(A26) LAW 121 - Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 159085)

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Sanlakas v.

Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 159085
3 February 2004
Tinga, J.

SUBJECT MATTER:
Judicial Review – Requisites of Judicial Review - Mootness

LEGAL BASIS

Article VII Section 18 The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing
to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. – States the power of the president exercised in
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4

ACTION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT:


Petition to declare unconstitutional Proclamation No. 427 & General Order No. 4
.

Main: Sanlakas (Rep. J.V. Bautista), Partido ng Manggagawa (Rep. Renato Magtubo)
Others: Social Justice Society, Rep. Rolex Suplico, Rep. Carlos Padilla, Rep. Celso Lobregat, Rep.
Petitioner(s):
Hussin Amin, Rep. Abraham Mitra, Rep. Emmylou Talino-Santos, Rep. Georgilu Yumul-Hermida, Sen.
Aquilino Pimentel
Parties
Main: Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, Secretary of National Defense Angelo Reyes, Gen.
Respondent(s): Narciso Abaya, Dir. Gen. Hermogenes Ebdante
Others: Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, Sec. Jose Lina Jr., Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

SUMMARY:

On July 27, 2003, 300 junior officials and enlisted men of the AFP stormed Oakwood Premier apartments, Makati City with high-
powered ammunition and explosives. The soldiers were demanding the resignation of the President, Sec. of Defense, and the Chief
of the PNP due to the corruption in the AFP. In response to this, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proc. No. 427 (declaring a
“state of rebellion”) and Gen. Order No. 4 (calling for AFP to suppress rebellion) both in pursuant of Article VII, Sec. 18 of the
Constitution. On the evening of the same day, the solders agreed to return to their barracks after negotiations. However, the
declaration of a state of rebellion was only lifted on August 1, 2003 through Proclamation No. 435.

ANTECEDENT FACTS:
Several petitions were filed challenging the the validity of Proc. No. 427 and G.O. No. 4.
 As party list organizations: Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM)
o Sec. 28, Art VII of the Constitution doesn’t require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed
forces
o Because of the cessation of Oakwood occupation, the state of rebellion has no factual basis to continue indefinitely
 Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers and Members (as citizens, taxpayers, law professors, and bar reviewers):
C2023(ATUN) – Law 121: Consti 1, GATMAYTAN
o Same contention as Sanlakas
o Declaration is a “constitutional anomaly” that could mislead public officers into violating constitutional rights of
private citizens
o Proclamation is a circumvention of report requirement under Sec 18, Art VII – President must submit report to
Congress within 28 hours from the proclamation of martial law
o Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers – Congress did not delegate any
such power to President
 Rep. Suplico, etc. (as citizens and as Members of the House of Reps)
o Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly affected by state of rebellion
o Does not challenge power of President to call out Armed Forces
o Argue that declaration is unnecessary and an exercise of emergency powers – usurping power of Congress granted
by Sec 23(2), Art VI of Constitution
 Sen. Pimentel
o Presidential issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of martial law power with no basis under the
Constitution
o Fears that it could lead to unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests for the crime of rebellion

Response of the Solicitor General:


 Petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of declaration and questions petitioners standing to bring suit

ISSUE(S) AND HOLDING(S):


1. WON the case at bar is already moot – YES
2. WON the petitioners have locus standi – only Rep. Suplico, etc and Sen. Pimentel
3. WON Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are valid – YES

RATIO:
1. Court agrees with Solicitor General that the cessation of the mutiny has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not
adjudicate moot cases. However, courts may decide on moot cases if it is capable of repetition. The court shall rule on moot
cases in order to prevent future repetition.
○ Similar incident happened before in Lacson v. Perez (regarding the validity of the May 1, 2001 state of rebellion
declaration). It was also
2. Only Rep. Suplico and Sen. Pimentel (members of Congress) have legal standing. The issuances may impair legislative
powers because declaration of emergency powers is an exercise of the powers of Congress
○ Locus standi/ legal standing –personal and substantial interest because the party has sustained/ will sustain direct
injury
○ Petitioners Sanlakas, PM, SJS have no locus standi to bring suit
 (Lacson v Perez) – as a juridical person, they cannot claim to be threatened by warrantless arrest
 (Kilosbayan v Morato) – only real parties in interest or those with standing may evoke the judicial power
 Taxpayers can file suit where the act directly involves illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxes, but that is not alleged in this case
 Citizens can only raise constitutionality questions when he has personally suffered an actual/threatened
injury, but that is not alleged
3. Sec. 18, Art VII does not prohibit the president from declaring a state of rebellion as the Constitution vests in him not only
Commander-in-Chief powers but first and foremost, Executive powers
○ Lesson from US Constitutional history: Commander-in-Chief powers are broad and become more so when taken
together with Executive powers
○ President is equipped with power to address threats which undermine the existence of government or the
integrity of the State
○ Late Justice Irene Cortes: PHL president vested with residual power that is greater than that of US president
because of the “unitary and highly centralized” nature of the government
○ (Marcos v. Manglapus) Although there was a limitation of specific powers of the president, these are not only
limited to those expressly enumerated in the Constitution.
○ President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from Chief Executive powers and draws
strength from Commander-in-Chief powers
 Sec 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987: Proclamations.
Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon
C2023(ATUN) – Law 121: Consti 1, GATMAYTAN
the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
○ Calling out armed forces in declaration of a state of rebellion = superfluity, devoid of any legal significance.
○ The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot violate constitutionally protected rights.
 A person may be subject to a warrantless arrest even without a declaration of a state of rebellion
○ Petitioners did NOT cite specific instance where President attempted to or has exercised beyond her powers as
Chief Executive or Commander-in-Chief

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
 Vitug, J.
o Warrantless arrests and searches referenced in opinion of Ynares-Santiago, J. may not find justification in the
proclamation
 Panganiban, J.
o Petitions should be dismissed because of mootness
o 4 requisites in deciding constitutional law issues:
 There must be an actual case
 Raised by a proper party
 Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity
 Adjudication of constitutional question must be necessary for the resolution of the case
o 1st and 4th requisite is missing
 There is no actual case because the proclamations are no longer in effect
 Courts do not pass upon issues through advisory opinions or friendly suits without real adverse interests.
They do not adjudicate academic questions either.
 Regarding the exception “capable of repetition yet evading review”, it can only be applied if the party
raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced as a direct result of it. The petitioners
do not show this.
 Theory of “capable of repetition yet evading review” cannot be used in the present controversy for
declaratory relief
 Declaratory relief - judgment of a court which determines the rights of parties without ordering
anything be done or awarding damages
 Because it is moot, the constitutionality of the case ceases to be an unavoidable question for resolution
 Ynares-Santiago, J.
o Warrantless arrests even after the rebellion has ended should be struck down
o Rebellion being a continuing crime should be applied with proper context (i.e. NPA)
o After the peaceful surrender, no person suspected of conspiring with the soldiers could be arrested without
warrant because no crime was being attempted, being committed, or had just been committed
o Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 issued on July 27, 2003 should be declared null and void for being
issued with grave abused of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and warrantless arrests relating to it should
be null and void as well
MAIN DISSENTING OPINION:
 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
o If Pres. Arroyo’s only purpose was to use her “calling out power”, she could have simply ordered AFP to suppress
what she perceived as a rebellion
o Declaring a “state of rebellion” is unorthodox. “State of rebellion” has no clear legal restraints so people do not
know what exactly is allowed and not.
o Extraordinary conditions should not create or enlarge constitutional power because it creates precedents
 Placed the Philippines under martial law without a declaration to that effect and without observing proper
procedure
 The concurrence of the Congress is used to ward-off totalitarian rule. By declaring “state of rebellion” the
President disregarded the concurrent power of Congress
 It is a step towards the wrong direction
 Any act which gears towards possible dictatorship must be severed at its inception
o Enumerated powers do not include undefined powers. No provision in the Constitution authorized the President to
C2023(ATUN) – Law 121: Consti 1, GATMAYTAN
declare “a state of rebellion.”

C2023(ATUN) – Law 121: Consti 1, GATMAYTAN

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