Lebanese Civil War Causes

World Affairs Institute
THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSES

Author(s): JOSEPH CHAMIE
Source: World Affairs, Vol. 139, No. 3 (Winter 1976/77), pp. 171-188
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671682
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JOSEPH CHAMIE THE LEBANESE CIVIL
WAR: AN INVESTIGATION
INTO THE CAUSES
The severe and tragic effects which the Lebanese civil war has had on its popula
tion and on its social and economic systems, as well as the serious repercussions that
it is generating in the Middle East and in other parts of the world, make it important
to have a clear understanding of the conflict. Although accounts of the war have ap
peared daily on the front pages of the newspapers throughout the world, the violence
and drama of the conflict have obscured the basic question of why the Lebanese are
fighting. In this article, an attempt will be made to address major causes underlying the
Lebanese civil war. Since the present fighting is intimately intertwined with events
from Lebanon's past, some knowledge of Lebanon's modem history is essential in
order to comprehend properly the current situation. Therefore, we begin our investi
gation with a brief discussion of Lebanon's history during the twentieth century.1
Lebanon's Recent History

At the beginning of World War I, the territory currently called Lebanon was under
control of the Ottoman Empire. "Lebanon" at that time referred to Mount Lebanon,
an area limited roughly to the Lebanon mountain range extending as far north and
south as Tripoli and Sidon, but not including these cities.
After the defeat of the Turks, the Allied Supleme Council gave France mandatory
control of Mount Lebanon and Greater Syria. Seeking to strengthen the political
position and economic viability of Mount Lebanon's pro-French Maronite Christian
community, the French annexed to Mount Lebanon (at Syria's expense) the coastal
regions of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre, and the Bekaa plain, areas which were
populated mainly by Muslims. And on September 1, 1920, the French representative,
General Henri Gouraud, officially declared the establishment of the State of Greater
Lebanon.
This new country, which is essentially modern Lebanon, was roughly 100 percent
larger in land area and 50 percent more populated than Mount Lebanon. Greater
Lebanon's religious composition also differed substantially from Mount Lebanon's.
Whereas Mount Lebanon consisted overwhelmingly of Maronite Christians, Greater
Lebanon's population reportedly had only a slight Christian majority. With the Chris
tians being in the majority as well as being decidely favored by the governing French
171
172 JOSEPH CHAMIE
authorities, the Muslims in the newly

ously under Muslim control) became in
both the French and Lebanese Christian
Greater Lebanon was plagued by tensio
communities.
As might be expected, the structure o
by the French system of government.
Chamber of'Deputies is elected by the
tionately representative of the various
turn select a president, who then choos
should be emphasized that while the C
sional communities, there are no simila
offices of the president, prime ministe
of religious status. However, as we will
status according to the National Pact o
In theory, the president as well as th
ber. In actuality, however, over the ye
dependence by virtue of his power to
and activities of the cabinet and prime
to veto bills, etc. As will be more evide
between the president and Chamber ha
Lebanese political system.2
The Lebanese Constitution stipulates t
representative to the sizes of the vario
As a provisional measure and for the s

equitably represented in public employ
provided such measures will not harm
amended on November 1943)
The Constitution, however, is not at all

practice should be continued. The situa
of other constitutional articles which a
All Lebanese shall be equal before the l

and shall equally be bound by public o
(Article 7)
Every Lebanese shall have the right to hold public office, no preference being made
except on the basis of merit and competence, according to the conditions established
by law. A special statute shall guarantee the rights of state officials in the departments
to which they belong. (Article 1 2)3
The Constitution also lacks an explicit definition of the procedure by which the
representative proportions are to be determined. Are the proportions to be based
LEBANESE CIVIL WAR 173
only on those Lebanese who reside in Lebanon? Or

their permanent residence in Lebanon? Or on all Le
regardless of place of residence? Since it is estimate
5 million "Lebanese" living outside Lebanon, as com
Lebanon, an acceptable definition of the Lebanese p
an academic question.4 This ambiguity has been a c
among the various Lebanese religio-political groups a
Lebanese have avoided many political and constitut
census since 1932. The 1932 census figures show a t
the Christians slightly more numerous than the M
estimates for 1943, 1951, and 1956 have indicated a
plurality. Consequently, from 1932 to the present,
Deputies has been in the ratio of six Christians to fi
At the time of independence in 1943, there was s
Lebanese on how the country should be structured
achieved, however, between the Maronite leader Bi
leader Riyad al-Sulh. These two men reached a verb
tional Pact, which spelled out the basic roles of the
ment as well as the relationships Lebanon would m
nations.6 A crucial ingredient of the Pact was the p
had been the tradition in the past, presidents would
sect according to the 1932 census), prime minister
largest sect), speakers of the Chamber of Deputies w
sect)7. Another important aspect of the Pact was t
,be an independent Arab nation in which the Muslim
Lebanon a part of a larger Arab state and the Chri
sistance and protection.
From 1943 to 1958 Lebanon's political formula wa
Lebanese factions. In 1958, however, the system su
series of events, among which the most notable wer
tion with the widely believed corrupt elections of 1
candidates won overwhelming victories; (b) Preside
to seek a second term, which conflicted with the C
consecutive term; (c) the Lebanese government's de
the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was a violation of
formation of the Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Re
which stressed the unification of all Arab countrie
marked increase in the existing tensions among th
groups.8 In May of that year, bloody conflicts brok
Tyre, and a number of other smaller Lebanese com
the country was in the midst of a civil war runnin
tarian lines. On July 20, at the request of President
174 JOSEPH CHAMIE
Table I
Enumerated Population of Lebanon in 1932 and Estimates

for 1943, 1951, and 1956 by Religious Sect
Year
Sect 1932 1943 1951 1956
Muslim 383,180 495,003 571,109 624,434

Sunni 175,925 222,594 271,734 285,698
Shi'a 154,208 200,698 237,107 250,605
Druze 53,047 71,711 62,268 88,131
Alawi -b - - -
Isma'li
Christian 392,544 544,822 700,154 769,558

(Catholic)
Maronite 226,378 318,201 377,544 423,708
Greek Catholic 45,999 61,956 81,764 87,788
Armenian Catholic 5,694 - 14,218 14,622
Syrian Catholic 2,675 - 5,911 5,699
Latin (Roman) - - 4,127 4,506
Chaldean 528 - 1,390 1,466
(non-Catholic)
Greek Orthodox 76,522 106,658 130,858 148,927
Armenian Orthodox 25,462 58,007 67,139 63,679
Protestant 6,712 - 12,641 14,365
Syrian Orthodox 2,574 - 4,562 4,798
Other
Jew, Baha'i, etc. 9,819 6,596 12,677 13,876
Population 785,543 1,046,421 1,303,940 1,407,868
Sources: 1932: Official census figures cited in S.B. Himadeh, Economic Organization of Syria,
Beirut: Khayat, 1936, pp. 408409.
1943: Official estimates, cited in Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, London:
Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 121.
1951: Estimates by Bahige Tabbarah, Les Forces Politiques A cruelles au Liban, Ph.D.
Thesis, Universite de Grenoble, 1954.
1956: Estimates cited in Al-Nahr (Beirut), no. 6249, April 26, 1956.
a~he dash indicates that no figure had been given in the original source.
Eisenhower ordered the landing of 10,000 Marin

thereafter, Chamoun was finally persuaded not
Maronite Christian, General Fuad Chehab, Comm
president. Following the conflict, governmental
to the ratio of six Christians to six Muslims; rep
Deputies, however, remained unchanged in the ra
The change in bureaucratic appointments and ot
out permitted the continuation of the fragile L
Although Lebanon has had little direct involvem
results of these wars have greatly affected the d
ical system. Due to the creation of Israel in 1948
large numbers of Palestinian refugees settled in
presence of such large numbers of Palestinians c
potent political force in Lebanese politics. The P
against Israel, the military actions taken by Isra
southern region, and the strong alignments whic
Lebanese Muslims and leftist groups added furth
political system. In 1969, these strains produced
tions which nearly led to another civil conflict a
And in 1973, the Christian-led, Lebanese armed
in and around the refugee camps. Although the
itary and the Palestinians did not result in an arm
it contributed substantially to the growing anim
groups in Lebanon, the underlying causes of wh
The tension among the Lebanese continued to i
intensity throughout 1973 and 1974. During the
were actively preparing themselves for the expec
ated that the number of trained and armed men
excess of the number of soldiers in the Lebanese
weapons being distributed and stockpiled by the
pistols and rifles, but included machine-guns, rec
even heavy artillery. The situation had develope
everyone sensed that confrontation was near; few
admit its probable magnitude or severity.9
Major Causes of the Outbreak of War

In the start of 1975, the Lebanese political scen
to the Lebanese government's non-response to Is
refugee camp of Nabatiya and the southern Leb
February fisherman's strike triggered by the atte
ation owned by Lebanese elites to dominate fish
176 JOSEPH CHAMIE
popular Sidon politician supporting the

and five soldiers were shot and killed d
of complexly interrelated events occur
April 13, a prominent member of the
of Maronite Christians and strongly o
Lebanon, was killed in a Christian neig
The Phalangists attributed his death to
Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Phal
dedication of a church in the same Ch
Palestinians and Lebanese sympathizers
sons were killed. Heavy fighting betwe
a week before a truce was finally nego
under heavy criticism for having failed
violence in which many Lebanese byst
appointed a military cabinet, Lebanon'
Muslim and Christian Lebanese and Pal
ese, strongly objected to the military
Christian, with close ties existing betw
a result of these objections and subseq
minister. However, he encountered ext
insistence of the right-wing Christian
cabinet and the opposition's unwilling
These political difficulties and the Pal
of progressive and traditional Muslims
their list of demands to the governm
lim participation in the Chamber of D
were seen as serious threats to the pol
National Pact and, therefore, could no
such as the Phalangists, who viewed th
guard of their social, economic, and p
What has followed has turned out to
twentieth century, in that there are f
percentages of a nation's population h
roughly two percent of the population
injured. These figures are indeed stagg
Although the events described above
ments which sparked the civil war, th
why there has been such extensive kil
the violent conflict, one must consider
causes of the civil war. To begin with,
between the warring factions. Basicall
On the one side, there are those who a
ditionalists," or, more specifically, the Front

National Liberal Party, Zogharta Liberation Ar
ite Monastic Order. Although this group consis
other Christians, it also contains a minority of
with the socially, economically, and politically
The traditionalists argue for a continuation, a
the existing political arrangements. Although i
electoral law reform, reduction of sectarianis
equality, they want these changes to come abo
political system. For example, the Phalangists
groups among the traditionalists, published a
conceded that the constitution could evolve an
and called for an amendment of the electoral
Jazzer, a prominent member of the Phalangis
take a generation at least and, until then, the
Lebanon's future." Furthermore, the Phalangi
strongly maintain the perspective that neither
attitudes can be meaningfully altered within
The traditionalists wish to follow the provis
requires, among other things, that the presiden
Sunni, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputie
sovereign state, politically independent of bot
tion, they wish to continue the practice of sec
Deputies as well as in the government as a wh
The combatants opposing the traditionalists
groups: (1) Lebanese "progressives," both Chri
minded Muslim Lebanese; and (3) the Palestinia
loose working alliance against the traditionalist
traditionalists, the views of the Lebanese prog
Muslims (who will henceforth be combined and
are less uniform and include a wide spectrum
genity among the progressives (or the Front o
illustrated by the diversity of their compositi
Socialist Party (Syria), Ba'th Socialist Party (Ir
Communist Action Organization, October 24 M
Party, Movement of the Deprived, Independen
ist Organization, Union of Popular Labor Forc
Movement, and the Arab Socialist Union.'4
In general, the progressives argue that the ex
be changed because it is highly corrupt, ineffe
favor of one sectarian community over anoth
mental and political system in which religious
178 JOSEPH CHAMIE
pragmatically, however, they deman

in the government and military. For
wanted representation of the Musli
of the Christians, a more equitable
president, and a larger role for the
the Christian-dominated higher ech
A further feature of the Lebanese
to and helped to perpetuate the con
ship among many of the warring f
Jumblat, Pierre Gamayel, and Raym
well over 25 years. The views, attitu
as their personalities. Moreover, th
endure tenaciously and spill over to
among their respective followings. A
may persist is the roughly 17-year
between Rashid Karami and Camille
its way were these men willing to a
The second major underlying cause
great extent to the differences in p
perceived widening, of significant s
between the warring factions. Alth
doubt due to the government's relu
sitive data), it is widely known tha
gressives are the "have-nots." In gen
cated, better clothed and housed, an
gressives. Largely as a result of thes
levels of the progressives are far gr
quently, the rates of population gro
greater than the growth rates for th
One indication of the extent of as
ferentials is found in the 1971 Nati
ducted by the Lebanon Family Plann
sentative sample of Lebanese couple
clearly observe the presence of sub
entials among the major Lebanese r
the two Christian groups, for examp
the three Muslim groups; the avera
Catholic Christians are approximate
income, 28 percent greater than th
than the average Shi'a income.
The educational status of the Chris
Shi'as. The average number of years
Table 2
Educational Status of Wife and Husband, Family Income, and
Husband's Occupation by Religious Group: Lebanon, 1971
Religion
Non-Catholic
Characteristics Catholicb Christianc Sunni Shi'a Druze Total
Wife's Education
Average no. years completed 4.4 5.2 3.3 1.6 4.5 3.6
Percent no schooling 29% 20% 49% 70% 23% 40%
Husband's Education
Average no. years completed 5.4 5.8 4.5 3.3 5.1 4.9
Percent no schooling 15% 13% 29% 31% 10% 21%
Family Income
Average Family Incomea 7173 7112 5571 4532 6180 6247
Percent less than 1,500 LL
per annum 6% 8% 15% 22% 11% 12%
Husband's Occupation
Professioial/technical 6 6 4 2 3 5
Business/managerial 17 21 16 13 20 17
Clerical 14 13 14 10 11 13
Army/police/guard 9 5 5 5 7 6
Crafts/operatives 20 24 22 15 27 21
Farming 10 8 7 11 8 9
Peddlery 0 1 3 4 1 1
Labor 18 16 23 35 20 22
Other 6 7 6 5 4 6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 925 592 564 567 119 2767
aIn 1971 1 U.S. dollar was equal to 3 Lebanese pounds

bit is estimated that roughly 80 percent of the Catholi
cit is estimated that roughly 65 and 29 percent of the
Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox sects, respec
Catholic, and Druze wives is 5.2, 4.4, and 4.5, res

average of 3.6 years. Substantially less is the Sun
completed. Even less than the Sunni educational
ber of years of schooling completed by Shi'a wiv
wives with no schooling is 70 percent, nearly twi
180 JOSEPH CHAMIE
A similar pattern exists with respect

the Druze are clearly lower than the t
Differences in the occupational distri
difficult to compare than income diffe
more likely than the other groups to
occupations, and less so in the low sta
the proportions who are in the profes
2 percent vs. 35 percent; Sunnis-4 pe
percent; Catholic-6 percent vs. 18 perc
vs. 16 percent.
With whatever reasonable criteria on
differentials between the religious gr
Christians and Catholics at the top, Dr
tom, and Shi'as at the very bottom. F
any significant changes in this orderin
most observers believe that the dispar
Given these substantial social and eco
the Sunnis and Shi'as maintain far high
(Table 3). Within each category of wif
born and living children per 1,000 ma
siderably greater than they are for th
of living children per 1,000 married w
5,141 for non-Catholic Christians; 5,2
years old); 6,907 for Sunnis; and 8,492
levels of fertility translate into substan
Shi'a populations.' 7
The more rapid rates of growth of t
implications for the Lebanese political
the Chamber of Deputies is supposed t
ferential growth rates suggest a basis f
Muslims, who are undoubtedly more n
Potentially even more significant tha
tions that these differential growth ra
office of the president. As was indica
reserved for the Maronites primarily b
sect according to the 1932 census. Now
the single largest sect, will the preside
At the present time, the most numero
largest sect now, it certainly will be so
ing rates of fertility continue without
Further complicating this situation is t
Maronite, but Sunni. And if the pract
ing to size of sect is adhered to, the larger size

that the Maronites may not even be entitled to
this point, it seems clear that these and related
composition of the population, such as higher
sects, make the tolerance of the continued fav
government extremely unlikely.18
The existence of sharp and deep societal cleav
the third major cause of the Lebanese civil wa
greatly in.producing what Barakat refers to a
of the 17 religious sects in Lebanon sees itself
sects and strives to maintain its autonomy and
the development of parallel, but separate, lega
according to law as well as tradition, each sect
its own system of family laws. These courts h
personal status matters as engagement, marriag
adoption, and tutelage. Civil courts dealing wit
Consequently, interfaith marriages are extrem
between members of the same sect.
In addition, the religious sects have control o
Within the extremely loose guidelines set dow
group is permitted to establish its own school
to be utilized in them. The effect of the preva
well as foreign schools in Lebanon (British, Ge
has been to retard the development of an adeq
and a unified educational curriculum.
Religious segregation is not limited simply to
majority of voluntary organizations are also r
youth clubs, women's and men's associations, s
and cultural groups is based, by and large, on o
The societal cleavages among the religious gro
graphic concentration and segregation. Both o
tend to live in specific areas within which they
instance, the Maronites are the overwhelming
Lebanon, e.g., Zgharta, Kasruwan and Batrun d
ity in Tripoli and Akkar districts and are one o
Shi'as are clearly the dominant group in South
religious groups also tend to be segregated int
The major faiths in Lebanon also tend to hav
refer. The Christians, especially the Maronites,
with Western nations (principally France), whil
Arab nations. The Christians, for example, rely
French language and Western dress and social h
182 JOSEPH CHAMIE
inn ooe OcOwose
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Lebanese Muslims stress their Arab heritage, m

ites, prefer to emphasize the distinctiveness o
ancestry.
Other Contributing Factors to the Civil War

In addition to the difference in political ideology between the warring groups, the
existence of sharp societal cleavages, and the prevalence of significant social, eco
nomic, and demographic differences among the various religious groups, there are
other less fundamental, but important factors which have contributed greatly to the
Lebanese civil war. First, there is the presence of roughly 400,000 Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon, which has a resident population of about 2.5 million. The traditionalists
see the highly politicized Palestinians and their guerrilla movement as constituting "a
state within a state." According to the traditionalists, the Palestinians are deeply
involved in local politics, provide extensive support and act as a catalyst to left-wing
and socially and economically depressed groups, and represent an armed threat to
Lebanese citizens. In addition, by using the country as a base for guerrilla operations
against Israel, the traditionalists feel that the Palestinians are exposing Lebanon to a
loss of territory and encouraging recurrent attacks from Israel. The traditionalists
argue that the guerrilla raids provoke Israel retaliation which, they point out, has
killed more Lebanese so far than Palestinian guerrillas. The aims of the traditionalists
are to disarm the heavily armed Palestinians, control their military activities against
Israel, and avoid military confrontation with Israel. To do otherwise, according to the
traditionalists, is to threaten seriously Lebanon's status and stability as well as its very
existence.
In contrast to the traditionalists, the progressives are much more sympathetic to
the Palestinian cause and more willing to tolerate Palestinian activities against Israel.
Support for the Palestinians among the progressives rests not only on common. politi
cal grounds, but also on social, economic, and geographic similarities. Ideologically,
both the Palestinians and the progressives wish to set up secular democracies in Israel
(referred to as occupied Palestine by the Palestinians) and Lebanon, respectively. In
addtion to this political commonality, most of the members of these groups are poor
and downtrodden. The progressives and Palestinians unquestionably exist in far worse
conditions than most of the traditionalists. Furthermore, the Palestinians and Shi'as
have suffered greatly from Israeli raids. Most of the Shi'as living in the "poverty
belt"20 surrounding Beirut are villagers from southern Lebanon who have been dis
placed by Israeli reprisals and bombings.
In a recent census at one "Palestinian" camp in the poverty belt, more Lebanese
Shi'as turned up than Palestinian refugees.21 Shafik al-Hout, a spokesman for the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, succinctly explained the bond between the Shl'as
and the refugees by pointing out that when the fighting began, the poor and
oppressed Lebanese found themselves on the same side of the conflict as the Pales
tinian refugees.22
184 JOSEPH CHAMIE
Another contributing factor which

the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the P
conflict, any significant changes in
between Palestinians and Lebanese. W
are progressing poorly for the Pales
enced by the traditionalists, tends t
the Palestinians and their guerrilla
tions were seriously affected by the
Israel, and the United States. This a
solution and a severe blow to their
ened position of the Palestinian mo
chance to assert Lebanese control ov
internal Lebanese politics. Recognizi
ing to avoid any recurrence of wha
conflict with the Lebanese military
determined to prevent it. Thus, rel
tionalists such as the Phalangists wo
The economic and military assistan
number of Arab and non-Arab coun
war. Well before the fighting began
the Palestinians received large amoun
Although it is always difficult to d
that Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Ir
given economic and military supplie
further their respective national int
East." The Libyans, for instance, ar
tinians. In addition to money and m
gressives and Palestinians substantia
in contrast, are supporting the trad
mon interests, the most important
eliminate their military incursions a
Palestinian victory would be threat
opening up of a fourth front along
Finally, although not contributing
dead and injured and the horrible a
have certainly greatly intensified,
Saturday slaughter" on December 6,
machine-gunned on the streets of Be
tiamen on the previous day; the bu
Damour; and the daily bombings, as
women, and children are only a few
which have already taken place. Mos
severely injured as a result of the fighting. In

universally accepted form of behavior, forgive
slow in coming.
A Look toward the Future
Although it is much too early to predict with

the probable outcomes of the Lebanese civil w
powerful constraints generated by them sugge
least for the foreseeable future, it seems highl
return to anything resembling its previous sta
The physical, social, and psychological damage
any chance for reconciliation and stability in t
Lebanese religio-political groups as well as the P
bitter, feelings that are likely to persist. Altho
businesses and other non-Lebanese agencies an
because they are highly doubtful about wheth
in a post-war Lebanon.
Second, prior to the spring of 1976 partition
impractical. In addition to many of the warrin
Syria, Jordan, and most Arab countries did n
dominantly Christian and Muslim sectors. Fur
tributions at that time, the economic viability
questionable; and even more importantly, the
nearly surrounded by a hostile neighbor whos
country. In the fall of 1976, with the warring
administrations and assumed other state func
is unquestionably a country partitioned on a d
partition on a de jure basis, while remaining im
istically be ruled out.
A third generalization which seems evident at
activities of the Palestinians directly and indir
society, the future stability of Lebanon, as we
long run on whether or not an acceptable solu
question. Despite attempts such as the 1969 Ca
Syrian-sponsored proposals, it is difficult to im
behavior of the Palestinians that would be acc
and the Palestinians. Except for very temporar
the issues created by the Palestinian presence
there is an overall peace settlement in the Mid
Finally, whatever kind of government is even
little chance that it will be biased, as it was bef
now probably in the minority among the resi
186 JOSEPH CHAMIE
beginning of the conflict, the progr

Muslim-Christian equality in the Ch
for the prime minister, and substan
social and economic conditions. Rece
ment with some of these proposed c
those reforms that would seriously
any programs that would jeopardize
The progressives were equally firm
would suggest a return to their old
Given the substantial political diffe
fluidity of the current situation, th
Syrian peacekeeping forces through
tainties involved in the conflict, the
deferred until a time when they ca
ever, one thing appears clear and tha
ated political solution satisfactory t
Notes
I wish to thank Mary Chamie, Jason Finkle, Nora Kalliel, Ruth Simmons, and an anonymous
reviewer for theii helpful criticisms of an earlier version of this paper. None of them bears respons
ibility for the content of the paper.
1. For further information on the history of Lebanon, refer to Philip Hitti, Lebanon in His
tory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967); Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: Oxford
University Press, 1946); and Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (London: Widenfeld
and Nicholson, 1965).
2. For an historical discussion of the role and impact of the Chamber of Deputies on the
Lebanese political system see: Abdo I. Baaklini, Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon,
1842-1972, (Durham, North Carolina: Consortium for Comparative Legislative Studies, Duke
University Press, 1976).
3. The Lebanese Constitution: A Reference Edition in English Translation, prepared by the
Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut
(Beirut: Khayats, 1960).
4. According to the 1970 sample survey conducted by the Ministry of Planning, the size of
the resident population in Lebanon was approximately 2,126,300 in November, 1970 (R?pub
lique Libanaise, Direction Centrale de la Statistique, L'Enqu?te par Sondage sur la Population
Active au Liban, 1972). However, in an evaluation of the results of this survey, Y. Courbage and
P. Fargues concluded that this was an underestimate and the population was about 2,265,000 on
January, 1970 (La Situation D?mographique au Liban, Libraire Orientale: Beirut, 1973). If we
assume thex widely accepted annual growth rate of 2.5 percent for the Lebanese population and
the Courbage population estimate, we arrive at a Lebanese population of roughly 2,567,000 for
1975.
5. The accuracy of the 1932 figures is by no means a settled matter. A number of groups
maintain that there was an undercount of Lebanese Muslims because of the French practice of
enumerating only those who were properly registered under Ottoman rule. It is argued that the
French incorrectly excluded many Lebanese Muslim

Turks in order that they could avoid Turkish milita
generally subject. The various estimates since 1932
do they exclude many "Lebanese" Muslims who hav
but the figures are considered by many Muslim gro
Christian communities.
6. For the essentials and interpretations of the N
tions from Riadh Solh's Speech in the Lebanese A
Main Principles of the Lebanese 'National Pact,' "
Bishara ai-Khuii, Haqa'iq Lubnaniyyat (Lebanese T
Ikhwan, 1960-61).
7. It was also agreed that the vice-premier and vi
fourth largest sect). For further discussion of the
tion without Revolution, Lebanon's Experience (Blo
pp. 52-62.
8. For further information on the 1958 crisis refer to: Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon
(Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961) and M.S. Agwani, ed., The Lebanese Crisis,
1958: A Documentary Study (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965).
9. It is interesting to note that somewhat prior to this time, that is, during the late sixties
and early seventies, there existed considerable disagreement over Lebanon's likely future. For
example, by and large, most political observers and commentators can be said to have taken one
of the following two themes: (1) Lebanon was headed for disaster and revolution, e.g., Halim
Barakat, "Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic," Middle East
Journal 27 (Summer 1973): 301-318; and Michael C. Hudson, "A Case of Political Underdevel
opment," Journal of Politics 19 (November 1967): 821-827; or (2) Lebanon would withstand and
adapt to the various social, economic, and political pressures and crises, e.g., Elie Salem,Modern
ization without Revolution; David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism, A
Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York: Elsevier, 1975), and Michael W. Suleiman,
"Crisis and Revolution in Lebanon," Middle East Journal 26 (Winter 1972): 11-24.
10. For a comprehensive description of the details of the Lebanese conflict see: Kamal S.
Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1976).
11. Although the dichotomization of the warring factions is no doubt a simplification of the
many parties involved, it is an accurate account of the major antagonists. We should add, however,
that many of the warring subgroups frequently operate separately, which seriously hinders cease
fire attempts.
12. Eric Rouleau, "Reform or Revolution? The Choice before Lebanon," The Manchester
Guardian, 19 October 1975, p. 14.
13. John P. Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon, Al-Kata'ib, 1936-1970
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p. 186.
14. Sabbi, Crossroads to Civil War, p. 165.
15. For a description of the survey as well as a detailed analysis of fertility, fertility control
behavior differentials, and their relation to socio-economic differences among the Lebanese relig
ious groups see: Joseph Chamie, Religious Fertility Differentials in Lebanon, Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Michigan,1976.
16. For example, see: Michael Wall, "The Tightrope Country, A Survey of Lebanon," The
Economist, 26 January 1974; and Elie Adib Salem, Modernization without Revolution.
17. Although the Sunnis and Shi'as have lower survival rates than non-Catholic Christians,
Catholics, and Druze, the differences are not sufficient to offset the large fertility differentials
between the groups. For example, based on the figures in Table 3, the Sunni and Shi'a survival
rates are consistently between two to six percent below the national averages, while the others
have rates which are from one to five percent above the averages.
18. In his comparative study of two Lebanese villages, Fuad Khuri found that when they
migrate, the Shi'as tend to settle in Beirut while the Greek Orthodox migrate to foreign countries.
("A Comparative Study of Migration Patterns in Two Lebanese Villages," Human Organization 26
no. 4 (1967). For detailed information on Lebanese migration, refer to: Elie Safa, L'Emigration
Libanaise, (Beirut: St. Joseph University, 1960).
188 JOSEPH CHAMIE
19. In his informative account of the

Barakat discusses seven major factors w
pluralistic society: (1) lack of consensu
(3) private loyalties and interests domi
tration of different religious commun
zation of confessionalism; (6) absence
flicting reference groups. See: "Social
20. The origins of and the existing co
well in the following account by Eric R
The Palestinian refugees, who founded
ago, were followed by Sunni Moslems
them, and their numbers are in turn b
fleeing their barren countryside. Today
poverty belt... There are 600,000 in th
Middle East's financial capital, where ba
population lives on the threshold of sta
the national average. The shanty town's
more and more difficult to feed thems
accommodation as rents have tripled in
children to school, let alone to give t
Manchester Guardian, 11 October 197
21. James M. Markham, "In Embattl
tain," New York Times, 19 July 1975
22. Ibid.
23. For an indication of the nature and extent of some of the foreign support see: "Libyan
Role Seen in Lebanon Strife," New York Times, 13 September 1975, p. 1; "Israel Apparently
Aiding Beirut Right," Washington Post, 21 July 1976, p. 1; "Questions and Answers on Lebanon,"
New York Times, 7 August 1976, p. 2; and "Israel Secretly Joins the War in Lebanon," Time, 13
September 1976, pp. 30-31.
24. For example, on February 14,1976, President Franjieh announced his political "new
foundation" reform program which included the following five major points: (1) continuation of
the tradition that the president be Maronite, prime minister be Sunni Moslem, and speaker of the
Chamber of Deputies be Shi'a Muslim; (2) equal distribution of seats in the Chamber where
Christians in the past held a 6-to-5 edge over the Muslims; (3) election of the prime minister by
the Chamber rather than by the president; (4) establishment of the tradition that the president is
responsible to the Chamber and creation of a Higher Commission to try presidents, prime minis
ters, and ministers for major offenses; (5) abolition of the apportionment of civil service posts
among the country's religious communities except for the highest ranking jobs and establishment
of a merit system. See James M. Markham, "Beirut Proclaims A Plan to Expand Moslems Rights,"
New York Times, 15 February 1976, p. 1.

Lebanese Civil War Causes

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Lebanese Civil War Causes

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World Affairs Institute

THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSES

INTO THE CAUSES

Lebanon's Recent History

authorities, the Muslims in the newly

As a provisional measure and for the s

The Constitution, however, is not at all

All Lebanese shall be equal before the l

only on those Lebanese who reside in Lebanon? Or

Enumerated Population of Lebanon in 1932 and Estimates

Muslim 383,180 495,003 571,109 624,434

Christian 392,544 544,822 700,154 769,558

Jew, Baha'i, etc. 9,819 6,596 12,677 13,876

Population 785,543 1,046,421 1,303,940 1,407,868

Eisenhower ordered the landing of 10,000 Marin

Major Causes of the Outbreak of War

popular Sidon politician supporting the

ditionalists," or, more specifically, the Front

pragmatically, however, they deman

aIn 1971 1 U.S. dollar was equal to 3 Lebanese pounds

Catholic, and Druze wives is 5.2, 4.4, and 4.5, res

A similar pattern exists with respect

ing to size of sect is adhered to, the larger size

inn ooe OcOwose

otn socO 1.o N c. o &

Lebanese Muslims stress their Arab heritage, m

Other Contributing Factors to the Civil War

Another contributing factor which

severely injured as a result of the fighting. In

A Look toward the Future

Although it is much too early to predict with

beginning of the conflict, the progr

French incorrectly excluded many Lebanese Muslim

19. In his informative account of the

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