Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 7 8 Historical Paper Yo. ___ 160 CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY 5 ‘THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION 1952 - 1956 0% a trolled by: ¥3/Division D Omer copy noid by: DOP Control Fy/pivision D, Sete prepared og of 2 Dete published! 24 June 1068, ae ‘Written by: Ld 5 me r wee Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 ‘TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE, 2 ee ee 5 1 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. ©. 2... se aut | oe 1 TT, PLANING, ‘ (HI, IMPLEMENTATION. «6. . beers OM ie sm V. PRODUCTION. 2. ee ae 25 e VI, AFTERMATH 7 aT Appendix A - of the Reasons for the y of the Tunnel Appendix B - Recapitulation of the Intelli- gence Derived, Appendix C - Typical American Press Comment Appendix D - Hast Gernan Presa Comment Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 PREFACE PBJOINTLY (the Berlin Tunnel project) came into being sometime in 1952 (the exact date cannot be established) and ceased a8 active operation in the sumer of 1958, The writer served as Headquarters cave officer on the project from tne winter of 1952-1989 until the sumer of 1954 and then as the field case officer until February 19! L |a senior Office of Communications otticer iy ie projecey he wuaLinn Xs ever, Chie, Berito operating nese, 1082-1088; and[ = ee as ee RN Mai ih planning and inplenentation of the profect at the policy level ta vory kindly offered muggeetions for the preperation ot Cie mununcript.Tede comment Dave Deen sacorporsted and are eraatiy appreciated. severn otter indivioaas,[ | Jno were in a position to offer valuable a advice were absent from Headquarters during the period the paper vas being ptepared and thus unavailable to assist. when this project was firat discussed with the then Director of CIA, ir. Allen Welsh Dulles, he ordered that, in the interests of security, as little as possible concerning . ‘the project would be reduced to writing. It is probable that fev orders have been so conscientiously obeyed, and yet there sERRET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 are a great many cubic feet of files connected with this pro- Ject. These files mainly concern technical and administrative matters. Only those details which, in the opinion of the writer, are necessary to ® broad understanding of the manner im which the project's objectives were accomplished have been included in this paper. Those interested in additional data say viento emmut te #1 tn aassion to wetting forth aignticast devlopani, ton elton han stoates co provide Sanight ino the reat for certain couras of action, At tines shin negered dpecutnine appronh, he uacnnte darted fro sh #0 ier er eee ant tone setvey concerned inthe See ae ante reas Cony tre eceuratenyexprevnd in the Zoblowing paper ay crrer in ene Tepactsnovver, do tn ele repmntDAiy of cre : Cerone reer —] @ “ Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1 ~ Map of Berlio 2 = Detata aap of Rudow Section, Berlin 3 - Aerial View of Budow Section, Berlin = Dirt 10 the Basement = Yopos Studying the Installation East German View of the Compound = Blinds on the Shield Spee eta are e reer fi ieemeeeeretaes ee eeieieneter ae petbeciesereanesta nett cena erree ease erantaraetes eae es eee : 18 ~ Pre-hup Chasber 19 ~ Tapping Bridie : 20 = Lesd-Auay Lines 2 ~ Soviet Press Briefing Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 szokrt 1. aerRopucrion ‘The exact soment when the idea exeryed of digging & tunnel to intercept Soviet and Kast German commnications 18 sonewnat obscure, A nunber of factors must be considered, ‘azong thou the following: a, As early as 1948 U.S. Intelligence officers became interested in the benefits to be derived trom tapping Soviet and Satellite landlines on a ecale not previously considered necessary. The lose of certain sources during this period created gaps in our intelli- gence cover: which were particularly unfortunate during this period of Cold War eacalation, It became evident that the tapping of certain selected landlines might pro- duce the information needed to f111 a oumber of ti ape in our overall intelligence picture, Db. In the 1a 1940's and early 1950's the 0. ‘through the briefings of “returses" German scientists (those who vere taken by the Soviets after World War I1 to work in Russia) and other sourci |) became avare of a nev foviet voce secrecy device which the Soviets referred to usually an "VEE CHE." “ It soon became evident that Tn noraal usage "VHE CHE" means high frequency”. The Soviets, however, in context, used this tera for a special speech scrambling device developed to provide security to their Bigh level commaications. aaa Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 the Soviets planned \ “e.in the Iate 1940's the Office of Communications, in the course of ite continuing efforts to provide secure ‘ consunications for the Agency, becane aware of a principle ‘which, when applied to target communications, offered bilities, Plane to exploit this techaique Tnece teters ten ered ition facentien (shoe ©. wx et tr son ctletin gure) to for atte tion on govnt Sando treea, In al@-105 espersory attack on Soviet 1andlines in East Germany with special eupha- sis to be placed on the Berlin area. As a result of thi _ fim seent networi fal in penetrating the Bast Berlin office of the Eat German Post snd Teleconmnications network. —— ‘ ‘ital inforaation Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 - Sw during the latter part of 1951, and by March 1952 all of the pertinent technical aaterial had been asseabled and oufficiest— ly analyzed to permit the pinpointing of the Soviet circuits Co | LL thin information to be completely correct. Various methods of tapping these circuitu were explored od one stapling operation vas run in the East Zone, untortu- nately with negative remults. By January 1983, hovever, the @ _ cttectivencss of the penetration network | fuse become such that a i5-sinute saaple of the prime target circuit. ‘This was accomplished recorded, al The longest continuous ensple obtained was ‘two houra. 29 minutes and moat samples were of two to three mimites! duration, Special mention should be made of the fact that At was necessary to maintain a 24-hour watch over a aix- month period on “our” end of the cable to record these Pres Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 ‘sanpl __ Weaotine collateral collection effort continued on thi conmanications ayatess involved and the Office of Conmintca- tions developed techniques for recovering the text from the magnetic tape recordings of the target signal. Somewhat ironically, the first actual material recovered proved to be a recording of @ student teletypist practicing on the “hone key intelligence content, this material served to prove the tech~ nical posstbinity | : meaty | “Ae thie point (aid-1953) we knew it could be done - the next woile perhape disappointing from the standpoint of step wae the problem of installing s perasnont tap on the target Lines. Precisely at what point the idea of a tunnel for the purpose of tapping the target cables began to come into focus cannot be pinpointed.’ In 1951, the British advised CIA that =~ they had for some yeara been tappiog Soviet cables through & system of tunnels in the Vienna area and offered to share the take with the U.8. ‘The suggestion was nade by the British at 4 sEARET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 de ‘the tina that similar opportunitios wight be present in the Berlin aren. Yoile it should perhaps be possible to credit cone individual with the initial concept, it appears to be & bit digeioult to do #0, At any rate, the British and CIA continued to pool collateral information, and by way 1989 | lene idea of a tunnel to ‘ais definite shape. a \ Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 seQasr 17, PLANNING Inspection of all sites from which it might be possible ‘to tuonel from the U.K, or the U.5, Zones to the target cables served to narrow the choices to teo spots: one in the British ‘and one in the U.S, Zone. The site actually used (see figs. 1, 2, and 3) was selected after careful deliberation which Ancluded, but was not Limited to, the following factors: &. The location of the permanent water table (which 18 noraaily relatively high in Berlin} was ascer- tained to be 32 feet below ground surface. It was con- sidered that this fact would obviate the necessity for ‘the use of compressed air, watertight locks, and water- tight construction with a corresponding reduction in the attendant engineering problens. >, The length of the tunnel was couaidered to be not impractical although it far exceeded anything which had been done by the British in Vienna, €. Land was available on which to construct an instalation from which to begin the tunnel, 4. Complete collateral information on the area ‘yas available, including the target cable plans, aerial photographs, and the plans for all utilities serving the Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Figure 3 Aerial View of Rudow Section, Berlio Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 At this point the following major questions reauined unanawered: a. Was 1t indeed possible to dig a tunne) of this magnitude (approximately 1500 feet) clandestinely, con sidering the fact that the border et this point was heavily and constantly patrolled by the Rast Germans, and hit the targets? b. If the ansver to tho above wae favorable, what was to be done with the spoil (reckoned at approxi~ je1y 3,000 tons of sand)? c. What type of cover tnutallation could be bulit in such a resote area (this portion of Berlin was at that time 4 “squattersvilie” of shacks and novels constructed fron rubble by refugees from the East German Zone)? In retrospect the first question, "Could the tunnel be dug?", was never really a debatable one---those concerned more or less decided that given sufficient money and personnel the Job could be done. (This judgnent fortunately proved sound.) The second question, "Where do we put the dirt?", haunted the minds of project personnel for ny wooks and a great many Angentous ideas vere brought forth and discarded for one rea won or another until the suggestion was made facetiously that we "dig @ hole and put the dirt in it.” This in effect was the solution. At this tise no convincing cover story had SEORET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 ake puggested itself and the current consensus favored making the cover compound an element of the Quartermaster Corps with a rather vague mission of housing itens that should be dispersed for one reason or another in a resote area of Werlin. Space requirenonts for the recording and associated equipment were buch that @ building of warehouse proportions was need: Le was decided to build a two-story warehouse. Local engineers wore told that At had been decided to experiment vith a now type of warchouse, on which would Do half above the ground and half below with a ramp aultable for running fork 1ift trucks tron the basexent to the first floor. Berlin had been selected a# the site for this warehouse because (a) construe tton would be cheap due to lov labor eaten and (0) tbe work would benefit the Berlin econony. 0 the basenont "a8 dug undor the eyes of the local border guards and ve had “our hole to put the dirt in S00 fig. 4.) sufficient to Mile the “warchouse cover" was adjudg solve the temporary problens of construction, it vas not deoned wolid enough to carry the project for an extended period. At this particular tine the intelligence community vas becoming r Ancreasingly interested in the potential of| L ‘As an interosting sidelight, "wo hoard later that the Quartermaster Corps became seriously intorested in this type Sonstruction because the ratio of cost to storage spac available vas amazingly lov. We do not know if any follow Up ever occurred. Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Dirt in the Basement Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 far eanmpiet provided tor ntaining extra- ordinary physical security and tight conpartmentation. hn tne Top secret ee ‘Gatogory at this period In ite evolution.) ~“Tesitinate tarcets | exteted in the area. | @, The oxistonce [ ‘the site provided the opposition with am 6 the site's existence. In spite of the fact that any form of presents a priority target, it Vas argued That presenting the opposition with a reason for the site's existence would make it a 166 prominent faving it a “aysterious something." The SOA Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 alte did in fact Addition, the sight of the Soviets and East Gen op top of the tunnel with binoculars focused fon tne root of the installation provided “considerable amusement to personnel at the ite. (Seo fig. 5.) Joint U.8.-U.K, planning for the project continued ‘throughout 1953 and in December of that year the Director of Central Intelligence approved the terns of reference which covered formal negotiations with the British for the implemen tation of the project. A series of conferences in late 1953 and early 1954 led to the following decisions: a, The U.8. would: (2) procure a site, erect the cessary etructures, and drive « tunnel to a point beneath the targer cables; (2) be responsible for the recording of al: signals produced) i G) procées in Washington all of the tele- graphic material received from the project b. The British would: (2) @rive a vertical shaft from the tunnel's, 0 ond to the target 10 BIRR ET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Wor yETLeISUT oy AuFKpars Bodos - Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 heer | I (2) effect the cable tape and deliver a usable signal to the hoad of the tunpel for recording; and (3) provide for a jointly manned U.8.-U.K. center in London to process the voice recordings fron the site. Tt was jointly agreed that each side would keep the other advised in detail on ali aspects of the project. It ‘should perhupa be satd here that the bilateral ampects of this operation (vith one notable exception which ¥ill be discussed later (see BLAKE, page 29)) caused few, tf any, problens. The e skills developed by the British during the Vienna operations stood us in good stead and the distribution of effort and ox- ponse proved in the end to be reasonably equitable. Activity thus proceeded on three fronts - in Berlin steps wore taken to lease the necessary land and right-of-way easo- nents for the site and contract was Jet with a German con tractor. The compound, which was roughly the size of an aver age city block, was fenced #ith chain-type high security Fencing and contained tho main operations building (the one story with basement type warehouse previously described), combined kitchen-dining facilities and barracks, and another building vhich housed thr: diesel driven generators to provide power for all factlities. (See fig. 6.) Sanitary Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 ge z punodaog ou; 70 maya wey aes - 9 oun Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 provisions consisted of a cesspool. (The logical placement situated only a fo foet of the cesspool was such that it w from the tunnel site, It later developed when the tunnel vas dug that this was quite unfortunate because working conditions in the sector adjacent to the cesspool were, to say the least, highly unpleasant.) Planning called for the completion of ‘this work on 27 August 1954. For assistance im actually digging the tunnel it was docided to request help from the Army Corps of Engin and to this ond the Chief of Staff and the G-2, U.S. Aray, were briefed on the project. The initial contact with the e Army was made personally by Mr. Allen Dulles te General Matthew B. Ridgway, Fortunately General Arthur Trud trained engineer, had just beon appointed A.C. of S., G2 Fron the first moment he learned of the operation, General Trudeau vas an enthusiastic supporter of the concept. The ‘Army selected Lt. Colonel Leslie i. Gross (the only available member of the Enginoering Corps with any experience in tunneling to head the project. This proved to be an excellent choice for Lt. Colonel Gross turned in an outstanding Job. By nid-sunner of 1954 he had firmed up the engineering plans, lected a crew of enginoering personnel, and actually con~ structed a mock-up tunnel sone 150 yards long Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Sone mention should be mado of the actual method of construct~ Ang the tunnel, Studies of the soil structure in the Berlin area showed @ high percentage of sand, For this reason it was doctded that the tunnel should be ined vith steel. The sano sand content contributed greatly to tho danger of cave-ing at the face of the tunnel, and to eliminate this risk a shield was devised (see figs. 7 and 8) with horizontal “blinds” 40 arranged acrous Sts face that should even dry sand be encountered the danger of cave-ins was virtually eliminated. ‘The tunnel liner vas formed of sections of heavy steel plate 40 constructed that, when bolted together, five sections formed 4 stool ring approxinately six feet in diameter and 15 inches long. Provision was made for bolting those rings together to form a continuous tube of solid stee}, The men worked under cover of the shield described above (which slightly larger in dianeter than tho steel liner) and when sufficient matorial had boon excavated, the shield was forced forward with hydrau- Lic Jacks and a nev section of liner was bolted in place. Since this method loft a void of approximately one and ono- half inches around the Liner (rememboring that the diameter of the shield was greater than that of the liner), screw-typo ronovable pluge were built into every third section of tunel Aimer. This permitted removal of the plugs and the forcing of grouting material under high prossure to f111 the void Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9ptorug ous wo spatia - 2 aunaes Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 ptarys oy) uo spurta ~ 2 oansys Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Spurs ows Bursn Aasgeasoey — g oxn3yz sparta our Sur Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 after the liner was in place. It was calculated (and subse. quently proven to be true) that thin method of construction would not permit settling of the soil and detection of the tunnel from the surface. (Soe fig. 9.) Moantine in the U.K. British engineers constructed @ aock- up of the tunnel's terminal end and fabricated an ingenious dovice which worked in principle Like the tunnel "shield" described above, with the difference, of course, that the blinds (which closely resembled a conventional venetian blind) were horizontal but so hinged as to ‘permit vertical excavation. This permitted excavating cautiously across the upper face of e the vertical shaft in small areas and then jacking the entire Structure up at the optimum rate. (See fig. 10.) Available plans indicated that the cables were buried soue 27 inches deep along the side of a heavily traveled highway. The top of the vertical shaft (see fig. 11) then needed to be approximately 12 to 14 inches below the surface of the high- vay in order to give the tapping crew room to work below the ceiling of the shaft, and the whole structure had to be capable of supporting the eight of heavy trucks since the tunnel and tap chamber lay directly beneath the highway. (See fig. 12.) Considerable care was devoted to insulating the Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 naa 6 ountya tavung pazetdmeg 943 Jo HaEA ~ 6 ound Taam, porsideos out Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 ayeus Te972404 au so KOFZONIIEUED ~ OL ANBTE Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 aw inp chamber to prevent its acting 1ike a huge drum. Considerable thought vas given to the quantity and content of the erial available from the target and the manner in which it vas to be processed. It was in this Held, perhaps, that we experienced sowe of our greatest problems. It had been decided vory early in the project's. planning stages to maintain the strictest possible security measures. As a minimum precaution scurity checks vere mado fon each individual who in any way decane knowledgeable of the project's mission, and the sane standards in force for clear~ ances for Special Intelligence vere utilized. A list of briefed porsonnel was maintained, special secrecy agreenents wore executed, and special briefings wore given to all knowl- edgeable personnel. It was in the asseablage of a processing toam that we experienced our groatont problem in maintaining security standards. Since the material to be processed was largely Russian voice, it was thought that we would nood Linguists with near native fluency in Russian. It is axtomatic that native fluency is usually available only in natives, and Vin spito of the insulation, it was a weird sensation to be in tho chanber when an Lron-shod horse trotted across it. "we also ausfered some anxious mosents onw Togey nornin vhon the microphone. In the tap chamber. gave forth with a Continuous series of dull twas. Altor the sun burned away the fog, vinval observation showed that the East Geran police had set up & temporary autoaobile checkpoint directly Over the chambor. “The “thuda” the microphone picked up wore caused by the poitce officer in charge stomping bis feet on the road surface to keep warm. as ser Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 natives were not clearable for the project. Although we were never successful in obtaining a8 macy Linguists as we needed, we were succesful, through careful screening and tatensive bling 4 mininun crew for the Job. Language training, tn a ‘Thin necessitated screening ach personnel file in the Agency of those individuals who claimed any knowledge of German or Rus#ian, arranging interviews and language tests, and negoti~ ating transfers to the project. The Agency's language capa bilities then were considerably less than now and some of the negotiations proved, to say the least, difficult. Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 TXT, IMBLEMENTATION by 17 August 1954 things were beginning to take shape and the situation was as follows 8. The Geraan contractors had completed the compound and we were in possession. b, ALL of the basic supplics, equipment, and personnel vere in Berlin ready to start construction on the tunnel. This in itwelf involved transporting 125 tons of steel tunnel liner from the ZI to Berlin. The initial shipment across the East Zone to Berlin consisted of one and one-half freight trains, the loss of any pack~ age of which could have blowa the project. For security weitive item, such as the tunnel Liner, purposes atl were double crated and banded and subjected to severe drop tests before they left the ZI. Similar items were ditferently packaged for deception purposes ©, Space at Weadquarters xas secured and the Office of Communications had assembled a crew and was well under way in fabricating the unique equipment necessary to process the anticipated telegraphic traffic 4. Initial personne! had been selected and were being processed for both the Main Processing Unit (MPU) im London and the Technical Processing Unit (TPU) ia Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Wayhington, It should be noted that personne] and equip~ ment were programmed initially to exploit approximately ten percent of the anticipated take. tn retrospect, per- hape this could be considered overly cautious. Io justification of this decision it should be said that no ‘one nad ever tunneled 1,476 feet under clandestine condi~ tions with the expectation of Hitting a target two incnes in diameter and 27 inches below # sain Gernan/Soviet highvay. ‘There were those who manifested certain reser- vations on the feasibility of go doing, and it is greatly to the credit of those senior officials, both civilian and military, that, in spite of these reservations, the project was permitted to proceed. In Inte August a vertical shart some 16 feet in diameter nas started in the warehouse basement fluor (eve fig. 13) and ground water was encountered at 16 feet instead of at the pre- dicted 92 feet, Such examination as could be safely undertaken under the steady observation of Bast German border guards and Soviet officials indicated that a clay leas existed in this particular spot, creating a “perched water table” the magnitude of which was unknowa. Available information indicated that the clay Lens possibly sloped down in the direction of the target and it was decided to proceed with the tunnel even though the top cover was to be les# than half what had been anticipated. 18 SERRET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Figure 13 - shage and Tunnel mtrance in Warchouse asoment Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 de e erable Order of Battle information was obtained. It was al: of smitviduntn vintting Rat Berlin by sbnerving the wecority precautions taken by tho Bast Govmans tnd the Soviets. Both aiden of the suet wore Lined vith cand in bags as tue tanned proceed and the excess spot] vas haved back wooden track vas Iaid on the floor of the tunnel and » con verted electric fork Ltt van ueed to poll a airing of rbbor- Lived trutiere back and forth in the tunel. (See fia. 34.) coot air vas upplied to the face of the tunel through auet= ork fron an nir conditioning wit located in the warehoune, ‘he tun a completed on 28 Fohruary 1985. Construction of tho tap chanbor consenced 10 March 1988 and van completed, itn tne three target cation exposed, on 28 March 1958, (Se to appreciate thie accomplishment At An secenenry to Fomonber that tho tunnel was 1,476 feet long (roughly the e . Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 403 paasenv09 xog 3410 pte 3377 #204 parzeauoD ~ HI ernBLs i : Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 a Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 length of the Lincoln Menorial reflecting pool) and that the first half sloped down and the second half sloped up. (See fig. 16.) The lack of an adequate base 1ine made the survey- ing problem especially difficult. The engineers decided at fone point that an object of known size in the East Zone would be useful as a reference point, so a baschall game was organ— ized with the objective of knocking baseball as far into the Bast Zone as possible. This schene vas frustrated by the friendliness of the East Geraan guards who kept returning the baseball. Nonetheless, the engineers expressed confidence that they knew thetr position when the tunnel was completed to @ point which could be contained in a eix-ineh cube, They were correct 7 Excess humidity is probably one of the greatest enemies of electronic equipment. To guard against this problem the section of the tunnel immediately adjacent to the tap chamber was insulated and sealed with marine-type plywood to form, in effect, a cloned room, (See figs. 17 and 18.) Vapor barriers wore erected and, in addition, heavy “anti-personnel” door of steel and concrete was constructed to seal off the tunnel sone 15 yards. from ite terminal end. From the beginning it was realized that the duration of this operation was finite. Considerable thought was given to the posture the U.S. Govern- ment would adopt upon the tunnel's discovery and to thoi Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 "ya it g Demolition pom A. Sector & z aren = ate 10°09 US sue a é 7830 on host sue] + ' a = fj , of u i i ¢ 2 ; pF 5 | sf a { 2, z zg 23 Leeetap = ag Bs F $ os cls cs A i g ee yo ORS |_| Zar oe ig RE g ey ae > w 3 a 2 x | 2 4 ; g ? 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 soqueyy dey-oid 50 woTaonarsU99 FO OBES LesIFUT = LT ans xequeg duy-oig Jo Goraonzsu0D yo oMs1g TeFATUT - 41 oansts Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 measures which would be taken at the site. The following position was f1oally approved: 8, The posture of the U.S. would be one of flat denial of any knowledge of the tunnel. b. The tunnel vas mined at the point it crossed the East-Weat Zone border with denolition charges capable of caving in the tunnel liner should the Soviets attempt forcible entry into the cover installation, c. The “anti-Personael" door described above was “ ‘The three cables were tapped on 11 May 1999, 21 May 1955, and 2 August 1955, A11 equipnent for isolating and preanpli- fying the signals and passing them down the tunnel for record ing vas in place before each tap was made so that monitoring of each paix could begin as soon as Lt was tapped, (See figs 19 and 20.) Careful check was kept of the temperature and A/rais door bore the following inscription neatly lettered in German and Cyrillic: "Entry is forbidden by order of the Conmanding General." It was reasoned that this sign might «ive pause to Soviet and/or German officials and gain tine, AS & Batter of fact, there were those Communist individuals *io considered the posting of this #ign as one of the most auda- clous aspects of the entire undertaking e ; SERRET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 aque duy-ord - 1 92nd Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 arpsan Masdden owprsa Suyddex ~ gt aunty Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 lead-Axay Lines Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 huwidity in the tap chauber to prevent the possibility of the introduction of moisture into the target cables thus causing faults. The moisture in the air caused by the breathing and perspiration of the technicians doing the tapping operation forced the auspension of the operation several tines to permit the air conditioning equipment to dehumidity the chamber, Al] the components in the electrical isolation net~ works were individually selected and subjected to rigorous tests to insure maxima reliability, ané the lead-away cables were constructed of the best available materials, sheathed in ead, and handled in accordance with the highest telephone company standards, ‘The strictest possible visual watch was naintained with the tap crew, In short, im this, as in all pects of the operation, every effort was made to guarantee success even though in many instanceu it meant delay in achieving the objective. 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 IV. TERMINATION ‘Te tunnel vas discovered (see fig, 21) 21 April 1956, after 11 months and 11 days of operation. A memorandum pre- pared on 13 August 1956 (reproduced in its entirety as Appendix A) examines in detail all evidence available as of that date on the reasons for the discovery, The conclusion reached was that the loss of this source was purely the result of unfortunate ctreustances beyond our control ~ » combina tion of the fact that one of the cables was in very poor physical condition (this was known from the begioning) and a long period of unusually heavy rainfall. It appeared that water entered the cable im sufficient quantity to make it inopera- tive, thus necessitating digging up sections of the cable and causing ¢iscovery of the tap. Subsequent developments offer an alternative reason for the demise of the operation. Io April 1956, MI-8 discov- ered that George BLAKE, cage officer in thelr service, ha been recruited by the Soviets while # prisoner in North Korea An 1952 and had continued under Soviet control. BLAKE was privy to all aspects of the tunnel from the earliest planniog auages. BLAKE atated that he bad informed his Soviet contact of the planned tunnel at the time the final decision wal made on ite location in the latter part of 1953. The Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Pune 21 Soviet Rest Brie Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 question then arises as to why the Soviets permitted the tunnel to be dug and to operate for nearly one year. Many theorice have been advanced, but it ie most probable that ne Will never know the exact rationale behind the Soviet reget Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 ¥v. PRopucTION 5 The following statistics may be of interest in evaluating ‘the project: 8. Three cables were tapped. They contained 273 notallic pairs capable of transmitting a total of approx- Amatoly 1200 communications channels. The maximum number of channels in use at any one time approximated 509. On the average 28 tolographic circuits and 121 voice ctrevits were recorded continuously. Approximately $0,000 reels of magnetic tape vere used - some 25 tons. b. The London processing conter employed » peak munber of 317 persons. Twenty thousand Soviet two-hour voice reels containing 368,000 conversations were fully transeribed. In addition, 13,500 Gorman two-hour voice reels wore recoived and 5,500 reols containing 75,000 conversations were processed. Seventeon thousand of these conversations wore fully transcribed. ‘The Wasuington centor employed 350 people at its peak. Eighteen thousand six-hour Soviet teletype reels and 11,000 six-hour Gernan teletype reels vere completely transcribed. It should be borne in mind that ny of these reels contained as many as 18 separate cireuits, some of which utilized tine-division multiplex to ereate additional circuits. The potential of any given six-hour teletype reel was approxinately 216 hours of teletype mousages. Both plain text and Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 other encrypted traffic was received. The daily output was about 4,000 feet of teletype messages. Printed in book form, these messages would huve filled a space ten feet wide, 18 feet long, and eight fect high. 4, A aanil processing unit (two to four persons) was maintained at the Berlin site to permit on-the-spot monitoring of engineering circuits for the protection of the project and ucanning of the sore productive circuits for the “hot intelligence. Daily reports of sufficient value to warrant electrical transmission to Fashington and London were produced. ©, Procea#ing of the backlogged material con- tinued until 30 September 1958 and resulted in a total of 1,750 reports plus 90,000 translated messages oF conversations. £, The total cost of the project was $6,700,000. The information fron this auterial was disseminated ta 4 clowely controlled ayaten called "REGAL. Appendix B consists of a summary of the value of the material receives togethor with typical customer comments. Despite our knowl edge of the fact that certain elements of the Soviet Govern nent were aware of our plans to tap these cables, we have a0 + evidence that the Soviets attempted to feed us deception material through this source Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 vi. AFTERMATH 3 given Ay previously noted, considerable thought during the entire life of the project on the result its discovery would bring. In retrospect it is probably correct to say that, among those most actively concerned with the project's management, a consensus developed that the Soviets ‘would probably suppress knowledge of the tunnel's existence rather than adait to the world that Free World intelligence organs bad the capability of successfully mounting an opera + thon of this magnitude, In other words, it was felt that for the Soviets to admit that the U.S, had been reading their high Level comminications circuits would cause the Soviets to lose face. Perhaps fortunately, fate intervened, and as a possible consequence the Soviet course of action was exactly contrary to expectation. ‘me Commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, who would normally have controlled the handling of the situation when the tunnel was discovered, was absent from Berlin and the Acting Conmandant, Colonel Ivan A, Kotsyuba, vas in charge. ‘more 1a vome reason to believe that he (for vhatever reason) was forced to make a personal decision on & course of action without benefit of advice from Moscow. At any rate his reaction was unexpected in that he invited the entire Berlin ar Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 press corps to a briefing and tour of the tunnel! aod its facklities. As a result the tunnel was undoubtedly the most highly publicized peacetine espionage enterprise in modern times prior to the "U2 incident.” Worldwide reaction was out- standingly favorable in term» of enhancement of U.S. prestige Nou-Soviet Bloc sentinent can be generally summarized as follows: a, Tere was universsl admiration (and this included informed Soviets) on the technical excellence of the tastaliation and the imaginative ature of the undertaking. b. ‘The non-Comminiat world reacted with surprise e@ and unconcesied delight to this indication that the V.S.. alnost universally regarded au 4 etunbling neophyte in espionage matters, was capable of @ coup against the Soviet Union, which had long been the acknowledged master sn much matters ©. Coupled with rogrot that the Cold War necesst- tated suc measures, thoughtful editorial consent applauded thin indication that the U.S. waa capable of fuiftiting ite role of Free World leaderanip in the strugele Appendix € containg a sampling of typical U.S. press accounts and editorial comment on the tunnel. Predictably ‘the Communist press trented the tunnel as an outrage and an e 2 SE OQET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 SENET intolerable indecency, Appendix D consists of @ study of Rast German press reaction to the incident rae For their contritutions to Project PRJOINTLY wore made to the following individuals: # ]— piutingusaed Inet agence Sedat Intelligence Medal of Merit Tatelligence Medal of ertt | Anteriigence Heda of mers rs Distinguished Intelligence Meda! Inteldigence Medal of Merit Intelligence Meda} of Merit Distinguiahed Tatelligence Medal Inteiligence Medal of Berit After the project wont into the production phase it was necessary to brief a great many people to properly utilize ‘the product, In #11 alaost 1500 U.S. personnel were cleared for the project, in addition to a very large number of British S/ontortunately the writer has been unable to locate an exact record of those person who received other recognition from the Agency for thesr participation in this project, and Any omissions are regretted. It should also be noted that Approximately 1000 people participated wittingly or unwittingly fh'this uidertaking, In fact thereare very few, $f any, of the Elenents of CIA that were not called upon for axsistance, either Girectly or indirectly (auch as providing manpower), during the life of the project Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 e@ org gubjects. With the exception of BLAKE (as noted above), we have no indication that there was a single security Leak during the Life of the project. It is algo interesting to note that conpartnentation was yood enough, even at the Bertin site, that number of individuals actively engaged in working with the REGAL material were unaware of the exact source until they read about it in the prei Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 APPENDIX A NOTE: This avsessnent was prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff Tameaiately after the discovery of the tunnel aud is based fon pertinent information available. At the time the report was prepared BLAKE's activities had not been surfaced 15 August 1958 DISCOVERY BY THE SOVIETS OF PBJOINTLY Analysis of all available evidence - traffic passing on the target cables, conversations recorded from « microphone installed in the tap chamber, and vital observations from the site - indicates that the Soviet discovery of PRJOINTLY was purely fortuitous and was not the result of a penetration of the U.S. oF U.K. agencies concerned, & security violation, or testing of the 1ines by the Soviets or Hast Germans. A descrip- tion of the events leading to theve conclusions 1s contained in this paper Following heavy rains in the Berlin area a nusber of tele- Phone and telegraph cables were flooded and began to fault between Karlshorst and Mablow on the night of 16 April 1956 ‘The first Jor fault wae discovered on cable FX 151 at Wansmannsdorf on 17 April. The fault was repaired by cutting the defective stretch of cable and replacing 1 3000 acter Length with a temporary replacenent cable. Between 17 and 22 SEQQET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 150, 151, 153, and April, when the tap was discovered, cabl 187 were inoperative at various times, During this period Soviot signal troops and East Gernon Post and Telograph tech~ nictans worked fr: fetablish and maintain con- tically to re munications. Telephone Lines serving Marshal Grechko, the Consander of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), and Goneral Kosyakin, Malyi, Taaronko, and Dudakov failed, tempo- rarily depriving those officers of conmnications. Faults on cable FK 150 put tho Main Soviet Signal Center in Germany out of communications with Moscow, and the Soviet Air Warning Control Center in East Germany similarly Lost its communications. German technicians began a testing program based at Karlshorst and Mahlow and working north from Mahlow. A major fault on FK 150 was discovered and repaired at Wassaannsdort on 18-19 April, and on 19 April # second major fault on the sane cable was discovered at Schoenfeld only two ktlonotors south of the tap site. It appears that the faulty section.of cable was replaced with @ now stretch during the early hours of 20 aprit, mut communications remained unsatisfactory, par- B tieularly on FK 150”, and the testing and repair program vy “'FK 150 caused project personnel considerable concern from the day that the cables were reached. It was physically in very poor shapo, with brittle and cracking insulation, The actual tap of FX 180 was delayeg almost three months in doference to 1ts poor physical condition. es Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 continued, This general situation was noted by personnel at the site who checked the tap on the aorning of 19 April and found it to be in good condition with no faults present, Berlin notified Headquarters of this fact on the evening of wailable precautto 20 April, noting taken Including primary one of crossing fingers.” ‘TMrroughout 20 April Soviet operators at Karlshorst. the Wahiow cable chanber, and Zounen/Muensdorf checked PK 150 pairs carrying circuits serving high ranking officials and made itches here necesuary or pousible, Nothing was suid con- corning the testing being conducted to discover the faults or work being done by a Soviet labor force lent to the Geraans to assist in digging up bad stretches of cable. On 21 April n/Muensdort a Kartshorst technician told a colleague in Zos: the FK 150 had not yet been repaired and that another two days' work would probably be necessary to cl ¢ up the trouble Testing and rerouting of circuits were stepped up during the evening of 21 April, and the Soviets shored considerable con- cern over the failure of the Moscow-GSFG Air Warning telegraph channel which had been transferred to FK 160 on 17 April, Lt. Colonel Vyuatk, Chief of the GSFG Signal Center at Muensdors, telephoned Major Alpatov, Chief of the Karishorst Signal Center, at his apartment to inform hin of the fatlure of the Air Warning circuit, They agreed that communications nad to be adeeer Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 seQgst eutablished before morning and Alpatoy left for his duty station. ‘There 18 no Significant information available on the actual progress of the testing and repair program proper from 0300 hours on 20 April to 0050 hours on 22 April. On the basis of available information. however, it seems probable that (a) the testing program continued north until a fault was located near the site and a decision was made to replace an entire section of cable vhich eubraced the tap site; or (b) the re- peated faulting coupled with the age and physical condition of FK 150 led the opposition to the conclusion that the only effective remedy was to replace the cable, section by section, and that this program vas inaugurated somewhere south of our site and continued northward until the tap was discovered At approximately 0050 hours on 22 April, 40 or 50 men wore scen on the east side of Schoenefelder Allee, deployed along the entire area observable from our Installation, digging at three to five foot intervals over the lucation of the cable and, incidentally, the tap chanber. At approximately 0200 hours the top of the tap chamber was discovered, and at 0210 Russian speech was heard from the aicrophone in the tap chamber. The first fragnents of speech indicated that the dis- covery of the tap chamber aroused no suspicion anong those present. A small hole was broken in the tap chanber roof Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 sucker permitting limited visual observation of the chamber, and a 2/ Soviet captain “wae brought to the spot. After some discus- sion all agreed that the discovery was a manhole covering a repeater point, and the working crew began enlarging the hole to gain acces to the “repeater point. nile the working party was uncovering the tap chamber, Major Alpatov and Lt. Colonel Vyunik discussed the conmunt- cations situation in a rambling telephone conversation at Approximately 0230 hours. They indicated relief at the res- toration of Air Warning Conmunications with Woscos, and Vyuntk went on to express suspicion about the continued trouble on ¥K 150. In context it appears that this suspicion was directed at the failure of the Germans to clear up the diffi- culties on FX 150 once and for all. In any event, Alpatov clearly did not share his colleague's doubts. The general tone of this conversation was xelaxed and casual, coapletely in keeping with the character of the two men, both of vhom we know well. The conversation appeare to be a clear indi- cation that, as of 0230 hours on 22 April, neither of these responsible officers was aware of the existence of the tap. 2/ presumably Captain Bartash, an engineer who later received an unspecified avard fron Marshal Grechko for the Aiscovery of the tap. Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Meanyhite back at the vité the work of enlarging @ hole to give full access to the tap chamber continued. At approxt- antely 0250 hours an unidentified Soviet Colonel arrived on the scone, presumably in response to « request for guidance by the working party. ‘The Colonel did not appear to be x signal officer wince he took no active part in the investign- tion and remained on the scene only for a short tine. Having enlarged the hole in the tap chamber roof, the workers saw for the first time the cables and the trap door on the floor of the chanber, They asyuned the trap door to be “sone sort of box" and had no suspicion of the true nature of the installa~ tion. At approximately 0300 hours barriers were erected to Keep inquisitive onlookers avay from the excavation and it was suggested that someone be sent to the Signal Directorate, presumably to obtain relevant cable data, At the sane time the first German voice was heard, in conversation with a German-speaking Russian, ‘The Geraan stated that two trucks munt have passed the spot without locating tt. The Russian Answered that "Soviet troops are coming 26 well,” and added that they mist wait "until morning” for the decision as to what further work would be undértaken. mite the f@ developments were taking place, Vyunik held a telecon with the Air Warning Center in Moscow in which he referred to the move of the GSFG Air Waraing Center and Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 discussed, in detail, communication arrangerents necossi- tated by this move. This revealing teleconference tends to support other evidence indicating that as of 0300 hours the true nature of the installation had still not been established. The work of excavation continued, and fragments of con- versation connected with it were picked up by the tap chaaber microphone. A German-speaking Russian commented that "some- body has cone from there and there are fewer workers there, suggesting that similar work wis in progress at another point. The Russian gave instructions that’ nothing in the installation was to be touched, A German remarked that the chanber might be connected with aewage work and proposed that plans of the sewage system be obtained from the responsible authorities. ‘The Rusatan anvered that they already had this information and that the plang showed “that chamber” to be 120 acters away from this point. At about 0320 hours, when sti11 sore of the tap chasber was revealed and a better view of the in- terior obtained, those present began to speculate vaguely about its exact nature and the tise of ite construction. One of the Soviets, probably an officer, suggested that it might have been built during the war, possibly for “Vhe Che” (Russian abbreviation for "high frequency transmission," but used loose- ly to denote anything connected with secure communications.) Shortly after 0330 hours, the Soviets left the site by motor Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 vontele, presumably to report their findings. For approxi- mately one and one-half hours = from 0330 to 0500 - no sounds or voices were recorded. At approximately :0415 hours Yyunik telephoned Alpatov's aparteont in Karlshorst and asked Alpatoy if he had spoken with General Dudakov, Chief Signal Officer, GSFG. Alpatov waid that he bad, that he was getting dressed, and that he would go to his signal center as oon as possible. Yyunik told Alpatey to telephone him at the GSPG frame room at Zossen/Muensdort, adding, "When vo speak we must do so care~ fully. We know what the matter ts, 60 we will spoak care— Deputy Chief of the Lines Department, GSFG, had left Yuensdort at 0625 to go “there.” Vyunik, in a resigned tone, then added that all that remained for him and Alpatov to do was to sit and wait. In due course Lt. Colonel Zolechko arrived at the site, accompanied by an unnaed Colonel and Captain Bartash, the @ ' SECRET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Commander of the working party. By this time the Sovicts apparently had brought eireuit diagraas to the gite and vere aware of the pair allocations on the affected cables, There wae considerable discussion of the discovery, and one of the crew actually entered the chamber and made a superficial and Ancouclusive examination. shortly afterwards the statement, “the cable is tapped," was made for the first time on the At about this time (0625 hours) Lt. Colonel Yyunik tele- phoned Major Alpatov and asked whether he had received the “task” and whether its meaning was clear, Alpatov replied that he had received and understood the assignnent. Speaking in unusually vague terms, Vyunik instructed Alpatov to take over two low-frequency channels, presusably provided by the KGD signals organization, (These channels would provide tele~ phone communications between Berlin and Wuensdort via overhead Line and would by-pass the tapped cables.) Vyunik added that they could continue necessary technict) discussions on the new facilities Although teletype traffic continued uatil the tap wires were cut - at 1535 hours on Sunday afternoon ~ the last tele- phone call of any interest was placed sonctine between 0800 and 0900 hours on 22 April, when an agitated General speaking from Marshal Grechto's apartment attempted to contact Colonel ® s Edger Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 . Berlia Rotsyubs, who was then acting for General Dibrov: Commandant. Unable to locate Kotsyuba, the General talked to colonel Ponozanovskit, Chief of Staff of the Berlin Garrison, ing the urgency of hig cell, Pomozanovakit promised to find Kotsyuba at once and got him to return the call. The return call was not tatercepted, but there appears to be no doubt that Marshal Grechko had by this tine been Inforned of the discovery and wished to discuss it with Colonel Kotsyuba A few telephone calls were attespted after this, but the oper ators refused to place the calls, and in one case a Karlshorst operator said, “I won't put you through to anyone. Don't ring, that's all, I won't answer you any more. It's in the order.” Between 0700 and 0800 hours a number of additional Soviet officers arrived at the excavation, including Colonel Gusev of the KGB Signals Regiment. A mussian-speaking German was heard to remark that a “commission” was expected, and a Soviet officer said that they would await the arrival of this commis sion before making a decision as to what the next step would be. Im answer to a question as to whether anything should be disconnected, the sane officer stated that nothing shoule be ‘one beyond making motion pictures of the chamber, He added, however, that the hole providing access to the chaaber should be enlarged and a detaiied inspection should be carried out. ‘The general discussion continued, and the possibility of some ody Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 form of explosive booby trap in the chasber was discussed at some length. There was widespread belief that the trap door which in fact provided access to the tuanel proper, vas a "box" or “battery box" possibly involving @ booby trap. One of the Soviet officers, probably Zolochko, suggested that, after every- ‘thing had beon carefully noted and recorded, a grappling tron could be attached to the "box" in order to tear it away, "If ‘there 19 no explosion,” he said. “then ¥e can calmly go ahead and deal with it." Qc eee eee age for getting from here to there!" ap Sone of those present apparently believed that the t an old one and had been abandoned due to recent faulte e fon the cable. During this discussion the microphone was a Ae Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 seQgeT twice noted, but was not recognized for what it vas. In the firet instance the speaker said, “That ts not a microphone land in the second it was described as “a black ball." ‘The general discussion continued, vith speculation as to the nature of the “battery box” and with soveral comments that it should be possible to identify the tappers “from the make of the materiale” and the techniques employed. Yhile the Ger mang began work evlarging the hole around the tap chamber, the Soviets discussed in some detatl the order in which technical experts and administrative representatives would carry out their inspection. ‘The Soviets identified the lead-off cable as “not ours," indicating that after the inspection they planned to disconnect the lead-off cable and to “check how far it goes from here" - probably by weans of electrical measurements, It se evident that at thie time (approximately 1130 hours) the Soviets and Germans were still unaware of the existence of the tunnel, the means of access to the tap chanber, or those re- sponsible for the tap. At approximately 1145 hours one of the German heard to exclaim, "The box is an entry to a snaft!” From the tenor of the ensuing conversation it would seem that 2 emall hole had been nade near the still-intact trap door. The Germans debated the removal of the trap door, but continued to work at and around 1t despite the alternate Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 seQaet ‘suggestion that “we should open up the road opposite untit ve reach the cable or the shaft." By approxinately 1230 they had renoved the hinges and entered the lower part of ‘the tap chasber. The padlock which secured the trap door fro below was examined and vas identified as “of English origin.” Failing to open the door separating the tap chaaber fron the equipment chanber, the Germans, after approximately twenty win utes, broke anole through the wall and guined visual access to the equipment charber, which they described as “a tong passage.” By 1300 they evidently had enlarged the access Lote and described “a completed installation - a telephone exchange. . An instariation for Listening 1a /Rohoeranage7. aa ttonai notion pictures were made and frequent excla- mations of wonder and admiration were heard. At 1420 a Soviet Colonel, probably Zolochko: @ person addressed as Nikolai Ivanovich, probably Major Alpatov; and a Captain, presunably parts fh, entered the chamber and discussed the method used by the tapers in gaining access to the cables. Zolochko evidently stil] believed that this vas done “fro above.” Conversations indicated that the joint Soviet-Geraan commis sion, wontioned earlier, had already visited the site and established the nature of the installation without going into Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Measurements of parts of the Interior were then taken, discussion of the installation became general, and the partici- pants clearly indicated that the means of access and full impli- cations of the operation were finally appreciated. Conversations reflected that all present realized that the planning of the tunnel approach to the cables must have necessitated a very detailed study of relevant maps and plans, The strexs to which the roof of the chambers would be subjected and the necessity of preparing the lead-off cables beforehand vere mentioned, and a German was heard to exclaim, "It must have cost a pretty penny.” A Runsian-apeaking German added, admiringly, “How neatly and tidily they have doue it." tt was decided that work on the tunnel mist have been carried out during the day then the sound of the atreet traffic would drown any noise, rhereas the actual tapping vs juring the night, between done one and two o'clock, when the traffic on the cables is slight.” One of the Germans rather indignatly exclaimed, “what a filthy trick. And where you vould Teast expect it." == to ‘hich another replied, "Unless one had ween tt for oneweif, nobody would believe it.” Betwoon 1515 and 1530 hours the tap wires were cut, and at about 1545 the attention of the Germans began to concentrate on the microphone itself. One of thea assuned it to be an “alarm device - probably a microphone,” to give warning of 1s sPRRET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 approaching motor traffic, and added that it ought to be photographed. At 1550 hours work began on dismantling the microphone. Shortly afterward the microphone went dond and, after 11 sonths and 11 days, the operational phase of PBJOINTLY was completed. Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 sacgET APPENDIX B (ULATION OF HE INTELLIGENCE DERIVED Set forth below are a recapitulation of intelligence derived from the REGAL saterial and sone typical consuser consents. SENERAL ‘The REGAL operation provided the United States and the Britioh with « unique source of current intelligence on the Soviet Orbit of @ kind and quality which had not been avail- able since 1948. Responsible U.S, and British officials con- sidered PRIOINTLY, during its productive phase, to be the prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in Burope, 1f not world-wide. Following are examples of itens of intelligence for which REGAL was either a unique or nost timely and reliable source POLITICAL ‘Throughout the Life of eource (11 May 1035 - 22 April 1956) we were kept currently informed of Soviet intentions ia Borlin; REGAL provided the inside story of every “incident occurring in Berlin during the period - = story which was in seQger Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 each case considerably at variance with accounts of the sane Ancident as reported by other sources. REGAL showed that, contrary to eatinates by other sources, the Soviets at that tine did not intend to relinquish their prerogatives vit-a- via the other three occupying powers despite continually socreasing preasure from the Kast Germuns to assert their sov- ‘eretguty in Hast Berlin as well as in the rest of East Germany. REGAL provided a clear picture of the unpreparedness, confusion, and indecision anong Soviet and Hast Gerean officials whenever An incident ocourred in East Berlin involving citizens of one of the Western powers ablishvent of an ‘The Soviet decision to implement the East German Army way disclosed by REGAL in October 1955, i time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva to that effect. REGAL provided a detailed account of the Soviet progran for implementation of the decisions of the 20th Party Congr: including measures to suppress unrest anong Soviet nuclear scientists resulting from a too-Literal interpretation of the nev theory of collective leadership and the denigration of Stalin, ‘The progress of Marshal Zhukov's attempt to curtail the influence of the political officer in the Soviet Arned Forces (which led to his subsequent downfall) was traced in REGAL Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 material from the autumn of 1955 to mid-April 1956. REGAL provided considerable intelligence on the relation~ snipe between various key military and political figures of the Soviet hierarchy and on relations between the Poles and the Soviet military forces stationed in Poland. MILITARY General 8, Reorganization of the Soviet Ministry of Derense. b, Soviet plane to Amplenent the War Ww Pact by increasing Soviet-Satellite ailitary coordination. ¢. Iaplementation of the publicly announced intention to reduce the strength of the Soviet Araed Fores 4, Identification of several thousand Soviet officer personnel die 8. Developneat of an improved nuclear delivery capability in the Soviet Air Aray in East Germany >. Re-equipment of the Soviet Air Aray in Bast Germany with new bonbers and twin-jet interceptors having an airborne radar capability. £2. Doubling of the Soviet bomber strength in Poland and the appearance there of a new fighter division. 3 sQRET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 4, Identification and location of approximately 100 Soviet Air Force installations in the USSR, East Germany, and Poland, including a number of key aircraft fnctort Ground Force: Order of battle of Soviet ground forces within the USSR not previously identified or not located for several years by any other source. b. Soviet training plans for the spring and early sumser of 1956 in Bast Gernany and Poland. fe, Wdentifseation of several thousand Soviet f1e1é eo post nunbers (used by G-2 to produce Soviet order of battle intelligence) Navy, 8. Reduetion in the status and personsel strength of the Soviet Naval Forces b. Organization and administrative procedures of the Headquarters of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and Soviet on the Baltic Coast Naval Bas SCIENTIFIC Identitieation of several hundred personalities assoct- ated with the Soviet Atomic Energy (AE) Program. Association of certain locations in the USSR with AE activities. 4 reget Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 srOwet organization and activities of Wismuth SDAG (iniog uranium ia the Aue area of Bast Gernay), OPERATIONAL, Organization, functions, and procedures of the Soviet Intelligence Services in East Germany; identification of several hundred Soviet Intelligence personalities in East Germany and Woscow TEPICAL CONSUMER ComsnnETS March 1956 ACSI/Aray - "REGAL has provided unique and highly valuable current information on the order of battle, training, organization, equipment, and operations of the Soviet and East German Ground Forces. In addition, the scope and variety of the types of inforaation found in REGAL have confirmed that Lt 1s our best source of early warning of Soviet attack.” ACSI/Atr ~ “Me numerous productions received from the REGAL project have been an extrenely valuable con- tribution to the Intelligence Community in our common REGAL haw provided valuable information on atomic energy activities in ast Germany, including Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 organizational relationstips, persoulities, procurenent details, and uranium ore shipment data. The nunber of hitherto unknown atonte energy localities, personalities and activities disclosed in REOAL traffic is impressive.” CIA/ORR - "In referenced memorandue ve indicated our great interest in financial material of all kinds which Taanks to your cooper was available in REGAL material, tion we are exploiting the material with great succe: Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 e Ne APPENDIX C TYPICAL AMERICAN PRESS COMMENT Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 WASHINGTON POST V May 1950 Phe Tunzel of Love ted Sates Canennet has not ye wal ialeny @ he eel and Eat Corman ng be Syed hntog tne Camienaa hive made dicey Ter ‘peal propa {ENineZaie te mreuppg a oe ie Se dead Ine sa seecamimenit rare fond Self amuse ane Ey tet ave sed sudan tee Mon a Angra reterefles an thereby ‘ieee sence mien in Wer Germeny at Then save we tee 0 Tinea ht the tevin at Vite toe es ane aa ‘ih aera Sifnage aus ge Im whch tbe Commas me ted ety tam ob Tani ant and ue orn ae tb Teepe deg tow Carma ae tbe Pranrer ele rns eeanty eoreces ne speed {hot he Ameteae Tne, he scene pode tren oat be went produc of anew seal re i 3 Ieeend pra naan Dery the mega ef Teerure iy 4 an eneepns Union ser fm ts Peanghvana col fe 1 parn wat tbe faire at Unie commands te eerle Seder, he idee of Hote, dat compiled Gini evr eee oe Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 TIME MAGAZINE 7 May 1956 aus BERLIN Votkspolie’ Went Bee ea amt a ree in Recta te Soren Mk fad Sah Ct Sects The Sig Cater. For many Teekacyeneiee sMeee Sie tae SS ee oniertee oo eT Bea, : aaianaiy | 5 1, rd Wi thea by te aed 3 Pe, caer Saas: Soon ; eta ice of New on ee cher wot they ere Bk i i i ih i i i ‘hee aioe tsb Se ree e@ 11lileat tanner Ea i iz f i # es tthe ee ie 3 bet ew hae siecle hee ce mmol cone Sem | Sf the US my Sia Ca WY i : i i : t i ¥ tee Hu ie rapa rt £ ham Bee farce Bet mentee, oa | Oho Rf aa Sasser see | ee adel | Sore |e ee Spee pte pee pe |S Gury cue fe font ie mint Rt: | $8 rhe cyte UB Soni dt o Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 = BOSTON Ost MAY A4I1g55 Ges mf 267.072 | i 3} 196496} i Hope fe ls True’ that Anti lneti ag steal Bec,tpged telephone cable, a [recorded conversations over the Rod communication net- trerk whch thee mai ih cone faore tl dating» contd Yat of te Spy tel fo teerondonts, gives cs some fois hapa ? re da tou a Aen in cagete were hat mare. i fac we ware bog ‘Rink tat what the ral Btelicenn Aprer nec 1-ne Sake) a apg dea usu cet Bu a Bie ag ‘the So sgtralon concerning, Suck tay operations And ‘fstalation East i Rie hope that American intelignce apents, hase Ynturated the Soviet" department of foreign alta: : ‘lated western syrpahlzers in te Bear a the Soviet) ‘urexuracy ned wari a team of roped cope! ‘et imporact. Soviet et tbes Claas 109 ‘ei dorms toearts Nhe be a ths because thats pressly what tha ‘Soviet spy network aed probably doing Fgh Bow Jn th United States. ‘Th ert ot i for tat stark pceaty the word of nea power pollen Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 | aa i2ies | apvocarz i i Ac te Th Pe ey Se OM si 1 : | conetuany ne nenty in td : ‘sognn wich daca not aeeoat fc 18, ee Rae : Eo Rear rae eae 2 Scare mice sno] [Mtoe Manse eiconere tbat shee ane a Wignane enter toa Cee er el reg Rete fee eye eS ‘Gur otis have expressed Dorset ae ise os Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 of 23,166Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 (OCA IRE RAVE ORDD VIRETAP TUNNEL = DABTER ‘lox Drotor at 6:00 Patf, over 1a (Chicago) and the HE Radio Network mind now under the heading, special report, part ones Gpoet-Seicain-stti-ter freeman wFy no turned cub to bo not co_tuntpey fa iin hig svereeivensea-his. nothing om us. We havo & SEE gander tho conaunist sector of Derlin and which tho FEE posed to the Ligne of cay, am you probably know, @ short This tuo. Well, eur 10 eorrospondont, good friend and colleagve, Thine Baritelsor, bas investigates the story of tha wiretap tunno) End’ ho. naya thore'g just one cofelusion ~~ it'e curse Wo dug ity wie oyuigped it with olectrorse equiprent to listen 4n on eoumnist Best'velSan conversations for a viele year before they found wa cute sprosunably wo should be estarrasaed but robody in Bor}én 46. in facts there La'a hint of Arerican end Yost German price in iov Ing that we pulled off an osptonage trick on the Reds for a changes Ofcourse, tho Bast Germans aro nakite, a good thing of it by con Rheting edure tnreagh the, tunnel to Loprevs thats people with tho Gastanininess of the Anerdosn spies, out thst nay osekfire on thos Sesause the Bast Gaeaano are net beyend getting a quiet chacklo at this oubriteing af their comunlet nularo, "purkholzor tells us that tho United States is atanped oll, vor the Listening post tuna). ov, the tunnel is en the outektrte Gf tow with eur eod being Located under & so-called experinontal fader station becide garbage dump. Tt runs atraight under a ploved ‘Held that hes white border narking poets above it. The Ruasiara ave nade thes openings fer tho tourists, Gro ia near the vrotep, tasthar at @ point about 150 yards out in tho field, When acon exo an Anarican ving shore Sen't sny radar at the experinontal radar Station, che uuil snmver, according te Parkholear, is, we said 48 Sts exporinontal, didn't vo? Mant to make sonething of $7" vyoturetty the army and the government in Washington aren't gotrg to aanit anyeling unieos they havo to, No one tells who Gecered the eavesdropping turral built or who paid for 1t or who Me the Lstening and the digeing. Perhaps 4¢ vas the work of © Seca Berlin outfit, Just a curious bunch of boys. Or perhaps it “ins dove secretly of ardera Sirect fron tho Pentagon or the CENTRAL Tetetaionice AOBICY. Amway, it vas doco well because 1t wasn't Ufscoverod fore year and not tho Russians may bo wondering hex (hich we etrned fo recording all tho phono talks, possibly sncludin Gvorything that went ehrough the avitebboard of the nearby Soviet Girfleid.” So thanks for the Safernation, Fra Burkholzer, and now Ye have a quastion for you, Way don't we open a tourist entrance ‘tt ur ond of tho tunnol and cagh in on the publicity? Stop up, ore end-all. Only a quarter. See nodera espionage in electronic Zorn and oli undergrochd, ard vho knowa? Poripps you will moat an Secaatonal comanist tourtat. Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 NSW yore DEALD TendNe n Reds Fisek to See | Tap Tunnel’: @ Orn mane lsnaty oted fatr Ned” Seat Sora Soren Sa enalercsi e | RS ae the Coma acre ue me ef [ret Srey samara fr te Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 sage p : i REDS NAW 6 ‘ > re Ty Peas a Thank You © Mis Aa carers] AUTCINE DRT EY, anual alert aetna na » QUTSIDE BERL sie ae a econo! { Ca + Entiat ed ede ane umet pecl Let S U.S, Repartars Ss Daeg sn oe i) on SS Sn Tour Eerie Boro "ios may eae Pea ewes. Te wes vt 2 tote a Take tw reveal we sections yeh “tumnehvielore we Soiled angles" "doin mete ag eerie ef fg ad it is io tae saspotie Tene kd. te nae brary eres oder rsd ois om Be [n'y the usa lr bese a [Shomicia Tne communi, E*vaps oe eusreey a, pure ud that 26 tlepene } a te led fen in thee ig enbles were ent ot Ape 2k when PhepescentTehig_ fs Thee sanduneedexcoeno minat s-rtendeid, Bans UStcomt and culpa wen aaNet apt] Chdoago Te tune ‘Se wet wed forte Tp, Lars eae “AU Dine (ns oo alge wee Since te tne say an Ae Regie Sate kee oe heh tne ama silean manciectoreres, i ‘But Germs, ht seen fea Oy wre tan 13.0 " ~~. {German “woruer‘ecogts,| "Rede San Gass Sie Commuted") pupa sent hot and oie Germans Adrve Fest | water ta am iy eononing Sancti wits ext, Or oe cy ba Baron, fon nusany ode of bac ects Ge BUA oad coat pdeeth waciane Sa ae Vane ok Brau ve Saatloncme hel gci Pam rey sea the Neos Say oe Ete a9 pow: ee ee tae aia a ce moa, sine “end Be oe Se cae ie rohit “ea Safi hada oe ia ete beet] Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 a aveApproved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 APPENDIX D NOTE: This analysis was prepared by the PRJOINTLY ‘SEAF! as part of the wrap-up of the operation. ROUND-UP OF EAST GERMAN PRESS REACTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE WIRETAP TUNNEL AT THE BERLIN SECTOR BORDER (Sources as Indicated) The following 1s an analysis of the Bast German press reaction to the discovery of the wiretap tunnel at the sector border between West and Bast Berlin, During the period under yeview - 24 to 26 April 1956 - a total of 31 datlics per day and four weeklies wore available for scrutiny; however, only the dailies reported and compented on the tneident. Wostly concerned with reporting and commenting on the incident were the Bast Berlin papers which, in some instances, devoted full pages of their local sections to reports and pic- tures on the tunnel in addition to their front-page or second- page accounts of developsent: The’ provincial press gave front~ page treatneat to the matter only in few instances, generally retrained from large articles or comentaries, and often carried pictorial material with only brief explanations, The least coverage was noted in the provincial press of other Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 ‘than SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands ~ Conmuniat Party Germany) affiliation; none of these papers published any commentary, or any cartoon of their own, on ‘the subject up to 26 April, in fact. Describing the tunnel as inspected by the journalists after the Soviet press conference. the papers pointed out that the installation was well designed and constructed, that the installation was costly and equivalent to a modern tele: phone exchange, and that the material - of British and Ameri- can origin - used in the installation wae of auch quality a e The Hast erin paper, which vere 3 \ding in the reports on the issue, treated the matter as a dent” which represents an “international scandal" and a “breach of the norms of international law." The papers, in their commentaries, addressed the West Berlin Senat, denand- ing an all1-Berlin understanding and stressing the nec sty for united action, and insinuated that Berlin is being kept divided merely for the purpose of providing the espionage centers in West Berlin with a bs for launching provocations eral and provincial against the GDR, Other conmentaries by c papers contained calls for vigilance and for defense prepared: Only one paper printed an editorial on the incident. Tn commenting on the incident the press did not draw a line oer Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 between the different developments, such as the press confer- ence, the Soviet protest, the GDR Governnent prot: + ete. but, as @ rule, the commentaries dealt with the incident as the first reaction of the West Berlin a whole. Later, wi prees was available, the central press swooped down upon the Wont Berlin press for attempting to belittle the incident and to divert attention from the of the aatter.” er Lous ‘The few caricatures published by the papers were designed to slander the Anericans. Day by Day Reaction 24 Apes 191 On 24 April 1956 #ix East Berlin papers printed the ADN (Allegeneines Deutsches Kachrichten Bureau - General German News Oftice) release of individual reports on the Soviet press conference, reported on the inspection of the tunael by the Journalists, and carried excerpts from General Zarenko's letter of protest (1 - 6). DER MOROEN and BERLINER ZEITUNG (5 and 6) printed only the abbreviated version of the ADN release, Six provincial SED papers (7 - 12) carried announcenents of the discovery, brief reports on the press conference, and merely an announcement to the effect that a letter of protest has been sent to the American Chief of Staff. Only NEVER TAG, Frankfurt/Oder, printed the long version of the ADN release (12). Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 de Provincial papers of other party affiliations carried no reports. 25 Aprit 1956 On 25 April 22 provincial papers came out with the ADN version of the report on the discovery of the tunael (13 - 34); the Six provincial SED papers which had carried a brief announe ment the day before followed up their reports by nore extensive Accounts of the press conference, the letter of protest, and the inspection of the tunnel (13 - 18). Papers of other party affiliations joined in the reporting campaign on this day. Only MAERXISCHE VOLKSSTIMME, of 211 provincial papers, published an “eye-witness” report containing a description of the tuanel and quoting individuals who had voiced their “outrage at such a thing” which produces new material for conflicts in foreign policy (16), SCHVERINER VOLKSZEITUNG, which printed the long version of the ADN release, reproduced the first picture of the tunnel (22) Meammhile the central press, in addition to supplenentary Feports on the discovery of the tungel, descriptions of the tunnel, and pictorial aaterial showing sections of the tunnel auch ae the plifter station, ete., case out with the first commentaries. A total of five conmontarion appeared on this day. The prea treated the matter as a bitterly serious nts an “international scandal atfatr" which repre: she Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 ‘preach of the norms of international law," pointing out that the United States violated the fuenos Aires Treaty on Telecon- munications on the one hand and the GDR's sovereignty oa the other hand (35 - 39). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND spoke of « new, hitherto unsurpa ed “gangster act” of the U.S. secret service (95), NATIONAL ZBITUNG termed the incident ae 2 “sensational yed that there 1# (38), ana international scandal" (38), NEUE ZEIT stré no word "strong enough to brand such wickedae: JUNGE WELT declared that “this had to happen Just to those who always babble about Conunist infiltration but can never prove it" (39). ALL commentaries were addressed to the West Berlin Senat, denanding an all-Berlin understanding for the Purpose of discontinuing the "stubborn adherence to KATO policy," achieving the withdrawal of the “cold war experts of a1] shades," dissolving the espionage centers in the "frontier city.” and achieving « “cormalization in the situation in Berlin.” Three papers reported on a meeting held by the National Front at Alt-Glienteke, at vhien the population adopted a resolution protesting against this "provocation." Franz Fiscuer, First Secretary of the Kreis Treptow SED Executive Boara, 1S reported to have said at the mecting that the People of West Germany and West Berlin have to pay for this installation through the occupation costs and to have termed the tunnel as “an appendix of the cold war" (98, 40, and 41). sERQET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 TRIBUENE, moreover, referred to a report by the HAMBURGER ANZEIGER to underacore the fact that the nstallations in the tunnel were not of provisional nature but designed for long service (40). DER MORGEN, describing the tunnel, added that West German correspondents who inspected the tunnel noted with satisraction the declaration of the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel that “quite obviously, Geraan quarters have no part in this" (41), while NATIONAL ZEITUNG briefly referred to an announce- ment made at the Alt-Glienteke meeting to the effect that the ‘tunnel open for public inspection (36). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reproduced the first caricature on the issue. The cartoon showed a garden which is divided into two indicating the "Desooratic Sector” - full of parte by a a: flowers, and the opposite aide - a barren piece of land with ‘4 wolenill topped by a flag with the dollar sign. A strong arn ip pulling out of @ hole in the Democratic Sector a mole wearing "U.S,"-uarked earphones, sone sort of Aray trousers with plugs and pliers showing from the pocket, and 4 U.S. Aray cap bearing the legend "Espionage." The cartoon is captioned, "Do Not Burrow in Other People's Yards” (95). 28 April 1956 ‘On 26 April 27 papers continued reporting on the i (42 - 68), In 17 instances the reports were supplenented with pictures as outlined above, A total of 15 papers 6 sBqRET Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 printed the text of, or large excerpt frox, the press release on the GDR Government protest (42 - 56). Six papers reported fon the inspection of the tunnel by the population, the press, and representatives of the diplomatic corps (42, 48, 59, 60, 85, and 67), Four papers referred to a report carried by the Wost Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL according to which Western journalists vere protibited from inspecting the wouth of the tunnel on the Western side (42, 43, 51, and 58), and four papers referred to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMBINE which had spoken of an "eloquent silence” about the affair on the part of the Anericane (42, 51, 55, and 58). A total of four papers reported on the Alt- Glionicke aceting (51, 60, 61. and 67). NEVES DEUTSCHLAND gave excerpts from Fisher's speech, quoting him to the effect that the people of West Berlin, in particular the SPD xexbers, Will be invited to inspect the tunnel (51), Three papers re- produced caricatures ($1, 52, and 56), six papers carried commentaries (51, 52, 53, $4, 57, and 58), and one paper cane out with an editorial (55). Three Bast Berlin papers, through ‘their commentaries, swooped down upon the West Berlin pre: for ite attitude tovard the incident, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND accused the West Berlin papers of attempting to belittle the incident and of lauding the efficiency of the Axerican “goblins, Adding that the West Serlin press ie thus making vain atteapts to divert attention from the seriousness of the matter (51). 7 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 SUNGE WELT lashed out at the Yost Berlin DER TAG, saying thet, by tte opinion, the West Berlin paper manifests its total los of any sense of decency. Besides, DER TAG is not in the least Gtaturbed about the violation alec of west Berlin's territory (52). NATIONAL ZBITUNG held that DER TAG now admitted what tt has been denying at all tines, namely that West Berlin is a de facto part of NATO, adding that DER TAG now regards as uatomary " the military espionage of the United States on GDR territory in addition to the “customary frontier-city policy,” the "customary" partition, and the “customary” diversionist activities of the XGU and other underworld organizations, The paper stressed that all Berliners fully gree with the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which id that the people must demand the discontinuation of “auch things” (58) NEUE ZEIT, carrying the only editorial, said that the wire- a NATO tapping post is 4 feature of West Berlin's misuse bane, The paper emphasized that GDR policy will continue to serve al1-Gernan understanding aod relaxation of international tensions, “But it mist be kept in mind that the success of this policy wil1 not only depend on the voluse of the appeal for peace but also on our preptredness to defend our homeland 25 well as on our vigélance regarding the prevention of can- gers resulting from the fact that one part of Berlin has be- come a frontier city against peace," the paper added. "what 8 sekreT Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 seQger we need are contact points above the ground and in full Light, namely 211-Gorman talks, and not underground trenches in the cold war" (55). The first commentaries carried by provincial papers dealt with the incident as an example of proof for East German preas reports on hostile espionage. VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-warx-Stadt, jatw "a document” vhich is pointed out that the tunnel repr quite apt to dispel a1 doubts of those who have hitherto been inclined to regard Kast Goraan press reports about the underground activities of Western eapionage services 1" (57). MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME quoted several “exaggerai workers vho voiced their indignation over “such a vileness” which makes German unity more difficult to demonstrate that the "Western side” te just as quiet about this “unpleasant affair" an the population ig outraged (53). And LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG stressed that anyone reading about the discovery of the tunnel will inevitably weigh the Soviet attempts at saintaining pence against the efforts made by the U.S. espio~ nage service, adding that this "breach of international law" aise places the Fest Berlin administration “in « peculiar Light." Te paper xeminded its readers that war preparation, which "formerly marched on Prussian Army boots," is now marching on “Aserican rubber soles, chewing gum, and tapping telephone lines" (54). omgasr Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's caricature showed an American soldier try- ing in vain to "milk" a disconnected, oversized telephone re~ ceiver into a bucket marked "CIC" while another soldier is ‘thoughtfully standing by (51), JUNGE WELT reproduced a car- toon showing & mole wearing a U.S. Aray cap on its head and & telephone receiver on its back halting before a sign which yarns that “spies are now facing danger." ‘The cartoon is captioned, "The Undervorid that Shuns the Light.” and foot- noted, "Damned, we did not put up that sign” (52). FREIES ps being disturbed by WORT showed rate wearing U.S, Army 4 Russian soldier in the operation of what looks 1ike a another escaping through an opening in the wall. The caricature is entitled, “Uaplensant Surprise,” and footnoted, "It de an Effrontery of the Russians to Disturb Us in Our (Burrowing) Work" (66). e » sPeger Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 srOyer SOURCES 1958 2. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 24 Apr 2. NEUs ZEIT 24 Ape 3. TRIBUENE 24 Apr 4° NATIONAL zerruNo 24 Apr 5. DER MORGEN 24 Apr 6. BERLINER ZEITUNG 24 Apr FRBINEIT 24 Apr 8. SABCHSIScux ZEITUNG 24 Ape 9. VOLKSSTIUNE, Karl-Marx-Stadt 24 Apr 10. MABRKISCHE VOLKSST TOE 24 Apr 11! LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG 24 Apr 12, NEUER TAG 24 Apr 33. FREIREIT 25 Apr 14) SAECHSISCHE ZEITUKG 25 Apr 15. VOLKSSTINME, Kari-Narx-Stadt 28 Apr 16. MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME 17. LRIPZIGER VOLKS2E1TUNO 18! NEUER TAG 19, LAUSITZER RuNDscHAU 20. VOLKSSTIMME, Magdeburg 21. DAS VOLK, Erture 22. SCHIVERINER VOLESZRITUNG 25 Apr 23. YRETE ERDE 23 Abr 24. osTene ZErTuNG 25 Apr 25. VOLKSWACHT. 25 Apr 26 FREIES WORT 25 Apr 27. SAECHSICHES TAGEBLATT 25 Apr 28. DIE UNION 25 Apr 29’ NORDDEUTSCHE NEUESTE KACHRICHTEN 25 Apr 30. MAERKISCHE UNION 25 Apr 31. BRANDENBURGISCHE NBUESTE NABER 25 Apr 32. BAUERN ECHO 25 Apr 33. DER NEUE ¥EG 25 Apr 34. LIGERAL DEMOKRATISCHE ZEITUNG 25 Apr 35. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 25 Ape 36. RATIONAL ZEITUXG 25 Apr 37. BERLINER ZEITUNG 25 Apr 38. NSUE ZEIT 25 Apr 30. JUNGE WELT 25 Apr 40. ‘TRIBUENE 28 Apr 41. DER MORGEN 28 Apr n oe Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9 seQer 29: BERLINER ZEITUNG 28 Apr SAECHSISCIGE ZEITUNG 26 Ape DAS VOLK, Erfurt 26 Apr NEVER TAG 26 Apr FREDIGIT 26 Apr DER MORGEN 26 Apr ‘THIBUENE, 26 Apr BAUBRN ECD 28 Apr DER NEUE. WRG 25 Apr NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 26 ape SUNGE MELT 26 Apr WAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMNE 26 Apr LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG 26 Apr NEUE ZEIT 26 Apr FREIES TORT 26 Apr VOLKSSTINMG, Kard-warx 26 Apr NATIONAL ZBiTUNG 26 Apr 39. VOLKSSTIMUE, Magdeburg 26 Apr 60: MABRKTSCME UNION 26 Apr 61. FREIE EADE 26 Apr 62. LETPZIGER voLKszExTUNG 26 Ape 63. YOLKSwAci 26 Apr 64! SAECHSISCHES TAGEBLATT 26 Apr 65. OSTSEE ZEITUNG 28 Apr 66. LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU 26 Apr 67. DIE UNION 26 Apr 68. SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG 26 Apr 2 ehgarr Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP07X00001R000100010001-9