Sison versus People, February 22, 2012, G.R. No.

187229

FACTS:

On April 21, 2003, two (2) separate Informations were filed with the RTC against
petitioner for Kidnapping with Rape and violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. 8294
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). Petitioner pleaded not guilty5 to both
charges. Trial thereafter ensued. During the trial, two different versions were presented.
Petitioner denied the accusation and claimed that what happened between him and AAA
was a consensual sex. The RTC found AAA’s testimony, narrating how petitioner raped her, to
be candid and straightforward, thus reflective of her honesty and credibility. It found nothing on
record that would show that AAA was actuated by ill motive in filing the charges against
petitioner. The RTC also noted that AAA even cried when she testified in court. It did not
believe petitioner’s claim that AAA was a small time prostitute, considering that she was a
college graduate who was already working at the time of the incident and the fact that she
immediately reported the rape incident to the police despite threat to her life.

As to the charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the RTC found
the elements of the crime to be duly proven. AAA testified that petitioner pointed a gun at her
and because of such threat submitted herself to his bestial desire; the gun, as well as the
ammunitions, was offered in evidence and even the accused admitted that he had a gun at the
time of the incident. It was established through the testimony of police investigator Regundina
Sosa that based on petitioner’s permit to carry firearm outside residence, the same had
already expired on January 11, 2003, few months before his apprehension. Petitioner filed his
appeal with the CA.

In so ruling, the CA pointed out that the crime committed was not kidnapping with
rape, but only rape qualified with the use of a deadly weapon. Applying jurisprudence, it said
that if the offender is only to rape the victim and in the process, the latter had to be illegally
detained, only the crime of rape is committed since illegal detention is deemed absorbed in
rape. The CA upheld the RTC’s assessment of AAA’s credibility, because of its unique position
to observe the deportment of the witness while testifying. It also found that while the
prosecution was able to prove that petitioner’s license to carry said firearm outside
residence already expired at the time he was apprehended with it, however, there was no
showing that the firearm he carried on April 17, 2003 was not licensed or its license had
expired, thus petitioner could only be liable for carrying a licensed firearm outside his residence
under the last paragraph of Section 1, P.D. 1866, as amended.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner’s conviction for illegal possession of firearms must be set aside.
RULING:

Petitioner’s conviction for illegal possession of firearms, such judgment must be set
aside. We find that he can no longer be held liable for such offense since another crime was
committed, i.e., rape.

In People v. Ladjaalam, 340 SCRA 617 (2000), we laid down the correct interpretation
of the law and ruled: “x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal
possession of firearms. Hence, if the “other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal possession
of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since
direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no
longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed
liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is
most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of
the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant
cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault
with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not
homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance. x x x x  x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to
homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph.
Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.”

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death. The prosecution was able to sufficiently allege in the Information,
and establish during trial, that a gun was used in the commission of rape. Since no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance was established in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall
be imposed.38 Thus, we affirm the penalty of reclusion perpetua meted by the courts below.
Chavez versus JBC, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012

Facts:

The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it
conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and
called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance
therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative
from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having
only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives
from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from
the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously
sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National
Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to
bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The
respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of
having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the
corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of
Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating
the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress
to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the
presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other
six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to
seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

Issue:

WON the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members,
two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.

RULING:

Yes. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to
perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.

It can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first
paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the
Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a
representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present
controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction.
It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention
that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.32 It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.33 Verba legis non est
recedendum―from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
 Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded
or with which it is associated.37 This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by
the latter.38 The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole . A
statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever
possible.39 In short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from
the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the
latter.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
“Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is
being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in
the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former
member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum,40 “from the enumeration of
the membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single
individual only.”
Pilar versus COMELEC, G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992,
petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated
November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon
petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the
COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-
2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which
denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was
subsequently filed to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn his
certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that “it is . . . clear from
the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won
or lost” under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized National
and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for
Other Purposes”.

ISSUE:

WON a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and expenditures

after he has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy.

RULING:

Petitioner’s argument is without merit.

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures.

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British
Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf. Olfato v.
Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the
application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).

In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must
be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who
withdrew his candidacy.

COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall
(The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution
No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on
election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers
to “all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy.”

Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word “shall.” As a general rule, the use
of the word “shall” in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty
which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where
public interest is involved.
People versus Evangelista and Tugonon, G.R. No. 110898, February 20, 1996

FACTS:

Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonon with intent to kill, has willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously assaulted, attacked and stabbed Roque T. Bade but which, nevertheless, has not
killed him by reason of timely medical attendance. Tugonon was found guilty and sentenced to
one year of prision correccional in its minimum period in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
frustrated homicide. The RTC has appreciated in his favor the privilege mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Tugonon has appealed but the Court of Appeals (CA) just affirmed his conviction
modifying his sentence by imposing an indeterminate penalty of two months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum.

Tugonon filed a petition for probation alleging that (1) he possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for probation under P.D. No. 968, as
amended; (2) the CA has in fact reduced the penalty imposed on him by the RTC; (3) in its
resolution, the CA took no action on a petition for probation which he had earlier filed with it so
that the petition could be filed with the RTC; (4) in the RTC’s decision, two mitigating
circumstances were appreciated in his favor; and (5) in Santos To vs. Paῆo, the Supreme Court
(SC) upheld the right of the accused to probation notwithstanding the fact that he had appealed
from his conviction by the trial court.

Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denial of

Tugonon’s application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the
trial court, when he could have been applied for probation, Tugonon waived the right to
make his application. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recommendation and
granted Tugonon’s application for probation in its order of April 23, 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion by granting private
respondent's application for probation despite filed by the private respondent.

RULING:

Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992
after P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfect the
appeal from the judgment of the conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal."
Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation after the
court of appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded
from the benefits of probation.

Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between

meritorious appeals (like his appeal notwithstanding the appellate court’s affirmance of his
conviction) and unmeritorious appeals. But the law does not make any distinction and so
neither should the Court, UBI LEX NON DISTUINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE
DEBEMOS. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free and not only
given probation. Private respondent’s original sentence (1 year of prision correccional in its
minimum period) and the modified sentence imposed by the Court of Appeals (2 months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum) are
probationable. Thus the fact that he appealed meant that private respondent was taking his
chances which the law precisely frown upon. This is precisely the evil that the amendment
in P.D. No. 1990 sought to correct, since in the words of the preamble to the amendatory
law, “probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct
and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by
offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated.”
Spouses Plopenio versus DAR and LBP, G.R. No. 161090, July 4, 2012

FACTS:

Spouses Plopenio and Eduardo Plopenio own 11.8643 and 22.8349 hectares
respectively of coconut plantation located in Caramoan, Camarines Sur. Gavino Plopenio,
Eduardo’s brother, had his land valued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjucation
Board (DARAB) at P 51,125.60 per hectare (DARAB Case No. V-LV-040-CS-00). Having
learned of this, the spouses Plopenio offered their own entire land to Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition and distribution pursuant to RA 6657. On October 26,
2001, Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication valuing the land of the
spouses Plopenio at P 23,485 per hectare and that of petitioner Eduardo at P 22,856.62 per
hectare.

The spouses Plopenio were dissatisfied with the value offered and referred the
matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur for
summary administrative proceedings.

In a decision dated September 5, 2002, PARAD affirmed Land Bank’s valuation, a

copy of which petitioners received on September 27, 2002. 14 days later, or on October 11,
2002, the spouses filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the PARAD subsequently in an
Order dated November 20, 2002. The said Order was received by the spouses on December 21,
2002. Unyielding, petitioner-spouses then filed separate Petitions 16 days after receipt of
PARAD’s, or on January 6, 2003 before the SAC-RTC.

The petitioner-spouses argued that they were allowed to file their appeal 15 days
from the receipt of the Order of Denial of their Motion for Reconsideration. Since the
5th day fell on a Sunday, they argued that it is only reasonable that they be allowed to file an
appeal on January 6, 2003. However, the decision of the PARAD is considered final after the
lapse of the 15-day period, counting from the receipt of the decision and that petitioners
failed to file their petition on time.

The petitioners were unfazed. They again filed for a petition, this time for Review
directly with the Court.  On July 24, 2006, the Court resolved to combine the cases in
consideration of the fact that the legal issues and facts involved are of similar nature.

ISSUE:

WON there is an error in applying Rule 45 of Rules of Court on Appeal by Certiorari to

the Supreme Court and not Rule 60 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

 RULING:
 Clearly, following the letter of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
petitioners should have appealed the SAC-RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners propose to carve out an exception to this rule by arguing that because
the instant Petitions raise only pure questions of law, the proper mode of appeal is via a
Rule 45 Petition to this Court.

We do not agree. While the general rule is that appeals raising pure questions of law
from decisions of RTCs are taken to this Court via a Rule 45 petition, decisions of trial
courts designated as SACs are only appealable to the Court of Appeals.

We have repeatedly ruled that the right to appeal is a remedy of statutory origin. As such,
this right must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law
authorizing its exercise. The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals therefrom are governed by Section 60
thereof. That law expressly states that appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of Appeals
without making a distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and those dealing purely
with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does
not distinguish, neither should we. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is regulated and
governed by the special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC and as such appeals therefrom are
governed by Section 60 thereof. As such, appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of
Appeals without making a distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and those
dealing purely with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we distinguish.
MTRCB versus ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 155282, January 17, 2005

FACTS:

On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-
tuition," an episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted
by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable
them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps,
customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s University
(PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU
Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The
showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community.

Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU
Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-complaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Acting
on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the
MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that respondents (1) did not
submit "The Inside Story" to petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same without its
permission, thus, violating Section 74 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and Section 3,6
Chapter III and Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations respondents
explained that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news documentary and
socio-political editorial," the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on
freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority and
jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents

ISSUE:

Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story” prior its
exhibition or broadcast by TV.

RULING:

Yes.

In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story falls under

the category of newsreels. MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as “straight news
reporting, as distinguished from analyses, commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a
given issue are not considered newsreels. Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of
a public affairs program and within petitioner’s power of review.

Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no
declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the
press has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious
programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there
is no justification to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story" which, according to respondents, is
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom
bearing no preferred status. The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are
those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies,
and (2) newsreels.

Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason
apparent in the law to justify it.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere... debemos.  Thus, when the law says "all television
programs," the word "all" covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs,
news documentary, etc.[29] The principle assumes that the legislative body... made no
qualification in the use of general word or expression.

Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to submit to... petitioner "The Inside Story"
for its review and approval.
Manila Rail Road versus Collector of Customs, G.R. No. L-30264, March 12, 1929

FACTS:

The question involved in this appeal is the following: How should dust shields be
classified for the purposes of the tariff, under paragraph 141 or under paragraph 197 of section
8, of the Tariff Law of 1909? These paragraphs placed in parallel columns for purposes of
comparison read:

"141. Manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for, forty per centum ad valorem."

"197. Vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof, ten per centum ad
valorem."

Dust shields are manuf actured of wool and hair mixed. The component material of
chief value is the wool. They are used by the Manila Railroad Company on all of its railway
wagons. The purpose of the dust shield is to cover the axle box in order to protect from
dust the oil deposited therein which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel. "Dust
guard," which is the same as "dust shield," is defined in the work Car Builders' Cyclopedia of
American Practice, 10th ed., 1922, p. 41, as follows: "A thin piece of wood, leather, (f elt,
asbestos or other material inserted in the dust guard chamber at the back of a journal box, and
fitting closely around the dust guard bearing of the axle. , Its purpose is to exclude dust and to
prevent the escape of oil and waste. Sometimes called axle packing or box packing."

Based on these facts, it was the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs that dust
shields should be classified as "manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for." That
decision is entitled to our respect. The burden is upon the importer to overcome the presumption
of a legal collection of duties by proof that their exaction was unlawful.

ISSUE:

WON dust shield should be classified as manufactures of wool or as detached parts of

vehicles for use on railways.

RULING:

Dust shields should be classified as "detached parts" of vehicles for use on railways.
This impartial finding is also entitled to our respect. It is the general rule in the interpretation of
statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the
language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the
Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to
be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import.
CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL AND PARTICULAR PROVISIONS.— There are
present two fundamental considerations which guide the way out of the legal dilemma. The first
is by taking into account the purpose of the article and then acknowledging that it is in reality
used as a detached part of railway vehicles. The second point is that paragraph 141 is a general
provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where there is in the same statute a
particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would
include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and
the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as
are not within the provisions of the particular enactment

We conclude that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields under
paragraph 197 of section 8, of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to classify them
under paragraph 141 of the same section of the law. Accordingly, the judgment appealed
from will be affirmed in its entirety, without special taxation of costs in either instance.
Colgate Palmolive versus Auditor General, G.R. No. L-14787, January 28, 1961

FACTS:

The Petitioner Colgate - Palmolive, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing
under the Philippine law for the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. The
company imported various materials such as Irish moss extracts, sodium benzoate, sodium
saccharin ate, precipitated calcium and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and dental
cream flavor of the dental cream they manufacture. For every importation of these materials,
the petitioner paid to the Central Bank 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for
the payment of the cost, transportation and other incidental charges, in accordance with R.A. 601
(Exchange Tax Law).

Petitioner filed with the Central Bank 3 applications for refund of the 17% special
excise tax in the total amount of ₱ 113,343.99, based on section 2 of R.A. 601 which provides
that foreign exchange used for the payment of cost, transportation and incidental charges to
the importation of stabilizers and flavors shall be refunded to any importer upon
satisfactory proof of actual importations.

OIC of the Exchange Tax Administration of Central Bank advised the petitioner
that they can claim for refund the amount of ₱ 23,958.13 of the total sum of ₱ 113,343.99,
representing the 17% special excise tax on foriegn echange used to import Irish moss extract and
sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate. However, the auditor of the Central
Bank refused to pass in audit its claim for refund on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers
and flavors are not exempt under sec. 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

The Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General but the latter affirmed the ruling of the
auditor of the Central Bank on the same ground that stabilizers and flavors in sec. 2 of Exchange
Tax Law refers only to food products. Petitioner elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream
stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax
Law (Republic Act No. 601).

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner Company. The ruling of the Auditor
General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those
materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is
based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "general terms may be
restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the
specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose. The rule, however, is, in
our opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an
enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is true that the
term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as
food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately f ollowing, it
do not belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under
the category of food or food products because they are used in the farming and poultry
industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine than food or
food product, for, as a matter of fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of
medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix to the law.

It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is among those listed preceding the term
in question, includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those for breeding purposes.
Again, it is noteworthy that under Republic Act No. 814 amending the above-quoted section of
Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not always refer to food for human
consumption, was added among the items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the
basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term
"stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers
only to those used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the
principle "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not
distinguish, neither do we distinguish".

Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the
preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we
are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general
sense. The rule of construction  that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by
particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general
terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is
to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.
Liwag versus Happy Glen Loop, G.R. No. 189755, July 4, 2012

FACTS:

In 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, a subdivision in
Deparo, Caloocan, obtained a loan from Ernesto Marcelo (Marcelo), the owner of T.P.
Marcelo Realty Corporation. To settle its debt after failing to pay its obligation, F.G.R. Sales
assigned to Marcelo all its rights over several parcels of land in the Subdivision. Marcelo
represented to subdivision lot buyers, NHA and HSRC that a water facility was available in
the Subdivision.

For almost 30 years, the residents of the Subdivision relied on this facility as their only
source of water. This fact was acknowledged by Marcelo and Hermogenes, petitioners late
husband who was then the president of respondent Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association
(Association).

Sometime in September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block No. 5 to Hermogenes. As a
result, Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-350099 was issued to him. When Hermogenes died in
2003, petitioner Emeteria P. Liwag subsequently wrote a letter to respondent Association,
demanding the removal of the overhead water tank from the subject parcel of land.

Refusing to comply with petitioners’ demand, respondent Association filed before

the HLURB an action for specific performance; confirmation, maintenance and donation
of water facilities; annulment of sale; and cancellation of TCT No. 350099 against T.P. Marcelo
Realty Corporation (the owner and developer of the Subdivision), petitioner Emeteria, and the
other surviving heirs of Hermogenes.

After the parties submitted their respective position papers, Housing and Land Use
Arbiter Melchor ruled in favor of the Association. He invalidated the transfer of the parcel of
land in favor of Hermogenes in a Decision dated 5 October 2004.

On appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11,
Block 5 was not an open space. Moreover, it ruled that Marcelo had complied with the
requirements of PD 1216 with the donation of 9,047 square meters of open space and road
lots. It further stated that there was no proof that Marcelo or the original subdivision
owner or developer had at any time represented that Lot 11, Block 5 was an open space . It
therefore concluded that the use of the lot as site of the water tank was merely tolerated.
Respondent Association interposed an appeal to the OP, which set aside the Decision of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners and affirmed that of the Housing and Land Use Arbiter.

ISSUE:

WON LOT 11 Blk 5 of the HAPPY GLEN LOOP is considered an open area as defined
in PD 1216.
RULING:

YES. The term “open space” is defined in P.D. 1216 as “an area reserved exclusively
for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals,
health centers, barangay centers and other similar facilities and amenities.”33

The decree makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities.
Therefore, we resort to statutory construction to determine whether these areas fall under
“other similar facilities and amenities.”

The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a
general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the
same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include—or to be restricted to
—things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned.

Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of P.D. 1216, we find that the
enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Thus, the
phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like manner.

Here, the water facility was undoubtedly established for the benefit of the
community. Water is a basic need in human settlements,without which the community would
not survive. We therefore rule that, based on the principle of ejusdem generis and taking into
consideration the intention of the law to create and maintain a healthy environment in human
settlements, the location of the water facility in the Subdivision must form part of the area
reserved for open space.
People versus Echavez, G.R. Nos. L-47757-61, January 28, 1980

FACTS:

Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen
persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the
accused could be arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order
dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1) that it was alleged
that the accused entered the land through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under the decree
the entry should be effected “with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner”, and (2) that under the rule
of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the
order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to
agricultural lands.

RULING:

No.

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in
urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-
to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

“WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction

No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Works and
Communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager,
the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal
Mayors, and City and District Engineers, ‘to remove all illegal constructions including buildings
on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits
on public and private property.’ squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all
over the country;

“WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public
and private lands belong to the affluent class;

“WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government’s drive against this
illegal and nefarious practice.”
 The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court
does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to
apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem
generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent
is uncertain

StatCon maxim: A preamble may restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a
law.
People versus Mapa, G.R. No. G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967

FACTS:

Mario Mapa was apprehended due to possession of an unlicensed firearm. The

defendant admitted before the trial court that he was carrying the unlicensed firearm and that he
does not have a permit to carry such a weapon. In his defense, he said that he is a secret agent
of the Governor of Batangas and that he is exempt from the requirement of securing a
license of firearm. The defendant also showed a certification that he was appointed as such.

ISSUE:

WON Can a secret agent of a governor carry a gun without necessary permits?

RULING:

No. The law is explicit that' except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to * * * possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in
the"manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides
that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in
the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties."

The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them." It is not within the power of a court to set aside the clear and
explicit mandate of a statutory provision.
Malinias versus COMELEC, G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a candidate
for congressional representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
Provincial Board of Canvassers held the canvassing of election returns at the second floor of the
Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province from May 11, 1998 to May 15,
1998.7

Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELEC’s Law Department for
violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against
Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who
was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers. Victor Dominguez (“Dominguez” for brevity) was then the incumbent Congressman
of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Teofilo Corpuz (“Corpuz” for brevity) was then the
Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Anacleto
Tangilag (“Tangilag” for brevity) was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc,
Mountain Province.

Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang,
Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and
prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando
further alleged that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters,
who nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol
grounds.

Petitioners filed a complaint with COMELEC against private respondents Governor

Dominguez, and Provincial Director Corpuz and Police Chief Tangilag for alleged
violations of:

Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646 and

Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881,  Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room

In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the COMELEC and its Law
Department to investigate and prosecute private respondents for the following alleged
unlawful acts. In support of the complaint, several supporters of Malinias and Pilando executed
so-called “mass affidavits” uniformly asserting that private respondents, among others, (1)
prevented them from attending the provincial canvassing, (2) padlocked the canvassing area, and
(3) threatened the people who wanted to enter the canvassing room. They likewise alleged that
the Provincial Board of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made public and
consented to the exclusion of the public or representatives of other candidates except those
of Dominguez.

Consequently, the COMELEC’s Law Department conducted a preliminary investigation during

which only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-Affidavit. Private respondents
submitted counter-affidavit stating that the checkpoint was not a sole case and that it was set-up
to enforce COMELEC’s gun ban and that no group will disrupt the canvass proceedings which
happened several times in the past.

After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against
the respondents forinsufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR
but it was also denied forfailure of adducing additional evidence thereon. Not satisfied with the
same, Malinias filed to SC apetition for reviewon certiorari on this case.

ISSUE:

Can COMELEC prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Sections 25

of RA 6646 and 232 of B.P. Blg. 881?

RULING:

No. The alleged violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 232 of
B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts defined as punishable criminal election
offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively.

The COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg.
881 is not one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262
of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the
persons referred therein to enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the
election offenses criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881.
Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal
election offense.

Though not a criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after proper
hearing,the imposition of administrative penalties. Under the rule of statutory construction
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to
prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely
because this is a non criminal act. “It is a settled rule of statutory construction that
the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others.
Municipality of Nueva Era Ilocos Norte versus Municipality of Marcos,

G.R. No. 169435, February 27, 2008

FACTS:

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong,
Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were
previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief.
Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial
government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by
virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 665 dated September 30, 1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos
in the Province of Ilocos Norte.” Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:

“SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit
in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the
Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same
time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest,
by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.”
Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall
be derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao,
Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not
mentioned. Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be
considered as a source of territory of Marcos.

There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as
the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos’
boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: “on the East, by the
Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary.” According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of
the territory of Dingras only. And since R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios
of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should not go beyond
the territory of said barrios.
 From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been considered to
be aligned and coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras.
However, based on a re-survey in 1992, supposedly done to conform to the second paragraph
of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form
part of Marcos. This was the area of Barangay Sto. Niño, Nueva Era that Marcos claimed in its
position paper. On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The
fallo of its decision R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos,
but none of Nueva Era’s barangays were mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the rule
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No.
3753 in creating Marcos. On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its
decision. the CA partly reversed the RTC decision with the following disposition.

ISSUE:

whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of
Nueva Era.

RULING:

No part of Nueva Era’s territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A.
No. 3753. Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its
territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated
as Marcos’ source of territory, Nueva Era’s territory is, therefore, excluded.

Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon
which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its
operation and effect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules
of logic and natural workings of the human mind.50

Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of
Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to
other matters.51 The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era
were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos
shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion
finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which states that a
person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally.
People versus Bello, G.R. No. 166948-59, August 29, 2012

FACTS:

In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged
anomalies at the AFP-RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that when acquiring
lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an unnotarized bilateral deed
of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a unilateral deed of sale that showed a
discounted purchase price. The first would be kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while
the second would be held by the vendors. The latter would then use these unilateral deeds of sale
in securing titles in the name of AFP-RSBS. This was done, according to the Committee, to
enable the AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its funds and to enable the vendors to pay
lesser taxes.

The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman (OMB) the prosecution of General

Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed the unregistered deeds of sale
covering acquisitions of lands in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba, and Iloilo for falsification
of public documents or violation of Article 172, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 171,
paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019,1
Sections 3(e) and 3(g).

Acting on the Committee’s recommendation, the OMB filed with respect to the
acquisition of lands in Iloilo City informations before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases
26770-75 and 26826-31 against respondents Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, Manuel S. Satuito,
Rosario Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie Barbasa, Minviluz Camina, Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel,
Felipe Villarosa, Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for six counts of violation of R.A. 3019,
Section 3(e), and six counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, RPC.

Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the informations
on the ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. On February 12,
2004 the Sandiganbayan granted the motions and ordered the remand of the records to the
proper courts, hence, this petition by the People of the Philippines, represented by the OMB,
which challenges such order.

Respondent Bello also argues that the Sandiganbayan does not exercise jurisdiction
over him because his rank at the time of the acts complained of was merely that of Police
Superintendent in the Philippine National Police. But the criminal information does not
charge him for offenses relating to the regular police work of a police officer of his rank.
He is rather charged for offenses he committed in relation to his office, namely, that of a
“manager” of the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation.

ISSUE:
 WON the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over offenses
involving the heads of the legal departments of government-owned and controlled corporations.

RULING:

Yes.

The Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to the accused since
Bello, who held the highest rank among those who allegedly conspired to commit the crime
charged, did not hold any of the government positions enumerated under that section.
Notably, in its February 2, 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan defined the word “manager”
used above as one who has charge of a corporation and control of its businesses or of its
branch establishments, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion and
independent judgment. The Sandiganbayan cited Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed.,
1968 to support this definition. The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the above
definition that includes “divisions, or departments,” which are corporate units headed by
managers. The United States case of Braniff v. McPherren5 also referred to “divisions”
and “departments” in relation to the position of “manager.” Under this definition,
respondent Bello would fit into the term “manager,” he having charge of the AFP-RSBS
Legal Department when the questioned transactions took place.

Since “managers” definitely do not have the same responsibilities as directors and
trustees or as presidents, they belong to a distinct class of corporate officers that, under the
definition above, has charge of a corporation’s “divisions or departments.” This brings
Bello’s position within the definition.

Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, a proper construction may be had by

considering the company of words in which the term or phrase in question is founded or
with which it is associated.―In clarifying the meaning of the term “manager” as used in
Section 4(a)(1)(g), the Sandiganbayan also invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Under this
doctrine, a proper construction may be had by considering the company of words in which the
term or phrase in question is founded or with which it is associated. Given that the word
“manager” was in the company of the words “presidents, directors or trustees,” the clear
intent, according to the Sandiganbayan, is to limit the meaning of the term “manager” to
officers who have overall control and supervision of government-owned and controlled
corporations.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the Sandiganbayan

decision dated February 12, 2004 and resolution dated February 2, 2005 in Criminal Cases
26770-75 and 26826-31, and DIRECTS the Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE these cases,
immediately ARRAIGN all the accused, and resolve accused Raul Aposaga’s motion for
reinvestigation.
Ang Bagong Bayani versus COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved

the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the
2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents,
arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition,
petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court. 

RULING:

The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other
remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in
case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

    Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections
subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory
law pertinent to the Party List System.

              Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from
the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representative may “be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”.
It is however, incumbent upon the COMELEC to determine proportional representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the
party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

             The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents
in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was
beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

 However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law
and the Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the
Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in
the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’
sectors and organizations.

RULING:

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive

The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,” “marginalized and
underrepresented,” and “lack [of] well-defined constituencies.”

“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in
a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized and
underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, “labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.36 Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.” In the end, the role of the
Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are “marginalized and underrepresented”
become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by
giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the imple menting
law, we repeat, is likewise clear: “to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives.” Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its
express terms.

Noscitur A Sociis; It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words

employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained
by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related.—
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in
a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the
words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term
in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association
Fule versus CA, G.R. No. L-79094, June 22, 1988

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court,
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting
petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing
Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and
the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. At the hearing of August 23, 1985,
only the prosecution presented its evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985,
petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a
Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-
appellant.

On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed
the judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that
the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court
convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August
8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedures:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or

entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless
reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]

Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.

RULING:

YES. By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in
the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of
the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No.
L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal statutes whether
substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused.
 The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the
accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of
Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum,
confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the
accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have
done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required
by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of
relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without
said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require
that evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has
been entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or
reopened.
Ramos versus CA, G.R. No. L-53766, October 30, 1981

FACTS:

The provincial fiscal of Bulacan and the municipal attorney of Hagonoy entered
their appearance as counsel for the municipality with the manifestation that its private
counsel would be under the control and supervision of those officials. Notwithstanding that
appearance, Domingo and Maria C. Ramos (lessee and sublessee of the fishpond) moved to
disqualify the Cruz law firm from serving as counsel of the municipality.

The trial court denied the motion. It found that Angel Cruz, the head of the law
firm, volunteered to act as counsel for the municipality because he desired to serve his
native town. Ramos and Domingo assailed that order by means of certiorari in the Court of
Appeals which in a decision dated February 15, 1979 sustained the trial court (Ramos vs. Judge
Jesus R. de Vega, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-7728-R). Ramos brought the case to this Court.

We hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the Cruz law firm
to act as counsel for the municipality in collaboration with the fiscal and the municipal attorney.

That ruling constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it is manifestly a transgression

of section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that “the provincial fiscal
shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court,
except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or
to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. The legislative intent to
prohibit a municipality from employing private counsel in its lawsuits is further implemented by
section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. 2264, which provides that the municipal
attorney, as the head of the legal division or office of a municipality, “shall act as legal counsel
of the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to him
by the council.” The municipal attorney is paid out of municipal funds.

ISSUE:

WON the finding of CA that it is legal for a private counsel to represent LGU is correct.

RULING:

The legislative intent to prohibit a municipality from employing private counsel in

its lawsuits is further implemented by section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act
No. 2264, which provides that the municipal attorney, as the head of the legal division or
office of a municipality, “shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform such
duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to him by the council.” The municipal
attorney is paid out of municipal funds. The law being clear and unmistakable, there is no
room for interpretation or for engrafting upon it exceptions or qualifications not contemplated
therein. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. We
hereby declare that the appearance in the aforementioned case of Cruz Durian Agabin
Atienza & Alday as counsel for the municipality of Hagonoy is contrary to law. The
municipality should be represented by its municipal attorney and by the provincial fiscal of
Bulacan. The restraining order is lifted. No costs.

The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate with
a private law firm does not legalize the latter’s representation of the municipality of
Hagonoy in Civil Case No. 5095-M. While a private prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases,
an analogous arrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein a municipality is the
plaintiff. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, as complemented by section 3 of
the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in providing that only the provincial fiscal and the
municipal attorney can represent a municipality in its lawsuits. That provision is
mandatory.
Bersabal versus Salvador, G.R. No. L-35910, July 21, 1978

FACTS:

Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The subsequent
decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the court issued an order
stating that “…counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within
which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the
court.” After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30
days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the Respondent judge
issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied
it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit
on time the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would empower the Court of First
Instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to Prosecute.

RULING:

NO. The challenged orders of Respondent Judge dated August 4, 1971, October 30,
1971, and March 15, 1972 are set aside as null and void.

The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an
Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that “Courts… shall decide…
cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city… courts:
Provided… parties may submit memoranda… if so requested…” It cannot be interpreted
otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.

As a general rule, the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and
operates to confer discretion; while the word “shall” is imperative, operating to impose a
duty which may be enforced (dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714,
716-717). The implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed
case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the
latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on
request.

Moreover, memoranda, briefs and oral arguments are not essential requirements. They
may be submitted and/or made only if so requested Finally, a contrary interpretation would be
unjust and dangerous as it may defeat the litigant’s right to appeal granted to him by law. In the
case of Republic vs. Rodriguez (L-26056, May 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 378) this Court underscored
“the need of proceeding with caution so that a party may not be deprived of its right to appeal
except for weighty reasons.”
Loyola Grand Villas versus CA, G.R. No. 117188, August 7, 1997

FACTS:

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. (LGVHAI) was organized on 8

February 1983 as the homeoenwers' association for Loyola Grand Villas. It was also
registered as the sole homeowners' association in the said village with the Home Financing
Corporation (which eventually became Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation ["HIGC"]).
However, the association was not able file its corporate by-laws.

The LGVHAI officers then tried to registered its By-Laws in 1988, but they failed to do so.
They then discovered that there were two other homeowners' organizations within the
subdivision - the Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (North) Association, Inc. [North
Association] and herein Petitioner Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc.
["South Association].

Upon inquiry by the LGVHAI to HIGC, it was discovered that LGVHAI was dissolved for
its failure to submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and for
its non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the association's
activities. These paved the way for the formation of the North and South Associations.

LGVHAI then lodged a complaint with HIGC Hearing Officer Danilo Javier, and
questioned the revocation of its registration.  Hearing Officer Javier ruled in favor of
LGVHAI, revoking the registration of the North and South Associations.

Petitioner South Association appealed the ruling, contending that LGVHAI's failure to file
its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code effectively
automatically dissolved the corporation. The Appeals Board of the HIGC and the Court of
Appeals both rejected the contention of the Petitioner affirmed the decision of Hearing Officer
Javier.

ISSUE:

WON LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of
the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation.

RULING:

No. The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of
controversy in this case states:

Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. - Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1)
month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws for its government not
inconsistent with this Code.

Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imposition of duty which must be

enforced. However, the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not always imperative. It
may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. If the language of a statute, considered as
a whole with due regard to its nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended to use
the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning.

As correctly postulated by the petitioner, interpretation of this provision of law begins

with the determination of the meaning and import of the word “must” in this section. Ordinarily,
the word “must” connotes an imperative act or operates to impose a duty which may be enforced.
It is synonymous with “ought” which connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. However, the
word “must” in a statute, like “shall,” is not always imperative. It may be consistent with
an exercise of discretion. In this jurisdiction, the tendency has been to interpret “shall” as the
context or a reasonable construction of the statute in which it is used demands or requires. This is
equally true as regards the word “must.” Thus, if the language of a statute considered as a whole
and with due regard to its nature and object reveals that the legislature intended to use the words
“shall” and “must” to be directory, they should be given that meaning.

Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute
itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 of the Corporate Code
reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the
word “must” in the first sentence thereof. Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the
law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to incorporation. This provision in the same
section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement of filing the by-laws
“within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of
incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.” It necessarily follows that failure
to file the by-laws within that period does not imply the “demise” of the corporation.
Herrera versus NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 166570, December 18, 2009

FACTS:

RA No. 9136 was enacted on June 8, 2001 to provide a framework for the
restructuring of the electric power industry, including the privatization of NPC’s assets and
liabilities.4 One necessary consequence of the reorganization was the displacement of
employees from the Department of Energy, the Energy Regulatory Board, the National
Electrification Administration and the NPC. To soften the blow from the severance of
employment, Congress provided in Section 63 of the EPIRA, for a separation package superior
than those provided under existing laws.

On February 28, 2003, all NPC employees, including the petitioners, were separated
from the service. As a result, all the employees who held permanent positions at the NPC as
of June 26, 2001 opted for and were paid the corresponding separation pay equivalent to
one and a half months’ salary per year of service. Nonetheless, in addition to the separation
package mandated by the EPIRA, a number of NPC employees also claimed retirement
benefits under CA No. 186,6 as amended by RA No. 6607 and RA No. 1616.8 Under these laws,
government employees who have rendered at least 20 years of service are entitled to a gratuity
equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of service for the first 20 years, one and a half
months’ salary for every year of service over 20 but below 30 years, and two months’ salary for
every year of service in excess of 30 years.

The NPC, on the other hand, took the position that the grant of retirement benefits to
displaced employees in addition to separation pay was inconsistent with the constitutional
proscription on the grant of a double gratuity. Unable to amicably resolve this matter with its
former employees, the NPC filed on September 18, 2003, a Petition for Declaratory Relief10
against several parties,11 including the petitioners, before the RTC of Quezon City, to obtain
confirmation that RA No. 9136 did not specifically authorize NPC to grant retirement benefits in
addition to separation pay.12 The case was docketed as SCA No. Q-03-50681 and raffled to
Branch 101 of said court.

Petitioners’ arguments. Before us, petitioners argue that:

1) The EPIRA does not bar the application of CA No. 186, as amended. Petitioners are
therefore entitled to their retirement pay in addition to separation pay.

2) Petitioners have vested rights over their retirement benefits.

3) The payment of both retirement pay and separation pay does not constitute double
compensation, as the Constitution provides that “pensions or gratuities shall not be considered
as additional, double or indirect compensation.”

Respondents’ arguments. Respondents NPC and the DBM, on the other hand, maintain that
1) Section 63 of RA No. 9136 and Section 3, Rule 33 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations do not authorize the grant of retirement benefits in addition to the separation
pay already received. Rather, Section 63 requires separated employees to choose between a
separation plan under existing laws or the separation package under the EPIRA.

2) The grant of both separation pay and retirement benefit amounts to double gratuity in direct
contravention of the Constitution.

3) No law authorizes the payment of both separation pay and retirement benefits to
petitioners.

ISSUE:

NPC employees who were separated from the service because of the reorganization of the
electric power industry and who received their separation pay under RA No. 9136 are still
entitled to receive retirement benefits under CA No. 186, as amended.

RULING:

We deny the petition and affirm the court a quo’s Decision. Section 8 of Article IX(B)
of the Constitution provides that “[n]o elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by
law.” In prior decisions, we have ruled that there must be a clear and unequivocal statutory
provision to justify the grant of both separation pay and retirement benefits to an
employee. Here, absent an express provision of law, the grant of both separation and
retirement benefits would amount to double compensation from one single act of
separation from employment.

Petitioners claim that having religiously paid their premiums, they have vested rights to
their retirement gratuities which may not be revoked or impaired. However, petitioners fail to
consider that under the retirement laws that they themselves invoke, separation from the service,
whether voluntary or involuntary, is a distinct compensable event from retirement. Nothing in
said laws permits an employee to claim both separation pay and retirement benefits in the
event of separation from the service due to reorganization. Thus, absent an express provision
of law to the contrary, separation due to reorganization gives rise to two possible scenarios: first,
when the separated employee is not yet entitled to retirement benefits, second, when the
employee is qualified to retire. In the first case, the employee’s separation pay shall be computed
based on the period of service rendered in the government prior to the reorganization. In the
second case, where an employee is qualified to retire, he or she may opt to claim separation or
retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 23, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101 in SCA No. Q-03-50681 holding that
petitioners are not entitled to receive retirement benefits under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as
amended is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioners are entitled to a refund of
their contributions to the retirement fund, and the monetary value of any accumulated
vacation and sick leaves.
Tavora versus Veloso, G.R. No. L-60367, September 30, 1982

FACTS:

Venustiano T. Tavora, a resident of Marikina, Metro Manila, owns an apartment in

Quiapo, Manila which he has leased to Julieta Capati, a resident of Quiapo. On account of
alleged violations of the lease agreement by the lessee (unauthorized subleasing and failure to
pay rent), the lessor filed on January 12, 1981 an ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 060828) in the
City Court of Manila. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of lack of
jurisdiction for failure of the plaintiff to bring the dispute first to the barangay court for
possible amicable settlement under PD 1508. Parenthetically, there is no question that there
has been no attempt to amicably settle the dispute between Tavora and Capati at the
barangay level.

After denying the motion to dismiss as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration,
the municipal court reversed itself and dismissed the ejectment case. Alleging grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, petitioner Tavora has come to this Court on
certiorari and mandamus praying that the order of dismissal be set aside and that
respondent judge be ordered to hear and decide the case.

ISSUE:

WON the barangay lupon has jurisdiction over the dispute between Tavora and Veloso.

RULING:

No, Section 2 of PD 1508 specifies the condition under which the Lupon of a
barangay “shall have authority” to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of
their dispute. The parties must be “actually residing in the same city or municipality.” At
the same time Sec. 3 of PD 1508 – while reiterating that the disputants must be actually
residing in the same barangay or in different barangays within the same city or
municipality – unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have “no authority” over
disputes involving parties who actually resides in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except when such barangays adjoin each other.

Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no
jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or
municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.

The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which
is to restrict or vary the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in
the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.
CIR versus Primetown, G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007

FACTS:

Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for
the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. According to Yap, because
respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. Respondent complied, but the
claim was not acted upon. Thus on April 14, 2000, it filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA. CTA dismissed the petition having been filed beyond the two-year prescriptive
period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or credit under Section 229 of the NIRC. The
CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right
to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.

Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the CTA ruled that the two-year prescriptive period
under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days.
Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent’s petition, which was filed 731 days
after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. The
CA reversed the CTA decision ruling that Article 13 of the Civil Code does not distinguish
between a regular year and a leap year.

ISSUE:

WON petition was filed within the two-year period.

RULING:

Yes, the Respondents petition is filed (April 14, 2000) on the last day of 24th
calendar month from the day the respondent filed its final adjusted return (April 14,
1998) . The CA’s decision is correct but the basis is wrong. Article 13 of the Civil Code and
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject
matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365
days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.There obviously exists a manifest
incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods. For this reason, we hold that Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law,
governs the computation of legal periods.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the
final adjusted return; A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular
year of a leap year.—The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the
filing of the final adjusted return. But how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, 29 SCRA
70 (1969), we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year
or a leap year.

We therefore hold that respondent’s petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on
the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted
return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period. Accordingly, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to
expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.