CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW I

JOHN WESLEY SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE

Case Number: 94
GAVINO ALEXIS C. VILLANUEVA II
Topic:  III. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, D. Rules of Succession; Executive Clemency
Case Name:  Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC
GR No.:  206666
Date: January 21, 2015
 
I. Facts:

In September 2007, former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of the crime of Plunder, for which he was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua,
with accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the sentence and Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification.

However, in October 2007, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President
Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full
text of said pardon states:

PARDON

WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have reached the age of
seventy (70),

WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a half years,

WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office,

IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby
grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights.

The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs and
processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he
owned before his tenure as President.

Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect.

Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October, in the year of Our Lord, two
thousand and seven.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW I
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The next day, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and accepted" the pardon
by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.

In November 2009, however, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
President. This earned three oppositions in the COMELEC, (1) Petition to Deny Due Course and
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, (2) Disqualification as Presidential Candidate, and (3) "Petition
to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M.from Running as President due to Constitutional
Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B”;
All three were dismissed by COMELEC on the grounds that (1) the constitutional
proscription on reelection applies only to a sitting president, and (2) the pardon restored
Estrada’s right to vote and be voted for a public office.

The motions for reconsideration were denied by COMELEC En Banc.

However, Estrada only gained the second highest number of votes in the May 2010
synchronized elections. Thus, the single Certiorari petition filed before the SC was dismissed for
mootness.
In October 2012, Estrada filed a COC again, but this time, for the position of Mayor of
the City of Manila.
January 2013, Atty. Risos-Vidal files with COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification
against Estrada, anchored on the theory that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office
because of his conviction for plunder by the Sandiganbayan sentencing him to suffer Reclusion
Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification.
She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state respectively, that:

Sec. 40, Local Government Code:

SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

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Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphases supplied.)

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW I
JOHN WESLEY SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE

The COMELEC second division dismissed for utter lack of merit, stating that “Risos-
Vidal failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of this
Commission declaring categorically that [former President Estrada’s] right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo.”
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.

In April 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the SC jurisdiction by filing the present petition.

While the case was pending in the Court, the elections were conducted, and Estrada was
voted into office. The next day he was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.

In June 2013 Estrada’s opponent for the position of Mayor, Alfredo Lim moved for leave
to intervene, subscribing to Risos-Vidal’s theory that Estrada was disqualified. Further, since
Estrada was disqualified, all the votes he obtained should be declared stray, and being the second
placer, Lim should be declared the winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila.

II. Issue/s:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to
vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo.

III. Ruling:

1. The petition lacks merit. The pardon restored Estrada’s right to be voted into
public office.

IV. Ratio Decidendi:

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for
Mayor of Manila in the May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local
elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo
for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW I
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perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former President Estrada)
right to vote and bevoted upon for public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code as the foundations of her theory.

Risos-Vidal insists that, since the pardon given to and accepted by former President
Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that
former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights
of suffrage and to hold public office, or to otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the
pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members
of the Congress.

In Cristobal v. Labrador and Pelobello v. Palatino, which were decided under the 1935
Constitution, wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the President shared similar
phraseology with what is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then unequivocally
declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated this
pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby establishing that, under the present
Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by
legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that the
exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered
with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the
Constitution.

It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no
departure. It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which
declares that former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political rights"
substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former
President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of
imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW I
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Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

Risos-Vidal also claims that the third preambular “whereas” clause, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," serves
to make the pardon conditional, and that the breach of such condition renders the pardon
ineffectual.

This is not the case. The pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation,
considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights" as being restored.

Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an

introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced
by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking,
they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue
is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate
to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

V. Statement of Principle / Doctrine:

 A pardon, being a presidential prerogative, cannot be limited by legislative action.

 An unconditional, plenary pardon restores full civil and political rights, including
the right to vote and be voted, unless the language of the pardon expressly
provides otherwise.
 Preambulatory “whereas” statements are not integral to the decree, and are not to
be taken as conditions upon which the effectivity of the decree is based.