A Geograpic Study of Kashmir

Wiley
American Geographical Society
A Geographic Study of the Kashmir Issue

Author(s): Robert C. Mayfield
Source: Geographical Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 1955), pp. 181-196
Published by: American Geographical Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/212229
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A GEOGRAPHIC STUDY OF THE KASHMIR ISSUE*
ROBERT C. MAYFIELD
A S PARTITIONof BritishIndianeared,the Governor-General,

Lord
Mountbatten,advisedthat decisionsof accession(whetherto accede
to Indiaor Pakistanor to remainneutral)shoulddepend "on factors
of geographic compulsion, and strategicand economic importance."'Un-
fortunately, the British neither defined nor amplified these terms, and the
rulersof the Indian Statesrequestedno interpretationof them. The Lahore
Resolution of I940,2 which called for the consolidation of contiguous Moslem
majority areas in the northwesternand eastern parts of the subcontinent,
received much more attention.There has been no strict adherenceto either
of Lord Mountbatten'ssuggestions,and among the disputesthat have arisen
regardingaccessionthe Kashmirissue has been prominent.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The "Kashmir"of all but relatively recent history refers to the Vale of
Kashmir.Since at least the seventh century this valley of the upperJhelum
River has been subjectedto alien rule that varied little as the rulerschanged.
The imprints made by successive waves of Buddhist, Hindu, Afghan,
Mogul, and Sikh conquerorshave left the Kashmirissurprisinglyhomogene-
ous in race, language, and arts. Islam was forced upon a majority by the
Moguls in the fourteenth century. The cultural uniformity reflects to a
markeddegree the geographicdistinctivenessof this isolatedvalley.
Kashmir3as presently outlined (Fig. i) came into being only slightly
more thana centuryago, duringthe Anglo-Sikhwars.The rulerof the Hindu
Dogra clan, alreadyholding Jammu, Ladakh,and Baltistan,establishedthe
StateofJammu and Kashmirby an act of purchasefrom the British,by which
* The writer wishes to thank ProfessorRhoads Murphey, Department of Geography, University

of Washington, for his criticalreading of the manuscript.
' Statedsummarilyin the "Reportof the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the
Periodfromi6 July I949 to Is July I950," UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,OfficialRecordsFifth Sess.,
Suppl.No. 2 (Doc. A/1361), p. II.
2 The Moslem League, meeting in convention at Lahore, passed the resolution in March, I940.
At this time there was no strict geographical delimitation of the areas; instead, two zones, the North-
Western and the Eastern, were suggested as Moslem majority areas. See R. A. Smith: Divided India
(New York and London, 1947), pp. iS5-i56.
3 In the remainder of this paper, "Kashmir" refers to the administrative State ofJammu and Kash-
mir, which comprises Kashmir and Jammu Provinces, the administrative districts of Ladakh, Baltistan,
and Gilgit, and PoonchJagir (dependency).
> MR. MAYFIELD is lecturer in geography at Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
I82 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW
the Vale and the adjacenthill country were addedto his holdings.The Dogra
period has been regarded by most Kashmirisas a century of alien rule.4
Immediately before partition of British India in August, I947, the
Maharajaof Kashmir negotiated a "standstillagreement" with Pakistan.5
By an earlierarrangementPakistanhad assumedresponsibilityfor carrying
on communicationand supplyfunctionsfor Kashmir.In an effort to impress
the Maharajawith the urgency of accessionto Pakistan,a virtual blockade
was imposed,by which badly needed suppliesof food grains,cloth, kerosene,
salt, and sugarwere stopped.6
In August, I947, rioting began in Poonch as a populardemandfor redress
of grievancesagainstthe Maharaja'sadministrationthere. The harshpunitive
action taken by statetroops (composedprimarilyof Hindu Dogras) againsta
go per cent Moslem population gave the disturbancesa commz,unal appear-
ance, and violence spread quickly along the Kashmir-Pakistanborder.
Pathansfrom the North-West FrontierProvince of Pakistanjoined kinsmen
from Gilgit in what they called "rescuemissions"for persecutedMoslems.
The widespreadlooting by these Moslem tribesmenin a Moslem majority
arealends supportto the premisethat the raidswere more relatedto the dis-
pleasureof Pathanleadersover the prospectof losing British tribute their
principalsourceof income.7The newly appointeddistrictofficialsof Pakistan
aided the raiders,perhapsto divert the tribesmenfrom supportingtheir own
"Pushtunistan"movement,' and the wealthier of the excited Pakistanina-
tionalistsprovided funds for equipment.9
The Maharajafled Srinagar,the threatened capital, and appealed for
Indian aid. India asked for accession, and the prince complied.'0 Indian
troops were flown in and began a drive that quickly pushedthe Pathansout
4 Alice Thorner: The Issues in Kashmir, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. I7, I948, pp. I73-I78; reference
on p. I73.
5 The "standstill agreement" forbade Kashmir's making agreements with countries other than
Pakistan without prior notification to the latter. A similar agreement was offered to India, which refused.
One may surmise that India's refusal hinged on the belief that the Maharaja planned to accede to Pakistan
because of the pro-Indian leanings of a strong political enemy, Sheikh Abdullah (whom the Maharaja
held in prison at the time of partition).
6 Early administrative inadequacies of the newly formed Pakistan government may have been at
fault, but concurrent issue of similar supplies to Pathan raiders would seem to preclude that possibility.
7 A. A. Freeman: Beyond Khyber, United Nationis World, Vol. 4, No. II, I950, pp. 54-56.
8
Ibid., and E. Odell: Afghanistan and the North West Frontier, Contemporary Rev., Vol. I73,
1948, pp. 240-244.
Pakistan has recently been embarrassed by suits to obtain repayment for private funds spent in
9
this manner. Pakistan had earlier stated that no help had been given the Pathans.
IO Mountbatten, who supervised the accession, included in the agreement a conditional provision that
a plebiscite must later determine final accession.
THE KASHMIR ISSUE I83
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76
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ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISI1ONS (5> S

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FIG. I
of theVale.Paki'stansent in its regularsto stop the Indianadvance,asserting

that the Mosletn populace was being drivLenout of Kashmir. Stopping the
Indian troops, Pakistan began the establishment of Azad (Free) Kashmir
forcesin the territoryit occupied.India,blockedin its military drives,
appealed to theUnitedNations.Throughthe SecurityCouncila commission
wasforrned,anda cease-fireline (Fig. I) was securedin August, I948, and
establishedin January,I4.Bth Indiaand Pakistanhave endeavoredto
theirmilitary andpolitical positions in the areasassignedthemby
strengthen
United Nations commissionsand media-
the truce commission. Succeeding~
torshavefailedto resolvethe dispute;theirchiefdifficultyhas beenthe un-
willingnessof Indiato agree to demilitarization,so that a free plebiscitemay

be held."
PHYSICAL AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY
The StateofJammuandKashmiris not reallya unitgeographically, demographically,

or economically.It is an agglomerationof territoriesbroughtunderthe politicalpowerof
one Maharajah. Thatis the unity it possesses.'2
The administrativedivisions of Kashmir reflect its conspicuoushetero-
geneity, even though physiographic,demographic, and cultural elements
have provided only a few political boundarylines.
Jammu, rising graduallyin the southwestfrom a low alluvialplain along
the Pakistanborder to the Pir PanjalRange (Fig. 2), is the one Hindu ma-
jority area of Kashmir.'3The almost completely agriculturalpopulation,
numberingnearly half of the state'sfour million inhabitants,is widely scat-
tered on the narrow strip of Punjabplain and along the Jhelum and Chenab
Valleys. With an average annualrainfallof more than 40 inches, this is the
only areain Kashmirsignificantlyaffectedby the monsoon.
The upper valley of the Jhelum, the Vale, whose encircling mountains
give it rather clearly defined physical boundaries,is an epitome of areal
distinctiveness.Its position between roughly parallelranges-the Pir Panjals
to the southwest and the Great Himalayas to the northeast-has given a
singularinsularityto the Vale, which comprisesmost of the "district"of
Kashmir. The fertile alluvium provides the economic foundation for a
population of more than i,6oo,ooo, the largestgroup in the state to speaka
common language (Kashmiri).At the time of partition,at least go per cent
of the Vale's inhabitantswere Moslems. Forestry,highly specializedcottage
industries,and tourismsupplementintensiveagriculture,which dependsboth
on irrigation and on a relatively reliable 26-inch average annual rainfall.
Gilgit, Baltistan, and Ladakh the "Highlands"-include parts of the
Karakoram,Ladakh,Zanskar,and GreatHimalayaRanges, with their high
and narrow valleys. These political units, covering almost three-fourthsof
Kashmir's84,000 squaremiles, are occupied by only some 300,000 people.
Practicallyall this sparselypopulatedareais a part of the IndusRiver water-
shed, and the scantyprecipitationis in the form of snow.
II For an account of later political developments, see N. D. Palmer: The Changing Scene in Kashmir,
Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 22, 1953, pp. i57-i63.
12 Sir Owen Dixon, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, Report to the Security
Council, September I5, i95o, Security Council Doc. 393, 1950.
I3 Although the 1941 Census of India gives a 3 per cent majority of Moslems over Hindus inJammu,
the large exodus of Moslems that occurred in 1947-I948 when Indian forces entered the area suggests a
present Hindu majority there. The 1941 census, as the one most recently conducted for undivided Kash-
mir, is used for all population statistics in this paper.
THE KASHMIR ISSUE i85
76 ALTITUDE (in feet)

;;I m Under1,000 3,000 -6,000
Lul1,000
-3,000 6,000 -15,000
G.R.APR.'55~~~~~~~ 75 Kilometers
FIG. 2-Relief features of Kashmir.
The Ladakhisare primarily Mongoloid in racial character,Tibetan in

language,and Buddhist in religion. Politico-religiousaffiliationswith Tibet
through allegianceto the Dalai Lamaare still in evidence, and the economic
life is generallydominated by the lamaseries,I4which hold title to much of
the land. In Baltistan,groupsof Moslem Indo-Aryanscombine herdingwith
a limited, terracedagriculturealong the Indus and its tributaries.Political
loyalties are strongly directed toward Pakistanby the Moslem chieftains.
Gilgit is inhabitedby Pathantribesmenwho are ethnicallyand linguistically
associatedclosely with groups in Afghanistanand in the North-West Fron-
tier Province of Pakistan.Their nomadic herding carriesthem across ill-
defined and undemarcatedboundariesbetween Afghanistan,Pakistan,and
Kashmir.Although conservativelyMoslem, most of the Pathanshave given
active militaryand political supportto the more liberalPakistanis.Members
of these tribesparticipatedin the I947 raid on the Vale.
Poonch, a Moslem majorityareamost of which is now held by Pakistan,
consists chiefly of mountains of the Pir Panjal Range. Its inaccessibilityis
'4 M. C. Feer: India's Hirmalayan Frontier, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 22, I953, pp. I37-I4I; reference
on p. I40.
i86 THE GEOGRAPHICALREVIEW
brokenonly by the Poonch River, a tributaryoftheJhelum. The inhabitants

are a Pahari-speakingpeople.
PAKISTAN AND KASHMIR
It is well known that. .. everyfactoron the basisof whichthe questionof accession

shouldbe determined-population,culturaland religiousbonds,the flow of trade,the
economicsituation,communications, the geographicalposition,strategicconsideration-
points insistentlyin the directionof the accessionof Kashmirto Pakistan."5
This statement by Pakistan's Foreign Minister, though requiring a

detailed examination, offers a convenient check list by which Pakistan's
claims may be evaluated.
"Population,CulturalandReligiousBonds."The demographicand cultural
heterogeneityof Kashmirprecludesthe establishmentof a preferentialclaim
to the state on such groundsby either Pakistanor India.Politicaldetermina-
tion based on these factors would involve Afghanistan, China, Pakistan,
and India in a piecemealdivision of the state.
If the LahoreResolutionhad been adopted and enforced by the British,
Kashmirwould unquestionablyhave been incorporatedinto Pakistan.Paki-
stan, in attempting to shapeinternationalopinion, has relied heavily on the
fact that the Kashmirisare predominantly Moslem. On maps issued by
Pakistanthe Hindu and Buddhist majority areashave been gerrymandered
into larger groupingsthat, when totaled, show a Moslem majorityfor each
section of Kashmir.Although common ties in Islamdo not necessarilyindi-
cate brotherlylove between variousMoslem groups (asevidencedby Pathan
attackson KashmiriMoslems in I947), neutralobserverssuch as Sir Owen
Dixon'6 have concludedthat the Moslem majorityareasof Kashmirwould
seek tojoin Pakistanin a free plebiscite.
"Geographical Position."As the upper part of the Indus basin, Kashmir
has physicalbonds with Pakistansuch as it has with no other nation. Much
of the northern half of the state is drained directly into the Indus or its
tributarythe Shyok (Fig. 2). The Vale and the southwesternpart are water-
shed areas for rivers that join the Indus in Pakistanas major tributaries.
The isolation of the Vale is deeply broken only by the Jhelum River as it
cuts throughthe Pir PanjalRangetoward the Pakistanborder.Between India
and the southwesternplain and hill area of Kashmirstandsan extension of
I5 Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, United Nations Security Council
debate, March 6, I951, as reprinted by the Pakistan Delegation to the United Nations in a pamphlet
entitled "Verdict on Kashmir."
I Op. cit. [see footnote Ia, above].
~~~71 ~~~~ C H I N A
0 75 Miles
.aJ .'Hunza 0 75 Kilometers
f\ ,I PS
KAR'AKORAM
Muzaf'a abad'
o r.Sa r
-rinaga % < < ~ ~- -
Epindi
I
( T I B E
-
} / PASS
) (AovAN/HAL s
> Jhelum Depot

Jmnmu
a INIAN MiTRAY R)XAD
S /
/R
bi 1k b\ialkot7o
t
o A \ Pathankot
gg / Surfaced highway
z Ma/ar nonsarfaced road
Srinagar-Leh cart rad
Lahore --- Mayor trails
GPAPRJ55 Railroad
FIG. 3-Principal communication routes.
the Pir Panjals. No such barrier exists between this part of Kashmir and
Pakistan. Thus Kashmir's most densely settled areas-the Vale and the
southwest-are somewhat openmouthed toward Pakistan.
Although Ladakh is considerably dissected by the Indus and its tribu-
taries, the high mountains and steep, narrow gorges between this part of
Kashmir and Pakistan have prevented the river's serving as a unifying factor.
"Communications." It is with good reason that Pakistan was asked to
assume responsibility for Kashmir's communication system at the time of
partition. In I947, Kashmir's two surfaced roads and one railroad were con-
nected with the transportation net of the states and provinces that acceded
to the Moslem nation (Fig. 3). Kashmir's physical ties with Pakistan had been
strengthened by the utilization of river valleys and water gaps as routes of
communication. The one all-weather road in prepartition Kashmir ran west
from Srinagar, along the Jhelum Valley, through the Baramula Pass, and
south to Rawalpindi to meet the railroad crossing the Punjab. Before parti-
i88 THE GEOGRAPHICALREVIEW
tion this road carriedthe largerpart of the state'straffic.The i6-mile railroad

connects the city of Jammu with Sialkot in West Punjab. Leading from
Jammu to the Vale is the road that rankedsecond in prepartitiontraffic-the
BanihalCartRoad. This road,which crossesthe BanihalPassat an altitudeof
9290 feet, is frequently blocked by snow. The constructionby India of its
Military Road (Fig. 3) was necessitatedby the almost complete control by
Pakistanof the other vehicularroutes.
Again, in communications, the Vale and the southwest face toward
Pakistan.Becausecommunicationlines of the remainderof Kashmirfocus on
the Vale (the many trailsinto the northernhighlandsradiatefrom this key
area), Pakistanmay be said to hold indirect communicationadvantagesfor
all the state. Control by Pakistanof the only highway that remainsopen to
the Vale in winter gives that nation the strong argument that if normal
communicationsfor Kashmirare to be maintained,the statemust seek union
with Pakistan.It is evident, however, that "normal"conditions in Kashmir
are substandardin terms of its communicationneeds, and Pakistan,unlike
India,hasofferedno detailedplansfor improvingthe internalcommunication
system. Completion of the all-weatherroad (utilizingtunnelsratherthan the
Banihal Pass) that India is attempting to constructalong the Banihal Cart
Road and the IndianMilitaryRoad will eliminatemuch of the communica-
tion advantagenow held by Pakistan.
Occupation of the Vale by India severed the normal contact of many
isolated settlementswith Pakistan,which they had chosen to support in
the conflict over Kashmir.When the Chinese Communists closed caravan
routes from Kashgarin Chinese Turkestanto the Hunza-Nagir valleys in
Baltistan,land supply routes to these valleys were completely closed. Since
I95I precariousair operationsalong the river valleys, especiallythe Indus,
were the only means of bringing in external suppliesuntil the recent com-
pletion of a road into Gilgit from the North-West Frontier Province of
Pakistan.'7High passesutilized by this new road are open only half of the
year. If Pakistanis to be alliedpermanentlywith these remote areas,free use
of land routes through the Vale is certainlydesirable.
"The Flow of Trade, the EconomicSituation." Because Kashmir'snormal
tradeflow has been disruptedby the dispute,prepartitionstatisticalmaterial
is manipulatedin attemptsto prove that the economic destiny of Kashmiris
inextricablylinked with one side or the other. An examinationof the data
reveals two significant points. First, prepartition markets for Kashmir's
17 Apparently the trade between Chinese Turkestan and Baltistan was considerable. See Ian Stephens:
Politics and Apricots, Geogr.Mag., Vol. 25, I952-I953, pp. 489-495; referenceon p. 490.
goods were widespreadover BritishIndia;and secondly,althoughthe articles

imported by Kashmirwere similarlyof widespreadorigin, the volume was
so small that either Pakistanor India could supply an equivalent amount
today if even limited world trade channelsremained open to it. Thus the
location of markets for the products of Kashmirproves to be of greater
significancethan that of supply areasfor Kashmir'simports.'8
Before partitionthe Jhelum River served as the chief means of transport
for Kashmir'sleading export, timber. The wood was distributedin what is
now Pakistanfrom the so-calledJhelumDepot, which lies on both theJhelum
River and the railroadbetween Sialkot and Rawalpindi.The timber-poor
Punjab and Sind were the chief consumers.That West Pakistanis today
the logical marketfor this product, carriedthere by naturaltransportfacili-
ties, is the economic factorwhich most clearlyfavorsunion of Kashmirwith
Pakistan.
The second major export has been dried fruitsand vegetables.The large
cities of India have served as the principalmarketsfor these goods of rela-
tively high unit value, but Karachiwas the principaldistributorof them, as
it was for many of Kashmir'sother exports.
Products of Kashmir'scottage industrieshave also found their main
marketsin India.The numerouspersonsemployed in these activitiesof the
Vale have been promised large-scaleindustrializationby Pakistan,but the
protected marketsoffered by India for the products of the existing system
have an appealthat is difficultfor Pakistanto match.
Tourism has long been importantin Kashmir'seconomy, and especially
advantageousto the scenicVale. Touristregistersmaintainedby theJammu-
Kashmirgovernment show that about 65 per cent of the visitorshave been
locals of areasnow India.'9Almost all tourists,however, have entered the
Vale from the Pakistanside, where the route is less hazardous.Communica-
tion development by Indiamay weaken Pakistan'stie with the touristtrade
of the Vale.
To an agrarianstatewith a long history of despoticrule, land redistribu-
tion is of vital interest.Pakistan'searly appealsfor popularsupportin Kash-
mir included promises of land reform, but as no significantstep has been
i8 As to major imports, Kashmir received cotton textiles and sugar from areas now India, and
grain,
leather, raw wool and cotton, oil, and salt from what is now Pakistan. All import-export statistics are
from an extract of the Administrative Report ofJammu-Kashmirfor 1944-1945 as reprinted by P. N. Dhar:
The Kashmir Problem: Political and Economic Background, India Quart., Vol. 7, I951, pp. 143-I62.
See also M. B. Pithawalla: An Introduction to Kashmir (Muzaffarabad, 1953), pp. 85-87.
'9 Dhar, op. cit.
taken in that direction, even in Pakistan itself, reforms in the Indian-

supervisedarea have won many friendsfor India.20
Two reasonsfor Pakistan'sdesireto control Kashmirstandout above all
others:the developmentof hydroelectricpower, and the protectionof water
sources for irrigation in the Punjab and Sind. Several years before the
creation of Pakistan,Moslem plannershad selected Kashmirfor expanding
industrialdevelopment through utilization of its hydroelectricpotential.2'
Definitely, the plans were oriented to aid Pakistanas a whole, not simply
to benefit an underdevelopedKashmir.22
Pakistan'sinsistencethat it must have Kashmirto protect its irrigation
projectshasperhapsbeen used more to createfavorableinternationalopinion
than to convey a true picture of the situation. Propagandais given addi-
tional weight by statementssuch as the following, by David E. Lilienthal,23
in an articleabout Kashmir:"No army could devastatea land so thoroughly
as could India by shutting off Pakistan'swater supply," and "Without
Kashmir,Pakistancannotdefendherselfif a worse Indiangovernmentcomes
after Nehru." In consideringthese statements,severalitems must be noted.
i. The implication that it is presently possible for India to "shut off Pakistan'swater
supply" is misleading. The Indus, carrying to Pakistan more water than all five rivers of
the Punjab, flows through a part of Kashmir in which India has no present water-storage
or hydroelectric developments.
2. India cannot afford to build storage dams and diversion canals simply to harass
an enemy, and present irrigation projects are long-term developments with which India
cannot now apply pressureon Pakistan.
3. The major installationsthat India rushed to completion after partition are on the
Sutlej River, which has no Kashmir tributaries.
4. The Lahore incident of I948, in which the city's water supply was cut for five
weeks, was due to withholding of watersof an Indian-fedpartof the Ravi by an installation
in India.
5. The union of the Pir Panjaland Great Himalaya mountains around the headwaters
of the Jhelum River prohibits India's diversion of the river to East Punjab, and its waters
are not used in the Vale to any extent that could be termed "restrictive."
6. At present, India has no control over the waters of the Chenab River of Kashmir,
though diversion by tunnel is one of India'sprojectsto permit expansion of irrigatedlands
20
See R. L. Park: India Argues with Kashmir, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 2I, I952, pp. II3-II6.
21 In the words of 0. H. K. Spate (The Partition of India and the Prospects of Pakistan, Geogr. Rev.,
Vol. 38, I948, pp. 5-29), "economically the water-power resources of Kashmir are essential if Pakistan
is to have any industrial future" (p. I5).
22
See J. B. Cohen: Economic Development in Pakistan, Land Economics, Vol. 29, I953, pp. I-I2.
Cohen indicates that the immediate power needs of Pakistan (through I956) may be met by plants now
projected for Pakistan itself (pp. 9-IO).
23 D. E. Lilienthal: Another Korea in the Making? Collier's, Vol. I28, No. 5, I95 I, pp. 22-23+.
THE KASHMIR ISSUE I9I
along the Ravi. The possibility of diversion of the Chenab is the only real threat to Paki-
stan's irrigated lands.24
Of all the water of the Indus system, only 20-45 per cent is used in
irrigationprojects.25Of the 3I canal systemsin the Punjab,only two have
been in disputeover water restrictions;and of these two, only one receives
part of its waters from Kashmir.26Pakistan'sinclusion of Kashmir in its
irrigationargumentsis certainlyjustified in view of possiblefuturedevelop-
ments, but too much emphasishas been put on control of Kashmiras vital to
Pakistan'seconomic existence.This is especiallytrue in the light of Pakistan's
effortsto develop new irrigationareasalong the Indus27insteadof finishing
projectsbegun that would divert wasted water from the Industo the canal
systems in the Punjabthat will be affeictedwhen India'sprojectsare com-
pleted.28Thus Pakistancan still use irrigationproblemsas a tool for shaping
internationalopinion on the Kashnmir dispute.
"Strategic Consideration."Pakistanhas made two principal approaches
in pressingits need to annex Kashmirfor strategicreasons.The first is that,
without Kashmir,Pakistanbecomesso vulnerablemilitarilythat it can never
adequatelydefend its western part. Apparentlythis argumenthinges on the
preniisethat shouldIndiacontrol Kashmir,therewould no longer be natural
defense lines between the two countries, such as now exist in the Sutlej
and Ravi Rivers. Control of the approachesto Pakistanfrom southwestern
Jammu might make invasionby Indiaeasier.Thus this part of Kashmirdoes
have strategicsignificanceto Pakistan.
The second approachis designedto win sympathyand supportfrom the
anti-Communistnations of the West. The appealconsistsof detailedstate-
ments on the advantageof havinga Moslem power controlthe partof north-
ern Kashmirthat bordersChina and the thin extensionof Afghanistansepa-
rating Kashmirfrom the U.S.S.R. The argumentis apparentlybasedon the
rugged physiographyand harshclimate of the area. India would be forced
24"... Of the three riverswhich flow into Pakistanfrom Kashmirviz. Indus,Jhelum and Chenab,
Pakistanapparentlydoes not dispute that the diversion of water from the first two for use to Indian
territoryis not possible,but statesthat by constructinga dam at Dhiangarh... the whole of water supply
of the Chenab can be diverted into the river Ravi in Indiato the detrimentof Pakistan"(PakistanTimes,
Oct. 9, I95I).
Lilienthal, op. cit. [see footnote 23, above], makes the lower estimate, which is somewhat sur-
25
prising considering his inferences regarding India's control of this water. The higher estimate is by
Madame V. L. Pandit, United Nations Security Council Official Recordsof the Seventh Year, 61 oth Meetinig,
23 December 1952.
26 The Economist, London, Apr. i8, I952.
27 Cohen, op. cit. [see footnote 22, above], pp. 8-9.
28 The
Economist, Apr. i8, I952.
not only to maintainprecarioussupplylinesbut to fight the inhabitantsas

well as any invader.
Thoughthe claimsmadeon groundsof strategicnecessityarepresented
in associationwith the need for annexingall of Kashmir,it is significant
thatPakistanhasneverclaimedthe abilityor expressedthe desireto defend
Ladakh.Indeed,the principaladdresson the matter29dismissedthe topicby
sayingthatthe IndianArmy controlsstrategicroutesin Ladakh.Certainly
the Ladakhisthemselveswould be able to offer little resistanceto Moslem
rule, but the reason Pakistanhas made no claim here is that its primary
interestslie with the Moslem tribesmenof the north and northwest. Alle-
giance of these Pathanswith their Afghan kinsmen might prove to be a
serious threat to Pakistan'snational unity.30
INDIA AND KASHMIR
India'sprincipalclaim to Kashmiris basedon Mountbatten'sacceptance,
for India, of the Maharajaa's accession.3'Lacking strong physical ties with
Kashmir, India has endeavored verbally to minimize Pakistan'sand at the
same time to offset communication advantagesheld by Pakistanby im-
proving and adding to Indiancommunicationlines into Kashmir.
EconomicAspects. India has based its economic argumentson the ground
that Kashmir is predominantlyagriculturaland needs access to "comple-
mentary" industrial centers in India.32Statistically,India points to first-
ranking cotton textiles and third-rankingsugar among Kashmir'simports
as proof that India is better equipped than its adversaryto meet Kashmir's
needs. It should be noted, however, that two other imports, leather goods
and grain, which in the past have totaled some three-fourthsof the value of
cotton-textile and sugarimports,33came from areasnow in Pakistan.
India's approachto economic problems in the area it received by the
cease-fireagreementhas been somewhat more enlightened.The "Kashmiri
socialism"typified by land reform has been achieved (under a policy of
winning Moslem friendsfor Indiain Kashmir)through the grantingof con-
trol over internal affairsto the local governing body. Appeal to cottage
industryhas been made by the establishmentof craft cooperativesand the
29 Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, United Nations Security Council debate, April 26, I949, Doc.
S/AC1a/l9o.
30 For the views of a British official well-informed on Pathan problems, see Sir William Barton:
Pakistan's Claim to Kashmir, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28, 1949-1950, pp. 299-308.
31 A detailed account of the Indian claim is given by Taraknath Das: The Kashmir Issue and the
United Nations, Political Sci. Quart., Vol. 65, i950, pp. 264-282.
32 Dhar, op. cit. [see footnote i8, above].
33 Total for cotton-textile and sugar imports, about four million dollars. See Dhar, op. cit., p. 22:
and Pithawalla, op. cit. [see footnote I8, above], p. 85.
creationthroughoutIndiaof controlledmarketsfor theirproducts.In these

handicraft emporiums,the "Kashmir Houses,"advantageous pricesarefixed
by the government.34 Indiahasbeenmuchlesssuccessful in attemptingto aid
the timberindustry;the useof trucksto carrylogs overtheBanihalPasshas
in no way compensated forthelossof theJhelumRiverfortimbershipments.
India'sstatementthat "thesystemof floatinglogs down the streamsis only
an indicationof Kashmir's backwardness"35 canhavewon few adherentsto
the Indiancause.
Regardingfutureeconomicdevelopmentfor Kashmir,Indiahasrevised
earlierapproaches.The initialFiveYearPlanmadeno mentionof the dis-
putedstate,but the i951 reappraisal outlinedmoderateproposedexpendi-
turesundereverymajorcategoryof development.Of specialimportance is a
proposedmultipurpose damon the SindRivernearSrinagar. But thelargest
proposedexpenditure is in the fieldof transport;
for Indiais makinga great
effortto restoretradeflow to prepartition volumewithoutthe benefitof
normaltradechannels.Althoughoccasional mentionis madeby Indiaof the
needfor industrialdevelopmentin Kashmir,the state'spredominantly peas-
ant agrarianbaseanddecidedlymeagerindustrial resources otherthanwater
powerdo not give promiseof earlyindustrialization.
When the Punjabwas partitioned,Indiareceivedonly one-thirdof the
irrigatedlandsand canalsystems.Recentirrigationdevelopmentsin East
Punjabare, or will be, basednot only on increaseduse of the waterthat
flowson to Pakistanafterrisingin Indiabutalsoon diversionof waterfrom
one of Pakistan'ssourcesin Kashmir,the ChenabRiver. Under present
agreements,the diversionis to utilize water that is now wasted-some
3,5oo,ooo acre-feet.The diversionpotential,however,is enoughto expand
considerablythe EastPunjabirrigatedarea.36Certainlythe advantagesof
the projectto Indiawould be heightenedby the bargainingpower that it
would give Indiain makingriparianagreementswith Pakistanelsewhere.
Supportof Non-MoslemMajorityAreas.The Hindumajorityin Jammu
has given activesupportto India.The peopleof Ladakh,as represented by
the spokesmenof their religion,also seek closerintegrationwith India.
BothareashavebeenunderIndiancontrolsincethebeginningof thedispute.
34 Ruth Fischer: The Indian Communist Party, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 22, I953, pp. 79-84; refer-
ence on p. 83.
35 Dhar, op. cit. [see footnote I8, above], pp. i6o-i6I.
36 The Economist, Apr. i8, i952, states that India hopes to increase its irrigated land here from the
5 million acres received at partition to 14 million acres. Pakistan, at partition, was allotted I8 million
irrigated acres. The thesis that the planned diversion will adversely affect West Pakistan's irrigated lands
is developed by F. J. Fowler: Some Problems of Water Distribution between East and West Punjab,
Geogr. Rev., Vol. 40, I950, pp. 5 83-599.
StrategicPosition. It is not easy to appraisethe validity of India'sarguments

for Kashmiron strategic grounds. Here again, concern is limited to only
a part of the state.Ladakhis importantto Indiafor severalreasons:desireto
maintaina protectiveHimralayanborderland,the physicalaffinityof Ladakh
with Tibet, the routes leading from Tibet through Ladakh down to the
Vale, the "floating" population along the ill-defined border, the spiritual
ties of the rulerswith those under Communistdominationin Tibet, and the
presenceof a strong Communist group in the Kashmirgovernment.37The
difficulty of conducting a major military operation-over such precarious
routes as exist in Ladakhand Tibet would seem to lessen the need for con-
cern. However, reports of increased military activity by the Chinese in
Tibet strengthenIndia'sdeterminationto maintaineffective control of the
Himalayanapproachesto the Indianplains.
Although India made early attempts to aggravate matters between
Afghanistanand Pakistan,there have been few recent efforts by India to
interferein Pakistan'sadministrationof the north and northwest, for much
the same reasonsthat Pakistanfinds for neglecting Ladakh.
Thus India,lacking strongphysicaland culturalbonds with Kashmir,has
emphasizedlegalisticclaimsand economic aid and development.To Ladakh,
India feels a strategic obligation. A long effort to win the allegiance of
Kashmirhas been made. In spite of this, a former pro-Indialeader rebelled
with: "It is wrong on the part of anybody to think that four million Kash-
miris are dependenton the trade, army, and money of India."38
INDEPENDENT KASHMIR
Though there has been agitationfor independencefor two decadesby a

small but politically active group of the Vale, Kashmir as a completely
independentstate is doubtful for severalreasons.
i. There is no strong unifying factor to overcome the decided physical and cultural
differencesthat exist between various parts of the state.

2. At present, Kashmir could not effectively protect its core areasfrom the incursions
of tribesmen within the state, nor could it maintain an adequatedefense along a Is oo-mile
border that has yet to be demarcated. So weak a state could hardly press for advantages
when making a permanent demarcation with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, or China.
3. Although Kashmir was ranked third among the Indian States in prepartition
wealth,39this position was based on the income of a government that taxed oppressively
37 Feer, op. cit. [see footnote I4, above], pp. I40-I4I.

38 Sheikh Abdullah in an Indian press release, April 25, I953.
39 Thorner, op. cit. [see footnote 4, above], p. I73.
andis no indicationthatthe statecouldaffordthe large-scaledevelopmentsgreatlyneeded

in communications, power,and so on.
The semi-independentstatus granted Kashmirby India has led Ladakh
leaders to seek full integration with that nation. The point of concern is
the land reform instituted by the Jammu-KashmirConstituent Assembly.
Contraryto the IndianConstitution,Kashmirhas expropriatedland without
compensation.As Buddhist monasteriesare the only large-scalelandowners
in Ladakh,their spokesmenlook to Indiato prevent the spreadof "Kashmir
socialism."Furtherindependenceis seen as increasingthe likelihood of a
redistributionof their landholdings.
As India and Pakistanstrengthentheir political and military grasp on
opposite sides of the cease-fire line, the prospect of Kashmir'sachieving
complete independencedecreases.
THE CEASE-FIRE LINE
Except for the Vale, the cease-fireline divides Kashmirratherwell by

religion, and the Vale is known as the Moslem majority area in which reli-
gious beliefs are politically the least significant. The products of cottage
industriesand most of the state's food surplus originate there, and the
marketsof India may well be more appealingto the Vale than the call to
brotherhoodin Islam.
Water problemscreatedby the establishmentof the cease-fireline as an
internationalboundaryare not insoluble.Even without agreements,Pakistan
would retain full use of the Indus and Jhelum water, and agreement has
alreadybeen reachedon sharingthe Chenab.40
Final acceptanceof the status quo would enable both countriesto revise
their militarybudgetsdownward. The reopeningof Kashmir'snormal trade
channelsthrough Pakistanwould not seriouslyaffectIndia'seconomy, and it
would certainly profit Pakistanas well as Kashmir. After completion of
India'sall-weatherroad, certaingoods could be directedmore conveniently
toward marketareas.Dried fruitsand vegetablesand productsof the cottage
industrieswould reach Indian cities via the new road, but it is certainthat
timber-of major importance to Kashmir'seconomy-would resume its
former flow down the Jhelum. With Kashmiropen to tourists and trade,
India might soon be able to drop presentsupportmeasures.
40 A World Bank commission, including both Indian and Pakistani engineers, is preparing compre-
hensive water proposals for the whole Indus basin.
I96 THE GEOGRAPHICALREVIEW
AN INDEPENDENT VALE
Thereremainsone possibilitythatwouldenablebothparticipants in the
quarrelto saveface,and to set a noteworthyexampleof international co-
operation.This possibilityis that Indiaand Pakistanguarantee the inde-
pendenceof the Vale.Alongwith politicalfreedomwouldbe free accessto
the marketsandgoodsof the two nations.
Suchan agreementwould requireno majorchangein watercontrolof
eithercountry'sirrigationsystem.Defenseand communications would be
entrustedto boththe Vale'sneighbors,so thatit would,in effect,be a con-
dominiumratherthana truesovereignunit.Obviously,securityfor theVale
wouldreston the uncertaingroundof continuedcooperationandharmony
betweenIndiaandPakistan.
The pressureon the religiousand politicalsentimentsof the Kashmiris
couldbe releasedas meaningless,andthe Valecouldonceagainprofitfrom
touristtrade.Industrial
aninternational developmentin anareaeconomically
dependenton a handicraft-touristtradewould remainunlikely.
The divisionof Kashmiralongthe cease-fireline andannexationof the

respectiveareasby PakistanandIndiaarethe probablelastingresultsof the
quarrelover the state.India,controllingtwo-thirdsof Kashmir'sterritory
and four-fifthsof the population,recognizesthataccessionwas conditional
on theresultsof a plebiscitebutcontinuesto findcauseforrejectingproposed
plebisciteprocedures.Mapsrecentlyissuedby Pakistanshow the northern
AzadKashmirareasasa partof the Moslemcountry.LadakhandJammuare
pressingfor completeintegrationwith India,andthe listlessKashmiriof the
Valehaslost his spokesman,SheikhAbdullah.
Abstractargumentsconcernedwith moralclaimshave givenway to the
consolidationof political,economic,and militarystrengthin the areas
assignedto IndiaandPakistanby the UnitedNationscommission.The divi-
sionalongthe cease-fireline is advantageous to India,whichholdsthe bulk
of territoryand population,and in the Indian-controlled areathereis no
groupviolentlyopposedto Indianrule.Eachnationcontrolsa partof the
sectionof Kashmirbelievedto be vital to its own militarysecurity,but
Pakistandoes not have the hydroelectricsitesit hoped to gain. Although
independence for theValemightbe a popularsolutionto manydifficulties in
Kashmir,prospectsfor it areslight.The achievement of workingagreements
on tradeandirrigationrightsis mostpressing.Thatthey couldbe achieved
along the lines of presentdivisionwould not seemto be an impossibility.

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A Geographic Study of the Kashmir Issue

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A S PARTITIONof BritishIndianeared,the Governor-General,

* The writer wishes to thank ProfessorRhoads Murphey, Department of Geography, University

> MR. MAYFIELD is lecturer in geography at Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.

z______ ,,,,2-_,,> 716

Bar7mul XI ingr LeSkardh

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISI1ONS (5> S

of theVale.Paki'stansent in its regularsto stop the Indianadvance,asserting

willingnessof Indiato agree to demilitarization,so that a free plebiscitemay

The StateofJammuandKashmiris not reallya unitgeographically, demographically,

76 ALTITUDE (in feet)

FIG. 2-Relief features of Kashmir.

The Ladakhisare primarily Mongoloid in racial character,Tibetan in

brokenonly by the Poonch River, a tributaryoftheJhelum. The inhabitants

PAKISTAN AND KASHMIR

It is well known that. .. everyfactoron the basisof whichthe questionof accession

This statement by Pakistan's Foreign Minister, though requiring a

> Jhelum Depot

FIG. 3-Principal communication routes.

tion this road carriedthe largerpart of the state'straffic.The i6-mile railroad

goods were widespreadover BritishIndia;and secondly,althoughthe articles

taken in that direction, even in Pakistan itself, reforms in the Indian-

27 Cohen, op. cit. [see footnote 22, above], pp. 8-9.

not only to maintainprecarioussupplylinesbut to fight the inhabitantsas

and Pithawalla, op. cit. [see footnote I8, above], p. 85.

creationthroughoutIndiaof controlledmarketsfor theirproducts.In these

StrategicPosition. It is not easy to appraisethe validity of India'sarguments

Though there has been agitationfor independencefor two decadesby a

differencesthat exist between various parts of the state.

37 Feer, op. cit. [see footnote I4, above], pp. I40-I4I.

andis no indicationthatthe statecouldaffordthe large-scaledevelopmentsgreatlyneeded

THE CEASE-FIRE LINE

Except for the Vale, the cease-fireline divides Kashmirratherwell by

hensive water proposals for the whole Indus basin.

The divisionof Kashmiralongthe cease-fireline andannexationof the

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