTION 1. Bail, where filed. — Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court
where the case is pending, or in the absence
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASPECT OF THE RULE 603
OF PROCEDURE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city or municipality. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available,
with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein. If
the court grants bail, the court may issue a hold-departure order in appropriate cases.
SEC. 2. Duties of the court. — Before granting the application for bail, the judge
must read the information in a language known to and understood by the accused and require
the accused to sign a written undertaking, as follows:
(a) To appear before the court that issued the warrant of arrest for arraignment
purposes on the date scheduled, and if the accused fails to appear without justification on the
date of arraignment, accused waives the reading of the information and authorizes the court to
enter a plea of not guilty on behalf of the accused and to set the case for trial; (b) To appear
whenever required by the court where the case is pending; and
(c) To waive the right of the accused to be present at the trial, and upon failure of the
accused to appear without justification and despite due notice, the trial may proceed in
absentia.
RULE 15 ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
SECTION 1. Arraignment. — The court shall set the arraignment of the accused
within fifteen (15) days from the time it acquires jurisdiction over the accused, with notice to the
public prosecutor and offended party or concerned government agency that it will entertain
plea-bargaining on the date of the arraignment.
SEC. 2. Plea-bargaining. — On the scheduled date of arraignment, the court shall
consider plea-bargaining arrangements. Where the prosecution and offended party or
concerned government agency agree to the plea offered by the accused, the court shall:
(a) Issue an order which contains the plea-bargaining arrived
at;
(b) Proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect of the case, if any; and
604 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
(c) Render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including the civil liability for
damages.
RULE 16
PRE-TRIAL
SECTION 1. Setting of pre-trial conference — After the arraignment, the court
shall set the pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days. It may refer the case to the branch clerk
of court, if warranted, for a preliminary conference to be set at least three (3) days prior to the
pre-trial.
SEC. 2. Preliminary conference. — The preliminary conference shall be for the
following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement of the civil aspect of the case;
(b) To mark the documents to be presented as exhibits;
(c) To attach copies thereof to the records after comparison with the originals;
(d) To ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the
genuineness and due execution of documents marked as exhibits;
(e) To consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the case;
(f) To record the proceedings during the preliminary conference in the Minutes of
Preliminary Conference to be signed by the parties and counsel;
(g) To mark the affidavits of witnesses which shall be in question and answer form
and shall constitute the direct examination of the witnesses; and
(h) To attach the Minutes and marked exhibits to the case record before the
pre-trial proper.
The parties or their counsel must submit to the branch clerk of court the names,
addresses and contact numbers of the affiants.
SEC. 3. Pre-trial duty of the judge. — During the pre-trial, the court shall:
(b) Adopt the minutes of the preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial
proceedings, confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and admissions on the
genuineness and due execution of documents, and list object and testimonial evidence;
(c) Scrutinize the information and the statements in the affidavits and other
documents which form part of the record of the preliminary investigation together with other
documents identified and marked as exhibits to determine further admissions of facts as to:
i. The court's territorial jurisdiction relative to the
offense(s) charged;
witnesses to be presented and the schedule of trial. The order shall bind the parties and control
the course of action during the trial.
RULE 17 TRIAL
SECTION 1. Continuous trial. — The court shall endeavor to conduct continuous trial
which shall not exceed three (3) months from the date of the issuance of the pre-trial order.
SEC. 2. Affidavit in lieu of direct examination. — Affidavit in lieu of direct
examination shall be used, subject to cross-examination and the right to object to inadmissible
portions of the affidavit.
SEC. 3. Submission of memoranda. — The court may require the parties to
submit their respective memoranda and if possible, in electronic form, within a non-extendible
period of thirty (30) days from the date the case is submitted for decision. With or without any
memoranda filed, the court shall have a period of sixty (60) days to decide the case counted
from the last day of the 30-day period to file the memoranda.
SEC. 4. Disposition period. — The court shall dispose the case within a period of ten
(10) months from the date of arraignment.
SEC. 5. Pro bono lawyers. — If the accused cannot afford the services of counsel or
there is no available public attorney, the court shall require the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
to provide pro bono lawyers for the accused.
RULE 19
STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL CASES
SECTION 1. Motion to dismiss. — Upon the filing of an information in court and
before arraignment, the accused may file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the criminal
action is a SLAPP.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASPECT OF THE RULE 607
OF PROCEDURE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
PART V
EVIDENCE
RULE 20
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
SECTION 1. Applicability. - When there is a lack of
full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between
human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply
the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it. The
constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
SEC. 2. Standards for application. — In applying the
precautionary principle, the following factors, among others, may
be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to
present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment
without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those
affected.
RULE 21
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
SECTION 1. Photographic, video and similar evidence. — Pho-
tographs, videos and similar evidence of events, acts, transactions of
608 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
SECTION 1. Effectivity. - These Rules shall take effect within fifteen (15) days following
publication once in a newspaper of general circulation.
SEC. 2. Application of the Rules of Court. — The Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory manner, except as otherwise provided herein.
CASE INDEX
609
610 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES /
UPDATED EDITION /
Merencillo v. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13, 2007 ....................................................... 503
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Rogelio Reynaldo and Jose C. Adrandea,
G.R. No. 164538, August 9,2010.................................................................... 20, 21,120
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda,
338 SCRA 254 .......................................................................................................................150
Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377...................................................... 18,313,314,428, 479
Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006 ....................................................18,19
Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006
citing People v. Montiero, 192 SCRA 548...........................................................................479
Mobilia Products v. Umezawa, G.R. No. 149357,
March 4, 2005 ........................................................................................................................12
Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1................................................................................299
Montilla v. Hilario, 90 Phil. 49 ...............................................................................................35
Mupas v. People, G.R. No. 172834, February 6, 2008............................................... 352,355
Narciso v. Santa Romana-Cruz,
328 SCRA 505 ................................................................................. 335, 336, 337, 338
Naui v. Mauricio, 414 SCRA 11............................................................................................322
Navarrete v. People, 513 SCRA 509, January 31,2007 ......................................................551
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524,
September 14,2005 .............................................................................................................558
Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, 544 SCRA 324,
February 11, 2008................................................................................................. 541, 542
Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 citing People v.
Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570....................................................................................................502
Nierras v. Dacuycuy, G.R. Nos. 59568-76,
January 11,1990 cited in Diaz v. Davao Light and
Power Co., Inc., G.R. No. 160959, April 3, 2007 .................................................................499
Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 ......................................................................................501
Nola v. Barroso, Jr., 408 SCRA 529......................................................................................237
Nolasco v. Pano, 139 SCRA 152 .................................................................................. 268,269
Nombrefia v. People, G.R. No. 157919, January 30,2007...................................................93
Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21..........................................................477
Office of the Court Administrator v. Go, 534 SCRA 156....................................................388
Office of the Court Administrator v. Janolo, Jr.,
534 SCRA 262 .......................................................................................................................388
Office of the Court Administrator v. Laron, 527 SCRA 45 .................................................387
Office of the Court Administrator v. Legaspi, Jr.,
512 SCRA 570 .......................................................................................................................388
Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano, G.R. No. 177580, October 17,2008 citing Vide Paredes v.
Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 577 ............................................................................477
CASE INDEX 623
People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010 ....................................................................... 235
People v. Tuazon, 532 SCRA 152, September 3, 2007 ................................................... 270, 271
People v. Tuazon, 532 SCRA 152 .................................................................................................... 261
People v. Tumambing, G.R. No. 191261, March 2, 2011................................................................ 85
People v. Tuniaco, G.R. No. 185710, January 19,2010.................................................................. 380
People v. Uba, L-131106, October 16,1959 ..................................................................................... 58
People v. Ubina, G.R. No. 176349, July 10,2007 .............................................................................. 91
People v. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374........................................................................................................... 372
People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 .......................................................................................... 244,245
People v. Vergara, 221 SCRA 567 ................................................................................................... 485
People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523 ................................................................................................ 501
People v. Villasan, G.R. No. 176527, October 9, 2009.....................................................561, 562
People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137,
January 20, 2004,420 SCRA 280 ......................................................................................... 272
Perez v. People, G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008 .....................................................376, 393
Petallar v. Pullos, 419 SCRA 434...................................................................................................... 388
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People,
427 SCRA 456 ........................................................................................................117, 559
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People,
G.R. No. 147703, April 14,2004 ............................................................................................ 69
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People,
G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004 ...........................................................................110,112
Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 215 SCRA 421..................................................................................... 314
Pilapil v. Garchitorena, 299 SCRA 343 .............................................................................................. 15
Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060,
September 13,2010 ............................................................................................................ 130
Pinote v. Ayco, A.M. No-RTJ-05-1944, December 13,2005 ............................................................ 73
Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F. 2d. 422 ............................................................................................... 310
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 135703,
April 15, 2009....................................................................................................................... 144
Quelnan v. People, 526 SCRA 653, July 6,2007................................................................242,245
Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 .............................................................................................................2
Quinicot v. People, G.R. No 179700, June 22,2009 ....................................................................... 277
Racho v. Miro, 567 SCRA 213.......................................................................................................... 177
Ramon Garces v. Simplicio Hernandez, et al.,
G.R. No. 180761, August 18,2010 ...................................................................................... 122
Ramos v. People, G.R. No. 171565, July 13,2010 .......................................................................... 194
Re: Complaint Against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion
of the Court of Appeals, 518 SCRA 512................................................................383, 388
Re: Conviction of Judge AAA, A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC,
January 31, 2008 ................................................................................................................. 354
CASE INDEX 635
Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in MTC's of Bayombong & Solano &
MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya,
535 SCRA 224 ....................................................................................................................... 387
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern
Samar, 536 SCRA 313 .......................................................................................................... 388
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit in RTC Branch 4,
Dolores, Eastern Samar, 536 SCRA 313.............................................................................. 342
Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director
Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C Office of the Ombudsman, A.M. No.
10- 1-13-SC,
March 2, 2010 ...................................................................................................................... 171
Resayo v. People, 522 SCRA 391, April 27, 2007 ................................................................538
Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil 484....................................................................................................... 11
Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 560 SCRA 518 .............................................................125
Ricaforte v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154438, September 5, 2007 ................................................152
Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451,
February 9, 2007 ..................................................................... 67, 86,102,107,108,
Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451,
February 9, 2007 citing Matalam v. Sandiganbayan,
455 SCRA 736 ....................................................................................................................... 101
Rilloraza v. Arciaga, L-23848, October 31,1967 .................................................................... 14
Ritualo v. People, G.R. No. 178337, June 25, 2009 .............................................................. 70
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687.................................................................................235, 240
Roberto B. Kalalo v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 158189, April 23, 2010 .......................................................................................... 151
Rodis v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618..............................................................................162
Rodis v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 71404- 09,
October 26,1988 .................................................................................................................. 456
Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 424 SCRA 236 ......................................................................383
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 ..........................................................................400,416
Rolito Calang and Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc.
v. People, G.R. No. 190696, August 3,2010........................................................................ 125
Romero v. People, G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009 ............................................................124
Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, 307 SCRA 104..........................................................386
Ruiz v. Beldia, Jr., 451 SCRA 402 ..........................................................................................160
Ruiz v. Beldia, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1731,
February 16, 2005 ..................................................................................................316, 342
Sabandal v. Tongco, G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001 ....................................................138
Sable v. People, G.R. No. 177961, April 7,2009 ................................................................565, 569
Salazar v. People, 411 SCRA 598 ............................................................................................U..464
636 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
UPDATED EDITION
Saldana v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88889, October 11,1990 citing People v. Bocar,
138 SCRA 166....................................................................................................................... 469
Sales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802,
November 16, 2001 ............................................................................................................ 146
Salvador Valdez Rebellion v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010 ............................................................................................. 227
Salvanera v. People, 523 SCRA 147, June 21, 2007 ....................................................................... 534
Samalio v. Court of Appeals, 454 SCRA 462 .................................................................................. 425
Samuel Lee, et al. v. KBC Bank N.V. [Formerly Kredietbank, N.V.], G.R. No. 164673,
January 15, 2010.................................................................................................................. 145
San Miguel v. Maceda, 520 SCRA 205............................................................................................ 324
San Miguel v. Maceda, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749,
April 4, 2007 ......................................................................................................................... 328
Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 .............................................................................................. 35
Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662,
February 19, 2008.................................................................................................................. 60
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636.................................................................................... 457
Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633.................................................................................................. 18
Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19,2005 ................................................ 147,148,184
Santos v. Orda, Jr., 437 SCRA 504 ................................................................................................... 193
Santos v. Pryce Gases, G.R. No. 165122,
November 23, 2007 ............................................................................................................ 230
Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122,
November 23, 2007 .................................... 233,235, 238,256, 258, 259, 260
Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, 543 SCRA 70 ................................................................. 174
Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 464 .................................................................................... 17
Sasot v. People, G.R. No. 143193, June 29, 2005 ........................................................................... 199
Savella v. Ines, 521 SCRA 417 .......................................................................................................... 342
Sayson v. People, G.R. No. L-51745, October 28,1988,
166 SCRA 680......................................................................................................................... 85
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 ...........................................400, 401, 402, 403, 404
SEC v. Interport Resources Corporation,
G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008........................................................................................ 65
Serana v. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA 225,
January 22, 2008.................................................................................................................. 458
Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059,
January 22, 2008................................................................................................24, 28, 34,
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468,
January 28, 2003........................................................................................ 316, 317, 319
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468,
January 29, 2003.................................................................................................................. 93
CASE INDEX 637
Vasquez v. Hobilia-Alinio, 271 SCRA 67 citing Torralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 101421-22,
February 10,1994 .................................................................................................................456
Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677......................................................................... 18, 546
Vertudes v. Buenaflor, 478 SCRA 210..............................................................................................424
Victoria P. Cabral v. Jacinto Uy, et al., G.R. No. 174584,
January 22, 2010 ....................................................................................................................24
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 ........................................................................................ 404, 408
Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 ....................................................................................................324
Vincoy v. Court of Appeals, 432 SCRA 36 ........................................................................................475
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642,
18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)...........................................................................................................280
Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652........................................................................... 154, 205, 238
Webb v. De Leon, G.R. Nos. 121245 and 121297,
August 23,1995.....................................................................................................................197
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 .....................................................................................................255
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361..............................................................................................399
Yao, Sr. v. People, 525 SCRA 108......................................................................................................236
Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306,
June 19, 2007...........................................................237, 240, 241, 248, 250, 251
Yap v. Cabales, G.R. No. 159186, June 5, 2009................................................................................134
Yap v. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30,1959.....................................................................................495
Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 ..............................................................................................................129
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,100 S.Ct,
338 62 L.Ed.2d 238 1979 ......................................................................................................253
Zacarias v. Cruz, 30 SCRA 728 ...........................................................................................................161
Zalameda v. People, G.R. No. 183656,
September 4, 2009............................................................. 213, 225, 226, 279, 286
Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 ............................................................................ 59, 60, 63, 64
Zapatos v. People, 411 SCRA 148......................................................................................432, 467
Zuiio v. Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382 citing Cortes v. Catral,
279 SCRA 1......................................................................................................................... 330
Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556,
98 S.Ct. 1970,1977, 56 L.Ed.2d 525, 535 ..........................................................................252