Hu Jintao and the CCP’s Ideology:

A Historical Perspective
ZHIYUE BO*

The role of ideology in Chinese politics has experienced dramatic changes in

the past six decades. Mao Zedong had tremendous power over the political
institutions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During the Cultural
Revolution, he mobilized the masses against the Party’s institutions in the
name of Mao Zedong Thought. Deng Xiaoping significantly downplayed the
role of ideology in politics by trying to avoid theoretical debates. Jiang
Zemin invented a new thought, “Three Represents,” yet the thought was
detached from his name when it was enshrined in the CCP Constitution. Most
recently, as a result of the political succession at the Sixteenth National
Congress of the CCP, Jiang is no longer the most authoritative interpreter of
the thought. Now it is Hu Jintao, new General Secretary of the CCP, who has
become the official interpreter of the thought. He offered a new interpretation
in his July 1st speech on the “Three Represents” in 2003. It seems that
ideology is no longer a personal trademark. It has become an asset of the
Party and been institutionalized under Hu Jintao because Hu has become the
legitimate interpreter of the Party’s ideology as the General Secretary of the
Party.

In the aftermath of the Sixteenth National Congress of the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP), Hu Jintao, the newly elected General Secretary, seemed to
be trapped in an ideological quagmire. Though his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, had
formally stepped down from the topmost position of the Party, Jiang’s thought, the
“Three Represents,” had been enshrined in the CCP Constitution. It appeared then
that Hu would have to continue to live in the shadow of Jiang for at least another five
years because of Jiang’s ideological residual power. Within less than eight months,
however, Hu had inherited the ideological mantle and become the sole legitimate
interpreter of the “Three Represents” on behalf of the Party.
This study analyzes the role of ideology1 in CCP politics from a historical
perspective. It will examine the rise and fall of Mao Zedong Thought from 1935 to
1969; analyze the role of ideology in Chinese politics in the Deng Xiaoping era;
*
Zhiyue Bo is Associate Professor and Chair of the International Studies Department at St. John Fisher
College in Rochester, New York. He will be the inaugural Joe and Teresa Long Endowed Chair in the Social
Sciences at Tarleton State University in Stephenville, Texas in the Spring Semester of 2005. He received his
Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. He is the author of Chinese Provincial Leaders:
Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949 (Sharpe, 2002). The author wishes to thank three
anonymous referees for their valuable comments on the earlier drafts of this article, Stephine Corso, Nancy
Hearst, and Fong Ruey-Jay for their research assistance, and Jessica Loon and Stephine Corso for their
editorial assistance.

© Journal of Chinese Political Science, vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 2004

JOURNAL OF CHINESE POLITICAL SCIENCE

evaluate Jiang Zemin’s attempts to establish his ideological authority; and present the
institutionalization of ideology under Hu Jintao.

RISE AND FALL OF MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT

As a branch of the Comintern (the Communist International, January 1919-
May 1943), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 2 was heavily dependent on the
Soviet Union for both organizational guidance and ideological legitimacy from 1922
through 1943. At its Seventh Congress in 1945, the CCP proclaimed ideological
independence. In his report on the revision of the CCP Constitution, Liu Shaoqi, a
member of the Secretariat,3 introduced Mao Zedong Thought as the guideline for all
work of the Party and had this statement written in the CCP Constitution. Eleven
years later, at the Eighth Congress of the CCP in 1956, however, Mao Zedong
Thought was deleted from the CCP Constitution. 4 Mao subsequently started a
campaign for propagating Mao Zedong Thought, first through the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) and then through the Red Guards. Eventually in 1969, he
managed to have Mao Zedong Thought reinstated in the CCP Constitution. Although
Mao Zedong Thought provided a centripetal force for the CCP in the years of 1945
through 1956, its deletion from the CCP Constitution had centrifugal effects that led
to the eruption of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the disintegration of the Party and
government apparatuses at all levels in 1967, and the demise of Liu Shaoqi in 1969.

Rise of Mao Zedong Thought

The Chinese communist revolution was basically a revolution of intellectuals,5
and ideology played a very important role in the whole process of the revolution. In
the early years of the CCP, the Comintern was dominant in both organization and
ideology of the Chinese communists. Comintern agents could determine the CCP’s
leadership almost at will. Pavel Mif for instance, a Comintern agent, called, in
December 1930, for a plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP (the Fourth
Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee) to be held in January 1931 without any
consultations. He handpicked his former student from Sun Yat-sen University in
Moscow, Wang Ming, as a member of the Politburo and the de facto leader of the
CCP, although Wang had not been an alternate member of the Central Committee
previously. 6 In September 1931, the Comintern practically decided a provisional
Politburo and appointed Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian), a non-central committee member, as
the head of the Provisional Politburo.7
The Comintern also had the final say in ideological terms. Wang Ming, a
representative of the CCP to the Comintern, wielded more power than the head of the
Provisional Politburo because of his Comintern connection. He was dominant in the
CCP’s political line between 1931 and 1934. His protégés criticized Mao Zedong and
removed Mao from the leadership positions of the Red Army in 1931. Mao’s
advocations of land reform and guerrilla strategies, which had proved to be very

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successful, were dismissed as non-Marxist because, according to students returning

from Moscow, “mountain valleys can’t produce Marxism.”8
At the Zunyi Conference in January 1935, the international faction was
criticized for its military blunders and Mao was rehabilitated as a leader of military
affairs.9 After consolidating his military power in 1936 when he was made chairman
of the Central Military Commission,10 Mao gained de facto political power in 1938
when an oral message from Moscow recognized him, instead of Wang Ming, as the
leader of the CCP 11 (though Mao did not assume the post of chairman of the
Politburo and the Secretariat until March 1943).12 Mao purged internationalists such
as Wang Ming, Zhang Wentian, and Bo Gu from the Secretariat in 1941 and prepared
to reshape the Party in his image.
Beginning in 1942, he embarked on a campaign that was unprecedented in the
history of communist movements: “rectification campaign” (Zhengfeng Yundong).13
He used this campaign to indoctrinate the CCP, especially for high-ranking officials,
with his own thoughts. Towards the end of the Rectification Campaign, many central
leaders began to realize that there was a Chinese Marxism in the form of Mao
Zedong Thought.
The first person to promote Mao Zedong Thought was Deng Tuo, director and
editor-in-chief of the Jinchaji Daily.14 He wrote a newspaper editorial in 1942 titled
“Commemorate the July First, the whole Party should study and master Mao Zedong
Thought.” 15 Chronologically, Deng’s article was the first to acknowledge the
existence of Mao Zedong Thought. But Deng’s rank in the CCP was not senior
enough for his article to serve as a formal introduction to Mao Zedong Thought. It is
Wang Jiaxiang, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, who officially
announced the emergence of Mao Zedong Thought when he published an article in
the Liberation Daily on July 8, 1943, titled “The Chinese Communist Party and the
Road of Chinese National Liberation.” In this article, Wang introduced the concept of
Mao Zedong Thought and elaborated on the process of formation and development of
Mao Zedong Thought. He indicated that Mao Zedong Thought was Chinese Marxism
and Leninism and that its formation and development went hand-in-hand with the
growth and expansion of the Chinese Communist Party.16
Of the so-called “twenty-eight and a half Bolsheviks” (i.e., “international
faction”) who had been trained in the Soviet Union, Wang was the first to be
converted to Mao’s side. His support of Mao at the critical Zunyi Conference in
January 1935 was very important for Mao’s rehabilitation as a military leader. He
was a member of the three-person group (the other two members being Zhou Enlai
and Mao Zedong) on military affairs after the Zunyi Conference. He was also the one
who brought the oral message from the Comintern in 1938 acknowledging Mao as
the undisputed leader of the CCP instead of Mao’s rival, Wang Ming. 17 His
credentials as someone who had been trained in genuine Marxism in the Soviet
Union, and as a top CCP leader with a close connection with the Comintern, made

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his judgment on the authenticity of Mao Zedong Thought as Chinese Marxism and
Leninism highly credible.
Zhou Enlai, another very important leader of the CCP, also rendered his
support of the Mao Zedong Thought. In a speech in August 1943, Zhou highly
praised Mao’s leadership and Mao’s line. He indicated that the Chinese Communist
Party did not make any major mistakes on many critical issues in the past three years
because of the correctness of Mao’s leadership. He testified that those who had
opposed or doubted Mao Zedong’s leadership had been proved to be completely
wrong. He said, “The 22-year history of our Party has indicated that Comrade Mao
Zedong’s ideas have been developed into Chinese Marxism and into the line of
Chinese Communism. Comrade Mao Zedong’s direction is the direction of the
Chinese Communist Party. Comrade Mao Zedong’s line is the line of Chinese
Bolsheviks.”18
Finally, Liu Shaoqi introduced Mao Zedong Thought into the CCP
Constitution at the Seventh Party Congress in 1945. In his report on CCP
Constitution revision, Liu mentioned Mao’s name 105 times19 and sang praises to
Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. “Our comrade Mao Zedong,” Liu said, “is not only
the greatest revolutionary and statesman in the whole history of China, but also the
greatest theorist and scientist in the whole history of China.” 20 “Mao Zedong
Thought,” he continued, “is the only correct guiding thought and the only correct
general line of our Party.” 21 Subsequently, Mao Zedong Thought, defined as “the
thought that has integrated the theories of Marxism and Leninism with the practice of
the Chinese revolution,”22 was written into the CCP Constitution as the guideline for
all the work of the Party.

Fall of Mao Zedong Thought

Eleven years later, however, Mao Zedong Thought was deleted from the CCP
Constitution. At the Eighth National Congress of the CCP in 1956, Liu clearly
downplayed Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. In his political report to the Congress,23
Liu referred to Mao Zedong only four times and did not mention Mao Zedong
Thought at all.24 The highest praise of Mao in this much longer report was Liu’s
reference to Mao as a “great helmsman.” 25 The only indirect reference to Mao
Zedong Thought was Liu’s remark that Mao was good at applying the universal truth
of Marxism and Leninism to the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.26
In Deng Xiaoping’s report on CCP Constitution revision, Mao’s name was
mentioned seven times but Mao Zedong Thought was not mentioned at all.27 In the
resultant CCP Constitution, Mao Zedong Thought as a guideline for the Party was
deleted. No reasons on such an important omission had been given in Deng’s report,
which put more emphasis on the role of the masses than that of a leader and
illustrated the negative consequences of personality cult with the Soviet Union as an
example.28

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According to the CCP’s official interpretation, it was Mao himself who made
the decision not to mention “Mao Zedong Thought” at the Eighth Congress of the
CCP. Between November 1948 and the convening of the Eighth Congress, Mao
replaced “Mao Zedong Thought” with either “the combination of Marxism-Leninism
universal truth with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution” or simply
“Marxism-Leninism” in official documents. 29 In his talk to representatives of
democratic parties and non-party personalities on December 19, 1954, Mao said, “Let
us not use the phrase of Mao Zedong Thought. If we use the phrase of Mao Zedong
Thought along with Marxism-Leninism, they would be mistaken as two different
things; in order to avoid misunderstandings, we will not use Mao Zedong Thought.”30
Moreover, Mao endorsed a circular issued by the Propaganda Department of the
Central Committee of the CCP that advised Party cadres not to use the phrase of
“Mao Zedong Thought.” Mao remarked on the circular that characters like “Comrade
Mao Zedong’s works” may be used when it was necessary to mention Comrade Mao
Zedong.31
This official interpretation for the deletion of Mao Zedong Thought from the
CCP Constitution is questionable for the following reasons. First, whether “Mao
Zedong Thought” as a phrase should be used in every single speech or article by all
cadres is quite different from whether Mao Zedong Thought as the guideline for the
Party should be used. Mao’s instructions for not overusing “Mao Zedong Thought”
as a phrase should not be regarded as evidence that Mao was against using “Mao
Zedong Thought” as the guideline for the Party. Second, there is no specific evidence
that Mao made a decision to delete “Mao Zedong Thought” from the CCP
Constitution before the Eighth Party Congress. All the cases mentioned above are
circumstantial. None of them can substantiate the claim that Mao indeed made a
decision in the process of preparing for the Eighth Party Congress. According to
Roderick MacFarquhar, it was Peng Dehuai, defense minister, who proposed to drop
Mao Zedong Thought from the party constitution. 32 Although there is no direct
evidence for this claim, Liu Shaoqi’s speech at the Lushan Conference in August
1959 seems to suggest that Peng Dehuai be the one to make the proposal. As Liu
stated, Peng was one of those who was enthusiastic about opposing the personality
cult in China in the aftermath of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist
Party.33 According to Liu, Peng suggested not to sing the song of “the East is red”
and not to chant “long live Chairman Mao Zedong.”34 Liu specifically stated that he
was the one who proposed to use “Mao Zedong Thought as the guideline” in the
Party’s constitution, clearing himself of the responsibility of deleting Mao Zedong
Thought from the CCP Constitution. 35 Finally, although Mao never explicitly
expressed his frustrations over the deletion, this does not mean that he was happy
with it. On the contrary, his subsequent actions were attempts at changing this
decision.
It seems that Mao was not entirely pleased with Liu Shaoqi’s political report.
The drafting group responsible for the political report initially included Liu Shaoqi,

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Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Wang Jiaxiang, Lu Dingyi, Hu Qiaomu, and Chen
Boda.36 However, on September 6, 1956 (less than ten days before the convening of
the Eighth Party Congress), Mao asked Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian to help revise
the political report.37 One day later, he told Zhou that the section on the domestic
situation could be substantially revised or rewritten.38
One important reason why Mao Zedong Thought disappeared from the CCP
Constitution in 1956 was external. In February 1956, a few months before the Eighth
Congress of the CCP, the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, delivered a secret speech
to the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress, denouncing Stalin. He attributed the reign of
terror under Stalin to Stalin’s personality cult. Although the CCP as a whole objected
to Khrushchev’s assessment of Stalin, Mao and his associates learned different
lessons. For Liu Shaoqi and others, Khrushchev was right in denouncing Stalin and
in attributing the reign of terror under Stalin to his personality cult. For Mao,
Khrushchev’s assessment of Stalin was not entirely accurate39 and his judgment on
the role of the personality cult was basically wrong.40
In order to prevent a replay of the Soviet Union case in China, Liu and others
decided to reign in Mao’s personality cult. The first step in this direction was to
remove Mao Zedong Thought from the CCP Constitution. Mao, on the other hand,
recognized the possibility of a Khrushchev emerging in China after his death. As
Roderick MacFarquhar noted, “For Mao the 8th Congress may have seemed like a
litmus paper, revealing his colleagues in their true colors. After leading the revolution
successfully for twenty-one years, he may well have been disappointed that a positive
attitude towards himself was not more widely in evidence.”41

Revival of Mao Zedong Thought

Contrary to the consensus that Mao approved Liu and Deng’s reports,42 Mao
in fact was furious about their reports. As his personal physician, Dr. Li Zhisui,
revealed, Mao was not happy with the Eighth Party Congress. Before the convening
of the congress, Mao complained that he was not allowed to participate in drafting
the political report43 and that he would have to resign as the head of state.44 After the
congress, he vented his anger on the subordinates of Liu and Deng. 45 Mao also
complained about the indiscriminate attack on the personality cult. At the Chengdu
Conference in March 1958, he made a clear distinction between correct and incorrect
personality cults.46 He said,
Khrushchev’s complete demolition of Stalin at one blow was also a kind of pressure,
and the majority of people within the Chinese Communist Party did not agree with it.
Others wished to submit to this pressure and do away with the personality cult.
Some people are very interested in opposing the personality cult. There are two
kinds of personality cults. One is correct such as that of the correct things of Marx,
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. These we ought to revere and continue to revere for ever.
It will not do not to revere them. As they held truth in their hands, why should we
not revere them? We believe in truth; truth is the reflection of objective existence.

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Then there is the incorrect kind of the personality cult in which there is no analysis,
simply blind obedience. This is not right. Opposition to the personality cult may also
have one of two aims: one is opposition to an incorrect personality cult, and the
other is opposition to reverence for others and a desire for reverence for oneself.47

Although Mao did not specify who “some people” were, Deng Xiaoping must
have been one of them. In Deng’s report on the revision of the CCP Constitution in
1956, he praised the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party for having
elaborated on the “great importance” of opposing the personality cult 48 and for
having revealed the “serious consequences” of the personality cult. 49 To preempt
Mao’s objections, he quoted Mao to support his argument against the personality cult.
50
That Mao did not react strongly to Deng’s report at the time does not mean that
Mao approved of Deng’s report. From Mao’s perspective, Khrushchev was terrible
because he denounced Stalin after Stalin’s death, but his colleagues in China were
even worse because they removed his thought from the CCP Constitution while he
was still alive! As a result of the deletion of Mao Zedong Thought, Mao’s position
was seriously undermined51 and he sought every opportunity for revenge. As Dr. Li
Zhisui observed,52

The general line laid out at the Eighth Party Congress never had Mao’s support, and
all of his political initiatives thereafter—the party rectification, the Great Leap
Forward, the socialist education campaign, and the Cultural Revolution—were
efforts to undermine the general line laid down by the congress. Not until the
Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress of 1969, which formally purged Liu
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, ousted the majority of representatives of the Eighth
Party Congress, and enshrined Mao’s thought as the country’s leading force, was
Mao’s revenge complete.53

Mao Zedong reversed the general line of the Eighth Party Congress at the
Second Meeting of the Eighth Party Congress in May 195854 and launched the Great
Leap Forward.55 Mao purged Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference in July-August
1959 because of Peng’s direct challenge to Mao’s leadership. With the assistance of
Lin Biao, Mao promoted Mao Zedong Thought first in the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), and then in the whole country. Finally, he launched the Cultural Revolution in
196656 and had Mao Zedong Thought reinstated as the guiding thought for the Party
in the CCP Constitution at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969.57 After thirteen
years, purges of many top leaders, losses of millions of lives,58 and destruction of
political institutions at all levels, Mao finally officially regained his status as the
ideological leader of the Party. Lin Biao made it very clear in his political report to
the Ninth Congress in 1969 that the draft CCP Constitution had clearly reinstated
Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought as the theoretical foundations of the
guiding thought of the Party. This was a great victory for the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution against the Party construction line of Liu Shaoqi’s revisionism as
well as a great victory for Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought.59

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IDEOLOGY UNDER DENG XIAOPING

Having learned the hard lessons from the personality cult and ideological
struggles, Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of the CCP from 1978 to 1992, tried
to avoid ideological debates and to focus on pragmatic issues.60 Using his personal
prestige and power, Deng steered the country away from ideological meltdown six
times during his reign.61
In 1978 when Hua Guofeng, Mao’s chosen successor, continued to follow
Mao’s footsteps in ideological and political terms, Deng Xiaoping provided an
alternative. Hua’s prescription for China was two “whatevers:” “Whatever policy
Chairman Mao decided on, we shall resolutely defend; whatever directives Chairman
Mao issued, we shall steadfastly obey.”62 Deng’s antidote was that practice is the sole
criterion for testing the truth63 and that the Party must seek truth from facts.
In 1979 when the democracy wall movement was getting out of control,
invoking the specter of the Cultural Revolution, Deng introduced the four cardinal
principles 64 (adhering to the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao
Zedong Thought) 65 and removed in the following year the clause in the state
constitution guaranteeing citizens freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom
of debate, and freedom of putting up big-character posters.66
In 1983 when the anti-spiritual pollution campaign threatened to spill into the
economic sphere, affecting economic reform and open-door policies, Deng
intervened to bring it to a halt.67 In 1987, after an anti-bourgeois liberalism campaign
had resulted in the downfall of Hu Yaobang as general secretary, Deng brought the
country back to the course of economic reform and opening to the outside world. At
the Thirteenth Party Congress, he (via Zhao Ziyang) introduced a formula for China:
one center and two basic points. The center is economic development, and the two
basic points are adherence to the four cardinal principles and persistence in the policy
of economic reform and opening up to the outside world.
In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 when conservatives
attempted to persecute Zhao Ziyang and reverse Zhao’s (actually Deng’s) policies,
Deng made it very clear that Zhao’s political report to the Thirteenth Party Congress
should continue to be followed; not a single word should be changed.68
Finally, between 1989 and 1992, Deng took drastic measures to get the
country from futile ideological disputes over whether a policy was “socialist” or
“capitalist” back to the path of economic reforms and opening to the outside world.69
He had a series of pro-reform articles published from Shanghai in 1991 70 and
conducted a “southern tour” in 1992.71

JIANG ZEMIN AND THE “THREE REPRESENTATIVES”

Jiang Zemin, the beneficiary of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, is different
from Deng and Mao in ideology. Unlike Deng who was not interested in ideological

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debates, Jiang was very interested in being regarded as “politically correct.” Unlike
Mao who was strongly committed to his ideology, Jiang was not really committed to
any particular ideology. Jiang saw ideology more as a shortcut to fame and power
than as a vision for the country.72
In his initial years as general secretary of the CCP, Jiang joined the
conservatives in their opposition to economic reform and open-door policies. He
actively participated in a debate on two types of reform in China. In his October 1
speech in 1989, Jiang made a distinction between socialist and capitalist reforms.73
According to him, the “socialist” reform was one that adhered to the four cardinal
principles and the “capitalist” reform was one that was based on “bourgeois
liberalization.”74 Meanwhile, Jiang also echoed the conservatives in their opposition
to the open-door policy under the slogan of anti-peaceful evolution. In his July 1
speech in 1991, Jiang indicated that the ideological arena was “an important arena for
the struggle between peaceful evolution and anti-peaceful evolution” 75 and there
existed reactionary forces in the international community wishing to subvert China’s
socialist system.76
When reformers became dominant in the Party in 1992, however, Jiang
became a champion of Deng’s reform and open-door policies.77 He declared on June
9, 1992 in his talk to the Central Party School that reform is like “steering a boat
against the current:” 78 “one would be driven back if he does not forge ahead.”79 At
the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, Jiang endorsed Deng’s reform and open-door
policies. Instead of arguing that there could be two types of reform as he did in 1989,
Jiang parroted Deng Xiaoping by stating in his political report to the congress that
planning and the market are both economic means for regulating the economy. 80
Instead of calling for a campaign against peaceful evolution in the ideological arena
as he did in 1991, Jiang emphasized that reform and opening up are “the most clear-
cut characteristics of the new historical era”81 and that the goal of economic reform is
to create a “socialist market economic system.”82
After the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee in 1994, at
which Jiang’s authority was formally recognized in a party resolution,83 however,
Jiang deviated from Deng’s line of focusing on economic development and urged the
Party to “talk politics” at the Fifth Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee in
1995. 84 Borrowing phrases and examples from both Mao and Deng extensively,
Jiang’s advice on talking politics was very much like Mao’s admonition of 1962 that
the Party should never forget about class struggle.
Although Jiang paid lip service to Deng Xiaoping’s theory of building
socialism with Chinese characteristics at the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, he
quickly moved to promote his own thoughts on the “three emphases” (emphasis on
learning, emphasis on politics, and emphasis on integrity) in 1998 85 and “three
represents” in 2000.86 His formulation that the Party represented the most advanced
productive forces, the most advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the
broad masses of the Chinese people (known as the “Three Represents”) had the

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appearance of an ideological breakthrough, though it is not clear how much credit he

should receive in producing such a formulation. Although some attributed the origin
of this new thinking to Zeng Qinghong, it is more likely that Wang Huning was
mainly responsible for such a theoretically sophisticated slogan.87
From Jiang’s perspective, an ideological formulation is a means to the end of
personal glorification. Whether this formulation actually means anything for the
Party or the country probably is of secondary consideration for him. It is
understandable then that the Sixteenth Party Congress must have been a
disappointment for Jiang because his name was detached from the thought of the
“Three Represents” when it was enshrined in the CCP Constitution as the guidance
of the Party alongside with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng
Xiaoping Theory.

HU JINTAO AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE PARTY

In contrast, Hu Jintao seems less concerned with his name than with the actual
content of the ideology. Since his assumption of power as General Secretary of the
CCP at the Sixteenth Party Congress in November 2002, Hu has maintained a low
ideological profile in spite of having advanced a number of important new themes.
On the one hand, he has been chanting the “Three Represents” and the “spirit of the
Sixteenth Party Congress.” On the other hand, he has developed new themes of his
own such as “two imperatives” (a motto Hu borrowed from Mao Zedong in reference
to the work style of humility and caution and the tradition of plain living and hard
struggle)88 and “build the Party for the public and govern the country for the people”
(lidang weigong, zhizheng weimin).
Most noticeably, Hu has effected the separation of the former Party leader
from the Party’s ideology and thus institutionalized ideology. In his July 1 speech on
the “Three Represents” in 2003,89 Hu indicated that studying the “Three Represents”
had gone through three stages since February 2000. Three events marked the
beginning of these three stages: Jiang Zemin introduced the “Three Represents” in
February 2000; Jiang Zemin delivered an important speech on July 1, 2001 on behalf
of the Party, systematically elaborating the “scientific implication and basic content”
of the “Three Represents;” and the Sixteenth Party Congress established that the
“Three Represents,” alongside Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng
Xiaoping Theory, would serve as the guiding thought of the Party in the long-run.
In his speech, Hu discussed four issues related to the “Three Represents.”90
First, he believed that the “Three Represents” was consistent with Mao Zedong
Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory and that it was the most recent development of
Marxism in China. Second, he indicated that the “Three Represents” provided a
fundamental guidance for the whole Party and the whole country in their efforts to
build a well-off society in an all-around way. Third, Hu pointed out that the essence
of the “Three Represents” was to build the Party for the public and to govern the
country for the people. According to him, the ultimate test is whether one is able to

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put the “Three Represents” into effect and serve the people. Therefore, all decisions
should be subject to the test of whether the people support, agree, or are happy with
them; all policies should be able to realize, maintain, and develop the fundamental
interests of the broad masses of the people. Fourth, Hu indicated that although the
“Three Represents” provided a fundamental guidance for the social practice of the
new century, it also served as a new beginning for theoretical innovations in view of
new practices and new issues.
Compared to Jiang’s July 1 speech of 2001, Hu’s July 1 speech of 2003 has
the following features. First, Hu’s speech is more analytical than Jiang’s. Jiang
devoted about one third of his speech to the history of modern China since 1840,
describing the historical origin of the founding of the CCP, the founding of the
People’s Republic of China, and the development of economic reform. Hu skipped
these historical descriptions and provided more in-depth analyses of theoretical
implications of the “Three Represents.” Second, Hu’s speech uses fewer political
slogans than Jiang’s speech. Jiang’s speech reminded the reader of the Cultural
Revolution. He described the CCP as a “great, glorious, and correct” (weida,
guangrong, zhengque) Marxist-Leninist political party and as “the core force” (hexin
liliang) of the Chinese people. He shouted the slogan of “Long Live Our Great
Motherland!” “Long Live the Great Chinese People!” “Long Live the Great Chinese
Communist Party!” Hu, on the other hand, did not use these phrases. He used such
terms as “integration” and “sustainable development” instead. More substantively,
Hu’s speech emphasized the fundamental interests of the broad masses of the
Chinese people, while Jiang’s speech stressed the importance of the “Three
Represents” itself. According to Jiang, the “Three Represents” is the basis of building
the Party, the foundation of governance, and the source of all strength. By
emphasizing the importance of the ideological formulation, Jiang was attempting to
draw attention to the originator of the formulation (i.e., himself). According to Hu,
however, it is the people’s support that ultimately determines whether a Marxist-
Leninist party or a political regime can survive. In contrast to Jiang who was
attempting to glorify himself with the theoretical formulation, Hu insisted that the
interests of the people be the starting point and the ultimate goal of the “Three
Represents.”
Most significantly, Hu Jintao reinterpreted the “Three Represents” along the
traditional Marxist line in Maoist tones as General Secretary of the Party. It is clear
that Hu took the interpretation of the Party’s ideology, the “Three Represents,” as his
duty of being General Secretary of the Party. By having fulfilled his duty as general
secretary in this regard, Hu has in fact replaced Jiang Zemin as the sole legitimate
interpreter of the “Three Represents.” In the sense that the general secretary of the
Party has become the legitimate interpreter of the Party’s ideology, we may say that
ideology has been institutionalized under Hu Jintao.91 Hu’s speech was released as an
offprint on July 3, 2003 92 and became the single most important document for
studying “the Three Represents.” 93 Jiang’s attempt to regain some authority on

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interpreting the “Three Represents” later on was not very successful. His only
statement on the “Three Represents” since the 16th Congress was made during his
brief meeting with participants in the PLA’s conference on studying the “Three
Represents” on July 26, 200494 but this causal statement was nowhere comparable to
Hu’s systematic analysis.

CONCLUSION
The Chinese Communist Revolution was based on an ideology, Marxism-
Leninism. In the process of the revolution and its resultant regime, political
supremacy has mostly been based on ideological supremacy. Mao Zedong’s
dominance in the CCP was not complete until the Seventh Party Congress in 1945
when Mao Zedong Thought was written into the CCP Constitution as the guideline
for the Party. Mao’s position was seriously undermined at the Eighth Party Congress
in 1956 when Mao Zedong Thought was deleted from the CCP Constitution. Mao
spent the next thirteen years reinstating Mao Zedong Thought as the guideline for the
Party, and the Thought was rewritten into the CCP Constitution at the Ninth Party
Congress in 1969.
Having realized the negative consequences of the ideological struggles, Deng
Xiaoping chose not to engage in ideological debates during his reign. Six times
between 1978 and 1992, Deng steered the Party away from an ideological meltdown
and directed the country towards economic reform and opening to the outside world.
He urged the Party to seek truth from facts in 1978; introduced the four cardinal
principles in 1979 to ensure political stability; brought the anti-spiritual pollution
campaign to a halt in 1983; reminded the Party of the importance of economic
development and economic reform and opening policies in 1987; reaffirmed the
Party’s policies of 1987 in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, and took
drastic measures between 1991 and 1992 to get China back to the course of economic
reform and opening to the outside world.
Jiang Zemin was an opportunist in ideological terms. He chanted the
conservative themes when the conservatives were dominant, but became reform-
oriented when reformers were more powerful. He parroted Deng at the Fourteenth
Party Congress in 1992 and voiced his loyalty to Deng Xiaoping’s theory at the
Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997. But he soon began to develop his own thoughts:
“three emphases” in 1998 and “three represents” in 2000. For Jiang, the content of an
ideological slogan was less important than the appearance of his originality as a
modern Marxist.
In contrast, Hu Jintao is more concerned with the content than the form of the
ideology. He took over the theory of the “Three Represents” and gave it a new
interpretation. He replaced Jiang’s slogans from the Cultural Revolution with modern
terminologies, and deemphasized the role of the person in ideology and anchored the
“Three Represents” in Maoist principles. Most significantly, Hu replaced Jiang as the

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sole legitimate interpreter of the ideology of the Party as General Secretary of the
Party and thus institutionalized the ideology.

Notes:
1
Due to space constraints, this study will not present and analyze the content of ideologies under
different CCP leaders. It will focus on the role of ideology in Chinese politics. For a systematic study
of ideology, see Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1936); for
a critical analysis of the Marxist conception of ideology, see Martin Seliger, The Marxist Conception
of Ideology: a critical essay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); for an earlier treatment
of ideology as a manner of thinking characteristic of an organization in China, see Franz Schurmann,
Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Second Edition, Enlarged) (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).
2
The CCP was founded in 1921 and joined the Comintern in 1922. For the Chinese text of the
resolution to join the Comintern made at the Second Congress of the CCP, see “The Resolution of
the Chinese Communist Party to join the Communist International” [Zhongguo gongchandang jiaru
disanguoji jueyian], People’s Daily online,
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5091/20010425/451204.html.
3
It was the equivalent of the Politburo Standing Committee in the current CCP organization. It was
composed of Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Ren Bishi. See Jin Chongji and Huang Zhen, The
Biography of Liu Shaoqi [Liu Shaoqi Zhuan], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian Chubanshe, 1998),
pp. 488-489.
4
The fact that Mao Zedong Thought was deleted from the CCP Constitution was politically
significant and consequential, though Mao was still dominant in Chinese politics between 1956 and
1969. The deletion of Mao Zedong Thought from the CCP Constitution was not just a matter of
formality but a part of the political reality.
5
It is common knowledge that the peasantry formed the social bases for the Chinese communist
revolution, but without the leadership of intellectuals the Chinese communist revolution would not
have been a communist revolution at all.
6
See Jin Chongji, The Biography of Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai Zhuan] vol. 1 (Beijing:
Zhongyangwenxian Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 280-285.
7
Jin Chongji, The Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1998, p. 294. For Bo Gu’s biography, see Shen
Xueming and Zheng Jianying, The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party
from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee [Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie
Zhongyangweiyuan] (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian Chubanshe, 2001), pp. 600-601.
8
This sentence has been used in the CCP literature to describe the attitude of internationalists
towards Mao Zedong’s thoughts in the 1930s. According to Luo Ming, one of Mao’s supporters, Bo
Gu once questioned him, “What kind of Marxism-Leninism is there in your mountain valleys?” See
Luo Ming, “Recollection on Lu Ming’s line” [Guanyu Luo Ming luxian de huigu], CCP History
Materials [Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao], no. 2,1982, quoted in Gao Xinmin and Zhang Shujun,
History of Ya’an Rectification Campaign [Ya’an Zhengfeng Shilu] (Hangzhou: Zhejiangremin
Chubanshe, 2000), p. 18. The sentence, “shangougouli chubuliao makesizhuyi,” must have been
derived from the question. For a reference, see
http://www.bjdj.gov.cn/Article/detail.asp?UNID=11509. For a detailed description of Mao’s
experiences under the leadership of Bo Gu, see Jin Chongji, The Biography of Mao Zedong: 1893-
1949 [Mao Zedong Zhuan: 1893-1949] vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonggongzhongyangwenxian Chubanshe,
1996), pp. 268-333.

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9
For a careful analysis of the Zunyi Conference, see Yang Zhongmei, The Zunyi Conference and the
Yan’an Rectification Campaign [Zunyi Huiyi yu Yan’an Zhengfeng](Hong Kong: Benma
Chubanshe, 1995), pp. 18-70.
10
Mao was appointed chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Northwest on
November 3, 1935 and chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Comission on December 7,
1936. See Peng Xianzhi et al., Chronicle of Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong Nianpu] vol. 1 (Beijing:
Zhongyangwenxian Chubanshe, 1993), pp. 484-485, 619.
11
See Jin Chongji, The Biography of Mao Zedong: 1893-1949, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian
Chubanshe, 1996), pp. 515-516.
12
See Peng Xianzhi et al., Chronicle of Mao Zedong, vol. 2, 1993, pp. 430-431.
13
For a detailed study of the Rectification Campaign, see Gao Hua, How did the sun rise over
Yan’an: a history of the Rectification Campaign in Yan’an [Hongtaiyang shi zenyang shengqide:
Yan’an zhengfeng yundong de lailongqumai] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Press, 2000).
14
For Deng Tuo’s experience in this regard, see Wang Xia, “The ‘Trumpet of the Nation’: Deng Tuo
and the Jinchaji Daily” [Minzu de hautong—Deng Tuo yu ‘Jinchaji ribao’],People’s Daily online,
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/21963/22065/2393102.html.
15
Gao Mingxiang and Zhao Xian, “The birth of the first volume of ‘Selected Works of Mao
Zedong’” [Diyibu ‘Mao Xuan’ danshengji] in Jiang Jiannong, ed., The Complete Books of Mao
Zedong [Mao Zedong Quanshu) (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 592-593.
16
See “Wang Jiaxiang is the first person to introduce the scientific concept of ‘Mao Zedong
Thought’” [Wang Jiaxiang shi tichu ‘Mao Zedong Sixiang’ kexuegainian de diyiren]
http://www.fjqz.gov.cn/zhuanti/80zhounian/qs506.htm.
17
See Jin Chongji, The Biography of Mao Zedong: 1893-1949 , vol. 2, 1993, pp. 515-516.
18
Jin Chongji, The Biography of Zhou Enlai vol. 1, 1998, pp. 680-681.
19
Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography (revised and expanded edition) (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999), p. 201.
20
Liu Shaoqi, “Report on the Revision of CCP Constitution,” May 1945 [Guanyu xiugai dangzhang
de baogao]. See http://202.99.23.246/communist/newfiles/h1020.html.
21
Ibid.
22
See “The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party” [Zhongguo Gongchandang Dangzhang]
adopted on June 11, 1945 by the Seventh National Congress of the CCP),
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5099/20010426/452728.html.
23
Liu Shaoqi, “Political Report” [Liu Shaoqi zuo zhengzhi baogao], September 15, 1956. See
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5100/5272/20010428/454341.html
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5100/5272/20010428/454334.html
24
To answer the question, “Why Mao Zedong Thought was not mentioned in the political report to
the Eighth Party Congress?” during the Cultural Revolution, Liu said, “As for whether Mao Zedong
Thought should be mentioned in the political report to the Eighth Party Congress, there was no
consensus. Those who thought it should not be mentioned were the majority. They believe that
Chairman Mao deleted this formulation from propaganda articles many times and therefore,
Chairman Mao is not in favor of using this formulation everywhere.” See Jin Chongji and Huang
Zhen, The Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1998, p. 1058.
25
This probably was the first time that Mao was mentioned as a “great helmsman” and it was Liu
Shaoqi who used this term first. Lin Biao later combined this phrase with three other “greats” to
make Mao “four greats:” great teacher, great leader, greater commander, and great helmsman.
26
Ibid., http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5100/5272/20010428/454334.html.
27
For Deng’s report in Chinese, see
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5100/5272/20010428/454520.html.

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 HU JINTAO AND THE CCP’S IDEOLOGY

28
See Deng’s report at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5100/5272/20010428/454520.html.
29
Peng Xianzhi and Jing Chongji, The Biography of Mao Zedong 1949-1976 [Mao Zedong
zhuan,1949-1976] vol. 1(Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian Chubanshe, 2003), pp. 534-535.
30
Ibid., p. 535. The original text is in Collections of Mao Zedong’s Works [Mao Zedong Wenji], vol.
6 (Beijing: Remin Chubanshe, 1999), p. 387.
31
Ibid., p. 535.
32
Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1974), p. 147.
33
Song Liansheng, The History of the General Line, Great Leap Forward, and People’s Commune
Campaign [Zongluxian, Dayuejin, Renmingongshehua Shimuo] (Kunming: Yunnanrenmin
Chubanshe, 2002), p. 271.
34
Ibid., p. 271.
35
Ibid., p. 271.
36
Peng Xianzhi and Jing Chongji, The Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, vol. 1, 2003, p. 508.
37
Collections of Mao Zedong’s Writings since 1949: January 1956-December 1957 [Jianguo yilai
Mao Zedong Wengao], vol. 6 (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian Chubanshe, 1990), pp. 151-152.
38
Ibid., p. 153.
39
According to Mao, Stalin is 70 percent correct and 30 percent wrong. See Mao Zedong, “Unite all
forces that can be united” [Yao tuanjie yiqie keyi tuanjie de liliang] April 29, 1956, Collections of
Mao Zedong’s Works, vol. 7, http://www.ccyl.org.cn/theory/mxweb/html/mx07060.htm.
40
See his talk at the Chengdu conference mentioned later.
41
MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 1, 1974, p. 109.
42
MacFarquhar, for instance, argued that Deng Xiaoping was simply carrying out the instructions of
Mao and the Politburo in his report. He was actually concerned to defend and even extol Mao.
MacFarquhar supported his argument with a careful comparison of Deng’s report with another
document titled “On the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat,” that has been
known as being approved by Mao. For MacFarquhar’s argument, see his book, The Origins of the
Cultural Revolution vol. 1, pp. 104-105 and 149-151. Interestingly, this is consistent with the CCP’s
official interpretation. Peng Xianzhi and Jing Chongji, the official biographers of Mao, made the
same comparison and reached the same conclusions. See The Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976,
vol. 1, 2003, p. 534.
43
In fact, he did participate in drafting the political report. But, as mentioned above, he was not
entirely happy about it. For some sample letters from Mao to Liu on the political report, see Jin
Chongji and Huang Zhen, The Biography of Liu Shaoqi, 1998, pp. 793-796.
44
Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (translated by Tai Hung-Chao) (New York: Random
House, 1994), p. 183.
45
Ibid., pp. 184-186.
46
For Mao’s speech at the Chengdu Conference, see
http://www.ccyl.org.cn/theory/mxweb/html/mx07365.htm. For the English translations of a slightly
different version, see Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People —Talks and Letters:
1956-1971 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp. 96-124.
47
See Mao’s speech at the Chengdu Conference.
48
Deng Xiaoping’s report on the revision of the CCP Constitution,
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5100/5272/20010428/454520.html.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Frederick C. Teiwes has a different interpretation on this. He believes that Mao’s position
fundamentally remained unchallenged, even though Mao Zedong Thought had been deleted. For his

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views, see his chapter, “The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949-57” in
Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics of China: the Eras of Mao and Deng (second edition) (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 74. According to Wu Jiaxiang, it must have come as a
shock to Mao that Mao only got one more vote than Liu Shaoqi in the election for the chairman of
the CCP and that the single extra vote was probably cast by Mao himself. See Wu Jiaxiang,
Wrestling for Power: The 16th CPC Congress and the Future Political Map of China [Jiaoli Shiliuda:
Weilai Zhongguo Kongzhiquan] (New York: Mirror Books, 2002), p. 126.
52
Although Dr. Li’s statement should not be used as the only source of information on Mao’s
sentiment, his statement can be used as one of the most important sources in this regard. This is
because Mao’s feelings were not publicly documented. We have to rely on people who were close to
him for such revelations.
53
Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, 1994, p. 183. He is not very accurate with dates.
The Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee was held in October 1968, not in 1969. Mao
expressed his bitterness on other occasions as well. He told British Field Marshal Montgomery Pipe
Band in 1960 that his power was declining. As he described it, “Mao Zedong was chairman of the
Party and chairman of the state before. Now Mao Zedong is chairman of the Party and Liu Shaoqi is
chairman of the state. In the future, Liu Shaoqi will be chairman of the Party as well as chairman of
the state.” See Song Liansheng, The History of the General Line, 2002, p. 234.
54
It was the first time in the history of the CCP that the Party held a second meeting of the congress
and no such meetings have been held ever since.
55
For a brief description, see Song Liansheng, The History of the General Line, 2002, pp. 88-93.
56
For a detailed study of the origins of the Cultural Revolution, see Roderick MacFarquhar’s three
volumes on the subject. According to MacFarquhar, the real reason that Mao launched the Cultural
Revolution was that Mao wanted to keep the revolution alive and on going.
57
For a copy of the text of the CCP Constitution of 1969 in Chinese, see
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5101/20010428/454635.html.
58
To some extent, those who died during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution could
all be regarded as victims of the power struggle between Mao and his lieutenants.
59
See Lin Biao’s political report to the Ninth Party Congress (April 1, 1969),
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5101/20010428/454631.html.
60
As will be mentioned below, Deng did introduce the “Four Cardinal Principles” as a guideline for
the Party and the government in the new era. However, the “Four Cardinal Principles” should not be
taken too literally as an ideological line. By introducing these principles, Deng simply wanted to set
a limit on political activities in order to avoid the backlashes of the political struggles.
61
For a different interpretation, see Ruan Ming, Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle of an Empire (translated
and edited by Nancy Liu, Peter Rand, and Lawrence R. Sullivan) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1992). According to Ruan Ming, as a result of the unsuccessful military campaign against Vietnam
in 1979, Deng Xiaoping broke with democratic forces in China and subsequently established his
empire. Ruan Ming significantly discounted Deng as a reformer. For a detailed description of the
ideological frictions under Deng, see Li Honglin, The History of Chinese ideological movements:
1949-1989 [Zhongsixiang Yundongshi, 1949-1989] (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1999), chapters 8-
13.
62
The “two whatevers” was first published on February 7, 1977 in the People’s Daily, the Liberation
Army Daily, and the Red Flag. See Ruan Ming, Deng Xiaoping, 1992, p. 20.
63
It was Hu Yaobang who sponsored the initiation of the nationwide debate on the criterion of
testing the truth with Deng’s endorsement. For details, see Ruan Ming, Deng Xiaoping, pp. 30-36
and 43-44; Benjamin Yang, Deng: a Political Biography (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 204;
and Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 58-59.

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64
According to Ruan Ming, the four cardinal principles originally came from Hu Qiaomu, one of
Mao’s favorite political secretaries, and Deng Xiaoping adopted them because he had been criticized
on Democracy Wall in Beijing. For details, see Ruan Ming, Deng Xiaoping, 1992, pp. 53-57.
According to Li Honglin, Deng’s speech introducing the four cardinal principles was drafted by Hu
Qiaomu’s staff with specific instructions from Deng and approved by Deng. See Li Honglin, The
History of Chinese ideological movements, 1999, p. 259.
65
It is likely that Deng Xiaoping had realized that it had been a mistake to delete Mao Zedong
Thought from the CCP Constitution in 1956. As Ruan Ming related, Deng Xiaoping, against the
objections of many cadres, insisted in 1980 on including Mao Zedong Thought in the “Resolution on
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China”
possibly for fear of being pegged like Khrushchev. See Ruan Ming, Deng Xiaoping, 1992, pp. 12-13,
note 15, and p. 96.
66
MacFarquhar, The Politics of China, 1997, p. 325
67
Ibid., p. 359.
68
Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), p. 23.
69
Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 2001, pp. 34-35, 44-63.
70
Ibid., p. 45.
71
Ibid., pp. 55-57. See also Suisheng Zhao, “Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour: Elite Politics in Post-
Tiananmen China,” Asian Survey 33, August 1993, pp. 739-756. For a detailed account of Deng
Xiaoping’s visit to Shenzhen, see Deng Xiaoping and Shenzhen: the spring of 1992 [Deng Xiaoping
yu Shenzhen: 1992 chun] (Shenzhen: Haitian Chubanshe, 1992).
72
For a different portrayal of Jiang Zemin, see Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and
China’s New Elite (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), where Jiang is depicted as a
sincere reformer and masterful tactician.
73
“General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s speech”[Jiang Zemin zongshuji de jianghua], September 29,
1989, People’s Daily, September 30, 1989, pp. 1-3.
74
Ibid., p. 2.
75
Jiang Zemin, “Speech at the celebration of the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the
Chinese Communist Party” [Zai qingzhu zhongguogongchandang chengli qishizhounian dahuishang
de jianghua], July 1, 1991, in Selections of important documents since the 13th National Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party [Shisanda Yilai: Zhongyao wenxian xuanbian], vol. 3 (Beijing:
Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 1646.
76
Ibid., p. 1641.
77
According to Gilley, at the conclusion of Deng’s southern tour, Jiang offered a self-criticism as a
tactic to get others to admit their errors in suppressing Deng’s speeches (Gilley, Tiger on the Brink,
1998, pp. 186-187). This interpretation is not entirely consistent with what transpired at the time.
According to Fewsmith, Deng’s remarks against the conservatives were also directed at Jiang Zemin
who should “step down” if he opposed reform (Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 2001, pp. 56-57).
78
Jiang Zemin, “Deeply understand and comprehensively implement the spirit of Comrade Deng
Xiaoping’s important speech in order to further promote economic construction and reforms and
opening to the outside world in a faster pace” [Shenkelinghui he quanmianluoshi Deng Xiaoping
tongzhi de zhongyaojianghua jingshen, ba jingjijianshe he gaigekaifang gaode gengkuaigenghao],
June 9, 1992, in Selections of important documents since the 13th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party, vol. 3, 1993, p. 2063.
79
Ibid., p. 2063.
80
For Jiang Zemin’s restatement, see Jiang Zemin, “Speed up the pace of reform and opening up and
modernization construction in order to win a greater victory in the socialist course with Chinese
characteristics” [Jiakuai gaigekaifang he xiandaihua jianshebufa, Duoquyou zhongguotese

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shehuizhuyishiye de gengdashengli], October 12, 1992, in Selections of Important Documents since

the 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party [Shisidayilai: Zhongyao wenxian
xuanbian], vol. 1(Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1996), p. 18.
81
Ibid., p. 6.
82
Ibid., p. 11.
83
According to the resolution passed at the Plenum, “the transition from the second generation of
leadership collective to the third generation of leadership collective” had been completed. See “The
Resolution on several important issues of the Party building” [“Zhonggongzhongyang Guanyu
Jiaqiang Dangdejianshe Jige Zhongdawenti de Jueding], September 28, 1994, in Selections of
Important Documents since the 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party vol. 2
(Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), p. 954. For a detailed analysis of this document and Jiang’s
emergence as an independent leader, see Gao Xin, Jiang Zemin’s road to power [Jiang Zemin de
Quanli Zhilu] (New York: Mirror Books, 1997), pp. 212-229.
84
Jiang Zemin, “Leading Cadres must pay attention to politics” [Lingdaoganbu Yidingyao
Jiangzhengzhi], September 27, 1995, in Selections of Important Documents since the 14th National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, vol. 2, 1997, pp. 1455-1459.
85
According to Zong Hairen, a pen-named insider (Zong Hairen refers to “a person from the Zhong
Nan Hai,” the headquarters of the Party and the government in Beijing), Jiang Zemin complained to
Politburo members in March 1999 that he had been wrongfully accused of attempting to establish his
personal authority with the three emphases campaign because he was not greedy, not power-thirsty,
and did not have any intentions to glorify himself personally. See Zong Hairen, Zhu Rongji of 1999
[Zhu Rongji zai 1999] (New York: Mirror Books, 2000), p. 135. For a detailed analysis of the
campaign as one to glorify Jiang Zemin, see ibid., pp. 135-172.
86
For a detailed description of the origins of “Jiang Thought,” see Gilley, Tiger on the Brink, 1993,
chapter 10, pp. 263-287.
87
See “A brief bio of Wang Huning” [Wang Huning Jianli],
http://www.bilinguist.com/data/pals/messages/whn.html;
and Zhang Xiaoxia, “Wang Huning: ‘a dictionary of political science’” [Wang Huning:
‘yibenzhengzhixue cidian’], in Zhang Xiaoxia, The Members of China’s Think Tank: personalities
that influence the development of today’s China [Zhongguo Gaocengzhinang:Yingxiang Dangjing
Zhongguo Fazhanjincheng de Ren], vol. 2 (Beijing: Jinghua Chubanshe, 2000), pp. 1-36. For an
official introduction to Wang Huning, see his bio at Fudan University’s website
http://www.hr.fudan.edu.cn/fudan/teacher/person.asp?No=30022.
88
Mao’s original phrases can be translated as “We must hew to a work style of humility and caution,
and avoid being supercilious and impatient; We must maintain the tradition of plain living and hard
struggle.” For the original Chinese expressions, see Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Second Plenum of
the Seventh Central Committee” [Zai zhongguo gongchandang diqijie zhongyangweiyuanhui
dierciquantihuiyi shangde jianghua], March 5, 1949,
http://www.ahetc.gov.cn/dangwei/m_wxuan/4_58.htm.
89
For a brief analysis of the political implication of this speech, see Zhiyue Bo, “Political Succession
and Elite Politics in Twenty-first Century China: Towards a Perspective of ‘Power-Balancing’,”
Issues & Studies, Forthcoming. For a different interpretation, see Joseph Fewsmith, “Studying the
Three Represents,” China Leaderhsip Monitor, no. 8, Fall 2003,
http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20034/jf.html.
90
For Hu’s speech in Chinese, see http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/1946147.html.
91
“The institutionalization of ideology” here refers to the fact that whoever is the general secretary
of the Party is entitled to interpret the ideology of the Party. Hu’s July 1 speech not only marks a
substantial return from the party line under Deng and Jiang to Mao’s mass line but also represents a

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dramatic departure from the party tradition since Mao that the ideology was a personal trademark.
His speech represents his own position as well as that of the Party.
92
“Hu Jintao’s July 1 speech was released in Beijing as an offprint” [Hu Jintao qiyi jianghua
danxingben zaijing shoufa”], http://dailynews.dayoo.com/content/2003-07/07/content_1136294.htm.
According to this report, more than 60,000 copies of the offprint were sold in Beijing on the first day
of the release.
93
The General Political Department of the PLA issued a circular on July 2, 2003 to urge PLA
officers and soldiers to study the “Three Represents” under the guideline of Hu Jintao’s speech. See
“The General Political Department requested seriously studying General Secretary Hu Jintao’s
important speech” [Zongzhengzhibu yaoqiu renzhen xuexi Hu Jintao zongshuji zhongyaojianghua],
People’s Daily online, July 2, 2004,
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/2072/2641/1948080.html.
94
“Jiang Zemin and others met with the participants in the PLA’s conference on studying the ‘Three
Represents’” [Jiang Zemin deng huijian quanjun xuexi sangedaibiao jingyanjiaoliuhui daibiao],
People’s Daily online, July 26, 2004, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2666648.html.

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