Sony Corp. of Am. v.

Universal City Studios,

Inc. - 464 U.S. 417, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984)
RULE:

Copyright protection has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all
possible uses of his work. Rather, it grants the copyright holder exclusive rights to use
and to authorize the use of his work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the
copyrighted work in copies pursuant to 17 U.S.C.S. § 106. All reproductions of the work,
however, are not within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner; some are in the
public domain. Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a fair use.

FACTS:

Petitioner Sony Corp manufactured and sold home video tape recorders. Respondents
owned the copyrights to television programs broadcast on public airwaves. Some
members of the general public use video tape recorders sold by petitioners to record
some of these broadcasts, as well as a large number of other broadcasts. Respondents
sued petitioners for copyright infringement, alleging that because consumers used
petitioners' recorders to record respondents' copyrighted works, petitioners were liable
for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by those consumers in violation of
the Copyright Act. The district court held in favor of petitioners. The appellate court
reversed.

ISSUE:

Is the sale of petitioners' copying equipment to the general public violative of the rights
conferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act?

ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the sale of home video tape recorders to the general
public did not constitute contributory infringement of copyrights on television
programs because there was a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of
copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television would not
object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers, and the plaintiff
copyright holders did not demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of
non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works.

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,

Inc. - 464 U.S. 417, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984)
Brief Fact Summary. Movie studios (Plaintiff) that owned copyrights in movies and
other television programming argued that Sony (Defendant) contributed to copyright
infringement of their copyrighted works by marketing videocassette recorders (VCRs or
VTRs) that enabled users to record the programs.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. One who supplies the way to accomplish an infringing

activity and encourages that activity through advertisement is not liable for copyright
infringement.

Facts. Sony Corp. (Sony) (Defendant) marketed Betamax videocassette recorders

(VCRs or VTRs), which allowed home recording of televised programs.  Several movie
studios (Plaintiff), holders of copyrights on televised movies and other televised
programs, brought an action for contributory copyright infringement on the theory that
Defendant was contributorily liable for infringement by consumers of VTRs of the
studios’ (Plaintiff) copyrighted works on the basis of Sony’s (Defendant) marketing and
distribution of the VTRs.  The district court, finding, inter alia, that no Sony (Defendant)
employee had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct
contact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted works off-the-air, and
that there was no evidence that any of the copies made by individuals were influenced
or encouraged by Defendant’s advertisements, held that Defendant was not liable for
direct or contributory copyright infringement.  The court of appeals reversed.  The
United States Supreme Court granted certeriori.

Issue. Is one who supplies the way to accomplish an infringing activity and encourages
that activity through advertisement liable for copyright infringement?

Held.(Stevens, J.)  No.  One who supplies the way to accomplish an infringing
activity and encourages that activity through advertisement is not liable for copyright
infringement.  The protection given to copyrights is wholly statutory, and, in a case like
this, in which Congress has not plainly marked the course to be followed by the
judiciary, the Court must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a
statute that never contemplated such a calculus of interests based on technological
advances.  In proceeding, the Court must balance the encouraging and rewarding of
authors to create new works with the public good.  This case does not fall in the
category of those in which it is manifestly just to impose vicarious liability because the
“contributory†infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by
others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner.  In
this case, the only contact between Defendant and the users of the VTR’s occurred at
the moment of sale.  However, there is no precedent for imposing vicarious liability on
the theory that Sony (Defendant) sold the VTR’s with constructive knowledge that its
customers might use the equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
material.  The sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce,
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes, or actually, is merely capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.  In this case, a large portion of the public’s use of VTRs does not implicate
copyright at all, and also time-shifting, the most common use for the Betama,
constitutes a fair use.  Reversed.

Discussion. Justice Blackmun, in a dissent, faulted the majority for deferring to

congressional action in the face of major technological advancements, saying that the
Court was thereby “evad[ing] the hard issues when they arise in the area of
copyright law.â€Â  He proposed instead a test for indirect liability for copyright
infringement based on whether the primary use of technology is infringing.  Even
under this test, however, Sony (Defendant) would have prevailed given the
determination of the majority that the predominant use of VTRs (time-shifting)
constituted fair use.

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.

Nation Enterprises
Brief Fact Summary. Nation Enterprises (Defendant) argued that its use of quotes from
a yet-unpublished set of memoirs constituted fair use.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Publication of parts of a work soon to be published does not

qualify as fair use.

Facts. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (Harper) (Plaintiff) obtained the rights to publish
President Ford’s memoirs, A Time to Heal. Time magazine contracted for the rights to
preview the work immediately before publication. Before the publication of the article by
Time magazine, Nation Enterprises (Defendant), publisher of The Nation magazine, got
a copy of the Ford manuscript. The Nation published an article that quoted the
manuscript about the Nixon pardon. Time then choose not to use the article as planned
and canceled its contract with Harper (Plaintiff). Plaintiff sued Defendant for copyright
infringement. The district court awarded damages for infringement. The Second Circuit
reversed, holding Nation Enterprises’ (Defendant) use to be a “fair use†under 17
U.S.C.107. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue. Does publication of parts of a work soon to be published qualify as fair use?

Held. (O’Connor, J.) No. Publication of parts of a work soon to be published does not
qualify as fair use. The idea behind the fair use doctrine as it was framed in the common
law was that one using a copyrighted work should not have to get a copyright holder’s
permission to use the copyrighted work in a case where a reasonable copyright holder
would in fact grant permission. Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which codified the
doctrine, expressly noted in its legislative history that it was not meant to change the
common law. As for reasonableness, it is not reasonable to expect a copyright holder to
let another person “scoop†it by publishing his material ahead of time. Regarding
the language of § 107, the section lists four points to consider in applying the doctrine.
The two factors most relevant here are purpose of the use and effect on the market.
Usually, a fair use will not be one of economic competition with the copyright holder,
which is exactly what prior publication of a copyrighted work is. In addition, the effect on
the market of such a use is shown by what happened here: it greatly decreases the
market value of the copyrighted work. Therefore, the conclusion in this case, and in
almost all cases, is that prior publication of a work pending publication will not be a fair
use. Reversed.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,

Inc.
Discussion. The common law doctrine of “fair use†is well established. The
Supreme Court recognized the doctrine as early as 1841. In Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342 (1841), Justice Story allowed use of quotes by a reviewer as a “fair use.†A
major application of the doctrine remains to be the use of quotes in criticism of a work.

Brief Fact Summary. 2 Live Crew (Defendant) argued that its parody of Roy Orbison’s
song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,†was a fair use within the meaning of the Copyright Act
of 1976. The appellate court, however, concluded the parody was presumptively unfair
because of its commercial nature.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. For fair use purposes, the commercial purpose of a work is
only one element of the inquiry into the purpose and character of the work.

Facts. 2 Live Crew (Defendant) recorded a rap parody of the hit by Roy Orbison, “Oh, Pretty
Woman.†Acuff-Rose (Plaintiff), the copyright holder of the original song, brought suit against 2
Live Crew (Defendant) for copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment
for 2 Live Crew (Defendant), concluding that its song made fair use of Orbison’s original. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. It concluded that every commercial use is presumptively
unfair and the blatantly commercial purpose of 2 Live Crew’s (Defendant) version prevented it
from constituting fair use. Defendant appealed.
Issue. For fair use purposes, is the commercial purpose of a work the decisive element
of the inquiry into the purpose and character of the work?

Held. (Souter, J.) No. For fair use purposes, the commercial purpose of a work is only
one element of the inquiry into the purpose and character of the work. The other
elements to be considered are the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the
effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work. In this case, it was
error for the court of appeals to conclude that the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew’s
(Defendant) parody rendered it presumptively unfair. No such evidentiary presumption
exists for either the first factor (the character and purpose of the use) or the fourth factor
(market harm). The court also erred in holding that 2 Live Crew (Defendant) had copied
excessively from the Orbison original, considering the satiric purpose of their version.
Reversed and remanded to evaluate the amount taken from the original, its
transformative elements, and potential for market harm.

Discussion. Dictionaries define “parody†as a work of art or literature that imitates

the characteristic style of an author or a work for ridicule or comic effect. Copyright law
recognizes that a parodist must use some elements of a prior author’s composition in
order to make a new one that comments on that authors work. Parody needs to imitate
an original to make its point, but it may or may not be fair use depending on whether it
could be seen as commenting on, or criticizing, the original.

In the matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice

Mariano C. Del Castillo. [A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC]
FACTS:

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya
Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et
al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano
del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these
books to support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J.
Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as
an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and c.
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).

As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used
inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works
advocated.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.

HELD: No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to
judicial bodies.

No Plagiarism

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from
(another) and pass them off as ones own.The passing off of the work of another as ones own is thus an
indispensable element of plagiarism.

According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another
person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”

This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed
decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s
researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del
Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.

But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.

On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313
SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict
rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very disadvantageous in
cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical explanations.

On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately

According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as background
facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme
Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme
Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to
conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.

No Misconduct

Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud
or corruption.

No Inexcusable Negligence (explanation of Justice Del Castillo)

The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a
highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable
educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her
error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise
her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part
cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was
grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a
long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though that prior to
 assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every sense, the
justice is in control in the writing of the draft.

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained, most legal
references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in
internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items
that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a
smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need.

She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted
these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed
report to the Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general
shape that her report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not
fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting
paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief
editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers
use everyday in their work.

In Re del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010

I.      THE FACTS

In the landmark decision of Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, promulgated

last April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition filed by a group of Filipino “comfort women”
during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines. The Court, speaking through Justice Mariano C.
del Castillo, held that the petition seeking to compel the Executive Department to espouse the
petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice and other international tribunals has NO MERIT because: (1) the
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan belongs exclusively to the
Executive Department; and (2) the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse the
petitioners’ claims.

Discontented with the foregoing decision, the petitioners in Vinuya filed a motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, they also filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration, this time accusing the Justice del
Castillo of plagiarizing (copying without attribution) and twisting passages from three foreign legal
articles to support the Court’s position in the Vinuya decision:

(1)  A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Professors Evan J. Criddle (Associate Professor of Syracuse
University College of Law) and Evan Fox-Descent (Assistant Professor of McGill University Faculty
of Law) published in the Yale Journal of International Law in 2009;

(2)  Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis (Executive Director of the
International Bar Association), published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
in 2006; and

(3)  Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law by Professor Christian J. Tams (Chair of
International Law of University of Glasgow School of Law), published in Cambridge University Press
(2005).
 The Court then referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its Committee on Ethics
and Ethical Standards, chaired by Chief Justice Renato Corona, for investigation and
recommendation. After the proceedings before it, the Committee submitted its findings and
recommendations to the Court en banc, which then treated and decided the controversy as an
administrative matter.

II.    THE ISSUES

1.    Did Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, plagiarize
the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis?

2.    Did Justice Del Castillo twist the works of these authors to make it appear that such
works supported the Court’s position in the Vinuya decision?

III.   THE RULING

[By a 10-2 vote, with three Justices including Justice del Castillo taking no part, the
Court DISMISSED the charges for lack of merit and held that Justice del Castillo was NOT
GUILTY of plagiarizing and twisting the cited materials and hence did NOT commit gross
negligence.]

1. NO, Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, did
NOT plagiarize the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another person’s language, thoughts, or
ideas.  To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is “to take (ideas, writings,
etc.) from (another) and pass them off as one’s own.”  The passing off of the work of another as
one’s own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.

As regards that one passage from Professor Tams, the Court believes that whether or not
the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners
is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of writing.  The statement “See Tams, Enforcing
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005)” in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no
matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit than he deserved.  Such attribution
altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off the challenged passages as his
own.   

That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase “cited
in” rather than the phrase “See” would make a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than
a case of “manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism.” If the Justice’s citations were imprecise,
it would just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of theft or deceit.  If it were otherwise, many
would be target of abuse for every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and for every
technical detail of form.

As regards the passages from Ellis, the Court notes that the lengthy passages in Footnote
65 of Vinuya came almost verbatim from Ellis’ article but did not contain an acknowledgment or
introduction that they are from that article. Moreover, as regards the passages from the work of
Professors Criddle and Descent, it was also observed that the Vinuya decision lifted the portions,
including their footnotes, from Criddle-Descent’s article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens as
footnotes in the Vinuya decision without any attributions made to the two authors. Unless amply
explained, these unattributed lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be construed
as plagiarism.

The explanation came from one of Justice Del Castillo’s researchers, a court-employed
attorney. She explained how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the
beginning drafts of her report to him, which report eventually became the working draft of the
decision.   She said that, for most parts, she did her research electronically.  For international
materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-
related materials to which the Court subscribes. The researcher showed the Committee the early
drafts of her report in the Vinuya case and these included the passages lifted from the separate
articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper attributions to these authors.  But, as it happened,
in the course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the
attributions.

It was notable that neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or reason for
omitting attribution for the lifted passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis.  The latter authors are highly
respected professors of international law.  The law journals that published their works have
exceptional reputations.  It did not make sense to intentionally omit attribution to these authors when
the decision cites an abundance of other sources.  Citing these authors as the sources of the lifted
passages would enhance rather than diminish their informative value.  Both Justice Del Castillo and
his researcher gain nothing from the omission.  Thus, the failure to mention the works of Criddle-
Decent and Ellis was unquestionably due to inadvertence or pure oversight.

2.    NO, Justice Del Castillo did NOT twist the works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent,
and Ellis to make it appear that such works supported the Court’s position in
the Vinuya decision.

The decision [in Vinuya] did NOT twist the passages from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and
Ellis.  To twist means “to distort or pervert the meaning of.”  For example, if one lifts the lyrics of the
National Anthem, uses it in his work, and declares that Jose Palma who wrote it “did not love his
country,” then there is “twisting” or misrepresentation of what the anthem’s lyrics said.  Here, nothing
in the Vinuya decision said or implied that, based on the lifted passages, authors Tams, Criddle-
Descent, and Ellis supported the Court’s conclusion that the Philippines is not under any obligation
in international law to espouse Vinuya et al.’s claims.

ABS CBN vs. GOZON

Doctrine: News or the event itself is not copyrightable. However, an event can be captured and
presented in a specific medium. As recognized by this court in Joaquin, television “involves a whole
spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio.” News coverage in television involves framing shots,
using images, graphics, and sound effects. It involves creative process and originality. Television news
footage is an expression of the news

Facts:

The controversy arose from GMA-7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino overseas worker
and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz. Respondents are officers and employees of GMA Network, Inc.
(GMA-7). They are: Felipe Gozon (Gozon), GMA-7 President; Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr. (Duavit, Jr.), Executive
Vice-President; Marissa L. Flores (Flores), Vice-President for News and Public Affairs; Jessica A. Soho
(Soho), Director for News; Grace Déla Peña-Reyes (Dela Peña-Reyes), Head of News and Public Affairs;
John Oliver Manalastas ‘(Manalastas), Program Manager; and others. As summarized by the Court of
Appeals

Overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for his
release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he was
released by his captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon. Occasioned by said
homecoming and the public interest it generated, both GMA Network, Inc and [petitioner] made their
respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event.

ABS-CBN “conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and the subsequent press conference.” ABS-CBN allowed
Reuters Television Service (Reuters) to air the footages it had taken earlier under a special embargo
agreement.

under the special embargo agreement, No other Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be allowed to
use ABS-CBN footage without the latter’s consent.

GMA-7 subscribes to both Reuters and Cable News Network (CNN). It received a live video feed of the
coverage of Angelo dela Cruz’s arrival from Reuters.

GMA-7 immediately carried the live newsfeed in its program “Flash Report,” together with its live
broadcast. Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing
footages of ABS-CBN.14 GMA-7’s news control room staff saw neither the “No Access Philippines” notice
nor a notice that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS-CBN.

Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued the Resolution finding probable cause to indict Dela
Peña-Reyes and Manalastas. Consequently, the Information for violation of the Intellectual Property
Code was filed.

Respondents filed the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. Department of Justice
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez (Secretary Gonzalez) ruled in favor of respondents and held that good faith
may be raised as a defense in the case.

Both parties moved for reconsideration of the Gonzalez Resolution.

Department of Justice Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra (Secretary Agra) issued the Resolution (Agra
Resolution) that reversed the Gonzalez Resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Peña-Reyes
and Manalastas for violation of the Intellectual Property Code

Respondents assailed the Agra Resolution through the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals. In the
Resolution, the Court of Appeals granted the temporary restraining order preventing the Department of
Justice from enforcing the Agra Resolution.

ABS-CBN’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. It then filed its Petition for Review before this court
assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
whether news footage is copyrightable under the law

Ruling:

YES! The Intellectual Property Code is clear about the rights afforded to authors of various kinds of work.
Under the Code, “works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or
form of expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose.” These include “[audio-visual works
and cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any
process for making audiovisual recordings.”

It is true that under Section 175 of the Intellectual Property Code, “news of the day and other
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information” are considered
unprotected subject matter. However, the Code does not state that expression of the news of the day,
particularly when it underwent a creative process, is not entitled to protection

News or the event itself is not copyrightable. However, an event can be captured and presented in a
specific medium. As recognized by this court in Joaquin, television “involves a whole spectrum of visuals
and effects, video and audio.” News coverage in television involves framing shots, using images,
graphics, and sound effects. It involves creative process and originality. Television news footage is an
expression of the news

In this case, respondents admitted that the material under review — which is the subject of the
controversy — is an exact copy of the original. Respondents did not subject ABS-CBN’s footage to any
editing of their own. The news footage did not undergo any transformation where there is a need to
track elements of the original.