EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE

G.R. No. 129556 November 11, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. REY GADO

Facts:

the victim and some of his friends were having a drinking session at the house of Juanito Vicente. Shortly
thereafter, the victim decided to leave and accused Rey Gado and Juanito Vicente decided to bring him
home. With them were a certain Emma and her brother whose name the victim failed to mention. On
their way, and while they were along Fleur De Liz Street, the victim was held by his companions and he
was stabbed in the abdomen by Rey Gado. As the victim freed himself from his assailants, the latter
fled. He immediately grabbed a stone and hurled it at them.

While he was proceeding home, he was chanced upon by barangay tanod who offered to help him
home. At about 9 o'clock that evening, he reached their house. He immediately slumped on the floor
and asked his father to bring him to the hospital. Upon his father's query, the victim identified Rey
Gado as his assailant.

While aboard a jeep on their way to Perpetual Help Hospital at Las Piñas, the victim once more
related what happened to him, identifying the other companions of Rey Gado. He was given medical
attention at Perpetual Help Hospital but about four hours thereafter, at around 2 o'clock early
morning of January 31, 1992, he succumbed.

an Information charging Rey Gado and Emma Gallos was filed in court. An order for the arrest of the
accused was accordingly issued, but the same was left unserved. The trial court ordered the case to be
archived on February 22, 1993. It was not until May 30, 1994 when Rey Gado, one of the two accused,
was served an alias writ of arrest by the PNP Criminal Service Command of the Cavite Provincial Office
while detained at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna due to a charge of Robbery/Hold Up before the
Municipal Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite

both accused-appellant Rey Gado, and his co-accused Emma Gallos, who voluntarily appeared in court
upon notice, were arraigned and both entered a plea of not guilty. Emma Gallos was then also ordered
to be detained.

The two accused, on their part, sought refuge in their defense of alibi. Rey Gado claimed to have been
tending the store of his brother at Sucat, Cupang, Muntinlupa, about five kilometers away from the
place where the incident happened, while Emma Gallos averred that she was at home tending to her
sick daughter.

The trial court rendered judgment acquitting Emma Gallos. Rey Gado was, however, convicted of the
crime of murder and sentenced to suffer "the penalty of reclusion perpetua

ISSUE: whether the statements, uttered by the victim before he died partake of the nature of a dying
declaration or not

RULING: YES
Court holds that the conviction of accused Rey Gado is not only based on the affidavit of the eye
witness which admittedly was recanted by the affiant, but also on the declaration of the victim who
told his father Melencio Manalang, Sr. that he was stabbed by accused; at a time when this victim
Melencio Manalang, Jr. felt he was weakening, and therefore conscious of an impending death . . .

Accused- claiming that the said declarations are not in the nature of a dying declaration for the simple
reason that they were not made under a clear consciousness of an impending death.

The witness reiterated the material points of this sworn statement during his testimony before the
trial court. He also established the basis for the admissibility of the dying declaration, as an exception
to the hearsay rule, to wit:

As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. In order that a dying
declaration may be admissible as evidence, four requisites must concur, namely:

that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending
death;

that the declarant is competent as a witness;

and that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the
declarant is a victim.

Capitalizing on the fact that the victim was still able to stand and walk even after the first declaration
was made, accused-appellant contends that there could not have possibly been a belief of a looming
and impending death on the part of the victim.

We cannot quite agree. From the established facts in the case at bar, the trial court correctly considered
the declaration of the victim a dying declaration and, therefore, admissible. The declarant was
conscious of his impending death. This may be gleaned not only from the victim's insistence right after
he reached their house that he should immediately be brought to the hospital and that he was
becoming weaker by the moment, but also from the serious nature of his wounds and the fact that
the said victim died shortly afterwards.

Even assuming that the victim's utterances were not made under a firm belief of an impending death,
the victim's statements may, at the very least, form part of the res gestae.

For the admission of evidence as part of the res gestae, it is required that

(a) the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence,

(b) the statements forming part thereof were made before the declarant had the opportunity to
contrive, and

(c) the statements refer to the occurrence in question and its attending circumstances.

We have ruled that while the statement of the victim may not qualify as a dying declaration because it
was not made under the consciousness of impending death it may still be admissible as part of the res
gestae if it was made immediately after the incident , or a few hours thereafter. Definitely, the victim's
statement in the case at hand was made immediately after the incident, before he could even have
the opportunity to contrive or concoct a story. Of relevance, too, is the fact that on two occasions,
first at their house, and later while he was being brought to the hospital, he identified one and the
same person as his assailant.

Where the elements of both a dying declaration and a statement as part of the res gestae are present,
as in the case at bar, the statement may be admitted as a dying declaration and at the same time as
part of the res gestae

The trial court justified the conviction anyway, upon the strength of the dying declaration as related by
Melencio Manalang, Sr.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION as to the actual damages as hereinabove indicated. No special pronouncement is made
as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188124 June 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS AND JOEL LORICA LABAD, Accused

FACTS:

around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, Niño Noel Ramos (Niño) had just brought his girlfriend, Dianne
(Dianne), home in Sto. Niño, Parañaque City. On his way back to La Huerta, he passed by a bridge
connecting the barangays of Sto. Niño and La Huerta. Thereat, Niño was stabbed and mauled.

(Cesar), Niño’s brother, was in the vicinity of N. Domingo Street in La Huerta when he heard a
commotion on the bridge. As he was about to proceed to the bridge, he met Niño and noticed that his
brother was soaked in his own blood. Niño relayed to Cesar that he was stabbed by Joe-An. Cesar
immediately brought Niño to the hospital where the latter expired thirty (30) minutes later. At the police
station, Cesar claimed that appellants told him that they merely "took fancy" on Niño.

Dianne initially related in her affidavit executed at the police station that her cousin informed her of a
commotion on the bridge. Upon reaching the bridge, she met a friend who told her that her boyfriend,
Niño, was stabbed and brought to the hospital. She added that one day before the incident, she and
Niño were walking along the bridge when they passed by the group of appellants and heard Joe-An utter
the words, "Iyang mama na iyan, may araw din siya sa akin." In her testimony during the trial however,
she narrated that she actually saw Joe-An stabbing Niño.

PO3 Ramoncito Lipana (PO3 Lipana) was at the police station in La Huerta on 8 December 2002 when a
woman named Dianne came to report a stabbing incident involving her boyfriend. PO3 Lipana, together
with PO2 Jesus Brigola (PO2 Brigola) and PO3 Marlon Golfo, immediately proceeded to the crime scene.
Upon arriving thereat, the police saw two men scampering away upon seeing them. They chased the
two men, later identified as Joe-An and Joel. The police managed to catch the appellants while they
were hiding near a bangka under the bridge. Appellants were brought to the police station where
Dianne identified them as the assailants of Niño.

Appellants invoked denial and alibi as their defense. Joe-An, a resident of Wawa, Sto. Niño, alleged that
he was at his house on 8 December 2002. While he was taking his dinner, he saw people running
towards the bridge. He went out of the house to check on what had happened. He approached a group
of people talking about the commotion. Thereafter, he saw the police and barangay tanods arrive. He
was immediately handcuffed and asked to go with the police. Joe-An alleged that he was physically
forced by the police to admit the killing of Niño. Joe-An denied knowing the victim or his girlfriend,
Dianne, but admitted that Joel is an acquaintance.

Joel likewise denied his participation in killing Niño. He stated that he was sleeping at around 11 p.m. he
was awakened by an argument involving his mother and four (4) men outside his room. He then got out
of the room and saw PO3 Lipana, PO2 Brigola, and two other police "assets." The group invited him for
questioning. When the two assets suddenly grabbed him, Joel resisted but he was forcibly brought to
the police station. He saw Dianne at the station but the latter did not identify him as the culprit. Instead,
Dianne even sought his help to identify the person who killed her boyfriend. This fact notwithstanding,
the police refused to let him go. He testified that he did not know the victim or Dianne personally.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appellants, the dispositive portion of which reads:

It gave full weight to the dying declaration uttered by Niño to his brother, as well as the statement of
Dianne, who allegedly witnessed appellants threaten Niño the night before the incident.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC by awarding exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. Thus:

Issue: WNOT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BASED ON THE DYING DECLARATION OF THE VICTIM?

RULING: YES

As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is
evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his
impending death would make a careless and false accusation.

In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must concur:

first, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death;

third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and

fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which
the declarant is the victim.

All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met by the statement of the victim
communicated to Cesar. First, the statement pertained to Niño being stabbed, particularly pin-
pointing Joe-An as the perpetrator. Second, Niño must have been fully aware that he was on the brink
of death considering his bloodied condition when Cesar met him near the bridge. Third, the
competence of Niño is unquestionable had he survived the stabbing incident. Fourth, Niño’s
statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution for his murder.
Jonel Falabrica Serenas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder not by virtue of identification by
Dianne but as established by the dying declaration of the victim. Upon the other hand, we reverse the
conviction of Joel Lorica Labad.

Appellants argue that Dianne gave conflicting statements regarding the identity of the assailants. In her
affidavit, she narrated that a friend informed her that Niño was stabbed and taken to the hospital.
During trial however, Dianne testified that she witnessed the actual stabbing incident.

Dianne’s testimony is doubtful to say the least. This Court is mindful of the rule that if there is an
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the latter should be given more
weight since affidavits being taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Corollary to this is
the doctrine that, where the discrepancies are irreconcilable and unexplained and they dwell on
material points, such inconsistencies necessarily discredit the veracity of the witness' claim. The
second rule is apt to the case at bar.

We cannot simply brush aside the fact that while Dianne pointed to the persons who threatened to do
harm on the victim, she failed to identify who the perpetrators of the crime are. To the mind of the
Court, this omission in Dianne’s affidavit is so glaring on a material point, i.e., the failure to attribute
authorship to the crime. Therefore, the testimony of Dianne altogether becomes suspect.

Nevertheless, the prosecution’s case did not necessarily crumble. The victim’s dying declaration is a
most telling evidence identifying Joe-an.

Appellants question the alleged dying declaration of the victim in that they were not sufficiently
identified as the persons responsible for Niño’s death. Appellants anchor their argument on the
utterance of the word "Joe-An" when the victim was asked on who stabbed him. Appellants advance
that the victim may have been referring to some other person. Moreover, the victim did not even
mention "Joel" or "Joel Labad," the other suspect.

The OSG defends the victim’s dying declaration and insists that there was no mistake that the victim was
indeed referring to Joe-An, considering that the latter was familiar to him.

In sum, we find that the prosecution has proven that appellant Joe-An is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of murder. The acquittal of the other appellant, Joel, is in order on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED.

Appellant JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS is found GUILTY of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. For failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, appellant JOEL LORICA LABAD is ACQUITTED. The Director of Prisons is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to inform this Court of such
action within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, April 19, 2006

Facts:

Respondent Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages

against petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-storey
residential house, that such property was constructed solely from his own funds and
declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048, he commenced the construction
of said house in 1972 until its completion three years later, when the second floor of
said house became habitable in 1973, he allowed petitioner’s parents, Florentino and
Susan, to move therein and occupy the second floor while the construction of the
ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials;
when the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent allowed
petitioner’s parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it was done
out of sheer magnanimity as petitioner’s parents have no house of their own and since
respondent’s wife is the older sister of Florentino, petitioner’s father; in November 1985,
respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former
was due for retirement and he needed the place to which petitioner’s parents heeded
when they migrated to U.S. in 1986; however, without respondent’s knowledge,
petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of
respondent’s house; petitioner’s refusal to vacate the house despite repeated demands
prompted respondent to file the instant action for recovery of possession. He contended
that: his parents are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e., the upper story
belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioner’s parents; he is
occupying the ground floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino, with
respondent’s full knowledge; his parents spent their own resources in improving and
constructing the said two-storey house as co-owners thereof; the late Florentino was an
awardee of the land on which the house stands and as a co-owner of the house, he
occupied the ground floor thereof; the demand to vacate was respondent’s attempt to
deprive petitioner’s parents of their rights as co-owner of the said house; that
respondent had filed ejectment case as well as criminal cases against them involving
the subject house which were all dismissed.

RTC rendered a decision stating that the house is co-owned by Florentino Parel and
herein plaintiff Simeon Prudencio and as such the plaintiff cannot evict the defendant as
heirs of the deceased Florentino Parel from said property, nor to recover said premises
from herein defendant.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the ruling and
and declared respondent as the sole owner of the subject house and ordered petitioner
to surrender possession of the ground floor thereof to respondent immediately. Hence
this instant appeal.

REPORT THIS AD
Issue:

WON Rule 132, Sec. 34 or Rule 133, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court applies in the case at
bar.

Held:

The latter applies.

Respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recovery of
possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof and
also was religiously paying the taxes therein. While tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has
a claim of title over the property. The house which petitioner claims to be co-owned by
his late father had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent, and this fact, taken with the other circumstances above-mentioned,
inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is the sole owner of the house subject
matter of the litigation. Respondent having established his claim of exclusive ownership
of the subject property, it was incumbent upon petitioner to contravene respondent’s
claim. The burden of evidence shifted to petitioner to prove that his father was a co-
owner of the subject house.

In the case of Jison vs. CA, he records show that although petitioner’s counsel asked
that he be allowed to offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file
the same. Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary evidence presented by
petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts
and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It
is a settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as
an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party.

Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were not formally offered, the
same were marked during the presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can
properly be taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, which is wrong as
in Bravo Jr., the court allowed evidence on minority by admitting the certified true copy
of the birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not formally offered in
evidence. This was due to the fact that the birth certificate was properly filed in support
of a motion for bail to prove petitioner’s minority which was never challenged by the
prosecution and it already formed part of the records of the case. The rule referred to in
the Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, and not Section 34 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the one applicable to the present case. Section
7 states that:

Section 7. Evidence on motion.- When a motion is based on facts not appearing of

record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the
respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on
oral testimony or depositions.

Even assuming arguendo that the documentary evidence of petitioner should be

considered in his favor, the evidence showing that respondent had filed civil and
criminal cases against petitioner which were dismissed as well as the alleged Special
Power of Attorney of petitioner’s parents whereby they authorized petitioner to stay in
the ground floor of the house, did not establish co-ownership of Florentino and
respondent of the subject house; all witnesses failing to state thast there was co-
ownership in the property.

DYING DECLARATION

G.R. No. 198022               April 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and

EDUARDO QUISAYAS, Accused,

facts:

Umali was riding a bicycle on his way home when he saw Januario being mauled by two persons.
Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that the accused ran away
and were chased by policemen who alighted from the police patrol vehicle. they saw Januario lying
6

on the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was severely injured, the policemen immediately
boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag Hospital. While inside the
vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered that it was "Jay-R and his
uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the appellant herein, while Jay-R is his co-
accused who remains at-large. 7

At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him in critical condition.
Three fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which eventually
caused his death. 8

Maria Castillo, for her part, testified on how she learned of what happened to her husband, the
amount allegedly stolen from her husband, as well as on the expenses and loss incurred by reason
of Januario’s death. She, further, quantified the sorrow and anxiety the family suffered by reason of
such death. 9
In his defense, appellant denied the accusation against him.

RTC rendered a Decision against the ACCUSED, the dispositive portion of which reads:

As to the identity of the perpetrators, the court considered the victim’s response to SPO3
Mendoza’s question as to who committed the crime against him as part of the res gestae,
which is an exception to the hearsay rule.  As to appellant’s defense of alibi, the court gave more
16

weight to the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence that indeed the former was an actual resident of
Mabini, Batangas. 17

CA affirmed the RTC decision. Contrary, however, to the RTC’s conclusion, the appellate
court considered Januario’s statement to SPO3 Mendoza, that the accused were the ones
who stabbed him and took his wallet, not only as part of res gestae but also as a dying
declaration.

ISSUE: WNOT THE UTTERANCE OF VICTIM TO THE POLICE IS CONSIDERED AS A DYING

DECLARATION?

RULING : NO. However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying
declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae.

We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt not of robbery with homicide but of murder.

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay

character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely:

(a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death;

(b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness
of impending death;

(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and

(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death. 39

In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. It
does not appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death
when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant.
It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that
renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all
hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending.  Thus, the utterances made by
40

Januario could not be considered as a dying declaration.

However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his
statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae.
Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact
and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the
main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation,
is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. 41

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. When
Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling
occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his co-accused. At that time, Januario and
the witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to the hospital, and thus, had no time to
contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance about appellant and his co-accused
having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity
and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant because
it identified the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario,
perpetrated by appellant, is adequately proven by the prosecution.

We find no sufficient evidence to show either the amount of money stolen, or if any amount was in
fact stolen from Januario. Even if we consider Januario’s dying declaration, the same pertains only
to the stabbing incident and not to the alleged robbery.

Moreover, assuming that robbery was indeed committed, the prosecution must establish with
certitude that the killing was a mere incident to the robbery, the latter being the perpetrator’s main
purpose and objective. It is not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the homicide
was to rob; a mere presumption of such fact is not sufficient.  Stated in a different manner, a
32

conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of the malefactor
and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of
human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.  What is crucial for a
33

conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to firmly establish the
offender’s intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the
homicide is actually carried out.  In this case, there was no showing of the appellant’s intention,
34

determined by their acts prior to, contemporaneous with, and subsequent to the commission of the
crime, to commit robbery.  No shred of evidence is on record that could support the conclusion that
35

appellant’s primary motive was to rob Januario and that he was able to accomplish it.  Mere
36

speculation and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required in establishing the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt.  Where the evidence does not conclusively prove the robbery,
37

the killing of Januario would be classified either as a simple homicide or murder, depending upon the
absence or presence of any qualifying circumstance, and not the crime of robbery with
homicide.  To establish the fact that appellant and his co-accused killed the victim by stabbing him
38

with a bladed weapon, the prosecution presented Umali as an eyewitness to the mauling incident. It
was this same witness who identified the perpetrators.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the Court of Appeals Decision dated February 23,
2011 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03593, affirming the Regional Trial Court Decision dated June 20,
2008 in Criminal Case No. 13838, convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with Homicide.
We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS
"ABE", Accused-Appellant.

facts:

SPO2 Borre took his five (5)-month-old grandson outside his residence at, Pasig City.
(PO3 Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was watching television when four
(4) successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2
Borre's house and saw two (2) men armed with .38 caliber revolvers standing a meter
away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre,
but he could not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants
fled on a motorcycle.6

PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson (Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to the
Pasig City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil and
PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe," "Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his
neighbor, Palanas -who shot him. This statement was repeated to his wife,
(Resurreccion), who followed him at the hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the
morning of even date, SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot wounds on his head
and trunk.7

For his part, Palanas interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that on
March 25, 2006 he was in Parafiaque City attending to the needs of his sick father. The
next day, he went to a baptism in Tondo, Manila and stayed there from morning until 9
o'clock in the evening, after which he returned to his father in Parafiaque City. He
maintained that he was not aware of the death of SPO2 Borre until he was informed by
a neighbor that Resurreccion was accusing him of killing her husband. He also denied
any knowledge why Resurreccion would blame him for SPO2 Borre's death. 8

The RTC Ruling

RTC convicted Palanas of the crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua,

The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that
Palanas and his companion were the ones who killed SPO2 Borre through the positive
identification of the eyewitnesses to the incident. Moreover, SPO2 Borre's statements
that Palanas shot him constituted an ante mortem statement and formed part of
the res gestae, and, thus, admissible as evidence against Palanas.
On the other hand, the RTC gave no credence to Palanas's defense of alibi. It observed
that it was not physically impossible for Palanas to be at the locus criminis as his own
witness even stated that the distance between Pasig City and Paranaque City could be
traversed in less than one (1) hour.

The CA Ruling

CA affirmed the RTC's ruling

The C A found all the elements of the crime of Murder to be present, giving probative
weight to the dying declaration of SPO2 Borre that it was Palanas who shot
him.
 The Issue Before the Court

WNOT THE UTTERANCE OF THE VICTIM IS ONSIDERED AS A DYING DECLARATION?

The Court's Ruling

YES
CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre's statements on his way to the hospital as
evidence, both as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.

For a dying declaration24 to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, 25 four
(4) conditions must concur:
(a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death;
(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his
impending death;
(c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where
the declarant is the victim.26

a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae,27 and thus, constitute another

exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.28

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration,

given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of his death and
taking into consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it may be
reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his
own death was already imminent.29 This declaration is considered evidence of the
highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his
impending death would make a careless and false accusation. 30 Verily, because the
declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when
every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and
awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered
in court.31

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise be deemed to form
part of the res gestae. "Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are
so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony." 32 In this case, SPO2 Borre's
statements refer to a startling occurrence, i. e., him being shot by Palanas and his
companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the
identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only
in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because it
identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2
Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution. 33

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 16, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04925 finding accused-appellant Bernabe P.
Palanas alias "Abe", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as
defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION, in that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole, and ordered to pay the heirs of SPO2 Ramon
Borre y Orio the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P2,464,865.07 as actual damages,
all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
judgment until full payment.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE

Facts:

while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who
was passing by, to join them.

After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch
his child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was
"Payat."  When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other
3

handcuffed him and told him "not to run because they were policemen" and because he had
an "atraso" or a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa
immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latter's mother of the
abduction.

Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernal's wife Naty and this was the motive behind the
former's kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.

the defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police on August 5, 1991,
and hence, was never kidnapped. 4
the court a quo rendered judgment  finding Bernal "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
5

kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua 

Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses' allegedly
illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January
1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal's wife Naty were having an affair. One
time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised
Naty "not to do it again because she (was) a married woman.  Undoubtedly, his wife's
9

infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.

ISSUE: WNOT Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with
Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence AS A DECLARATION AGAINST HIS OWN INTEREST

RULING: YES

Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the

perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence of facts from which it may be
reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support
a conviction.  Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with
10

Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence, viz.:

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased,
or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-
in-interest and against third persons.

With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision, it is safe to
assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is,
pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal. 11

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:

"(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;

(2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;

(3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to
his aforesaid interest; and

(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true." 12

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with
Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence  because no sane person will be
13

presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. 14

We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the victim has yet to resurface.
Considering the circumstances, it is safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is already dead.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision
dated November 18, 1993, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against accused-appellant Theodore Bernal.

SO ORDERED.

DECLARATION AGAINST PEDIGREE

G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

TEODORA DOMINGO, 

an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private respondent before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon
located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses
Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene
Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on
March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband,
Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died hence they seek to
inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an Affidavit
of Extrajudicial Settlement  adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, Martin Guerrero
2

sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name.

Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on
November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in
question by right of representation.

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the
following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their
aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller;
certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death
certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed
records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton
Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of
Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and
Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that
petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance
with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon
Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving,
uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article
172 of the Family Code to establish filiation.

the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the
complaint for reconveyance. 7

In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary
evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture,
and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WNOT PET FAILED TO ESTABLISH LEGITIMACY AND FILIATION?

RULING: NO

Petitioners' evidence, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the
baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a
family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she
identified and explained in the course and as part of her testimony.

The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is
Teodora's niece.   Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is
16

admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions:

(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;

(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;

(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and

(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for
analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence
sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime
regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to
present evidence other than such declaration.

American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the
declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and
when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:

One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not
from, the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding
claimant's pedigree, he may not do by declarant's own statements as to declarant's
relationship to the particular family. The reason is that declarant's declaration of his
 own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there must be precedent
proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member
of the particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant's
relationship to the common family must appear is not met. But when the party
claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim directly from the declarant or
the declarant's estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite
different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in
controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible
without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is
then disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not
derive their evidential value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an
artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations belong. The distinction
we have note is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-
serving, in the other they are competent from reasons of necessity. 

The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative
common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate,
the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration
itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact.   As an exception, the requirement
18

that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not
apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the
family. 19

the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be
relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably,
the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that
there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is
rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of
justice.   More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry
20

to refute that declaration made by the decedent.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the
decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and
nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case,   where the subject of the declaration is
21

the declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems absurb to require, as a foundation for
the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish.
The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.

Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while
the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their
admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of
private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being
offered in evidence.   It is elementary that an objection shall
22

be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence,   otherwise, the
23

objection shall be treated as waived,   since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party
24

may waive.  25

As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al.,   it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence
26

that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time,
otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the question
addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the
inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred.

Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver if
the provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the
question is asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken
after the testimony has been given, is too late.   Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence
27

given on the stand, where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject
property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.

SO ORDERED.

FAMILY REPUTATION

Jison vs. CA
GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter.  The case was filed 20 years after her mother’s death
and when she was already 39 years of age.  

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated
Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother.  Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his
family.  It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she
became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner.  Monina was able to present total of 11
witnesses.     

ISSUE: WON various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives CONSTITUTES AS

PART OF THE FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE AS
FAMILY POSSESSIONS

HELD: NO

As to, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio
Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINAs filiation,
while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA witnessed the authors
signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents
may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to
testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other
than the documents in question. As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section
40, however, this requires further elaboration.

Rule 130, Section 40, provides:

Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or tradition existing
in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question
may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing
the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether private documents,
fall within the scope of the clause and the like as qualified by the preceding phrase [e]ntries in
family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits.

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in
light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family
possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a familys joint statement of its belief as
to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects openly exhibited and well known
to the family, or those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition.
Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.

Plainly then, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above,
may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted
on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation, it having been observed that:

[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the
common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material
element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx [Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by
reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the
pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.

Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like manner as MONINA's

school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed,
relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.

We now direct our attention to MONINAs 21 September 1971 affidavit , subject of the fourth
assigned error, where she attests that FRANCISCO is not her father. MONINA contends that she
signed it under duress, i.e., she was jobless, had no savings and needed the money to support herself
and finish her studies. Moreover, she signed Exhibit P upon the advice of Atty. Divinagracia that
filiation could not be waived and that FRANCISCOs ploy would boomerang upon him. On the other
hand, FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be afforded Exhibit P as MONINA was already
25 years old at the time of its execution and was advised by counsel; further, being a notarized
document, its genuineness and due execution could not be questioned. He relies on the testimony of
Jose Cruz, a partner at the accounting firm of Miller & Cruz, who declared that he intervened in the
matter as MONINA was spreading rumors about her filiation within the firm, which might have had
deleterious effects upon the relationship between the firm and FRANCISCO.
 Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and
on the same evidence as that of legitimate children.  Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of
evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not
only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such
in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1.     That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was
employed by the former;
2.     That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competence evidence as to the issue of paternity.  Francisco’s lack of participation in the
preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as
incompetent to prove paternity.  With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was
25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina
were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to
such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation.  Monina’s evidence hurdles the
“high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate
filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”.  Hence, Monina
proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

In fine, We hold that [MONINAs] filiation as [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter has been
conclusively established by the uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and
Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee himself had admitted his paternity of the appellee, and
also by the testimonies of appellant, Arsenio Duatin, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo
Baylosis unerringly demonstrating that by his own conduct or overt acts like sending appellant to
school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del
Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, defraying appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a]
monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging appellants
paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing his office personnel to give
appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co.,
allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls,
having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence,
allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records, appellee had continuously
recognized appellant as his illegitimate daughter. Added to these are the acts of [FRANCISCOs]
relatives acknowledging or treating [MONINA] as [FRANCISCOs] daughter or as their relative. On
this point, witness Zafiro Ledesma, former Mayor of Iloilo City, whose spouse belongs to the Lopez
clan just like [FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA] has been considered by the Lopezes as a
relative. He identified pictures of the appellee in the company of the Lopezes . Another witness,
Danthea H. Lopez, whose husband Eusebio Lopez is appellees first cousin, testified that appellant
was introduced to her by appellees cousin, Remedios Lopez Franco, as the daughter of appellee
Francisco Jison, for which reason, she took her in as [a] secretary in the Merchants Financing
Corporation of which she was the manager, and further allowed her to stay with her family free of
board and lodging. Still on this aspect, Dominador Savariz declared that sometime in February, 1966
appellees relative, Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to appellant as the daughter of appellee
Francisco Jison.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her
action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her
action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.  Petition was denied.

RES GESTATE

G.R. No. 196735               May 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA,

CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR

The facts

members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity at around 12:30 to 1 :00 p.m., were having lunch at Beach
House Canteen, located at the back of the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
Quezon City.  Suddenly, Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"
8 9

According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around when
Venturina shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them.  The men were armed
10

with baseball bats and lead pipes, and their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or
shirts.  Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him with their lead
11

pipes.  During the attack, he recognized one of the attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir
12

because his mask fell off. 13

Lachica tried to parry the blows of his attackers, suffering scratches and contusions. 14

He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education.  Just before reaching it, he looked
15

back and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where
the commotion was.  Both of them did not have their masks on.  He was familiar with Alvir,
16 17

Zingapan, and Medalla because he often saw them in the College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy (CSSP) and Zingapan used to be his friend.  The attack lasted about thirty (30) to forty-
18

five (45) seconds. 19

According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when
Venturina shouted.  He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing masks,
20

running toward them.  He was stunned, and he started running.  He stumbled over the protruding
21 22

roots of a tree.  He got up, but the attackers came after him and beat him up with lead pipes and
23

baseball bats until he fell down.  While he was parrying the blows, he recognized two (2) of the
24

attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva since they were not wearing any
masks.  After about thirty (30) seconds, they stopped hitting him.
25 26
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to five (5) men
coming toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero.  This group also beat him up.  He did not move until
27 28

another group of masked men beat him up for about five (5) to eight (8) seconds. 29

When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground.  Several bystanders brought him to the
30

U.P. Infirmary where he stayed for more than a week for the treatment of his wounds and fractures. 31

According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked back when Venturina
shouted and saw a group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces of
cloth around their heads.  He ran when they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces were covered
32

with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and hit him with lead pipes.  While running and parrying the
33

blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo because their
masks fell off.  He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to the Main Library.  He then decided
34 35

that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and turned back toward Beach House.  There, he saw 36

Venturina lying on the ground.  Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while
37

Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina.  When they saw him, they went toward his
38

direction.  They were about to hit him when somebody shouted that policemen were coming.
39

Feliciano and Narag then ran away. 40

According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood up when he heard
someone shout, "Brods!"  He saw a group of men charging toward them carrying lead pipes and
45

baseball bats.  Most of them had pieces of cloth covering their faces.  He was about to run when
46 47

two (2) of the attackers approached him.  One struck him with a heavy pipe while the other stabbed
48

him with a bladed instrument.  He was able to parry most of the blows from the lead pipe, but he
49

sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm. 50

He was able to run away.  When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach
51

House Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano.  He decided 52

to go back to the canteen to help his fraternity brothers.  When he arrived, he did not see any of his
53

fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who attacked them.  He ended up going to their hang-out
54

instead to meet with his other fraternity brothers.  They then proceeded to the College of Law where
55

the rest of the fraternity was already discussing the incident. 56

According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the group of attackers
coming toward them.  When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina.  He was
57 58

also able to see Warren Zingapan and George Morano at the scene. 59

Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education, boarded a jeepney to
the College of Law to wait for their other fraternity brothers.  One of his fraternity brothers, Peter
60

Corvera, told him that he received information that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west
wing of the Main Library and were regrouping in SM North.  Lachica and his group then set off for
61

SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and identify their attackers. 62

When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them.  Lachica saw Robert 63

Michael Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan.  They had no choice but to
64

get away from the mall and proceed instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity members held
a meeting. 65

On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to lodge
their complaints with the National Bureau of Investigation.  Their counsel, Atty. Frank
66

Chavez, told the U.P. Police that the victims would be giving their statements before the
National Bureau of Investigation, promising to give the U.P. Police copies of their statements.
In the meantime, Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital on
December 8, 1994. He died on December 10, 1994.

On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the court granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not identified by the
prosecution's witnesses and that he was not mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the
prosecution.85

the trial court rendered its decision  with the finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo
100

Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other
penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua.  The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida,
101

Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag.  The case against
102

Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension.  The trial court, m
103

evaluating the voluminous evidence at hand, concluded that:

After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered view that of the ten accused,
some were sufficiently identified and some were not. The Court believes that out of the amorphous
images during the pandemonium, the beleaguered victims were able to espy and identify some of
the attackers etching an indelible impression in their memory. In this regard, the prosecution
eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw the attackers rush towards them wielding deadly
weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and bladed ones, and pounce on their
hapless victims, run after them, and being present with one another at the scene of the crime during
the assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently
behind bars, not one .of them testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were
all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could
have easily tagged each and every single accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric
assault to make sure that no one else would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named
only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the blows
against them. 104

Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to this court
on automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal,  the case was
105

remanded to the Court of Appeals.  In the Court of Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled several
106

Times  before it was eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for the writing of
107

the decision.

the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed  the decision of the Regional Trial
108

Court, with three (3) members concurring  an one (1) dissenting.
109 110

ISSUE: WNOT statements made by the bystanders, IS ADMISSIBLE as part of the res gestae

RULING: YES

Evidence as part of the res

gestae may be admissible but
have little persuasive value in
this case

According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador,  when he arrived at the scene, he
139

interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they
were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res
gestae.

As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x."  All other kinds of
140

testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however,
provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part
of res gestae, thus:

Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit:

(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and

(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act."
In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out
of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility
of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony. 143

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school
campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were
made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence
given in res gestae.

In People v. Albarido,  however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience:"
144

x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference.
Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot
expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because different
persons have different impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x 145
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value
since the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and
at different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack,
testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked
and some were unmasked.

When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed
the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be
given considerably less weight than that of the

A Final Note

It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also the effect on the five other lives
whose once bright futures are now put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado. There
is now more honor for them to accept their responsibility and serve the consequences of their
actions. There is, however, nothing that they can do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully
compensate for his senseless and painful loss.

This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it be the last. Perhaps this
case and many cases like it can empower those who have a better view of masculinity: one which
valorizes courage, sacrifice and honor in more life-saving pursuits.

"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the Philippines. It colors the stories of
many who choose to expend their energy in order that our people will have better lives. Fraternity
rumbles are an anathema, an immature and useless expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a culture
that retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at dangal."

This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26,
2010 is AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla,
Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the MODIFICATION that they be
fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136,
Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158362               April 4, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. @ "BERTING", GILBERTO

VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, and RICKY VILLARICO

FACTS:

Haide was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen of his family’s residence in Bolinsong, Bonifacio,
Misamis Occidental. The kitchen, located at the rear of the residence, had a wall whose upper
portion was made of three-feet high bamboo slats (sa-sa) and whose lower portion was also made of
bamboo slats arranged like a chessboard with four-inch gaps in between. At that time, Haide’s
sister-in-law Remedios Cagatan was attending to her child who was answering the call of nature
near the toilet. From where she was, Remedios saw all the accused as they stood at the rear of the
kitchen aiming their firearms at the door – Ricky Villarico was at the left side, and Gilberto, Jr. stood
behind him, while Gilberto, Sr. was at the right side, with Ramentos behind him. When Gilberto, Jr.
noticed Remedios, he pointed his gun at her, prompting Remedios to drop to the ground and to
shout to Lolita Cagatan, her mother-in-law and Haide’s mother: Nay, Nay tawo Nay (Mother, mother,
there are people outside, mother). At that instant, Remedios heard three gunshots. 5

Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the gunshots just as he was coming out of the
toilet, making him instinctively jump into a hole, from where he was able to see and recognize
Gilberto, Sr., Gilberto, Jr. and Ricky who were then standing by the kitchen door. They were aiming
their guns upward, and soon after left together with Ramentos. 6

Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She recalled that Haide then came towards
her from the kitchen, asking for help and saying:  (I was shot by Berting).7 At that, she and
Remedios brought the wounded Haide to Clinica Ozarraga, where he was treated for gunshot
wounds on his left scapular region (back of left shoulder) and right elbow. He succumbed shortly
thereafter due to hypovolemic shock or massive loss of blood. 8

Version of the Defense

The accused denied the accusations and each proffered an alibi.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC convicted the four accused of homicide aggravated by dwelling, disposing: 16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide, with one aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences each one of them to a penalty of imprisonment
ranging from 6 years and 1 day, as its minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, as its maximum, to
suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, to pay jointly and solidarily, the heirs of the victim
₱50,000.00, as civil liability and to pay the costs.

The RTC accorded faith to the positive identification of the accused by the Prosecution’s witnesses,
and disbelieved their denial and alibis due to their failure to show the physical improbability for them
to be at the crime scene, for the distances between the crime scene and the places where the
accused allegedly were at the time of the commission of the crime were shown to range from only
100 to 700 meters.

Ruling of the CA

On intermediate review, the CA modified the RTC’s decision, holding instead that murder was
established beyond reasonable doubt because the killing was attended by treachery, viz: 19

Issues

wnot The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting
– uttered in the immediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim – was a true
part of the res gestae.
 Ruling: yes

The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting –
uttered in the immediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim – was a true part
of the res gestae. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the
hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
res gestae. (36 a)

The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." 31 In a general way, res
gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve
to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. 32 The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. 33

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. 34 A declaration or an utterance is
thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule when the following requisites concur:

(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

(b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and

(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act – the shooting of Haide
– was a startling occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the
group of Berting was made before Haide had time to contrive or to devise considering that it
was uttered immediately after the shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned the
startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of the
assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of the res gestae for being uttered in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.

In the face of the positive identification of all the four accused, it did not matter whether only one or
two of them had actually fired the fatal shots. Their actions indicated that a conspiracy existed
among them. Indeed, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 36 Direct proof of a previous
agreement among the accused to commit the crime is not necessary,37 for conspiracy may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused at the time of their commission of the crime that evinces a
common understanding among them on perpetrating the crime. 38 Thus, the concerted acts of the four
manifested their agreement to kill Haide, resulting in each of them being guilty of the crime
regardless of whether he actually fired at the victim or not. It is axiomatic that once conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all;39 and that all the conspirators are then liable as co-
principals.40

But did not the fact that the name Berting without any surname being too generic open the
identification of the accused as the assailants to disquieting doubt about their complicity?

We hold that there was no need for a surname to be attached to the nickname Berting in order to
insulate the identification by Haide from challenge. The victim’s res gestae statement was only
one of the competent and reliable pieces of identification evidence. As already shown, the
accused were competently incriminated also by Remedios and Francisco in a manner that
warranted the logical inference that they, and no others, were the assailants. Also, that
Berting was the natural nickname for a person whose given name was Gilberto, like herein
accused Gilberto, Sr. and Gilberto, Jr., was a matter of common knowledge in the Philippines.
In fine, the pieces of identification evidence, including Haide’s res gestae statement,
collaborated to render their identification unassailable.

Relevantly, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v.
Gallarde,41 namely: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the
act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim
immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:

xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of
being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of
the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct
evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually
seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person
or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author
of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to
possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be
convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no
conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely
absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial
evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence,
then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.

The rejection was warranted. Long judicial experience instructs that their denial and alibis, being too
easy to invent, could not overcome their positive identification by credible Prosecution witnesses
whose motives for the identification were not shown to be ill or vile. Truly, a positive identification
that is categorical, consistent, and devoid of any showing of ill or vile motive on the part of the
Prosecution witnesses always prevails over alibi and denial that are in the nature of negative and
self-serving evidence.43 To be accepted, the denial and alibi must be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence establishing not only that the accused did not take part in the commission of the
imputed criminal act but also that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at or near the
place of the commission of the act at or about the time of its commission. In addition, their proffered
alibis were really unworthy of credit because only the accused themselves and their relatives and
other intimates substantiated them. 44

WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on June 6, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 24711,
finding GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR., GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, and RICKY
VILLARICO guilty of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer reclusion perpetua, subject to the
modification that they are held jointly and solidarily liable to pay to the heirs of the late Haide
Cagatan death indemnity of ₱75,000.00, moral damages of ₱75,000.00, and exemplary damages
of P30,000.00.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

ENTRIES IN THE COURSE BUSINESS

G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., vs. JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO,

MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA, 

The antecedents facts

Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipe Javalera, are
officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from
Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m. The tickets
were brought sometime in August 1985. Among the conditions included in plaintiffs tickets is the
following:

1. CHECK-IN TIME — Please check in at the Airport Passenger check-in counter at

least one hour before PUBLISHED departure time of your flight. We will consider
your accommodation forfeited in favor of waitlisted passenger if you fail to check-
in at least 30 minutes before PUBLISHED departure time.

Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went to the check-in counter of the defendant's Naga
branch at least one (1) hour before the published departure time but no one was at the counter until
30 minutes before departure, but upon checking -in and presentation of their tickets to the
employee/clerk who showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance
passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and seek actual, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees for breach of contract of carriage.

Defendant disclaim any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of plaintiff on the said flight
was due to their having check-in late for their flight. It is averred even if defendant is found liable to
the plaintiffs such liability is confined to, and limited by, the CAB Economic Regulations No. 7 in
conjunction with P.D. 589.
The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach of contract of carriage in
bumping-off the plaintiffs from its F264 flight of September 25, 1985, and ordered defendant to pay:

PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 15, 990, the appellate court rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which, reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against appellant.

Hence, this present petition with the following legal questions:

1. Can the Honorable Court of Appeals validity promulgate the questioned decision
by the simple expedient of adopting in toto the trial court's finding that defendant-
appellant is liable for damages on the sole issue of credibility of witnesses without
considering the material admissions made by the plaintiffs and other evidence on
record that substantiate the defense of defendant-appellant.

Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a case is required to prove his
affirmative allegations. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support
his claim is preponderance of evidence or that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondents were late in checking-in for their flight from Naga City to
Manila on September 24. 1985.

It is immediately apparent from the records of this case that the claims of the parties on this question
are dramatically opposed. As a rule, the determination of a question of fact depends largely on the
credibility of witnesses unless some documentary evidence is available which clearly substantiates
the issue and whose genuineness and probative value is not disputed. The exception to the rule now
runs true in this case.

We reverse. This case once more illustrates Our power to re-weigh the findings of lower courts when
the same are not supported by the record or not based on substantial evidence.

It is an admitted fact that the private respondents knew of the required check-in time for passengers.
The time requirement is prominently printed as one of the conditions of carriage on their tickets, i.e.,
that the airport passenger should check-in at least one hour before published departure time of his
flight and PAL shall consider his accommodation forfeited in favor of waistlisted passengers if he
fails to check-in at least 30 minutes.

We note that while the aforequoted condition has always been applied strictly and without exception,
the station manager, however, may exercise his discretion to allow passengers who checked-in late
to board provided the flight is not fully booked and seats are available . On September 24, 1985,
flight 264 from Naga to Manila was fully booked owing to the Peñafrancia Festival. In addition, PAL
morning flights 261 and 262 were canceled resulting in a big number of waitlisted passengers.

The private respondents claim that they were on time in checking-in for their flight; that no PAL
personnel attended to them until much later which accounted for their late check-in; that PAL
advanced the check-in time and the departure of their flight resulting in their non-accommodation;
and that they suffered physical difficulties, anxieties and business losses.
The evidence on record does not support the above contentions. We note that there were two other
confirmed passengers who came ahead of the private respondents but were refused
accommodation because they were late. Edmundo Araquel, then the check-in-clerk, testified on this
point, as follows:

The private respondents submitted no controverting evidence. As clearly manifested above, the
intervening time between Capati and Go and the private respondents took only a mere second. If
indeed, the private respondents were at the check-in counter at 3:30 p.m., they could have been the
first ones to be attended to by Araquel than Capati and Go. They cold have also protested if they
were the earliest passengers at the counter but were ignored by Araquel in favor of Go and Capati.
They did not.

It is likewise improbable that not a single PAL personnel was in attendance at the counter when the
check-in counter was supposed to be opened at 3:25 p.m. It must be remembered that the morning
flight to Manila was canceled and hence, it is not farfetched for Us to believe that the PAL personnel
then have their hands full in dealing with the passengers of the morning flight who became waitlisted
passengers. Moreover, the emphatic assertions of private respondent Daniel Javalora Ilano
regarding the absence of a PAL personnel lost its impact during the cross examination:

It is significant to note that there were no other passenger who checked-in late after the private
respondents. In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented to
corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie evidence of the truth of their
allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents, (with emphasis on the printed condition of
the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well as on the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the
flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents) and the
passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. "5," (which showed the non-accommodation of Capati
and Go an the private respondents)are entries made in the regular course of business which the
private respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their
testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made
contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when
admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater
probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and
recollection. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that
speaks a uniform language. This dictum is amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of the
private respondents in their complaint (where they claimed that no one was at the counter until thirty
(30) minutes before the published departure time and that the employee who finally attended to
them marked them late) and in their testimonies (where they contended that there were two different
PAL personnel who attended to them at the check-in counter. Private respondents' only objection to
these documents is that they are self-serving cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in
this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main
transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are
admissible as apart of the res gestae . Based on these circumstances, We are inclined to believe
the version of PAL. When the private respondents purchased their tickets, they were instantaneously
bound by the conditions of the contract of carriage particularly the check-in time requirement. The
terms of the contract are clear. Their failure to come on time for check-in should not militate against
PAL. Their non-accommodation on that flight was the result of their own action or inaction
and the ensuing cancellation of their tickets by PAL is only proper.

Furthermore, We do not find anything suspicious in the fact that PAL flight 264 departed at
4:13 p.m. instead of 4:25 p.m. Apart from their verbal assertions, the private respondents did
not show any evidence of irregularity. It being clear that all the passengers have already
boarded, there was no sense in keeping them waiting for the scheduled time of departure
before the plane could take flight.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 15, 1990 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS

RUDY LAO, Petitioner, v. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., Respondent.

The following are the antecedent facts: chanrob1virtual1aw library

Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck with Plate No. FCG-538. The truck was insured
with Standard Insurance Co., Inc. for the maximum amount of P200,000 and an
additional sum of P50,000 to cover any damages that might be caused to his goods.

While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24,
1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck, ,
also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead of the insured truck
and was bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be
around P110,692, while the damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity
of the accident, were placed at P35,000 more or less.

Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from his policy.
However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its
adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured
truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper driver’s license at the time of
the accident. The restriction 4 in Leonardo Anit’s driver’s license provided that he can
only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured
truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the
"authorized driver" clause 5 of the insurance policy. In addition, respondent cited the
following excerpts from the police blotter of the Iloilo INP, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact another driver named
Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was driving the insured truck. Giddie Boy possessed a driver’s
license authorizing him to drive vehicles such as the truck which weighed more than
4,500 kgs. As evidence, petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle Accident Report 7
wherein the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D. Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie
Boy driving the insured truck and not Leonardo Anit. The said report was made three
days after the accident or on April 27, 1985. However, respondent insurance company
was firm in its denial of the claim.

Hence, petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC. After trial, the court disposed of
the case as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that plaintiff lacks sufficient cause of
action against the defendant and hence ordered his case dismissed and further orderes
(sic) him to pay the defendant the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On appeal with the Court of Appeals, the RTC decision was affirmed. The petition was
dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied. The CA stated: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Three issues must be resolved: (1) The admissibility and probative value of the police
blotter as evidence;

RUILING: YES

The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of
Court. Under the said rule, the following are the requisites for its
admissibility: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially
enjoined by law to do so;

(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.

We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was
properly admitted as they form part of official records. Entries in police records made
by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either
substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police blotters are
of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the
absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.

In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information subject
of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving
the insured truck with plate number FCG-538.

Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as
evidence. The person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he
identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information
was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any
inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise given
by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.

Petitioner also assails the credence given by the trial court to the version of the
respondents vis-a-vis the testimonies of the witnesses. Time and again we have
reiterated the settled doctrine that great weight, and even finality, is given to the
factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the trial courts. We
find on this score no reason to overturn such conclusions.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees is hereby DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING

[G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  v. LANIE ORTIZ-

MIYAKE accused-appellant.

The information in the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-
6154 alleges:

That in or about or sometime in the month of August, 1992, in the

Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud, falsely pretending to have the capacity
and power to send complainant Elenita Marasigan to work abroad,
succeeded in inducing the latter to give and deliver to her the total
sum of P23,000.00, the accused knowing fully well that the said
manifestations and representation are false and fraudulent and
calculated only to deceive the said complainant to part with her
money, and, once in possession thereof, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, apply and
convert the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Elenita Marasigan, in the
aforementioned amount of P23,000.00. 2 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and

the cases were tried jointly in Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati.
Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large
scale, Marasigan was the only one who testified at the trial.
The two other complainants, Generillo and Del Rosario, were
unable to testify as they were then abroad.

Marasigan testified that she was a 32 year-old unmarried sales

representative in 1992 when she was introduced to appellant by her
co-complainants. 3 Appellant promised Marasigan a job as a factory
worker in Taiwan for a P5,000.00 fee. At that time, Marasigan had a
pending application for overseas employment pending in a
recruitment agency. Realizing that the fee charged by appellant was
much lower than that of the agency, Marasigan withdrew her money
from the agency and gave it to appellant. 4 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Marasigan paid appellant P5,000.00, but she was later required to

make additional payments. By the middle of the year, she had paid
a total of P23,000.00 on installment basis. 5 Save for two
receipts, 6 Marasigan was not issued receipts for the foregoing
payments despite her persistence in requesting for the same.

Marasigan was assured by appellant that obtaining a Taiwanese visa

would not be a problem. 7 She was also shown a plane ticket to
Taiwan, allegedly issued in her name. 8 Appellant issued Marasigan
a photocopy of her plane ticket, 9 the original of which was promised
to be given to her before her departure. 10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Marasigan was never issued a visa. 11 Neither was she given the

promised plane ticket. Unable to depart for Taiwan, she went to the
travel agency which issued the ticket and was informed that not
only was she not booked by appellant for the alleged flight, but that
the staff in the agency did not even know appellant.

Later, Marasigan proceeded to the supposed residence of appellant

and was informed that appellant did not live there. 12 Upon
verification with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA), it was revealed that appellant was not authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment. 13 Marasigan wanted to recover
her money but, by then, appellant could no longer be located.
The prosecution sought to prove that Generillo and Del Rosario, the
two other complainants in the illegal recruitment case, were also
victimized by appellant. In lieu of their testimonies, the prosecution
presented as witnesses Lilia Generillo, the mother of Imelda
Generillo, and Victoria Amin, the sister of Del Rosario.

Lilia Generillo claimed that she gave her daughter P8,000.00 to

cover her application for placement abroad which was made through
appellant. 14 Twice, she accompanied her daughter to the residence
of appellant so that she could meet her; however, she was not
involved in the transactions between her daughter and
appellant. 15 Neither was she around when payments were made to
appellant. Imelda Generillo was unable to leave for abroad and Lilia
Generillo concluded that she had become a victim of illegal
recruitment.

The prosecution presented Victoria Amin, the sister of Rosamar Del

Rosario, to show that the latter was also a victim of illegal
recruitment. Victoria Amin testified that appellant was supposed to
provide her sister a job abroad. She claimed that she gave her
sister a total of P10,000.00 which was intended to cover the latters
processing fee. 16
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Victoria Amin never met appellant and was not around when her
sister made payments. She assumed that the money was paid to
appellant based on receipts, allegedly issued by appellant, which her
sister showed her. 17 Del Rosario was unable to leave for abroad
despite the representations of appellant. Victoria Amin claimed that
her sister, like Marasigan and Generillo, was a victim of illegal
recruitment.

The final witness for the prosecution was Riza Balberte, 18 a

representative of the POEA, who testified that appellant was neither
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment,
POEA certificate certification. 19 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Upon the foregoing evidence, the prosecution sought to prove that

although two of the three complainants in the illegal
recruitment case were unable to testify, appellant was guilty
of committing the offense against all three complainants
and, therefore, should be convicted as charged.

On the other hand, appellant, who was the sole witness for the
defense, denied that she recruited the complainants for overseas
employment and claimed that the payments made to her were
solely for purchasing plane tickets at a discounted rate as she had
connections with a travel agency. 20 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

She denied that she was paid by Marasigan the amount

of P23,000.00, claiming that she was paid only P8,000.00, as shown
by a receipt. She further insisted that, through the travel
agency, 21 she was able to purchase discounted plane tickets for the
complainants upon partial payment of the ticket prices, the balance
of which she guaranteed. According to her, the complainants were
supposed to pay her the balance but because they failed to do so,
she was obliged to pay the entire cost of each ticket.

The evidence presented by the parties were thus contradictory but

the trial court found the prosecutions evidence more credible. On
December 17, 1993, judgment was rendered by said court
convicting appellant of both crimes as charged. 22 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale,

the lower court adopted a previous decision of Branch 78 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque as a basis for the
judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa
promulgated on July 26, 1993, 23 rendered in Criminal Cases Nos.
74852-53, involving the same circumstances in the instant case,
wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant
with two counts of estafa. This decision was not appealed and had
become final and executory.

In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the

decision therein of the Regional Trial Court stated that the facts in
the foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal
recruitment case before it. It, therefore, adopted the facts and
conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own findings of
facts and as its rationale for the conviction in the case before it. 24 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Criminal Case No. 92-6153, the Makati court sentenced appellant
to serve the penalty of life imprisonment for illegal recruitment in
large scale,

In the instant petition, appellant seeks the reversal of the foregoing

judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati convicting her of
illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. Specifically, she insists
that the trial court erred in convicting her of illegal recruitment in
large scale as the evidence presented was insufficient.

Moreover, appellant claims that she is not guilty of acts constituting

illegal recruitment, in large scale or otherwise, because contrary to
the findings of the trial court, she did not recruit the complainants
but merely purchased plane tickets for them. Finally, she contends
that in convicting her of estafa, the lower court erred as she did not
misappropriate the money paid to her by Marasigan, hence there
was no damage to the complainants which would substantiate the
conviction.

We uphold the finding that appellant is guilty but we are, compelled

to modify the judgment for the offenses she should be convicted of
and the corresponding penalties therefor.

Appellant maintains that her conviction for illegal recruitment in

large scale is erroneous. It is her view that in the prosecution of a
case for such offense, at least three complainants are required to
appear as witnesses in the trial and, since Marasigan was the only
complainant presented as a witness, the conviction was groundless.

During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
was passed increasing the penalty for illegal recruitment. This new
law, however, does not apply to the instant case because the
offense charged herein was committed in 1992, before the
effectivity of said Republic Act No. 8042. Hence, what are applicable
are the aforecited Labor Code provisions.

It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons

victimized is determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed
against a lone victim, the accused may be convicted of simple illegal
recruitment which is punishable with a lower penalty under Article
39(c) of the Labor Code. Corollarily, where the offense is committed
against three or more persons, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in
large scale which provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a) of
the same Code.

ISSUE: WNOT RTC MAKATI In convicting ACCUSED of illegal

recruitment in large scale, MAY adopt a previous decision of
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque as a basis for the
judgment.

RUILIMG: NO

The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of

appellant should be merely for the lesser offense of simple illegal
recruitment. He submits that the Regional Trial Court of Makati
erred in convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale
because the conviction was based on an earlier decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque where appellant was found
guilty of estafa committed against Generillo and Del Rosario.

It is argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the
facts embodied in the decision of the Paraaque court to show
that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and
Del Rosario as well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven
to have been committed against only one person,
particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may
only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of
such offense in large scale.

He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts
in the decision of the Paraaque court for estafa to constitute the
basis of the subsequent conviction for illegal recruitment is
erroneous as it is a violation of the right of appellant to confront the
witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo and Del Rosario, during
trial before it. He cites the pertinent provision of Rule 115 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall be entitled:
 xxx

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the

trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of
a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot, with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify,
given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party
having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

xxx

It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing

rule is likewise found in the following provision of Rule 130:

Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. -

The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable
to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party
who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is

guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such right has two
purposes:

first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and,

second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying. 27 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is

sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has
already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his
previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of
evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. 28 The previous
testimony is made admissible because it makes the
administration of justice orderly and expeditious. 29 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of

the facts stated in the decision of the Paraaque trial court
does not fall under the exception to the right of
confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers
only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made
in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of
previous decisions or judgments.

In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the

testimonies made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario
in the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered,
admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the
conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale
was the previous decision in the estafa case.

A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may

only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a
crime. 30 It may not be used to prove that the accused is
guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the
requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as
said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used
as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would
constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront
the witnesses against him.

As earlier stated, the Makati courts utilization of and reliance on the

previous decision of the Paraaque court must be rejected. Every
conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial
court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A
conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of
another court, especially where what is presented is only its
decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who
testified therein and upon which the decision is based.

Furthermore, this is not the only reason why appellant may not be
held liable for illegal recruitment in large scale. An evaluation of the
evidence presented before the trial court shows us that, apart from
the adopted decision in the previous estafa case, there was no
other basis for said trial courts conclusion that illegal
recruitment in large scale was committed against all three
complainants.
The distinction between simple illegal recruitment and illegal
recruitment in large scale are emphasized by jurisprudence. Simple
illegal recruitment is committed where a person: (a) undertakes any
recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited
practice enumerated under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code;
and (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers. 31 On the other hand,
illegal recruitment in large scale further requires a third element,
that is, the offense is committed against three or more persons,
individually or as a group. 32
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not require
that at least three victims testify at the trial, it is necessary that
there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed
against three or more persons. This Court agrees with the trial court
that the evidence presented sufficiently proves that illegal
recruitment was committed by appellant against Marasigan, but the
same conclusion cannot be made as regards Generillo and Del
Rosario as well.

The testimonies of Generillos mother, Lilia Generillo, and Del

Rosarios sister, Victoria Amin, reveal that these witnesses had no
personal knowledge of the actual circumstances surrounding the
charges filed by Generillo and Del Rosario for illegal recruitment in
large scale. Neither of these witnesses was privy to the transactions
between appellant and each of the two complainants. The witnesses
claimed that appellant illegally recruited Generillo and Del Rosario.
Nonetheless, we find their averments to be unfounded as they were
not even present when Generillo and Del Rosario negotiated with
and made payments to appellant.

For insufficiency of evidence and in the absence of the third element

of illegal recruitment in large scale, particularly, that the offense is
committed against three or more persons, we cannot affirm the
conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale. Nonetheless, we
agree with the finding of the trial court that appellant illegally
recruited Marasigan, for which she must be held liable for the lesser
offense of simple illegal recruitment.
Appellants defense that she did not recruit Marasigan but merely
purchased a plane ticket for her is belied by the evidence as it is
undeniable that she represented to Marasigan that she had the
ability to send people to work as factory workers in Taiwan. Her
pretext that the fees paid to her were merely payments for a plane
ticket is a desperate attempt to exonerate herself from the charges
and cannot be sustained.

Furthermore, no improper motive may be attributed to Marasigan in

charging appellant. The fact that Marasigan was poor does not make
her so heartless as to contrive a criminal charge against appellant.
She was a simple woman with big dreams and it was appellants
duplicity which reduced those dreams to naught. Marasigan had no
motive to testify falsely against appellant except to tell the
truth. 33
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Besides, if there was anyone whose testimony needed

corroboration, it was appellant as there was nothing in her
testimony except the bare denial of the accusations. 34 If appellant
really intended to purchase a plane ticket and not to recruit
Marasigan, she should have presented evidence to support this
claim. Also, in her testimony, appellant named an employee in the
travel agency who was allegedly her contact person for the
purchase of the ticket. She could have presented that person, or
some other employee of the agency, to show that the transaction
was merely for buying a ticket. Her failure to do the foregoing acts
belies her pretensions.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-

appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 92-
6153) and estafa (Criminal Case No. 92-6154) is hereby MODIFIED,
as follows:

1) Accused-appellant is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

simple illegal recruitment, as defined in Article 38(a) of the Labor
Code, as amended. She is hereby ordered to serve an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-6154 for estafa, herein accused-
appellant is ordered to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to reimburse
Elenita Marasigan the sum of P23,000.00.

In all other respects, the aforestated judgment is AFFIRMED, with

costs against accused-appellant in both instances.

SO ORDERED.