DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA, JR.

G.R. No. 134577 | Panganiban, J. | November 18, 1998

Separation of Powers & Judicial Review

DOCTRINE: POW ER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW - it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
inquire whether indeed the senate or its officials committed a violation of the constitution or gravely abused its
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives;
The PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POW ERS ordains that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from
prying into the internal workings of the Senate.

RELEVANT FACTS
The first regular session of the 11th Congress is composed of, in terms of party affiliation, as follows:
Number of
Party affiliation
members
10 Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
7
Muslim Democrats of the PH (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 Liberal Party (LP)
1 Aksyon Demokrasya
1 People’s Reform Party (PRP)
1 Gabay Bayan
2 Independent
Total number of senators (The last six members are
12
all classified by petitioners as "independent".)

On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate
President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen.
Miriam Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the
Senate.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member
of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator
Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
"minority."
Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7)
and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was
arrived at. The following session day, the debate privilege speeches were delivered by petitioners. On the third
session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
After which, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule
66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate
and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.

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ISSUE
(1) WON Court has jurisdiction over the petition – Yes
(2) Was there actual violation of the Constitution – No
(3) Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sen. Pres. Fernan from recognizing Guingona as
minority leader? - None

RATIO DECIDENDI

(1) W ON Court has jurisdiction over the petition – Yes

Petitioner’s argument: The definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution,
specifically Section 16(1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives
its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members."

Respondent’s defense: Who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of
the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the
Senate. The legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of
selecting its occupant.

Court’s Ruling: Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light
of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either
house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive
acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies."
In Tañada v. Cuenco, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that "it refers to 'those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular measure
In a case, the Court rules that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a
political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
Principle of separation of powers — characteristic of the presidential system of government — the functions of which are
classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely,
1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department;
2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same,
which belong to the executive department; and
3) those dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or con icts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally
demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice.
Within its own sphere — but only within such sphere — each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or filed of action assigned to any of the other departments, but also to
inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments — provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution."
Unlike or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The present
Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments.
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"Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
It will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only on either of two grounds: (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.

(2) W as there actual violation of the Constitution – No

Petitioner’s argument: Those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority,
to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs; members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority
leader, because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.

Court’s Ruling: "Majority" means “the number greater than half or more than half of any total." The plain and unambiguous
words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of
all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in the said
body.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute
the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

(3) W as there grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sen. Pres. Fernan from recognizing
Guingona as m inority leader? – None

The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" is
restricted only by the definition and confines of the term "grave abuse of discretion."

"By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

RULING
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

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