LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO.
11
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149. March 9, 2011.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2787-RTJ)
LYDIA A. BENANCILLO, complainant, vs. JUDGE VENANCIO J. AMILA, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 3, TAGBILARAN CITY, respondent.
Judges; Code of Judicial Conduct; Impropriety; Judges are held to higher standards of integrity
and ethical conduct than attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust. —The Code
recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can nevertheless be perceived by the
larger community as such. “Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity
and ethical conduct than attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust.” In this
case, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the intervenors
to a meeting inside his chambers.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance
of the Law and Procedure, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order, Partiality and
Impropriety and Permanent Protection Order under Republic Act No. 9262.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us is a Verified-Complaint1 dated November 29, 2007 filed by complainant Lydia A.
Benancillo (Lydia) charging respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila (Judge Amila) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Tagbilaran City with Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of
the Law and Procedure, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order, Partiality and
Impropriety relative to Civil Case No. 7268 entitled “ Lydia A. Benancillo v. Paul John Belot ,” a
Petition for Temporary Protection Order and Permanent Protection Order under Republic Act No.
9262.The facts as culled from the Report2 of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) are as
follow:
1. VERIFIED COMPLAINT
xxxx
The complainant, the petitioner in Sp. Civil Case No. 7268, avers that Branch 1 of RTC
Tagbilaran City, acting as then Family Court in Tagbilaran City, issued a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her live-in partner, Paul John Belot (Belot). The TPO included a directive to
Belot to turn over to her personal effects, including properties in their diving business called the
Underworld Diver’s Panglao, Inc. (Underworld). Belot sought the reconsideration of the issuance
of the TPO. Meanwhile, their business partners, Paz Mandin Trotin and Christopher Mandin, filed
a motion for intervention with respect to the properties of Underworld. The complainant filed an
opposition to the motion for intervention with prayer for preliminary injunction.
The complainant alleges that when Branch 2 of RTC Tagbilaran City, presided by the
respondent judge, was designated as the new Family Court in Tagbilaran City, Sp. Civil Case No.
7268 was transferred to the said court. Acting on the pending incidents, the respondent judge
denied both Belot’s motion for reconsideration and the intervenors’ motion for intervention in an
Order dated July 16, 2007. The respondent judge incorporated in the resolution a cease-and-
desist order prohibiting the intervenors from taking possession of the properties of Underworld.
The complainant further alleges that the respondent judge reiterated his Order of July 16,
2007 in an Order dated August 14, 2007. Subsequently, the respondent judge denied the
intervenors’ motion for reconsideration in an Order dated October 2, 2007.
The complainant states that the respondent judge constantly ruled in her favor as he
1
consistently held that the intervenors had no legal personality in the case. However, the
respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO.
The complainant claims that on October 8, 2007, the respondent judge called her and her
counsel to a meeting in his chambers on October 9, 2007. They agreed to the meeting but they
did not proceed when they learned that the intervenors were joining them. Subsequent to the
respondent judge’s meeting with the intervenors, he issued an Order dated October 18, 2007
which rescinded his Order of October 2, 2007. Then, in an Order dated October 25, 2007, he
denied the complainant’s motion for reconsideration.
According to the complainant, the respondent judge’s conduct smacks of impropriety and
partiality. She further charges the respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion, gross
ignorance of the law and procedure and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order for
issuing the questioned Orders of October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007.
The complainant further observed that the respondent judge revoked his Order of October 2,
2007, without any motion being filed by any of the parties. Moreover, the Order of October 18,
2007 was based on an inexistent ground as the respondent judge mentioned in this Order a
petition for certiorari supposedly filed by Belot which had not yet been x x x filed with the Court
of Appeals.
The complainant alleged that the respondent judge’s Order of October 25, 2007 ruling on
the complainant’s motion for reconsideration of the Order of October 18, 2007 introduced a new
issue on the jurisdiction of the court over the person of Belot. The respondent judge also ruled
on maintaining the status quo, a position inconsistent with the preliminary injunction he had
previously issued.
2. COMMENT of Judge Venancio J. Amila dated February 8, 2008 wherein he denies the
charges against him.
The respondent judge claimed that the complainant was motivated by her “ insatiable
greed to have exclusive control and possession pending trial of the case [of] all the properties of
the Underworld Divers Panglao, Inc. of respondent Paul John Belot .” x x x [H]e added that the
“complainant . . . is only a live-in partner of respondent with no specific address who was
branded repeatedly by Belot as a ‘prostitute’ and one ‘only after his money’ .”
According to the respondent judge, he rescinded his Order of October 2, 2007 because the
complainant had no right to her alleged shares in the corporation being merely a dummy owner
of Belot’s shares. He was “fearful of the consequence in the event that complainant would
stealthily dispose of or abscond [with] the properties. . . because of the illegitimate status of
their relationship, more so, with their present feud caused by the arrival of Belot’s son and the
alleged coming of the legitimate wife.”
The respondent judge averred that the complainant “ masterminded all [the] legal
manipulations [and] moved heaven and earth x x x to get possession of all the properties of
Belot to the extent of filing the instant administrative charge and a petition for certiorari lately
with the Court of Appeals, dated December 21, 2007 using the same offensive and disrespectful
language in her arguments.
The respondent asserted he had the authority to motu proprio rectify an error to restore
things to their status quo during the pendency of the case in order to avoid damage or loss. x x
x [T]he complainant refused to attend the meeting he called with the intervenor in chambers to
explain the Order.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
Respondent Judge Amila incorporated in his submission his comment to a similar administrative
complaint filed earlier by the complainant. x x x [H]e alleged that he set aside his Order of
October 2, 2007 because the Petition for Certiorari filed by Belot before the Court of Appeals
had placed the jurisdiction of the court under question.
3. REPLY-AFFIDAVIT dated February 29, 2008 of the complainant.
The complainant claimed that she suffered psychological and emotional violence as the
respondent judge echoed Belot’s verbal and psychological abuse against her that she was “ only
a live-in partner” “in an illegitimate relation” and a “prostitute.” The respondent judge’s remarks
revealed his prejudice and lack of gender sensitivity and this was unbecoming of a family court
judge. His remarks also manifested his lack of knowledge and/or utter disregard of the law on
the equal protection to women-victims in intimate relationships under the anti-VAWC law which
he was mandated to uphold as a family court judge.
The complainant averred that the respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO under the
Anti-VAWC law because of his prejudiced view that she would abscond with the contested
properties due to the “illegitimate status” of their “relationship.” His personal bias against the
complainant reflects his utter lack of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The complainant denied the respondent judge’s accusation that she and her counsel
“masterminded all these legal manipulations.” She added that the accusation implies that the
respondent judge was not in control of the proceedings and that he could be manipulated by the
parties.
The complainant alleged that as the respondent judge still refused to implement the TPO
despite the dismissal of Belot’s petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, she filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court for the annulment of the Orders dated October
18, 2007 and October 25, 2007.
The complainant asserted that while the respondent judge can change his mind, he could
no longer do so when the Order already became final and executory and was not questioned
anymore by the parties. Moreover, there was no reason for the respondent judge to call for a
meeting with the intervenors because he already ruled that intervention was not allowed in the
case.
4. AFFIDAVIT-MANIFESTATION dated May 27, 2008 of the complainant.
The complainant manifested that the Court of Appeals of Cebu City already dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari filed by Belot which petition the respondent Judge cited as reason for
rescinding his Order dated [October] 2, 2007, the petition being a prohibited pleading under
Section 22 of RA 9262 (Anti-VAWC).3
In its Report4 dated September 11, 2008, the OCA found that Judge Amila acted inappropriately
in calling the intervenors to a meeting in his chambers. It was also noted that he used
derogatory and irreverent language in presenting complainant in his Comment as an
opportunist, a mistress in an illegitimate relationship and that she was motivated by insatiable
greed. As regards the charge for gross ignorance of the law, the OCA noted that the same is
premature considering that complainant filed before this Court a petition assailing the October
18 and 25, 2007 Orders of respondent Judge. 5
The OCA thus recommended:
      “x x x x
2
1. That the case be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2. That the charges of Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Procedure and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order relative to the issuance
of the Order[s] dated October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007 be DISMISSED for being
premature;
3. That r]espondent Judge Venancio J. Amila, Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Tagbilaran
City, be found guilty of impropriety for the use of intemperate language and unbecoming
conduct and be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 with the warning that a repetition of
the same or similar offense x x x shall be dealt with more severely.” 6
We adopt the findings and the recommendations of the OCA.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the
judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times.
Judge Amila should be reminded of Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.7
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
“Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
xxxx
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in
such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.”
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety but
even acts which have the appearance of impropriety. The Code recognizes that even acts that
are not per se improper can nevertheless be perceived by the larger community as such. “Be it
stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys
and other persons not [vested] with public trust.”8 
In this case, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the
intervenors to a meeting inside his chambers. His explanation that he called the said meeting to
advice the parties that he will rescind his October 2, 2007 Order is not acceptable. Why would a
judge give the parties advance notice that he is going to issue an Order, more so rescind his
previous Order? Worse, why would he call on the intervenors whom he had earlier ruled as not
having any legal personality in this case? This act of respondent judge would logically create an
impression to complainant that the meeting of the judge with the intervenors had turned his
views around towards issuing a revocation of the October 2, 2007 Order.
In his Comment, respondent judge used degoratory and irreverent language in relation to
complainant. The former in effect maliciously besmirched the character of complainant by calling
her as “only a live-in partner of Belot ” and presenting her as an opportunist and a mistress in an
illegitimate relationship. The judge also called her a prostitute. The judge’s accusations that
complainant was motivated by insatiable greed and would abscond with the contested property
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11 3
are unfair and unwarranted. His depiction of complainant is also inconsistent with the
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) he issued in her favor as a victim of domestic violence.
Verily, we hold that Judge Amila should be more circumspect in his language.

“It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of
patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language.
He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise
and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.” 9

Accordingly, respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, 10 Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11C 11 thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine
of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4)
Admonition with warning.

In as much as Judge Amila was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in
connection with his Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 14988 and 14989 which was docketed as
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2071 where he was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, the penalty of fine of
P21,000.00 is deemed appropriate in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, we find Judge Venancio J. Amila GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, and
FINE him P21,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta** and Sereno,*** JJ., concur.

Judge Venancio J. Amila meted with P21,000.00 fine for conduct unbecoming of a judge.

Note.—A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical
principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people’s faith
in the judicial system. (Pascual vs. Bonifacio , 398 SCRA 695 [2003])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062.* January 18, 2011.**
IMELDA R. MARCOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, respondent.
Judgments; Doctrine of Finality of Judgments; It is axiomatic that when a judgment is
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. —It is axiomatic that when a
judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine
of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.
Judges; Code of Judicial Conduct; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Ignorance of the law,
which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one—not even judges. —Competence is a mark of
a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with the rules or with settled
jurisprudence, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly
crucial that judges be acquainted with the law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law,
which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one—not even judges.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
The judiciary cannot keep those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct
and integrity. This being so, in the performance of the functions of their office,
judges must endeavor to act in a manner that puts them and their conduct above
reproach and beyond suspicion. They must act with extreme care for their office
indeed is burdened with a heavy load of responsibility. 1
At bench is an administrative case filed by Imelda R. Marcos ( Marcos) against Judge Fernando
Vil Pamintuan (Judge Pamintuan), Presiding Judge, Branch 3, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City
(RTC), for Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The Facts:
From the records, it appears that on November 15, 2006, Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit
charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final
and executory order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes ( Judge Reyes) dated May 30,
1996 (and modified in the September 2, 1996 order), in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled “ Albert
D. Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters
Association of the Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al.”
Judge Reyes dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R in an order, dated May 30, 1996, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and further, for failure to comply with Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994 on forum shopping, the petition is
DISMISSED.
It is further ORDERED that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be immediately
RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic Roxas and
to decedent’s brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.
SO ORDERED.”
4
The parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the said order but both motions
were denied by the RTC for lack of merit in its June 24, 1996 Order.
On June 25, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own motion for
reconsideration which was also denied in a court order dated September 2, 1996.
Ten (10) years later, in an order dated May 9, 2006, Judge Pamintuan set the case for hearing
on June 29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to its rightful
owner. Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in the case.
On August 15, 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September
2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas.
However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final
settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estate’s
administrator.
This Court further rules that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a mere replica of
the original Golden Buddha which has a detachable head, which has been missing since 1971 up
to the present, or for a period of thirty five (35) years by now, and has been in unlawful
possession of persons who do not have title over it, nor any right at all to possess this original
Golden Buddha.”
Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory order
constituted gross ignorance of the law. In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, she argued
that final and executory judgments of lower courts were not reviewable even by the Supreme
Court. Judge Pamintuan reversed a final and executory order not upon the instance of any of
the parties in Civil Case No. 3383-R but motu proprio. He even failed to indicate where he
obtained the information that the Golden Buddha sitting in his sala was a “mere replica.” Marcos
claimed that his order was in conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that a judgment or final order shall state “clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it (his order) is based x x x.”
In his Comment, Judge Pamintuan argued that Marcos could have just filed a pleading
manifesting lack of interest or moving for the recall of the subpoena, but she did not. In fact,
her counsel, Atty. Robert Sison, entered his appearance and actually appeared in court. With her
appearance through counsel, she subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the court. She should
have filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 15, 2006 Order instead of filing an
administrative complaint. As she did not, Judge Pamintuan opined that her lost judicial remedies
could not be substituted with the filing of this case.
Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, stated that she was not a party in Civil Case No. 3383-R, hence,
she could not file a motion for reconsideration. She cited Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides
that only the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within the period for taking
an appeal.
In its Report, dated June 29, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator ( OCA) recommended
that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of
all his retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service,
including government owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for
“violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.” The OCA pointed out that:
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
“As held, execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left
unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Bearing this in
mind, respondent issued the questioned Order dated August 15, 2006, the pertinent text of
which reads:
Despite said Order which was issued almost ten (10) years ago, the estate of the late Rogelio
Roxas has not taken possession of the Buddha Statuette or the Buddha replica from the Court,
thus, this incumbent Presiding Judge, seeing the necessity of finally disposing of the Buddha
Statuette physically, and finding out the present statue of the late Rogelio Roxas, ordered the
hearing on June 29, 2006. (Italics supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September 2,
1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas.
However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final
settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estate’s
administrator.
Clearly, the questioned Order conforms to the directive of the Court in its previous Order dated
May 30, 1996, which provides:
It is further ORDERED that the Buddha Statuette in custody of this Court be immediately
RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic Roxas and
to the decedent’s brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.
And modified in an Order dated September 2, 1996, which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General is DENIED. The
Order of this Court on May 30, 1996 remains insofar as the Buddha statuette is awarded to the
state of the late Rogelio Roxas and is at the same time MODIFIED in the sense that the Buddha
statuette shall be under the custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late
Rogelio Roxas or upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator.”
x x x x x x x x x
A normal course of proceedings would have been that respondent Judge waits for the proper
party to go to court to ask for the release of the Buddha statuette. x x x.
However, respondent was being overzealous when he ruled that the Golden Buddha in its
custody is a “fake one, or a mere replica.” Notwithstanding that the same may be his’ and the
litigants’ opinion during the hearing of June 29, 2006. (sic) He should have borne in mind that
there were no issues nor controversies left for consideration in Civil Case No. 3383-R. It must be
noted that the Order dated May 30, 1996 (and modified on September 2, 1996) has become
final and executory. Hence, issues have been settled and the matter laid to rest. As repeatedly
ruled by this Court, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A
final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Should judgment of lower courts—which may
normally be subject to review by higher tribunals—become final and executory before, or
without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable, impervious to
modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or
indirectly, by a higher court, not even by Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch
or department of government.
It is inexcusable for respondent Judge to have overlooked such an elementary legal principle.”
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in its July 31, 2007 Resolution, preventively
5
suspended Judge Pamintuan pending resolution of this administrative case to stop him from
committing further damage to the judiciary. Judge Pamintuan moved for reconsideration and
eventually filed a Motion for Early Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration and to Submit the
Case for Decision.
The matter was referred again to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. In its
Memorandum dated November 22, 2007, the OCA recommended that “the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent be GRANTED and that the Order of Preventive Suspension
dated July 31, 2007, be LIFTED.” Thus, in its December 11, 2007 Resolution, the Court granted
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Judge Pamintuan and lifted the Order of Preventive
Suspension effective immediately.
Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and benefits covering the period
of his preventive suspension from August to December 13, 2007. In its June 3, 2008 Resolution,
following the recommendation of the OCA, the Court denied said request for being premature
and for lack of merit.
Now, the Court resolves the complaint against Judge Pamintuan.
After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and recommendation of
the OCA.
Doubtless, the May 30, 1996 Order, which was modified on September 2, 1996, in Civil Case No.
3383-R, has long become final and executory. In his assailed August 15, 2006 Order, Judge
Pamintuan made express declarations that were not embodied either in the May 30, 1996 Order
or in the September 2, 1996 Order. He ruled that the Golden Buddha in the custody of the court
was a “fake one, or a mere replica” of the original. This may be his opinion or the litigants’
during the hearing of June 29, 2006 but Judge Pamintuan should have realized that the trial
court did not rule on that point in its May 30, 1996 Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order).
Insofar as this issue is concerned, the May 30, 1996 Order pertinently reads:
“Albert Umali anchors his claim on the supposed Memorandum of Agreement between him and
the late Rogelio Roxas executed on November 25, 1988. He claims that under this agreement,
he and Rogelio Roxas will share in the profits of their business venture, that is, treasure hunting
and claim for lost treasure.
He adds, however, that the Buddha with this Court is not the genuine Buddha. According to him,
he has photographs to prove the existence of the real and genuine golden Buddha. To be sure,
this Court is baffled by the foregoing submission of Mr. Umali, if the subject Buddha is not the
genuine golden Buddha, and therefore a fake one, it cannot be covered by the memorandum of
Agreement.
Be it noted that the Memorandum of Agreement speaks of treasure hunting and lost treasure
which could refer to things of great value. Based on Mr. Umali’s own claim the subject Buddha
has no appreciable material value. It is therefore outside the scope of the Memorandum of
Agreement. This being the case, what right then does Albert Umali have to demand the return
of the subject Buddha to him? On this score alone, this Court should already reject the claim of
Mr. Umali over the Buddha now in this Court’s custody.
x x x x x x x x x
Now, as to whether or not there is that controversial golden Buddha different from the one now
in custody of this Court, there is none. x x x.”
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
“SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in
such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.” [Emphases ours]
Judge Pamintuan indeed made a serious error in making such a pronouncement in the
challenged order.
It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or
even by this Court. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-
fold purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to
make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies,
at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on
indefinitely.2
It is inexcusable for Judge Pamintuan to have overlooked such basic legal principle no matter
how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be well-informed,
thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural rules at all times. When
the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.3
The Court agrees with the view of OCA that Judge Pamintuan manifested gross ignorance of the
law in issuing the questioned August 15, 2006 Order. Verily, he failed to conform to the high
standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides
that:
Rule 1.01—A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
Rule 3.01—A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with
the rules or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of
our courts. It is highly crucial that judges be acquainted with the law and basic legal principles.
Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one—not even judges. 4
Notably, this is not Judge Pamintuan’s first and sole administrative case. In The Officers and
Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan ,5 Judge
Pamintuan was charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional
Rights of the Accused, Arrogance and Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was
suspended for one (1) year.
In the case of Atty. Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan,6 he was found guilty of violating Canons 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amounted to
grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer of the judiciary and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. He was reprimanded and was sternly warned that a repetition of
the foregoing or similar transgressions would be dealt with more severely. He was also meted a
fine of P10,000.00.
In a much recent case, Biggel v. Pamintuan,7 he was charged with manifest partiality, gross
misconduct, ignorance of the law, and unjust and malicious delay in the resolution of the
incidents in Criminal Case No. 25383-R entitled “ People of the Philippines v. Emil Biggel ,” a case
for estafa. He was found guilty of violating Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
requires judges to dispose of court business promptly. The Court imposed upon him a fine in the
6
amount of P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would
be dealt with more severely.
As of this time, there is another administrative case yet to be resolved against Judge Pamintuan
filed by one Peter Cosalan for gross ignorance of the law. 8 Although, this is not pertinent in the
resolution of this case, it is clear from the other undisputed records that Judge Pamintuan has
failed to meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. He has shown himself
unworthy of the judicial robe and place of honor reserved for guardians of justice. As held in the
case of Malabed v. Asis:9
“Respondent Judge must bear in mind that membership in the judiciary circumscribes one’s
personal conduct and imposes upon him certain restrictions, the faithful observance of which is
the price one has to pay for holding such a distinguished position. x x x His conduct must be
able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of
propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system
lest public confidence in the judiciary would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and
negligent conduct of judges.”
The Court has held time and again that a judge is expected to demonstrate more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is essential that he be familiar with
basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled doctrines.10
As fittingly stated in the case of Borromeo v. Mariano,11 “Our conception of good judges has
been, and is, of men who has a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law.” Thus, this Court has had the occasion to hold that:
“When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or
a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of
the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge’s
dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-
litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their
grasp of legal principles.”12
In this case, the Court finds Judge Pamintuan accountable for gross ignorance of the law. He
could have simply been suspended and fined, but the Court cannot take his previous infractions
lightly. His violations are serious in character. Having been previously warned and punished for
various infractions, Judge Pamintuan now deserves the ultimate administrative penalty—
dismissal from service.
The Court doubts if he ever took seriously its previous warnings that a repetition of his offenses
would merit a more severe sanction from this Court. His conduct in this case and his prior
infractions are grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As shown from the cited
administrative cases filed against Judge Pamintuan, he was liable not only for gross ignorance of
the law but for other equally serious transgressions. This Court should, therefore, refrain from
being lenient, when doing so would give the public the impression that incompetence and
repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from
performing any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11 7
Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Sereno, JJ.,
concur.

Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan dismissed from service.

LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
A.M. No. MTJ-91-619. January 29, 1993.*
ATTY. HUGOLINO V. BALAYON, JR., petitioner, vs. JUDGE GAYDIFREDO O. OCAMPO,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Grave misconduct; For serious misconduct to exist, there must be
reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of all well-known legal rules. —We do
not find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct: In the case of Babatio vs. Tan, this Court
ruled that "(f)or serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the
judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in
persistent disregard of all well-known legal rules".
Same; Same; Same; Mere suspicion without proof cannot be a basis for conviction. —In the case
at bar, although respondent Judge admitted having written the letter dated December 7, 1989,
there is no showing that he did so with the intention to violate the law. Neither is the charge
that he was reportedly given a share of the sale substantiated. Mere suspicion without proof
cannot be a basis for conviction. It should be pointed out, however, that under Cannon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities. Hence, respondent Judge is advised to conduct himself accordingly.
Same; Same; Same; Judges enjoined not only to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order
to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties but also prohibited from engaging in the
private practice of law.—The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate
their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but
also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; It is well settled that municipal judges may not engage in notarial work
except as notaries public ex-officio. —It is well settled that municipal judges may not engage in
notarial work except as notaries public ex-officio. As notaries public ex-officio, they may engage
only in the notarization of documents connected with the exercise of their official functions.
They may not, as such notaries public ex-officio, undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyance, which bear no
relation to the performance of their functions as judges.
Same; Same; Same; Mere errors in the appreciation of evidence unless so gross and patent as
to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an
unjust decision are irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him. —In
the case of Vda. de Zabal vs. Pamaran, this Court had the occasion to pronounce that mere
errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision are irrelevant
and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him.
Same; Same; Same; Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for an
error of judgment or lack of awareness of the appropriate legal rules, that does not mean that
he should not exercise due care in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. —Although a judge
may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for an error of judgment or lack of awareness
of the appropriate legal rules, that does not mean that he should not exercise due care in
performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. He should study the principles of law and be diligent in
endeavoring to ascertain the facts.
Same; Same; Same; Not every error of judgment can be attributable to a judge's ignorance of
the law.—The charge of gross ignorance of the law and/or grave misconduct has no factual
basis. Not every error of judgment can be attributable to a judge's ignorance of the law. Until
the alleged error shall have been properly raised on appeal and resolved by the proper appellate
8
court, it is generally premature to say that the error was due to the Judge's ignorance of the
law.
Same; Same; Same; Unless there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. —Judicial action
on a motion to dismiss or demurrer to the evidence is left to the exercise of sound judicial
discretion. Unless there is a grave abuse thereof, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the trial
court's denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed.
Same; Same; Same; Absent any showing that respondent judge acted with malice or bad faith
in the issuance of the subject warrants, the presumption is that official duty has been regularly
performed by him.—Every court has the power and indeed the duty to review and amend or
reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called to any error or defect
therein. In the case at bar, the motion to quash the search warrant and warrant of arrest filed
by complainant was favorably considered by respondent Judge which resulted in the quashal of
the search warrant. The non-quashal of the warrant of arrest was due to the fact that
complainant's client has already posted bail. Absent any showing that respondent Judge acted
with malice or bad faith in the issuance of the subject warrants, the presumption is that official
duty has been regularly performed by him.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Rules on Summary Procedure; Even if a witness has not priorly
submitted his/her affidavit, he may be called to testify in connection with a specific factual
matter relevant to the issue.—In Orino vs. Judge Gervasio, the Supreme Court ruled in a Minute
Resolution that even if a witness has not priorly submitted his/her affidavit, he may be called to
testify in connection with a specific factual matter relevant to the issue. Thus, a medical doctor
whose medical certificate is among the evidence on record may be called to testify. This also
applies to a Register of Deeds or Provincial Assessor in connection with official documents issued
by his office. Respondent Judge may not therefore be held guilty of ignorance of the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross ignorance of the law and grave
misconduct.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
For our consideration is a letter-complaint of Atty. Hugolino V. Balayon, Jr., dated October 9,
1991, charging Judge Gaydifredo O. Ocampo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Tupi, South
Cotabato with gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct. The charge is grounded on
eight complaints, separately discussed as follows:
FIRST COMPLAINT:
The first complaint charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law and grave
misconduct. The charge arose when one Ronilo Hijastro complained to respondent Judge about
a certain Romeo Panes (complainant's client) who allegedly was withholding possession of some
sacks of copra from Ronilo Hijastro. Hijastro sought the help of respondent Judge for protection
while his dispute with Romeo Panes was ongoing. Ronilo Hijastro was not interested in the
services of a lawyer. What respondent Judge did was to write one Lt. Sulam, the Police Station
Commander of Tupi, South Cotabato, to wit:
"December 7, 1989                    
Dear Lt. Sulam,
Bearer went to me for legal advice affecting the sacks of copras and other produce of the land
in possession by Mr. Ronilo Hijastro but who appears to be an illegitimate son of the late Mr.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
Juan Panes.
Mr. Romeo Panes is allegedly claiming the land and its produce as brother of Mr. Juan Panes.
Romeo has no right on it as he has no papers on the land notwithstanding being a brother of
Juan Panes.
So, if Romeo shall force Ronilo or his tenant on the land to give the produce and possession of
the land, your Office can lend assistance to Mr. Ronilo Hijastro.
Thanks.
(SGD.) JUDGE GAYDIFREDO OCAMPO"1
Complainant contends that what respondent Judge did amounts to private practice which is in
conflict with his position of being a municipal judge. Complainant further accuses respondent
Judge of using his influence as incumbent Judge to pressure the Police Station Commander as a
result of which the sacks of copra were sold with respondent Judge reportedly having been
given a share in the proceeds.
In his Comment, respondent Judge admits having written the aforequoted letter, but
vehemently denies the express insinuations by complainant of any ulterior motive on his part.
He does not personally know said Ronilo Hijastro as that was the first time respondent Judge
met him in his sala. He advised him to see a counsel who could lend him legal assistance on any
proper case that may be filed, if he so desired, but Hijastro, according to him, just wanted police
assistance. While he might have fallen short of using his discretion in writing the letter, he
contends that he did the same in full and absolute good faith. He denies having gotten a share
of the sale of the sacks of copra.
We do not find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct: In the case of Babatio vs. Tan,2
this Court ruled that "(f)or serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing
that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or
were in persistent disregard of all well-known legal rules".
In the case at bar, although respondent Judge admitted having written the letter dated
December 7, 1989, there is no showing that he did so with the intention to violate the law.
Neither is the charge that he was reportedly given a share of the sale substantiated. Mere
suspicion without proof cannot be a basis for conviction. It should be pointed out, however, that
under Cannon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Hence, respondent Judge is advised to conduct
himself accordingly.
SECOND COMPLAINT:
On January 4, 1990, a Criminal Complaint for Qualified Theft as Principals and Accessories After-
the-Fact, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5016 entitled, "People vs. Mario Sanso, Fernando
Manggubat and Tony Joven", was filed by Lt. Sulam before respondent Judge's sala.
Tony Joven was charged as an accessory after-the-fact for allegedly having bought two (2)
piglets which were the proceeds of the crime.
On the same date, Lt. Sulam filed an application for search warrant attaching thereto the
affidavit of one Mario Lim as witness. Respondent Judge took the sworn statements of Lt. Sulam
and Mario Lim and on the basis thereof issued the search warrant.
The implementation of the search warrant resulted in the seizure of two piglets found at Tony
Joven's backyard. Thereafter, respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against Tony Joven
who was later arrested and imprisoned but was released after posting the necessary bail.
9
It was only after his release that Tony Joven engaged the legal services of complainant.
On January 29,1990, complainant filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Warrant
of Arrest alleging that the same were illegally issued on the ground that the applicant and his
witness have no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which formed the basis for
the issuance of said warrants. Hence, in violation of his client's constitutional rights.
On February 16,1990, respondent Judge issued a resolution annulling the subject search
warrant and the proceedings held thereon after finding that the applicant and his witness did
not have the personal knowledge as required by law. With respect to the warrant of arrest, the
same stood. Respondent Judge scheduled the arraignment and trial of complainant's client.
Complainant charges respondent Judge for alleged illegal issuance of a search warrant and
warrant of arrest.
In his Comment, respondent Judge contends that: "Notwithstanding the fact that the
respondent in its resolution x x x quashed the said search warrant, it does not mean that the
(same was) at the outset illegally and improvidently issued as it found a basis for its issuance as
aforestated. The said resolution was accomplished not solely on the basis of the said motion of
complainant x x x but on the inherent power of the Court to amend its orders and processes to
conform to law and justice. Besides, the resolution of respondent speaks for itself. Affecting the
warrant of arrest which the complainant argued should have been cancelled also together with
the search warrant, respondent does not find basis in his judicial discretion to do so.
Complainant's allegation of gross ignorance of law on the part of respondent is therefore only
his self-serving assertions of his personal view". 3
Respondent Judge further states that after complainant filed his said Urgent Motion, he inhibited
himself from continuing with the further proceedings of this case in the exercise of his sound
discretion. He added that the subject case had long been terminated by the Judge designated
by Executive Judge Rodolfo Soledad, RTC, Marbel, South Cotabato.
Complainant failed to show that there was malice or bad faith on the part of respondent Judge
in issuing the subject warrants.
Every court has the power and indeed the duty to review and amend or reverse its findings and
conclusions when its attention is timely called to any error or defect therein. 4 In the case at bar,
the motion to quash the search warrant and warrant of arrest filed by complainant was
favorably considered by respondent Judge which resulted in the quashal of the search warrant.
The non-quashal of the warrant of arrest was due to the fact that complainant's client has
already posted bail. Absent any showing that respondent Judge acted with malice or bad faith in
the issuance of the subject warrants, the presumption is that official duty has been regularly
performed by him.
THIRD COMPLAINT:
On December 4, 1990, a Criminal Complaint for Theft, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5123,
entitled, "People vs. Norberto Solis and Jose Catapang", was filed by Lt. Sulam on the basis of
the sworn statements of two prosecution witnesses, namely, Antonio Dacayo and Buenaventura
Condova, against Jose Catapang and Norberto Solis accusing them of stealing pineapples
belonging to DOLEFIL plantation before the respondent Judge's court.
Although respondent Judge was satisfied that there existed probable cause based on the sworn
statements of the prosecution witnesses, on December 20, 1990, respondent Judge conducted a
summary clarificatory examination of Romulo Severino, a jeepney driver, and one of the
accused, Jose Catapang. Thereafter, respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against Jose
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
Catapang and Norberto Solis.
On January 15, 1991, as shown in the return of the warrant of arrest, Jose Catapang was
arrested and detained at the municipal jail of Tupi. Norberto Solis was at large.
On January 23, 1991, the case was called for arraignment but was postponed since the accused
had no counsel. Complainant was appointed as his counsel-de-officio.
On February 11, 1991, complainant filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement of the
arraignment.
On February 12,1991, accused posted bail and was released.
On February 21,1991, Jose Catapang, with the assistance of complainant, was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. After the arraignment, complainant manifested that he was filing a Motion to
Dismiss.
On March 5, 1991, complainant filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the arrest
of complainant's client was unlawful.
On March 6, 1991, respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the case.
On March 19, 1991, private prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
Dismissal.
Per Order of the same date, respondent Judge reconsidered his Order of dismissal.
On April 2, 1991, respondent Judge reiterated his previous Order of dismissal.
Private prosecutor filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari which was pending resolution at the
time this complaint was filed.
Complainant comes to this Court charging respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in
ordering the arrest of accused Jose Catapang on mere suspicion, hence, resulting in the illegal
arrest and arbitrary detention of the accused because the sworn statements of the two
prosecution witnesses were not based on their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances.
Neither did the clarificatory examinations conducted by respondent Judge on Romulo Severino
and Jose Catapang point to the accused as the persons who stole the pineapples.
Again, there is no showing that malice or bad faith attended the issuance of the warrant of
arrest by the respondent Judge.
As earlier mentioned, every court has the power and indeed the duty to amend or reverse its
findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called to any error or defect therein. 5 Let it
be noted, though, that this is the second complaint charging respondent Judge of issuing a
search warrant and/or warrant of arrest in violation of the requirement of personal knowledge of
the facts and circumstances by the applicant and his witnesses. This does not speak well of
respondent Judge's appreciation and application of the law. It would be beneficial for both
respondent Judge and those whose cases would fall within his jurisdiction, if respondent
updated himself with the law and the latest jurisprudence.
Respondent Judge is admonished to exercise more prudence and circumspection in the issuance
of the aforementioned warrants so as not to trample on the rights as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
10
FOURTH COMPLAINT:
The complaint states that respondent Judge, with gross ignorance of the law, allowed a witness
to testify during the trial without previously submitting his affidavit as required under Section 14
of the Rules on Summary Procedure.6
In People vs. Esther Ante, Criminal Case No. 5226 for Slight Physical Injuries, a prosecution
witness who had not previously submitted his affidavit was allowed by respondent Judge to
testify during the trial, over and above the objection of complainant. Complainant alleged that
Section 14 of the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibits any witness, without
exception, from testifying during the trial without previously submitting his affidavit, citing the
case of Gonzales vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 1, RTC of Bohol. 7
In Orino vs. Judge Gervasio,8 the Supreme Court ruled in a Minute Resolution that even if a
witness has not priorly submitted his/her affidavit, he may be called to testify in connection with
a specific factual matter relevant to the issue. Thus, a medical doctor whose medical certificate
is among the evidence on record may be called to testify. This also applies to a Register of
Deeds or Provincial Assessor in connection with official documents issued by his office.
Respondent Judge may not therefore be held guilty of ignorance of the law.
FIFTH COMPLAINT:
The complaint alleges that respondent Judge continuously notarized documents not connected
with the exercise of his official functions and thus earning extra money out of the same, even if
there were two duly commissioned notaries public in the municipality, contrary to the Resolution
of the Court En Banc dated December 19, 1989.
In his Comment, respondent Judge contends that the power of the MTC and MCTC judges to act
as notaries public exofficio, contained in Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26,1990, was received
by him on March 30, 1990.
Respondent Judge vehemently denies the alleged continuous notarization. He admits that he
had notarized six documents in 1990 and three documents in 1991. The aforesaid documents
were notarized by respondent Judge by reason of the unavailability of notaries public and the
urgent need by the parties therein. The fees thereon were paid to the Government as certified
to by the Clerk of Court.9
Respondent Judge admits that there are two lawyers and notaries public in his station at Tupi.
They are Atty. Neptali Solilapsi and the herein complainant. Although Atty. Solilapsi is a resident
of Tupi and with a law office thereat, he is rarely present by reason of almost daily appearances
in the courts of the province of South Cotabato and General Santos City, not to mention his
occasional trips to Manila. On the other hand, herein complainant, although residing in Tupi
holds a law office at Marbel, South Cotabato and goes home late in the afternoon or evening.
They are therefore not in a position to render regular legal services that may be asked of them
in Tupi.
The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial
activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them
from engaging in the private practice of law.10
It is well settled that municipal judges may not engage in notarial work except as notaries public
ex-officio. As notaries public ex-officio, they may engage only in the notarization of documents
connected with the exercise of their official functions. They may not, as such notaries public ex-
officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and
other acts of conveyance, which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as
judges.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
However, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have neither
lawyers nor notaries public, the Supreme Court ruled that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to
municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity as notaries
public ex-officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided
that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned-over to the
municipal treasurer and (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the
lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.11
In the case at bar, there are two notaries public in respondent's station at Tupi. That these two
notaries public do not appear to be stationed regularly at Tupi, as respondent Judge claims,
does not suffice to qualify under the exception. It is only when there are no lawyers or notaries
public that the exception applies.
For the unauthorized notarization of nine private documents, respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to pay the fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) with a warning that the
commission of similar acts in the future will warrant a more severe sanction. 12
SIXTH COMPLAINT:
On May 15, 1989, a Criminal Complaint for grave threats against Joe Maliang was filed with the
respondent Judge's sala. After the submission of the affidavits and counter-affidavits,
respondent Judge rendered a decision dated October 4, 1989 convicting the accused of light
threats as defined and penalized under Article 285, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. On
October 16, 1989, accused appealed to the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch
25, Koronadal, South Cotabato. The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision dated July 19,
1990 reversing the respondent Judge and acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt.
Complainant now contends that with the acquittal of his client in the grave threats case,
respondent Judge had shown his utter lack of correct appreciation of evidence. It is also a
manifestation of respondent Judge's habit of deciding cases on his own personal view and not
based on the evidence adduced.
There is no showing that respondent Judge decided the case in bad faith. It will be noted that
complainant's client was acquitted on reasonable doubt. Hence, there was evidence indicating
that he committed the crime but that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not
enough to convict complainant's client beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case of Vda. de Zabal vs. Pamaran,13 this Court had the occasion to pronounce that mere
errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision are irrelevant
and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him.
SEVENTH COMPLAINT:
A letter-complaint14 for theft, dated July 2,1991, was filed by Rodolfo L. Lizada, in his capacity as
Tupi Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, against Feliciano Angeles, et. al. This was based on the
alleged illegal taking by the accused of the galvanized iron roofing sheets of a government
warehouse. Attached to the letter-complaint were the affidavits and sworn statements of
witnesses.15
On July 17, 1991, respondent Judge conducted an ocular inspection and found the following:
1.The galvanized iron roofings of the government warehouse were indeed missing.
2.A total of eighty-eight used galvanized iron sheets were found in the premises of accused
Feliciano Angeles. He was not around when the inspection team arrived.
11
3.Feliciano Angeles' wife was present during the inspection, She informed the members of
the inspection team that five of the used galvanized iron sheets were used in roofing their
house. However, when Feliciano Angeles arrived, he corrected his wife's statement, saying
that a total of eight was instead used by them.
On August 6, 1991, respondent Judge issued a resolution dismissing the case and remanded the
records thereof to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Marbel, South Cotabato. In
dismissing the case, the respondent Judge ruled as follows:
"For all these acts of the accused, the Court does not find a prima facie case for Theft. The
elements of Theft are clear and firm. All must be present. Intent to gain as one of its basic
elements was not satisfactorily established as the subject GI sheets were not taken away from
the premises but rather found and kept therein by the accused for cogent reason of prevailing
thievery (sic) at the place which the prosecution did not dispute. The Court neither finds a case
for malicious mischief as assuming a damage was caused by the accused, there is no evidence
that he deliberately and maliciously removed the GI sheet roofings of the subject bodega but
rather he did it with cogent reason as herein before stated. The liability of the accused, if any, is
civil in nature, The private complainant has other provisional remedies to protect its interest." 16
In this seventh complaint, respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of discretion. Complainant alleges that respondent Judge abused his discretion
in dismissing the case for theft and had no jurisdiction in ruling that no malicious mischief was
committed considering that the case at bar was for theft and that another one for malicious
mischief was pending in his sala. Complainant further accuses respondent Judge of having
dismissed the case on the ground that one of the accused, Normita Cornejo, is the daughter-in-
law of respondent Judge's good friend.
A reading of the ocular inspection report shows that all the elements of theft are present in the
case. Contrary to respondent Judge's basis for dismissal, the element of intent to gain was
present therein. The wife of the accused admitted having used five galvanized iron sheets for
their house. This was reiterated by the accused Feliciano Angeles that not only five, but eight
galvanized iron sheets, were appropriated for their house. Hence, the dismissal of the case was
not proper. However, complainant still has the remedy of review by the provincial fiscal.
Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for an error of judgment or
lack of awareness of the appropriate legal rules, that does not mean that he should not exercise
due care in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. He should study the principles of law and
be diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts.17
Respondent Judge is therefore admonished to exercise more prudence and circumspection in
the performance of his duties as municipal judge.
EIGHTH COMPLAINT:
A Criminal Complaint for Theft docketed, as Criminal Case No. 5180, entitled, "People vs. Julio
Relativo and Miller Estigoy", was filed before respondent Judge's sala charging accused of
stealing coconut trees.
After the prosecution had rested its case, complainant, as defense counsel, instead of presenting
his evidence, filed a Demurrer to the Evidence on June 4, 1991 alleging that the private
complainant in said case had no legal personality to sue because he was no longer the owner of
the land where the coconut trees were stolen, having failed to redeem the land from the
Development Bank of the Philippines.
An Opposition to Demurrer to the Evidence, dated June 4, 1991, was filed by the prosecution.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11 12
FIFTH COMPLAINT: For the unauthorized notarization of nine private documents,
On June 18, 1991, respondent Judge issued an Order denying the said Demurrer to the respondent Judge is fined TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) with warning that the
Evidence. commission of similar acts in the future will warrant a more severe sanction.

On June 29, 1991, complainant filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 1, 1991, the prosecution was ordered to file its Comment on the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.
On July 11, 1991, the prosecution filed its Comment and Opposition to the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.
On July 17, 1991, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge.
On August 12, 1991, complainant filed a Special Action for Certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court contending that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying complainant's Demurrer to the Evidence.
SIXTH COMPLAINT: This complaint is dismissed. That respondent Judge's decision of
convicting accused in a criminal complaint for light threats was reversed on appeal on
reasonable doubt is not an indication of respondent Judge's lack of correct appreciation of facts.
A mere error in judgment is immaterial in an administrative complaint against a judge absent
any showing of bad faith.
SEVENTH COMPLAINT: There is enough evidence to hold respondent Judge remiss in the
performance of his duties as municipal judge when he dismissed a criminal case for theft filed
with his sala for preliminary investigation despite his own finding that there was intent to gain
on the part of the accused when they appropriated the galvanized iron sheets. Thus, respondent
Judge is again admonished to exercise more prudence and circumspection in the performance of
his duties as municipal Judge.

Complainant now charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law and/or grave
misconduct in denying his Demurrer to the Evidence.
The charge of gross ignorance of the law and/or grave misconduct has no factual basis. Not
every error of judgment can be attributable to a judge's ignorance of the law. Until the alleged
error shall have been properly raised on appeal and resolved by the proper appellate court, it is
generally premature to say that the error was due to the Judge's ignorance of the law. 18
Judicial action on a motion to dismiss or demurrer to the evidence is left to the exercise of
sound judicial discretion. Unless there is a grave abuse thereof, amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. 19
It will be noted that complainant had already filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court.
EIGHTH COMPLAINT: The denial of a demurrer to the evidence is left to the sound discretion of
the Court, rather than an indication of ignorance of the law. It was well within the respondent
Judge's discretion, absent any showing of bad faith or excess of jurisdiction, for him to have
denied complainant's Demurrer to the Evidence in Criminal Case No. 5180. The complaint is
therefore dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
Complaint dismissed.
Note.—Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are
sufficient defenses that may be availed of by a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law
and promulgation of an unjust decision (Pilipinas Bank vs. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834).

IN SUMMARY, We resolved the eight complaints filed against respondent Judge as follows:
FIRST COMPLAINT: Under Cannon 2 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent
Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. While
respondent Judge was found to have written the police station Commander of Tupi, South
Cotabato in good faith, he should refrain from engaging in such activity, and other similar ones,
so as not to tarnish the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

SECOND COMPLAINT: There is no basis for the charge against respondent Judge of
improperly issuing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest in relation to Criminal Case No.
5016. The issuance was not attended with malice or bad faith. The complaint is therefore
hereby dismissed.

THIRD COMPLAINT: This being the second complaint against respondent Judge for alleged
issuance of a search warrant and/or a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5123 in violation of
the requirement of personal knowledge, respondent Judge is hereby admonished to exercise
more circumspection and prudence in the issuance of the said warrants so as not to unwittingly
trample on the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused.

FOURTH COMPLAINT: This complaint is dismissed. We hold respondent Judge not guilty of
ignorance of the law when he allowed a witness to testify despite his non-submission of an
affidavit. This is well within the Rules on Summary Procedure.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
A.M. No. R-592-RTJ. September 17,1987.*
JUANITO L. HAW TAY, complainant, vs. HON, EDUARDO SINGAYAO, respondent.
Administrative Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act; Respondent's acts constitute serious
misconduct in office and ignorance of the law.—From the evidence, it would appear that the
complainant was able to substantiate the allegation in his complaint, and to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that respondent demanded and received money on several occasions, i.e. on
June 17, 1983P1,000.00; on June 18, 1983-P3,000.00; on July 22, 1983-P1,000.00; on August
1, 1983-plane ticket worth P1,348.00 and on October 20, 1983-P1,500.00 from the defendants
who had two pending cases before his sala. It would also appear that the respondent erred in
approving the injunction bond which was posted by way of a check in the name of the plaintiff
and not the defendants. To correct this error, respondent issued an order on November 27,
1985 requiring the plaintiff to modify, amend or post another bond strictly in accordance with
Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court."
Same; Same; Court condemns in the strongest possible terms the misconduct of respondent
Judge—We agree with the conclusions of the Investigating Justice. The acts of respondent
Judge in demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court constitute
serious misconduct in office. This Court condemns in the strongest possible terms the
misconduct of respondent Judge. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of
those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that
so quickly and surely corrodes the respect for law and the courts without which government
cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity. The respondent's ignorance of
the requirements of the Rules of Court and of elementary rules of Commercial Law, is equally
conspicuous. Respondent Judge combines in himself the twin evils of corruption and ignorance
of the law and thus constitutes a diseased member which must be decisively severed from the
body of the judiciary and cast aside.
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Anti-Graft t and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn Administrative Complaint filed with this Court on 4 April 1986, Mr. Juanito L. Haw
Tay charged Judge Eduardo Singayao of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City , with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended) and
with gross ignorance of the law.
The respondent Judge filed his Answer, denying the allegations of the complaint and claiming
instead that complainant had subjected him to systematic harassment. By a Resolution dated 20
January 1987, this Court referred this matter to Associate Justice Eduardo R. Bengzon of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendations, and at the same time,
suspended respondent Judge from office pending the investigation and until further orders from
the Court.
The Report dated 29 June 1987, of Mr. Justice Bengzon shows that the hearings held in this
administrative matter had in effect to be conducted ex-parte because respondent Judge never
appeared at the scheduled hearings to present his defense, if any. At the outset, hearings were
scheduled on 25, 26, and 27 March 1987 at 1:30 P.M. However, respondent Judge moved for
deferment of the hearings, stating that he was experiencing financial difficulties as a result of
13
the acceptance by the President of his courtesy resignation as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cotabato City, Thus? hearings were reset to 22, 23, and 24 April 1987, at 1:30 P.M.
Respondent Judge did not appear on 22 April 1987. At the instance of the complainant, hearings
were reset once more to 4, 5, and 6 May 1987, again at 1:30 P.M. to afford respondent Judge
once more an opportunity to be heard and to crossexamine the witnesses of the complainant.
On 4 May 1987, however, only complainant and his lawyer appeared. In order not to take
advantage of respondent's absence, complainant moved that the hearing be reset to 5 May
1987 as previously scheduled. Once more, on 5 May 1987, respondent Judge failed to appear.
The Investigating Justice thereupon considered respondent, in his Resolution dated 5 May 1987,
to have waived his right to cross-examine complainant's witnesses, without prejudice, however,
to his (respondent's) right, to present evidence. A copy of the Investigator's Resolution was sent
to the respondent by registered mail on 14 May 1987. To date, respondent Judge has not
questioned this Resolution nor moved for its reconsideration.
In respect of the charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Report of
the Investigating Justice shows that on several occasions in 1983, respondent Judge, either by
himself or through his Court Interpreter, Mr. Benjamin Pascual, asked for and received from
complainant differing sums of money and a round trip airplane ticket (CotabatoManila-
Cotabato). The details of the findings are as follows:
"x x x The evidence presented during the hearings conducted on May 5, 6 and 7, 1987 shows:
that Juanito Haw Tay is the complainant in this case (administrative matter No. R-592-RTJ-Exh.
A) against respondent Judge Eduardo Singayao for violation of the Anti-Graft Law and for Gross
Ignorance of the Law filed on April 11, 1986; that complainant is one of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 140, for Certiorari and Prohibition and one of the defendants in Civ. Case No. 411 for
Damages. Both cases are assigned to the sala of respondent; that when complainant filed his
petition for certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for a restraining order before the Court of
respondent on June 16, 1983, he was approached by Mr. Benjamin Pascual, an Interpreter, who
has known both the complainant and the respondent for about 15 years. Mr. Pascual informed
complainant that the respondent was demanding P1 ,000.00 for filing fee. So complainant
borrowed P1,000.00 and on the following day June 17, 1983 gave it to Pascual who in turn
delivered it to respondent Judge;
that on June 17, 1983, in the afternoon, Mr. Pascual informed complainant that the Judge was
asking for P3,000.00 so that complainant will no longer be required to post a bond. On June 18,
1983 complainant again gave the money to Mr. Pascual who delivered the same to respondent.
On June 22,1983 respondent issued the restraining order without the filing of a bond;
that on July 22,1983, while jogging with his son in front of Farmacia Victoria, complainant was
approached by respondent who was also jogging with some friends. Respondent told him he
needed P1,000.00 very badly on that day. Complainant borrowed P1,000.00 from a friend who
issued a check. After encashing the check, complainant gave the P1,000.00 personally to
respondent in his chambers where respondent acknowledged having received the P 1,000.00
and P3,000.00;
that on August 1, 1983, after the scheduled hearing of his petition for Certiorari was postponed,
respondent again asked complainant for a round trip ticket for Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato flight.
Complainant raised the amount and bought the ticket from Miss Cecile Domines at the PAL
Office at Cotabato City. Complainant delivered the round trip ticket to the respondent on the
same day; that the purchase and use of said ticket (coupon) was confirmed by Rolando
Corcuera, PAL Records Custodian, who produced the flight/coupon (Cotabato-Manila) of Ticket
No. 9120205-3 issued to Judge Eduardo Singayao on August 1, 1983 (Exh., G). Said flight
coupon was perforated, which means that it was used. Appearing on said coupon is the name of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
the agent Cecile Domines;
that on October 20, 1983 before the hearing of the certiorari case, respondent called
complainant inside his chambers and told him that he needed P 1,500.00. Complainant
borrowed the amount from his brother and gave it to respondent in his house at the Vilo
Subdivision;
x x x"
In respect of the charge of gross ignorance of the law, the Investigating Justice found that
respondent Judge had issued a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 411 although the
party granted such injunction posted not the bond required under the Rules of Court but rather
a check issued by such party and payable to himself. The Report of Justice Bengzon sets out the
following details:
"x x x
that in Civil Case No. 411 entitled Eusebio Tanghal, plaintiff versus Spouses Juanito Haw Tay,
which case was also filed in the sale of respondent plaintiff Tanghal was ordered to post a bond
of P1,000.00 which was done by way of a check payable to plaintiff. Respondent then issued a
preliminary injunction (Exh. "D"). Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
improper posting of the bond. On November 27, 1985 respondent issued an order requiring
plaintiff to modify, amend, or post another bond in accordance with Sec. 4. Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court.''
14
The Court also RESOLVES to require respondent to show cause, within 10 days from
notice hereof, why he should not be disbarred for the acts of which he has been f found guilty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Special Prosecutor, Office of the
Tanodbayan, for appropriate action on the probable violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act by the respondent, with the request that the Court be informed of the action
taken.
SO ORDERED.
     Teehankee (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, MelencioHerrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortés, JJ., concur.
     Gancayco, J., on leave.
Respondent disqualified from re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
government.
Notes.—Informations charged against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices act are within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. ( Orap vs. Sandiganbayan,
139 SCRA 252.)
Preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal, not a "contract" or
"transaction" provided in RA 3019. (Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 154.)

From the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice reached the following conclusions:

"x x x
From the evidence, it would appear that the complainant was able to substantiate the allegation
in his complaint, and to prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondent demanded and
received money on several occasions, i.e. on June 17, 1983-P1,000.00; on June 18, 1983-
P3,000.00; on July 22, 1983-P1,000.00; on August 1, 1983plane ticket worth P1,348.00 and on
October 20,1983-P1,500.00 from the defendants who had two pending cases before his sala.

It would also appear that the respondent erred in approving the injunction bond which was
posted by way of a check in the name of the plaintiff and not the defendants. To correct this
error, respondent issued an order on November 27, 1985 requiring the plaintiff to modify,
amend or post another bond strictly in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.''

We agree with the conclusions of the Investigating Justice. The acts of respondent Judge in
demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court constitute serious
misconduct in office. This Court condemns in the strongest possible terms the misconduct of
respondent Judge. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are
charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and
surely corrodes the respect for law and the courts without which government cannot continue
and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity. The respondent's ignorance of the
requirements of the Rules of Court and of elementary rules of Commercial Law, is equally
conspicuous. Respondent Judge combines in himself the twin evils of corruption and ignorance
of the law and thus constitutes a deseased member which must be decisively severed from the
body of the judiciary and cast aside.

Accordingly, this Court makes clear that had respondent Judge's resignation not been
accepted by the President, respondent Judge would be dismissed from the service forthwith. In
addition, the Court RESOLVES to declare respondent disqualified from re-employment in any
position in any branch, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and as having forfeited all his accrued retirement benefits and
leave and other privileges,if any.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999.*
(OCA I.P.I. No. 95-72-MTJ)
LUALHATI M. LIWANAG, complainant, vs. JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE, Presiding
Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, respondent.
Courts; Judges; Administrative Law; As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary
in deciding administrative cases—only substantial evidence is required .—As a rule, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is
required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence: “ Sec. 5.
Substantial evidence.—In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”
Same; Same; Immorality; Evidence; Photographs; By their very nature, acts of sexual congress
are not proper subjects of photographs .—It is true that the pictures do not show respondent
and complainant actually engaging in any form of sexual congress. However, this is
understandable since by their very nature, such acts are not proper subjects of photographs.
Often, as in this case, what is available to us is only the narration of the parties involved.
Same; Same; Same; Serious Misconduct; The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on
the part of the officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than
enhances the public’s faith and trust in the judiciary .—The Court cannot countenance any act or
omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes
rather than enhances the public’s faith and trust in the judiciary. Respondent’s disgraceful
conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already retired as of November 1, 1998. For the
serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules
of Court, by way of fine in the maximum amount should be imposed.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Lualhati M. Liwanag for and in her own behalf.
     Benedicto Q. Librojo for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On September 19, 1995, complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a letter to the Court 1 praying
that respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be dismissed from the service due to “gross immorality
and grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession.” 2 Attached to her letter was a sworn
statement, reproduced verbatim hereunder, which details how respondent allegedly molested
her sexually.
SWORN STATEMENT
I, LUALHATI LIWANAG, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Karunungan Road, Pamana
Homes, Calamba, Laguna, after being duly sworn, according to law, hereby depose and state:
1.Prior to July, 1994, my husband, Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12) counts of violation of B.P.
22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua for issuing checks amounting to
approximately 3.5 million pesos, that were dishonored when presented for payment.
2.On July 22, 1994, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed twelve (12)
informations for violation of BP 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua,
charging each of them with three (3) counts of Violation of BP 22. Copies of the
informations are hereto attached for reference.
15
3.The said cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided
by Judge Paterno Lustre.
4.After the informations were filed, the accused posted bail. However, their arraignment
were (sic) postponed several times at the instance of the accused.
5.The case was set for hearing for November 16, 1994. However, when the date came,
Judge Lustre was not present. Hence, the hearing was reset to December 15, 1994.
6.On November 17, 1994 at about 8:30 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber to
inquire about the case filed by my husband, why the accused have not yet been arraigned.
At that point, I asked Judge Lustre if it is possible to schedule hearings in January and
February, 1995 and every month thereafter and to order the arraignment of the accused.
He responded in the affirmative and told me to come back after the hearing on December
15, 1994, at about 7:00 A.M. in his chamber.
7.The date of the hearing arrived, Dec. 15, 1994 at 1:30 P.M. The representative of Atty.
Buted, counsel for the accused, arrived with a Motion to Transfer the scheduled hearing.
Judge Lustre then reset the hearing on Jan. 17, Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995.
8.As requested, on December 16, 1994, one day after the hearing, at about 7:00 A.M., I
went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber. There, he told me that he prepared an order for
the accused. I thanked him and I told him that if the accused will pay us, my husband and
I will give him five (5%) percent of it as token of gratitude. At that point, he stood up and
told me he does not need money. While he was giving me a copy of the order, he touched
my shoulder, down to my breast. I froze and could not do anything. He was telling me that
he acceded to my request. Later, he told me that he is available during Mondays and
Fridays as there are no scheduled hearings and for me to come back to him before the
hearing on January 17, 1995.
9.I did not go back to see Judge Lustre as per his request before the hearing on Jan. 17,
1995 because of what he did to me, he took advantage of the situation to molest me.
10.Came the date of the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995. Despite the previous order setting the
case for hearing for Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995, he cancelled hearings on all dates as per
request of the counsel for the accused. Instead, he reset the same on Feb. 22, 28 and
March 7, 1995.
When the hearing on Feb. 22, 1995 came, Judge Lustre cancelled the one set on Feb. 28,
1995.
12.By the way things were going, I could sense that Judge Lustre is delaying the case,
granting postponement after postponement, despite objections from our lawyer. The case
was already dragging and nothing was happening. We were running out of money and we
needed to have the case terminated right away in order to get paid for the money the
accused have swindled us. Because of this dilemma, I decided to see Judge Lustre.
13.On March 6, 1995, Monday, at about 10:00 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre. I asked
him why he cancelled the hearings. He responded that I fooled him since I did not come to
him as per his request, whereas he acceded to my earlier request. He then told me that I
must obey his wishes if I want our case to go smoothly since he is the only one who will
decide our cases. After that, he told me that he was already free and for me to wait for him
outside the courtroom. We boarded his white Toyota car, with Plate No. PLN-513 and he
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
brought me to Canlubang Tollway. While in the car, he kissed me on the lips and caressed
my breast. I was repulsed and disgusted but I could not do anything since our cases are
with him and he was deliberately delaying the hearings. At that instant, I told him to set
hearings for April and May, 1995 since according to his staff, there would be no hearings in
May and in April. He told me, he will take care of it and ordered me to come to his office
on March 13, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. and we will talk about the settings.
14.On March 13, 1995, Monday, as ordered, I went to see Judge Lustre at his office at
around 7:10 A.M. There was no one there except him. I saw him waiting just outside his
chamber. He ushered me inside, but I had barely entered the room, when he kissed me on
the lips and caressed my body, particularly my breast. He exposed his penis and ordered
me to masturbate him. I could not do anything but obey. There was a fluid that oozed from
his penis, which was somewhat bloody. I felt dirty. While doing that, he told me to tell my
lawyer to file a motion to set hearing for April and May, 1995. He then asked me to go with
him to Laguna de Bay Inn. I refused, he got angry. He retorted that the fate of our case is
on his hands and told me to see him on March 23, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. at Laguna de Bay Inn
in Sucat since his house is near the area.
15.After that, my lawyer filed a Motion to Set Case for Hearing. But I did not go and see
Judge Lustre at Laguna de Bay Inn. Thus, on March 28, 1995 hearing, no schedule was set
for April and May. Instead, he made the setting in June, 1995.
16.On April 10, 1995 I received a new subpoena for pre-trial and arraignment of the new
cases we filed, scheduling the same for May 3, 1995. The following day, April 11, Tuesday,
I went to see Judge Lustre to inquire why our case was not scheduled on May 3, at any
rate, there is arraignment of our new case filed on the same date. He responded that he
was early at Laguna de Bay Inn on March 23, and he waited for me at 7:00 A.M. but I did
not come. He told me not to fool him, “masama daw siyang magalit.”
17.The June 6 hearing proceeded, that of June 13 was cancelled at the instance of the
accused’s lawyer.
18.On June 15, 1995, Thursday, at around 7:00 A.M., I went to Judge Lustre in his office
because I was told that our next hearing would be in September despite previous settings.
I requested Judge Lustre to give us monthly hearings, in July and August. He told me that
he would oblige if I would follow his wishes. As he was saying that, he was already
touching my breast. He exposed his penis at told me to perform “fellatio.” I refused. I was
then told to return the following day, the same time and he will wait for me.
19.I came back on June 16, around 7:00 A.M. As ordered, I proceeded to the Calamba
Church to wait for Judge Lustre. He fetch (sic) me from there on board his white Toyota
car and he brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex in Crossing, Calamba,
Laguna. I could not refuse because of the threat about our case. Inside the room at
Riverview, he told me there will be a setting for July and August. Then he undressed
himself and ordered me to do the same. I knew I was selling myself to the devil but our
blood money is at stake. It is for the future of my son and I was willing to do anything for
my family. Perhaps I was too stupid to do it, but at that time, I felt helpless. He ordered
me to perform “fellatio” on him and I obeyed. There was blood that oozed from his penis. I
also saw black rashes on his body, especially on his legs. Before we left, he told me to see
him again on July 10 in his office.
20.On June 23, 1995, the same thing happened. I went to his office at 7:00 A.M. Judge
Lustre brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex and I was again ordered to
perform “fellatio” on him.
16
21.The June 28 hearing proceeded. But I did not go and see Judge Lustre on July 10 as
requested. I just called him and presented an alibi. He told me to just come the following
day, July 11 at 7:00 A.M. at Jollibee, Calamba and he will wait for me. As parting words, he
told me not to fool him.
22.I did not see him on July 11 because I already felt so dirty and used. I never realized
before I was capable of doing such a thing for my family, until the time came. But I could
not take it anymore.
23.On July 27, the hearing proceeded. But the previous schedules were cancelled and
instead hearing was set in November, 1995.
24.On August 15, 1995 at 7:00 A.M., I went to his office to get an order for the referral of
the specimen signatures of Rowena Chua to the NBI. Again, he kissed me and touched me.
I could not refuse for fear of retaliation.
25.I could see that Judge Paterno H. Lustre is deliberately delaying the prosecution of our
cases to prolong his abusive acts towards me. As can be seen from the transcript of the
hearings, he is not leaning in our favor. What we are asking only is for the continuous
setting of the trial because we cannot afford a long drawn out proceedings. But instead, he
is delaying the trial. He has even shown hostility towards my husband when he was
testifying and towards my lawyer, allegedly because he was jealous.
26.This kind of judge gives the judiciary a bad name. There must be a stop to this evil
doings. I am not the only victim of Judge Lustre. I know at least two (2) other women who
are similarly situated are being used and abused by him. But they do not want to complain
because of fear and the possible consequence to their cases. As for me, I am emboldened
by disgust and frustration. I now seek the intervention of the Honorable Supreme Court to
give justice to the victims and rid the judiciary of the likes of Judge Paterno H. Lustre.
27.I know the shame I have to bear but I have to expose the wrong doings of a judge who
is supposed to uphold the law and morality. But instead, he preys on hapless and those
who are not learned in law as his victims.
28.What I have narrated here are true, which I would never have revealed were it not for
my better sense of judgment. I know I made a mistake by becoming a willing victim. But I
did it for my family as I thought that is the only way I can help my husband get back his
money for our future.3
Apart from the letter and the sworn statement, complainant also sent the Court 11 photographs
showing her and respondent together in various places. Five of these were allegedly taken at
the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna. She also submitted a receipt issued by said resort
dated June 23, 1995 and two transcripts of phone conversations she had with respondent. 4
Respondent’s defense is anchored on denial. In a “2nd Indorsement” 5 he sent to the Court, by
way of answer to the complaint, he “strongly denie(d)” 6 the charges leveled against him and
dismissed them as “the vile products of (complain-ant’s) malicious and prejudiced mind.” 7
According to him, complainant and her common-law husband thought of filing charges against
him when he “refused to bend to, and accommodate, (their) haughty and arrogant demands . . .
to hastily schedule, try continuously, finish and decide arbitrarily within a very short period of
time”8 the B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) cases filed by complainant’s husband. The complaint
was, according to respondent, likewise prompted by respondent’s refusal to accept
complainant’s offer to “reward” him with five percent of the P3.5 million her husband seeks to
recover.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
Respondent claimed that he could not have been in his chambers as early as 7:00 in the
morning as alleged by complainant since he usually arrives for work some five to ten minutes
before 8:00 in the morning. Moreover, he said the door to his room is never locked—thus, the
impossibility of him engaging in illicit sexual conduct within its confines—since the only comfort
room in the courtroom is inside his room and anyone who wants to use it may enter his room
freely.
Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, with a heart ailment and diabetes, “(s)ex is
beyond (his) physical capacity.” 9 He said he is “no longer capable of what ordinary men indulge
in, lest (he) die in the attempt.”10 He sought the dismissal of the complaint filed against him.
In support of his claims, respondent submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) affidavit
executed by Rodelio A. Alcaraz, a utility worker, stating that respondent usually arrives at the
office at 7:45 in the morning; (2) affidavit executed by Atty. Benjamin A. Alonzo, Sr., a private
practitioner based in Calamba, attesting to respondent’s fine work ethics and moral uprightness;
and (3) certification from Dr. Elmer S. Sayoc stating that respondent is being treated for
coronary artery diseases, atrial fibrillation, and diabetes mellitus. 11
In response to respondent’s averments, complainant alleged that respondent had set their
meetings at 7:00 in the morning since he knew that nobody from his staff reported for work that
early. She said respondent was very particular about the time she left his office, which must be
before 7:30 in the morning. As for respondent’s health condition, complainant pointed out that,
indeed, he did not engage in sexual intercourse with her but only engaged in foreplay and asked
her to perform oral sex on him; and while diabetes might have diminished respondent’s sexual
urge, it did not totally erase the same.12
In a resolution dated January 17, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the matter to Judge
Norberto Geraldez, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, for investigation,
report and recommendation. In the same resolution, respondent was directed to inhibit himself
from hearing the B.P. 22 cases filed by complainant’s husband.
On January 8, 1997, Judge Geraldez requested that he be allowed to inhibit himself from
hearing the case because complainant raised the matter of his friendship with respondent. 13 The
Court, however, in a Resolution dated June 9, 1997, denied his request and directed him to
resolve the case with dispatch.14
In his report dated October 6, 1997, Judge Geraldez recommended dismissal of the complaint
against respondent since complainant failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Judge Geraldez observed that:
“In the B.P. 22 cases pending before Judge Lustre, Jose Zafra was never assured that he could
recover the amount of P3.5 million even if the sexual demands were satisfied. Jose Zafra and
Ms. Liwanag were aware of this. Consequently, it is surprising why the complainant, no matter
how desperate she may have been, would submit to oral sex. And, why Jose Zafra allowed it.
The B.P. 22 cases are simply not classic cases where the court’s decision would be so vital, that
the judge can demand his “price.”
There is a rather large disparity in the value of the “B.P. 22” cases vis-a-vis the seriousness and
mess of the sexual demand. Ms. Liwanag’s allegations are beyond comprehension. It borders on
the very credibility of the sexual allegations. This is specially true with respect to the allegations
of oral sex with its blood secretions. And, according to her she did it more than once. If indeed
there were “blood secretions” the first time, the claim of a second time is beyond relief (sic).
17
Ms. Liwanag claimed that Judge Lustre, on August 15, 1995, simply kissed and touched her. But
human nature would demand another oral sex as they had done before. Moreover, in her
complaint dated September 19, 1995, Ms. Liwanag failed to advance any reason why they
stopped at oral sex.15
Judge Geraldez concluded that the evidence presented by complainant is not credible in itself.
Moreover, Judge Geraldez pointed out that complainant merely relied on the photographs
showing her and respondent together, which, however, do not establish the acts complained of.
Despite having the opportunity to do so, according to the report, complainant failed to testify to
substantiate her claims, thereby depriving respondent of his right to cross-examine her.
Judge Geraldez recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The Court thereafter referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report, and recommendation.
The OCA, in its Memorandum dated September 1, 1998, took a position directly opposite that of
Judge Geraldez.
The OCA noted that:
“x x x we cannot help discerning here an effort to gloss over a charge against respondent which
the investigating judge himself admitted to be serious. His investigative work and his
subsequent report reveal a perfunctory treatment and analysis of the submissions of the parties,
particularly the complainant herein, and an egregious misapplication of the law and
jurisprudence.
xxx
We find credible the allegations of complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag. Her narration bears the
earmarks of truth, for the incidents giving rise to the acts complained of are so finely etched by
her as to preclude any suspicion of wild imagining or other similar fictive handiwork. It is an
essential baring of rage, revulsion and disgust:
x x x”
The OCA recommended that the case be formally docketed as an administrative complaint and
that respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and
-controlled corporations.
Clearly, we have to review the records of this case for a comprehensive view of the entire
controversy. Moreover, it is essential to lay stress on basic canons of conduct applicable to
judges, in whatever level of the judicial hierarchy they may be.
As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only
substantial evidence is required, 16 as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence:17
“Sec. 5. Substantial evidence.—In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a
fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”
Given this requirement, we find that there is enough evidence on record to sufficiently establish
complainant’s case against respondent.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
The photographs submitted by complainant to this Court show her and respondent in various
places. The first two show them talking beside an outlet of Andok’s Litson Manok, another
shows respondent’s car parked by a sidewalk, its front passenger door open. The car is seen
leaving in the next photograph. In the next two photographs, the car is seen in the driveway of
what appears to be one of a row of rooms. On top of this room’s doorway is the letter “D.” Next
are five photographs which show complainant and respondent coming out of the room together
and heading towards respondent’s parked car.18
Complainant claims that the photographs were taken when respondent took her to the
Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna.
In a Manifestation dated September 2, 1996, respondent pointed out that nothing indecent is
portrayed in the photographs. They did not show any act constituting immorality or grave
misconduct. He denied that the pictures showing him and complainant leaving a room together
were taken at the Riverview Resort. He added that the receipt issued by the resort did not
indicate that he was with complainant at said resort.
Respondent took his own set of photographs at the Riverview Resort. 19 On the basis of his own
pictures, he concluded that complainant’s photographs could not have been taken at that resort.
When he testified on his behalf, he said:
“. . . when I went to the place those letters were not there, I have photographs there because I
personally went there to have these photographs but this (sic) sign boards were not there, sir.” 20
A sign prohibiting vandalism, noticeable in complainant’s pictures, was missing in respondent’s
pictures.
Respondent avers that the real intention of complainant in filing the complaint—which she has
denied—is to extort money from him as she allegedly made an “outrageous demand” 21 for P3.5
million to settle the case.
We are not convinced, however, that respondent’s conduct in this case is entirely blameless, nor
that complainant’s alleged intent would excuse respondent’s wrongdoing.
It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in any
form of sexual congress. However, this is understandable since by their very nature, such acts
are not proper subjects of photographs. Often, as in this case, what is available to us is only the
narration of the parties involved.
Respondent denies that the photographs were taken at Riverview. He took pictures of the resort
himself to prove his contention. He said his pictures are different from those of complainant’s.
We note, however, that respondent does not deny that he is the one appearing with
complainant in the photographs. He conveniently testified that somebody else had posed for the
photograph,22 but this is obviously an afterthought. Respondent made this assertion almost a
year after complainant filed her complaint. He could have done it as early as October 1995 in his
comment to complainant’s charges.
If the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why was respondent
with complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a legitimate reason for complainant and
respondent to be seen together at the time and place depicted in the photographs, respondent
would have wasted no time explaining where they were taken and under what circumstances, in
order to extricate himself from his present predicament. This, he failed to do. The reason for
18
this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer any plausible explanation why he was seen
with complainant coming out of what is apparently a private room.
Respondent claims that the charges hurled against him are products of complainant’s
vindictiveness. Again, this claim raises more questions than it answers. It opens the door to
undue speculation. Thus, why should she resent his actions? Was it only because of repeated
postponements of the hearing of her cases?
Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the unjustifiable delays
in the hearing of their B.P. 22 cases. But would she falsely accuse respondent with sexual
molestation only to get back at him? This goes against the grain of human nature and therefore
unlikely. She should know that by revealing her sexual misadventures with respondent,
graphically describing each and every detail, she would only be exposing herself and her family
to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from the exercise, save the hope that
her dignity may somehow be vindicated in the process.
As for complainant’s failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of no moment. Complainant’s
affidavit stands in lieu of her testimony; the investigating judge even had her resubscribe and
re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part of complainant’s evidence. 23
Complainant could have been cross-examined based on her affidavit. That she was not cross-
examined by respondent is not her fault but respondent’s.
As the records now stand, we are constrained to agree with the Court Administrator’s
assessment that respondent has failed to live up to the high standard of conduct required of
members of the bench. He grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and
to avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his private life as well. 24 All to the grave
prejudice of the administration of justice, indeed.
The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in
the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the public’s faith and trust in
the judiciary. Respondent’s disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already
retired as of November 1, 1998.25 For the serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty
provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the maximum
amount should be imposed.26
We are not in accord with the OCA’s recommendation, however, as regards forfeiture of all
retirement benefits due respondent. We note that implementation of this penalty, while directed
at respondent, might adversely affect innocent members of his family, who are dependent on
him and his retirement gratuity. It is our considered view that, given the circumstances of this
case, the maximum fine of P40,000.00 would be sufficient penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby find respondent GUILTY of gross
misconduct. As he has already retired from the service and thus could no longer be dismissed
nor suspended, we hereby order that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon him, to be
deducted from his retirement benefits. Further, he is hereby barred from any employment in all
branches of the government including government-owned and -controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre meted a fine of P40,000.00 for gross misconduct.
Notes.—By having sexual intercourse with a girl who is only fifteen (15) years old, a
judge violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals
and strict standards of morality required of members of the judiciary. ( Naval vs. Panday, 275
SCRA 654 [1997])
The fact that a judge’s dishonorable conduct occurred several years before his appointment to
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
the judiciary may be appreciated as a mitigation of his failing to fully achieve the moral
standards required of a judge. (Zamudio vs. Peñas, Jr., 286 SCRA 367 [1998])
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891. July 28, 2005.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2093-RTJ)
RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 123.
Administrative Law; Judges; Those who don the judicial robe and wield the judicial gavel ought
to impress in their consciousness that appearance is an essential manifestation of reality .—The
Court agrees with the Investigating Justice’s observation that the respondent’s use of such
expletives is improper for the extolled office of a magistrate of the law. By virtue of the very
office he holds, the public expects more of the respondent as he undeniably occupies an exalted
yet delicate niche in the administration of justice. Those who don the judicial robe and wield the
judicial gavel ought to impress in their consciousness that appearance is an essential
manifestation of reality. Thus, the respondent’s claim that his “favorite expressions” were not
directed at anyone in particular is unacceptable.
Same; Same; Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in
conduct and in language; A judge’s personal behavior, not only while in the performance of
official duties, must be beyond reproach, being the visible personification of law and of justice .—
Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in
language. Indeed, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential
to the performance of all the activities of a judge. We recognize, of course, that judges are also
human beings, with their own burdens and private affairs. However, having accepted the
esteemed position of judge, the respondent ought to have known that more is expected of him
than an ordinary citizen. As subjects of constant public scrutiny, personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen should be freely and willingly accepted by a
judge. In particular, he or she must exhibit conduct consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office. Indeed, a judge’s personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties,
must be beyond reproach, being the visible personification of law and of justice.
Same; Same; In conducting hearings and promulgation of decisions on the day when his official
leave of absence was to commence, the respondent Judge was guilty of impropriety .—In
Ignacio v. Valenzuela, a judge who heard a motion while he was on vacation was held guilty of
impropriety and was meted a fine of one month’s salary. To reiterate, a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Thus, in conducting hear-ings
and promulgation of decisions on the day when his official leave of absence was to commence,
the respondent Judge was guilty of impropriety. Considering, however, that no bad faith or ill
motive can be attributed to the respondent, the Court deems it proper to reprimand him for his
actuations.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Impropriety.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On November 21, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a Letter 1 dated
November 3, 2003 from “Concerned citizens of the lower court” reporting the alleged “practices”
of Judge Edmundo T. Acuña, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 123. According to the
letter, the respondent Judge conducted trials, signed orders and even sentenced accused while
on official leave from August 15, 2001 to September 15, 2001. Among the decided cases were
as follows:
19
1.Crim. Case No. C-63250 People v. Alex Sabayan;
2.Crim. Case Nos. C-63261-62 People v. Renato Simo;
3.Crim. Case No. C-61323 People v. Elizabeth Canaberal;
4.Crim. Case No. C-63238 People v. Narciso Asistio, et al.; and Crim. Case No. C-63238
People v. Marlon Duritan.
The letter went on to question whether the respondent had authority to impose such sentences,
issue orders and conduct hearings. Aside from listing the respondent’s “dialogues,” his “favorite
expressions” were likewise listed, as follows:
1.Putris
2.Anak ng pating
3.Putang Ina
4.Pogi, beauty
5.Tulungan nyo naman ako, hirap na hirap na ko.
6.Mali ka na naman.
According to the unknown complainants, the respondent Judge also “spends much of his energy
talking” and loves to berate and embarrass people, not caring whether he speaks in open court,
as long as he has an audience. The complainants further stated that the respondent’s decisions
usually take about seven to ten drafts, as he “changes his mind so many times.” It was further
alleged that the respondent loves to “glorify himself,” and that his behavior was weird.
In his comment, the respondent averred that the writers of the letter were actuated by improper
motive, and sent the letter with no other purpose than to harass him. Furthermore, the
allegations in the letter were fabricated, exaggerated, or misquoted.
Anent the allegation that he conducted trials, signed orders and issued sentences while he was
on official leave, the respondent alleged that he was issued an Authority to Travel 2 dated August
14, 2001 duly approved and signed by then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida Elepaño allowing
him to travel to Toronto, Canada to visit his brother, who unfortunately passed away before he
could leave. As evidenced by the entries in the daily time records/logbook, 3 he was not yet on
leave from August 15, 2001 to August 21, 2001. As such, he had the “right and duty to come to
court and conduct trials, sign orders and issue sentences.” His application 4 for a thirty-day leave
was from August 21, 2001 to September 21, 2001, duly approved by Deputy Court Administrator
Jose P. Perez.
On the allegation that he exhibited weird behavior, he explained that he was still mourning the
loss of his eldest son who died of a fatal aneurism last December 21, 2002. His son, who was at
the prime of his life, had just taken the 2002 bar examinations and was employed at a law firm.
The respondent Judge surmised that the unknown complainants may have seen and observed
him at the “second phase of his recovery,” a time when he was depressed and angry.
As to the alleged humiliating statements that he made, the respondent Judge admitted having
made some of them while he was discussing the performance ratings of his staff. He insisted,
however, that he had been misquoted, and dismissed as mere fabrication some of the
statements attributed to him. He admitted, however, that “ putris, putang-ina, beauty and pogi”
were among his favorite expressions, but clarified that he did not use them often, certainly not
in open court.
In its Report dated September 17, 2004, the OCA recommended that the instant administrative
case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that the respondent be reprimanded
for ignorance of a policy on leave of absence expressed through the ruling of the Court in Paz v.
Tiong,5 where it was held that a judge on leave of absence “would have absolutely no authority
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
to discharge his duties or exercise the powers of a judge.” The OCA made the following
evaluation:
Official records culled from the OCA Office of Administrative Services indicate that Judge Acuña
had an approved application for leave covering the period from 21 August 2001 to 21
September 2001. This application for leave of absence was approved on 3 August 2001. In view
of this approved application for leave, it was a natural expectation that Judge Acuña would
cease from exercising his functions during the said period.
However, per verification with the clerk-in-charge at RTC Branch 123, Caloocan City, respondent
Judge Acuña presided over the following cases on 21 August 2001:
1.Criminal Case No. C-63250 entitled “People v. Alex Sibayan”;
2.Criminal Case Nos. 63261-62 entitled “People v. Renato Simo”; and
3.Criminal Case No. 61323 entitled “People v. Canaberal.”
In his Comment dated 19 January 2004, the respondent judge admitted reporting for work on
21 August 2001 and presiding over two (2) criminal cases. He even took pride in the fact that he
did not go on leave that day, pointing to the court’s logbook as proof of his attendance.
The admission by Judge Acuña confirms the allegation in the anonymous letter that he
performed his functions on a day when he was already on leave of absence. The reference
made by the respondent judge to the logbook only serves to establish that he indeed performed
his duties on 21 August 2001—the first day of his official leave. We state that not even his
overzealousness to work can shield him from administrative liability for ignorance of the
consequences of his approved application for leave of absence.6
In a Resolution7 dated December 8, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa for investigation, report and
recommendation. The respondent manifested that he was going to file an extended comment,
which the Investigating Justice allowed.
In his supplemental comment, the respondent alleged that he decided to defer his leave for
another week as his siblings who would be going with him to Canada had not yet secured their
visas. The respondent alleged that he was even uncertain if this could be done by amending his
travel authority. Jenny Rivera-Baliton, the clerk in charge of criminal cases in the respondent’s
sala, informed him that this would take another week or so. Ms. Rivera-Baliton executed an
affidavit attesting to the veracity of the respondent’s claim. Thus, the respondent decided not to
defer his leave anymore, and no longer reported for work beginning August 22, 2001. On the
issue of hearing cases on August 21, 2001 despite his approved travel authority and approved
leave, the respondent claimed, thus:
. . . I was not actuated by any evil or improper motive. Neither was I motivated by any
monetary consideration or otherwise except by my desire to discharge my sworn duty to
administer justice expeditiously. I acted in good faith and in the honest belief that I had the
right to defer the effectivity of my leave chargeable against the 30-day forfeitable leave benefit.
I wish to reiterate at this juncture what I stated in my original comment that the leave I applied
for in 2001 was my first full availment of the 30-day forfeitable leave. Previously, and even after
2001, I went on forfeitable leave only for several days and never consumed the complete 30
days leave accorded to judges. In hearing cases on August 21, 2001, I did not receive any extra
remuneration for it. The public service was not prejudiced thereby. I had in mind only the
interest of the accused who were in detention. I had no intention of violating any rule, nor was
it ever my intention to prejudice anybody. On that day, as in the past, I had a heavy case load,
involving detention prisoners as I [my court is] a Drugs Court. (My court is also a commercial
20
[law] and [Intellectual Property Law] Court, the only branch in Caloocan City which is that). Had
I not heard the cases of the accused who pleaded guilty on that day, they would have waited
for my return after 30 days.
If I committed any infraction of the rules on leave, in all sincerity, to reiterate, there was no
intention at all on my part to so disregard the rules. If I committed any infraction, I plead for the
leniency of this Court with a promise that I will not commit a repetition thereof anymore. 8
The Investigating Justice thereafter submitted her Report, recommending that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit. She ratiocinated that while the respondent Judge admitted having
performed his functions on August 21, 2001, the date of the commencement of his approved
leave, there was nothing repulsive in deferring the date of his leave. Moreover, there was no
showing that the respondent was actuated by any ulterior motive other than to lessen his
workload. According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent’s decision to report for work
that day appears to have been motivated by his honest belief that he could defer his leave and
make the necessary adjustments later; he had no clear intent to deliberately ignore the rules
regarding vacation leaves. The Investigating Justice further pointed out that nobody was
prejudiced by the respondent’s appearance during that day, and went on to state:
However, respondent should bear in mind that approved leaves are filed through official
documents and in the future, such act may obliterate the validity of the issuances he made while
on official leave when his orders, decisions and other promulgations reflect a date when he is
already supposed to be on leave. Thus, he should exercise utmost caution regarding these
matters.
Therefore, in our consideration, the act of respondent does not constitute such a gross
ignorance of the rules that will warrant an administrative liability. In view of the lack of malice
and improper motive in reporting for work and discharging his functions and taking into account
his desire to dispense justice promptly, respondent cannot be said to have been grossly ignorant
of the rules as to be deemed administratively liable. 9
As to the use of humiliating and insensitive expressions, the Investigating Justice agreed with
the OCA that the use of “putris” and “putang ina” were unfit expressions for men of the robe. It
did not matter that they were not directed to any person in particular, as they give the
impression of a person’s ill manners. Considering that the respondent is not an ordinary citizen,
such intemperate language detracts from how a judge should conduct himself. The Investigating
Justice made the following conclusion:
In sum, we find that the allegations in the anonymous complaint, some of which were admitted
with qualifications by the respondent, are not sufficient to warrant a penalty other than to
remind him of the rules regarding official leaves and of proper conduct of judges.
As a final note, respondent is reminded that as a judge, it is paramount that a judge’s official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
in the bench and in the performance of his official duties, but also in his everyday life should be
beyond reproach. This includes following simple rules as well as conducting himself in the most
respectable and honorable manner possible. Only through such kind of demeanor of the
members of the judiciary that the institution earns the respect and faith of our people in the
administration of justice.10
The Court agrees with the Investigating Justice’s observation that the respondent’s use of such
expletives is improper for the extolled office of a magistrate of the law. By virtue of the very
office he holds, the public expects more of the respondent as he undeniably occupies an exalted
yet delicate niche in the administration of justice. Those who don the judicial robe and wield the
judicial gavel ought to impress in their consciousness that appearance is an essential
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11 21
manifestation of reality.11 Thus, the respondent’s claim that his “favorite expressions” were not
directed at anyone in particular is unacceptable.

Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in
language.12 Indeed, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 13 Propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. 14 We recognize, of course, that
judges are also human beings, with their own burdens and private affairs. However, having
accepted the esteemed position of judge, the respondent ought to have known that more is
expected of him than an ordinary citizen. As subjects of constant public scrutiny, personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen should be freely and
willingly accepted by a judge. In particular, he or she must exhibit conduct consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office. 15 Indeed, a judge’s personal behavior, not only while in the
performance of official duties, must be beyond reproach, being the visible personification of law
and of justice.16

Thus, while we commiserate with the respondent Judge for the loss of his brother and son, we
cannot spare him from the consequences of his unacceptable behavior.

In Ignacio v. Valenzuela,17 a judge who heard a motion while he was on vacation was held guilty
of impropriety and was meted a fine of one month’s salary. To reiterate, a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. 18 Thus, in conducting hearings
and promulgation of decisions on the day when his official leave of absence was to commence,
the respondent Judge was guilty of impropriety. Considering, however, that no bad faith or ill
motive can be attributed to the respondent, the Court deems it proper to reprimand him for his
actuations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Edmundo T. Acuña is found GUILTY of impropriety and is
REPRIMANDED therefor. He is STERNLY WARNED that the repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Judge Edmundo T. Acuña reprimanded for impropriety, with stern warning against repetition of
similar act.

Note.—The role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of
temperance, patience and courtesy. ( In the Matter of the Alleged Improper Conduct of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., 395 SCRA 231 [2003])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055. December 17, 2009.*
HEIRS OF THE LATE REV. FR. JOSE O. ASPIRAS, complainants, vs. JUDGE CLIFTON U. GANAY,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 31, AGOO, LA UNION,
respondent.
Courts; Judges; Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of
all the activities of a judge. —Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge. Lower court judges, such as respondent Judge
Ganay, play an important role in the promotion of the people’s faith in the judiciary. They are
front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their interaction
with litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must
avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to
them. In Dulay v. Lelina, Jr., 463 SCRA 269 (2005) the Court held: Although every office in the
government is a public trust, no position exacts greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of law must comport
himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
prescribes that judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer . Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are mandated not to
allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey
or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge. The Code clearly prohibits judges or members of their families from asking for or
accepting, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted
to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
Same; Same; The acts of a judge in receiving lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos, cellular
phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of someone who
was then the ward of the court constitute impropriety which the Court cannot allow. —
Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of receiving lawbooks worth fifty thousand
pesos, cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of
the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute impropriety which the
Court cannot allow. Respondent Judge Ganay’s act of issuing Orders directing the manager of
the PNB, La Union Branch to draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the account of
the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras creates the impression of impropriety and subjects the court to
suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Abuse of Authority.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from an unsigned letter-complaint 1 dated June 6,
2005, filed by the heirs of the late Reverend Father Jose O. Aspiras addressed to the Court
Administrator, requesting that an investigation be conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on the alleged abuse of authority of respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union in connection with Special
Proceeding Case No. A-1026, entitled “In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O.
Aspiras.”
In the letter, the heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras state the following:
“That the judge in the above mentioned case has been abusing his authority as observed by the
Heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras as he previously ordered to withdraw the amount of
P50,000.00 in his favor from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras on December
17, 2004 for him to purchase law books. As per his order, he alleged that, ‘In the spirit of this
Yuletide season and considering the efforts of the Judge of this Court, the guardians in the
above entitled case deemed it best to give him fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of law
books to aid him in his work as a judge.’ The truth of the matter is that this has been the idea of
22
Judge Ganay, himself, and was never consented by the guardians. For your reference, attached
is a photocopy of this order.
There are still other orders issued by Judge Ganay ordering the bank to release certain amounts
from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras in his favor without the written
consent of the guardians. Unfortunately, photocopies of these orders cannot be attached for
your reference as no copies of these orders were sent to the guardians. The copies can be
found in the records of the case being kept by the said court.”
The OCA conducted a surprise investigation and examination of the records of SP Case No. A-
1026 from August 30 to September 2, 2005. The investigating team selected pertinent
documents relative to the anonymous complaint in order to verify the irregularities allegedly
committed by respondent Judge Ganay.
From the documents gathered, the investigating team found that the Order 2 dated December
17, 2004 was indeed issued by respondent Judge Ganay. For the money received from the said
order, respondent Judge Ganay even issued an Acknowledgement Receipt 3 dated December 22,
2004. The team also discovered that on several occasions, respondent Judge Ganay issued
numerous orders4 directing the manager of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Agoo, La Union
Branch, to draw checks from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras amounting to several
thousands of pesos in the name of the Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia
P. Eslao (OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao) for the purpose of purchasing cellular phone prepaid cards.
The said cards were received by respondent Judge Ganay and OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao as
evidenced by acknowledgement receipts5 signed by them on several dates.
   The investigating team also discovered two other orders 6 issued by respondent Judge Ganay
directing the manager of PNB, Agoo, La Union Branch to draw from the account of the late Rev.
Fr. Aspiras checks in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) each for the purpose of
purchasing three (3) cellular phones. Thereafter, OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao submitted a Report on
Expenses7 dated March 1, 2005 enumerating in detail how the money was spent for buying
three (3) cellular phones.
In a Resolution8 dated January 17, 2006, this Court resolved to:
(a)  DIRECT Judge Clifton S. Ganay and Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court Precilla
Olympia P. Eslao, both of RTC, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union, to submit their respective comments
on the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 of the Heirs of the Late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras and
the report dated September 22, 2005 of Attys. Reynan M. Dollison and Kenneth P. Fulton, Legal
Office, OCA, and to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them, both
within ten (10) days from notice hereof;
(b)  AUTHORIZE the Office of the Court Administrator to secure the complete records of
Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, entitled In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose
O. Aspiras; and
(c)  DIRECT Executive Judge Samuel R. Martires, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, to safekeep
immediately the case records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, consisting of three (3)
volumes, and thereafter, surrender the same to a duly authorized representative of the Office of
the Court Administrator.”
Respondent Judge Ganay sent a letter 9 dated March 3, 2006 to the Clerk of Court stating that he
had yet to receive a copy of the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 of the heirs of the late Rev.
Fr. Aspiras against him and the report dated September 22, 2005 made by the OCA lawyers who
conducted a surprise inspection and examination of the records of Special Proceeding Case No.
A-1026. He further stated that he should be given a medal for effecting a speedy settlement of
the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras among his heirs. Respondent Judge Ganay maintained
that all his actions merely implemented the orders of the two (2) property guardians of the late
Rev. Fr. Aspiras.
Respondent Judge Ganay, together with OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao, subsequently filed a Motion to
Furnish Copies dated March 13, 2006 reiterating his earlier manifestation that he had not yet
received copies of the documents that he was directed to comment on through the Resolution
dated January 17, 2006. Respondent Judge Ganay again moved that they be furnished copies of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
the said documents so that they could properly and intelligently comment thereon.
And again on March 22, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay filed a Manifestation 10 dated March 21,
2006, submitting an Advance Comment 11 dated March 21, 2006, despite the fact that he had not
yet received copies of the documents that he was directed to comment on. According to
respondent Judge Ganay, he was submitting his Advance Comment “to show to the Supreme
Court that its foot soldier of Branch 31, RTC, AGOO, La Union deserves a MEDAL, not a
disciplinary action.”
In his Advance Comment dated March 21, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay explained that the
cellular phones were purchased upon the orders of the two (2) property guardians of the late
Rev. Fr. Aspiras. He further explained that the communication devices were for the fast
networking of information for the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras who was then the ward of the court.
Respondent Judge Ganay also narrated that the property guardians persistently asked him to
take a vacation in the United States, which he declined. According to him, they kept on asking
him what they could do to help the court. He, in reply, mentioned that lawbooks would enhance
the appearance of his office and make it look scholarly and presentable. They then appropriated
fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos for the purchase of books.
Respondent Judge Ganay expounded on the system of checks and balances that he devised for
the handling of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras’ funds, thus:
“I am just the implementor of the orders of the guardians. In the case of the property
guardians, I only implement if the order is unanimous, i.e., if both property guardians assent.
Why? Because in order to safeguard Reverend Aspiras[‘] wealth, one property guardian not
taking advantage of the other, it was arranged that I would be the implementor of their orders.
And so if the guardian over the ward’s person says that the ward should have a wheelchair and
the property guardians say okay, I issue an order directed to the bank manager where the
ward’s moneys are to release the stated amount (after a choice of wheel-chair was made by the
guardian over the ward’s person). The bank issues a check and have it delivered to the OIC-
Branch Clerk of Court, from which the guardian over the person retrieves. That way there will be
no lamangan, no gulangan between the two (2) property guardians belonging to opposite
camps.”
In a Resolution12 dated April 18, 2006, this Court granted respondent Judge Ganay’s motion that
he be furnished with copies of the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 and the report dated
September 22, 2005.
In another Manifestation 13 dated May 16, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay again stated that he
and OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao had not yet received copies of the documents they were required
to comment on. This prompted the Court to issue another Resolution 14 dated July 11, 2006,
directing the Office of the Clerk of Court to furnish respondent Judge Ganay and OIC-Clerk of
Court Eslao copies of the said documents.
OIC Clerk of Court Eslao submitted her Comment15 dated August 22, 2006 and explained, thus:
“The prepaid cell cards were purchased upon the knowledge and approval of the property
guardians.
There were 7 cellphones which were regularly fed with prepaid cell cards. These were automatic
expenses on a regular basis. The regularity was every 2 months because the lifetime of a
prepaid card is 60 days. Hence, the amount of regular expenses for prepaid cards was
something like P21,000.00 annually. For 2 years, the regular amount was something like
P42,000.00.
The 3 cellphones mentioned in the Memorandum (November 2004) were the replacement
cellphones of the 3 guardians.
My position as OIC-Branch Clerk of Court functioned as the clearinghouse so that there could be
monitoring of the activities regarding the ward in this special proceeding.
There was nothing irregular in all these purchases because they were upon the written orders of
Judge Ganay, who, in turn, was himself requested-ordered by the property guardians.
BESIDES, the parties had long ago buried the hatchet as of August 22, 2005 even before the 2
OCA lawyers came to this Court (August 31, 2005).
This is a case of a false alarm.”
23
Respondent Judge Ganay again submitted an Extended Comment 16 dated August 22, 2006 and
narrated the peculiar circumstances in connection with Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026,
entitled “In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras,” to wit:
“When Father Aspiras suffered a stroke sometime in September of 2001, paralyzing a portion of
his body, his sister Gloria Aspiras Mamaril filed a petition for guardianship asking the Court that
she be appointed guardian primarily because she is a sister. This was opposed by Helen Grace
Canlas, a daughter of Alejandro Aspiras (brother of Father Aspiras). After several hearings that
established the legal incompetency of Father Aspiras, the heirs including those with stakes to
protect (numbering more than 25 in all) agreed that the personal guardian should be, as she
was appointed by the Court eventually, HELEN GRACE CANLAS. The property guardians who
were appointed were the living brother and sister of Father Aspiras, namely Gloria Aspiras
Mamaril and Alejandro Aspiras. Both Gloria Aspiras Mamaril and Alejandro Aspiras are retired
public servants, Gloria, being a retired DEPed elementary school teacher while Alejandro, a
retired Navy man. After 2 years or so as one of the property guardians, because he could no
longer come up to the third floor where Branch 31 RTC holds office, Alejandro Aspiras begged
off, to be substituted by one of his learned daughters, Professor Mercedita A. Mabutas. She was
appointed later in lieu of her father. She is a Professor of Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State
University (DMMMSU) based in AGOO, La Union.
Normally, a ward of a Court has only one guardian. But the ward of this Court, Father Jose
Aspiras, had three (3) guardians. This is because I had to accommodate both warring camps to
avert a continuing war that would not redound to the benefit of the ward of the Court.
xxx
It was agreed that no withdrawals from the bank account of Father Aspiras shall be allowed
without a written order from me.
In order that not one of the 3 guardians could act independently of the other, a system was
developed whereby the judge (and that’s me) only could order the manager of the bank to issue
a check in such amount that will cover and answer for a certain need (see, also pages 8-9,
ADVANCE COMMENT, March 21, 2006).
In other words, I and I alone, by agreement with the guardians, held the key to the bank vault.
While I held the key to the bank, the property guardians were the ones who could request-order
me to instruct the manager of the bank to draw or issue a check.
xxx
Contrary to what the writer of that Letter-Complaint dated June 6, 2005, every order for the
withdrawal of moneys have been all highly REGULAR. There was nothing that was irregular.
That’s why after the heirs have chosen to peacefully settle among themselves in the last week of
July 2005, I was prevailed upon by the heirs to stay a little longer so that I can make orders to
the bank manager for the eventual, which was a certainty, distribution of the moneys for the
heirs. On August 22, 2005, after the filing of the inventory of properties by the property
guardians, on the same date (August 22, 2005), the heirs executed an EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND ARRANGEMENT OF ESTATE, which wrote finis to the squabble among the
heirs and the sub-heirs. Eventually their shares in money were distributed. I was hailed as a
hero, savior, Santa Claus, godfather. Some of the heirs adopted me a member of their family. All
of them gave balatos one way or another all due to the fast distribution of their shares. Those
who came from Australia, Tarlac and outlying areas beyond the Province of La Union were most
grateful.
Respondent Judge Ganay also addressed the allegation that he and his cohorts were attempting
to “withdraw at least the amount of about FOUR MILLION FOUR HUNDRED PESOS
(P4,400.00.00)” (sic) from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras. According to him, he
could do it since he held the key to the bank, but he could not and would not do it for the
following reasons:
“xxx First, I fear God and the Supreme Court. Second, I was not raised that way by my poor but
dignified parents (mother: retired DEPed public school principal; father: deceased, municipal
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
employee). Third, I am satisfied with my present earning. Fourth, I have no need for that kind
of sum. Fifth, I have a name to protect, being the recipient of many awards. And sixth, I am an
automatic applicant to the Court of Appeals by virtue of R.A. 6713.”
In a Resolution17 dated August 29, 2006, this Court referred the instant case to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Report18 dated March 12, 2007, the OCA rejected the explanations of respondent Judge
Ganay and found him guilty of violating Sections 13 and 14 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA recommended the following actions:
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are
our recommendations that:
a) the instant administrative case be REDOCKETED;
b) Judge Clifton U. Ganay, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Agoo, La
Union, be FINED the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00);
c) Likewise, OIC-Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P[.] Eslao, be FINED the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); [and]
d) The records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, consisting of three (3) volumes,
under the custody of the Office of the Court Administrator, (per resolution dated January 17,
2006) shall be returned back to the Regional Trial Court of Branch 31, Agoo, La Union.
After a judicious review of the record of this administrative matter, we find that respondent
Judge Ganay has indeed violated Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, of Canon 4 of the
New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.19 The aforesaid provisions on Propriety state:
“SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him
or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence,
direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.
SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive
a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that
such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge
in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of
a judge. Lower court judges, such as respondent Judge Ganay, play an important role in the
promotion of the people’s faith in the judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the
judicial branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who do
business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but
also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to them. 20
In Dulay v. Lelina, Jr.,21 the Court held:
“Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of
law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can
bear the most searching scrutiny of the public. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary prescribes that judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer . Thus, judges are
to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are
mandated not to allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge. The Code clearly prohibits judges or members of their families
from asking for or accepting, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to
be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial
duties.”
Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of receiving lawbooks worth fifty thousand
24
pesos, cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of
the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute impropriety which the
Court cannot allow. Respondent Judge Ganay’s act of issuing Orders directing the manager of
the PNB, La Union Branch to draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the account of
the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras creates the impression of impropriety and subjects the court to
suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings.
This Court finds unsatisfactory the explanations propounded by respondent Judge Ganay for his
actuations in connection with Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026 . He tried justifying his act of
receiving cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians
of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras as necessary for the networking of information about the ward of the
court. He likewise rationalized his acceptance of the lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos from
the property guardians as his way of showing them that he “appreciate[d] their show of
appreciation of [his] judicial work for the ward and to all other cases.” Respondent Judge Ganay
explained that he did not want the property guardians “to feel resentful (‘tampo’), frustrated or
shamed (‘mapahiya’) if [he] would refuse their generosity.”
This Court has always stressed that a judge should avoid impropriety and even the appearance
of impropriety in all activities, and that he should perform his duties honestly and with
impartiality and diligence. Also, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.22 Since respondent Judge Ganay
occupied an exalted position in the administration of justice, he should pay a high price for the
honor bestowed upon him; and his official, as well as his private, conduct must at all times be
free from the appearance of impropriety.23
As held in Edaño v. Asdala:24
“As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are
expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of
the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but
they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s
faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed
essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of
judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the
decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ‘ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable
observers.’ Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality
have been observed by judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these must also appear
to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the
justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and
suspicion in the dispensation of justice. xxx”
With regard to the recommendation of the OCA to impose a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos on OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao, this Court finds the same to be without basis. In her
Comment dated August 22, 2006, OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao sufficiently explained that she merely
followed the official orders of respondent Judge Ganay in issuing the Acknowledgment Receipts
for the prepaid cards for the cellular phones. Moreover, nowhere in the OCA Report dated March
12, 2007 is a discussion regarding OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao’s participation in the alleged
irregularities in Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026.
WHEREFORE, for violating Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay is FINED in the amount
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of similar
infractions shall be dealt with more severely.
Let the records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026 , consisting of three (3) volumes, under
the custody of the Office of the Court Administrator (per resolution dated January 17, 2006), be
returned to Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
Puno (C.J.), Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta, Bersamin,
Del Castillo, Abad and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Brion, J., On Leave.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139. August 6, 2010.*
MICHAEL B. BELEN, complainant, vs. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, Regional Trial
Court, Calamba City, Branch 36, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal
interest violate Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.—Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities
and employees to secure public information regarding complainant’s piggery and poultry
business; to inform addressees of the laws allegedly being violated by complainant; and to
remind the addressees of their duties as government officials or employees and warn them of
the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing these letters, respondent judge’s
use of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of   issuance of municipal clearance and license to complainant’s business establishment. We
RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and stating that the letter was “from [his] chambers,” clearly
manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his office to influence said
government officials and employees, and to achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for
which those letters were written. In other words, respondent judge used said letterhead to
promote his personal interest. This is violative of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Grave Abuse of Authority and Conduct
Unbecoming a Judge.
  
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
 
CARPIO, J.:
 
The Case
 
This is an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a
judge filed by Michael B. Belen against Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch 36.
 
The Facts
 
Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
with grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. According to complainant, 1
sometime in March 2004, respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against complainant’s father,
Nezer D. Belen, but the same was dismissed for lack of probable cause by Assistant City
Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman in a Resolution dated 28 July 2004. Respondent judge
filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration and Disqualif[ication]) before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of San Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that Sunega-Lagman was always absent
during the hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa case. Respondent judge
likewise filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline, docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1700. To
refute the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman, complainant executed an
Affidavit dated 19 May 2006, which was submitted by Sunega-Lagman as evidence in the CBD
case. Complainant’s Affidavit stated that the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-
25
Lagman were “false”; that Sunega-Lagman was present during the preliminary investigation
hearings dated 14, 21 and 29 April 2004, and that she was absent only once, on 6 May 2004,
when she was already on maternity leave; and that it was respondent judge who was absent
during the hearings.2
Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the
filing of several cases against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the morning,
complainant received a mobile phone text message from the caretaker of his piggery, informing
him that respondent judge arrived and was taking pictures of the piggery. Complainant rushed
to the area and saw respondent judge, accompanied by the Municipal Agriculturist and Sanitary
Inspector and the Barangay Chairman, inspecting complainant’s piggery.
Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities
and employees, requesting information on complainant’s piggery and poultry business; advising
them of the alleged violations by the complainant of the National Building Code and certain
environmental laws; and reminding the local government authorities of their duty to forestall the
enumerate these letters below. 3
1. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of Alaminos,
Laguna, requesting confirmation of the issuance by said office of construction,
building and occupancy permits to “Michael B. Belen’s Piggery and Poultry in Brgy. IV
and House in Sta. Rosa,” and stating that non-compliance with, or violation of the
National Building Code is a criminal offense;4
2. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of
Alaminos, Laguna, referring to respondent judge’s previous letter dated 15 January
2007; citing provisions of the National Building Code on Building Use Affecting Health
and Safety (Sec. 1.01.05), Building Permits (Sec. 1.02.03), and Inspection and
Certificates of Occupancy (Sec. 1.02.05); and stating: “These statutory provisions are
mandatory and any violation thereof is subject to appropriate legal sanctions. Thus, in
accordance with the National Building Code and Code of Conduct of Public Officers
that mandates action and reply to any complaint within 15 days from receipt, may I
know your official action and reply on the matter”; 5
3. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos,
Laguna, expressing his appreciation of the “immediate action” taken by the mayor in
relation to the inspection of the piggery and poultry business establishment of
complainant; enumerating the environmental laws violated by the complainant, i.e.,
Sec. 8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 984, Section 3 of PD 953, Section 48 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9003, Section 49 of PD 1152, and Section 27 of Resolution No.
33, Series of 1996; stating that “With the violations of the owner and his farm
workers, appropriate criminal actions shall be instituted against them;” and reminding
the mayor that municipal officers are mandated by environmental laws not to issue
municipal clearance and permits, and to close business enterprises within its
jurisdiction, specifically complainant’s piggery and poultry, violating environmental
laws;6
4. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser of
Alaminos, Laguna, inquiring on the official action taken by the mayor in relation to
respondent judge’s earlier letters and complainant’s alleged violation of environmental
laws, and emphasizing the responsibility of the mayor to withhold clearances and
permits from business establishments violating environmental laws;7
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
5. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to Ms. Gladys D. Apostol, the Municipal
Agriculturist of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting a copy of the Inspection report dated 11
January 2007;8 and
6. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of Alaminos,
Laguna, requesting for prompt action on respondent judge’s previous letters dated 15
and 23 January 2007, with a warning that the failure of the said office to reply to
respondent judge’s inquiries will compel the latter to file administrative and criminal
complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Section 5 of RA 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.”9
 
All of the letters enumerated above bore a letterhead indicating respondent judge’s official
government position, viz.:
From the Chamber of:
 
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 36
4th Judicial Region, Calamba City
 
Respondent judge also filed a criminal case against complainant for violations of Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 953, docketed as I.S. No.
07-246/07-247, before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. 10
In his Comment,11 respondent judge alleged that he never neglected his duties as a judge; that
as a landowner and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, he had the right to file criminal
complaints against violators of environmental laws to protect the environment; and that he had
the right, under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6173, to secure public information from
government offices, especially about the complainant who was violating numerous laws.
Respondent judge also claimed that he did not use the court’s official stationery or letterhead in
his correspondence with government authorities and employees of Alaminos, Laguna. He
emphasized that the court’s official letterhead should appear as:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
4TH JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 36
CALAMBA CITY
 
Respondent judge claimed that he used his personal stationery or letterhead, and signed the
same in his private, not judicial, capacity.
 
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
 
On 11 March 2008, the OCA submitted its Report 12 finding respondent judge guilty of violating
Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA
stated that while respondent judge did not actually use the court’s official letterhead but his own
personal stationery, his letters indicated that he is the presiding judge of an RTC in Calamba
City, and even stated that his letters were “from the chambers of” the presiding judge. It is
apparent from the acts of respondent judge that he intended to use the prestige of his judicial
position to promote his personal interest.
The OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against respondent judge be re-
26
docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B.
Belen be fined in the amount of P11,000 for violation of Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.13
In a Resolution dated 13 August 2008, the Supreme Court resolved, among others, to re-docket
the administrative complaint against respondent judge as a regular administrative matter. 14
Subsequently, the OCA, in compliance with the Court’s Resolution, 15 designated Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia as the investigating justice of the administrative case.
 
The Findings and Recommendation
of the Investigating Justice
 
Investigating Justice Ramon R. Garcia found respondent judge to have violated Section 4 of
Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary when he used a letterhead indicating his position as the Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Calamba City, Branch 36. According to Justice Garcia, while the computer-printed letterhead of
respondent judge is not the official letterhead of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, the use of
the same reflects respondent judge’s designation and position in the judiciary, and indicates that
the letters came from the “chambers” of the presiding judge of Branch 36. Undoubtedly,
respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his judicial office for his own personal
interest.
Justice Garcia agreed with the OCA in recommending the imposition of the administrative
penalty of fine in the amount of P11,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
 
The Court’s Ruling
The findings and recommendations of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA are well-
taken.
Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public
information regarding complainant’s piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the
laws allegedly being violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as
government officials or employees and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of
public duties. In writing these letters, respondent judge’s use of his personal stationery with
letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and
stating that the letter was “from [his] chambers,” clearly manifests that respondent judge was
trying to use the prestige of his office to influence said government officials and employees, and
to achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written. In other
words, respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal interest. This is violative
of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. We quote these sections below:
“CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE
x x x
SECTION 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in
a special position to influence the judge.
CANON 4
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of
a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
x x x”
In Oktubre v. Velasco,16 this Court held that respondent judge’s act of sending several letters
bearing his sala’s letterhead, in connection with an apparent dispute in the administration of the
estates of his relatives, clearly showed the judge’s intent to use the prestige of his judicial office,
and hence, violative of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 17 The Court considered
respondent Judge Velasco’s excuse for using his sala’s letterhead, i.e., that he wanted to protect
the interest of his maternal co-heirs in the subject properties, as flimsy, and emphasized that
respondent judge had no business using his sala’s letterhead for private matters, as the same
should be used only for official correspondence.18
Similarly, in Rosauro v. Kallos,19 it was held that respondent judge’s use of his sala’s official
stationery in his private correspondence with complainant and his counsel constitutes violation
of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court concluded that: “By using his sala’s
stationery other than for official purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his
office to benefit Guerrero (and himself) in violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code.” 20
In Ladignon v. Garong,21 respondent judge’s act of using the official letterhead of his court and
signing the same using the word “judge” in his letter-complaint to the First United Methodist
Church in Michigan, USA, was held to be violative of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics and
Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court held, thus:
“We agree with the Report that what is involved here is the rule that “Judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities”. (Canon 4, Section 1,
New Code of Judicial Conduct) Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach
and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the
discharge of their official duties as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. No
position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness on the individual than
a seat in the Judiciary. x x x
xxx
x x x As the Report stated, [repondent judge’s] use of the letterhead and his designation as a
Judge in a situation of potential dispute gave “the appearance that there is an implied or
assured consent of the court to his cause.” This circumstance, to our mind, was what marked
the respondent Judge’s use of his letterhead and title as improper. In other words, the
respondent Judge’s transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being
very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his
letterhead and his title.
xxx
x x x the use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding
circumstances of the use—the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of
“impropriety” or “appearance of impropriety”. In the present case, the respondent Judge
crossed the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint involving an
alleged violation of church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the
letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the impression of
27
official recognition or notice of the reported violation.
The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title of “Judge” or
“Justice” in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary. While the use of the title is an
official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be
drawn based on the circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the title can be used for
social and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use the prestige of
his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can
the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, or to
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence
the judge. (Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct) To do any of these is to cross
into the prohibited field of impropriety.”22
 
In view of the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1
and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, 23
provides that violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less-serious charge punishable by
any of the following sanctions:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating justice and the OCA that respondent
judge, for his transgression, be meted a penalty of fine amounting to P11,000, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and FINE him P11,000, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Nachura, Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen meted with P11,000 fine for violation of Section 4 of Canon
1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, with
stern warning against repetition of similar act.
Note.—Court has always been punctilious about any conduct, act or omission that would violate
the norm of public accountability or diminish the people’s faith in the judiciary. ( Espiritu vs.
Pestaño-Buted, 553 SCRA 1 [2008])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136. September 21, 2010.*
SUSAN O. REYES, complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL N. DUQUE, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 197, Las Piñas City, respondent.
Judges; Retirement; Where the administrative complaint against a judge was filed before his
retirement, the Supreme Court no doubt has jurisdiction over the case. —On the question of
jurisdiction as Judge Duque is no longer a member of the judiciary having retired from the
service on 21 February 2008, the records show that Reyes filed four similar complaints against
Judge Duque. A complaint dated 18 January 2008 addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno and subscribed on 19 February 2008 was received by the OCA on 20 February 2008 and
by the Office of the Chief Justice also on 20 February 2008, or one day before the date of
retirement of Judge Duque. A similar complaint subscribed on 19 February 2008 was received by
the OCA on 12 March 2008. An identical complaint addressed to the OCA and subscribed on 23
January 2008 was filed and received by the OCA on 25 January 2008. As pointed out by the
OCA, Judge Duque was “inadvertently sent” a copy of the complaint that was filed and received
on 12 March 2008. The filing of similar and identical complaints on different dates was due to
the directive of the OCA requiring that the complaint be “verified” or that the “original copy of
the verified complaint” be filed. Nonetheless, it is clear from the records that Reyes filed her
intended complaint before Judge Duque retired. Consequently, the Court no doubt has
jurisdiction over this administrative case.
Same; Immorality; No judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party litigant
even from a woman of loose morals. —On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, and
after a thorough investigation conducted by the Investigating Justice, it was established, and
Judge Duque admitted, that Reyes went to his house. Substantial evidence also pointed to
Judge Duque’s liability for impropriety and gross misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes.
There is no need to detail again the lewd acts of Judge Duque. The Investigating Justice’s
narration was sufficient and thorough. The Investigating Justice likewise observed that Judge
Duque merely attempted to destroy the credibility of Reyes when he insinuated that she could
be a “woman of ill repute or a high class prostitute” or one whose “moral value is at its lowest
level.” However, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party litigant even from a
woman of loose morals.
Same; Impropriety; Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they should always conduct themselves
in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.—Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities. Judges should conduct themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they should always
conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
Same; Misconduct; Retirement; Respondent judge failed to live up to the high moral
standards of the judiciary and even transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society—had
he not retired, his misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service. —The conduct
of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary. He failed to
behave in a manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary. Considering that a judge is
a visible representation of the law and of justice, he is naturally expected to be the epitome of
integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge Duque’s conduct indubitably bore the marks of
impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards of the judiciary and
even transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society. Had Judge Duque not retired, his
misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service.
28
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Impropriety, Corruption and Gross
Misconduct.
  
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CARPIO, J.:
The Facts
In her Verified Complaint, Susan O. Reyes (Reyes) charged respondent Judge Manuel N. Duque
(Judge Duque) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Las Piñas City (RTC-Branch 197), with
Impropriety, Corruption and Gross Misconduct. Reyes alleged that she was a party-in-
intervention in Land Registration Case No. 06-005 entitled “ In re: Petition of Philippine Savings
Bank for Issuance of a Writ of Possession under Act No. 3135 over Properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-85172 and T-84847 ” filed by the Philippine Savings Bank (bank) against the spouses
Carolyn Choi and Nak San Choi (spouses Choi). In a Decision dated 6 November 2006, Judge
Duque granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the bank and
ordered the spouses Choi and all those claiming rights under them to vacate the properties
covered by TCT Nos. T-85172, T-84848, and T-84847 situated in BF Resort Village, Talon 2, Las
Piñas. On 13 August 2007, Reyes filed an “Urgent Petition for Lifting and Setting Aside of Writ of
Possession and Quashal of Notice to Vacate” claiming that she bought the subject property
covered by TCT No. T-85172 from the spouses Choi and that she was in actual possession of the
property with full knowledge of the bank.
At the hearing of Reyes’ petition, Atty. Herminio Ubana, Sr., (Atty. Ubana) the lawyer of Reyes,
introduced her to Judge Duque who allegedly gave Reyes 30 days to settle matters with the
bank. Reyes was unable to re-negotiate with the bank. On the first week of December 2007,
Reyes allegedly received a phone call from Judge Duque and the latter instructed Reyes to go
“to his house and bring some money in order that he can deny the pending motion to break
open.” As she did not have the money yet, Reyes allegedly told Judge Duque that she would see
him the following day as her allotment might arrive by that time. The following day, when her
allotment arrived, Reyes went to the PNB Cubao Branch in Quezon City to withdraw P20,000.
She, her secretary, and driver went to the house of Judge Duque at No. 9 CRM Corazon, BF
Almanza, Las Piñas. The son of Judge Duque opened the gate. At his house, Judge Duque
demanded P100,000. Reyes gave him P20,000 and she asked for time to give him the balance.
After a week, Atty. Ubana called Reyes telling her that Judge Duque was asking for her and
waiting for the balance he demanded. On 21 December 2007, Reyes went to the house of Judge
Duque with P18,000 on hand. Judge Duque allegedly scolded her for not bringing the whole
amount of P80,000. Reyes explained that she had difficulty raising the amount. Judge Duque
locked the main door of his house and asked Reyes to step into his office. Judge Duque pointed
to a calendar posted on the wall and pointed to December 26 as the date when she should
complete the amount. All of a sudden, Judge Duque held the waist of Reyes, embraced and
kissed her. Reyes tried to struggle and free herself. Judge Duque raised her skirt, opened her
blouse and sucked her breasts. He touched her private parts and attempted to have sexual
intercourse with Reyes. Reyes shouted for help but the TV was too loud. As a desperate move,
Reyes appealed to Judge Duque saying: “ kung gusto mo, huwag dito. Sa hotel, sasama ako
sayo.” Judge Duque suddenly stopped his sexual advances and ordered Reyes to fix her hair.
In his Comment,1 Judge Duque averred that since the complaint of Reyes was filed after he
retired on 21 February 2008, he was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). He denied the charges hurled against him and claimed the allegations were
“fabricated, false and malicious.”
In its Report dated 26 June 2008, 2 the OCA found that Reyes actually filed four identical
complaints. First, Reyes filed a complaint dated 16 January 2008 duly subscribed on 23 January
2008. Reyes was directed to comply with the requirement of verification and she complied by
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
filing on 20 February 2008 verified complaints with the Office of the Chief Justice and the OCA.
On 12 March 2008, Reyes filed for the third time another verified complaint with the OCA which
was a mere reiteration of her previous complaints. The OCA opined that the jurisdiction of the
Court at the time of the filing of the complaint was not lost by the mere fact that Judge Duque
had ceased to be in office during the pendency of the case. Thus, as recommended by the OCA,
the case was referred to a Court of Appeals’ Justice 3 for investigation, report and
recommendation per Resolution dated 6 August 2008.4
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Justice
On the charge of graft and corruption, Reyes presented photocopies of P1,000 bills to prove that
Judge Duque demanded and received money from her in consideration of a favorable ruling.
The Investigating Justice, however, found no compelling evidence to corroborate Reyes’
accusation as it was doubtful whether these were the same bills used to pay off Judge Duque. 5
On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, the Investigating Justice opined that the act
of Judge Duque in embracing and kissing Reyes, sucking her breasts and touching her most
intimate parts were certainly acts of lewdness that were downright obscene, detestable, and
unwelcome. These acts were established by substantial evidence. The Investigating Justice,
however, stated that Reyes’ description of the sexual assault could not be deemed as attempted
rape.6
The Investigating Justice found Judge Duque guilty of impropriety and gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended the imposition of fine
of P40,000 which should be deducted from the retirement benefits of Judge Duque.
Report of the Court Administrator
In his Memorandum,7 the Court Administrator 8 confirmed that Judge Duque compulsorily retired
from the judiciary on 21 February 2008. He opined that the conduct of Judge Duque bore the
marks of impropriety and immorality. The actions of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting
standards for members of the judiciary. Judge Duque failed to behave in a manner that would
promote confidence in the judiciary. The Court Administrator recommended that a P40,000 fine
be imposed on Judge Duque which should be deducted from his retirement benefits.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA for the
imposition of a fine of P40,000 on Judge Duque.
First, on the question of jurisdiction as Judge Duque is no longer a member of the judiciary
having retired from the service on 21 February 2008, the records show that Reyes filed four
similar complaints against Judge Duque. A complaint dated 18 January 2008 addressed to then
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and subscribed on 19 February 2008 was received by the OCA on
20 February 20089 and by the Office of the Chief Justice also on 20 February 2008, 10 or one day
before the date of retirement of Judge Duque. A similar complaint subscribed on 19 February
2008 was received by the OCA on 12 March 2008.11 An identical complaint addressed to the OCA
and subscribed on 23 January 2008 was filed and received by the OCA on 25 January 2008. 12 As
pointed out by the OCA, Judge Duque was “inadvertently sent” a copy of the complaint that was
filed and received on 12 March 2008. 13 The filing of similar and identical complaints on different
dates was due to the directive of the OCA requiring that the complaint be “verified” or that the
“original copy of the verified complaint” be filed. 14 Nonetheless, it is clear from the records that
Reyes filed her intended complaint before Judge Duque retired. Consequently, the Court no
doubt has jurisdiction over this administrative case.
On the charge of graft and corruption, the Investigating Justice and the OCA found insufficient
29
evidence to sustain Reyes’ allegation that Judge Duque demanded and received money from her
in consideration of a favorable ruling. Thus, this charge should be dismissed for being
unsubstantiated.
On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, and after a thorough investigation
conducted by the Investigating Justice, it was established, and Judge Duque admitted, that
Reyes went to his house. 15 Substantial evidence also pointed to Judge Duque’s liability for
impropriety and gross misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes.16 There is no need to detail
again the lewd acts of Judge Duque. The Investigating Justice’s narration was sufficient and
thorough. The Investigating Justice likewise observed that Judge Duque merely attempted to
destroy the credibility of Reyes when he insinuated that she could be a “woman of ill repute or a
high class prostitute” or one whose “moral value is at its lowest level.” However, no judge has a
right to solicit sexual favors from a party litigant even from a woman of loose morals. 17 In Tan v.
Pacuribot,18 this Court further stressed:
“We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be
beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday
lives. For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character
and are at all times expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public
decency. We have adhered to and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency,
which every member of the judiciary must observe. A magistrate is judged not only by his
official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are
externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral
integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.”
Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. 19
Judges should conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office.20 Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they should always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of
the judiciary.21
The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary.
He failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary. Considering
that a judge is a visible representation of the law and of justice, 22 he is naturally expected to be
the epitome of integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge Duque’s conduct indubitably
bore the marks of impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards of
the judiciary and even transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society. Had Judge Duque
not retired, his misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Manuel N. Duque GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and GROSS
MISCONDUCT. We FINE him P40,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Carpio-Morales, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr. and
Sereno, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion and Mendoza, JJ., On Official Leave.
Perez, J., No part; acted on the matter as Court Administrator.
Judge Manuel N. Duque meted with P40,000 fine for impropriety and gross misconduct.
Note.—The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same time both a criminal
act and an administrative offense, and whether the criminal case relates to an act committed
before or after he became a judge is of no moment, and neither is it material that an MTC judge
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
will be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. ( Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sardido ,
401 SCRA 583 [2003])
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270. January 31, 2011.*
[Formerly A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3380-RTJ]
ELADIO D. PERFECTO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO DESALES-
ESIDERA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Catarman, Northern
Samar, respondent.
Code of Judicial Conduct; Judges; Impropriety; Respondent’s act of proceeding to the
Prosecutor’s Office under the guise of soliciting for a religious cause betrays not only her lack of
maturity as a judge but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of
justice.—Respondent’s act of proceeding to the Prosecutor’s Office under the guise of soliciting
for a religious cause betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack of
understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice, held in high esteem and
respect by the local community, which must be preserved at all times. It spawns the impression
that she was using her office to unduly influence or pressure Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer
appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into donating money through her charismatic
group for religious purposes.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Impropriety and Unbecoming Conduct.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Eladio D. Perfecto (complainant), in a Complaint 1 which was received at the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on March 5, 2010, charges Judge Alma Consuelo Esidera (respondent),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Northern Samar, Branch 20, of soliciting
and receiving on January 6, 2010 at the Prosecutor’s Office the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) from practitioner Atty. Albert Yruma (Atty. Yruma), and the same amount from
Public Prosecutor Rosario Diaz (Prosecutor Diaz), purportedly to defray expenses for a religious
celebration and barangayfiesta. To prove her charge, complainant attached the Affidavit 2 dated
February 16, 2010 of Public Prosecutor Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching (Prosecutor Ching) who claimed
to have witnessed the first incident, without respondent issuing any receipt. In the same
Affidavit, Prosecutor Ching added that she “heard” that respondent also solicited the same
amount from Prosecutor Diaz.
Complainant also questions the conduct of respondent in Special Proceedings No.  C-360, “for
Cancellation of Birth Registration of Alpha Acibar,” in which she issued a January 5, 2010 Order
directing the therein petitioner to publish said Order in a newspaper of general circulation,
instead of in the Catarman Weekly Tribune (of which complainant is the publisher), the only
accredited newspaper in the province.
Furthermore, complainant charges respondent with acts of impropriety—scolding her staff in
open court and treating in an “inhuman and hostile” manner practitioners “who are not her
friends.” He adds that respondent even arrogantly treats public prosecutors assigned to her sala,
citing instances of this charge in his complaint.
To the first charge, respondent explains that when she went to the Prosecutor’s office, she was
merely following up the pledge of Adelaida Taldo, a member of a Catholic charismatic group of
which she (respondent) belongs, to donate a Sto. Niño image when Atty. Yruma, who had
received a solicitation letter countersigned by Father Alwin Legaspi, the parish priest of San
Jose, overheard her (respondent) and requested her to receive his donation of P1,000.00
30
through her.
Respondent brushes off the above-stated Affidavit of Prosecutor Ching who, she opines, is of
“dubious personality” and has a “narcissistic personality disorder,” the details of the bases of
which she narrates in her Comment.3
Respecting the complaint against her Order of publication, respondent claims that the Catarman
Weekly Tribune is “not in circulation.” Respondent echoes her Comment in A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-
3340-RTJ, a complaint previously filed by complainant bearing on his claim that all orders of the
court should be published in Catarman Weekly Tribune, in which Comment she listed pending
cases the hearing of which had to be reset for failure of the Catarman Weekly Tribune to publish
her orders on time.
As for the charge of impropriety, respondent denies the instances thereof cited by complainant
in his complaint and claims that she has been maintaining a professional relationship with her
staff and the lawyers who appear in her court.
The OCA has come up with the following:
“EVALUATION: There is merit in the allegation of impropriety against respondent Judge
Esidera.
xxxx
The fact that she is not the principal author of the solicitation letter or that the solicitation is for
a religious cause is immaterial. Respondent Judge Esidera should have known that going to the
Prosecutor’s Office to receive “donations” from a private lawyer and a public prosecutor does
not bode well for the image of the judiciary. Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC; date of effectivity: 1 June 2004) explicitly provides that
“judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.”
xxxx
Soliciting donations from lawyers is not the only act of impropriety from respondent Judge
Esidera. In a 27 May 2010 Comment, respondent Judge Esidera virtually gave Public Prosecutor
Atty. Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching a verbal lashing for the affidavit the latter executed relative to the
solicitation incident. To quote pertinent portions of the Comment of respondent Judge Esidera:
“The affidavit of Fiscal Ruth Arlene Ching should not be believed and accepted simply
because she is a fiscal. Not all prosecutors are credible and have integrity and are in possession
of their normal mental faculties. x x x Fiscal Ching is one whose personality is dubious.”
“I get the impression that she (Prosecutor Ching) is suffering from some sort of personality
disorder and should be subjected to neurological, psychiatric or psychological examination
before she gets worse x x x Having read enough psychological examination reports of
psychologists/psychiatrists submitted in annulment cases, it is my non-expert opinion that the
character of Fiscal Ching falls under the category of narcissistic personality disorder.”
“She was one of my students in Taxation in the UEP, College of Law, I was not a judge then. I
gave her a ‘3’ because when I checked her finals test booklet, her ‘codigo’ was still inserted in
the examination booklet. Until now, that is one of the gossips she is spreading around.”
xxxx
The use of acerbic words was uncalled for considering the status of respondent Judge Esidera.
In Atty. Guanzon, et al. v. Judge Rufon (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038; 19 October 2007), the Court
found respondent Judge Rufon guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct for uttering
discriminatory remarks against women lawyers and litigants.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
“Although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble
position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court.
Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in
language,” held the Court in the Guanzon case.
Anent the allegations of ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority against
respondent Judge Esidera, for issuing a directive to the petitioner in a special proceedings case
to cause the publication of her order in a newspaper of general publication, this Office finds the
same devoid of merit.
Complainant Perfecto had made a similar allegation in OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3340-RTJ,
insisting that all orders from the courts of Northern Samar should only be published in the
Catarman Weekly Tribune, the only accredited newspaper in the area.
xxxx
[T]hat Catarman Weekly Tribune is the only accredited newspaper of general publication in
Catarman does not bar the publication of judicial orders and notices in a newspaper of national
circulation. A judicial notice/order may be published in a newspaper of national circulation and
said newspaper does not even have to be accredited.
Section 1 of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC thus provides:
SECTION 1. Scope of application.—These Guidelines apply only in cases where judicial or legal
notices are to be published in newspapers or periodicals that are of general circulation in a
particular province or city.
Publication of notices for national dissemination may be published in newspapers or periodicals
with national circulation without need of accreditation.
Adopting the comments she made in OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3340-RTJ to the instant case, respondent
Judge Esidera claims that she only arrived at the decision to direct the publication of her orders
in a newspaper of national circulation after repeated failure of the Catarman Weekly Tribune to
meet the publication requirements in other pending cases in the court. Respondent Judge
Esidera even presented a list of cases where the hearings therein had to be reset because of the
failure of the Catarman Weekly Tribune to publish the pertinent orders on time.
Moreover, the petitioner in the subject special proceedings case where respondent Judge
Esidera issued the directive did not contest the order calling for the publication of the court’s
order in a newspaper of national circulation.”4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the OCA RECOMMENDS that respondent be faulted for Impropriety and Unbecoming
Conduct for which a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) should be imposed,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
While the Court finds the Evaluation and Recommendation of the OCA that respondent be
charged with Impropriety and Unbecoming Conduct to be well-taken, it deems the
recommendation for the imposition of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 to be insufficient as
would impress upon her the gravity of the indictment. Respondent’s improprieties as manifested
in, among other things, her lack of discretion and the vicious attack upon the person of
Prosecutor Ching as characterized by her use of uncalled for offensive language prompts this
Court to raise the fine to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).5
Specifically with respect to respondent’s alleged solicitation from Prosecutor Diaz, albeit
Prosecutor Ching merely claimed to have “heard” of it, respondent did not deny it categorically
as she merely, as reflected above, brushed off Prosecutor’s Ching’s Affidavit as coming from one
31
with a “dubious personality” and possessed of a “narcissistic personality disorder.” With respect
to the alleged solicitation from Prosecutor Diaz, respondent never disclaimed or disavowed the
same.
Respondent’s admission of having received the sum of P1,000.00 from Atty. Yruma—albeit
allegedly as a mere accommodation to the latter, and her failure to disclaim the same act with
respect to Prosecutor Diaz, only confirms her lack of understanding of the notion of propriety
under which judges must be measured.
In his Annotation on Judges Fraternizing with Lawyers and Litigants ,6 Jorge C. Coquia 7
commented on the Spirit and Philosophy of Canon 2 on Impropriety of Judges, viz.:
“In Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75 (1991), the Supreme Court said that the Code of
Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his official duties, but also to his behavior outside his
sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality. A public official is also judged
by his private morality being the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.” (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s act of proceeding to the Prosecutor’s Office under the guise of soliciting for a
religious cause betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack of understanding
of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice, held in high esteem and respect by the local
community, which must be preserved at all times. It spawns the impression that she was using
her office to unduly influence or pressure Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer appearing before her
sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into donating money through her charismatic group for religious
purposes.
To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate’s
activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesar’s wife—above suspicion and
beyond reproach.8 Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a
member of the judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his
activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and
circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the
courtroom is always under constant observation.9
WHEREFORE, Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera is, for Impropriety and Unbecoming
Conduct, ORDERED to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera meted with P10,000 fine for impropriety and unbecoming
conduct, with warning against repetition of similar act.
Note.—A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in
such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public
scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system. (Correa vs. Belen, 627 SCRA 13 [2010])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1802. September 21, 2004.*
J. KING & SONS COMPANY, INC., represented by its President, Richard L. King,
complainant, vs. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., Presiding Judge of RTC,
Branch 16, Cebu City, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; The trial judge’s, in this case, the investigating justice’s findings of
facts and assessment of the credibility of witnesses are accorded finality, exceptions .—It is a
wellentrenched rule that the trial judge’s, in this case, the investigating justice’s findings of facts
and assessment of the credibility of witnesses are accorded finality. However, such rule is not
without exceptions. Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. Among the
circumstances which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to reexamine the trial
court or appellate court’s findings of facts are, when the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of fact of the
trial court or appellate court is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record.
Same; Same; Being a trial judge, respondent is not expected to be careless enough to
document his extortion activities on paper .—In this case, complainant is quite fortunate to even
have two witnesses to corroborate each other. Verily, to require that there be any documentary
evidence or a paper trail of the commission of extortion would be quite absurd for, naturally,
respondent would not allow such incriminating evidence to exist. In Velez vs. Flores, we
observed that being a trial judge, respondent is not expected to be careless enough to
document his extortion activities on paper. Therefore, the King brothers’ testimonies cannot be
automatically disregarded simply because there is no additional evidence presented by
complainant.
Same; Same; Remedial Law; Motions; Although Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the court, for good cause, may set the hearing on shorter notice, the
rule is explicit that notice of the hearing cannot be altogether dispensed with. — Although
Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court, for good cause,
may set the hearing on shorter notice, the rule is explicit that notice of the hearing cannot be
altogether dispensed with. In this case, common knowledge dictates that it would be impossible
for a copy of the motion, mailed only on July 3, 2002, to be delivered by registered mail to
counsel for the plaintiff on or before July 5, 2002. Obviously, therefore, the plaintiff had no
notice whatsoever of the filing of the motion and the hearing date for the same.
Same; Same; Judges cannot be held to account or answer crimi-nally, civilly or administratively
for an erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in good faith, or in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption; When the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to
disciplinary action; Court finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the
three-day notice rule and failing to give therein complainant due notice and the opportunity to
be heard.—It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer
criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in
good faith, or in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption. However, it has also been held
that when the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary action. The principles
of due notice and hearing are so basic that respondent’s inability to accord a litigant their right
thereto cannot be excused. In this case, we believe that respondent’s actuations reek of malice
and bad faith. Thus, we find respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the
three-day notice rule and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the opportunity to be
heard on the matter as mandated by Section 12, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Same; Same; Respondent should know the basic requirements before approving a surety bond
32
or a judicial bond such as a counter-bond; Requirements for Accepting a Surety Bond as Bail .—
As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to exercise due
care in examining the supporting papers therefor. The respondent should know the basic
requirements before approving a surety bond or a judicial bond such as counter-bond. In
Mangalindan vs. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the requirements for accepting a
surety bond as bail. Since surety bail bonds are closely analogous to judicial bonds and counter-
bonds required for the issuance of writs of attachment or the lifting thereof, the respondent
should know that the requirements for acceptance of said surety bail bonds are the same for all
other bonds such as acceptance bonds or counter-bonds except the requirement for
photographs of the accused. Said requirements are: (1) affidavit of justification, including a
statement that the company has no pending obligation demandable and outstanding in any
amount to the Government or any of its agencies as of the last day of the month preceding the
date the bond is issued or posted; (2) Clearance from the Supreme Court, valid only for thirty
days from the date of issuance; (3) Certificate of compliance with the Circular from the Office of
the Insurance Commissioner; (4) Authority of the agent in case the bond is issued through a
branch office or through an agent; and (5) current certificate of authority issued by the
Insurance Commission with the financial statement showing the maximum underwriting capacity
of the company.
Same; Same; By entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits given by said litigant,
respondent miserably failed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct .—Respondent’s
defense that his wife offered to pay but the management of the karaoke bar did not allow her to
do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at said bar are quite clear that respondent’s wife
would sign the order slips, but no payment was ever given by respondent or his wife.
Respondent should have insisted on paying, especially considering that complainant has a total
of three cases pending before his court. Nothing on record shows that respondent even exerted
any effort to so insist. He appeared only too ready and willing to enjoy the facilities of
complainant’s karaoke for free. By entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits
given by said litigant, respondent miserably failed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Complainant is not guilty of forum shopping in filing a criminal
complaint against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas). —It cannot be said
that complainant is guilty of forum-shopping in filing a criminal complaint against respondent
before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas). We held in Bejarasco, Jr. vs. Judge Buenconsejo
that: . . . it is a settled rule that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the latter charges. As the disciplining
arm of the judiciary, it is the Court’s duty to investigate and determine the truth behind every
matter in complaints against judges and to mete the necessary penalties therefor.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the
Law or Procedure and Simple Misconduct.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Dennis Patrick Z. Perez for complainant.
     Purita Hontanosas-Cortes for respondent Judge.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a complaint filed by J. King & Sons Company, Inc., represented by its President,
Richard L. King, against Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Cebu
City (RTC for brevity).
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
Complainant alleges: It is the plaintiff in a case for Specific Performance with Damages with
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Attachment, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-27870, 1 pending
before the RTC presided over by respondent. On July 2, 2002, respondent issued an Order
granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment upon applicant’s filing of a bond in
the amount of P35,973,600.00. An urgent motion to discharge and lift writ of preliminary
attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent on July 5, 2002 and on the same
day, respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order dated July
5, 2002 was issued sans proper notice and hearing as required by section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent approved defendants’ counter-bond despite knowledge
that the bonding company’s Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net
retention of the bonding company had a deficiency of P22,541,463.69. At a meeting in his
house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants’ offer to pay P250,000.00 so that the
Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filed by
complainant. Respondent’s favorite hang-out is the karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel
owned by herein complainant, and he uses said facilities “gratis et amore.”
In compliance with the directive of the Court Administrator, respondent filed his Comment,
dated August 22, 2002, wherein he vehemently denies soliciting money from the King brothers.
He contends that complainant is merely a dissatisfied litigant which cannot accept an
unfavorable court ruling; and that the questioned orders relative to Civil Case No. CEB-27870
were issued by him in the exercise of lawful judicial discretion in accordance with the rules of
procedure, the evidence on record, and with the dictates of justice and equity.
Complainant then filed a Reply where it pointed out that respondent failed to squarely meet the
issues of the administrative complaint. It emphasized that there was actually no hearing on the
motion to lift the writ of attachment allegedly conducted on July 5, 2002.
Respondent filed a Supplemental Comment alleging that complainant has also filed a complaint
against him with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), attaching his counteraffidavit thereto.
He further claims that it is clear that Richard King and Atty. Renecio Espiritu sought another
forum to further expose him to public ridicule thru the print media and air waves thereby
eroding public trust and confidence of the people in the judiciary.
The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), had forwarded to this Court the complete records of
King vs. Hontanosas, pursuant to Section 23(2) of Republic Act No. 6670.
On September 8, 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the herein administrative matter
to Associate Justice Jose Reyes, Jr., Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Investigating Justice conducted hearings where complainant presented the testimonies of
witnesses, Richard L. King, Rafael L. King, and the waiters at complainant’s karaoke bar,
namely: Antonio Cabigon and Axel Reyes.
Richard King testified that he is the president of complainant corporation. He adopted the joint
affidavit executed by him together with Rafael King as part of his direct examination. In said
joint affidavit, Richard states as follows: He and Rafael are the President and Treasurer,
respectively, of J. King and Sons Co., Inc., the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-27870 pending
before herein respondent. On July 2, 2002, respondent issued the writ of preliminary attachment
against the defendants in the aforementioned case for specific performance. Thereafter,
respondent approved the counter-bond despite knowledge of the fact that the clearance was
valid only until June 28, 2002, the maximum net retention of the bonding company was only
P13,432,136.31, thus, causing a deficiency of P22,541,436.69. On July 5, 2002, respondent
lifted the writ of preliminary attachment without notice and hearing in violation of Rules 13 and
33
15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The calendar of cases of the court showed that the
motion to lift attachment filed by defendants in the subject case was not scheduled for hearing
on said date of July 5, 2002. The minutes presented by respondent showing that there was a
hearing held after 11 o’clock and before 12 o’clock of July 5, 2002, could be easily
manufactured. Previous to the aforementioned incidents, respondent had been a frequent visitor
of the corporation’s music lounge where respondent would entertain himself, his guests and
friends for free; Rafael King would entertain respondent when he visited said music lounge; on
July 5, 2002, Rafael received a telephone call from respondent, telling him to see him
(respondent) at his residence. Richard and Rafael King obliged but they were shocked when
respondent asked them to equal the defendants’ offer of P250,000.00 so he would reconsider
his order lifting the attachment. The King brothers told respondent they could not comply with
said demand since they are suffering a financial crisis. Thus, respondent denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by J. King & Sons Company, Inc. 2 Richard King further testified that they
filed a motion to inhibit respondent from further hearing the subject case and when said motion
was granted, the case was re-raffled to a new judge who then reinstated the writ of attachment
against the defendants in the subject case.
On cross-examination, Richard testified: Respondent and his brother, Rafael, are friends. At the
behest of respondent, he and his brother went to the house of respondent at around 7 or 8
o’clock in the evening. Due to the fact that Rafael and respondent were friends, respondent
frankly told Rafael that he (respondent) needed money and if Rafael could match the offer of
the opposing party and come up with P250,000.00, respondent would reverse his order lifting
the attachment upon complainant’s filing of a motion for reconsideration. Their conversation
lasted no more than twenty minutes and because Richard and Rafael were shocked by
respondent’s actuation, they immediately left respondent’s house. Richard King further pointed
out that he is a very busy businessman and by the filing of the present administrative case
against respondent, he has nothing to gain. 3
Witness Rafael King likewise adopted the joint affidavit he executed with his brother, Richard
King, as part of his direct testimony. Rafael further stated that respondent had been his friend
for 3 to 4 years and in that span of time, he had never asked for any favors from respondent
regarding cases of complainant corporation pending before the sala of respondent. Respondent
did not ask for money from him for the granting of the writ of attachment. However, after the
order lifting the attachment had been issued on July 5, 2002, at around 2 or 3 o’clock in the
afternoon, respondent called him up on the phone and asked him to go to his (respondent’s)
house. Since this was the first time that Rafael would go to respondent’s house, it was even
respondent who gave him (Rafael) directions on how to reach said house. Rafael denied
respondent’s claim that he was the one who called respondent’s son, Butch, to ask for a meeting
with him. Rafael admitted that he knows the wife of respondent since she often uses the music
lounge owned by complainant corporation. Before July 5, 2002, respondent had often called
Rafael on the phone to tell the latter that he and his family will use said music lounge. Upon the
Investigating Justice’s questioning, Rafael stated that they filed the present administrative case
against respondent because it was an injustice for respondent to demand money from them. 4
Antonio Cabigon and Axel Reyes, corroborated each other’s testimonies. They testified that: they
work as waiters at the karaoke bar owned by complainant and they often saw respondent and
his wife, sometimes also with some of their friends, at said bar; respondent and his wife did not
have to pay for the use of the facilities of said bar, per instruction of the bar’s management;
however, for record purposes, they would still give the bill or order slips to respondent for his
signature, but it was respondent’s wife who signed the same in their presence.
Respondent, on the other hand, testified as follows: A hearing on the defendants’ motion to lift
the preliminary attachment was actually held on July 5, 2002 between eleven o’clock in the
morning and twelve o’clock noon as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes taken during
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
said hearing. He held the hearing because the motion was urgent in nature, and he did it in the
spirit of equity and justice. Furthermore, he asked from counsel for defendants whether counsel
for complainant had been notified of the hearing and the former assured respondent that
counsel for complainant had been notified of the hearing. With regard to the claim that he
demanded P250,000.00 from the Kings, he denied ever calling Rafael King or demand any
money from the Kings; instead, it was Rafael King who called up his (respondent’s) son Butch
and asked that they be allowed to meet with him at his residence. While the Kings were at his
house, the Kings tried to bully him into reconsidering his Order dated July 5, 2002, but he told
them to just file a motion for reconsideration. Complainant filed the motion for reconsideration
but after hearing the same, he denied the motion in his Order dated July 17, 2002. He pointed
out that at the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, the defendants were able to present
a Certification from the Supreme Court that the authority of the bonding company was up to
August 3, and so he denied the Motion for Reconsideration. With regard to the claim that he
frequently used complainant’s karaoke bar without paying for said facilities, respondent insisted
that his wife offered to pay but the bar’s management would not allow her to pay. 5
On June 14, 2004, the Investigating Justice submitted his Investigation Report together with his
recommendation which reads as follows:
RECOMMENDATION:
The complaint may be divided into four (4) issues. First, would be the alleged demand for
P250,000.00 in exchange for a favorable action regarding complainant’s motion for
reconsideration. The second, the use of complainant’s karaoke bar at the Metropolis Hotel by
respondent and his family for free. The third, the alleged impropriety regarding the issuance of
the Order of July 5, 2002, and lastly, the sufficiency of the counterbond.
A. AS TO THE ALLEGED DEMAND FOR P250,000.00
The investigating justice finds that the same had not been sufficiently substantiated. Other than
the bare assertion of Rafael and Richard King there was no other evidence presented. Although
the visit of the King brothers to the house of respondent in the evening of July 5, 2002 is
admitted, this by itself would not prove that a demand for money was made.
However, the investigating justice finds that it was inappropriate for respondent to have
entertained a litigant in his home particularly when the case is still pending before his sala. As
held in De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison (355 SCRA 69 [2001]) patronizing with litigants tarnishes the
appearance of propriety, to wit:
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must also appear to be
impartial. Hence, the judge must, at all times, maintain the appearance of fairness and
impartiality. His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the
best of intentions be misconstrued. A judge’s conduct must be above reproach. Like Caesar’s
wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. A judge’s private as well as official
conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety and be beyond reproach.
Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. It was, thus, held that it is improper for a
judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the complainant. (at 89-90)
B. AS TO THE USE OF COMPLAINANT’S KARAOKE BAR AT THE METROPOLIS HOTEL
The investigating justice notes that this was not denied by respondent but interposes the
defense that during the time he used the bar, his friends would pay the bill (See: TSN, April 27,
2004, p. 29). He also claimed that at one time the owners of the karaoke bar would not allow
his wife to pay. He testified, thus:
Atty. Cortez:
34
Mr. Respondent, the complainant thru its witnesses Richard King and Rafael King have accused
you of taking advantage of the amenities in their karaoke joint and according to them you were
not charged, what can you say to this? Did you abuse?
 
Witness:
I did not. Because that is an open place. I went there together with my wife to entertain some
judge friends and then my wife was suppose to pay and the management did not allow my wife
to pay. (TSN, April 27, 2004, p. 20)
Although there is a question of whether or not respondent had used the facilities free of charge,
the investigating justice nevertheless finds that respondent judge should have not frequented
the place to prevent any appearance of impropriety considering that, as admitted by
respondent, there are at least three (3) cases filed by complainant which are pending before his
court. This is a violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Thus, it has been held time and again that the judges must avoid all appearances of
impropriety. In Calilung v. Suriaga (339 SCRA 340 [2000]), it was held:
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN
ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.
It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and the appearance must concur.
Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge
and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and occupying
an exalted position in the administration of justice. The irresponsible or improper conduct of a
judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. It is thus the duty of the members of the bench
to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court
judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with
the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should remain free
from any appearance of impropriety and should be beyond reproach.
Given the factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court does not hesitate to conclude
that respondent Judge tainted the image of the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the
obligation to keep it all times unsullied and worthy of the people’s trust. A judge should conduct
himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the
people for he is the visible representation of the law. (at 361-362)
C. AS TO THE ALLEGED IMPROPRIETY REGARDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF JULY 5,
2002
For clarity, the undisputed facts leading to the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction are
reiterated, thus: On July 2, 2002, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. On July 5, 2002
defendants filed an urgent motion to lift writ of preliminary injunction and on the same day an
order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction was issued.
...
Respondent on the other hand, countered in his testimony that he granted the motion to lift the
writ of preliminary attachment because he thought that it was the most equitable thing to
do . . .
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
The investigating justice is not persuaded by respondent’s explanation. As held in the case of
Peroxide Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals (199 SCRA 882 [1991]) before a writ of
attachment may be lifted, a hearing and an opportunity to oppose the motion should be given to
the attaching creditor, to wit:
Now, it is undeniable that when the attachment is challenged for having been illegally or
improperly issued, there must be a hearing with the burden of proof to sustain the writ of being
on the attaching creditor. That hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also
a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing parties and meet them. The right
to submit arguments implies that opportunity, otherwise the right would be a barren one. It
means a fair and open hearing. And, as provided by the aforecited Section 13 of Rule 57, the
attaching creditor should be allowed to oppose the application for the discharge of the
attachment by counter-affidavit or other evidence, in addition to that on which the attachment
was made. (at 890)
In the present administrative case, no opportunity was given to complainant to even oppose the
motion to lift attachment. Respondent failed to persuade the investigating justice of the alleged
urgency to grant the motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment as a justification for
granting the motion without a full-blown hearing. It may also be said that the July 5, 2002 Order
may have been too hastily issued considering the fact that a copy of the said motion was mailed
only on July 3, 2002 (Exhibit “5”). Hence, as argued by complainant, the motion could not have
been set for hearing earlier than July 6, 2002 without doing violence to the 3-day notice rule.
The respondent judge, having ignored settled jurisprudence, is GUILTY of gross ignorance of
law.
As held in Gozum v. Liangco (339 SCRA 253 [2001]):
When the law violated is elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. (at 259)
There could be nothing more basic under Philippine Law than the aforementioned 3-day notice
rule:
D. AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COUNTER-BOND
In this regard, complainant alleged that:
That there is no better evidence of the insufficiency of the counter-bond submitted and lack of
clearance from the Supreme Court on the date the counter-bond was approved on July 4, 2002
than the Certification of the Clerk of Court VII, Joeffrey S. Joaquino, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Cebu City, that the said counter-bond its (sic) Supreme Court Clearance was valid up to June 28,
2002. That its maximum net retention is only P13,432,136.31, but was issuing a counter-bond
worth P35,973,600.00 to answer for damages to petitioner. What is material was the date the
counter-bond was approved not any other date thereafter. (Rollo, pp. 15-16)
Respondent, upon the other hand, testified that he did not notice that the clearance had already
expired and that the bond was over the legal retention . . .
On this matter, the investigating justice finds that respondent judge was negligent. The
Indorsement issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Cebu dated July 5, 2002 contained the
following Information (Exhibit “F”).
a)The signature of the bonding officer is genuine as compared to his specimen signature on
file.
b)The company’s Supreme Court Clearance is valid until June 28, 2002.
c)The company’s Maximum Net Retention Per Subject of Insurance is only THIRTEEN
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX & 31/100
35
PESOS (P13,432,136.31), per its OIC Form No. 1 on file with this Office.
Had respondent carefully examined the aforesaid Indorsement it would have been immediately
apparent to him that the insurance company’s clearance had already expired and that the bond
issued exceeded its net retention. Because of this negligence, damage resulted to the litigant in
the case. The position of a judge is a sensitive one, he should have been more circumspect and
careful in his actions, granting that his actions may have been motivated with the desire to act
equitably.
“To recapitulate, the investigating justice finds that respondent judge is GUILTY of:
a).IMPROPER CONDUCT when he entertained the litigant in his residence as well as when he
used complainant’s karaoke bar;
b).GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW when he failed to hold a hearing regarding the lifting of the
writ of preliminary attachment as mandated in the case of Peroxide Philippines Corporation v.
Court of Appeals (supra) as well as when he heard the motion to lift the writ of preliminary
attachment in violation of the 3-day notice rule; and
c).NEGLIGENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY when he approved the patently
defective counter-bond.
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent judge
be SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay and be issued a warning that a more severe
penalty shall be imposed in case of another infraction.”6
We do not fully agree with the evaluation and recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
On the alleged demand for P250,000.00.
The Investigating Justice finds that the charges of extortion had not been sufficiently
substantiated because “other than the bare assertions of Rafael and Richard King there was no
other evidence presented.” The following questions come to mind. May we, considering that we
are not a trier of facts, review the assessment of the credibility of witnesses? Should the
testimonies of both Rafael and Richard King be automatically disregarded simply because there
is no other evidence presented by complainant? May the testimonies of such witnesses suffice to
establish the guilt of respondent?
It is a well-entrenched rule that the trial judge’s, in this case, the investigating justice’s findings
of facts and assessment of the credibility of witnesses are accorded finality. However, such rule
is not without exceptions. Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some
fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. 7 Among
the circumstances which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to reexamine the
trial court or appellate court’s findings of facts are, when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of
fact of the trial court or appel-late court is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record.8
In the present case, we find that such circumstances exist to make this case come under those
aforementioned exceptions. A re-assessment of the Investigating Justice’s ruling on the
sufficiency of evidence against respondent is warranted. We find that the Investigating Justice’s
inference that the evidence on record is insufficient to hold respondent liable is erroneous, a
patent mistake. The Investigating Justice seriously overlooked the fact that to require the King
brothers to present evidence other than their corroborating testimonies that respondent made
such a demand would be unrealistic. Human experience tells us that extortion would be done in
utmost secrecy, minimizing possible witnesses. Hence, respondent required the King brothers to
meet him at his house, where everything would be under his control. In this case, complainant
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
is quite fortunate to even have two witnesses to corroborate each other. Verily, to require that
there be any documentary evidence or a paper trail of the commission of extortion would be
quite absurd for, naturally, respondent would not allow such incriminating evidence to exist. In
Velez vs. Flores,9 we observed that being a trial judge, respondent is not expected to be careless
enough to document his extortion activities on paper. Therefore, the King brothers’ testimonies
cannot be automatically disregarded simply because there is no additional evidence presented
by complainant.
It should be noted that the Investigating Justice did not categorically state that the King
brothers are not credible witnesses or that their testimonies are not worthy of belief. Thus, we
closely examined the testimonies of Richard and Rafael King and found the same to be very
candid, forthright, unwavering, and bereft of any material or significant inconsistencies.
Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by Richard King, they actually have nothing to gain from the
filing of the present administrative case. If anything, their having to appear at the hearings of
this case was even a burden, as they had to squeeze in such hearings into their already busy
schedules. They even had to travel from Cebu City, where they reside, to Manila just to give
their testimonies before the Investigating Justice. Moreover, respondent failed to present
evidence that Richard and Rafael King had any ill motives in leveling such grave accusations of
extortion against him. Furthermore, respondent’s admission that he did entertain the King
brothers at his home bolsters the credibility of their averment that he demanded P250,000.00
from them for a favorable ruling on the motion for reconsideration that they would file. Thus, we
find the King brothers’ testimonies to be entitled to full faith and credit and sufficient proof that
respondent demanded P250,000.00 in exchange for a ruling in their favor.
In Avancena vs. Liwanag,10 we considered the mere testimony of complainant that respondent
judge therein was demanding P1,000,000.00 for a favorable judgment in her favor and the
testimony of an NBI agent that they tried to entrap respondent therein but their operation was
unsuccessful, as sufficient evidence to find respondent therein guilty of extortion. Imposing the
penalty of dismissal on respondent therein, we held that:
. . . in the instant proceeding, respondent is being held to account for serious misconduct or
malfeasance in office in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The quantum of proof required to establish re-spondent’s misconduct
in the administrative complaint is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence,
which is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
Again, in Office of the Court Administrator vs. Morante,11 we emphasized that:
. . . in administrative proceedings only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction, is required.
Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, as the standard of integrity
demanded of members of the Bench is not satisfied which merely allows one to escape the
penalties of criminal law.
In Villaros vs. Orpiano,12 we found the testimony of complainant therein and his mother that
respondent Stenographer and Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, Branch 32, had solicited P1,500.00 from them, as sufficient evidence to hold him guilty of
improper solicitation, and held thus:
The Court finds the respondent administratively liable for improper solicitation and thus imposes
the penalty prescribed by prevailing rules and jurisprudence, which is dismissal from service on
the first offense.
Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved
36
in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a
heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times
in order to merit and maintain the public’s respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say,
all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and
uprightness.
The respondent’s act of demanding money from the complain-ant hardly meets the foregoing
standard. Improper solicitation from litigants is a grave offense that carries an equally grave
penalty.
In the present case, we likewise hold that the credible testimonies of the King brothers meet the
required quantum of evidence which justifies our conclusion that respondent indeed demanded
P250,000.00 from them. Such conduct is a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01,
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provide that:
Canon 1—A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary
Rule 1.01.—A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
Canon 2—A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities
Rule 2.01.—A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
On the Investigating Justice’s finding of gross
ignorance of the law for not holding a full
blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment
and for violating the three-day notice rule.
We agree with the Investigating Justice’s finding that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating the
three-day notice rule.
Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion.—. . .
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served
in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the
date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
A perusal of the motion to lift attachment shows that a copy of the same was mailed to
plaintiff’s counsel only on July 3, 2002. The court’s receiving stamp showed that said motion was
filed in court only at 11:02 in the morning of July 5, 2002, despite the fact that the notice of
hearing for said motion stated that said motion would be set for hearing at 8:30 in the morning
of July 5, 2002. The proximity of the date of mailing of the copy of the motion to the other party
and the hearing date indicated in the notice of hearing clearly shows that it is impossible for the
other party to receive said motion at least three days before the date of hearing. Evidently, the
party filing the motion to lift attachment had already violated the three-day notice rule. Such
circumstances should have already warned respondent that plaintiff in the subject case had not
yet been apprised of the filing of such a motion, much less the holding of a hearing for said
motion. Yet, despite said patent defects in the motion, respondent consented to hold a hearing
on the motion at 11:20 of the very same morning of July 5, 2002. Although Section 4, Rule 15
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court, for good cause, may set the
hearing on shorter notice, the rule is explicit that notice of the hearing cannot be altogether
dispensed with. In this case, common knowledge dictates that it would be impossible for a copy
of the motion, mailed only on July 3, 2002, to be delivered by registered mail to counsel for the
plaintiff on or before July 5, 2002. Obviously, therefore, the plaintiff had no notice whatsoever of
the filing of the motion and the hearing date for the same.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
Section 12, Rule 5713 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, also provides that the court shall,
after due notice and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if the movant makes a cash
deposit, or files a counter-bond executed to the attaching party with the clerk of the court
where the application is made, in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of
attachment. Although it is true that respondent was able to present a transcript of stenographic
notes14 to prove that a hearing on the motion to lift attachment was conducted on July 5, 2002,
the same only highlighted the fact that respondent failed to give herein complainant, the plaintiff
and attaching party in subject case, due notice and the opportunity to be heard , as mandated
by the aforementioned rule. The transcripts of stenographic notes of July 5, 2002, in fact shows
that respondent already had strong suspicions that the plaintiff had not yet been notified of the
filing of the motion when he propounded the following questions to the counsel of defendants in
the subject case, to wit:
COURT:
Where is the proof that the counsel for the plaintiff received this?
 
ATTY. SENO:
It was mailed, Your Honor. Our basis that he received this is the registry receipt which is the
proof of mailing, and there is an explanation why no personal service could be made because of
time constrained (sic), Your Honor. As we can recall, we filed our Answer last July 3, Your
Honor, and it was about that time that we received the summons and it was also about that
time that we filed this motion, Your Honor. At any rate, this is only a counterbond which is a
mere ministerial procedure. It is just a matter of paying the surety of the counterbond and to
submit it to the Honorable Court to prove that there is already a bond which may answer for any
loss that the plaintiffs may suffer.
 
COURT:
But are you sure that Atty. Navarro was aware of that?
 
ATTY. SENO:
Yes, because we met him, Your Honor. He had a case here and we met at the hallway. Before
he left, I told him that I filed a motion and he was furnished a copy through mail, Your Honor.
 
COURT:
You should have let him signed (sic) this pleading here as a copy furnished, since you were
already talking to him at that time.
 
ATTY. SENO:
Yes, Your Honor, precisely there is an explanation why no personal service could be had. Under
the rules, if no personal service could be had, then it should be mailed by registered mail. But
there is already an explanation why no personal service could be made and we believe that is
already sufficient, Your Honor.
 
COURT:
Because this is a very urgent motion and considering that the counsel for the plaintiffs was
around, you should have furnished him a copy and let him sign to prove that he received a
copy. At that time, was he willing to receive the copy? Perhaps, he was not willing to receive a
copy.
 
ATTY. SENO:
No, no, we had a talk, Your Honor. He may not be willing to receive the copy at that time, but
we have mailed to him already a copy and we believe that it is already suffice (sic), Your Honor.
 
37
COURT:
But it was easy for you to serve him a copy personally. Why do you have to mail it, when you
could have serve (sic) it to him personally?
 
ATTY. SENO:
No, because my office, Your Honor, is in Mandaue City. The office of Atty. Navarro is in Capitol
and its so hard to travel from Mandaue to Capitol in just a matter of 30 minutes especially
during school days, Your Honor. As a matter of fact, we can even file an ex-parte motion, Your
Honor.
 
COURT:
Anyway, the incident is now considered submitted for resolution.
Despite such misgivings on the lack of due notice on counsel for plaintiff in subject case,
respondent still conducted an exparte hearing on the motion and hastily considered the same
submitted for resolution and on the very same day of July 5, 2002, respondent approved the
counter-bond. Complainant is not quite accurate in stating that respondent approved said
counter-bond on July 4, 2002. The stamp of approval of the bond was affixed onto the bond
without any date thereof. The date of execution by the President of the bonding company was
July 4, 2002; but this does not mean that respondent also approved said counter-bond on the
same date of July 4, 2002. The Indorsement of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City was dated July 5, 2002, thus, respondent could not have received subject counter-
bond any earlier than the date of said indorsement.
Just the same, respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on the
motion to lift attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in considering the same
submitted for resolution, and in issuing the order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment and
approving the counter-bond, all on the same day of July 5, 2002, without giving complainant the
opportunity to be heard on the matter. We agree with the Investigating Justice that re-
spondent’s defense that he immediately heard the motion even in the absence of counsel for the
other party because of the urgency of the lifting of the attachment, is not persuasive. The
transcripts of stenographic notes for the hearing on July 5, 2002 shows that counsel for
defendants in subject case presented no argument whatsoever showing the urgency of the
motion.
It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in good faith, or in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption. 15 However, it has also been held that when the law
violated is elementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary action. 16 The principles of due notice and
hearing are so basic that respondent’s inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be
excused. In this case, we believe that respondent’s actuations reek of malice and bad faith.
Thus, we find respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice
rule and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the opportunity to be heard on the
matter as mandated by Section 12, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On respondent’s negligence
in the performance of his duty
As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to exercise due
care in examining the supporting papers therefor. The respondent should know the basic
requirements before approving a surety bond or a judicial bond such as counter-bond. In
Mangalindan vs. Court of Appeals, 17 the Court enumerated the requirements for accepting a
surety bond as bail. Since surety bail bonds are closely analogous to judicial bonds and counter-
bonds required for the issuance of writs of attachment or the lifting thereof, the respondent
should know that the requirements for acceptance of said surety bail bonds are the same for all
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
other bonds such as acceptance bonds or counter-bonds except the requirement for
photographs of the accused. Said requirements are: (1) affidavit of justification, including a
statement that the company has no pending obligation demandable and outstanding in any
amount to the Government or any of its agencies as of the last day of the month preceding the
date the bond is issued or posted; (2) Clearance from the Supreme Court, valid only for thirty
days from the date of issuance; (3) Certificate of compliance with the Circular from the Office of
the Insurance Commissioner; (4) Authority of the agent in case the bond is issued through a
branch office or through an agent; and (5) current certificate of authority issued by the
Insurance Commission with the financial statement showing the maximum underwriting capacity
of the company.18 The Court imposed these requirements for very good reason, and that is, to
ensure that the bonding company has the capacity to pay whatever liability it may have under
the bond it issued. The bonding company’s ability to pay is all too important in this case where
the counter-bond it issued is supposed to answer for whatever amount may ultimately be
adjudged in favor of the party who applied for the writ of attachment. It is, therefore,
indispensable for a judge to review these documents before he approves the bond.
Notably, among the requisites for the bond to be acceptable are a clearance from the Supreme
Court and the current certificate of authority showing the maximum underwriting capacity of the
company.
The Clerk of Court’s Indorsement dated July 5, 2002, clearly showed that the bonding
company’s Supreme Court Clearance was valid only until June 28, 2002, and its Maximum Net
Retention is only P13,432,136.31. A simple perusal thereof would have alerted respondent that
at the time the counter-bond was submitted to him for approval on July 5, 2002, the bonding
company did not have enough properties to answer for the counter-bond it issued in the amount
of P35,973,600.00. Thus, we agree with the Investigating Justice that respondent acted
negligently in approving the counterbond.
On respondent’s improper conduct in
entertaining litigants at his home and
using litigant’s karaoke bar for free.
It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home and to frequent
the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free. Respondent thereby
received benefits from a litigant appearing in his court. Respondent’s defense that his wife
offered to pay but the management of the karaoke bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The
testimonies of the waiters at said bar are quite clear that respondent’s wife would sign the order
slips, but no payment was ever given by respondent or his wife. Respondent should have
insisted on paying, especially considering that complainant has a total of three cases pending
before his court. Nothing on record shows that respondent even exerted any effort to so insist.
He appeared only too ready and willing to enjoy the facilities of complainant’s karaoke for free.
In Cañeda vs. Alaan,19 we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their
conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondent’s] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from
any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create
an impression of indecorum.
. . .      . . .      . . .
38
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
“A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one
has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely
venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in
the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He
must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach.” (Emphasis supplied),
By entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits given by said litigant, respondent
miserably failed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct.
A judge must assiduously protect the image of his exalted office as we have previously
emphasized in Spouses Makadaya Sadik and Usodan Sadik vs. Judge Abdallah Casar, 20 to wit:
It must be borne in mind that courts exist to dispense and to promote justice. However, the
reality of justice depends, above all, on the intellectual, moral and personal quality of the men
and women who are called to serve as our judges. In a piece written by Rosenberg, this point
was emphasized, thus:
Justice is an alloy of men and mechanisms in which, as Roscoe Pound remarked, “men count
more than machinery.” Assume the clearest rules, the most enlightened procedures, the most
sophisticated court techniques; the key factor is still the judge. In the long run, “There is no
guarantee of justice except the personality of the judge.” The reason the judge makes or breaks
the system of justice is that rules are not selfdeclaring or self-applying. Even in a government of
laws, men make the decisions.
In the recent case of Jocelyn Talens-Dabon v. Judge Hermin E. Arceo , the Court emphasized the
importance of the role played by judges in the judicial system, thus:
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but
also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system
have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice
but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served.
Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges
and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the
law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable
moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured
that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence
in the judicial system.
Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for judicial office
reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the damage that can be done to
the legal order by judicial corruption. The rationale for this was succinctly put by Jones, thus:
If a physician or a professor or a businessman is discovered to be a thief or an influence
peddler, the disclosure will not put medicine, higher education, or business into general
disrepute. But judges are different and more representative; revelations of judicial corruption
create suspicion and loss of confidence in legal processes generally and endanger public respect
for law.
Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of exceptional integrity and honesty.
The special urgency for requiring these qualities in a judge is not hard to understand for the
judge acts directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his countrymen. Hence, being in a
position of such grave responsibility in the administration of justice, a judge must conduct
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office. 21
Finally, it cannot be said that complainant is guilty of forum-shopping in filing a criminal
complaint against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas). We held in
Bejarasco, Jr. vs. Judge Buenconsejo22 that:
. . . it is a settled rule that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the latter charges. As the disciplining
arm of the judiciary, it is the Court’s duty to investigate and determine the truth behind every
matter in complaints against judges and to mete the necessary penalties therefor.
In sum, we find respondent guilty of the serious charges of two counts of Gross Misconduct in
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under
Section 8(3) of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, for
demanding P250,000.00 from complainant and using complainant’s karaoke bar and entertaining
litigants at his home. Respondent is likewise guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure
under Section 8(9) Rule 140 of the same Rules for failing to accord complainant the due notice
and hearing it was entitled to under the rules. Lastly, respondent is guilty of the less serious
charge of Simple Misconduct under Section 9(7), also under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, for his negligence in approving the subject counter-bond.
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized
as follows:
Sec. 11. Sanctions.—A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits.
2.Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3.A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
while Section 11(B) of said Rule, dealing with sanctions that may be imposed on the
respondent found guilty of less serious charges, provide thus:
39
administrative case against him, justifies the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the
service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of two
counts of Gross Misconduct, one count of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure, and, Simple
Misconduct. He is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except as to
accrued leave credits and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge is further ordered to cease and
desist from discharging the functions of his Office upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy
hereof be entered in the personnel records of respondent.
Further, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on October 1, 2002,
respondent is required to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be
disbarred from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
     Chico-Nazario, J., On Leave.
Respondent judge dismissed from the service for gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law
or procedure and simple misconduct, with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment in the
government service.
Note.—A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules. (Dayawon vs. Badilla, 339 SCRA 702 [2000])

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) or more
than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

Consequently, we find the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent be
suspended for only three (3) months without pay to be inappropriate.

We note further that respondent had been previously administratively sanctioned in City
Government of Tagbilaran vs. Judge Hontanosas, Jr. 23 for violating Circular No. 4 issued on
August 27, 1980, enjoining judges of inferior courts from playing in or being present in gambling
casinos. Thus, the fact that respondent is guilty of three counts of serious offenses, i.e., two
counts of Gross Misconduct and one count Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure, and also of
one count of Simple Misconduct, further aggravated by the finding of guilt in a previous
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1501. March 14, 2005.*
(Formerly O.C.A. I.P.I. No. 02-1261-MTJ)
JAIME LIM CO, complainant, vs. JUDGE RUBEN R. PLATA, MTCC, BRANCH 1, SANTIAGO
CITY, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Bails; There should be a hearing before granting bail, whether bail
was a matter of right or discretion and the Judge should notify the prosecutor of the date of the
hearing or require the prosecutor to submit his recommendation .—The rights of the accused
Villacerans to bail and to the reduction thereof to a reasonable amount were not questioned
herein; rather, at issue was the manner the reduction of the bail was granted. In the cases of
Te v. Perez and Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas, referred to by the OCA in its Memorandum, dated 12
October 2004, this Court held that there should be a hearing before granting bail, whether bail
was a matter of right or discretion; and the Judge should notify the prosecutor of the date of
the hearing or require the prosecutor to submit his recommendation.
Same; Same; Evidence on the issue of gross misconduct weighs heavily in favor of the
innocence of the respondent Judge .—Evidence on the issue of gross misconduct weighs heavily
in favor of the innocence of the respondent Judge. The respondent Judge’s version of the events
that transpired on 07 March 2002 was corroborated by a greater number of witnesses whose
characters were not put into question. They generally appeared to be disinterested parties to
the case with no reason or motive to protect respondent Judge. Respondent Judge was also
able to present documentary evidence to further support the affidavits and oral testimonies of
his witnesses.
Same; Same; A judge must freely and willingly impose upon himself certain restrictions on
which might be viewed as burdensome on an ordinary citizen because he must conduct himself
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of his judicial office .—Although respondent Judge
cannot be enjoined from sharing jokes, he must be more prudent in this regard. As a Judge,
respondent herein is the subject of constant scrutiny. He must freely and willingly impose upon
himself certain restrictions, which might be viewed as burdensome on an ordinary citizen,
because he must conduct himself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of his judicial
office.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Partiality, Serious Misconduct and
Inefficiency in Office.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Jaime Lim Co filed before this Court a Complaint,1 dated 13 May 2002, against Hon. Ruben R.
Plata, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1 of Santiago
City, Isabela, for gross partiality, serious misconduct, and inefficiency in office. Respondent
Judge filed his Comment2 and Additional Comment3 on the said Complaint, dated 11 September
2002 and 2 April 2003, respectively.
On 09 July 2003, this Court resolved to re-docket the case as a regular administrative matter 4
and to refer the administrative matter to Executive Judge Fe Albano Madrid of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela, for investigation, report, and recommendation. 5 Counsel
for the respondent Judge, Atty. Emerito Agcaoili, however, moved for the inhibition of Executive
Judge Madrid from hearing the administrative matter since she was supposedly a bosom friend
of Eva T. Co, the wife of complainant Co. 6 Executive Judge Madrid decided to grant the motion
and inhibit herself because she believed that it would be hard to dispel the suspicion that she
might be prejudiced against the respondent Judge just because his counsel, Atty. Agcaoili, filed
40
a previous administrative case against her. 7 Thus, this Court designated Executive Judge
Bonifacio T. Ong of RTC, Branch 24 of Echague, Isabela, to investigate the administrative matter
in place of Executive Judge Madrid.8
In his Report,9 dated 19 May 2004, the investigating Judge made the following findings and
recommendations on the administrative matter: (1) respondent Judge was guilty of negligence
rather than partiality, and should be meted a fine of P1,000; (2) respondent Judge was culpable
of simple misconduct, instead of gross misconduct, and should pay a fine of P1,000; and (3) the
charge of inefficiency against respondent Judge should be dismissed for lack of merit.
After reviewing the Report of the investigating Judge, dated 19 May 2004, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) made its own findings and recommendations in its Memorandum, 10
dated 12 October 2004, summarized as follows: (1) adopting the recommendation of the
investigating Judge that respondent Judge was not guilty of partiality, but of simple negligence,
and imposing the penalty of censure; (2) finding that although respondent Judge was not guilty
of gross misconduct, he still failed to avoid the appearance of impropriety, for which he should
be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely;
and (3) dismissing the charge of inefficiency in office for lack of merit.
I The Charge of Gross Partiality
Complainant Co was the private offended party in Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211,
filed against spouses Milagros and Jose Villaceran, respectively, for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The accused Villacerans, in the said
criminal cases, allegedly issued separately two postdated checks, each for the amount of
P1,000,000, payable to complainant Co, which were subsequently dishonored by the drawee
banks.
The two criminal cases were raffled to Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, presided over by the
respondent Judge. Respondent Judge issued a Warrant of Arrest for the accused Villacerans and
fixed their bail at P100,000 each, as recommended by the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Before the warrant of arrest could be served upon them, the accused Villacerans voluntarily
appeared before the respondent Judge and separately filed Applications for Bail. Respondent
Judge granted bail to the accused Villacerans in the reduced amount of P50,000 each. By virtue
of the property bonds posted by the accused Villacerans, respondent Judge recalled the Warrant
of Arrest issued against them.
Complainant Co charged respondent Judge with gross partiality by pointing out the following
irregularities in the Applications for Bail filed by the accused Villacerans, and the grant thereof
by the respondent Judge, which allegedly demonstrated respondent Judge’s gross partiality for
the said accused:
1.The Applications for Bail failed to state the amount of bail applied for and the exact date of
application.
2.A duplicate of the Application for Bail of accused Milagros Villaceran was signed by
respondent Judge himself.
3.The Applications for Bail were not properly received by the Santiago City MTCC Br. I.
4.Respondent Judge signed an undated Order, reducing the amount of bail from the original
amount of P100,000 each to P50,000 each, even though the accused Villacerans did not file
any Application to Reduce Bail.
5.The Order signed by the respondent Judge for the recall of the Warrant of Arrest for the
accused Villacerans again failed to state important information such as the values of the
property bonds posted, and the time and date of approval of the said property
bonds.According to complainant Co, respondent Judge purposely left blank the values of the
property bonds in the above-mentioned documents because he was aware of the
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
insufficiency of the property bonds posted by the accused Villacerans. The property bonds
posted by the accused Villacerans, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No.
263647 and No. 264847, had assessed values of only P6,200 and P6,900, respectively. The
values of the said property bonds failed to comply even with the reduced amount of bail,
fixed by respondent Judge himself, at P50,000 for each of the accused.
6.Only upon the insistence of complainant Co did respondent Judge order the accused
Villacerans to post additional bail bonds. The accused Villacerans complied with the order by
posting Surety Bonds No. 25746 and No. 25747, dated 20 June 2000, in the amount of
P40,000 each, and issued by Wellington Insurance Company, Inc. (WICI). Said surety bonds,
however, were good for only one year. During the joint hearing conducted on 06 December
2001 of Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211, the private prosecutor, Atty. Dionisio E.
Bala, Jr., informed the respondent Judge that the said surety bonds had already expired. He
also questioned the present standing of WICI as a bonding company duly accredited by the
Supreme Court, considering that the certification submitted before the Santiago City MTCC
Br. I was dated 1999. Atty. Bala thus requested the respondent Judge to order the arrest of
the accused Villacerans until they were able to post new bonds. Respondent Judge refused to
order the arrest of the accused Villacerans and merely said that, “[t]he Court will look into
that.”
7.Complainant Co observed that accused Milagros Villaceran would often go in and out of the
respondent Judge’s chambers before and after court hearing.
Convinced that the respondent Judge was biased and sympathetic to the accused Villacerans,
complainant Co filed a motion 11 for the respondent Judge to inhibit himself from Criminal Cases
No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211. In his Order, 12 dated 21 February 2002, the respondent Judge
granted complainant Co’s Motion to Inhibit “[s]o as not to erode the public’s faith in the
capability of the Court to render fair and impartial justice without the element of suspicion or
bias.”
Despite having inhibited himself from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211, respondent
Judge maintained that he had not been partial and biased in favor of the accused Villacerans to
the detriment of complainant Co, who was the private offended party in the said criminal cases.
According to the respondent Judge, the accused Villacerans appeared at the Santiago City,
MTCC, Br. I, before the Warrant of Arrest could be served upon them. The accused Villacerans
manifested that they came to learn about the criminal cases filed against them and they wanted
to post bail.
The accused Villacerans pleaded with the respondent Judge for the reduction of the amount of
bail bond, which respondent Judge approved. The bail bond for each of the accused was
originally fixed at P100,000. Respondent Judge agreed to reduce the bail bond to P50,000 each.
Since the accused Villacerans did not have enough cash, they instead offered two pieces of their
real property, located in the Municipality of Echague, Isabela, as property bonds.
Respondent Judge asked the accused Villacerans to file Applications for Bail so that he could act
on them officially. When the accused Villacerans informed him that they did not yet have a
lawyer, respondent Judge instructed them to request for the usual form of an Application for
Bail from his own staff. The accused Villacerans, however, prevailed upon respondent Judge’s
staff to do more than just provide the required form, but also to help the accused Villacerans
prepare their Applications for Bail, the Property Bond Form, and other supporting documents.
The respondent Judge’s staff immediately submitted the prepared documents to respondent
Judge for his signature.
Addressing the alleged irregularities in the Applications for Bail of the accused Villacerans and
his grant thereof, respondent Judge explained in his Comment, dated 11 September 2002, that:
41
1.10. Upon verifying that the accused have accomplished all the necessary documents in
relation to their property bond and have submitted the originals of the Transfer Certificate
of Title to their properties, Judge Plata approved the bail for property bond at P50,000.00
each.
a.Judge Plata then signed the order for the recall of their warrant of arrest and accordingly
returned the papers to his staff for further processing and promulgation, as it is the usual
job of the clerical staff.
b.Judge Plata was not aware that one of the papers that he had signed was one of the
applications for bail of Milagros Villaceran until he received a copy of the complaint of Mr.
Jaime Lim Co.
c.Judge Plata was likewise not aware that his staff failed to completely fill up all the
necessary data in the forms in accordance with his instructions prior to filing them.
d.Judge Plata had to contend with the volume of work as presiding/executive judge of
MTCC Br. 1 and Br. 2 of Santiago City and that of the MTC Cordon, Isabela. 13
This Court upholds the findings of both the investigating Judge and the OCA that the above-
stated facts demonstrated the negligence of the respondent Judge rather than his gross
partiality.
As stated in the OCA Memorandum, dated 12 October 2004:
We find that respondent Judge was remiss in scrutinizing the documents which he signed. We
agree with the investigating Judge’s observation that respondent was negligent in this aspect.
That his signature above the printed name of the accused was made inadvertently is credible as
it would be the height of folly if he deliberately signed the bail for and in behalf of the accused. 14
Given that the documents herein had been prepared by his staff, respondent Judge had the
responsibility of reviewing the said documents when submitted to him, before affixing his
signature thereon. Respondent Judge’s signature carried a lot of weight and could turn an
ordinary piece of paper into an official act of the court, thus, he should have checked, and if
necessary, double-checked, whether the forms were properly filled-out and the information
therein were correct, in order to avoid similar controversies in the future.
Respondent Judge defended his decision to reduce the bail bond from P100,000 to P50,000 for
each of the accused Villacerans as a legitimate exercise of his judicial discretion. According to
respondent Judge, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, allowed the reduction of the
amount of bail upon certain overriding considerations, i.e., (a) financial ability of the accused to
give bail; (b) nature and circumstance of the offense; (c) penalty of the offense charged; and
(d) character and reputation of the accused.
Respondent Judge also invoked paragraph 2(o) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No.
89, dated 29 August 2000, otherwise known as The 2000 Bail Bond Guide, which stated that:
For violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, bail shall be P2,000.00 for the first P40,000.00 face
value of the check and an additional P1,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P40,000.00,
but bail shall not exceed P30,000.00.
The two checks involved in Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211, allegedly issued by the
accused Villacerans, each had a face value of P1,000,000. Respondent Judge argued that the
reduced amount of bail bond, amounting to P50,000 for each of the accused Villacerans, was
still substantial, considering that he could have further reduced the said amount to P30,000, as
provided under The 2000 Bail Bond Guide.
Worth reiterating herein is the finding of the OCA, in its Memorandum, dated 12 October 2004,
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
which reads as follows—
As reported by the Investigating Judge, respondent was negligent in reducing motu proprio the
bail recommended by the public prosecutor not because the accused are not entitled to it but
because respondent failed to comply with the time tested safeguard against arbitrariness. As
held in AM No. MTJ-00-1286 (21 January 2002), “[I]n all cases, whether bail is a matter of right
or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation.”
Respondent’s infraction is procedural in nature, that is, reducing the bail without the benefit of
hearing. The court in AM No. RTJ-03-1767, 3-28-03 enunciated that under the present rules, a
hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion . . . 15
The rights of the accused Villacerans to bail and to the reduction thereof to a reasonable
amount were not questioned herein; rather, at issue was the manner the reduction of the bail
was granted. In the cases of Te v. Perez16 and Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas,17 referred to by the OCA
in its Memorandum, dated 12 October 2004, this Court held that there should be a hearing
before granting bail, whether bail was a matter of right or discretion; and the Judge should
notify the prosecutor of the date of the hearing or require the prosecutor to submit his
recommendation.
Such procedural requirements were laid down by jurisprudence precisely to avoid accusations of
arbitrariness against the Judges in fixing the amount of the bail for the accused, as what
happened herein. Respondent Judge was negligent for failing to comply with a very elementary
rule of criminal procedure, and this Court believes that such negligence actually merits a stiffer
penalty than those recommended by the investigating Judge (a fine of P1,000) and OCA
(censure). This Court therefore imposes upon respondent Judge a fine of P2,000.
Respondent Judge approved the provisional release of the accused Villacerans upon acceptance
of their property bonds because respondent Judge believed that, notwithstanding the assessed
values stated in their respective Tax Declarations, the two pieces of agricultural lands covered
by TCTs No. 263647 and No. 264847 had an area of 1.0014 and 1.0127 hectares, respectively,
which were actually worth more than the P100,000 bail bond for both of the accused
Villacerans. At any rate, respondent Judge, upon the insistence of complainant Co, required the
accused Villacerans to post additional bail bonds. The accused Villacerans complied with the said
order by posting the WICI surety bonds.
As for the respondent Judge’s refusal to order the arrest of the accused Villacerans after the
expiration of the WICI surety bonds, respondent Judge was of the opinion that once a surety
bond was posted by an accused, the same remained effective until it was ordered released by
the court. He further maintained that in case of nonpayment of the premium on the surety
bond, it was up to the bondsmen to complain and to request for the release of the bond upon
surrendering the body of the accused. Nonetheless, in order to address the concerns of the
private prosecutor, Atty. Bala, respondent Judge issued an Order, 18 dated 20 December 2001,
directing WICI, the bonding company, to submit an updated certification of good standing from
the Supreme Court.
However, even before WICI could comply with the said Order, dated 20 December 2001,
complainant Co already filed a Motion to Inhibit Presiding Judge 19 on 21 January 2002.
Respondent Judge, in his Order,20 dated 21 February 2002, granted the said Motion. Respondent
Judge, therefore, had no more opportunity to resolve the issue concerning the expiration of the
WICI surety bonds. In the words used by the investigating Judge and the OCA, the said issue
was “overtaken” by the filing of the Motion to Inhibit. Respondent Judge cannot be held
accountable when his failure to fully resolve the matter was impeded by subsequent events in
42
the criminal cases, instigated by complainant Co himself.
II The Charge of Grave Misconduct
Complainant Co also accused respondent Judge of grave misconduct because the respondent
Judge had allegedly demanded tikoy from complainant Co in consideration for respondent
Judge’s voluntary inhibition from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211; and when
complainant Co was unable to give tikoy, respondent Judge asked for P500 instead.
According to complainant Co, he never received a copy of the respondent Judge’s Order, dated
21 February 2002, granting his Motion to Inhibit, so on 07 March 2002, he went to see the
respondent Judge at Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, to personally follow-up on the status of the said
Motion. He did not find respondent Judge at the office of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, but
instead, saw him at the adjoining office of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II.21
Respondent Judge informed him that the Motion had already been approved. Thereafter,
respondent Judge allegedly told complainant Co, “ Magkaibigan pa tayo… And to prove that you
still love me, give me tikoy.” When complainant Co replied that he did not know where to buy
tikoy, respondent Judge supposedly said, “Magbigay ka ng pera, kami na ang bibili. ”
Complainant Co then handed P500 to respondent Judge.22
Respondent Judge disputed the charge of gross misconduct against him. According to the
respondent Judge, he had already issued the Order inhibiting himself from hearing Criminal
Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 on 21 February 2002, or almost two weeks before he saw
complainant Co on 07 March 2002; hence, he did not need to demand for anything from
complainant Co in exchange for granting the latter’s Motion to Inhibit. Records of Criminal Cases
No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 were transferred to Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, the very same day.
Respondent Judge submitted affidavits and oral testimonies of several witnesses, including court
officers and staff members of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I and Br. II, to support his version of the
events that transpired on 07 March 2002, during complainant Co’s visit.
Among respondent Judge’s witnesses was Mr. Roger Ruma, the former Branch Clerk of Court of
Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II. On 07 March 2002, respondent Judge was at Santiago City, MTCC,
Br. II, talking to Mr. Ruma, when complainant Co intruded to inquire about his Motion to Inhibit.
Mr. Ruma recounted the exchange between respondent Judge and complainant Co as follows:
Jaime Co : Judge, anong nangyari sa Motion ko?
Judge Plata : Nandon na sa Branch 2, napirmahan ko na, matagal na.
Jaime Co : Nandon na pala, sige. He looks glad.
Judge Plata : Oh Jaime trabaho lang yan; Magkaibigan pa ba tayo?
Jaime Co : Oo naman!
Judge Plata : Papaano ko malaman kung mahal mo kami?
Jaime Co : Eh di magpabili ako ng tikoy!
Judge Plata : Huwag! Bawal, nagbibiro lang ako.23
The conversation was interrupted at this point by a court staff member who informed the
respondent Judge that there was a telephone call for him. After respondent Judge left the
room to answer the telephone call, complainant Co gave P500 to another court staff
member who used the money to buy pizza when he could not find any tikoy. The court
staff and student trainees shared the pizza among themselves.
Respondent Judge also discredited the two witnesses presented by complainant Co, namely
Eugenio Taguba and Maripi A. Apolonio, both employees of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II.
Respondent Judge alleged that Mr. Taguba and Ms. Apolonio had an ax to grind against
him. Respondent Judge complained to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 11
staff members of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, were gambling in the court premises during
office hours, instigating the NBI to conduct a raid of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II. In the
raid, which happened at around 3:00 p.m., the NBI actually caught several staff members,
including Mr. Taguba and Ms. Apolonio, in the act of gambling. An administrative case was
filed against the staff members caught in the raid, wherein they were subsequently found
guilty by this Court of simple misconduct, and were meted the penalty of suspension for
one month and one day, without pay.24
Respondent Judge, in addition, presented evidence that during the time he was talking to
complainant Co, there was an on-going session at Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, and Mr.
Taguba and Ms. Apolonio were in the courtroom attending to their duties. Thus, they
could not have been present in the office of Mr. Ruma where complainant Co and
respondent Judge were talking.
Furthermore, it could be expected that Ms. Apolonio would support complainant Co because he
was her Ninong or godfather at her wedding. 25
Evidence on the issue of gross misconduct weighs heavily in favor of the innocence of the
respondent Judge. The respondent Judge’s version of the events that transpired on 07 March
2002 was corroborated by a greater number of witnesses whose characters were not put into
question. They generally appeared to be disinterested parties to the case with no reason or
motive to protect respondent Judge. Respondent Judge was also able to present documentary
evidence to further support the affidavits and oral testimonies of his witnesses.
Moreover, this Court agrees in the findings of the OCA in its Memorandum dated 12 October
2004, that:
It is hard to believe that respondent would risk his reputation and position as a judge by asking
tikoy in front of other people. Besides, the case had already ceased to be in his sala and had
already been transferred to the other branch long before complainant had a talk with
respondent.
Also, it must be considered that said conversation was cut short when respondent was called to
answer a phone call, that ceased him to control (sic) the events that later on ensued.26
This Court, however, also agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge committed an indiscretion
when he commented to complainant Co, “Papaano ko malaman kung mahal mo kami?”
Although respondent Judge made the comment jokingly, it was also very understandable
how complainant Co had construed it as an insinuation to do some act or to give
something to prove that he had no hard feelings towards respondent Judge.
For making such a comment, respondent Judge violated Canon 2 of the then Code of Judicial
Ethics, which provided that, “A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.”27 Since respondent Judge occupied an exalted position in the
administration of justice, he should pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him; and his
private, as well as his official, conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of
impropriety.28
Although respondent Judge cannot be enjoined from sharing jokes, he must be more prudent in
this regard. As a Judge, respondent herein is the subject of constant scrutiny. He must freely
and willingly impose upon himself certain restrictions, which might be viewed as burdensome on
an ordinary citizen, because he must conduct himself in a way that is consistent with the dignity
of his judicial office. 29
III The Charge of Inefficiency in Office
As to his charge of inefficiency in office, complainant Co alleged that Criminal Cases No. 1-4210
43
and No. 1-4211 had been pending for a long time before Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I. Respondent
Judge did not assert his authority to try and resolve these cases as soon as possible. The cases
were often called at 11:30 a.m., just to be reset for lack of material time to hear the cases.
This Court finds no basis for this charge of inefficiency against respondent Judge. Respondent
Judge had satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum, 30 dated 04 May 2004, that the delay in
the resolution of Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 were attributable to reasons other
than respondent Judge’s alleged inefficiency.
Respondent Judge was present during all the scheduled hearings of the said criminal cases. The
records of the criminal cases supported respondent Judge’s claim that hearings of the cases
were reset three times because of the absence of the private prosecutor; five times because of
the absence of the public prosecutor; and two times because of the absence of the counsel for
the accused.31
At other times, respondent Judge was unable to hear the said criminal cases since there were at
least 30 criminal cases set for hearing on every hearing date. Due to the sheer number of cases,
there was barely enough time to call all the cases in the calendar, much less, to hear the
testimony of the witnesses in all of the cases scheduled.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that: (1) the respondent Judge is guilty of simple
negligence for his failure to scrutinize the documents he had signed and to follow the
proper procedure for fixing the amount of bail, for which he is meted a fine of P2,000.00;
(2) the respondent Judge is guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics for his
failure to avoid the appearance of impropriety, for which he is reprimanded with a warning
that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely; and (3) the charge of
inefficiency in office against respondent Judge to be without basis and is hereby
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Respondent Judge meted with P2,000 fine for simple negligence and reprimanded for violation
of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics. Complaint for inefficiency dismissed.
Note.—It was no less than a bribe for Judge Suriaga to demand and receive money from a
party in a case before him for which act he has no place in the judiciary. ( Calilung vs.
Suriaga, 339 SCRA 340 [2000])