SECTION CASE TO CITE

1 Banco Filipino v. Palanca

Samartino v. Roan

Lim v. CA

Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA

Rural Bank of Buhi v. CA

Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations

Vertudes v. Bureau of Immigration

Guzman v. NU

DLSU Inc. v. CA

Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association

United States v. Toribio

Ynot v. IAC

Lupangco v. CA

Ermita Malate Hotel v. Manila City

City of Manila v. Laguio

White Light Corporation v. Lim

Beltran v. Sec. of Health

Phil. Blooming Mills Employees vs. PBM, Inc.

Tanada v. Tuvera

People v. Nazario

Villegas v. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

People v. Cayat

Ormoc Sugar v. Treasurer of Ormoc City

Phil Judges Association

Taxicab Operators v. BOT

Tablarin v. Gutierrez

Himagan v. People

Central Bank Employees v. BSP

 Farinas v. Exec. Sec.

Ang LADLAD LGBT Party List v. COMELEC

Philsat case

2 Soliven v. Makasiar

Lim v. Felix

Bache v. Ruiz

Roan v. Gonzales

Alvarez v. CFI

Microsoft

People v. Tee
Tambasen v. People

People v. Veloso

Ypousef Al Ghoul v. CA

Uy v. BIR

Go v. CA

Padilla v. CA

Espano v. ca

People v. Mengote
Caballes v. CA

Manalili v. CA

Malacat v. CA

People v. Musa

People v. Salanguit

People v. Amminudin

People v. Mariacos

People v. Aruta

People v. Malmstedt

People v. Mago

People v. Lo Ho Wing

People v. Marti

People v. Bongcarawan
People v. Susan Canton

Ramirez vs. CA

Gaanan vs. IAC

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals

Alejano vs. Cabuay

Roxas vs. Zuzuarregui

Ayer Productions vs. Judge Capulong

Sanidad vs. Comelec

Adiong vs. Comelec

ABS CBN vs. Comelec

Chavez vs. Gonzales

MTRCB vs CA
 Social Weather vs. Comelec

Policarpio vs. Manila Times

Borjal vs. CA
3
to
4

Ledesma vs. CA

Flor vs. People

Phil. Journalist, Inc. vs. Thoenen

Fernando vs. CA

Navarro vs. Villegas

JBL Reyes vs. Bagatsing

Malabanan vs. Ramento

Bayan vs. Executive Secretary

Aglipay vs. Ruiz

Garces vs. Estenzo

Islamic Da'wah vs. Exec. Sec.

 Taruc vs. Bishop de la Cruz

Victoriano vs. Elizalde

5
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent

German vs. Barangan

Pamil vs. Teleron

INC vs. CA

Estrada vs. Escitur

Soriano vs. Laguardia

In Re Request Muslim Employees

Villavicencio vs. Lukban

6 Manotoc vs. CA
Yap vs. CA

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission

Valmonte vs. Belmonte

Aquino vs. Morato

7
7

Chavez vs. PCGG

Chavez vs. PEA and AMARI

Akbayan vs. Aquino

8 GSIS vs. Kapisanan

Republic vs. Castellvi

EPZA vs. Dulay

Sumulong vs. Guerero

9

Manotok vs. NHA

Heirs of Moreno vs. Mactan

Manosca vs. CA

Masikip vs. City of Pasig

Rutter vs. Estaban

10
10

Banat vs. Comelec

Chavez vs. Comelec

1
5
0.08
DOCTRINE
DUE PROCESS: As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the
requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely:
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is
the subject of the proceeding;
(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
The action quasi in rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the f former an
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to
the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or
other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of
remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.
Foreclosure proceeding (QUASI IN REM) against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who f fails to
come in and submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the
court is derived f from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over the
person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to
such as can be enforced against the property itself.

Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant
cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of. If efforts to serve the
summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in
the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed, otherwise substituted service
cannot be upheld; Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
—

While the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary
power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same, he must observe, however, due process in
exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police
power.
There is no requirement whether express or implied that a hearing be first conducted before a banking
institution may be placed on receivership; due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure.
Right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.

It is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to

explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained o
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend
her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are
essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not
comply with the requirements of notice and hearing

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances, and
without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now
become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public safety.

The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one province to another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation
and disposal without a prior court hearing is violative of due process for lack of reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose to be achieved and for being confiscatory.

Quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a
decision or order which applies to a specific situation. This does not cover rules and regulations of
general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and
function
The exercise of such police power, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person, is
subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee may call for correction by the courts.
The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free
the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity,
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. obedience to the dictates of justice
If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the
most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.

Ordinance to be valid
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded
 The purpose of due process guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the
life, liberty and property of individuals.
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property; Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the
due process clause—it inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property
Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
The classification to be reasonable:
(a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(b) must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and,
(d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over propertyrights is
recognized. Property and property rights can be lost through prescriptions, but humanrights are
imprescriptible.
It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents.

A vague statue is one that lacks comprehensible standards that men of “Common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative
that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to
the subject of the particular legislation.
The classificationto be reasonable:
(a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(b) must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and,
(d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
A reasonable classification should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The
equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction.
What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all
persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege
conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during
those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the
number of students who have reached the cutoff score established
—The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.

Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality: A statute valid at one time may become void at another time
because of altered circumstances.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive
officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause

The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrasment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par.
3, of the Constitution, and Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be
conducted by the judge himself and net by others.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact—not of law—by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued
—Probable cause: “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.”
An application for search warrant if based on hearsay cannot, standing alone, justify issuance of that
writ.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid.
The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charge.
When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the facts is necessary.
The oath required must refer to “the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.” The
applicant must have personal knowledge of the circumstances. “Reliable information” is insufficient.
Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his
witnesses.

The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is

primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to
be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.
The description “an undetermined amount of marijuana” satisfies the requirement for particularity in a
search warrant.
A search warrant for more than one offense—a “scattershot warrant”— is totally null and void
Warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, except in those cases where it contains a
description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the
accused." The description must be sufficient to
dicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served.
The place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory
provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
1. the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
2. the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
person;
3. in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
4. the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized
The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in
the community
In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of
petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen (14) days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon
the ground that such offenses constituted “continuing crimes.”
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or
technical right; it is a substantial right

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner’s grabbing distance regardless of
the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search:
(i) the item to be searched was within the arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and
(ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.

An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.

Warrantless search in broad daylight of a person merely looking from side to side and holding his
stomach is illegal
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of
certain exceptions, namely:
(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(3) search of moving vehicles;
(4) consented warrantless search;
(5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; The mere mobility of vehicles, however,
does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants
if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause

Stop-andfrisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search
without a warrant.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control. Objects
in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence. The “plain view” doctrine may not, however, be used to
launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made
solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no longer
provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found—the doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges

A search cannot be considered an incident of a lawful arrest if there is no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest does not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable
cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search
There is no valid warrantless arrest where the accused was apprehended while merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM
agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime and it was only when the informant
pointed to the accused and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was
singled out as the suspect

The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control,
even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search,
which must still be present in such a case.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is
open, where no tresspass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against act of private
individuals, it is directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
 It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To
limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending
her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society."

Even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under Section 1 of R.A. 4200
Mere act of listening to a telephone conversation in an extension line is not punished by
AntiWiretappingLaw.—
A person by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The Supreme Court held that while letters containing confidential communication between detainees and
their lawyers enjoy a limited protection in that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for
contraband but could not read the contents thereof without violating the inmates’ right to
correspondence, letters that are not of that nature could be read by prison officials
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is a
guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained
or imprisoned—by the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a
diminished expectation of privacy of rights..

The Supreme Court held that a letter furnished all members of the Supreme Court even if a copy was
not disseminated to media does not enjoy the mantle of right and privacy. Letters addressed to
individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions, become part of the
judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.

The Supreme Court held that the Right of privacy like right of free expression is not an absolute right;
The right cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest
Public figure: a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a ‘public personage.’

The Supreme Court held that A restriction on the choice of the forum where a person may express his
view is an abridgement of freedom of speech and is, therefore, unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court held that All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we
have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom. This qualitative significance of
freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly
every other freedom.
A statute is considered void for overbreadth when “it offends the constitutional principle that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected.
The right to property may be subject to a greater degreeof regulation but when this right is joined by a
"liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of theGovernment must be exceptionally
convincing and irrefutable

Clear and present danger - A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger
of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. To justify a restriction, the promotion
of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown.
Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic
government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive
economic freedom or other liberties.
There has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of
expression and of the press has a preferred status.
O’Brien test: [A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest

Newspaper may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which
are not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such
proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy
immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also,
fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press.

Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense
in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a
false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts
*Discreditable imputation directed against a public person in his public capacity, when actionable:
1. if false allegation of fact or;
2. a comment based on a false supposition
New York Times Doctrine - honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are
insulated from libel judgments. While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the
privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. To be considered
malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published with the
knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. Even
assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does
not prove actual malice.

Privileged communication - a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the
communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person
having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains incriminatory matter which, without the
privilege, would be libelous and actionable.
Under the New York Times test, false statements alone are not actionable; maliciousness may be
shown only through knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct
and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art.
361 of the Revised Penal Code, it would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom
of expression—it would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a selfgoverning
community.
The right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.
A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and
circulated in public, which was what the petitioners did in this case.
A newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is
neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against
liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest
As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its
mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must
justify the regulation or limitation.
The test to determine the existence of obscenity is, whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Obscenity is an issue
proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound
discretion.
If made for commercial purposes, obscene

The right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, though granted by theConstitution, is not
absolute for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injuriousto the equal enjoyment of others
having an equal right of community and society, This power may be exercised under the police power of
the state, which is the power of thestate, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace,education, and good order, safety and general welfare of the people.
The general rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a
public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown
that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made.

The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the
public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of
the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well
ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections
to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper
judicial authority.
Guidelines for holding student rallies within the campus:
permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of
the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if,
however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the
offense.

Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march,
parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place." So it does not
cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against
their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious
freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognize. The government should not be precluded from
pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a
religion or sect.
There is nothing unconstitutional in holding fiesta.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community
can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
Disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which the Court should not
touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences. Thus, The amendments of the constitution, restatement of
articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant,
having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of
membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.

The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the
latter must, therefore, yield to the former. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest', that the State has a
right (and duty) to prevent
Exercise of right to religious freedom must he done in good faith without any ulterior motive, e.g.,
political.
Previous ruling on the disqualification of eclessiasticals from elective public positions. Repealed by the
passage of LGC.

The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantial evil which the State is duty bound to prevent. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground

In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with
penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the Establishment Clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices.
It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution

Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech.

Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday
(Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the prescribed
government working hours—the performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees
or those belonging to other denominations, should not prejudice the court and the public

The privilege of domicile is a principle often protected by constitutions and deeply imbedded in American
jurisprudence.
A court may prohibit an accused from leaving the Philippines even if he was admitted to bail
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
absolute rights.

The fundamental right to information on matters of public concern recognized in the Bill of Rights,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and amplified in Article IV, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution can be
invoked in a Mandamus proceeding.—These constitutional provisions are selfexecuting.

The constitutional right to information is not an absolute right, hence, before mandamus may issue, it
must be clear that the information sought is of “public interest” or “public concern” and that the same is
not exempted by law from the operation of such constitutional right.
Public” distinguished from “private” documents.—. The term private has been defined as “belonging to
or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest”; whereas, public means “pertaining to, or
belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large”s
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and
intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other
confidential information.

0
The privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso facto lose all force and effect
simply because the same privilege is now being claimed under different circumstances—clearly, the
privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens’ demands for information,
but also in the context of legislative investigations
Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of
work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike

A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property for purposes of eminent domain:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Just Compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything
beyond that is more and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would
accrue to the expropriating entity
It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
It is violative of the due process and the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution to deny to a
property owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation made by a local assessor is wrong or
prejudiced.
The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that is akin37 to the implied trust
referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, "If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to
secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is
established
Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily
diminish the essence and character of public use.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government which has the
authority to delegate the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public
utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the necessity” and the
taking must be limited to such necessity

Here are instances by which these bounds may be transgressed.

(1) The impairment should only: refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right
(2) The protective power of tho state, the police power, may only be invoked and justified by an
emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it
may not infringe the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts
(3) "A different situation is presented when 'extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy A shadow
(4) The decision in the Bleisdell case is predicated on the ground that the laws altering existing contracts
will constitute an impairment of the contract clause of the Constitution only if they are unreasonable in
the light of the circumstances occasioning their enactment
The non- impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a
subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions,
dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the
parties.
It is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. sThe constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community.
The nonimpairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public
 KEY PHRASE

QUASI IN REM

Substituted service of summons

Limits of Mayor's Power

Exception to procedural due

process: Vital Public Interest

Subsequent oportunity to be
heard
Due process in schools when not
met

Due process in schools when met

Due process in quasi-judicial

functions vs. executive/legislative
funtions

Public interest and reasonable

means

Public interest but unlawful means

Quasi judicial funtion

Permissible exercise of police

power.

Validity of ordinance; Reasonable

relation between means and
puposes; Non-permissible exercise
of police power
 Non-permissible exercise of police
power

Valid classification between

commercial and public blood
banks

Human rights over property rights

Publicatiion is requirement of due

process

Vague statutes violates due

process

Invalid classification between alien

and domestic employees

Valid classification of Non-

Christian Tribes

Ormoc Sugar was singled-out

Invalid classification made

Valid classification between taxis

in Manila and in all other places.

NMAT case; Different cut off

scores as valid

Valid classification between

members of the PNP and non-
members.

Invalid classification between R&F

employees of BSP and other GFIs
Valid classification between
appointive and elective officials

Invalid classification between

LGBTs and other party-list
representative

Personal determination in warrant

of arrest

Preliminary inquiry vs. Preliminary

investigation

Personal determination in search

warrant

Probable cause; Hearsay in search

warrant

Test of sufficiency of an affidavit

for a search warrant to issue

Personal knoweldge;

Reasonable particularity
scatter-shot warrant

John Doe warrants

Requirements for a search

warrant; Description of the place
to be searched

Warrantless arrest made 6 days

after the alleged commission of a
crime, when such crime is not a
continuing offense, is not valid;
Substantial right to preliminary
investigation

Lawful warrantless arrest; when a

warrantless search and seizure of
property is valid; valid incidental
search

Invalid incidental search

Illegal warrantless arrest

Unlawful warrantless search and
seizure of a moving vehicle

Valid stop-and-frisk

Invalid stop-and-frisk

“Plain view” doctrine; When not

valid

“Plain view” doctrine; When not

valid

When a search cannot be

considered an incident of a lawful
arrest
Lawful warrantless arrest

Unlawful warrantless arrest

Lawful warrantless arrest

Lawfule seizure by BOC

Lawful warrantless search and

seizure of a moving vehicle

Valid search made by a private

individual

Valid search made by a private

individual
Valid search made in an airport

Letters of prisoners, detainees;

Public at large

Letters to Supreme Court

Exception to right of privacy:

public interest; Public figures

Choice of forum;

preferred freedom; void for

overeadth
O’Brien test

Newspapers: REQs to immunity

Qualified privileged
communication; doctrine of fair
comment; Priveleged
communication defeats
presumption of malice; New York
Doctrine

New York Times test,

Exception to privileged
communication.
obscenity

Right to peaceful assembly: not

absolute

REQs of a peacable assembly.

Student rallies
closed shop provision,

Reversal of Gerona

Invalid restraint against freedom

of religion

Benevolent Neutrality.

Bail is execive but prohibition to

travel is valid

Right to information
Exception to right to information

Privileged communication not

subject to right to information

Right to association and right to

strike in public service.

REQs Eminent Domain

Just compensation

Public use

Just compensation

Discontinuance of public use

Public use

genuine necessity

Impairment of contracts, when

allowed.