AMADO PICART, 
plaintiff-appellant, situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
Alejo Mabanag for appellant.
G. E. Campbell for appellee.
STREET, J.:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000,
as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has
appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on the
Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the
opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his
course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed
by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing
on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought
he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75
meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would
move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the
automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across
to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse
alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity
to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In
so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse
fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that
when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the
bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff
received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above
described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done; and we are
of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the
horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too
late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of
within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the
situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate
stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far
away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he
was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in
question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and jump under the conditions which here
confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion,
negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men
govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration,
foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to
guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that
the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the
defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence
in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps be
mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person
injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would G.R. No. 126467            January 31, 2007
otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant company had there employed the
plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards
NATIVIDAD (Substituted by her children MARCELINO AGANA III, ENRIQUE AGANA, JR., EMMA AGANA
located not far away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. At certain
ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA, and RAYMUND AGANA) and ENRIQUE AGANA, Petitioners,
spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the
vs.
insecurity of the road bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught
JUAN FUENTES, Respondent.
and broken. It appeared in evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had dislodged
one of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company was negligent in having failed to
repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - x
negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held that while the
defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair
G.R. No. 127590            January 31, 2007
nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account of the contributory negligence in the
plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The liability of the
company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the one now before MIGUEL AMPIL, Petitioner,
us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which caused the damage, we do vs.
not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents.
damage according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant
was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the
plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case. DECISION

A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the defendant's answer, to
the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the court of a justice of the
peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused
criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the defendant with the infliction of
serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary investigation the defendant was discharged by the
magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon
the merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of his
civil liability arising from negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the action of
the justice of the peace in dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect.
(See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is her
rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other
instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the
plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of
this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be
recoverable. So ordered.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Hospitals, having undertaken one of mankind’s most important and delicate endeavors, must assume the grave
responsibility of pursuing it with appropriate care. The care and service dispensed through this high trust,
however technical, complex and esoteric its character may be, must meet standards of responsibility
commensurate with the undertaking to preserve and protect the health, and indeed, the very lives of those
placed in the hospital’s keeping.1
Assailed in these three consolidated petitions for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals’ Decision2 dated
September 6, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 affirming with modification the
Decision3 dated March 17, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
43322 and nullifying its Order dated September 21, 1993.
The facts, as culled from the records, are:
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City Hospital)
because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr.
Miguel Ampil, petitioner in G.R. No. 127590, diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."

On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff 4 of the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior
resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary,
necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband,
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,
Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform hysterectomy on her.
vs.
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the
incision.
x-----------------------x
However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984,
the attending nurses entered these remarks:
"sponge count lacking 2
"announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure."
On April 24, 1984, Natividad was released from the hospital. Her hospital and medical bills, including the
doctors’ fees, amounted to P60,000.00.
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. Dr.
Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not
removed during the operation.
On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further treatment.
After four months of consultations and laboratory examinations, Natividad was told she was free of cancer.
Hence, she was advised to return to the Philippines.
On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her
daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded
to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then
assured her that the pains would soon vanish.
Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at
the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another
foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her
vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through
the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad
underwent another surgery.
On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for
damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr.
Fuentes, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43322. They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving
two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.
Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative
complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as Administrative
Case No. 1690. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case only with respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to
acquire jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States.
On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad died and was duly substituted by her
above-named children (the Aganas).
On March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice, the decretal part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs ordering the defendants PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES, INC., DR. MIGUEL AMPIL and DR. JUAN FUENTES to pay to the plaintiffs, jointly and severally,
except in respect of the award for exemplary damages and the interest thereon which are the liabilities of
defendants Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes only, as follows:
1. As actual damages, the following amounts:
a. The equivalent in Philippine Currency of the total of US$19,900.00 at the rate of P21.60-
US$1.00, as reimbursement of actual expenses incurred in the United States of America;
b. The sum of P4,800.00 as travel taxes of plaintiffs and their physician daughter;
c. The total sum of P45,802.50, representing the cost of hospitalization at Polymedic
Hospital, medical fees, and cost of the saline solution;
2. As moral damages, the sum of P2,000,000.00;
3. As exemplary damages, the sum of P300,000.00;
4. As attorney’s fees, the sum of P250,000.00;
5. Legal interest on items 1 (a), (b), and (c); 2; and 3 hereinabove, from date of filing of the complaint
until full payment; and
6. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 42062.
Incidentally, on April 3, 1993, the Aganas filed with the RTC a motion for a partial execution of its Decision,
which was granted in an Order dated May 11, 1993. Thereafter, the sheriff levied upon certain properties of Dr.
Ampil and sold them for P451,275.00 and delivered the amount to the Aganas.
Following their receipt of the money, the Aganas entered into an agreement with PSI and Dr. Fuentes to
indefinitely suspend any further execution of the RTC Decision. However, not long thereafter, the Aganas again
filed a motion for an alias writ of execution against the properties of PSI and Dr. Fuentes. On September 21,
1993, the RTC granted the motion and issued the corresponding writ, prompting Dr. Fuentes to file with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 32198. During its pendency, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 5 dated October 29, 1993 attending nurses’ failure to properly count the gauzes used during surgery; and (3) the medical intervention of
granting Dr. Fuentes’ prayer for injunctive relief. the American doctors who examined Natividad in the United States of America.

On January 24, 1994, CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 was consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 42062. For our resolution are these three vital issues: first, whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Dr. Ampil
liable for negligence and malpractice; second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of
any liability; and third, whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.
Meanwhile, on January 23, 1995, the PRC Board of Medicine rendered its Decision 6 in Administrative Case No.
1690 dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes. The Board held that the prosecution failed to show that Dr.
Fuentes was the one who left the two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body; and that he concealed such fact I - G.R. No. 127590
from Natividad.
Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Holding Dr. Ampil
On September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision jointly disposing of CA-G.R. CV No. 42062
and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198, thus:
Liable for Negligence and Malpractice.

WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the case against defendant-appellant Dr. Juan Fuentes is hereby
Dr. Ampil, in an attempt to absolve himself, gears the Court’s attention to other possible causes of Natividad’s
DISMISSED, and with the pronouncement that defendant-appellant Dr. Miguel Ampil is liable to reimburse
detriment. He argues that the Court should not discount either of the following possibilities: first, Dr. Fuentes left
defendant-appellant Professional Services, Inc., whatever amount the latter will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs-
the gauzes in Natividad’s body after performing hysterectomy; second, the attending nurses erred in counting
appellees, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal DISMISSED.
the gauzes; and third, the American doctors were the ones who placed the gauzes in Natividad’s body.

Concomitant with the above, the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by herein defendant-appellant Dr.
Dr. Ampil’s arguments are purely conjectural and without basis. Records show that he did not present any
Juan Fuentes in CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 is hereby GRANTED and the challenged order of the respondent judge
evidence to prove that the American doctors were the ones who put or left the gauzes in Natividad’s body.
dated September 21, 1993, as well as the alias writ of execution issued pursuant thereto are hereby NULLIFIED
Neither did he submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the record of operation, particularly the number of
and SET ASIDE. The bond posted by the petitioner in connection with the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
gauzes used. As to the alleged negligence of Dr. Fuentes, we are mindful that Dr. Ampil examined his (Dr.
this Court on November 29, 1993 is hereby cancelled.
Fuentes’) work and found it in order.

Costs against defendants-appellants Dr. Miguel Ampil and Professional Services, Inc.
The glaring truth is that all the major circumstances, taken together, as specified by the Court of Appeals,
directly point to Dr. Ampil as the negligent party, thus:
SO ORDERED.
First, it is not disputed that the surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the
Only Dr. Ampil filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution7 dated December 19, 1996. patient during the surgical operation.

Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
In G.R. No. 126297, PSI alleged in its petition that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: (1) it is estopped
from raising the defense that Dr. Ampil is not its employee; (2) it is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil; and (3) it is not
entitled to its counterclaim against the Aganas. PSI contends that Dr. Ampil is not its employee, but a mere
consultant or independent contractor. As such, he alone should answer for his negligence.
Second, immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the surgery noted in their report
that the ‘sponge count (was) lacking 2’; that such anomaly was ‘announced to surgeon’ and that a
‘search was done but to no avail’ prompting Dr. Ampil to ‘continue for closure’ x x x.
Third, after the operation, two (2) gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs.
Agana where the surgery was performed.

In G.R. No. 126467, the Aganas maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Dr. Fuentes is not guilty
of negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. They contend that the pieces of
gauze are prima facie proofs that the operating surgeons have been negligent.
Finally, in G.R. No. 127590, Dr. Ampil asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in finding him liable for negligence
and malpractice sans evidence that he left the two pieces of gauze in Natividad’s vagina. He pointed to other
probable causes, such as: (1) it was Dr. Fuentes who used gauzes in performing the hysterectomy; (2) the
An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are properly
removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision
has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. 8 To put it simply, such act is
considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence. There are even legions of
authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.9
Of course, the Court is not blind to the reality that there are times when danger to a patient’s life precludes a
surgeon from further searching missing sponges or foreign objects left in the body. But this does not leave him
free from any obligation. Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was required by the urgent necessities of the
case to leave a sponge in his patient’s abdomen, because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his
legal duty to so inform his patient within a reasonable time thereafter by advising her of what he had been
compelled to do. This is in order that she might seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body
as her condition might permit. The ruling in Smith v. Zeagler10 is explicit, thus:
The removal of all sponges used is part of a surgical operation, and when a physician or surgeon fails to remove
a sponge he has placed in his patient’s body that should be removed as part of the operation, he thereby leaves
his operation uncompleted and creates a new condition which imposes upon him the legal duty of calling the
new condition to his patient’s attention, and endeavoring with the means he has at hand to minimize and avoid
untoward results likely to ensue therefrom.
Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that
the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more candid,
Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her
body. To our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act
of deceiving his patient.
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully pursue
this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent
provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. 11 Simply put, the elements
are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all
foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it
was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to
Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s
negligence is the proximate cause12 of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision
despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were
later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the
injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the
knowledge of Natividad and her family.
II - G.R. No. 126467
Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving
Dr. Fuentes of any Liability
The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case against Dr. Fuentes on the ground that it is
contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. According to them, the fact that the two pieces of gauze were left
inside Natividad’s body is a prima facie evidence of Dr. Fuentes’ negligence.
We are not convinced.
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence,
or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation.13 Stated differently, where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, is under
the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not have occurred if he, having such
control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the injury arose from
the defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due
care and diligence.14
From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and
management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the
defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the "control and management of the thing which
caused the injury."15
We find the element of "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to be wanting. Hence, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.
It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the
assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy in her
sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and
showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes
to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the
procedure when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search"
was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.
During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital.
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery
room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. 16 As stated before, Dr.
Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the "Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such role is
evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of
Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes’ permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of
the incision. To our mind, it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of
gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad’s body. Clearly, the control and management
of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute
an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule. 17 In other words, mere invocation
and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the
negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.
III - G.R. No. 126297
Whether PSI Is Liable for the Negligence of Dr. Ampil
The third issue necessitates a glimpse at the historical development of hospitals and the resulting theories
concerning their liability for the negligence of physicians.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, hospitals were generally charitable institutions, providing medical services to
the lowest classes of society, without regard for a patient’s ability to pay. 18 Those who could afford medical
treatment were usually treated at home by their doctors. 19 However, the days of house calls and philanthropic
health care are over. The modern health care industry continues to distance itself from its charitable past and
has experienced a significant conversion from a not-for-profit health care to for-profit hospital businesses.
Consequently, significant changes in health law have accompanied the business-related changes in the hospital
industry. One important legal change is an increase in hospital liability for medical malpractice. Many courts now
allow claims for hospital vicarious liability under the theories of respondeat superior, apparent authority,
ostensible authority, or agency by estoppel. 20
In this jurisdiction, the statute governing liability for negligent acts is Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
A derivative of this provision is Article 2180, the rule governing vicarious liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, thus:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x x x x
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x x x required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications, generally, evidence of
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
A prominent civilist commented that professionals engaged by an employer, such as physicians, dentists, and
pharmacists, are not "employees" under this article because the manner in which they perform their work is not
within the control of the latter (employer). In other words, professionals are considered personally liable for the
fault or negligence they commit in the discharge of their duties, and their employer cannot be held liable for such
fault or negligence. In the context of the present case, "a hospital cannot be held liable for the fault or
negligence of a physician or surgeon in the treatment or operation of patients."21
The foregoing view is grounded on the traditional notion that the professional status and the very nature of the
physician’s calling preclude him from being classed as an agent or employee of a hospital, whenever he acts in
a professional capacity.22 It has been said that medical practice strictly involves highly developed and
specialized knowledge,23 such that physicians are generally free to exercise their own skill and judgment in
rendering medical services sans interference.24 Hence, when a doctor practices medicine in a hospital setting,
the hospital and its employees are deemed to subserve him in his ministrations to the patient and his actions are
of his own responsibility.25
The case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital 26 was then considered an authority for this view. The
"Schloendorff doctrine" regards a physician, even if employed by a hospital, as an independent contractor
because of the skill he exercises and the lack of control exerted over his work. Under this doctrine, hospitals are
exempt from the application of the respondeat superior principle for fault or negligence committed by physicians
in the discharge of their profession.
However, the efficacy of the foregoing doctrine has weakened with the significant developments in medical care.
Courts came to realize that modern hospitals are increasingly taking active role in supplying and regulating
medical care to patients. No longer were a hospital’s functions limited to furnishing room, food, facilities for
treatment and operation, and attendants for its patients. Thus, in Bing v. Thunig,27 the New York Court of
Appeals deviated from the Schloendorff doctrine, noting that modern hospitals actually do far more than provide
facilities for treatment. Rather, they regularly employ, on a salaried basis, a large staff of physicians, interns,
nurses, administrative and manual workers. They charge patients for medical care and treatment, even
collecting for such services through legal action, if necessary. The court then concluded that there is no reason
to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior.
In our shores, the nature of the relationship between the hospital and the physicians is rendered inconsequential
in view of our categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals 28 that for purposes of apportioning
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals
and their attending and visiting physicians. This Court held:
"We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. The unique practice (among private
hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting "consultants," who are allegedly not hospital
employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases.
However, the difficulty is more apparent than real.
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of
their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for ‘consultant’ slots, visiting or attending, are
accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These
requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set
up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. x x x.
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is normally required to attend
clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand
rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to maintain
a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to these, the
physician’s performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of
mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A consultant remiss
in his duties, or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its
peer review committee, is normally politely terminated.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting ‘consultant’
staff. While ‘consultants’ are not, technically employees, x x x, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to
terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception
of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining.
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians. "
But the Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining PSI’s liability. Its liability is also anchored upon
the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which
have gained acceptance in the determination of a hospital’s liability for negligent acts of health professionals.
The present case serves as a perfect platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our
jurisprudence.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding
out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel,29 has its origin from the law of agency. It
imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of
a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority
exists.30 The concept is essentially one of estoppel and has been explained in this manner:
"The principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the agent
to assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing. The question in every case is whether
the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in presuming that such
agent has authority to perform the particular act in question.31
The applicability of apparent authority in the field of hospital liability was upheld long time ago in Irving v. Doctor
Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc.32 There, it was explicitly stated that "there does not appear to be any rational basis
for excluding the concept of apparent authority from the field of hospital liability." Thus, in cases where it can be
shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a
patient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of
the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician’s negligence.
Our jurisdiction recognizes the concept of an agency by implication or estoppel. Article 1869 of the Civil Code
reads:
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action,
or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the
physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the
Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it "is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names
it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and
competence." Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out to the public that Medical City Hospital, through its
accredited physicians, offers quality health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its agents, authorized to
perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them,
accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such were being rendered by the hospital or its employees,
agents, or servants. The trial court correctly pointed out:
x x x regardless of the education and status in life of the patient, he ought not be burdened with the defense of
absence of employer-employee relationship between the hospital and the independent physician whose name
and competence are certainly certified to the general public by the hospital’s act of listing him and his specialty
in its lobby directory, as in the case herein. The high costs of today’s medical and health care should at least
exact on the hospital greater, if not broader, legal responsibility for the conduct of treatment and surgery within
its facility by its accredited physician or surgeon, regardless of whether he is independent or employed."33
The wisdom of the foregoing ratiocination is easy to discern. Corporate entities, like PSI, are capable of acting
only through other individuals, such as physicians. If these accredited physicians do their job well, the hospital
succeeds in its mission of offering quality medical services and thus profits financially. Logically, where
negligence mars the quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for the acts of its
ostensible agents.
We now proceed to the doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility.
One allegation in the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-43332 for negligence and malpractice is that PSI as owner,
operator and manager of Medical City Hospital, "did not perform the necessary supervision nor exercise diligent
efforts in the supervision of Drs. Ampil and Fuentes and its nursing staff, resident doctors, and medical interns
who assisted Drs. Ampil and Fuentes in the performance of their duties as surgeons."34 Premised on the
doctrine of corporate negligence, the trial court held that PSI is directly liable for such breach of duty.
We agree with the trial court.
Recent years have seen the doctrine of corporate negligence as the judicial answer to the problem of allocating
hospital’s liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the application of
respondeat superior or apparent authority. Its formulation proceeds from the judiciary’s acknowledgment that in
these modern times, the duty of providing quality medical service is no longer the sole prerogative and
responsibility of the physician. The modern hospitals have changed structure. Hospitals now tend to organize a
highly professional medical staff whose competence and performance need to be monitored by the hospitals
commensurate with their inherent responsibility to provide quality medical care.35
The doctrine has its genesis in Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital. 36 There, the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that "the jury could have found a hospital negligent, inter alia, in failing to have a sufficient number of
trained nurses attending the patient; failing to require a consultation with or examination by members of the
hospital staff; and failing to review the treatment rendered to the patient." On the basis of Darling, other
jurisdictions held that a hospital’s corporate negligence extends to permitting a physician known to be
incompetent to practice at the hospital.37 With the passage of time, more duties were expected from hospitals,
among them: (1) the use of reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment;
(2) the selection and retention of competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or supervision of all persons who
practice medicine within its walls; and (4) the formulation, adoption and enforcement of adequate rules and
policies that ensure quality care for its patients. 38 Thus, in Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevich, 39 it was held
that a hospital, following the doctrine of corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets the standards
of responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the proper supervision of the members of its
medical staff. And in Bost v. Riley,40 the court concluded that a patient who enters a hospital does so with the
reasonable expectation that it will attempt to cure him. The hospital accordingly has the duty to make a
reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by the physicians practicing
in its premises.
Subsequent to the Purcell decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a hospital has certain inherent
responsibilities regarding the quality of medical care furnished to patients within its walls and it must meet the
standards of responsibility commensurate with this undertaking. Beeck v. Tucson General Hospital, 18 Ariz.
App. 165, 500 P. 2d 1153 (1972). This court has confirmed the rulings of the Court of Appeals that a hospital
has the duty of supervising the competence of the doctors on its staff. x x x.
x x x x x x

In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs did plead that the operation was performed at the hospital with its
In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and
knowledge, aid, and assistance, and that the negligence of the defendants was the proximate cause of the
under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to
patient’s injuries. We find that such general allegations of negligence, along with the evidence produced at the
exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment.
trial of this case, are sufficient to support the hospital’s liability based on the theory of negligent supervision."
Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such duty. The findings of the trial court are convincing, thus:

Anent the corollary issue of whether PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil for damages, let it be emphasized that
x x x PSI’s liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the nota bene of
PSI, apart from a general denial of its responsibility, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
the count nurse. Such failure established PSI’s part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the
diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision of the latter. In neglecting to offer such
gauzes. Ethical considerations, if not also legal, dictated the holding of an immediate inquiry into the events, if
proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180 cited earlier, and, therefore,
not for the benefit of the patient to whom the duty is primarily owed, then in the interest of arriving at the truth.
must be adjudged solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil. Moreover, as we have discussed, PSI is also directly liable to
The Court cannot accept that the medical and the healing professions, through their members like defendant
the Aganas.
surgeons, and their institutions like PSI’s hospital facility, can callously turn their backs on and disregard even a
mere probability of mistake or negligence by refusing or failing to investigate a report of such seriousness as the
one in Natividad’s case. One final word. Once a physician undertakes the treatment and care of a patient, the law imposes on him
certain obligations. In order to escape liability, he must possess that reasonable degree of learning, skill and
experience required by his profession. At the same time, he must apply reasonable care and diligence in the
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City
exercise of his skill and the application of his knowledge, and exert his best judgment.
Hospital’s staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that
PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out,
particularly the report of the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. In Fridena v. Evans, 41 it WHEREFORE, we DENY all the petitions and AFFIRM the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
was held that a corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired by or notice given to its agents or officers within G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198.
the scope of their authority and in reference to a matter to which their authority extends. This means that the
knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the failure of PSI,
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
despite the attending nurses’ report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts
vs.
to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice
CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE LEONARDO T. YABUT, respondents.
medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed. This renders
PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also
directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176. In Fridena, the Supreme Court of Arizona held: x ----------------------------- x

x x x In recent years, however, the duty of care owed to the patient by the hospital has expanded. The emerging G.R. No. 149507             May 28, 2004
trend is to hold the hospital responsible where the hospital has failed to monitor and review medical services
being provided within its walls. See Kahn Hospital Malpractice Prevention, 27 De Paul . Rev. 23 (1977).
CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE, petitioner,
vs.
Among the cases indicative of the ‘emerging trend’ is Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75,500 P. 2d 335 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondent.
(1972). In Purcell, the hospital argued that it could not be held liable for the malpractice of a medical practitioner
because he was an independent contractor within the hospital. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the
hospital had created a professional staff whose competence and performance was to be monitored and DECISION
reviewed by the governing body of the hospital, and the court held that a hospital would be negligent where it
had knowledge or reason to believe that a doctor using the facilities was employing a method of treatment or PANGANIBAN, J.:
care which fell below the recognized standard of care.
By the nature of its functions, a bank is required to take meticulous care of the deposits of its clients, who have 1990
the right to expect high standards of integrity and performance from it.
6. 729149 Mar. 22, 1990 148,000.00
Among its obligations in furtherance thereof is knowing the signatures of its clients. Depositors are not estopped
7. 729129 Mar. 16, 1990 51,015.00
from questioning wrongful withdrawals, even if they have failed to question those errors in the statements sent
by the bank to them for verification. 8. 839684 Dec. 1, 1990 140,000.00

The Case 9. 729034 Mar. 2, 1990 98,985.00

Before us are two Petitions for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 23, 2001
Decision2 and the August 17, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 63561. The
decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification
that defendant bank [Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)] is held liable only for one-half of the value of
the forged checks in the amount of ₱547,115.00 after deductions subject to REIMBURSEMENT from
third party defendant Yabut who is likewise ORDERED to pay the other half to plaintiff corporation
[Casa Montessori Internationale (CASA)]."4
The assailed Resolution denied all the parties’ Motions for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:
"On November 8, 1982, plaintiff CASA Montessori International5 opened Current Account No. 0291-
0081-01 with defendant BPI[,] with CASA’s President Ms. Ma. Carina C. Lebron as one of its
authorized signatories.
"In 1991, after conducting an investigation, plaintiff discovered that nine (9) of its checks had been
encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos since 1990 in the total amount of ₱782,000.00, on the
following dates and amounts:
Total -- ₱ 782,600.006
"It turned out that ‘Sonny D. Santos’ with account at BPI’s Greenbelt Branch [was] a fictitious name
used by third party defendant Leonardo T. Yabut who worked as external auditor of CASA. Third party
defendant voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature of Ms. Lebron and encashed the checks.
"The PNP Crime Laboratory conducted an examination of the nine (9) checks and concluded that the
handwritings thereon compared to the standard signature of Ms. Lebron were not written by the latter.
"On March 4, 1991, plaintiff filed the herein Complaint for Collection with Damages against defendant
bank praying that the latter be ordered to reinstate the amount of ₱782,500.00 7 in the current and
savings accounts of the plaintiff with interest at 6% per annum.
"On February 16, 1999, the RTC rendered the appealed decision in favor of the plaintiff."8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Modifying the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA apportioned the loss between BPI and CASA.
The appellate court took into account CASA’s contributory negligence that resulted in the undetected forgery. It
then ordered Leonardo T. Yabut to reimburse BPI half the total amount claimed; and CASA, the other half. It
also disallowed attorney’s fees and moral and exemplary damages.
Hence, these Petitions.9

Issues
‘Check
Date Amount
No.
In GR No. 149454, Petitioner BPI submits the following issues for our consideration:
1. 839700 April 24, 1990 ₱ 43,400.00

2. 839459 Nov. 2, 1990 110,500.00 "I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding this case NOT in accord with the applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court to the effect that forgery cannot be presumed; that it must be
3. 839609 Oct. 17, 1990 47,723.00 proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence; and that the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging the forgery.
4. 839549 April 7, 1990 90,700.00

5. 839569 Sept. 23, 52,277.00 "II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding this case not in accord with applicable laws,
in particular the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) which precludes CASA, on account of its own
 negligence, from asserting its forgery claim against BPI, specially taking into account the absence of
any negligence on the part of BPI."10
In GR No. 149507, Petitioner CASA submits the following issues:
"1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that ‘there is no showing that [BPI], although
negligent, acted in bad faith x x x’ thus denying the prayer for the award of attorney’s fees, moral
damages and exemplary damages to [CASA]. The Honorable Court also erred when it did not order
[BPI] to pay interest on the amounts due to [CASA].
"2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it declared that [CASA] was likewise negligent in the
case at bar, thus warranting its conclusion that the loss in the amount of ₱547,115.00 be ‘apportioned
between [CASA] and [BPI] x x x.’"11
These issues can be narrowed down to three. First, was there forgery under the Negotiable Instruments Law
(NIL)? Second, were any of the parties negligent and therefore precluded from setting up forgery as a
defense? Third, should moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and interest be awarded?
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition in GR No. 149454 has no merit, while that in GR No. 149507 is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Forged Signature Wholly Inoperative
Section 23 of the NIL provides:
"Section 23. Forged signature; effect of. -- When a signature is forged or made without the authority of
the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right x x x to enforce
payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless
the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or
want of authority."12
Under this provision, a forged signature is a real 13 or absolute defense,14 and a person whose signature on a
negotiable instrument is forged is deemed to have never become a party thereto and to have never consented
to the contract that allegedly gave rise to it.15
The counterfeiting of any writing, consisting in the signing of another’s name with intent to defraud, is forgery.16
In the present case, we hold that there was forgery of the drawer’s signature on the check.
First, both the CA17 and the RTC18 found that Respondent Yabut himself had voluntarily admitted, through an
Affidavit, that he had forged the drawer’s signature and encashed the checks.19 He never refuted these
findings.20 That he had been coerced into admission was not corroborated by any evidence on record.21
Second, the appellate and the trial courts also ruled that the PNP Crime Laboratory, after its examination of the
said checks,22 had concluded that the handwritings thereon -- compared to the standard signature of the drawer
-- were not hers.23 This conclusion was the same as that in the Report24 that the PNP Crime Laboratory had
earlier issued to BPI -- the drawee bank -- upon the latter’s request.
Indeed, we respect and affirm the RTC’s factual findings, especially when affirmed by the CA, since these are
supported by substantial evidence on record.25
Voluntary Admission Not Violative of Constitutional Rights
The voluntary admission of Yabut did not violate his constitutional rights (1) on custodial investigation, and (2)
against self-incrimination.
In the first place, he was not under custodial investigation.26 His Affidavit was executed in private and before
private individuals.27 The mantle of protection under Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution 28 covers
only the period "from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not
yet in custody."29
Therefore, to fall within the ambit of Section 12, quoted above, there must be an arrest or a deprivation of
freedom, with "questions propounded on him by the police authorities for the purpose of eliciting admissions,
confessions, or any information."30 The said constitutional provision does "not apply to spontaneous statements
made in a voluntary manner" 31 whereby an individual orally admits to authorship of a crime. 32 "What the
Constitution proscribes is the compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts."33
Moreover, the right against self-incrimination34 under Section 17 of Article III35 of the Constitution, which is
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to all other government proceedings -- including civil
actions, legislative investigations,36 and administrative proceedings that possess a criminal or penal aspect 37 --
but not to private investigations done by private individuals. Even in such government proceedings, this right
may be waived,38 provided the waiver is certain; unequivocal; and intelligently, understandingly and willingly
made.39
If in these government proceedings waiver is allowed, all the more is it so in private investigations. It is of no
moment that no criminal case has yet been filed against Yabut. The filing thereof is entirely up to the appropriate
authorities or to the private individuals upon whom damage has been caused. As we shall also explain later, it is
not mandatory for CASA -- the plaintiff below -- to implead Yabut in the civil case before the lower court.
Under these two constitutional provisions, "[t]he Bill of Rights40 does not concern itself with the relation between
a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the
State."41 Moreover, the Bill of Rights "is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of
the [S]tate."42 These rights43 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest coercion by the State that may lead the
accused "to admit something false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth."44
Yabut is not an accused here. Besides, his mere invocation of the aforesaid rights "does not automatically entitle
him to the constitutional protection."45 When he freely and voluntarily executed46 his Affidavit, the State was not
even involved. Such Affidavit may therefore be admitted without violating his constitutional rights while under
custodial investigation and against self-incrimination.
Clear, Positive and Convincing Examination and Evidence
The examination by the PNP, though inconclusive, was nevertheless clear, positive and convincing.
independent examinations of the evidence presented and arrived at reasonable and similar conclusions. Not
only did they admit secondary evidence; they also appositely considered testimonial and other documentary
evidence in the form of the Affidavit.
The best evidence rule admits of exceptions and, as we have discussed earlier, the first of these has been
met.70 The result of examining a questioned handwriting, even with the aid of experts and scientific instruments,
may be inconclusive;71 but it is a non sequitur to say that such result is not clear, positive and convincing. The
preponderance of evidence required in this case has been satisfied.72

Second Issue:
Forgery "cannot be presumed."47 It must be established by clear, positive and convincing evidence. 48 Under the
best evidence rule as applied to documentary evidence like the checks in question, no secondary or
substitutionary evidence may inceptively be introduced, as the original writing itself must be produced in Negligence Attributable to BPI Alone
court.49 But when, without bad faith on the part of the offeror, the original checks have already been destroyed or
cannot be produced in court, secondary evidence may be produced.50 Without bad faith on its part, CASA
Having established the forgery of the drawer’s signature, BPI -- the drawee -- erred in making payments by
proved the loss or destruction of the original checks through the Affidavit of the one person who knew of that
virtue thereof. The forged signatures are wholly inoperative, and CASA -- the drawer whose authorized
fact51 -- Yabut. He clearly admitted to discarding the paid checks to cover up his misdeed.52 In such a situation,
signatures do not appear on the negotiable instruments -- cannot be held liable thereon. Neither is the latter
secondary evidence like microfilm copies may be introduced in court.
precluded from setting up forgery as a real defense.

The drawer’s signatures on the microfilm copies were compared with the standard signature. PNP Document
Examiner II Josefina de la Cruz testified on cross-examination that two different persons had written
them.53 Although no conclusive report could be issued in the absence of the original checks, 54 she affirmed that
her findings were 90 percent conclusive.55 According to her, even if the microfilm copies were the only basis of
comparison, the differences were evident.56 Besides, the RTC explained that although the Report was
inconclusive, no conclusive report could have been given by the PNP, anyway, in the absence of the original
checks.57 This explanation is valid; otherwise, no such report can ever be relied upon in court.
Even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the contents of a
document -- such as the drawer’s signature on a check -- is the subject of inquiry.58 As to whether the document
has been actually executed, this rule does not apply; and testimonial as well as any other secondary evidence is
admissible.59 Carina Lebron herself, the drawer’s authorized signatory, testified many times that she had never
signed those checks. Her testimonial evidence is admissible; the checks have not been actually executed. The
genuineness of her handwriting is proved, not only through the court’s comparison of the questioned
handwritings and admittedly genuine specimens thereof,60 but above all by her.
The failure of CASA to produce the original checks neither gives rise to the presumption of suppression of
evidence61 nor creates an unfavorable inference against it.62 Such failure merely authorizes the introduction of
secondary evidence63 in the form of microfilm copies. Of no consequence is the fact that CASA did not present
the signature card containing the signatures with which those on the checks were compared. 64 Specimens of
standard signatures are not limited to such a card. Considering that it was not produced in evidence, other
documents that bear the drawer’s authentic signature may be resorted to. 65 Besides, that card was in the
possession of BPI -- the adverse party.
Clear Negligence in Allowing Payment Under a Forged Signature
We have repeatedly emphasized that, since the banking business is impressed with public interest, of
paramount importance thereto is the trust and confidence of the public in general. Consequently, the highest
degree of diligence73 is expected,74 and high standards of integrity and performance are even required, of it.75 By
the nature of its functions, a bank is "under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous
care,76 always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship."77
BPI contends that it has a signature verification procedure, in which checks are honored only when the
signatures therein are verified to be the same with or similar to the specimen signatures on the signature cards.
Nonetheless, it still failed to detect the eight instances of forgery. Its negligence consisted in the omission of that
degree of diligence required 78 of a bank. It cannot now feign ignorance, for very early on we have already ruled
that a bank is "bound to know the signatures of its customers; and if it pays a forged check, it must be
considered as making the payment out of its own funds, and cannot ordinarily charge the amount so paid to the
account of the depositor whose name was forged." 79 In fact, BPI was the same bank involved when we issued
this ruling seventy years ago.
Neither Waiver nor Estoppel Results from Failure to Report Error in Bank Statement
The monthly statements issued by BPI to its clients contain a notice worded as follows: "If no error is reported in
ten (10) days, account will be correct." 80 Such notice cannot be considered a waiver, even if CASA failed to
report the error. Neither is it estopped from questioning the mistake after the lapse of the ten-day period.

We have held that without the original document containing the allegedly forged signature, one cannot make a
This notice is a simple confirmation81 or "circularization" -- in accounting parlance -- that requests client-
definitive comparison that would establish forgery;66 and that a comparison based on a mere reproduction of the
depositors to affirm the accuracy of items recorded by the banks. 82 Its purpose is to obtain from the depositors a
document under controversy cannot produce reliable results.67 We have also said, however, that a judge cannot
direct corroboration of the correctness of their account balances with their respective banks. 83 Internal or
merely rely on a handwriting expert’s testimony, 68 but should also exercise independent judgment in evaluating
external auditors of a bank use it as a basic audit procedure 84 -- the results of which its client-depositors are
the authenticity of a signature under scrutiny.69 In the present case, both the RTC and the CA conducted
neither interested in nor privy to -- to test the details of transactions and balances in the bank’s
records.85 Evidential matter obtained from independent sources outside a bank only serves to provide greater
assurance of reliability86 than that obtained solely within it for purposes of an audit of its own financial
statements, not those of its client-depositors.
Furthermore, there is always the audit risk that errors would not be detected 87 for various
reasons. One, materiality is a consideration in audit planning; 88 and two, the information obtained from such a
substantive test is merely presumptive and cannot be the basis of a valid waiver. 89 BPI has no right to impose a
condition unilaterally and thereafter consider failure to meet such condition a waiver. Neither may CASA
renounce a right90 it has never possessed.91
Every right has subjects -- active and passive. While the active subject is entitled to demand its enforcement, the
passive one is duty-bound to suffer such enforcement.92
On the one hand, BPI could not have been an active subject, because it could not have demanded from CASA a
response to its notice. Besides, the notice was a measly request worded as follows: "Please examine x x x and
report x x x."93 CASA, on the other hand, could not have been a passive subject, either, because it had no
obligation to respond. It could -- as it did -- choose not to respond.
Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or asserting, by their own deed or representation, anything contrary
to that established as the truth, in legal contemplation. 94 Our rules on evidence even make a juris et de
jure presumption95 that whenever one has, by one’s own act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing to be true and to act upon that belief, one cannot -- in any litigation arising
from such act or omission -- be permitted to falsify that supposed truth.96
In the instant case, CASA never made any deed or representation that misled BPI. The former’s omission, if
any, may only be deemed an innocent mistake oblivious to the procedures and consequences of periodic audits.
Since its conduct was due to such ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake, estoppel will not arise. 97 A
person who has no knowledge of or consent to a transaction may not be estopped by it. 98 "Estoppel cannot be
sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference x x x." 99 CASA is not barred from questioning BPI’s error even
after the lapse of the period given in the notice.
Loss Borne by Proximate Source of Negligence
For allowing payment100 on the checks to a wrongful and fictitious payee, BPI -- the drawee bank -- becomes
liable to its depositor-drawer. Since the encashing bank is one of its branches, 101 BPI can easily go after it and
hold it liable for reimbursement.102 It "may not debit the drawer’s account103 and is not entitled to indemnification
from the drawer."104 In both law and equity, when one of two innocent persons "must suffer by the wrongful act of
a third person, the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the proximate cause of the loss or who
put it into the power of the third person to perpetrate the wrong."105
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of the case. 106 "It is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred."107
Pursuant to its prime duty to ascertain well the genuineness of the signatures of its client-depositors on checks
being encashed, BPI is "expected to use reasonable business prudence."108 In the performance of that
obligation, it is bound by its internal banking rules and regulations that form part of the contract it enters into with
its depositors.109
Unfortunately, it failed in that regard. First, Yabut was able to open a bank account in one of its branches without
privity;110 that is, without the proper verification of his corresponding identification papers. Second, BPI was
unable to discover early on not only this irregularity, but also the marked differences in the signatures on the
checks and those on the signature card. Third, despite the examination procedures it conducted, the Central
Verification Unit111 of the bank even passed off these evidently different signatures as genuine. Without
exercising the required prudence on its part, BPI accepted and encashed the eight checks presented to it. As a
result, it proximately contributed to the fraud and should be held primarily liable 112 for the "negligence of its
officers or agents when acting within the course and scope of their employment."113 It must bear the loss.
CASA Not Negligent in Its Financial Affairs
In this jurisdiction, the negligence of the party invoking forgery is recognized as an exception 114 to the general
rule that a forged signature is wholly inoperative. 115 Contrary to BPI’s claim, however, we do not find CASA
negligent in handling its financial affairs. CASA, we stress, is not precluded from setting up forgery as a real
defense.
Role of Independent Auditor
The major purpose of an independent audit is to investigate and determine objectively if the financial statements
submitted for audit by a corporation have been prepared in accordance with the appropriate financial reporting
practices116 of private entities. The relationship that arises therefrom is both legal and moral. 117 It begins with the
execution of the engagement letter 118 that embodies the terms and conditions of the audit and ends with the
fulfilled expectation of the auditor’s ethical119 and competent performance in all aspects of the audit.120
The financial statements are representations of the client; but it is the auditor who has the responsibility for the
accuracy in the recording of data that underlies their preparation, their form of presentation, and the
opinion121 expressed therein.122 The auditor does not assume the role of employee or of management in the
client’s conduct of operations123 and is never under the control or supervision124 of the client.
Yabut was an independent auditor125 hired by CASA. He handled its monthly bank reconciliations and had
access to all relevant documents and checkbooks. 126 In him was reposed the client’s127 trust and
confidence128 that he would perform precisely those functions and apply the appropriate procedures in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.129 Yet he did not meet these expectations. Nothing
could be more horrible to a client than to discover later on that the person tasked to detect fraud was the same
one who perpetrated it.
Cash Balances Open to Manipulation
It is a non sequitur to say that the person who receives the monthly bank statements, together with the cancelled
checks and other debit/credit memoranda, shall examine the contents and give notice of any discrepancies
within a reasonable time. Awareness is not equipollent with discernment.
Besides, in the internal accounting control system prudently installed by CASA, 130 it was Yabut who should
examine those documents in order to prepare the bank reconciliations.131 He owned his working papers,132 and
his output consisted of his opinion as well as the client’s financial statements and accompanying notes thereto.
CASA had every right to rely solely upon his output -- based on the terms of the audit engagement -- and could
thus be unwittingly duped into believing that everything was in order. Besides, "[g]ood faith is always presumed
and it is the burden of the party claiming otherwise to adduce clear and convincing evidence to the contrary."133
Moreover, there was a time gap between the period covered by the bank statement and the date of its actual
receipt. Lebron personally received the December 1990 bank statement only in January 1991 134 -- when she
was also informed of the forgery for the first time, after which she immediately requested a "stop payment
order." She cannot be faulted for the late detection of the forged December check. After all, the bank account
with BPI was not personal but corporate, and she could not be expected to monitor closely all its finances. A
preschool teacher charged with molding the minds of the youth cannot be burdened with the intricacies or
complexities of corporate existence.
There is also a cutoff period such that checks issued during a given month, but not presented for payment within
that period, will not be reflected therein.135 An experienced auditor with intent to defraud can easily conceal any
devious scheme from a client unwary of the accounting processes involved by manipulating the cash balances
on record -- especially when bank transactions are numerous, large and frequent. CASA could only be blamed,
if at all, for its unintelligent choice in the selection and appointment of an auditor -- a fault that is not tantamount
to negligence.
Negligence is not presumed, but proven by whoever alleges it.136 Its mere existence "is not sufficient without
proof that it, and no other cause," 137 has given rise to damages. 138 In addition, this fault is common to, if not
prevalent among, small and medium-sized business entities, thus leading the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC), through the Board of Accountancy (BOA), to require today not only accreditation for the
practice of public accountancy, 139 but also the registration of firms in the practice thereof. In fact, among the
attachments now required upon registration are the code of good governance 140 and a sworn statement on
adequate and effective training.141
142 143
The missing checks were certainly reported by the bookkeeper  to the accountant  -- her immediate
supervisor -- and by the latter to the auditor. However, both the accountant and the auditor, for reasons known
only to them, assured the bookkeeper that there were no irregularities.
144 145
The bookkeeper  who had exclusive custody of the checkbooks  did not have to go directly to CASA’s
president or to BPI. Although she rightfully reported the matter, neither an investigation was conducted nor a
resolution of it was arrived at, precisely because the person at the top of the helm was the culprit. The vouchers,
invoices and check stubs in support of all check disbursements could be concealed or fabricated -- even in
collusion -- and management would still have no way to verify its cash accountabilities.
Clearly then, Yabut was able to perpetrate the wrongful act through no fault of CASA. If auditors may be held
liable for breach of contract and negligence,146 with all the more reason may they be charged with the
perpetration of fraud upon an unsuspecting client. CASA had the discretion to pursue BPI alone under the NIL,
by reason of expediency or munificence or both. Money paid under a mistake may rightfully be recovered,147 and
under such terms as the injured party may choose.
Third Issue:
Award of Monetary Claims
Moral Damages Denied
We deny CASA’s claim for moral damages.
In the absence of a wrongful act or omission,148 or of fraud or bad faith,149 moral damages cannot be
awarded.150 The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful, or the party liable for it.
One may err, but error alone is not a ground for granting such damages. 151 While no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary therefor -- with the amount to be awarded left to the court’s discretion 152 -- the claimant must
nonetheless satisfactorily prove the existence of its factual basis 153 and causal relation154 to the claimant’s act or
omission.155
Regrettably, in this case CASA was unable to identify the particular instance -- enumerated in the Civil Code --
upon which its claim for moral damages is predicated. 156 Neither bad faith nor negligence so gross that it
amounts to malice157 can be imputed to BPI. Bad faith, under the law, "does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence;158 it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach
of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud."159
As a general rule, a corporation -- being an artificial person without feelings, emotions and senses, and having
existence only in legal contemplation -- is not entitled to moral damages,160 because it cannot experience
physical suffering and mental anguish.161 However, for breach of the fiduciary duty required of a bank, a
corporate client may claim such damages when its good reputation is besmirched by such breach, and social
humiliation results therefrom.162 CASA was unable to prove that BPI had debased the good reputation of, 163 and
consequently caused incalculable embarrassment to, the former. CASA’s mere allegation or supposition thereof,
without any sufficient evidence on record,164 is not enough.
Exemplary Damages Also Denied
We also deny CASA’s claim for exemplary damages.
Imposed by way of correction 165 for the public good,166 exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of
right.167 As we have said earlier, there is no bad faith on the part of BPI for paying the checks of CASA upon
forged signatures. Therefore, the former cannot be said to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner.168 The latter, having no right to moral damages, cannot demand exemplary
damages.169
Attorney’s Fees Granted
Although it is a sound policy not to set a premium on the right to litigate, 170 we find that CASA is entitled to
reasonable attorney’s fees based on "factual, legal, and equitable justification."171
When the act or omission of the defendant has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect the latter’s
interest,172 or where the court deems it just and equitable,173 attorney’s fees may be recovered. In the present
case, BPI persistently denied the claim of CASA under the NIL to recredit the latter’s account for the value of the
forged checks. This denial constrained CASA to incur expenses and exert effort for more than ten years in order
to protect its corporate interest in its bank account. Besides, we have already cautioned BPI on a similar act of
negligence it had committed seventy years ago, but it has remained unrelenting. Therefore, the Court deems it
just and equitable to grant ten percent (10%)174 of the total value adjudged to CASA as attorney’s fees. DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Interest Allowed
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek the
reversal of the 17 June 1996 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 and the
For the failure of BPI to pay CASA upon demand and for compelling the latter to resort to the courts to obtain resolution 2 denying their motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision set aside the 15
payment, legal interest may be adjudicated at the discretion of the Court, the same to run from the filing 175 of the January 1992 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 60 in Civil Case No.
Complaint.176 Since a court judgment is not a loan or a forbearance of recovery, the legal interest shall be at six 7119 and ordered petitioners to pay damages and attorney’s fees to private respondents Conrado
percent (6%) per annum.177 "If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in and Criselda (CRISELDA) Aguilar.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of x x x legal
interest, which is six percent per annum."178 The actual base for its computation shall be "on the amount finally
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel’s Department Store, Makati City.
adjudged,"179 compounded180 annually to make up for the cost of money181 already lost to CASA.
Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store’s branch manager,
operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the
Moreover, the failure of the CA to award interest does not prevent us from granting it upon damages awarded parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
for breach of contract.182 Because BPI evidently breached its contract of deposit with CASA, we award interest in
addition to the total amount adjudged. Under Section 196 of the NIL, any case not provided for shall be In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvel’s
"governed by the provisions of existing legislation or, in default thereof, by the rules of the law Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and
merchant."183 Damages are not provided for in the NIL. Thus, we resort to the Code of Commerce and the Civil verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked
Code. Under Article 2 of the Code of Commerce, acts of commerce shall be governed by its provisions and, "in
behind her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the
their absence, by the usages of commerce generally observed in each place; and in the absence of both rules,
bulk of the store’s gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help.
by those of the civil law."184 This law being silent, we look at Article 18 of the Civil Code, which states: "In matters
which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied" by its Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the
provisions. A perusal of these three statutes unmistakably shows that the award of interest under our civil law is counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor. 3
justified.
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. The next
day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 149454 is hereby DENIED, and that in GR No. 149507 PARTLY magic slate. The injuries she sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14)
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification: BPI is held liable for
days after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old. 4
₱547,115, the total value of the forged checks less the amount already recovered by CASA from Leonardo T.
Yabut, plus interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum -- compounded annually, from the filing of
the complaint until paid in full; and attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) thereof, subject to reimbursement from The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. The provisional medical
Respondent Yabut for the entire amount, excepting attorney’s fees. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the certificate 5 issued by ZHIENETH’s attending doctor described the extent of her
Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulation Commission for such action as it may deem appropriate injuries:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
against Respondent Yabut. No costs.
Diagnoses:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SO ORDERED. 1. Shock, severe, sec. to intra-abdominal injuries due to blunt injury

2. Hemorrhage, massive, intraperitoneal sec. to laceration, (L) lobe liver

JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA 3. Rupture, stomach, anterior & posterior walls
PANELO, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and
CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, Respondents. 4. Complete transection, 4th position, duodenum

DECISION 5. Hematoma, extensive, retroperitoneal

6. Contusion, lungs, severe


CRITICAL
After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon petitioners the
reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses 6 which they
had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 7119 wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for
actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney’s fees and an unspecified
amount for loss of income and exemplary damages.
In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any liability for the injuries and consequent
death of ZHIENETH. They claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence
over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and
appliances. ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter,
triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of
sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its
construction.
Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation maintained that it observed the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees. The other
petitioners likewise raised due care and diligence in the performance of their duties and countered
that the complaint was malicious for which they suffered besmirched reputation and mental
anguish. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and an award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees in their favor.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In its decision 7 the trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after finding that the
preponderance of the evidence favored petitioners. It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of
the counter on ZHIENETH was her act of clinging to it. It believed petitioners’ witnesses who
testified that ZHIENETH clung to the counter, after which the structure and the girl fell with the
structure falling on top of her, pinning her stomach. In contrast, none of private respondents’
witnesses testified on how the counter fell. The trial court also held that CRISELDA’s negligence
contributed to ZHIENETH’s accident.
In absolving petitioners from any liability, the trial court reasoned that the counter was situated
at the end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary measure hence, it could not be
considered as an attractive nuisance. 8 The counter was higher than ZHIENETH. It has been in
existence for fifteen years. Its structure was safe and well-balanced. ZHIENETH therefore, had no
business climbing on and clinging to it.
Private respondents appealed the decision, attributing as errors of the trial court its findings that:
(1) the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was ZHIENETH’s misbehavior; (2) CRISELDA
was negligent in her care of ZHIENETH; (3) petitioners were not negligent in the maintenance of
the counter; and (4) petitioners were not liable for the death of ZHIENETH.
Further, private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be entitled to the conclusive
presumption that a child below nine (9) years is incapable of contributory negligence. And even if
ZHIENETH, at six (6) years old, was already capable of contributory negligence, still it was
physically impossible for her to have propped herself on the counter. She had a small frame (four
feet high and seventy pounds) and the counter was much higher and heavier than she was. Also,
the testimony of one of the store’s former employees, Gerardo Gonzales, who accompanied
ZHIENETH when she was brought to the emergency room of the Makati Medical Center belied
petitioners’ theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter. Gonzales claimed that when ZHIENETH
was asked by the doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied," [N]othing, I did not come near the
counter and the counter just fell on me." 9 Accordingly, Gonzales’ testimony on ZHIENETH’s
spontaneous declaration should not only be considered as part of res gestae but also accorded
credit.
Moreover, negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it was reasonable for her to have let
go of ZHIENETH at the precise moment that she was signing the credit card slip.
Finally, private respondents vigorously maintained that the proximate cause of ZHIENETH’s death,
was petitioners’ negligence in failing to institute measures to have the counter permanently
nailed.
On the other hand, petitioners argued that private respondents raised purely factual issues which
could no longer be disturbed. They explained that ZHIENETH’s death while unfortunate and tragic,
was an accident for which neither CRISELDA not even ZHIENETH could entirely be held faultless
and blameless. Further, petitioners adverted to the trial court’s rejection of Gonzales’ testimony
as unworthy of credence.
As to private respondent’s claim that the counter should have been nailed to the ground,
petitioners justified that it was not necessary. The counter had been in existence for several years
without any prior accident and was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents. Truth
to tell, they acted without fault or negligence for they had exercised due diligence on the matter.
In fact, the criminal case 10 for homicide through simple negligence filed by private respondents
against the individual petitioners was dismissed; a verdict of acquittal was rendered in their favor.
The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private respondents and reversed the
appealed judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally
dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted "L" 11 with a top wider than the
base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor
supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous; a
downward pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the counter
to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the attention of the
management the danger the counter could cause. But the latter ignored their concern. The Court
of Appeals faulted the petitioners for this omission, and concluded that the incident that befell
ZHIENETH could have been avoided had petitioners repaired the defective counter. It was
inconsequential that the counter had been in use for some time without a prior incident.
The Court of Appeals declared that ZHIENETH, who was below seven (7) years old at the time of
the incident, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that since a child
under nine (9) years could not be held liable even for an intentional wrong, then the six-year old
ZHIENETH could not be made to account for a mere mischief or reckless act. It also absolved
CRISELDA of any negligence, finding nothing wrong or out of the ordinary in momentarily allowing
ZHIENETH to walk while she signed the document at the nearby counter.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
 heard ZHIENETH comment on the incident while she was in the hospital’s emergency room should
The Court of Appeals also rejected the testimonies of the witnesses of petitioners. It found them receive credence; and finally, ZHIENETH’s part of the res gestae declaration "that she did nothing
biased and prejudiced. It instead gave credit to the testimony of disinterested witness Gonzales. to cause the heavy structure to fall on her" should be considered as the correct version of the
The Court of Appeals then awarded P99,420.86 as actual damages; the amount representing the gruesome events.
hospitalization expenses incurred by private respondents as evidenced by the hospital’s statement
of account. 12 It denied an award for funeral expenses for lack of proof to substantiate the same. We deny the petition.
Instead, a compensatory damage of P50,000 was awarded for the death of ZHIENETH.
The two issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or
We quote the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, 13 thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library attributable to negligence; and (2) in case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was
attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the lower court is SET ASIDE and another ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
one is entered against [petitioners], ordering them to pay jointly and severally unto [private
respondents] the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the
defendant. 15 It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without
1. P50,000.00 by way of compensatory damages for the death of Zhieneth Aguilar, with legal any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which
interest (6% p.a.) from 27 April 1984; under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." 16

2. P99,420.86 as reimbursement for hospitalization expenses incurred; with legal interest (6% On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
p.a.) from 27 April 1984; by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. 17 Negligence is "the
3. P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
4. P20,000.00 in the concept of attorney’s fees; and suffers injury." 18

5. Costs. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident
occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any
Private respondents sought a reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied in the person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
Court of Appeals’ resolution 14 of 16 July 1997. 19

Petitioners now seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision and the reinstatement of the The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v.
judgment of the trial court. Petitioners primarily argue that the Court of Appeals erred in Smith, 20 thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
disregarding the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court. They stress that since the caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
action was based on tort, any finding of negligence on the part of the private respondents would is guilty of negligence. 21
necessarily negate their claim for damages, where said negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury sustained. The injury in the instant case was the death of ZHIENETH. The proximate We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH’s death
cause was ZHIENETH’s act of clinging to the counter. This act in turn caused the counter to fall on could only be attributable to negligence.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
her. This and CRISELDA’s contributory negligence, through her failure to provide the proper care chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
and attention to her child while inside the store, nullified private respondents’ claim for damages.
It is also for these reasons that parents are made accountable for the damage or injury inflicted We quote the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales who was at the scene of the incident and
on others by their minor children. Under these circumstances, petitioners could not be held accompanied CRISELDA and ZHIENETH to the hospital:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
responsible for the accident that befell ZHIENETH.
Q While at the Makati Medical Center, did you hear or notice anything while the child was being
Petitioners also assail the credibility of Gonzales who was already separated from Syvel’s at the treated?
time he testified; hence, his testimony might have been tarnished by ill-feelings against them.
A At the emergency room we were all surrounding the child. And when the doctor asked the child
For their part, private respondents principally reiterated their arguments that neither ZHIENETH "what did you do," the child said "nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just
nor CRISELDA was negligent at any time while inside the store; the findings and conclusions of fell on me."cralaw virtua1aw library
the Court of Appeals are substantiated by the evidence on record; the testimony of Gonzales, who
Q (COURT TO ATTY. BELTRAN) since the top is heavy.

You want the words in Tagalog to be translated? Q And what did you do?

ATTY. BELTRAN A I informed Mr. Maat about that counter which is [sic] shaky and since Mr. Maat is fond putting
display decorations on tables, he even told me that I would put some decorations. But since I told
Yes, your Honor. him that it not [sic] nailed and it is shaky he told me "better inform also the company about it."
And since the company did not do anything about the counter, so I also did not do anything about
COURT the counter. 24 [Emphasis supplied]

Granted. Intercalate "wala po, hindi po ako lumapit doon. Basta bumagsak." 22 Ramon Guevarra, another former employee, corroborated the testimony of Gonzales,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETH’s statement formed (and should be admitted
as) part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus:chanrob1es Q Will you please described [sic] to the Honorable Court the counter where you were assigned in
virtual 1aw library January 1983?

Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or x       x       x
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given
in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. A That counter assigned to me was when my supervisor ordered me to carry that counter to
another place. I told him that the counter needs nailing and it has to be nailed because it might
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a cause injury or accident to another since it was shaky.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. 23 All that is required for their
admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a Q When that gift wrapping counter was transferred at the second floor on February 12, 1983, will
startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by you please described that to the Honorable Court?
the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for
ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she A I told her that the counter wrapper [sic] is really good [sic] condition; it was shaky. I told her
trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales’ testimony on the matter, i.e., that we had to nail it.
ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their
negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter’s base. Q When you said she, to whom are you referring to [sic]?

Gonzales’ earlier testimony on petitioners’ insistence to keep and maintain the structurally A I am referring to Ms. Panelo, sir.
unstable gift-wrapping counter proved their negligence, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q And what was the answer of Ms. Panelo when you told her that the counter was shaky?
Q When you assumed the position as gift wrapper at the second floor, will you please describe the
gift wrapping counter, were you able to examine? A She told me "Why do you have to teach me. You are only my subordinate and you are to teach
me? And she even got angry at me when I told her that.
A Because every morning before I start working I used to clean that counter and since it is not
nailed and it was only standing on the floor, it was shaky.
x       x       x

x       x       x

Q Will you please describe the counter at 5:00 o’clock [sic] in the afternoon on [sic] May 9, 1983? Q From February 12, 1983 up to May 9, 1983, what if any, did Ms. Panelo or any employee of the
management do to that [sic]
A At that hour on May 9, 1983, that counter was standing beside the verification counter. And
since the top of it was heavy and considering that it was not nailed, it can collapsed at anytime, Witness:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
None, sir. They never nailed the counter. They only nailed the counter after the accident hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was
happened. 25 [Emphasis supplied] reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at time ZHIENETH was pinned
down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the was just four meters away from CRISELDA. 32 The time and distance were both significant.
danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us.
situation nor ensure the safety of the store’s employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the
prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to counter just fell on her.
discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged
On the issue of the credibility of Gonzales and Guevarra, petitioners failed to establish that the decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 June 1996 in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 is hereby AFFIRMED.
former’s testimonies were biased and tainted with partiality. Therefore, the allegation that
Gonzales and Guevarra’s testimonies were blemished by "ill feelings" against petitioners — since G.R. No. L-3422             June 13, 1952
they (Gonzales and Guevarra) were already separated from the Company at the time their
testimonies were offered in court — was but mere speculation and deserved scant consideration. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
It is settled that when the issue concerns the credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts will not GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
as a general rule disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to determine
the same. The trial court has the distinct advantage of actually hearing the testimony of and
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Salazar for petitioner.
observing the deportment of the witnesses. 26 However, the rule admits of exceptions such as
Antonio M. Moncado for respondents.
when its evaluation was reached arbitrarily or it overlooked or failed to appreciate some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. 27 In the instant
case, petitioners failed to bring their claim within the exception. BENGZON, J.:

Anent the negligence ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below This is an appeal by certiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals requiring Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. to pay
nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In his book, 28 former Guillermo Balandan and his wife, damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son Mario.
Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted
without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine
and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since
negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability,
either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be
incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one,
under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. [Emphasis supplied]
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the
counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners’ theory that the counter was
stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter
to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a
scrutiny of the evidence 29 on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped
like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded
towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured. 30
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on
to CRISELDA’s waist, later to the latter’s hand. 31 CRISELDA momentarily released the child’s
It appears that the petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San
Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of
its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with
any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground.
Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said
commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard
assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old,
while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to
take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished
out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an
attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons
entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this
Jurisdiction in Taylor vs. Manila Electric 16 Phil., 8.
The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary
care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is
injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. (See 65 C.J.S., p. 455.)
The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is
apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get
on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children (65 C.J.S., p. 458).
Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little children in play?
In other words is the body of water an attractive nuisance?
The great majority of American decisions say no.
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location.
There are numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has not been held not to be
applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of water, streams, canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains,
cesspools or sewer pools, . . . (65 C.J.S., p. 476 et seg. citing decisions of California, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Miss., Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, Nebraska, Wisconsin.)
In fairness to the Court of Appeals it should be stated that the above volume of Corpus Juris Secundum was
published in 1950, whereas its decision was promulgated on September 30, 1949.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive nuisance was
lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always
the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently
presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own
property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable
because of having created an "attractive nuisance." Anderson vs. Reith-Riley Const. Co., N. E., 2nd,
184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170.
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had
taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner — that the
parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for Manila on
that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual — needs no further discussion.
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. No costs.
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA,
ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian,
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARIANO
MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Fortunato Jose, for Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; CARRIER’S LIABILITY; WORDS AND PHRASES; PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED. —
"The proximate legal cause is that the acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion., all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might be probably result therefrom."cralaw virtua1aw
library
2. ID.; ID.; OVERTURNING OF BUS; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH. — When a vehicle turned not
only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with the lighted torch was in response to
the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the
rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where the
lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch the most handy and available;
and what was more natural, that said rescuers should innocently approached the overtuned
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. Held: That the proximate
cause of the death of B was overturning of the vehicle thru the negligence of defendant and his
agent.
3. ID.; ID.; CARRIER’S NEGLIGENCE; BURNING OF THE BUS. — The burning of the bus wherein
some of the passengers were trapped can also be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through the driver and conductor who were on the road walking back and forth. They should and
must have known that in the position in which the overtuned bus was, gasoline could and must
have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from
the fact that gasoline when spilled, especially over a large area, can be smelt and detected even
from a distance, Held: That the failure of the driver and the conductor to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus, constitute negligence
on the part of the agents of the carrier under the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly, Article
1733, 1759 and 1763 thereof.
DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952, bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner, defendant Mariano Medina, under a certificate of public convenience, left
the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado
Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the
passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, seated
to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the
witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated on the left side of the
driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At
about 2 :00 o’clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or
ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave
the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the
passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the
bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said that they could not get out of
the bus. There, is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free
from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate
and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made
to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying
a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These
men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on
the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under
and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for
help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed passengers inside the bus were removed
and duly identified, specially that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud
Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to
recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to
the plaintiffs, plus P600 as attorney’s fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried
by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter court endorsed the appeal to us
because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
Our New Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of a common carrier to its passengers
and their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal
provisions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7 while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"ART. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented
or stopped the act or omission."cralaw virtua1aw library
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire,
the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay
City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant,
through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out,
the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that
according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where
one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zagging, there was
a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes
in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only
question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the
death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus,
including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire
started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive,
and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.
We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . .’that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more
comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle
sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and
under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the
tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver
and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and
available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words,
the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What
is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through its driver and its conductor. According to the witnesses, the driver and the conductor
were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have
known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked
from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that
gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the
part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above- reproduced, particularly,
Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regards the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the
amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to
include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney’s fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs’ attorneys not only in the
trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by
them, the attorney’s fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS. The award made
by the trial court of ONE HUNDRED (P100) PESOS for the loss of the merchandise carried by the
deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence,
one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in
the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she
overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the
bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had
been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions.
If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially
those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as
we have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe
that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four of his
passengers, physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and
yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally
dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to
support the complaint, either failed to appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the
case before us shows that several witnesses, passengers in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly
testified in court to the effect that the said driver was negligent. In the public interest, the
prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for
the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS to SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from
SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for
attorney’s fees, respectively, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
FILOMENO URBANO, Petitioner, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; LIABILITY OF ACCUSED FOR NATURAL CONSEQUENCES
RESULTING FROM CRIME. — Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal
liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended . . ." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is
criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR NOT LIABLE FOR SUBSEQUENT DEATH OF HACKING
VICTIM DUE TO TETANUS NOT PRESENT AT TIME OF INFLICTION OF WOUND. — In the case at
bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which
Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on
November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The DECISION
following day, November 15, 1980, he died. If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have seen more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the
time Javier’s wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed
not yet present. Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTION TO HOMICIDE REQUIRES PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THAT WOUND WAS PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH. — The rule is that the death of the victim At about 8:00 o’clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his
must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with
proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind beyond water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting
of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his
(People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038). Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long,
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his
tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier’s death with which the petitioner had hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from
nothing to do. Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the
back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict
4. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SETTLEMENT OF MINOR OFFENSES ALLOWED UNDER P.D. 1508. — It further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very
least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner’s Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house
criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim’s own act. After the hacking incident, about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of
Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman
where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police
settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree No. station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought
1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16). to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who
did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla
5. ID.; CIVIL LIABILITY; JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL DOES NOT NECESSARILY EXTINGUISH CIVIL had no available medicine.
LIABILITY. — It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The
well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla
the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said: who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit
. . .." . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
(Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused "TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559) "This is to certify that I have examined the would of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married,
residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1-Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right. 11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden

"As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This would was presented to cessation of respiration and HR after
me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88,
Original Records) muscular spasm. O2 inhalation

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and
Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980,
the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable cardiac massage done but to no avail.
settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit "A"), to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18

x       x       x P.M. PMC done and cadaver brought

home by relatives." (p. 100, Original

"Entry Nr 599/27 Oct ‘80/1030H/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this
Station accompanied by brgy councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are Records)
neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to
Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide
him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
against each other." (p. 87, Original Records.)
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of
P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano’s house in the presence of barangay captain prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
Soliven.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs
of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in
a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter’s
serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a hearing wound in The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the
Javier’s palm which could have been infected by tetanus. award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the
appellant.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of
Dr. Exconde are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was
based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which
"Date Diagnosis states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus "That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the
present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
adm. at DX: TETANUS
"That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;

difficulty opening his mouth. "That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued-irrigation dam which irrigates
the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to
#35, 421 Restless at times. Febrile the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;
"That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an
which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches become shallow which afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found
was suitable for catching mudfishes; himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would
be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand." (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
"That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary
Perfecto Jaravata; The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was
due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier
"That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco
fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions; plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus
germs.chanrobles law library : red
"That few days thereafter, or on November 15, 1980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier
died of tetanus." (p. 33, Rollo) The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected
with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition. wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition. the record.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that In Vda. de Bataclan, Et. Al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the proximate cause:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended . . ." Pursuant to this provision "an
accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the x       x       x
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631)

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of
which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which
was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition
and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier’s death was the natural and logical
consequence of Urbano’s unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier’s death.
Thus, the appellate court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the
deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not
deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but
the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound
which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
"Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw
because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could
be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981).
Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim’s death was the wound which got infected with
tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the
consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C.; People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072;
People v. Cornel, 78 Phil. 418)
"Appellant’s allegation that the proximate cause of the victim’s death was due to his own
negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he
". . . A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . .’that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more
comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier’s death.
We look into the nature of tetanus —
"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become
symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when
symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury, the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
 20 to 22 days before he died.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"Nonspecific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are
encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing
rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038)
the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and
symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected. Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, on interval referred to as proximate cause of Javier’s death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in
the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, Et. Al. (99 Phil. 118)
poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles "‘A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer-lasting spasms with increasing possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because
nervous system damage and death. of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances, which result in injury
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.’
more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms (45 C.J. pp. 931-932)." (at p. 125)
are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and
onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the
remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the
time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent petitioner’s criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim’s own act. After the
prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison’s Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied) compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses
of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man’s body depends on the Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16)
incubation period of the disease.
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner
bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable,
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, Et. Al. (G.R.
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs x       x       x
at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should ". . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
have seen more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier’s wound was inflicted by the appellant, the (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier’s wound could only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559)
surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not
"The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of
the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the
Code Commission as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt
in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as
the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil
liability cannot be demanded.

"‘This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights.
One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of
damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each
other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: ‘There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of
the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished.’ It is just and proper that, for the purposes of
the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be
proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"‘For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It
will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice — a
cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.’"

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so
minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.