[150] Fontanilla v Maliaman (Original Case)
the torts of agents within the scope of their employment. The National Irrigation
G.R. 55963 | Feb. 27 1991| Vicarious Liability | Ali
Petitioner: SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA
Respondents: HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION
Recit-Ready:
A pick-up owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA),
a government agency, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said
agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of
herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika
Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were
injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla
was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. Whether
NIA is liable for damages? Yes.
Art 2180 states that “The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the
task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be
applicable.”ralaw
The liability of the State has two aspects, namely: 1. Its public or governmental aspects
where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. Its private or business
aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an
ordinary employer. In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the
damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent. Under the
aforequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for
acts done through special agents. The State’s agent, if a public official, must not only
be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign
to said official’s usual governmental functions. If the State’s agent is not a public
official, and is commissioned to perform non-govern mental functions, then the State
assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its
agent’s tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special
governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the
provision.
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are
more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is
immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be
provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it,
the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for
Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not
a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-
governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the
accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case,
the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes
answerable for damages.
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence
on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence of supervision. NIA is responsible for
the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver. Trial court stated that "as
a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50 meters away
from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit further away.
The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented portion of the road."
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they
were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the
group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and
allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further
aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether
or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing
imprudence and recklessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the
group.c
Doctrine: In bold.
FACTS:
1. On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pick-up owned and operated by
respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency,
then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its
regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of
herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the
Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and
Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency
Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan
Provincial Hospital where he died.
2. Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation
Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional
driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
 respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic
rules and maintenance of vehicles.
3. The trial court rendered judgment which directed respondent National
Irrigation Administration to pay damages and actual expenses to petitioners.
NIA filed its MR of the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied.
NIA thus appealed said decision to the CA. Instead of filing the required brief
in the aforecited CA case, petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the victim may be entitled to an award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees? Yes
HELD:
1. Art. 2176 thus provides, whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 2180 read as follows, Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.cralaw virtua1aw library
"The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent;
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be
applicable."cralaw v
2. The liability of the State has two aspects, namely: 1. Its public or
governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents
only. 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private
enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. In this
jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by
the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.
3. Under the aforequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily
assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The State’s agent, if
a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular
task but that such task must be foreign to said official’s usual governmental
functions. If the State’s agent is not a public official, and is commissioned
to perform non-govern mental functions, then the State assumes the role
of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent’s tort.
Where the government commissions a private individual for a special
governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning
of the provision.
4. Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the
government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in
character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand,
a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and
particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a
"proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents
within the scope of their employment.chanrobles law library
5. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government
exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601.
"Section 1. Name and domicile. — A body corporate is hereby created
which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter
called the NIA for short, which shall be organized immediately after the
approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of
Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the proper
conduct of its business.’
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA’s proprietary functions.
Thus —
"(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it
such fees as may be necessary to finance the continuous operation of the
system and reimburse within a certain period not less than twenty-five
years cost of construction thereof; and
"(d) To do all such other things and to transact all such business as are
directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment
of the above objectives."crala
6. Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical
personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a
corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes
liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious
act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the
responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes
answerable for damages.
7. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of
negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence of supervision. NIA
is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has
failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the driver.chanrobles.com : virtual law l 12. Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein
8. Trial court stated that "as a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla was
thrown to a distance 50 meters away from the point of impact while Restituto
Deligo was thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place almost at
the edge of the cemented portion of the road."
The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact
with a person causes force and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the
vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the impact was so strong as
shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the
radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown by
the investigation report.
9. It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika
National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area.
Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the
point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at
a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered
substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA
group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as
shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have
been their normal and initial reaction.
10. Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason
that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the
supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver
observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the
situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their
destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered
damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
recklessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the
group.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
11. Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the
diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been
established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or
take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable. Thus,
too, this Court held that a driver should be especially watchful in anticipation
of others who may be using the highway, and his failure to keep a proper
look out for reasons and objects in the line to be traversed constitutes
negligence.
petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco
Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the
aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees of 20% of the total award.
[150] Fontanilla v Maliaman (MR from GR 55963)
G.R. 55963 & 69105| Feb. 27 1991| Vicarious Liability | Ali
1. The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that, on the strength
of PD 552 and the case of Angat River Irrigation System v. Angat River
Workers’ Union, "the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental
functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo
Garcia, who was not its special agent."cralaw virt
2. Although the majority opinion in the cited case declares that the Angat
System (like the NIA) exercised a governmental function there is a strong
dissenting opinion. Quoting from said dissenting opinion which cited
McQuillin’s The Law of Municipal Corporations: In undertaking to supply
water at price, municipality is not performing governmental function but is
engaged in trade, and is liable first as private company would be for any
negligence in laying out of its pipes, in keeping them in repair, or in
furnishing potable water through them.
3. In this connection, the opinion is that irrigation districts in the United States
are basically identical to our irrigation systems. Because of such similarity,
it is appropriate to consider certain doctrines from American jurisprudence.
"An irrigation district is a public quasi corporation, organized, however, to
conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its
limits. They are members of the corporation, control its affairs, and alone
are benefited by its operations. It is, in the administration of its business,
the owner of its system in a proprietary rather than a public capacity, and
must assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership."
4. The functions of government have been classified into governmental or
constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise
of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely
the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The
 Solicitor General argues that the reasons presented by P.D. 552 for the
existence of the NIA (the WHEREAS clauses of said decree) indubitably reveal 7. Like the NAWASA, the NIA was not created for purposes of local
that the responsibility vested in said agency concerns public welfare and government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service
public benefit, and is therefore an exercise of sovereignty. On the contrary, agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public
We agree with the former CJ Concepcion in saying that the same purpose welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a
such as public benefit and public welfare may be found in the operation of "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of
certain enterprises (those engaged in the supply of electric power, or in "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national
supplying telegraphic, telephonic, and radio communication, or in the irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump
production and distribution of prime necessities, etc.) yet it is certain that the irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are
functions performed by such enterprises are basically proprietary in nature. largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions
are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation
5. Its general purposes are not essentially public, but are only incidentally so; of lands.chanrobles virtual lawli
those purposes may be likened to those of a city which is operating a an
irrigation system. A water improvement district can do nothing, it has and 8. We must not lose sight of the fact that the NIA is a government agency
furnishes no facilities, for the administration of the sovereign government. invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the
Its officers have no power or authority to exercise any of the functions of the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Besides, Section 2,
general government, or to enforce any of the laws of the state or any of its subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that NIA can charge and collect from the
other subdivisions, or collect taxes other than those assessed by the district. beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or
They have no more power or authority than that of the officers of a private under its administration, such fees or administration charges as may be
corporation organized for like purposes. As a practical matter, the primary necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and
objects and purposes of such district are of a purely local nature, an analysis to recover the cost of construction. The same section also provides that NIA
of those objects and purposes discloses that they directly benefit only the may sue and be sued in court.c
landowners who reside within and whose lands form a part of the district, to
the exclusion of all other residents therein. It is obvious, then, that the
9. All actions for the recovery of compensation and damages against the NIA
purposes and duties of such districts do not come within the definition of
shall be filed with a competent court within five (5) years. All other actions
public rights, purposes, and duties which would entitle the district to the
for the recovery of compensation and damages under NIA, which have
exemption raised by the common law as a protection to corporations having
accrued ten (10) or more years prior to the approval of this decree are
a purely public purpose and performing essentially public duties.
deemed to have prescribed and are barred forever. It has its own assets
and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of
6. Of equal importance is the case of NAWASA v. NWSA Consolidated Unions, Directors.
which propounds the thesis that "the NAWASA is not an agency performing
governmental functions; rather it performs proprietary functions.” The
10. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, NIA is a government agency
functions of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as
with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is
mere optional functions of government even though the service rendered
not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing
caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of
proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages
society. The business of furnishing water supply and sewerage service, as
caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.
held in the case of Metropolitan Water District v. Court of Industrial
Relations, "may for all practical purposes be likened to an industry engaged
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
in by coal companies, gas companies, power plants, ice plants, and the like."
Withal, it has been enunciated that "although the State may regulate the
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is DENIED
service and rates of water plants owned and operated by municipalities,
WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045
such property is not employed for governmental purposes and in the
dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED.
ownership and operation thereof the municipality acts in its proprietary
capacity, free from legislative interference."library