LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1966. March 21, 2006.* Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and
IMELDA S. ENRIQUEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANACLETO L. CAMINADE, respondent.
Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Lack of conversance with legal principles
sufficiently basic and elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law. —This Court has
consistently held that lack of conversance with legal principles sufficiently basic and elementary
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of
the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws.
Same; Same; Same; Diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of the Supreme Court is
a commendable virtue of judges and, of course, members of the bar. —Diligence in keeping up-
to-date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judges and, of course,
members of the bar. Comprehending the Court’s decisions is a different matter, however, for it
is in this area where one’s competence may be tested and proven.
Same; Same; Same; The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to be embodiments of judicial competence and diligence. —The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be embodiments of judicial competence
and diligence. Those who accept this exalted position owe the public and this Court the ability to
be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. Indeed,
competence is a mark of a good judge. This exalted position entails a lot of responsibilities,
foremost of which is proficiency in the law. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory
knowledge of statutes and procedural rules. Respondent judge fell short of these standards
when he failed in his duties to follow elementary law and to keep abreast with prevailing
jurisprudence. Service in the judiciary involves continuous study and research from beginning to
end.
Same; Same; Same; Judges are expected to be personifications of justice and the rule of law
and, as such, to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules.—Exacting as these standards may be, judges are expected to be personifications of
justice and the rule of law and, as such, to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules. Essential to every one of them is faithfulness to the laws and
maintenance of professional competence. Judges are not common individuals whose gross
errors “men forgive and time forgets.” For when they display an utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, they erode the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts. Such lack is
gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands and rules constitutes
gross ignorance of the law, of which no one is excused, and surely not a judge.
Administrative Law; Appeals; The court’s power of appellate review is distinct from an
administrative matter, which involves the exercise of the court’s power to discipline judges. —
Respondent contends that instead of filing the instant Administrative Complaint, complainant
should have resorted to judicial recourse, like an appeal of the Order in question. It should be
reiterated that the court’s power of appellate review is distinct from an administrative matter,
which involves the exercise of the court’s power to discipline judges. An administrative matter is
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare; that is, to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the government.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Misconduct, Knowingly Rendering an
Unjust Judgment and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PANGANIBAN, C.J.:
1
procedural laws. In all good faith, they must know the laws and apply them properly. Judicial
competence requires no less. Where the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic and
elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a verified Complaint 1 filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by Imelda S. Enriquez. In that case, Judge Anacleto Caminade was charged
with gross misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and gross ignorance of the
law. The material averments of the Complaint and respondent’s Comment are summarized by
the OCA as follows:
“x x x [Complainant] Imelda S. Enriquez charges [Respondent] Judge Anacleto Caminade with
Gross Misconduct, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment and Gross Ignorance of the Law
and Procedure relative [to] Criminal Case No. CBU-066703, entitled ‘ People of the Philippines
versus Sherwin Que @ Bungol, Anthony John Apura ,’ for Murder. As mother of the victim in the
criminal case, [complainant] alleges that respondent issued an order dated 31 March 2004, the
decretal portion of which reads:
‘WHEREFORE, the Court hereby denies the motion for the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against the accused-movants; sets aside the assailed Resolution of the City Prosecutor on the
basis of which the latest amended information was filed; quashes the latest amended
information; and remands this case to the City Prosecutor for completion of the preliminary
investigation.’
“Respondent so ruled because there was no preliminary investigation completed on accused
Alvin Taggart Pimentel Alvez and Alvin John Apura [as] they were denied the opportunity to file
a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the information was filed in court.
“Complainant claims that respondent was grossly mistaken when he ruled, in effect, that the
investigating prosecutor cannot file a criminal information before the expiration of the 15-day
period within which the accused are allowed by the Revised Rules of Court to move for
reconsideration or petition for review of an adverse ‘Resolution.’ Respondent cited Sales versus
Sandiganbayan (G.R. [No.] 143802, 16 November 2001) that ‘the filing of motion for
reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper’ and that an
[i]nformation ‘filed without first affording x x x accused his right to file motion for
reconsideration’ is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
“Complainant contends that Sales is not applicable to the criminal case because of significant
factual and procedural distinctions between the two cases: (1) the Sales case proceeded under
the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, while subject criminal case was conducted under the
Rules of Court; (2) there was no completed preliminary investigation in the Sales case but there
was a completed full-blown panel preliminary investigation on the accused in the subject
criminal case; and (3) it is only under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman that the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed and terminated upon the lapse of the period to
file a motion for reconsideration from the resolution of the Ombudsman while there is nothing in
the Rules of Court which states that a person investigated has the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation before the [i]nformation can be filed in court.
“In his COMMENT, respondent explains that the panel of prosecutors conducting preliminary
investigation filed in court their amended information without furnishing accused Apura and
Alvez their copy of the resolution. He stresses that his challenged order is in accordance with
law and jurisprudence, citing among others, the case of Sales. He claims his order was an
honest response to the pending matters before him and [he] merely granted reliefs consistent
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
with those granted by the Supreme Court in the Sales case.
“[Respondent judge asserts that] while the facts of Sales and the criminal case are different, the
legal principle involved in the former case ‘that a preliminary investigation is part of due process
and a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Prosecutor finding probably cause for
the filing of information is part of a preliminary investigation and respondent who is not given
the opportunity to file the same is in effect deprived of his right without due process of law’
cannot be overlooked. Respondent points out that complainant, who was represented by two
attorneys, should have resorted to judicial recourse such as an appeal of the order in question
via a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals.” 2
Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Report,3 the OCA finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Thus, it
recommends that respondent be penalized with the maximum imposable fine of P40,000,
considering that he was earlier penalized with six months’ suspension for another serious though
unrelated offense. According to the OCA, the issue raised by complainant does not pertain to an
error of judgment or to one pertaining to the exercise of sound judicial discretion by respondent.
Rather, the issue is whether respondent complied with procedural rules so elementary that to
digress from them amounts to either ignorance or negligence. Since the procedure for the
institution of criminal actions is basic and clearly expressed in the Rules of Court, respondent’s
Order is deemed to have been attended by gross ignorance of the law.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA but reduces the penalty.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
This Court has consistently held that lack of conversance with legal principles sufficiently basic
and elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 4 As an advocate of justice and a visible
representation of the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws. 5
A perusal of the Order issued by respondent on March 31, 2004, shows that he remanded
Criminal Case No. CBU-066703 to the city prosecutor for the completion of the preliminary
investigation based on this Court’s ruling in Sales v. Sandiganbayan.6 Clearly, respondent failed
to read the case in its entirety, or he grossly misapprehended the doctrine it had laid down.
A careful study of Sales reveals that it applies specifically to preliminary investigations conducted
before the Ombudsman. That case was decided in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of
the Ombudsman, granting the accused fifteen days to move for a reconsideration or a
reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation. 7 Obviously, the criminal
case filed before respondent’s court was not covered by the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman but by the Rules of Court, which had no corresponding provision. Thus, Sales was
not in point.
Diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of
judges and, of course, members of the bar. Comprehending the Court’s decisions is a different
matter, however, for it is in this area where one’s competence may be tested and proven. 8
As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the termination of a preliminary investigation upon the filing of
an information in court is a well-established procedural rule under the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Respondent clearly strayed from the well-trodden path when he grossly misapplied
the ruling of the Court in Sales. Since a preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. CBU-
066703 was held, that stage of the legal process was already completed.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be
embodiments of judicial competence and diligence. 9 Those who accept this exalted position owe
2
the public and this Court the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain
professional competence at all times.10 Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. This
exalted position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law. One
cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory knowledge of statutes and procedural rules. 11
Respondent judge fell short of these standards when he failed in his duties to follow elementary
law and to keep abreast with prevailing jurisprudence. 12 Service in the judiciary involves
continuous study and research from beginning to end.13
Exacting as these standards may be, judges are expected to be personifications of justice and
the rule of law and, as such, to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules.14 Essential to every one of them is faithfulness to the laws and maintenance of
professional competence.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors “men forgive and time forgets.” 15 For
when they display an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, they erode the confidence of the
public in the competence of our courts. 16 Such lack is gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure
to follow basic legal commands and rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, of which no
one is excused, and surely not a judge.17
Respondent contends that instead of filing the instant Administrative Complaint, complainant
should have resorted to judicial recourse, like an appeal of the Order in question. It should be
reiterated that the court’s power of appellate review is distinct from an administrative matter,
which involves the exercise of the court’s power to discipline judges. An administrative matter is
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare; that is, to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the government.18
In sum, we reiterate our ruling in Abbariao v. Beltran,19 as follows:
“We emphasize that ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. For this reason, we
always remind the members of the bench of their duty to be faithful to the law and to maintain
professional competence. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules must be at the palms of their hands. Their
inexcusable failure to observe the basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable.
‘Where the law involved—as in this case—is simple and elementary, lack of conversance
therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.’ ”20
As to the charges of grave misconduct and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, we agree
with the findings of the OCA that there is no allegation or evidence on record to support these
claims.
Regarding the penalty to be imposed on respondent, although gross ignorance of the law is
classified as a serious charge, it has been sanctioned with a wide range of penalties. 21 The Court
has to balance the recommended penalty. The OCA suggests the maximum fine of P40,000,
because respondent was penalized earlier with six months’ suspension for another serious
though unrelated offense. Without minimizing the seriousness of the previous misconduct, the
Court notes that the acts presently complained of are completely unrelated to and dissimilar
from those in the prior case. The acts under consideration cannot be considered a repetition of
the same or similar acts for which respondent was previously suspended. Neither is there any
showing that he acted with malice or bad faith in issuing his Order in the present case. Under
the present circumstances, this Court deems a fine of P20,000 to be appropriate.
Unrelated or not, both cases reflect poorly on respondent as a public officer. The Constitution
expects judges to be embodiments of competence, integrity, probity and independence. Indeed,
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13 3
magistrates should personify four Ins; namely, integrity, independence, industry and
intelligence.23
WHEREFORE, Judge Anacleto L. Caminade is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law,
for which he is FINED in the amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000). He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the
future.
SO ORDERED.
     Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Judge Anacleto L. Caminade meted with P20,000.00 fine for gross ignorance of the law, with
stern warning against repetition of similar acts.

Notes.—A judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, not to
be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. ( Agunday vs. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134
[1999])

When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything
less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. ( Cañas vs. Castigador , 348
SCRA 425 [2000])

To be guilty of gross ignorance of the law, the Supreme Court had laid down a caveat that for
liability to attach, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of
official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most importantly, that he was
actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive. ( Sevilla vs. Quintin, 474
SCRA 10 [2005])
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043. September 5, 2007.*
JUAN DE LA CRUZ (CONCERNED CITIZEN OF LEGAZPI CITY), complainant, vs. JUDGE
RUBEN B. CARRETAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 9,
respondent.
Courts; Judges; A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas—he should be learned in the law,
dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character; A judge who is
inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or witnesses who appear in his sala
commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the people’s faith in the judiciary. —A
judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be learned in the law, dignified in
demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character. Besides having the requisite learning in
the law, he must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint. In this connection, he should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who
come to his court. A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or
witnesses who appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the
people’s faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides: SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation
to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.
Same; Same; It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness; Pleasing
speech increases a wise and just man’s persuasiveness.—It is reprehensible for a judge to
humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint.
Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words,
written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed
for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness. Equanimity and judiciousness
should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. A judge should always keep his passion
guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level
of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words, snide remarks or
sarcastic comments. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence in
the judiciary.
Same; Same; A judge displays a condescending attitude toward lawyers in the provinces when
he implies that they are “inferior” to lawyers from Manila—a judge must never show conceit or
even an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety. —Against this backdrop, respondent
judge indeed appears arrogant and boastful not only in the eyes of the anonymous complainant
but also to the lawyers who practice in his sala. He revealed a hint of arrogance in his comment
when he professed exasperation over minor procedural mistakes or even negligible lapses (such
as the confusion in the use of “collaborate” and “corroborate”). He also displayed a
condescending attitude toward lawyers in the provinces when he implied that they were
“inferior” to lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he should ensure that his conduct is always above
reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. He must never show conceit or even
an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety.
Same; Same; Respondent judge, in asking more questions than counsel and in conducting
direct and cross-examination of witnesses, he contravened Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. —Respondent judge unduly intervened in
the presentation of evidence. He asked more questions than counsel and conducted direct and
cross-examination of witnesses. In so doing, he contravened Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Same; Same; A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC; Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct
4
embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility—certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial
office tends to diminish the people’s respect for the law and legal processes. —Pursuant to A.M.
No. 02-9-02-SC, this administrative case against respondent judge shall also be considered as a
disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar. Violation of the fundamental tenets
of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 1
and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics
of the judicial office tends to diminish the people’s respect for the law and legal processes. He
also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers.
Same; Same; A judge transgresses Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he humiliates, insults or embarrasses lawyers appearing in his sala. —
Respondent judge also transgressed Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he humiliated, insulted or embarrassed lawyers appearing in his sala.
Instead of establishing a cordial and collaborative atmosphere with lawyers, respondent judge
alienated them and effectively disregarded their significant role in the administration of justice.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Conduct Unbecoming a Judge.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This administrative case stems from an anonymous complaint by “Juan de la Cruz,” a concerned
citizen of Legazpi City, against respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas, presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 9. The letter-complaint 1 read:
The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court
and The Honorable Court Administrator
Supreme Court, Manila
Sir and Madam,
Kami po ay sumulat sa inyo dahil po sa reklamo sa masamang ugali at asal ni Judge Ruben
Car[r]etas ng RTC, Branch 9, Legazpi City.
Siya po ay isang mayabang na Judge at mahilig mang insulto sa pamamagitan ng side
comments sa mga testigo, abogado at fiscal, parang siya na lang ang may alam sa batas. Bilang
Judge siya na po ang nagdirect, at cross-examine sa mga testigo.
Dahil sa kanyang ginagawa napapahiya ang mga testigo, abogado at fiscal sa harap ng publiko.
Nawawala din po ang respeto ng publiko sa justice system.
Kami po ay umaasa at nanalangin sa madaliang aksyon ng inyong opisina para malutas ang
problemang ito.
Salamat at mabuhay po kayong lahat.
Ang gumagalang,                    
(Sgd. Juan de la Cruz)               
Concern[ed] citizen of Legazpi [City]
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
In his comment,2 respondent judge surmised that the complaint was initiated by a lawyer whose
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was not granted. He denied the accusation and
claimed that he had not insulted anyone. He then narrated that, in his first few months in office,
he experienced the following exasperating and somewhat amusing incidents: a lawyer insisting
on further examining a witness he had already subjected to re-cross examination; a prosecutor
proceeding with the presentation of evidence when the accused had not yet been arraigned; a
lawyer appearing for an absent counsel de parte and manifesting that he was appearing “in
corroboration” with the latter; lawyers appearing without observing the proper dress code; a
lawyer offering the testimony of his witness “to collaborate” the testimony of another witness; a
lawyer manifesting that he was ready for trial but turning out to be unprepared with his
documentary evidence, prompting the court to call a recess; a case for unjust vexation
committed against a minor being raffled to his sala when the records showed that the victim
was waylaid, boxed and dragged to a forested area where the accused touched her private part
and mashed her breasts; a case being filed for kidnapping and serious illegal detention only
despite the fact that the girl was raped while in captivity. Respondent judge stated that he never
encountered these mistakes “in all his years of law practice in Manila.” Thus, he was shocked
because he thought that these things “happened only in anecdotes.”
Respondent judge observed that due to their familiarity with each other, lawyers appearing in
his sala hardly objected even to obviously objectionable questions. In such instances, he called
the attention of counsels because, to his mind, they were making a “moro-moro” 3 out of the
proceedings.
Respondent judge also stated that, while he may have used harsh word sometimes, they were
made out of exasperation and with the intention merely to right the wrong committed in his
presence, not to insult anyone. Nonetheless, he apologized to those who may have been
offended by his remarks.
In connection with the complaint, Judge Romeo S. Dañas, executive judge of the RTC of Legazpi
City, conducted a discreet investigation.4 He interviewed lawyers who appeared in the sala of
respondent judge. He requested them to submit their respective written comments on the
decorum of respondent judge when holding trial. Among these comments were the following:
1.Atty. Mariano B. Baranda, Jr.
“Respondent judge should avoid making embarrassing, insulting and abrasive remarks. He
should also limit himself to asking clarificatory questions.” 5
2.Atty. Expedito P. Nebres
“If not in open court respondent judge is kind, courteous and respectful. However, in open court
he is arrogant and boastful. He has a bad habit in making embarrassing or insulting remarks
when presiding over cases. Most of the time, he was the one conducting direct and cross-
examination of witnesses. He used to scold, harass and embarrass witnesses, litigants, lawyers,
prosecutors and PAO6 lawyers for just a slight mistake in procedure.” 7
3.Atty. Alexis C. Albao
“In the course of presentation of evidence for his client, he was insulted and subjected to
sarcastic remarks by respondent judge, not once but for several occasions. This traumatized him
and made him avoid reading the transcript of stenographic notes of the said hearing until now.
In one occasion, respondent judge proceeded to cut short the proceedings. When he manifested
that he would cross-examine the defendant, respondent judge stood from his seat and in a
sarcastic manner looked backward manifesting that he was not interested or not listening to the
cross-examination. Thus, he was discouraged from proceeding with his cross-examination. Most
of the time, respondent judge would unduly intervene in the presentation of evidence and asked
5
more questions than counsel. Respondent judge showed apathy to those who were subjected to
his insults. He insisted that others submit to his way of doing things. He showed inflexibility to
minor mistakes.”8
4.Atty. Ricardo V. de Jesus
“While he was in the process of conducting direct examination, respondent judge instructed him
to ask questions which respondent judge thought to be material. When he was through with his
direct examination, respondent judge asked him in open court how long he had been in private
practice. He replied that he had been practicing for only a period of one and a half (1 1/2)
years. Respondent judge then told him to prepare supposed direct questions and expected
answers. He felt embarrassed.”9
On October 6, 2005, the members of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Albay held a meeting
to discuss the matter of assigning a public prosecutor to the sala of respondent judge. During
the meeting, the prosecutors raised their concern about the behavior of respondent judge.
Provincial prosecutor Benigno L. Tolosa furnished Judge Dañas with a copy of the minutes of the
meeting.10 The relevant portions of the minutes11 were:
II. DISCUSSION
• The Provincial Prosecutor informed the group about the purpose of the meeting. He said that
the prosecutor assigned in RTC Branch 9, Prosecutor Maria Miranda-Gojar will soon be
transferring to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. He asked suggestions from the group
on how to go about the matter of assigning a prosecutor in Branch 9 considering that all
prosecutors have their own court assignment and considering further that the Presiding Judge of
said Branch has a behavioral and attitudinal problem.
• Considering that the matter to be discussed involves the problem with the Presiding Judge, the
Provincial Prosecutor requested those prosecutors [present] to share their experiences in the
court with the Presiding Judge.
• Prosecutor [Eduardo B.] Quinzon remarked that the judge has a sudden burst of temper and
wild moods, insulting and humiliating lawyers in front of their clients even in the presence of
other people.
• Prosecutor Gojar added that the Presiding Judge has a volatile temper and is fond of insulting
and humiliating witnesses and also lawyers. She also said that during arraignment or trial of
cases, he would even call her attention and would insult the prosecutor who made the
Information and Resolution of the case and even the Chief who approved the same.
• Prosecutor [Maria Teresa A.] Mahiwo added that she observed one hearing [where] the
Presiding Judge [scolded] the two private lawyers who [were] much older than him. She said
that being assigned in Branch 9 will not be good for the health of any prosecutor.
III. RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT
• Prosecutor [Elmer M.] Lanuzo opined that because the judge is temperamental, he should be
given a fiscal who is not temperamental.
• It was resolved by the group that no prosecutor will be assigned at RTC Branch 9 considering
that all prosecutors have their own court assignment.
• It was also agreed that the Presiding Judge can request from the Department of Justice a
prosecutor who would attend to the cases in his sala.12
Judge Dañas also received a letter 13 from city prosecutor Palmarin E. Rubio of Legazpi City. City
prosecutor Rubio stated that the prosecutor assigned to the sala of respondent judge did not
want to comment on the conduct of respondent judge. He suggested that members of an audit
team from this Court be made to observe the proceedings in Branch 9 to “see and feel the
tension[-]charged atmosphere in the sala once the trial started.” 14
To his report, Judge Dañas attached copies of the comments of the lawyers he interviewed, the
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
letter of provincial prosecutor Tolosa enclosing the minutes of the meeting of the public
prosecutors in Albay and the letter of city prosecutor Rubio. 15 He concluded that the charges
against respondent judge were true. However, he refrained from recommending any definite
action against him and left the matter to the sound discretion of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).16
In its report,17 the OCA adopted the findings of Judge Dañas and made the following
recommendation:
“RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our
recommendation that respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
Legazpi City be ADVISED to observe proper judicial decorum and to conscientiously abide by the
mandates of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics in the exercise
of his official functions.”18
We disagree. Respondent judge deserves more than mere “advice.”
Respondent judge should be reminded of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 and Section 1, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:19
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
x x x      x x x      x x x
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of
a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be learned in the law, dignified in
demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character. Besides having the requisite learning in
the law, he must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint.20 In this connection, he should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who
come to his court.21 A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or
witnesses who appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the
people’s faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides:
“SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.” 22
(emphasis supplied)
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, 23 litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of
patience, prudence and restraint.24 Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his
6
language.25 He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient
control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness.26
Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. 27 A judge
should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his
reason. He descends to the level of a sharptongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters
harsh words, snide remarks or sarcastic comments. As a result, he degrades the judicial office
and erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
Against this backdrop, respondent judge indeed appears arrogant and boastful not only in the
eyes of the anonymous complainant but also to the lawyers who practice in his sala. He revealed
a hint of arrogance in his comment when he professed exasperation over minor procedural
mistakes28 or even negligible lapses (such as the confusion in the use of “collaborate” and
“corroborate”). He also displayed a condescending attitude toward lawyers in the provinces
when he implied that they were “inferior” to lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he should ensure
that his conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. He
must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety.
The dispensation of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. 29 A sense of
shared responsibility which is a crucial factor in the administration of justice is expected of
them.30 They should co-exist in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, not animosity and
derision. Respondent judge antagonized the lawyers (private practitioners, public attorneys and
public prosecutors alike) appearing in his sala by his perceived arrogance and insulting remarks.
Consequently, he impaired the administration of justice.
Respondent judge unduly intervened in the presentation of evidence. He asked more questions
than counsel and conducted direct and cross-examination of witnesses. In so doing, he
contravened Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics:31
“RULE 3.06—While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some
obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should be borne
in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the
ascertainment of truth.
—oo——oo——oo—
14. Interference in conduct of trial
While a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition and prevent
unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, nevertheless, he should bear in mind
that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a
severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the
unusual circumstances of trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the
ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.
Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but the judge should
be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute between
litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing counsel, litigants or witnesses, he
should avoid a controversial tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their
positions, and he should not be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or a premature
judgment.”
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent
unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details in the course of the
testimony of the witness or thereafter.32 Questions designed to clarify points and to elicit
additional relevant evidence are not improper. 33 But the judge should limit himself to asking
clarificatory questions and the power should be sparingly and judiciously used. The rule is that
the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the
conduct of the trial.34 A judge must always maintain cold neutrality and impartiality for he is a
magistrate, not an advocate.35
7
[2002])
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also
the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities—even if respondent judge did not intend to
use his position as a judge to influence the outcome of his brother’s election protest, it cannot
be denied that his presence in the courtroom during the hearing of his brother’s case would
immediately give cause for the community to suspect that his being a colleague in the judiciary
would influence the judge trying the case to favor his brother. ( Vidal vs. Dojillo, Jr., 463 SCRA
264 [2005])

In fine, the over-all conduct of respondent judge has been unbecoming of a magistrate. It is
classified as a light charge36 for which a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000
may be imposed.37

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, 38 this administrative case against respondent judge shall also
be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar.

Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial
Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 139 and 1140 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the
people’s respect for the law and legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the
esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers.

Respondent judge also transgressed Canon 841 and Rule 8.0142 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he humiliated, insulted or embarrassed lawyers appearing in his sala.
Instead of establishing a cordial and collaborative atmosphere with lawyers, respondent judge
alienated them and effectively disregarded their significant role in the administration of justice.

Accordingly, respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is hereby found GUILTY of conduct

unbecoming of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2, Section 1, Canon 4
and Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Rule
3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is FINED
in the amount of P7,500.

Respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is also hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 8 and
11 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED in the amount
of P7,500.

Judge Carretas is further STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Judge Ruben B. Carretas meted with P7,500.00 fine for violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2,
Section 1, Canon 4 and Section 6, Canon 6 of New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, Rule 3.06 of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, he is
further meted with P7,500.00 fine for violation of Canons 1, 8 and 11 and Rule 8.01 of Code of
Professional Responsibility, with stern warning against repetition of similar acts.

Notes.—Clearly, public interest in an adept and honest judiciary dictates that notice of
future harsher penalties should not be followed by another forewarning of the same kind, ad
infinitum, but by discipline through appropriate penalties. ( Poso vs. Mijares, 387 SCRA 485
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
A.M. No. MTJ 04-1537. March 25, 2004.*
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 01-998-MTJ)
ARTEMIO SABATIN, complainant, vs. JUDGE EFREN B. MALLARE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT, NATIVIDAD-LLANERA, NUEVA ECIJA, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; The dismissal or withdrawal of charges and the desistance of
witnesses does not automatically result in the dismissal of an administrative case; The need to
maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and
instrumentalities should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants
who are in a real sense, only witnesses therein. —The Court would like to stress that the
dismissal or withdrawal of charges and the desistance of witnesses does not automatically result
in the dismissal of an administrative case. The withdrawal of the complaint does not have the
legal effect of automatically exonerating the respondent from any administrative disciplinary
action. It does not operate to divest this Court with jurisdiction to determine the truth behind
the matter stated in the complaint. Furthermore, the need to maintain the faith and confidence
of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities should not be made to
depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses
therein.
Same; Same; Undue delay in resolving a pending motion constitutes gross inefficiency and
constitutes a less serious charge. —Furthermore, in resolving the complainant’s motion to quash
almost four months after it was filed, the respondent violated Rule 3.05 of The Code of Judicial
Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and to act, one way
or the other, on pending cases within the prescribed period therefor. Undue delay in resolving a
pending motion constitutes gross inefficiency, and constitutes a less serious charge, punishable
under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Judges are duty-bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional
competence at all times.—Judges are duty-bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain
professional competence at all times. The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle.
This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed
on them and the institution they represent. Judges are also human, although they are expected
to rise above human frailties. At the very least, there must be an earnest and sincere effort on
his part to do so. Considering that they are the visible representation of the law and of justice,
the citizenry expects their official conduct as well as their personal behavior to always be beyond
reproach.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law, Serious
Misconduct and Violation of Republic Act No. 3019.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative case arose when Artemio Sabatin, in an Affidavit-Complaint 1 dated
January 15, 2001, charged Judge Efren B. Mallare, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Natividad-
Llanera, Nueva Ecija, with gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct and violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, relative to
Criminal Case No. 2751-N entitled People of the Philippines v. Artemio Sabatin for illegal
possession of firearms.
The complainant, the accused in the said criminal case, alleged that pursuant to Search Warrant
No. 017-N-2000 issued by the respondent judge, elements of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of General Natividad, Nueva Ecija under the command of P/Sr. Insp. Franklin Versoza
8
Simon, entered his home and conducted a search thereon without his consent. The complainant
averred that the search warrant in question was actually issued against his brother Pedrito
Sabatin. When the complainant pointed this out to the police, P/Sr. Insp. Simon merely
instructed his men to erase the name “Pedrito” and replace it with “Artemio,” making it appear
that the warrant was, indeed, issued in the complainant’s name.
The complainant further alleged that he was arrested and brought by the policemen to their
station for investigation, but was later released. He then received a subpoena after a few days,
and it was only then that he learned that a criminal complaint had been filed against him for
illegal possession of firearms. The complainant, in turn, filed a complaint for illegal search,
unlawful arrest, arbitrary detention and falsification of public document against P/Sr. Insp.
Simon and his men before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).
On August 5, 2000, the complainant filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000
before the respondent judge’s sala. After several postponements, the preliminary investigation
was again set for November 8, 2001. The complainant narrated the events as follows:
17.Na bago dumating ang araw na iyon ay nakatanggap ako ng MOTION TO DISMISS, petsang
Oktubre 12, 2000, para sa mga demanda ko [ sic] ilalim ng I.S. No. H-3275-78 sa Cabanatuan
City, galing sa inireklamo kong mga pulis, at kabilang sa mga UNANG PAGKAKATAON ay
nahawakan ko ang kopya ng “SEARCH WARRANT NO. 017-N-2000”, na maliwanag na
nanggaling pala sa Branch 30 ng Regional Trial Court ng Cabanautan City, pero ang
nakapirmang hukom ay si Judge EFREN B. MALLARE , bilang Acting Presiding Judge, gaya nang
makikita sa kopya ng nasabing ‘SEARCH WARRANT”, na minarkahang ANNEX “K”;
18.Sa pagka-diskubre naming ang Branch 30 ng Regional Trial Court ng Cabanatuan City ang
nag-”issue” ng pinalsipikang SEARCH WARRANT, ako, sa pamamagitan ng aking abogada, ay
duon nag-”file” ng MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NO. 017-N-2000, kasabay ng
kinakailangang i-”file” ko sa 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court ng Gen. Natividad-Llanera, Nueva
Ecija, ng aking OMNIBUS MOTION TO WITHDRAW MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NO.
017-N-2000 AND TO TRANSFER ITS RECORDS TO BRANCH 30, RTC, CABANATUAN CITY, WITH
ADDED MOTIONS TO SUSPEND PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE INSTANT CASE UNTIL
RESOLUTION ON THIS PENDING INCIDENT AND TO FURNISH ACCUSED OF ALL PERTINENT
DOCUMENTS/EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IN ITS PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION,
parehong may petsang Oktubre 30, 2000. . . .2
The complainant was surprised when Judge Federico F. Fajardo, Jr. of the RTC of Cabanatuan
City, Branch 30, issued the following Order on November 7, 2000, to wit:
This is a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000, dated July __, 2000 which appears
to have been issued by Judge Efren B. Mallare. Upon a careful examination of the said Search
Warrant, the caption thereof appears to be RTC-Branch 30, Cabanatuan City. However, the
Presiding Judge of RTC, Br. 30 is the undersigned presiding judge and not Judge Efren B.
Mallare. Judge Mallare is the Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
General Natividad and Llanera, Nueva Ecija.
The undersigned did not issue the questioned search warrant. He is not the Executive Judge
who is the only one authorized to issue search warrants for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. The Executive Judge of the RTC, Cabanatuan City is the Hon. Johnson Ballutay of
RTC, Branch 25, Cabanatuan City.
Further, the questioned search warrant is not at all connected with any case pending in this
Court, and therefore, this Court is not the proper forum for the quashing of the said search
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
warrant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to quash search warrant is hereby returned to
the accused and his counsel, with the advise that it be referred to the Hon. Executive Judge,
RTC, Cabanatuan City or Judge Efren B. Mallare for appropriate action. 3
The respondent judge thereafter issued an Order dated December 4, 2000, to wit:
After a careful perusal of the grounds relied upon by the accused in seeking for the
quashal/dismissal of this case, the Court noticed that the same appeared to be well taken as the
records would readily show that the Chief of Police, PNP, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija has
applied for a search warrant against one Pedrito Sabatin alias Boyet and this has been admitted
by the then Chief of Police Franklin Versoza Simon as per his comment dated 13 September
2000 (p. 27, rec.), although he misspelled the name Pedrito to Pablito by advancing reason that
an error was committed when said first name was typewrote (sic) and in order to obviate any
leakage thereof, a correction has been made from Pedrito/Pablito to Artemio Sabatin alias Boyet
which led to the filing of the instant case.
In short, the search warrant issued by this court against one Pedrito Sabatin alias Boyet, after it
has complied with the requisite for issuing search warrant (Sec. 3, Rule 126 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure), has not been fully implemented.
Furthermore, the case filed before this Court against one Artemio Sabatin y Miguel alias Boyet
cannot be entertained by this court for this court has never issued any search warrant against
said accused; and, therefore, any evidence taken from him may be considered inadmissible for
the search undertaken by the PNP of Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija, is considered unlawful.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash/Dismiss Criminal Complaint meritorious, the same is
hereby granted and this case is hereby dismissed.4
According to the complainant, the respondent judge issued the questioned search warrant
despite his lack of authority to do so in order to protect P/Sr. Insp. Franklin V. Simon. He also
alleged that the respondent later on denied that he issued the questioned warrant in order to
escape possible administrative sanctions.
In his Comment, the respondent averred that the normal procedure in criminal cases was to set
them for preliminary examination in order to determine probable cause. However, in this case,
the complainant (accused therein) through counsel practically waived the early resolution of the
preliminary examination by filing several motions. Thus, the complainant cannot now question
the delay in the early termination of the criminal case, for had it not been for the filing of said
motions, the preliminary examination could have been terminated since September 2000 as
provided for in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The respondent further stated, thus:
To recapitulate; therefore, the undersigned believes that being an Acting Presiding Judge of the
2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gen. Natividad-Llanera, N.E., he has performed and [is] still
performing, in good faith, the duties and responsibilities vested upon his office. In fact the
records will speak for itself, and being the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, he has always been dedicated to his work and never committed any
absence, and this fact can also be attested by the records of that Court which also speak for
itself. Lastly, if ever the undersigned committed an error, the same had been committed in good
faith and that the attached pertinent documents in the criminal case filed against Sabatin will
readily reveal that the undersigned did not commit the accusation lodged against him in this
administrative case.5
The respondent then prayed that the instant administrative case be dismissed for lack of merit.
Upon the Court Administrator’s recommendation that a formal investigation was necessary to
9
resolve the factual issues, the case was referred to Executive Judge Tomas B. Talavera,
Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City.6 The Executive Judge made the following findings:
To this Court, it appears that the complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case. If he
still has any interest in the prosecution of this case he should have notified this Court of his
whereabouts by furnishing his new address so that he could have been notified about the
ongoing investigation. In this regards ( sic), this Court was not able to acquire any evidence that
would substantiate the allegations of the complainant in the present administrative case. It will
be impossible for this Court to rule in favor of the complainant lacking the latter’s evidence,
whether oral or documentary, not to mention his un-cooperation ( sic) in the investigation of this
administrative case.
Be it noted that it was the respondent who was religiously attending the investigation is borne
out by the record of the case. On the other hand, complainant did not appear even once though
on April 24, 2003, he was notified through his wife Vilma Sabatin evidencing his lack of interest
to further prosecute this administrative case.7
The Executive Judge apparently re-set the case for hearing for a total of four times, due to the
complainant’s repeated failure to appear.8 It was, thus, recommended that the present
administrative case be dismissed for lack of evidence, as well as the complainant’s lack of
interest to prosecute the case.9
We do not agree with the Investigating Judge.
The Court would like to stress that the dismissal or withdrawal of charges and the desistance of
witnesses does not automatically result in the dismissal of an administrative case. 10 The
withdrawal of the complaint does not have the legal effect of automatically exonerating the
respondent from any administrative disciplinary action. It does not operate to divest this Court
with jurisdiction to determine the truth behind the matter stated in the complaint. 11
Furthermore, the need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government
and its agencies and instrumentalities should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices
of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein.12
Pursuant to the foregoing, it was incumbent upon the Investigating Judge to delve into the
matter subject of the complaint, considering that the pleadings submitted by the complainant
and the respondent, as well as the annexes thereof, were forwarded by the OCA precisely for
his perusal. The Court, in numerous cases, has even acted upon administrative complaints filed
by anonymous complainants on the following rationale:
Although the Court does not as a rule act on anonymous complaints, cases are excepted in
which the charge could be fully borne by public records of indubitable integrity thus needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant, whose identity and integrity could
hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest.13
The records in the instant case clearly show that the respondent is administratively liable. A
perusal of the questioned search warrant shows that although it was issued by Branch 30 of the
RTC of Cabanatuan City, the signatory therein was the respondent. Judge Federico F. Fajardo,
Jr. then presiding judge of Branch 30, Cabanatuan City denied that the questioned warrant was
issued by him. The respondent then made a volte-face and denied that he ever issued any
search warrant against the complainant in his Order dated December 4, 2000, where he also
granted the com-plainant’s motion to quash. Furthermore, in resolving the complainant’s motion
to quash almost four months after it was filed, the respondent violated Rule 3.05 of The Code of
Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and to act,
one way or the other, on pending cases within the prescribed period therefor. 14 Undue delay in
resolving a pending motion constitutes gross inefficiency, 15 and constitutes a less serious charge,
punishable under Section 9 of Rule 14016 of the Rules of Court.
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13 10
Judges are duty-bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence at all
times.17 The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges
can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on them and the institution
they represent.18 Judges are also human, although they are expected to rise above human
frailties. At the very least, there must be an earnest and sincere effort on his part to do so.
Considering that they are the visible representation of the law and of justice, the citizenry
expects their official conduct as well as their personal behavior to always be beyond reproach. 19

WHEREFORE, for gross inefficiency and dishonesty, the respondent Judge Efren B. Mallare
is meted a FINE of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000).
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Judge Efren B. Mallare meted a P15,000 fine for gross inefficiency and dishonesty.

Note.—Judges are mandated to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required period (Tauro vs. Colet, 306 SCRA 340 [1999])
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
A.M. No. MTJ-88-184. October 13, 1989.*
CALI A. IMPAO, DANIEL M. ESPERAT and NENA E. HERRERA, petitioners, vs. JUDGE
JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-88-217. October 13, 1989.*
ROSAMAR V. MAREGMEN, ELLEN G. VILLARUEL and GINA D. NATIVIDAD, petitioners, vs.
JUDGE JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-88-221. October 13, 1989.*
EMPLOYEES OF THE MTC, MAGANOY AND MCTC OF AMPATUAN-SULTAN SA BARONGIS,
PROVINCE OF MAGUINDANAO, petitioners, vs. JUDGE JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent.
Judges; Court agrees with the investigating judge that the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the complainants convincingly established the charges against the
respondent.—After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds that the findings
and conclusions contained in the report of Investigating Judge Bagundang are supported by the
evidence on record. The Court agrees with the investigating judge that the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the complainants convincingly established the charges
against the respondent. The Court finds nothing in the records which would warrant the reversal
of the investigating judge’s findings and conclusion.
Same; Same; Contention that respondent was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses who testified against him is manifestly devoid of merit. —It is readily apparent from
the records of the case that the above contention is manifestly devoid of merit. Respondent and
his counsel were present during the hearings on November 17 and 18, 1988 [TSN, November
17, 1988, pp. 2-3; TSN, November 18, 1988, pp. 2-3]. Respondent’s counsel cross-examined
witnesses Nena Herrera and Daniel Esperat during the November 18, 1988 hearing [TSN,
November 18, 1988, pp. 3-37.] As to the other five witnesses, namely, Cali Impao, Noemi
Socias, Belen Pasaforte, Ellen Villaruel and Rosamar Maregmen, the failure of respondent’s
counsel to cross-examine them was entirely the fault of respondent and his counsel. They failed
to heed the warning of the investigating judge that the hearings on January 16 to 20 would
continue even without the presence of respondent. Despite due notice both respondent and his
counsel did not appear in the scheduled hearings nor did they explain the reason therefor. By
their unexplained absence, respondent and his counsel effectively waived respondent’s right to
cross-examine the other witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; Respondent should know that it is not incumbent upon the investigating
judge to call up respondent’s counsel to inquire into the reason for their non-appearance in the
scheduled hearings.—The above contentions sadly reflect ignorance of the requirements of due
process. As a lawyer and a municipal judge for a number of years, respondent should know that
it is not incumbent upon the investigating judge to call up respondent’s counsel to inquire into
the reason for their non-appearance in the scheduled hearings. Nor is it for the investigating
judge to prove that he gave respondent “an opportunity to be present.” It is the duty of the
respondent’s counsel to be present during the hearings and to inform the court of the reason for
their absence.
Same; Same; The seriousness of respondent’s illness cannot justify his failure to perform his
duties nor does it excuse him from the consequences of his misconduct and abuse of authority.
—The Court is not unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge Makilala is suffering from a
lingering illness. Respondent himself alleges in his Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing
Officer that he cannot travel long distances nor do any job requiring physical exertion because
the nature of his illness, known as polycythemia vera, requires that his blood be drained
periodically. However, the seriousness of respondent’s illness cannot justify his failure to perform
his duties nor does it excuse him from the consequences of his misconduct and abuse of
authority. If indeed respondent found it difficult to discharge the functions of a municipal judge,
11
then he should have retired voluntarily instead of clinging to his office at the expense of the
litigants, his staff and the general public. Considering the number and the serious nature of
offenses committed by respondent judge, the Court believes that the penalty of dismissal with
forfeiture of retirement benefits should be imposed upon him.
Same; Same; The behavior of respondent judge complained of and proven in this case shows
beyond doubt his unfitness to occupy the position of a municipal judge. —The behavior of
respondent judge complained of and proven in this case, i.e., his acceptance of a bribe, his
holding office and conducting hearings at his residence, his falsification of his daily time record,
his failure to observe proper decorum in conducting court proceedings, his intemperate
language and threats against the personnel of his courts, and his use of physical violence
against Daniel Esperat, among others, shows beyond doubt his unfitness to occupy the position
of a municipal judge. Respondent judge violated the established norms for judicial behavior, and
the best interest of the judiciary demands that respondent be dismissed from the service.
Same; Same; Same; Respondent found guilty of serious misconduct and abuse of authority. —
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala guilty of serious
misconduct and abuse of authority and is hereby DISMISSED from the service. Any retirement
benefits due him are hereby ordered FORFEITED to the government.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS in the Supreme Court. Gross misconduct and abuse of authority.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Rosamar V. Maregmen for petitioners in AM-MTJ-88-217.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Maganoy,
Maguindanao and Designated Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Ampatuan-Sultan Sa Barongis, Maguindanao was charged in three separate complaints by the
employees of the above mentioned courts with gross misconduct, falsification, abuse of
authority and neglect and irregularity in the performance of duties. The three letter-complaints
were designated as Administrative Matter Nos. MTJ-88-184, MTJ-88-217 and MTJ-88-221.
Complainants alleged that from September 1985 up to the last week of April 1988, Judge
Makilala held office every Monday at his residence in Maganoy and the rest of the week stayed
at his residence in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Respondent judge allegedly refused to hold office
at the newly constructed municipal building where a suitable space for a court was furnished by
the municipal government of Maganoy. It is alleged that whenever hearings are held in his
residence, respondent judge would always appear in sleeveless shirt and slippers while the
party-litigants and their counsels were in business attire.
While respondent judge required his staff to strictly observe the Civil Service Rules on office
attendance, he allegedly had no qualms in filling up his daily time record as if he rendered full
service when in fact he was always absent because of his illness and when he was not absent,
he only stayed in court for a short period [Affidavit of Ellen Villaruel and Gina Natividad, Annex
“D”, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217].
The complainants also charged respondent judge with unduly favoring two court personnel—
Josue Calzado, Process Server of Maganoy Municipal Court, and Jose Subaldo, Process Server of
Ampatuan-Sultan Sa Barongis Municipal Circuit Court—because they were allegedly used by
respondent judge in his house as driver-mechanic, house guard or errand-boy. Calzado and
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
Subaldo were given high performance ratings by respondent while all the other employees were
given failing marks.
Complainants averred that Judge Makilala found pleasure in scolding them in front of other
people, uttering insulting words like “mga baboy kayong mga Kristiyano,” [Affidavit of Rosamar
Maregmen, Annex “C-3”, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184.] On one occasion, Judge Makilala
allegedly told visiting soldiers to choose from among his female staff members whom they
wanted to rape. He also told the male court employees not to waste their time and to start
having sexual intercourse with the female employees from Ampatuan [Joint Affidavit of Daniel
Esperat and Cali Impao Annex “G”, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217]. At one time respondent judge
threatened his female staff members that if he could not dismiss them, he will have them
ambushed on their way home to Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. The employees were so alarmed by
this threat that they reported the matter to the Office of the Provincial Commander of Maganoy.
Complainants also alleged that Judge Makilala punched Daniel Esperat, Court Aide of the MTC of
Maganoy, because the latter failed to deliver the entire volume of nipa ordered by respondent
for the roof of his house. After punching Esperat, respondent judge allegedly went inside his
house to get his gun and threatened to kill Esperat. Esperat then ran away and later went to the
provincial hospital for treatment. A medical certificate issued by Dr. Teogenes F. Baluma, which
was attached to the letter-complaint of Esperat, shows that he suffered a “swelling contusion”
on the right side of the abdomen.
Respondent judge is also charged with having accepted a bribe from an accused in a criminal
case. Datu Cali Impao, Court Interpreter of the MTC of Maganoy, narrated that during the
hearing of the case entitled People v. Mario Labrador, respondent Judge Makilala gave a sign to
the accused to follow him (respondent) inside his chambers. When they emerged from the
chambers, Judge Makilala immediately ordered the dismissal of the case. Later, respondent
proudly announced to his staff that he got four hundred pesos (P400.00) from Labrador which
will be used in purchasing the office supplies needed by the court [Affidavit of Datu Cali Impao,
Annex “C”, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184].
To support the foregoing allegations, complainants submitted affidavits from the employees
concerned. They also submitted the affidavits of Datu Gambay A. Upam, a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Maganoy, and Olandigan A. Sulaik, the Municipal Secretary of Maganoy,
who both corroborated the claim of the complainants that Judge Makilala seldom reported in the
municipal court in Maganoy [Annexes “D” and “D-1”, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184]. Also
attached to the complaints as annexes were copies of a “diary” kept by Nena Herrera,
Stenographic Reporter of the MTC of Maganoy, containing a record of the behavior of
respondent judge from April 1988 up to the time he was suspended, including the insulting
utterances he made and the time of his arrival in and departure from the municipal court. The
diary was signed not only by Nena Herrera but also by the other court employees.
On August 22, 1988, the court employees under respondent Judge Makilala went on mass leave
to show their protest against respondent judge’s behavior towards them.
On September 13, 1988 the Court issued a resolution referring Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-221 to
Judge Ismael C. Bagundang of the Regional Trial Court of Maganoy, Maguindanao for
investigation, report and recommendation, and ordering the suspension of respondent judge
pending the investigation of the charges against him. Subsequently, the Court issued a
resolution dated September 22, 1988 ordering the consolidation of Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184
and Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217 with Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-221 earlier referred by the
Court to Judge Bagundang in the September 13, 1988 resolution. The Court reiterated the order
of suspension of Judge Makilala and required respondent judge to file a consolidated comment
within ten (10) days from notice.
12
In his consolidated comment, respondent judge denied the charges against him and claimed
that the allegations were fabricated by the complainants to get back at him for his strict
enforcement of the Civil Service Law.
On the use of his residence as the MTC of Maganoy from 1974-1984, respondent explained that
it was with the approval of the municipal government because at that time there was no
municipal building and the municipal government had to rent private buildings and houses for its
use as its offices. He claimed that in 1984 he refused to transfer to the new municipal building
because the municipal government had not fixed the space allotted for the municipal court.
However, from 1985 up to the present, the municipal court and office have always been in its
permanent space in the Maganoy Municipal Building.
As to his alleged absences and short stay in court, respondent insisted that this was due to the
lightness of his caseload, and that the records will show that he has no pending or unfinished
work [Ibid., p. 4].
Lastly, respondent asked the Court to reconsider his suspension pending the investigation of the
charges against him considering his old age and his long service without any previous record of
serious official misconduct [Ibid., p. 5]. A counter-complaint against the court personnel was
also filed by respondent judge for alleged violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and dishonesty and immorality.
The initial investigation of the case was conducted on October 17, 1988, during which
respondent judge manifested that he will file a motion to inhibit the investigating judge due to
partiality. On November 17, 1988 respondent filed his motion to inhibit Judge Bagundang but
the latter denied the same. Respondent then filed the motion with this Court but it was likewise
denied by this Court in a resolution dated December 12, 1988.
Meanwhile, on the scheduled hearing on December 5, 1988, respondent’s motion for
postponement on the ground of Judge Makilala’s illness was granted by the investigating judge
but with a warning that henceforth the hearings will continue even without the presence of the
respondent. The hearing was resumed on January 16, 1989, but neither the respondent nor his
counsel were present. No explanation was given for the absence of respondent and his counsel,
hence the hearing proceeded as scheduled and was terminated on January 19, 1989.
On January 30, 1989 Investigating Judge Ismael C. Bagundang submitted to this Court a report,
with the following findings:
.... there is reasonable ground to believe that Judge Makilala really abused his authority against
his staff, the utterances made by him that he will have his staff be raped (sic), calling the staff
“mga baboy kayong mga kristiyano” which utterances have been duly blottered in the Office of
the Provincial Commander of Maganoy, the seeming biased attitude of Judge Makilala by giving
failure rating for the majority of the staff while giving high performance rating to Jose Calzado
and Jose Subaldo, is clear indication that he really harrassed (sic) his staff. The boxing of Daniel
Esperat because [he] failed to deliver on that particular day the nipa intended for the roofing of
his private house, is an act unbecoming for (sic) him as a Judge. The threatening remarks that
he have (sic) uttered on several occasions against the staff of Maganoy and Ampatuan-Sultan sa
Barongis, uttered almost daily is a clear sign that he really harrass (sic) the employees. The
entry that he made in his daily time record from 1987 to 1988, that he reports to the office
Monday thru Friday when in truth and in fact he only goes to Maganoy every Monday and stays
most of his time in Tacurong residence and when cases were filed, the cases has (sic) to be
brought to his residence at Tacurong for his signature, is a clear indication that he has falsified
his daily time record and is a violation not only of the Civil Service Law but also with (sic) the
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
Revised Penal Code. The taking of money from Mr. Labrador for the sum of P400.00 under the
guise of donation for the purchase of supplies for the use of the court, is a clear violation of the
provision of the law regarding bribery [Report of the Investigating Judge, p. 5].
Judge Bagundang recommended that respondent judge be separated from the service and that
all his retirement benefits be forfeited in favor of the government [Report of the Investigating
Judge, p. 6].
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds that the findings and
conclusions contained in the report of Investigating Judge Bagundang are supported by the
evidence on record. The Court agrees with the investigating judge that the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the complainants convincingly established the charges
against the respondent. The Court finds nothing in the records which would warrant the reversal
of the investigating judge’s findings and conclusion.
In his Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer filed with this Court on May 12, 1989,
respondent judge assailed the findings of Judge Bagundang on the ground of “gross denial of
due process” because his counsel was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
who testified against him [Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer, p. 4].
It is readily apparent from the records of the case that the above contention is manifestly devoid
of merit. Respondent and his counsel were present during the hearings on November 17 and 18,
1988 [TSN, November 17, 1988, pp. 2-3; TSN, November 18, 1988, pp. 2-3]. Respondent’s
counsel cross-examined witnesses Nena Herrera and Daniel Esperat during the November 18,
1988 hearing [TSN, November 18, 1988, pp. 3-37]. As to the other five witnesses, namely, Cali
Impao, Noemi Socias, Belen Pasaforte, Ellen Villaruel and Rosamar Maregmen, the failure of
respondent’s counsel to cross-examine them was entirely the fault of respondent and his
counsel. They failed to heed the warning of the investigating judge that the hearings on January
16 to 20 would continue even without the presence of respondent. Despite due notice both
respondent and his counsel did not appear in the scheduled hearings nor did they explain the
reason therefore. By their unexplained absence, respondent and his counsel effectively waived
respondent’s right to cross-examine the other witnesses.
Judge Makilala contends that “when the sickly, old respondent failed to appear in the
investigation, proof must be shown [by the investigating judge] . . . of such efforts of giving
[respondent the] opportunity to be present.” It is further contended by respondent that since his
two counsel “are both residents of Cotabato City with telephone connection in their respective
homes,” the investigating judge could have “easily contacted [them] to find out why they failed
to be present on the scheduled investigation.” [Ibid., p. 4.]
The above contentions sadly reflect ignorance of the requirements of due process. As a lawyer
and a municipal judge for a number of years, respondent should know that it is not incumbent
upon the investigating judge to call up respondent’s counsel to inquire into the reason for their
non-appearance in the scheduled hearings. Nor is it for the investigating judge to prove that he
gave respondent “an opportunity to be present.” It is the duty of the respondent’s counsel to be
present during the hearings and to inform the court of the reason for their absence.
Disagreeing with the investigating judge’s recommendation, Deputy Court Administrator
Reynaldo Suarez recommended that Judge Makilala be instead considered resigned from the
service as of the time he was suspended with full payment of retirement benefits. The Deputy
Court Administrator is of the opinion that the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of retirement
benefits is too harsh considering that Judge Makilala is “already in the twilight years of his
career as a judge” and is now “sickly and in need of medical check-ups and constant
medication” [Memorandum of Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, p. 10].
13
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge Makilala is suffering from a
lingering illness. Respondent himself alleges in his Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing
Officer that he cannot travel long distances nor do any job requiring physical exertion because
the nature of his illness, known as polycythemia vera, requires that his blood be drained
periodically. However, the seriousness of respondent’s illness cannot justify his failure to perform
his duties nor does it excuse him from the consequences of his misconduct and abuse of
authority. If indeed respondent found it difficult to discharge the functions of a municipal judge,
then he should have retired voluntarily instead of clinging to his office at the expense of the
litigants, his staff and the general public. Considering the number and the serious nature of
offenses committed by respondent judge, the Court believes that the penalty of dismissal with
forfeiture of retirement benefits should be imposed upon him.
It is an important judicial norm that a judge’s private as well as official conduct must at all times
be free from the appearance of impropriety [Luque v. Kayanan, G.R. No L-26826, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 165; See Section 3, Canons of Judicial Ethics]. As held by this Court in the case
of De la Paz v. Inutan, Adm. Matter No. 201 MJ, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 540:
. . . The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From
him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary
of justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the station of municipal judges, like
respondent Judge, who have that close and direct contact with the people before anybody else
in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the
law and weave an example for the others to follow . . .
The behavior of respondent judge complained of and proven in this case, i.e., his acceptance of
a bribe, his holding office and conducting hearings at his residence, his falsification of his daily
time record, his failure to observe proper decorum in conducting court proceedings, his
intemperate language and threats against the personnel of his courts, and his use of physical
violence against Daniel Esperat, among others, shows beyond doubt his unfitness to occupy the
position of a municipal judge. Respondent judge violated the established norms for judicial
behavior, and the best interest of the judiciary demands that respondent be dismissed from the
service.
WHERERORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala guilty of serious
misconduct and abuse of authority and is hereby DISMISSED from the service. Any retirement
benefits due him are hereby ordered FORFEITED to the government.
SO ORDERED.
     Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
     Gutierrez, Jr., J., on leave.
Respondent judge dismissed from the service. Retirement benefits ordered forfeited.
Notes.—Only the Supreme Court, not the investigating judge, can order the
administrative case against a judge dismissed for having become moot and academic. ( Bautista
vs. Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632.)
Penalty for serious judicial misconduct is dismissal. (Arban vs. Borja, 143 SCRA 634.)
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248.* September 29, 2010.**
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, complainant, vs. JUDGE MARIA ELISA SEMPIO DIY,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 225, respondent.
Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; A judge cannot choose to prolong the period for
resolving pending incidents and deciding cases beyond the period authorized by law. —Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of
the Constitution. This is supplemented by Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, requiring judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness. A careful perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes
and the Minutes of the hearing held on January 29, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and
Q-95-62690, would clearly show that respondent indeed gave the defense ten (10) days to
submit its reply to the prosecution’s comment on the motion for reconsideration and, thereafter,
she would resolve all pending incidents in said consolidated cases. As correctly observed by the
OCA, the reglementary period to resolve the motion in question began to run from February 8,
2009 or after the lapse of ten days from January 29, 2009. Respondent, however, did not act on
the matter and allowed a hiatus in the consolidated criminal cases. A judge cannot choose to
prolong the period for resolving pending incidents and deciding cases beyond the period
authorized by law. Let it be underscored that it is the sworn duty of judges to administer justice
without undue delay under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied.
Judges should act with dispatch in resolving pending incidents, so as not to frustrate and delay
the satisfaction of a judgment.
Same; Same; A judge’s claim of death threats on her and her staff, even if real, would not
constitute a valid excuse for her inaction—after all, as member of the judiciary, she must display
diligence and competence amid all adversities to live up to her oath of office. — Respondent’s
claim of death threats on her and her staff, even if real, would not constitute a valid excuse for
her inaction. After all, as member of the judiciary, she must display diligence and competence
amid all adversities to live up to her oath of office. Besides, when said threats were received
from May to July 2009, the three-month mandatory period for resolving the motion had already
expired. Accordingly, respondent cannot rely on said predicament to exonerate her from
administrative liability for incurring undue delay in resolving the subject motion. Although it is
true that Judge Sempio Diy finally issued a resolution denying accused Carino’s motion for
reconsideration on August 24, 2009 or within 30 days from the time the incident was submitted
for resolution on July 30, 2009, her inaction on the motion for more than 6 months is not
excused.
Same; Same; Elementary court management practice requires her to keep her own
records or notes of cases pending before her sala, especially those that are pending for more
than 90 days, so that she can act on them promptly and without delay. —It appears that
respondent has simply forgotten about the pending motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case
Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 after said cases became inactive due to the failure of the
defense to submit its reply. The realization of the blunder came only during the semi-annual
inventory of the court’s cases. This situation could have been avoided had respondent adopted
an effective system of record management and organization of dockets to monitor the flow of
cases for prompt and efficient dispatch of the court’s business. Elementary court management
practice requires her to keep her own records or notes of cases pending before her sala,
especially those that are pending for more than 90 days, so that she can act on them promptly
and without delay.
Same; Same; Judicial Ethics; A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC; Violation of the basic tenets of judicial
conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code
of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of
14
the Code of Professional Responsibility. —Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, this administrative
case against respondent shall also be considered a disciplinary proceeding against her as a
member of the bar. Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a
breach of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment and Dismissal from Judiciary
Service.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment and dismissal from judiciary service filed by
complainant Judge Adoracion G. Angeles (Judge Angeles) against respondent Hon. Maria Elisa
Sempio Diy (Judge Sempio Diy), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 225, which stemmed from consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690
entitled “People of the Philippines v. Proclyn Pacay ” and “People of the Philippines v. P/Insp.
Roberto Ganias,” respectively.
Judge Angeles charges respondent Judge Sempio Diy with Violations of Section 15 (1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution; Section 2, Canon 2 and Section 5 Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary; Rule 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; Number 6 of the Code of Judicial Ethics; Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Section 4 paragraph b of Republic Act No. 6713 of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; Falsification of Official
Documents; and Dishonesty. Complainant urges the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to
examine the numerous violations allegedly committed by the respondent and to make an
assessment if, indeed, she is still worthy to wear the judicial robe or, if her continued presence
on the bench would unduly tarnish the image of the judiciary.1
In her Comment,2 respondent Judge Sempio Diy vehemently denies the material allegations in
the complaint. She claims that complainant’s charges are harsh, rash and baseless, calculated
merely to harass and “destroy the reputation of a younger sister in the profession.” 3
As synthesized by the OCA in its Report4 dated May 7, 2010, the facts of the case are as follows:
“Complainant Judge Angeles alleges that she is the private complainant in the above-mentioned
cases which, by order of respondent Judge Sempio-Diy dated 20 June 2008, were submitted for
decision, and the promulgation of judgment was set for 11 September 2008. In a subsequent
Order dated 8 September 2008, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy moved the promulgation of
judgment to 17 September 2008, for the reason that she had a previously scheduled medical
consultation concerning a neck ailment. Thereafter, the promulgation of judgment on 17
September 2008 was cancelled and reset to 17 October 2008, with respondent Judge Sempio-
Diy citing voluminous case records and health problems as grounds to support her request
before the Court of a thirty (30)-day extension.
On 17 October 2008, the promulgation of judgment was once again cancelled and reset to 14
November 2008 on account of a second request for extension of time based on the ground that
respondent Judge Sempio-Diy had just recently arrived from a trip to the United States where
she attended a symposium on religious freedom. Following a third request for extension of time,
the promulgation of judgment was reset for the last time to 12 December 2008.
Finally, the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was promulgated on 12 December 2008,
wherein all the accused, except for accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino, were acquitted. To
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
complainant Judge Angeles, the said Decision was belatedly rendered because there was a lapse
of six (6) months from the time it was submitted for resolution to the time it was promulgated.
She further avers that her personal examination of the case records revealed that no requests
for extension of time to decide the subject cases were made by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy.
Likewise, she notes that the case records do not show that requests for extension of time, if any
had indeed been made by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy, were granted by the Supreme Court.
It is her opinion that such requests and Resolutions of the Supreme Court granting the same
should be made integral parts of the case records.
As for the reasons proffered by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy for the repeated cancellation and
resetting of the dates for promulgation of judgment, complainant Judge Angeles argues that:
(1) respondent Judge Sempio-Diy’s medical check-up could have been done on any other day
that would not conflict with the scheduled promulgation; (2) the neck ailment was not as serious
as it was made to appear because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy was able to travel abroad to
attend a symposium; and (3) the claim that she needed time to study the voluminous case
records is not a valid excuse because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy found time to travel abroad
instead of attending to her pending cases.
In fine, complainant Judge Angeles is adamant in her contention that the Joint Decision in the
subject criminal cases was rendered way beyond the 90-day period prescribed by the
Constitution. In addition, complainant Judge Angeles raises another instance where respondent
Judge Sempio-Diy is supposed to have incurred unjustifiable delay.
As it happened, convicted accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino assailed the Joint Decision by filing
an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on 5 January 2009, which the prosecution countered in its
Opposition filed on 14 January 2009. However, it was not until 30 July 2009, or more than six
(6) months later, that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy issued an Order submitting the incident for
resolution, “it appearing that the accused through counsel has failed to file the necessary
pleading despite the period given by the Court.” Less than a month later, or on 24 August 2009,
respondent Judge Sempio-Diy resolved the pending matter by denying the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Despite the denial of the said Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, things did not sit well for
complainant Judge Angeles. For her, the Resolution dated 24 August 2009 was belatedly issued
by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy. First and foremost, she contends that the incident should
have been submitted for resolution upon the filing of the prosecution’s Opposition on 14 January
2009. And yet, it was more than six (6) months later, or only on 30 July 2009, that respondent
Judge Sempio-Diy issued the Order submitting the said incident for resolution. Secondly,
complainant Judge Angeles asserts that there was no basis for the trial court to have to wait for
more than six (6) months before submitting the motion for resolution considering that there
exists no order in the case records directing the accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino, through
counsel, to file the necessary pleading. Asserting that there was no basis for submitting the
incident for resolution only after the lapse of six (6) months, complainant Judge Angeles further
contends that the Resolution issued by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy on 24 August 2009
denying the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise delayed for a total of more than
seven (7) months.
To support her assertions, complainant Judge Angeles attached to her COMPLAINT a
Certification issued by Benedict S. Sta. Cruz, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 225, Quezon
City, wherein the latter attested that, “ based on the record of People vs. Proclyn Pacay, et al.,
Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690, it appears that there is no order from the
Court directing the defense to file a reply to the Comment/Opposition (to the Motion for
Reconsideration) filed by the prosecution on January 14, 2009 .” She also points out that there
appears to be an irregularity in the face of the Order submitting the incident for resolution. In
15
particular, she refers to the date of its issuance—“July 30, 2009”—which is written in a different
font when compared to the rest of the contents of the said Order. She, therefore, contends that
the said date was “merely typewritten in lieu of another date which was snowpaked .”
By failing to decide/resolve the subject cases and the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration within
the period mandated by law and jurisprudence, as well as in falsifying official documents,
complainant Judge Angeles now stresses, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy violated the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution, New Code of Judicial Conduct, Code of Judicial Ethics, Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials.
For her part, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy belies the accusations hurled at her by complainant
Judge Angeles in the latter’s COMPLAINT. In her COMMENT dated 2 December 2009,
respondent Judge Sempio-Diy counters that she decided the subject cases in due time and
within the extended period granted by the Supreme Court. She maintains that the orders
resetting the promulgation of judgment were issued in good faith and in the interest of full
transparency, pursuant to her request to decide the subject cases expeditiously.
For starters, she notes that she merely inherited the subject cases which had already been
previously handled by three (3) other judges from the time they were filed in 1995. Thus, the
case records were voluminous.
For another, the first resetting of the promulgation of judgment from 11 September to 17
September 2008 was occasioned by her illness, which assertion she substantiated by way of a
Medical Certificate. She points out that the setting of the promulgation of judgment on 17
September 2008 is still within the Constitutionally-prescribed 90-day period for deciding the
subject cases.
As for the three (3) subsequent re-settings, she avers that she timely asked for extensions of
the period, all of which were granted by the Supreme Court. To support her claim that she did
not incur delay in the promulgation of judgment, she appended to her COMMENT certified true
copies of her first and second letters/requests addressed to the then Assistant Court
Administrator, Jesus Edwin A. Villasor (now Deputy Court Administrator) and other related
documents. These requests were favorably considered by the Court and she was granted an
extension of a total of ninety (90) days from 18 September 2008.
She likewise attached to her COMMENT a copy of her third letter/request to prove that this was
filed prior to the lapse of the original 90-day extended period granted to her. In fine, she insists
that there was no unjustified delay when the Joint Decision was finally promulgated on 12
December 2008 as the same was still within the original 90-day extended period reckoned from
18 September 2008. The Court’s granting of her third request for an additional thirty (30) days
in a Resolution dated 16 February 2009 had, by then, become moot and academic.
While she admits that her letters/requests for extension and the Supreme Court Resolutions
granting the same were not attached to the voluminous records of the subject cases, she
nevertheless manifests that these were kept in a separate folder.
With regard to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, she points out that the delay was
inadvertently incurred in good faith.
During the hearing of the said motion on 29 January 2009, the request of the defense for time
to file the necessary pleadings was granted, for which reason, she says, the said motion could
not yet be submitted for resolution. She deemed it prudent to give the parties a reasonable
period of time within which to submit their adversarial pleadings. To substantiate this
contention, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy attached to her COMMENT the transcript of
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13
stenographic notes taken on that day and the Minutes of the proceedings of the same day.
In the light of the foregoing, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy discredits the import of the
Certification issued by the Branch Clerk of Court, Benedict S. Sta. Cruz, by arguing that, while
there is no order appearing in the case records directing accused SPO1 Carino to file his Reply to
the prosecution’s Comment to his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the said directive appears
in the Minutes of the hearing conducted on 29 January 2009. She likewise notes that during the
said hearing, the said Branch Clerk of Court was not present.
Respondent Judge Sempio-Diy likewise attributes the inadvertent delay to the “ unfortunate
crises” that befell her, her mother, and the court’s personnel sometime in May to July of 2009.
She reported to the Office of the Court Administrator that they received a series of death threats
which caused, among others, disorientation. Thus, it was only on 30 July 2009, after the semi-
annual inventory, that an Order submitting the matter for resolution was issued. She stresses
that the incident was resolved within thirty (30) days from its submission. As for the
“snowpaked” correction of the date of the said Order, she avers that this was simply due to a
typographical error.”5
Complainant Judge Angeles filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and, thereafter,
respondent Judge Sempio Diy filed her Rejoinder in amplification of their respective claims.
Later, complainant filed her Sur-Rejoinder on February 9, 2010 while respondent filed her Reply
to the Sur-Rejoinder on February 18, 2010.
In its evaluation, the OCA found that Judge Sempio Diy cannot be held guilty of unreasonable
delay in rendering the Joint Decision in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 given
her seasonably-filed requests for extension of time. The requests were all granted by this Court
in the November 24, 2008 Resolution, giving respondent a total extension period of ninety (90)
days from September 18, 2008. The OCA, however, opined that respondent should be
administratively sanctioned for incurring delay in the resolution of accused Carino’s Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter against
Judge Sempio Diy and that she be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for her delayed action on a
motion for reconsideration with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.6
After a judicious review of the records of the case, this Court determines that the findings of the
OCA are well-taken. However, we modify the recommended disposition in light of the
circumstances of the case.
The Court finds no evidence to sustain the charges of delay against Judge Sempio Diy in
rendering the Joint Decision in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-
62690. It is the stance of the complainant that Judge Sempio Diy merely sat on the cases for an
unreasonable length of time and failed to resolve them within the constitutionally prescribed 90-
day period. This constituted gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions. Judge Angeles accuses respondent of concocting requests for extension and making it
appear that these requests were granted by this Court. Complainant avers that she perused the
records of the consolidated criminal cases but respondent’s alleged requests for extension and
the Court’s Resolutions allowing them were nowhere to be found.
Complainant’s contentions fail.
Records reveal that Judge Sempio Diy timely sought for three successive extensions 7 of the
period to decide the consolidated criminal cases. All requests were favorably considered by this
16
Court.8Respondent was granted a total extension period of ninety (90) days to be reckoned from
September 18, 2008 or until December 18, 2008. So, the promulgation of Joint Decision on
December 12, 2008 was made well within the 90-day extension period. Complainant should
have first verified the veracity and accuracy of her allegations from the records of Branch 225,
this Court and the OCA, before hurling accusations of dishonesty and slothful conduct against
respondent. Truly, respondent was charged with a litany of imagined sins relative to her alleged
undue delay in deciding the subject consolidated criminal cases without sufficient proof.
We hold, however, that there was indeed delay in resolving accused Carino’s Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration filed on January 5, 2009.
Respondent Judge Sempio Diy claims that the delay in submitting accused’s motion for
reconsideration was due to inadvertence and without bad faith on her part. She explains that
she opted to wait for the defense to file its reply to the prosecution’s comment on the motion for
reconsideration because the offense of which accused was convicted was serious and his liberty
was at stake. She adds that the death threats she and the members of her judicial staff received
from May to July 2009, caused them disorientation and contributed further to the delay in the
resolution of the subject motion. She readily admits that it was only after the semi-annual
inventory that the pending incidents in the consolidated criminal cases were considered
submitted for resolution in the July 30, 2009 Order.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 9 admonishes all judges to dispose of the
court’s business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2),
Article VIII of the Constitution.10 This is supplemented by Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, requiring judges to perform all judicial duties
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.11
A careful perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes 12 and the Minutes13 of the hearing held
on January 29, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690, would clearly show
that respondent indeed gave the defense ten (10) days to submit its reply to the prosecution’s
comment on the motion for reconsideration and, thereafter, she would resolve all pending
incidents in said consolidated cases. As correctly observed by the OCA, the reglementary period
to resolve the motion in question began to run from February 8, 2009 or after the lapse of ten
days from January 29, 2009. Respondent, however, did not act on the matter and allowed a
hiatus in the consolidated criminal cases. A judge cannot choose to prolong the period for
resolving pending incidents and deciding cases beyond the period authorized by law. Let it be
underscored that it is the sworn duty of judges to administer justice without undue delay under
the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Judges should act with dispatch
in resolving pending incidents, so as not to frustrate and delay the satisfaction of a judgment. 14
Judge Sempio Diy, having been a member of the judiciary for several years, should not have any
trouble disposing the court’s business and resolving motions for reconsideration within the
required period. Otherwise, she should formally request this Court for an extension of the
deadline to avoid administrative liability. Unfortunately, she failed to do that in these cases.
Delay in resolving motions and incidents within the reglementary period of 90 days fixed by the
law cannot be excused or condoned.15
Respondent’s claim of death threats on her and her staff, even if real, would not constitute a
valid excuse for her inaction. After all, as member of the judiciary, she must display diligence
and competence amid all adversities to live up to her oath of office. Besides, when said threats
were received from May to July 2009, the three-month mandatory period for resolving the
motion had already expired. Accordingly, respondent cannot rely on said predicament to
exonerate her from administrative liability for incurring undue delay in resolving the subject
motion. Although it is true that Judge Sempio Diy finally issued a resolution 16 denying accused
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 13 17
Carino’s motion for reconsideration on August 24, 2009 or within 30 days from the time the
incident was submitted for resolution on July 30, 2009, her inaction on the motion for more than WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Maria Elisa Sempio Diy is found to have been in delay in the
6 months is not excused. rendition of an order in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 and is hereby
It appears that respondent has simply forgotten about the pending motion for reconsideration in ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in observing the reglementary period for disposing of
Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 after said cases became inactive due to the motions. 
failure of the defense to submit its reply. The realization of the blunder came only during the
semi-annual inventory of the court’s cases. This situation could have been avoided had
respondent adopted an effective system of record management and organization of dockets to
monitor the flow of cases for prompt and efficient dispatch of the court’s business. Elementary
court management practice requires her to keep her own records or notes of cases pending
before her sala, especially those that are pending for more than 90 days, so that she can act on
them promptly and without delay. In Ricolcol v. Judge Camarista,17 the Court declared:

“A judge ought to know the cases submitted to her for decision or resolution and is expected to
keep her own record of cases so that she may act on them promptly. It is incumbent upon her
to devise an efficient recording and filing system in her court so that no disorderliness can affect
the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management is as
much her responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her
official functions.”
The Court reminds the respondent of her duty to closely supervise and monitor the monthly
docket inventories to forestall future occurrences of this nature. Pertinently, the Court held in
Gordon v. Judge Lilagan:18

“The physical inventory of cases is instrumental to the expeditious dispensation of justice.

Although this responsibility primarily rests in the presiding judge, it is shared with the court
staff. This Court has consistently required Judges for a “continuous inventory of cases on a
monthly basis so that a trial judge is aware of the status of each case. With the assistance of the
branch clerk of court, a checklist should be prepared indicating the steps to be taken to keep the
cases moving. In Juan v. Arias [72 SCRA 404 (1976)], the Court underscored the importance of
this physical inventory stressing “it is only by this that the judge can keep himself abreast of the
status of the pending cases and informed that everything is in order in his court.”

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, 19 this administrative case against respondent shall also be
considered a disciplinary proceeding against her as a member of the bar. 20 Violation of the basic
tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 21 and 1222 as well as
Rules 1.0323 and 12.0424 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In determining the sanction to be imposed on errant magistrates, the Court considers the factual
milieu of each case, the offending acts or omissions of the judges, as well as previous
transgressions, if any. In the instant case, there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive that could have compelled respondent to delay the resolution of the subject
motion. In fact, when respondent found out about the unresolved subject motion in the
consolidated cases, she immediately ordered its submission for resolution on July 30, 2009. In
the absence of malice, the delay could only be due to inadvertence. It is significant to note that
respondent resolved the motion within thirty days from its submission date which clearly showed
her effort to zealously attend to her duties. Lastly, it appears that this is her first infraction and
the first time for her to face an administrative complaint of this kind.

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order
constitutes a less serious charge punishable by either suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of not more
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. However, considering that this is her first
infraction due to inadvertence, We believe that admonition will suffice.