G.R. No.

4963 September 15, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.

Gibbs and Gale for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission, which reads
as follows:

Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises, or who
shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag,
banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify
those in armed rebellion against the United States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted
at any time by the public enemies of the United States in the Philippine Island for the purpose of public
disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or
any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is commonly known as such, shall be
punished by a fine of not less that five hundred pesos for more than five thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of September, 1908. After
hearing the evidence adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him
under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place prescribed by law until said fine should be
paid. From that judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to this court.

A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following facts:

That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the
windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the form of a small
button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner
or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed
insurrection against the United States. On the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased
the stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the
sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his
stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one
of the windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law against
the display of the medallions in question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts above stated are
admitted.

The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:

First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems
actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.

In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many
crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial.
This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be
impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect
which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and
result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration
of this. The display of a flag or emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government
tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as
effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the
intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the
common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the
person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the interest which society has in the act
depends, not upon B's death, upon the intention with which A consummated the act. If the gun were discharged
intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security
violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern
in the matter, even though the death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society
and institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B
do not of themselves make him so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar,
however, the evil to society and the Governmental does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays
the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is affected
by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.

It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that —

The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to
the intent of the doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although the intention
may have been innocent. Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be so construed is to be
determined by the court by considering the subject-matter of the prohibition as well as the language of the
statute, and thus ascertaining the intention of the legislature.

In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of adulterated milk
under a statute reading as follows:

No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any impure, unhealthy,
adulterated, of unwholesome milk.

It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk which was shown to
contain a very small percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There was no dispute about the
facts, but the objection made by the defendant was that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of
criminal intent, or to go the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge from the
court which made his intent totally immaterial and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article whether he
knew it or not and however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article.

The opinion of the court in that case says:

As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its
motive, constitutes the crime.
 xxx xxx xxx

It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace
the health and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless
consumers are exposed to increasing perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task.
Experience has taught the lesson that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of
the dealer's knowledge or of his intent to deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish their
purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws upon the seller the entire responsibility of
the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him to know and certain.

In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which provided that an
inspector of elections of the city of New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in writing to
the officer sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth clearly and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and
further provided that any person who removed such an officer without such notice should be guilty of a
misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was removed by Gardener, the defendant, without notice. Gardener was
arrested and convicted of a misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and the
opinion from which the following quotation is made was written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice
Church, writing the opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal intent:

In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal device. The court ruled out the
evidence offered, and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the offense. It is quite clear
that the facts offered to be shown, if true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt
intent, and, indeed, from any intent to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such
mistakes do not excuse the commission of prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears to be, that in
acts mala in se, intent governs but in those mala prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?

xxx xxx xxx

The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to
prove that the act was knowingly and intentionally done.

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had been given to the
inspector, although it had not, they would not have been guilty of the offense, because the intention to do
the act would have been wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended to remove the inspector without notice,
but we thought the law permitted it. This was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a defense.

xxx xxx xxx

If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal; while a rule
requiring proof of a criminal intent to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do the act which the
statute declares shall constitute the offense, would, in many cases, prevent the restraining influence which
the statute was designed to secure.

In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437) the court says:

But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.

In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court says:
 In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class of
cases in which, on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the
defendant understands the facts that give character to his act.

In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes within
the legislative prohibition.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished, the practical methods available for
the enforcement of the law, and such other matters as throw light upon the meaning of the language, the
question in interpreting a criminal statute is whether the intention of the legislature was to make knowledge
of the facts an essential element of the offense, or to put upon everyone the burden of finding out whether
his contemplated act is prohibited, and of refraining from it if it is.

In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a criminal intent arose under a
statute, under which the defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any township committee or other
body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of public moneys in excess of appropriations made for the purpose,
the persons constituting such board shall be guilty of a crime. The defendant was one who violated this law by
voting to incur obligations in excess of the appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from
which the quotation is taken was written upon a decision of that appeal. That court says:

When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in the passage and
effectuation of the resolution which I have pronounced to be illegal, did so under the advice of counsel and
in good faith, and from pure and honest motives, and that he therein exercise due care and caution.

xxx xxx xxx

As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the
knowledge or motive of the doer of such act, there can be of necessity, no judicial authority having the
power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. In such instances
the entire function of the court is to find out the intention of the legislature, and to enforce the law in
absolute conformity to such intention. And in looking over the decided cases on the subject it will be found
that in the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the judicial guide.

In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E. C. L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for unlawfully transposing
from one piece of wrought plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. It was conceded that the act
was done without any fraudulent intention. The court said:

There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The words of it are, 'Shall
transpose or remove, or cause of procure to be transposed or removed, from one piece of wrought plate to
another.

In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated:

It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every
criminal offense, and that where is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is especially true as to
statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the
law implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of
the law he violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon
the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.
In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by the defendant
from a judgment requiring him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which provided that any
person would be liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his
possession with intent to sell," oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the defendant requested the court to instruct the
injury that if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be
furnished, or knew of there furnished, to any of his customers any oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew, furnished
genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the defendant. The court refused to make the charge as requested and
that is the only point upon which the defendant appealed.

The court says:

The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive.
The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden act shall be done
knowingly or willfully, and if it did, the designed purpose of the act would be practically defeated. The
intention of the legislature is plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that
they can not set up their ignorance of the nature and qualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense.

The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 Ia., 374); Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen, 489);
Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth vs. Boyton (2 Allen, 160); Wharton's Criminal Law, section
2442; Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 21; Farrell vs. The State (32 Ohio
State, 456); Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The People vs. Roby (52 Mich., 577).

It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a criminal
intent should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word
implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully. The wording is plain. The Act means what it
says. Nothing is left to the interpretation.

Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act,
and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself — intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the
intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window.
Nothing more is required to commit the crime.

We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applicable only to the identical
banners, etc., actually used in the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those banners, can be sustained.

It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the display of the flag or flags actually used in
the insurrection, and, at the same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (saving, perhaps, size) to be displayed
without hindrance. In the case before us, to say that the display of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of
its exact duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The rules governing the interpretation of statutes are rules of
construction not destruction. To give the interpretation contended for by the appellant would, as to this particular
provision, nullify the statute altogether.

The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identity those in armed
rebellion against the United States" mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag
which is of that type. This description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. That phrase was used
because there was and is no other way of describing that type of flag. While different words might be employed,
according to the taste of the draftsman, the method of description would have to be the same. There is no concrete
word known by which that flag could be aptly or properly described. There was no opportunity, within the scope of a
legislative enactment, to describe the physical details. It had no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in the
insurrection, by which it could, in such enactment, be identified. The great and the only characteristic which it had
upon the which the Commission could seize as a means of description and identification was the fact that it was
used in the insurrection. There was, therefore, absolutely no way in which the Commission could, in the Act, describe
the flag except by reciting where and how it was used. It must not be forgotten that the Commission, by the words
and phrases used, was not attempting to describe a particular flag, but a type of flag. They were not describing a
flag used upon a particular field or in a certain battle, but a type of flag used by an army — a flag under which many
persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings wherever seen or in whatever form it appeared. It is a
mere incident of description that the flag was used upon a particular field or in a particular battle. They were
describing the flag not a flag. It has a quality and significance and an entity apart from any place where or form in
which it was used.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense, and the
literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity or evidently fail to give the real intent of the
legislature. When this is the case, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so
that a thing which is within the intention of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the
letter, and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the
intention of the makers, and the statute should be construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the
mischief contemplated by the framers. (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487; State Bolden, 107 La., 116, 118;
U.S. vs. Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515; Lake Shore R. R. Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y.,
339; Delafield vs. Brady, 108 N. Y., 524 Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State, 330.)

The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial
construction, are to control the literal interpretation of particular language in a statute, and language
capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in that sense which will harmonize with such intention and
object, and effect the purpose of the enactment. (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law., 602.)

Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition.

The preamble is no part of the statute, but as setting out the object and intention of the legislature, it is
considered in the construction of an act. Therefore, whenever there is ambiguity, or wherever the words of
the act have more than one meaning, and there is no doubt as to the subject-matter to which they are to be
applied, the preamble may be used." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72; Platt vs. Union Pacific R. R.
Co., 99 U. S., 48; Myer vs. Western Car Co., 102 U. S., 1; Holy Trinity Church vs. U. S., 143 U. S., 457; Coosaw
Mining Co. vs. South Carolina, 144 U. S., 550; Cohn vs. Barrett, 5 Cal., 195; Barnes vs. Jones, 51 Cal., 303;
Field vs. Gooding, 106 Mass., 310; People vs. Molineaux, 40 N. Y., 113; Smith vs. The People, 47 N. Y., 330; The
People vs. Davenport, 91 N.Y., 547; The People vs. O'Brien, 111 N.Y., 1)

The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of
the defendant and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature. If the language be
plain, it will be construed as it reads, and the words of the statute given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the
court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial. In both
cases it will endeavor to effect substantial justice." (Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U. S., 262, 265; U.
S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76, 95; U. S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S., 214)

It is said that notwithstanding this rule (the penal statutes must be construde strictly) the intention of the
lawmakers must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, but this is not a
new, independent rule which subverts the old. It is a modification of the known maxim and amounts to this -
- that though penal statutes are to be construed strictly, they are not be construed so strictly as to defeat the
obvious purpose of the legislature. (U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76; Taylor vs. Goodwin, L. R. 4, Q. B. Civ.,
228.)
In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving any sort of carriage"
a person could be convicted for immoderately driving a bicycle.

It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render then
operative and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them. Accordingly, in case of any
doubt or obscurity, the construction will be such as to carry out these objects. (Black, Interpretation of Laws,
p. 106.)

In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said:

The occasion of the enactment of a law always be referred to in interpreting and giving effect to it. The court
should place itself in the situation of the legislature and ascertain the necessity and probable object of the
statute, and then give such construction to the language used as to carry the intention of the legislature into
effect so far as it can be ascertained from the terms of the statute itself. (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U.
S., 72, 79.)

We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is necessity requiring that clauses should be taken
from the position given them and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give the whole Act a reasonable
meaning. Leaving all of the clauses located as they now are in the statute, a reasonable interpretation, based upon
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, requires that the Act should be held applicable to the case at bar.

The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So ordered.

Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988

ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant,

vs.
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch
113, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander
Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly
erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case
No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense charged,
i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country.

Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an Answer, dated October 6, 1987,
reciting his "commendable record as a fearless prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila
on December 4, 1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in the
reorganization of the judiciary after the February 26, 1986 revolution, he was reappointed to his present position;
that his length of service as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations of the
petitioner" (should be complainant), whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only known to
him; that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by respondent on September 29, 1986, but the
complaint against him was filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the complainant to
subject respondent to harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision, of which he submits a copy
(Annex A) as part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of rights and justice" and
that if there are mistakes or errors in the questioned decision, they are committed in good faith. Accordingly,
respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition (should be complaint).

The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally,
civilly or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.

The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a
Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign
exchange instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM
officers on July 9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the time of
his apprehension, he was found carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces)
amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, Australian
Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche Mark,
Canadian Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without any authority as provided by law. At the time the accused was
apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations which he was supposed to have accomplished upon
his arrival in Manila in previous trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for
US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated June 29, 1986 for
Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.

An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular
No. 960, as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to take out of the Philippines through the Manila
International Airport the following foreign currencies in cash and in checks:

Japanese Yen Y 32,800,000.00

Swiss Franc SW. FR 6,9000.00

Australian Dollar A$ 17,425.00

Singapore Dollar S$ 9,945.00

 Deutsche Marck DM 18,595.00

Canadian Dollar CS 13,330.00

Hongkong Dollar HK$ 15,630.00

HFL Guilder HFL 430.00

French Franc F/6,860.00

US Dollar US$ 73,950.00

English Pound 5,318.00

Malaysian Dollar M$. 14,760.00

(in checks)

Australian Dollar A$ 7,750.00

British Pound 700.00

US Dollar US$ 17,630.00

Canadian Dollar C$ 990.00

without authority from the Central Bank.

Contrary to Law.

The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently raffled to Branch 113, presided by
herein respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.

Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. — No person shall take out or transmit or
attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly, through
other persons, through the mails or through international carriers except when specifically
authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under existing international agreements or Central Bank
regulations.

Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in
amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. For purposes of
establishing the amount of foreign exchange brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists and non-
resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at
points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which reads as follows:

Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange .— That any person who shall engage in the trading
or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the
Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal, (minimum of 12 years and I day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine
of no less than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the
garment business, in which he had invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to the Philippines 9
to 1 0 times, although the only dates he could remember were April 2, 1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and July 8,
1986; that the reason for his coming to the Philippines was to invest in business in the Philippines and also to play in
the casino; that he had a group of business associates who decided to invest in business with him, namely: Wakita
Noboyuki, Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had their own businesses in Japan and
Hongkong; that when he came to the Philippines on April 2,1986, he brought US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00
Japanese Yen which he tried to declare but the Central Bank representative refused to accept his declaration, until he
could get a confirmation as to the source of the money, for which reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a
telex was sent to him on April 3,1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought in with him US$39,000.00 and 4,000,000.00 Japanese
Yen when he arrived on May 4,1986 which he declared (Exh. 1). Again, he declared 8,600,000.00 Japanese Yen when
he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He also testified that his business associates, as per their agreement to invest in
some business with him in the Philippines, started putting their money for this purpose in a common fund, hence,
every time anyone of them came to the Philippines, they would declare the money they were bringing in, and all
declarations were handed to and kept by him; these currency declarations were presented at the trial as exhibits for
the defense. When asked by the court why he did not present all of these declarations when he was apprehended at
the airport, his answer was that he was not asked to present the declaration papers of his associates, and besides, he
does not understand English and he was not told to do so. He also testified on cross-examination that the reason he
was going back to Hongkong bringing with him all the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was
because of the fear of his group that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might become widespread. It was
because of this fear that he was urged by his associates to come to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the money out of
the Philippines.

The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated:

The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the accused wilfully violated Section 6
of Circular No. 960. The fact that the accused had in his possession the foreign currencies when he
was about to depart from the Philippines did not by that act alone make him liable for Violation of
Section 6.

What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign currencies out of the country
was done the very intention. It is that which qualifies the act as criminal or not. There must be that
clear intention to violate and benefit from the act done. Intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is shown by overt acts of a person.

The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according to him, tended to show that the accused had
no wilfull intention to violate the law. According to the respondent in his decision:

... this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that the currencies confiscated
and/or seized from the accused belong to him and his business associates abovenamed. And from
the unwavering and unequivocal testimonies of Mr. Templo and all of currencies in question came
from abroad and not from the local source which is what is being prohibited by the government. Yes,
simply reading the provisions of said circular will, readily show that the currency declaration is
required for the purpose of establishing the amount of currency being brought by tourist or
temporary non-resident visitors into the country. The currency declarations, therefore, is already (sic)
intended to serve as a guideline for the Customs authorities to determine the amounts actually
brought in by them to correspond to the amounts that could be allowed to be taken out. Indeed, this
Court is amazed and really has its misgivings in the manner currency declarations were made as
testified to by the Central Bank employees. Why the Bureau of Customs representative never took
part in all these declarations testified to by no less than five (5) Central Bank employees? Seemingly,
these employees are the favorites of these travellers. It is the hope of this Court that the authorities
 must do something to remedy the evident flaw in the system for effective implementation of the
questioned Central Bank Circular No. 960.

But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to pin criminal responsibility on the
accused. This is due to its steadfast adherence and devotion to the rule of law-a factor in restoring
the almost lost faith and erosion of confidence of the people in the administration of justice. Courts
of Justice are guided only by the rule of evidence.

The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the
accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the
criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea)
is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the
respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of his
apprehension at the Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted
foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without any specific authority from the Central
Bank as required by law. At the time of his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency
declarations in his possession. These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his previous trips to the
Philippines.

Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
the respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on his defense that the foreign currency he was
bringing out of the country at the time he was apprehended by the customs authorities were brought into the
Philippines by him and his alleged business associates on several previous occasions when they came to the
Philippines, supposedly to be used for the purpose of investing in some unspecified or undetermined business
ventures; that this money was kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines to take the money out
as he and his alleged business associates were afraid that the "attempted revolution" which occurred on July 6,1986
might spread. Such fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of the accused
under the information, was swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook, line and sinker." It did not matter to the
respondent that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of the accused when
he was apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond
to the foreign currency declarations presented by the accused at the trial. It did not matter to the respondent that
the accused by his own story admitted, in effect, that he was a carrier" of foreign currency for other people. The
respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of foreign exchange found in the
possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension consisted of personal checks of other people, as well as
cash in various currency denominations (12 kinds of currency in all), which clearly belied the claim of the accused
that they were part of the funds which he and his supposed associates had brought in and kept in the Philippines for
the purpose of investing in some business ventures. The respondent ignored the fact that most of the CB Currency
declarations presented by the defense at the trial were declarations belonging to other people which could not be
utilized by the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession. Although contrary to ordinary
human experience and behavior, the respondent judge chose to give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused
that he and his alleged business associates had brought in from time to time and accumulated and kept in the
Philippines foreign exchange (of very substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency
denominations) for the purpose of investing in business even before they knew and had come to an agreement as to
the specific business venture in which they were going to invest. These and other circumstances which make the
story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of the respondent judge
obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the
decision "in good faith." His actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound
and fair administration of justice.

He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the release to the accused of at least the
amount of US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under Central Bank Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the
fact that forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the currency listed in the
information, which according to the respondent should be respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive
jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the alleged infringements of the
aforesaid Central Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$
3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said
amount of U.S. Currency to the accused. According to the above-cited CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out
from the Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them; for the purpose of establishing such amount, tourists or non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them
more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of
entries upon arrival in the Philippines. In other words, CB Circular No. 960 merely provides that for the purpose of
establishing the amount of foreign currency brought in or out of the Philippines, a tourist upon arrival is required to
declare any foreign exchange he is bringing in at the time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the amount of
US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies. There is nothing in said circular that would justify returning
to him the amount of at least US$3,000.00, if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of said
amount without specific authority from the Central Bank.

Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency,
and consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper administration of justice and for the
attainment of the objective of maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it
is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the service. All leave and retirement benefits and
privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of
government service, including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the
individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct
line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual
spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges
that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all
cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of
any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of
maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws
that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order,
carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of
contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and
obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often
outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its
members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against
State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm.
He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused
to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries
are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State (underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations,
docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559
to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 ( The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183
of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by
RA 6085).

On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably,
the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law
under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.

On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused."
On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for
vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the
Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in
the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law
requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to
due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic
principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. 3 Courts invariably train their
sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of
constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is
forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the
legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged
by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question
of constitutionality.

In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the
court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available
grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe
environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the
organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the
statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution,
for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly
suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant
case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable
the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts,
conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty
and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection
with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the
illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least ₱50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in
its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty
the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and
a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,
and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by
Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of
FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR
SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,

for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.
7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES;
(italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION
NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF
SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH
 BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the
crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon
such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to
prepare for an intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination"
and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2,
and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional
for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; 6 much less do we
have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its
will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical
or special legal meaning to those words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such
close relationship as to obscure individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is
pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES
OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and
something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a
repetition of the same act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that
two or more, di ba?

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion
because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. So x x x x

REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.

REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already
result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read,
therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway,
the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....

SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.

SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts
of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1),
and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same
category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public
treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in
the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4,
in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or
criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy'
to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan
of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve
the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods
used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a
statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though
defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The
first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear
and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice.12 It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings
or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all
the details in advance as in all other statutes.

Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the
deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial
review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms."14

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."15 The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we
have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 16 In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."19

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot
be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule
is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." 21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's
claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be
applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.22 It constitutes a departure
from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"25 and is generally disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of
the conduct with which the defendant is charged.27

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously
claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be
created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific
precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other
part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality
and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about.
Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively
deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.

The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that
courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its
details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise
and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for
its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to
wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the
discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being
charged and prosecuted.

In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not
suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross
and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e),
of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the
indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized
(Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful
the act of the public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x
x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public
officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits,
advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in
Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general
acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section
unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the
immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the
crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or
conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in
all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of
criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper
factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in
the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during
the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated
in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say,
by falsification is less than ₱100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is ₱100 million since there is
malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr.
Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces
of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime
for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now,
what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.

MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the
amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act
of bribery, he was able to accumulate only ₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate ₱1
million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the
rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a
need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the
amount involved is ₱100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the
total amount would be ₱110 or ₱120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up
the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions,
proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of
proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every
fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is
only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to
have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for
plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty
(50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only
that they amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00.31

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or
amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation
for a combination or series of

overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to
prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very
important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a
substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying
Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts
complained of?

ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not
plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without
applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation
of the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
on the acts charged constituting plunder?

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are
concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder
and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the
epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder.
Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused
but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably,
even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to
present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and
vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without
necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than
enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of
some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should
accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best
be achieved.

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof
of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims
the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.
733:

SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and
every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime
of plunder.33

However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by
petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence,
which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34

Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not
prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as
the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, §2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime
of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the
Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of
the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to
believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said:
"We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to
these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:36

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because
life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the
normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected
to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the
death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious
illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on
the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed
or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal
acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling
to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political
will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money
to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people
it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified
bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers,
that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For
when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala
in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the
inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional
grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the
same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The
declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and
becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have
shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time
as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government.
Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant
tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living
testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the
avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can
equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his
eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among
our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above
factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:

Before I explain my vote, I think it necessary to restate the basic facts.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was President of the Philippines until January 20, 2001 when he was forced to
vacate the presidency by people power and then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him in
office.1 He was charged, in eight cases filed with the Sandiganbayan, with various offenses committed while in office,
among them plunder, for allegedly having amassed ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion, more or less. He
moved to quash the information for plunder on the ground that R.A. No. 7080, otherwise called the Anti-Plunder
Law, is unconstitutional and that the information charges more than one offense.

In its resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion, along with those filed by his co-
accused, Edward Serapio, and his son, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada. Petitioner brought this petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 to set aside the Sandiganbayan’s resolution principally on the ground that the Anti-
Plunder Law is void for being vague and overbroad. We gave due course to the petition and required respondents
to file comments and later heard the parties in oral arguments on September 18, 2001 and on their memoranda filed
on September 28, 2001 to consider the constitutional claims of petitioner.

I. THE ANTI-PLUNDER LAW

The Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. No. 7080) was enacted by Congress on July 12, 1991 pursuant to the constitutional
mandate that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruption."2 Section 2 of the statute provides:

Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. ¾ Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in
Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (As
amended by Sec. 12, R.A. No. 7659).

The term "ill-gotten wealth" is defined in §1(d) as follows:

"Ill-gotten wealth," means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury.

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
 4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.

Section 4 of the said law states:

Rule of Evidence. ¾ For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

II. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NOT TO BE JUDGED

"ON ITS FACE"

The amended information against petitioner charges violations of §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), of the statute. It reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a "Asiong Salonga" and a.k.a "Jose Velarde,"
together with Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John Does & Jane Does, of
the crime of plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public officer, being then the President of the Republic of
the Philippines, by himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue
advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred
seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos [₱4,097,804,173.17], more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, through
any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of
five hundred forty-five million pesos (₱545,000,000.00), more or less, from illegal gambling in the form of
gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in connivance with co-
accused Charlie "Atong" Ang, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does
and Jane Does, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling;

(b) by diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing directly or indirectly, for his or their
personal gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
 [₱130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the two hundred million pesos [₱200,000,000.00]
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in
connivance with co-accused Charlie "Atong" Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does and Jane Does;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, for his personal gain and benefit, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) to purchase 351,878,000 shares of stocks, more or less, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 shares of stocks, more or less, of the Belle Corporation in the amount of more or
less one billion one hundred two million nine hundred sixty five thousand six hundred seven pesos and fifty
centavos [₱1,102,965,607.50] and more or less seven hundred forty four million six hundred twelve thousand
and four hundred fifty pesos [₱744,612,450.00], respectively, or a total of more or less one billion eight
hundred forty seven million five hundred seventy eight thousand fifty seven pesos and fifty centavos
[₱1,847,578,057.50]; and by collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance
with John Does and Jane Does, commissions or percentages by reason of said purchases of shares of stock in
the amount of one hundred eighty nine million seven hundred thousand pesos [₱189,700,000.00], more or
less, from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Equitable-PCI Bank under the
account name "Jose Velarde";

(d) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages, kickbacks, or any form of
pecuniary benefits, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, in the amount of more or less three billion
two hundred thirty three million one hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos and
seventeen centavos [₱3,233,104,173.17] and depositing the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at
the Equitable-PCI Bank.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001

But, although this is a prosecution under §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), what we are seeing here is a wholesale attack
on the validity of the entire statute. Petitioner makes little effort to show the alleged invalidity of the statute as
applied to him. His focus is instead on the statute as a whole as he attacks "on their face" not only §§1(d)(1)(2) of the
statute but also its other provisions which deal with plunder committed by illegal or fraudulent disposition of
government assets (§1(d)(3)), acquisition of interest in business (§1(d)(4)), and establishment of monopolies and
combinations or implementation of decrees intended to benefit particular persons or special interests (§1(d)(5)).

These other provisions of the statute are irrelevant to this case. What relevance do questions regarding the
establishment of monopolies and combinations, or the ownership of stocks in a business enterprise, or the illegal or
fraudulent dispositions of government property have to the criminal prosecution of petitioner when they are not
even mentioned in the amended information filed against him? Why should it be important to inquire whether the
phrase "overt act" in §1(d) and §2 means the same thing as the phrase "criminal act" as used in the same provisions
when the acts imputed to petitioner in the amended information are criminal acts? Had the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code been subjected to this kind of line-by-line scrutiny whenever a portion thereof was involved in a case, it
is doubtful if we would have the jurisprudence on penal law that we have today. The prosecution of crimes would
certainly have been hampered, if not stultified. We should not even attempt to assume the power we are asked to
exercise. "The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with
reference to hypothetical cases . . . . In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be
examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged." 3

Nonetheless, it is contended that because these provisions are void for being vague and overbroad, the entire
statute, including the part under which petitioner is being prosecuted, is also void. And if the entire statute is void,
there is no law under which he can be prosecuted for plunder. Nullum crimen sine lege, nullum poena sine lege .
Two justifications are advanced for this facial challenge to the validity of the entire statute. The first is that the
statute comes within the specific prohibitions of the Constitution and, for this reason, it must be given strict scrutiny
and the normal presumption of constitutionality should not be applied to it nor the usual judicial deference given to
the judgment of Congress.4 The second justification given for the facial attack on the Anti-Plunder Law is that it is
vague and overbroad.5

We find no basis for such claims either in the rulings of this Court or of those of the U.S. Supreme Court, from which
petitioner’s counsel purports to draw for his conclusions. We consider first the claim that the statute must be
subjected to strict scrutiny.

A. Test of Strict Scrutiny Not Applicable to Penal Statutes

Petitioner cites the dictum in Ople v. Torres6 that "when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this Court will
give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation stricter scrutiny" and that "It will not do for
authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties." As will presently be shown,
"strict scrutiny," as used in that decision, is not the same thing as the "strict scrutiny" urged by petitioner. Much less
did this Court rule that because of the need to give "stricter scrutiny" to laws abridging fundamental freedoms, it will
not give such laws the presumption of validity.

Petitioner likewise cites "the most celebrated footnote in [American] constitutional law," i.e., footnote 4 of the
opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,7 in which it was stated:

There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.

It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.

Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious,
or national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.

Again, it should be noted that what the U.S. Supreme Court said is that "there may be narrower scope for the
operation of the presumption of constitutionality" for legislation which comes within the first ten amendments to
the American Federal Constitution compared to legislation covered by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. The American Court did not say that such legislation is not to be presumed constitutional, much less that it is
presumptively invalid, but only that a "narrower scope" will be given for the presumption of constitutionality in
respect of such statutes. There is, therefore, no warrant for petitioner’s contention that "the presumption of
constitutionality of a legislative act is applicable only where the Supreme Court deals with facts regarding ordinary
economic affairs, not where the interpretation of the text of the Constitution is involved."8

What footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case posits is a double standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny for laws
dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and deferential or rational basis standard of
review for economic legislation. As Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando explained in Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Ass’n v. The City Mayor,9 this simply means that "if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider."
Hence, strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race
and facial challenges are allowed for this purpose. But criminal statutes, like the Anti-Plunder Law, while subject to
strict construction, are not subject to strict scrutiny. The two (i.e., strict construction and strict scrutiny) are not the
same. The rule of strict construction is a rule of legal hermeneutics which deals with the parsing of statutes to
determine the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, strict scrutiny is a standard of judicial review for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental
freedoms. It is set opposite such terms as "deferential review" and "intermediate review."

Thus, under deferential review, laws are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest, without
courts seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such interest and examining the alternative means by which the
objectives could be achieved. Under intermediate review, the substantiality of the governmental interest is seriously
looked into and the availability of less restrictive alternatives are considered. Under strict scrutiny, the focus is on the
presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means
for achieving that interest.10

Considering these degrees of strictness in the review of statutes, how many criminal laws can survive the test of strict
scrutiny to which petitioner proposes to subject them? How many can pass muster if, as petitioner would have it,
such statutes are not to be presumed constitutional? Above all, what will happen to the State’s ability to deal with
the problem of crimes, and, in particular, with the problem of graft and corruption in government, if criminal laws
are to be upheld only if it is shown that there is a compelling governmental interest for making certain conduct
criminal and if there is no other means less restrictive than that contained in the law for achieving such
governmental interest?

B. Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines, as Grounds for Facial Challenge,

Not Applicable to Penal Laws

Nor do allegations that the Anti-Plunder Law is vague and overbroad justify a facial review of its validity. The void-
for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law."11 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms."12

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."13 The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we
have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 14 In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,15 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative Act is … the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid."16 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it
is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."17

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot
be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule
is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional."18 As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a particular defendant." 19 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner’s
claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

C. Anti-Plunder Law Should be Construed "As Applied"

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be
applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.20 It constitutes a departure
from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.21 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris:22

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.

This is the reason "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"23 and is generally disfavored.24 In determining the constitutionality of
a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of
the conduct with which the defendant is charged.25

This brings me to the question whether, as applied, §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law is void on
the ground of vagueness and overbreadth.

III. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NEITHER VAGUE NOR OVERBROAD

As earlier noted, the case against petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada in the Sandiganbayan is for violation of §2, in
relation to §1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law, which, so far as pertinent, provide:

SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. ¾ Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death....
SEC. 1. Definition of Terms. ¾ ...

(d) "Ill-gotten wealth," means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury.

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

The charge is that in violation of these provisions, during the period June 1998 to January 2001, petitioner, then the
President of the Philippines, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amassed wealth in the total amount of
P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts," to wit: (1) by receiving or
collecting the total amount of P545,000,000.00, more or less, from illegal gambling by himself and/or in connivance
with his co-accused named therein, in exchange for protection of illegal gambling; (2) by misappropriating,
converting, or misusing, by himself or in connivance with his co-accused named therein, public funds amounting to
P130,000,000.00, more or less, representing a portion of the share of the Province of Ilocos Sur in the tobacco excise
tax; (3) by ordering the GSIS and the SSS to buy shares of stocks of the Belle Corp., worth P1,102,965,607.50 and
P744,612,450.00 respectively, or the total amount of P1,847,578,057.50, for which he received as commission the
amount of P189,700,000.00, more or less, from Belle Corp.; (4) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts,
shares, percentages, and kickbacks in the amount of P3,233,104,173.17, which he deposited in the Equitable-PCI
Bank under the name of "Jose Velarde."

Anyone reading the law in relation to this charge cannot possibly be mistaken as to what petitioner is accused of in
Criminal Case No. 26558 of the Sandiganbayan. But, repeatedly, petitioner complains that the law is vague and
deprives him of due process. He invokes the ruling in Connally v. General Constr. Co.26 that "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." He does this by
questioning not only §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), as applied to him, but also other provisions of the Anti-Plunder
Law not involved in this case. In 55 out of 84 pages of discussion in his Memorandum, petitioner tries to show why
on their face these provisions are vague and overbroad by asking questions regarding the meaning of some words
and phrases in the statute, to wit:

1. Whether "series" means two, three, or four overt or criminal acts listed in §1(d) in view of the alleged
divergence of interpretation given to this word by the Ombudsman, the Solicitor General, and the
Sandiganbayan, and whether the acts in a series should be directly related to each other;

2. Whether "combination" includes two or more acts or at least two of the "means or similar schemes"
mentioned in §1(d);

3. Whether "pattern" as used in §1(d) must be related to the word "pattern" in §4 which requires that it be
"indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy";

4. Whether "overt" means the same thing as "criminal";

5. Whether "misuse of public funds" is the same as "illegal use of public property or technical malversation";
 6. Whether "raids on the public treasury" refers to raids on the National Treasury or the treasury of a
province or municipality;

7. Whether the receipt or acceptance of a gift, commission, kickback, or pecuniary benefits in connection
with a government contract or by reason of his office, as used in §1(d)(2), is the same as bribery in the
Revised Penal Code or those which are considered corrupt practices of public officers;

8. Whether "illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government,"
as used in §1(d)(3), refers to technical malversation or illegal use of public funds or property in the Revised
Penal Code;

9. Whether mere ownership of stocks in a private corporation, such as a family firm engaged in fishing, is
prohibited under §1(d)(4);

10. Whether the phrase "monopolies or other combinations in restraint of trade" in §1(d)(5) means the same
thing as "monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade" in the Revised Penal Code because the latter
contemplates monopolies and combinations established by any person, not necessarily a public officer; and

11. Whether under §1(d)(5) it is the public officer who intends to confer benefit on a particular person by
implementing a decree or it is the decree that is intended to benefit the particular person and the public
officer simply implements it.

Many more questions of this tenor are asked in the memorandum of petitioner27 as well as in the dissent of MR.
JUSTICE KAPUNAN. Not only are they irrelevant to this case, as already pointed out. It is also evident from their
examination that what they present are simply questions of statutory construction to be resolved on a case-to-case
basis. Consider, for example, the following words and phrases in §1(d) and §2:

A. "Combination or series of overt or criminal acts"

Petitioner contends that the phrase "combination or series of overt, or criminal acts" in §1(d) and §2 should state
how many acts are needed in order to have a "combination" or a "series." It is not really required that this be
specified. Petitioner, as well as MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN, cites the following remarks of Senators Gonzales and Tañada
during the discussion of S. No. 733 in the Senate:

SENATOR GONZALES. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act while constituting a single offense, it
must consist of a series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation of public funds, swindling,
falsification of public documents, coercion, theft, fraud, and illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt practices act and
like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think, this provision, by itself, will be vague. I am afraid that it might be faulted for
being violative of the due process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation of an
accused. Because, what is meant by "series of overt or criminal acts"? I mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series?
During the period of amendments, can we establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in band? The
law defines what is robbery in band by the number of participants therein.

In this particular case, probably, we can statutorily provide for the definition of "series" so that two, for example,
would that be already a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such a determination?

SENATOR TAÑADA. I think, Mr. President, that would be called for, this being a penal legislation, we should be very
clear as to what it encompasses; otherwise, we may contravene the constitutional provision on the right of the
accused to due process.28
But, as the later discussion in the Senate shows, the senators in the end reached a consensus as to the meaning of
the phrase so that an enumeration of the number of acts needed was no longer proposed. Thus, the record shows:

SENATOR MACEDA. In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already
result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or." To
read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series."
Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TAÑADA. That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT. Probably, two or more would be . . .

SENATOR MACEDA. Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.

SENATOR TAÑADA: Accepted, Mr. President.

....

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts
of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President. 29

Indeed, the record shows that no amendment to S. No. 733 was proposed to this effect. To the contrary, Senators
Gonzales and Tañada voted in favor of the bill on its third and final reading on July 25, 1989. The ordinary meaning
of the term "combination" as the "union of two things or acts" was adopted, although in the case of "series," the
senators agreed that a repetition of two or more times of the same thing or act would suffice, thus departing from
the ordinary meaning of the word as "a group of usually three or more things or events standing or succeeding in
order and having a like relationship to each other," or "a spatial or temporal succession of persons or things," or "a
group that has or admits an order of arrangement exhibiting progression."30

In the Bicameral Conference Committee on Justice meeting held on May 7, 1991, the same meanings were given to
the words "combination" and "series." Representative Garcia explained that a combination is composed of two or
more of the overt or criminal acts enumerated in §1(d), while a series is a repetition of any of the same overt or
criminal acts. Thus:

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say, THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES
OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and
something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?

....

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that ¾

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, combination is not twice ¾ but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a
repetition of the same act.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to series. Yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.

REP. ISIDRO: That’s not [a] series. It’s a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say
that two or more, ‘di ba?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, this distinguishes it, really, from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts. So. . .

....

REP. ISIDRO: When you say "combination", two different?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA): Two different. . . .

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha. . .

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition. . .31

Thus, resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily reveal that the word "combination" includes at least two
different overt or criminal acts listed in R.A. No. 7080, such as misappropriation (§1(d)(1)) and taking undue
advantage of official position (§1(d)(6)). On the other hand, "series" is used when the offender commits the same
overt or criminal act more than once. There is no plunder if only one act is proven, even if the ill-gotten wealth
acquired thereby amounts to or exceeds the figure fixed by the law for the offense (now P50,000,000.00). The overt
or criminal acts need not be joined or separated in space or time, since the law does not make such a qualification. It
is enough that the prosecution proves that a public officer, by himself or in connivance with others, amasses wealth
amounting to at least P50 million by committing two or more overt or criminal acts.

Petitioner also contends that the phrase "series of acts or transactions" is the subject of conflicting decisions of
various Circuit Courts of Appeals in the United Sates. It turns out that the decisions concerned a phrase in Rule 8(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:

(b) Joinder of Defendants: Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they
are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or
transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged on each count. (Emphasis added)
The fact that there is a conflict in the rulings of the various courts does not mean that Rule 8(b) is void for being
vague but only that the U.S. Supreme Court should step in, for one of its essential functions is to assure the uniform
interpretation of federal laws.

We have a similar provision in Rule 3, §6 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure. It reads:

SEC. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. ¾ All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the
action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. (Emphasis
added)

This provision has been in our Rules of Court since 1940 but it has never been thought of as vague. It will not do,
therefore, to cite the conflict of opinions in the United States as evidence of the vagueness of the phrase when we
do not have any conflict in this country.

B. "Pattern of overt or criminal acts"

Petitioner contends that it is not enough that there be at least two acts to constitute either a combination or series
because §4 also mentions "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy," and
"pattern" means "an arrangement or order of things or activity."

A "pattern of overt or criminal acts" is required in §4 to prove "an unlawful scheme or conspiracy." In such a case, it is
not necessary to prove each and every criminal act done in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy so long as those
proven show a pattern indicating the scheme or conspiracy. In other words, when conspiracy is charged, there must
be more than a combination or series of two or more acts. There must be several acts showing a pattern which is
"indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy." As Senate President Salonga explained, if there are 150 constitutive
crimes charged, it is not necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of them. If a pattern can be shown by
proving, for example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be sufficient to secure conviction.32

The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting separate crimes as just one crime of
plunder by allowing their prosecution by means of a single information because there is a common purpose for
committing them, namely, that of "amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth through such overt or criminal acts."
The pattern is the organizing principle that defines what otherwise would be discreet criminal acts into the single
crime of plunder.

As thus applied to petitioner, the Anti-Plunder Law presents only problems of statutory construction, not vagueness
or overbreadth. In Primicias v. Fugoso,33 an ordinance of the City of Manila, prohibiting the holding of parades and
assemblies in streets and public places unless a permit was first secured from the city mayor and penalizing its
violation, was construed to mean that it gave the city mayor only the power to specify the streets and public places
which can be used for the purpose but not the power to ban absolutely the use of such places. A constitutional
doubt was thus resolved through a limiting construction given to the ordinance.

Nor is the alleged difference of opinion among the Ombudsman, the Solicitor General, and the Sandiganbayan as to
the number of acts or crimes needed to constitute plunder proof of the vagueness of the statute and, therefore, a
ground for its invalidation. For sometime it was thought that under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code convictions
can be had for the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson, and other common crimes. The question was
finally resolved in 1956 when this Court held that there is no such complex crime because the common crimes were
absorbed in rebellion.34 The point is that Art. 134 gave rise to a difference of opinion that nearly split the legal
profession at the time, but no one thought Art. 134 to be vague and, therefore, void.

Where, therefore, the ambiguity is not latent and the legislative intention is discoverable with the aid of the canons
of construction, the void for vagueness doctrine has no application.

In Connally v. General Constr. Co.35 the test of vagueness was formulated as follows:

[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.

Holmes’s test was that of the viewpoint of the bad man. In The Path of the Law, Holmes said:

If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct,
whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. 36

Whether from the point of view of a man of common intelligence or from that of a bad man, there can be no
mistaking the meaning of the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to petitioner.

IV. PLUNDER A COMPLEX CRIME REQUIRING PROOF OF MENS REA

Petitioner argues that, in enacting the statute in question, Congress eliminated the element of mens rea, or the
scienter, thus reducing the burden of evidence required for proving the crimes which are mala in se.37

There are two points raised in this contention. First is the question whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se or
a malum prohibitum. For if it is a malum prohibitum, as the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General say it is,38 then
there is really a constitutional problem because the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

A. Plunder A Malum In Se Requiring Proof of Mens Rea

Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in
se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims
the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S. No.
733:

SENATOR TAÑADA. . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and
every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime
of plunder.39

However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by
petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence,
which, in the Gentleman’s view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAÑADA. Yes, Mr. President . . .40

Señator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not
prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as
the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, §2 provides that ¾

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime
of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the
Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of
the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the
said public officers in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to
believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said:
"We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 41

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to
these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echagaray:42

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because
life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the
normal course of his or her growth as a human being. . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected
to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the
death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious
illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on
the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed
or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal
acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling
to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political
will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money
to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people
it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified
bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers,
that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For
when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se43 and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala
in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the
inherent wrongness of the acts.

B. The Penalty for Plunder

The second question is whether under the statute the prosecution is relieved of the duty of proving beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant. It is contended that, in enacting the Anti-Plunder Law, Congress simply
combined several existing crimes into a single one but the penalty which it provided for the commission of the crime
is grossly disproportionate to the crimes combined while the quantum of proof required to prove each predicate
crime is greatly reduced.

We have already explained why, contrary to petitioner’s contention, the quantum of proof required to prove the
predicate crimes in plunder is the same as that required were they separately prosecuted. We, therefore, limit this
discussion to petitioner’s claim that the penalty provided in the Anti-Plunder Law is grossly disproportionate to the
penalties imposed for the predicate crimes. Petitioner cites the following examples:

For example, please consider the following ‘combination’ or ‘series’ of overt or criminal acts (assuming the P50 M
minimum has been acquired) in light of the penalties laid down in the Penal Code:

a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods),

– combined with –

one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under Art. 213 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period,

- equals -

plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080)

b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215 of the revised Penal Code with prision correccional in
its minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 or both),

– combined with –

one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized under Art. 186 of Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P6,000, or both),

-equals-

plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080.

c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (penalized with prision correccional in
its minimum period or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both under Art. 216 of the Revised Penal Code),

– combined with –
one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade (penalized under Art. 186 of the Revised penal Code
with prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both,

- equals -

plunder, punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets)44

But this is also the case whenever other special complex crimes are created out of two or more existing crimes. For
example, robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code is
punished with prision correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months, and 1 day) to prision mayor in its
medium period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years). Homicide under Art. 249 of the same Code is punished with reclusion
temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). But when the two crimes are committed on the same occasion, the law
treats them as a special complex crime of robbery with homicide and provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death for its commission. Again, the penalty for simple rape under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua, while that for homicide under Art. 249 it is reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). Yet, when
committed on the same occasion, the two are treated as one special complex crime of rape with homicide and
punished with a heavier penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Obviously, the legislature views plunder as a crime
as serious as robbery with homicide or rape with homicide by punishing it with the same penalty. As the explanatory
note accompanying S. No. 733 explains:

Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the
use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth
and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many
states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of
malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute the plunder of an entire nation
resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine
statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the
depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting
influences of power.

Many other examples drawn from the Revised Penal Code and from special laws may be cited to show that, when
special complex crimes are created out of existing crimes, the penalty for the new crime is heavier.

______________________

To recapitulate, had R.A. No. 7080 been a law regulating speech, I would have no hesitation examining it on its face
on the chance that some of its provisions ¾ even though not here before us ¾ are void. For then the risk that some
state interest might be jeopardized, i.e., the interest in the free flow of information or the prevention of "chill" on the
freedom of expression, would trump any marginal interest in security.

But the Anti-Plunder Law is not a regulation of speech. It is a criminal statute designed to combat graft and
corruption, especially those committed by highly-placed public officials. As conduct and not speech is its object, the
Court cannot take chances by examining other provisions not before it without risking vital interests of society.
Accordingly, such statute must be examined only "as applied" to the defendant and, if found valid as to him, the
statute as a whole should not be declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness of its other provisions.
Doing so, I come to the following conclusions:

1. That the validity of R.A. No. 7080, otherwise known as the Anti-Plunder Law, cannot be determined by
applying the test of strict scrutiny in free speech cases without disastrous consequences to the State’s effort
to prosecute crimes and that, contrary to petitioner’s contention, the statute must be presumed to be
constitutional;
 2. That in determining the constitutionality of the Anti-Plunder Law, its provisions must be considered in
light of the particular acts alleged to have been committed by petitioner;

3. That, as applied to petitioner, the statute is neither vague nor overbroad;

4. That, contrary to the contention of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General, the crime of plunder is
a malum in se and not a malum prohibitum and the burden of proving each and every predicate crime is on
the prosecution.

For these reasons, I respectfully submit that R.A. No. 7080 is valid and that, therefore, the petition should be
dismissed.

G.R. No. 172602 September 3, 2007

HENRY T. GO, petitioner,

vs.
THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner of the Decision dated April 13, 2007.

Petitioner, a private individual, stands charged with violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the clear
terms of which punishes public officers who, on behalf of the government, enter into contracts or transactions
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.

The first element of the crime is that the accused must be a public officer who enters into a contract on behalf of the
government. The philosophy behind this is that the public officer is duty bound to see to it that the interest of the
government is duly protected. Thus, should the contract or transaction entered into by such public officer is
manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government’s interests, the public officer is held liable for violation of
Section 3(g), whether or not this public officer profited or will profit thereby.

In Luciano v. Estrella,1 Justice J.B.L. Reyes opines that the act treated in Section 3(g) partakes of the nature of malum
prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or
criminal intent is completely immaterial.2 Section 3(g), however, applies restrictively only to public officers entering
into a contract on behalf of the government manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government.

The pronouncement in Luciano v. Estrella3 is instructive:

Second, herein respondent municipal officials were charged with violation of Republic Act 3019 under its
Section 3(g), or specifically, for having entered, on behalf of the government, into a contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. It is not at all difficult to see that to determine
the culpability of the accused under such provision, it need only be established that the accused is a public
officer; that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and that such a contract
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to that government. In other words, the act treated thereunder
partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum; x x x

In Luciano v. Estrella, the private persons who were charged with "conspiring and confederating together" with the
accused public officers to have unlawfully and feloniously, on behalf of the municipal government of Makati, Rizal,
entered into a contract or transaction with the JEP Enterprises, were also charged with violation of Section 4(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019, for knowingly inducing or causing the above-mentioned public officials and officers to enter
into the aforementioned contract or transaction.

These private individuals were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence, which simply means that the criminal liability
of the public officers for violation of Section 3(g) is separate and distinct from the liability of private persons under
Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019. In other words, notwithstanding the allegation of conspiracy to violate Section
3(g), the liability of private individuals who participated in the transaction must be established under the appropriate
provision which is Section 4(b), for knowingly inducing or causing the public officers to commit Section 3(g) where
criminal intent must necessarily be proved. This is in clear recognition that Section 3(g), a malum
prohibitum, specifically applies to public officers only.

The information in this case, reads:

The undersigned Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, accuses
VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR. and HENRY T. GO with violation of Sec. 3(g), R.A. No. 3019 committed as follows:

On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his
office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and
President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the
project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was
awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession
Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957 as amended by Republic
Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event that
the latter defaults specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 © in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the
ARCA which term is more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.

From a cursory reading of the Information, it indubitably shows that all the elements enumerated for the violation of
Section 3(g) relate to the public officer, not to the private individual, for as have been emphasized, Section 3(g)
is a crime that can only be committed by public officers.

This brings to the fore the overstated point that Section 3(g), by its clear terms, can only be committed by public
officers, for if it were otherwise, then the law itself would have clearly provided for it. Notably, even certain
paragraphs of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 provide for its application to private individuals, but not Section
3(g), thus:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – xxx

xxxx

The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or
offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the
divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section
shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be
permanently or temporarily disqualified, in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form
with the Government.

It is clear that sub-paragraph (g) is not included in the quoted portion of Section 3. There are indeed offenses
punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws where the mere allegation of conspiracy will suffice in
order to validly charge the persons who connived in the commission of the offense. In Section 3(g), however, and
other penal provisions, which can only be committed by a certain class of persons, an allegation of conspiracy to
indict those which are clearly not within its purview, is deficient, as shown in Luciano v. Estrella where the public
officers were convicted under Section 3(g) and yet the private parties therein were acquitted inspite of the allegation
of conspiracy in the Information.

In voting to grant the motion for reconsideration, I am not saying that petitioner is innocent or that he can no longer
be prosecuted if indeed he is liable for any crime relating to his acts that led to the signing of the ARCA. As
emphasized in my Dissenting Opinion dated April 13, 2007, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides for the
prohibition on private individuals, thus:

SEC. 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close
personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with
the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or
relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include
close personal relationship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to
intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

It is well-settled that penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and liberally for the accused, so much so
that the scope of a penal statute cannot be extended by good intention or by implication. The Information lumping
petitioner with a public official for conspiracy to violate Section 3(g), is totally infirm. Section 3(g) can only be
violated by a public officer. The acts for which private persons can be charged together with the public officials are
enumerated in the last paragraph of Section 3 and Section 4, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 3019. If
warranted, petitioner Go should be charged for violation of Section 4(b) in relation to Section 3(g).

In my Dissent to the Decision dated April 13, 2007, reference was made to Articles 210 (Direct Bribery) and 212
(Corruption of Public Officials) of the Revised Penal Code. In Direct Bribery, the public officer agrees to perform an
act either constituting or not constituting a crime, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by
such officer. Only the public officer may be charged under and be held liable for Direct Bribery under Article 210,
while the person who conspired with the public officer, who made the promise, offer or gave the gifts or presents,
may be indicted only under Article 212 for Corruption of Public Officials, regardless of any allegation of conspiracy.

Another concrete example is Campomanes v. People.4 Petitioner Campomanes, a private individual, was charged
with conspiring with a public officer who failed to render account for public funds disbursed punishable under
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he
must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; (3) the offender is required by law to render accounts to
the Commission on Audit; and (4) fails to render an account for a period of two months.

The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Campomanes is not a public officer and applied Article 222 in relation to
Article 218. Article 222 also involves failure to render an account not by a public officer, but by a private individual
who has charge of any national, provincial or municipal funds, revenues or property. Notwithstanding the charge
of conspiracy, petitioner Campomanes was made to answer not to Article 218, which pertains only to public officers,
but to Article 222.

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED and the Decision dated April 13, 2007
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092 dated December 6,
2005 denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash and its March 24, 2006 Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case No.
28092 in so far as petitioner Henry T. Go is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents.
 DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was convicted in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan1 involved moral turpitude.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during
the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to
disqualify2 petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h),
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was
sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public
office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office.4 The case was docketed as SPA No. 07-242 and assigned to the
COMELEC’s First Division.

On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of
House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. 5

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which was denied in its assailed October
9, 2007 Resolution for being moot, thus:

It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position of member
of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for
Reconsideration moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 May 2007 filed by respondent Edgar
Y. Teves challenging the Resolution of this Commission (First Division) promulgated on 11 May 2007 is hereby
DENIED for having been rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.6

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

I.

THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN
BANC DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN ISSUE RAISED IN PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,
WHETHER PETITIONER IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE DECISION
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.

II.

THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE RESOLUTION THEREOF WILL DETERMINE
PETITIONER’S QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN FUTURE ELECTIONS.

III.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN
BANC IN EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION WHICH RULED THAT PETITIONER’S CONVICTION
FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(H) OF R.A. 3019 AND THE IMPOSITION OF FINE IS A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.

A.

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE SHOULD BE
RESOLVED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.

B.

THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST
DIVISION OF THE COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE "TOTALITY OF FACTS" DOCTRINE, PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED
OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.7

The petition is impressed with merit.

The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14, 2007 elections did not effectively moot the issue
of whether he was disqualified from running for public office on the ground that the crime he was convicted of
involved moral turpitude. It is still a justiciable issue which the COMELEC should have resolved instead of merely
declaring that the disqualification case has become moot in view of petitioner’s defeat.

Further, there is no basis in the COMELEC’s findings that petitioner is eligible to run again in the 2010 elections
because his disqualification shall be deemed removed after the expiration of a period of five years from service of
the sentence. Assuming that the elections would be held on May 14, 2010, the records show that it was only on May
24, 2005 when petitioner paid the fine of P10,000.00 he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandignbayan.8 Such being
the reckoning point, thus, the five-year disqualification period will end only on May 25, 2010. Therefore he would still
be ineligible to run for public office during the May 14, 2010 elections.

Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No.
3019 involves moral turpitude. 1avvphi1

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. lawphil.net

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general.9

Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection
with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by
any law from having any interest.

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a
direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or by law.10

Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution
or by law.11

In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court held
therein:

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia,
Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26
September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal
application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any
evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed
because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27
September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs.
Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to
other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the
management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit,
his interest over it was direct.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a
direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each
other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership
of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of
gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is,
therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or
employee, directly or indirectly, to:

xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit…. [Emphasis supplied].

The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is
possession of a prohibited interest.13

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A
determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral
turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited, as in the instant case.

Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that:

Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of
the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of
which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:

"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It
must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not
its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not
of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."

This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International Rice Research Institute
v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by
merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but
rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the
final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. (Emphasis supplied) 1awphi1

Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s conviction and found
that the same does not involve moral turpitude.

First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELEC’s finding that petitioner used his official capacity in
connection with his interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to his wife, in
violation of the trust reposed on him by the people.

The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioner’s conviction involved moral turpitude, misunderstood or
misapplied our ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:

In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted may per se not involve moral turpitude, still
the totality of facts evinces [his] moral turpitude. The prohibition was intended to avoid any conflict of interest or
any instance wherein the public official would favor his own interest at the expense of the public interest. The
[petitioner] knew of the prohibition but he attempted to circumvent the same by holding out that the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel Teves. Later on, he would aver that he already
divested himself of any interest of the cockpit in favor of his wife. But the Supreme Court saw through the ruse and
declared that what he divested was only the management of the cockpit but not the ownership. And even if the
ownership is transferred to his wife, the respondent would nevertheless have an interest thereon because it would
still belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, of which the [petitioner] is the other half.

[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to divest himself but he did
not and instead employed means to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he nevertheless concealed his
interest thereon. The facts that he hid his interest denotes his malicious intent to favor self-interest at the expense of
the public. Only a man with a malevolent, decadent, corrupt and selfish motive would cling on and conceal his
interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly shows his moral depravity and proclivity to put primacy
on his self interest over that of his fellowmen. Being a public official, his act is also a betrayal of the trust reposed on
him by the people. Clearly, the totality of his acts is contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, honesty and
good morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves moral turpitude. 15

On the contrary, the Court’s ruling states:

The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business permit or
license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded." This it based, and rightly so, on
the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit
in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the
Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of
cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of
the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the
issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in the information, because he was not a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan.16

Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary or
financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the
management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC
prohibiting possession of such interest.

As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:

As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31 December 1991,
possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was before the effectivity of
the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In
accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her
sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the cockpit in question dated 28 January 1990 and 18 February
1991, she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her renewal
application dated 6 January 1992, she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise in the
separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992, which she submitted on 22 February
1991 and 17 February 1992, respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission for the renewal of the cockpit registration, she signed her name as Operator/Licensee. 17 (Emphasis
supplied)

Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit is
expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily
involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere
possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions. Thus, in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that:

x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions
enumerated in Section 41 thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC
of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection
with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of the
prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although ignorance thereof would not
excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under
Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.18 (Italics supplied)

The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to
twelve years as maximum to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioner’s violation was
not intentionally done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals but due to his lack of awareness or ignorance of
the prohibition.

Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality as it tends to bring forth
idlers and gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral turpitude.

Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture
and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the
wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., it was held that:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In
the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it
may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices,
Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it
been said that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide,
they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not
to the courts of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated May 11, 2007
and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the position of Representative of the
3rd District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the crime
committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179090 June 5, 2009

LEONILO SANCHEZ alias NILO, Appellant,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, Appellees.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated February 20, 2007 which affirmed the Decision3 dated July 30,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, convicting appellant Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo
(appellant) of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 76104 in relation to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603,5 with a modification of the penalty imposed.

The Facts

Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information 6 dated August 29, 2001 which
reads:
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of Lajog, Clarin,
Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],7 a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the
upper part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered
by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to
the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No.
7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying
versions emerged.

Version of the Prosecution

Private complainant VVV was born on March 24, 1984 in Mentalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu to FFF and MMM.8

On September 24, 1997, VVV's father, FFF, started leasing a portion of the fishpond owned by Escolastico Ronquillo
(Escolastico), located at Lajog, Clarin, Bohol. FFF and his family occupied the house beside the fishpond which was
left by the former tenant.9

On September 2, 2000 at around 7:00 in the morning, while VVV was cutting grass in their yard, appellant arrived
looking for FFF who was then at another fishpond owned by Nilda Parilla located in Boacao, Clarin, Bohol. VVV knew
appellant because he is the husband of Bienvenida Ronquillo (Bienvenida), one of the heirs of Escolastico. 10 She
noticed that appellant had a sanggot (sickle) tucked in his waist.

Appellant then went to VVV’s house and inquired from VVV’s younger brother, BBB, the whereabouts of the latter’s
father. BBB did not answer but his mother, MMM, told appellant that FFF was not around. Right then and there,
appellant told them to leave the place and started destroying the house with the use of his sickle. As a result,
appellant destroyed the roof, the wall and the windows of the house.11 MMM got angry and told appellant that he
could not just drive them away since the contract for the use of the fishpond was not yet terminated. VVV was then
sent by MMM to fetch a barangay tanod. She did as ordered but barangay tanod Nicolas Patayon refused to oblige
because he did not want to interfere in the problem concerning the fishpond. On her way back to their house, VVV
saw appellant coming from his shop with a gallon of gasoline, headed to their house. Appellant warned VVV to
better pack up her family’s things because he would burn their house.12

Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother, BBB, get a piece of wood from the back of their house to defend
themselves and their house from appellant. However, appellant approached BBB, grabbed the piece of wood from
the latter and started beating him with it.13 At the sight, VVV approached appellant and pushed him. Irked by what
she did, appellant turned to her and struck her with the piece of wood three (3) times, twice on the left thigh and
once below her right buttocks. As a result, the wood broke into several pieces. VVV picked up some of the broken
pieces and threw them back at appellant. MMM restrained BBB, telling him not to fight back. After which, appellant
left, bringing with him the gallon of gasoline.14

FFF arrived at about 10:00 in the morning of that day. When he learned about what had happened, FFF brought his
daughter to the Clarin Health Center for medical attention and treatment.15 Dr. Vicente Manalo (Dr. Manalo)
attended to VVV and issued her a medical certificate 16 dated September 2, 2000, stating that VVV sustained the
following:

CONTUSION WITH HEMATOMA PROXIMAL

LATERAL PORTION OF THIGH, RIGHT

TIME TO HEAL: 3-4 DAYS, BARRING COMPLICATIONS

From the health center, FFF and VVV went to the Clarin Police Station where they had the incident
blottered.17 Thereafter, FFF requested Eliezer Inferido to take pictures of the injuries sustained by VVV. 18

Version of the Defense

Appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, developed and operated the fishpond from 1982 to 1987. Sometime in 1997, FFF
occupied the fishpond and the nipa hut beside the same, by virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement19 (MOA)
entered into by FFF with the Heirs of Escolastico, as represented by Segundino Ronquillo. After the MOA expired in
1998, appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, decided to discontinue the lease because they did not understand the
management and accounting of FFF. They made several demands on him to return possession of the fishpond but
FFF refused, asking for a written termination of the contract from all the heirs of Escolastico. To solve the problem,
appellant and Bienvenida engaged the services of FFF as caretaker of the fishpond, providing him with fingerlings,
fertilizers and all necessary expenses.

This notwithstanding, FFF still failed to make an accounting. Thus, on September 2, 2000, at around 7:00 in the
morning, after pasturing his cattle, appellant dropped by the house of FFF to ask him to make a detailed accounting
because he and his wife were not satisfied with the harvest in August of 2000. MMM, however, retorted, saying that
they would no longer make any accounting, as Benny Ronquillo, brother of appellant’s wife, would finance the next
cropping. Displeased with MMM's statement, appellant got angry and demanded that they leave the fishpond. FFF's
family resented this demand and a commotion ensued. BBB got a piece of wood and struck appellant but the latter
was able to parry the blow. Appellant got hold of the piece of wood which actually broke. Intending not to hurt
anybody, appellant threw the same behind him. Suddenly from behind, VVV appeared, got hold of the said piece of
wood and hit appellant once at the back of his shoulder. Appellant testified that the blow was not strong enough to
injure him.20

Appellant claimed that he was surprised that a criminal case was filed by VVV against him for allegedly beating her.
Appellant denied that he beat VVV, saying that the instant case was fabricated and was being used as a means to
extort money from him.21 Moreover, appellant asseverated that Ronald Lauren22 (Ronald) witnessed the incident.

Ronald testified that he saw BBB strike appellant with a piece of wood but appellant was able to parry the blow; that
appellant threw away the piece of wood; that when appellant threw the piece of wood, there was no one there at the
time; and that appellant left the place immediately.23

The RTC's Ruling

On July 30, 2003, the RTC found that at the arraignment, appellant, through former counsel Atty. Theodore Cabahug
(Atty. Cabahug), admitted that he hit VVV, although unintentionally. Thus, appellant had the burden of proving that,
at the time VVV was hit, appellant was performing a lawful act. The RTC ruled that the evidence did not favor
appellant because his demand for FFF's family to vacate the fishpond, coupled with threats and punctuated with
actual use of force, exceeded the limits allowed by law. The RTC also held that the injuries sustained by VVV were
distinguishable, indicating that the blow was forceful, and that the force used was strong. Thus, the RTC disposed in
this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds LEONILO SANCHEZ y Aranas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, and applying in his favor the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, this Court imposes on him the indeterminate sentence of an imprisonment of Six (6) years
of prision [correccional] as minimum to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor as maximum, with costs
against him. The Court orders him to pay [VVV] the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) for civil indemnity
and the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) for damages; the awards for civil indemnity and damages are
without subsidiary penalties in case of insolvency.

IN ACCORDANCE with letter (f) of Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610, the Court exercising its discretion also
imposes on Leonilo Sanchez y Aranas the penalty of a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) without subsidiary
penalty in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.24

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 contending that appellant never admitted that he hit VVV. The RTC,
however, denied the motion in its Order26 dated August 8, 2003 for being pro forma. Aggrieved, appellant appealed
to the CA.27

The CA's Ruling

On February 20, 2007, the CA held that the record of the proceedings taken during appellant's arraignment before
the RTC belied appellant's contention that his defense was one of absolute denial. The CA pointed to a
manifestation of appellant's counsel, Atty. Cabahug, in open court that appellant was putting up an affirmative
defense because the act of hitting VVV was unintentional. Furthermore, the defense of absolute denial interposed by
appellant cannot prevail over the positive and categorical statements of VVV and her witnesses, giving full credence
to the factual findings of the RTC. The CA also ruled that the Information filed against appellant was not defective
inasmuch as the allegations therein were explicit. In sum, the CA held that the prosecution had fully established the
elements of the offense charged, i.e., Other Acts of Child Abuse under R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. However, the
CA opined that the RTC erred in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law because R.A. No. 7610 is a special law.
Lastly, the CA deleted the award of civil indemnity and damages for utter lack of basis. The fallo of the CA decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed Judgment dated July 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City in Criminal Case No. 11110 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Other Acts of Child Abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 and Presidential Decree No. 603 is
hereby UPHELD with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum of prision mayor.
The fine imposed is retained.

The Order dated August 8, 2003 denying appellant's motion for reconsideration is hereby AFFIRMED.

The award of civil indemnity and damages in the assailed Decision is deleted.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.28

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration29 which the CA denied in its Resolution30 dated July 11, 2007.

Hence, this Petition claiming that the CA erred:

 1. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT[;]

2. IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION [OVER] THE CASE DESPITE
A DEFECTIVE INFORMATION WHICH ALLEGED THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF IS (sic) NOT COVERED BY
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED[; AND]

3. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED (VIOLATION OF SECTION
10(a) OF R.A. NO. 7610) NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE ACT COMPLAINED OF IS OBVIOUSLY COVERED BY
THE REVISED PENAL CODE (Act No. 3815) AS SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURY.31

Appellant posits that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt; that the RTC erred when it
shifted the burden of proof to appellant; that the RTC and CA erred in ruling that appellant interposed an affirmative
defense when, all throughout his testimony before the RTC, he denied having inflicted any injury on VVV; and that
appellant and his counsel did not sign any written stipulation for appellant to be bound thereby, hence, the burden
of proof still rests in the prosecution. Moreover, appellant claims that VVV and her family had ill motive to implicate
him because of the pressure he exerted against them to give up the fishpond. Appellant pointed out that VVV, in her
testimony, made material inconsistencies as to who got the piece of wood at the back of their house. Appellant also
claims that he had no motive or intention of harming anyone, otherwise, he would have done so earlier that day;
that if BBB was also beaten, he should have submitted himself for medical treatment and examination; and that the
Information charging appellant was substantially and jurisdictionally defective as the acts complained of were
covered by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant submits that, if duly proven, the acts complained of
are clearly constitutive of Slight Physical Injuries punishable under Article 266 32 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant, likewise, posits that the instant case is not one for child abuse, since VVV was neither punished in a cruel
and unusual manner nor deliberately subjected to excessive indignities or humiliation. The act was not cruel since
the injury was merely slight per medical findings; the location of the injury was on the thigh which is not unusual;
and VVV was not beaten in front of many people as to humiliate her. Lastly, no evidence was submitted by the
prosecution, such as a testimony of a child psychologist, or even of VVV's teacher who could have observed changes
in the victim's behavior, as to prove that the injury was prejudicial to the victim's development. Appellant alleges
that the charge was obviously made as one for child abuse, instead of slight physical injuries, in order to subject him
to a much heavier penalty. Appellant prays for acquittal based on reasonable doubt and, in the alternative, if found
guilty, he should be convicted only of the crime of slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. 33

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asseverates that the instant Petition is fatally defective
because it raises purely factual issues contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; that the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) taken during appellant's arraignment on November 6, 2001 clearly shows
that appellant, through Atty. Cabahug, raised an affirmative defense, hence, appellant cannot now change his theory;
that the prosecution established the fact that appellant committed the acts complained of by virtue of the direct,
positive and categorical testimonies of VVV, corroborated by MMM and duly supported by the medical examination
conducted by Dr. Manalo and the entry in the police blotter; that VVV's and MMM's statements are consistent with
their allegations in their respective complaint-affidavits; and that appellant failed to present any reason or ground to
set aside the decisions of the RTC and the CA. Furthermore, the OSG argues that there is no ambiguity in the
Information as the allegations are clear and explicit to constitute the essential elements of the offense of child abuse,
to wit: (a) minority of the victim; (b) acts complained of are prejudicial to the development of the child-victim; and (c)
the said acts are covered by the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. The OSG submits that
appellant cannot now feign ignorance of the offense under which he was specifically charged, and to which he
voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned.34

However, the OSG opines that the CA erred in modifying the indeterminate sentence imposed by the RTC. The
offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse as defined and punished under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, a special law,
carries the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period which is a penalty defined in the Revised Penal Code. The
OSG states that the RTC correctly applied the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing
appellant to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and
four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, the minimum term thereof being within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree to the prescribed penalty, as there were no attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances.
Thus, the OSG prays that the instant petition be denied and the assailed CA Decision be modified as aforementioned
but affirmed in all other respects.35

Our Ruling

The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual
or not, which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.36

In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 37 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610 provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. —

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.

In this connection, our ruling in Araneta v. People38 is instructive:

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned
statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are
different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No.
7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse,
child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the
development of the child is different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and
independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it
lavvphi1

ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible
for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein.
First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner
suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the
questioned provision does not warrant such construal.39

Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as slight physical
injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that
when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by
the Constitution.40 As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is
habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's
contention.

In the same manner, we reject appellant's claim that the Information filed against him was defective. In Resty
Jumaquio v. Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa,41 we held that what controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited therein. Without doubt, the averments in the Information
clearly make out the offense of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. The following were alleged: (1) the
minority of VVV; (2) the acts constituting physical abuse, committed by appellant against VVV; and (3) said acts are
clearly punishable under R.A. No. 7610 in relation to P.D. No. 603. Indeed, as argued by the OSG, the commission of
the offense is clearly recited in the Information, and appellant cannot now feign ignorance of this.

Appellant could only proffer the defense of denial. Notably, the RTC found VVV and MMM to be credible witnesses,
whose testimonies deserve full credence. It bears stressing that full weight and respect are usually accorded by the
appellate court to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.42 Equally noteworthy is the fact that the CA did not disturb
the RTC's appreciation of the witnesses’ credibility. Thus, we apply the cardinal rule that factual findings of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on such findings, are accorded
respect, if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. The exception is when it is established that the
trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered,
will change the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA and we find no reason to
deviate from the findings of both courts and their uniform conclusion that appellant is indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse.43

However, the penalty imposed upon appellant by the CA deserves review. The imposable penalty under Section
10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 is prision mayor in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the RTC imposed upon appellant the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum. The CA modified this by imposing upon
appellant the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum,
of prision mayor, postulating that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the RTC should have imposed on appellant an
indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same."44 On the other hand, the OSG contends
that the RTC appropriately applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law, citing our ruling in People v. Simon.45

We agree with the OSG.

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

To repeat, the penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its minimum period. This penalty is derived
from, and defined in, the Revised Penal Code. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the Revised Penal
Code for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Thus, where the
special law adopted penalties from the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it
would in felonies.46 In People v. Simon,47 the Court applied the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law to cases of illegal drugs. In Cadua v. Court of Appeals,48 the Court applied the same principle to cases involving
illegal possession of firearms. In those instances, the offenses were also penalized under special laws. Finally, in Dulla
v. Court of Appeals,49 a case involving sexual abuse of a child as penalized under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, the Court likewise applied the same first clause of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This case should be no
exception.

In the absence of any modifying circumstances, and because it is favorable to appellant, we find the penalty of four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, proper. lawphi1

As a final word, we reiterate our view in Araneta,50 to wit:

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for
the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the
Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." This piece of legislation supplies the
inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and
Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for
strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their
commission, and a means by which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.51

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No.
27817 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant Leonilo Sanchez is hereby sentenced to four (4) years, nine
(9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121179 July 2, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ANTONINE B. SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:

The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some "illegal recruiters" who would even go to the extent of
issuing forged tourist visas to aspiring overseas contract workers. These unsuspecting job applicants are made to
pay exorbitant "placement" fees for nothing really since, almost invariably, they find themselves unable to leave for
their purported country of employment or, if they are able to, soon find themselves unceremoniously repatriated.
This Court once described their plight in a local proverb as being " naghangad ng kagitna, isang salop ang nawala." 1

In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
10, 2 appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the Revised Penal Code and six counts
of illegal recruitment, one committed in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.

Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(1), of the
Revised Penal Code. The cases (naming the complainants and stating the amounts therein involved) include:
(1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 3 (Francisco T. Labadchan — P45,000.00); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414
(Victoria Asil — P33,000.00); (3) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 (Cherry Pi-ay — P18,000.00); (4) Criminal Case
No. 92-CR-1426 (Corazon del Rosario — P40,000.00); (5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 (Arthur Juan —
P24,200.00); (6) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644 (Alfredo C. Arcega — P25,000.00); (7) Criminal Case No. 93-
CR-1646 (Brando B. Salbino — P25,000.00); (8) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647 (Mariano Damolog —
P25,000.00); (9) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649 (Lorenzo Belino — P25,000.00); (10) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-
1651 (Peter Arcega — P25,000.00) and (11) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 (Adeline Tiangge — P18,500.00).
Except for the name of the offended party, the amount involved and the date of the commission of the
crime, the following information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 typified the other informations for the
crime of estafa:

That in or about the month of December, 1991, and sometime prior to or subsequent thereto,
at Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud
ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS and by means of deceit through false representations and
pretenses made by her prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS, by
then and there representing herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter for overseas
employment, when in truth and in fact she was not, thereby inducing the said ADELINE
TIANGGE y MARCOS to give and deliver to her the total amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P18,500.00), Philippine Currency, for placement abroad and after
having received it, she appropriated and misappropriated the same for her own use and
benefit and despite-repeated demands made upon (her) to return the same, she refused,
failed, neglected, and still refuses, fails and neglects to comply therewith, all to the damage
and prejudice of ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS in the total sum aforesaid.

Contrary to law. 4

For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code, five separate informations were
also instituted against appellant on various dates. These cases (with the names of the complainants) include:
(1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396 (Francisco T. Labadchan); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 (Cherry Pi-ay);
(3) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416 (Victoria Asil); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario) and
(5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 (Arthur Juan). The typical information in these indictments read:

That sometime in the month of April, 1991 and subsequent thereto at Buyagan, Municipality
of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
recruit one ARTHUR JUAN for overseas employment, by then and there ably misrepresenting
herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she fully knew it to
be false but by reason of her said misrepresentations which were completely relied upon by
Arthur Juan, she was able to obtain from the latter the total amount of TWENTY FOUR
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P24,200.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and
prejudice of Arthur Juan in the total sum aforesaid.

Contrary to Law. 5

The information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale under Article 38,
paragraph 1, of Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, filed on 16 April 1993, read:

That in or about the months of August and September, 1992, in the Municipality of La
Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit the
following: PETER ARCEGA, LORENZO BELINO, MARIANO DAMOLOG, FIDEL OPDAS, BRANDO
B. SALBINO, DEMBER LEON and ALFREDO C. ARCEGA for overseas employment, by then and
there misrepresenting herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in
fact she was not and by reason of her said misrepresentation which was completely relied
upon by the said complainants whom she recruited, either individually or as a group
amounting to illegal recruitment in large scale causing economic sabotage, she was able to
 obtain and received from them the aggregate total amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P175,000.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of the
foregoing complainants in the total sum aforesaid.

Contrary to law. 6

Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa. The criminal cases filed were
raffled off to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet; later, however, the cases were
consolidated at the instance of the prosecution.

Parenthetically, appellant jumped bail pending trial but she was soon arrested by agents of the Criminal
Investigation Service ("CIS").

The Evidence for the Prosecution. —

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396

Francisco Labadchan, a 25-year-old employee in the Navy Base in Pacdal, Baguio City, was introduced to
appellant by Crispin Perez. In September 1991, the two went to the house of Conchita Tagle at Kilometer 3,
La Trinidad, Benguet, who was known to be recruiting workers for abroad. After Labadchan had expressed
interest in applying for a job in Korea, Tagle told Labadchan to prepare P45,000.00, P30,000.00 of which was
to be paid that month and the balance of P15,000.00 before his departure for abroad. Labadchan paid Tagle
the amount of P30,000.00 on 23 September 1991. Appellant, in turn, received that amount when she went to
La Trinidad to "brief" him. She told Labadchan that his flight would be on the 9th of October 1991 and that
he should have paid by then the balance of P15,000.00 of the fees. He paid Tagle the P15,000.00 balance on
05 October 1991. When he requested her to make a receipt, Tagle included the amount in the old receipt for
the P30,000.00 previously given. Appellant handed over to Labadchan some papers to fill up and gave last-
minute instructions before she boarded a green-colored aircraft.

On 08 October 1991, Labadchan and his wife went to Manila and stayed, as so instructed by Tagle, at the
Prince Hotel near the terminal of the Dangwa bus company in Dimasalang, Manila. There, he met other
people, among them, his co-complainant Arthur Juan. In the morning of 09 October 1991, Labadchan and
the others were told to go to the airport with Tagle, where appellant was supposed to give the travel papers
including passports and plane tickets for Korea. At the airport, however, appellant told the group that their
flight had been re-scheduled for 11 October 1991. Labadchan returned to Baguio City.

On 11 October 1991, Labadchan returned to the airport only to be told this time, however, that his passport
was still with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Appellant told her husband to accompany Labadchan to the
Foreign Affairs office. When Labadchan received the passport, he saw that while his picture appeared on it,
the passport was made out in the name of a person from Negros Occidental. Labadchan had to imitate the
signature on the passport just so he could get it. Back at the airport, he was allowed inside the terminal but
only to be later sent out because the ticket he had was one intended for passage from Korea and not to
Korea. Asserting that he and company were mere "chance passengers," appellant sent them all home with a
promise that another departure date would be set. She also took back the "show money" of US$1,000.00.

Appellant would repeatedly schedule a departure date but nothing tangible came out of her assurances.
Finally, Labadchan was able to get appellant to promise that the money he had given her would be refunded.
When this promise neither materialized, Labadchan finally reported the matter to the National Bureau of
Investigation ("NBI"). In that office, appellant executed a promissory note stating that she would return the
amount of P46,500.00, which included the amount of P1,500.00 allegedly used for getting a passport, to
Labadchan. 7
 In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416

Victoria Asil, a 40-year-old housewife from Imelda Village, Roxas Street, Baguio City, heard from her elder
sister, Feling Derecto, that appellant was recruiting workers for abroad. During the second week of January
1992, she, along with her husband Gabriel, went to appellant's house in Buyagan, La Trinidad. Appellant
assured her that she could have a job in a factory in Korea. Appellant asked for an advance fee of P25,000.00
of the P40,000.00 agreed fee. Victoria gave appellant the "advance fee" on 13 January 1992 at her
(Victoria's) shop in Shopper's Lane, Baguio City which appellant acknowledged by issuing a receipt for the
amount. She told Victoria to be at appellant's house in Buyagan after three weeks.

When Victoria went to appellant's house as so directed, appellant told her that her flight had been
postponed supposedly because prior applicants had to be accommodated first. Victoria met appellant seven
more times only to be ultimately told that the latter had been allegedly "fooled" by the "main office" in
Manila. Appellant, nevertheless, demanded an additional P5,000.00 from Victoria so that she could leave on
18 April 1992. Victoria gave appellant the amount of P5,000.00 at her shop on 31 March 1992 for which
appellant gave a corresponding receipt.

When on 18 April 1992 still "nothing happened," Victoria demanded from appellant a refund. Appellant gave
her an "advance" of P15,000.00. An acknowledgment receipt with appellant's signature affixed thereon
would evidence that payment. Appellant, however, failed to return the rest of the promised refund. 8

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 and Criminal Case No 92-CR-1415

Cherry Pi-ay, a 26-year-old nursing student from Acop, Tublay, Benguet, was visited once in March 1991 by
appellant who encouraged Cherry to apply for work in a textile or a plastic factory in Korea with a monthly
salary of US$800.00. Appellant told Cherry that the moment she would pay the amount of P45,000.00, she
could be deployed in Korea. Cherry prepared her bio-data and gave it to appellant at the latter's residence
during the first week of April 1991.

Cherry was able to leave the country on 04 July 1991 after having paid the total amount of P45,000.00.
Appellant told her that a certain Ramil would meet her at the airport in Korea. When she arrived, a Filipina,
named Marlyn, instead met her. Marlyn introduced herself as appellant's friend and accompanied Cherry to a
certain house owned by a Korean. There, Cherry met, among other compatriots, Corazon del Rosario and
Jane Kipas. Cherry soon realized that she was not going to have a job in the factory promised by appellant.
Instead, she was made to work for the Korean applying rugby on and folding leather jackets. About a month
later, men from the Korean Immigration accosted her and the others. Brought in for questioning by
Immigration officials, Cherry and her companions were informed that they were illegal workers. After the
investigation, Cherry and her group were allowed to go but on 08 August 1991, all were deported.

Back to the Philippines, the deportees were assured by appellant that they would get a refund of their
money. Cherry executed a sworn statement narrating her experience in Korea. 9

Ayson Acbaya-an, Cherry's "boyfriend" who later was to become her husband, corroborated Cherry's
testimony that appellant first received P18,000.00 from Cherry. Thereafter, appellant also received
P27,000.00 from Cherry, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) of which amount came from him. In both
instances, appellant signed receipts for the payments. The receipts were among Cherry's papers confiscated
in Korea. 10

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426

Corazon del Rosario, a 34-year-old housemaid from 48 Happy Homes, Baguio City, had known appellant, an
acquaintance, since 1980. One day in December 1990, she happened to chance upon appellant at a PLDT
telephone booth in Kilometer 4, La Trinidad, Baguio City. Appellant, representing herself to be an authorized
recruiter, tried to persuade Corazon to work abroad. Corazon showed interest. From then on, appellant
would visit Corazon in her brother's house in Kilometer 4. Ultimately, appellant was able to convince Corazon
that, for a fee of P40,000.00, she could be sent to Korea. Corazon gave appellant the amount of P15,000.00.
She paid the balance of P25,000.00 in May 1991. The payments were both made in the presence of Cherry Pi-
ay and Jane Kipas. Appellant issued the corresponding receipts for these amounts.

Corazon took the flight for Korea on 28 June 1991. Appellant had instructed Corazon, upon landing in Korea,
to call up a certain Ramil. At the airport, Corazon, including her companions among them Jane Kipas, kept on
dialing the number but each time only a Korean woman would answer the call. Later, that evening, a certain
Marlyn, who introduced herself as appellant's friend, took them to a hotel. There, Marlyn took their "show
money" of US$1,000.00. The group stayed overnight in the hotel and the following morning, a Korean took
them to a house proximately two hours away by car from the airport. For about a month, they did nothing
but apply rugby on leather jackets, for which they were not paid, until a policeman arrived and took all ten of
them to the airport. All that the immigration and airport personnel would tell them was that they should be
thankful they were only being repatriated home. Immigration and airport authorities confiscated everything
that they had.

At home, appellant promised to return Corazon's money. Not having received the promised refund, Corazon
went to the CIS stationed at Camp Dangwa where, on 28 July 1992, she executed her sworn statement. 11

Avelina Velasco Samidan, a friend of Corazon and in whose house the latter would stay whenever she was in
Baguio, corroborated the testimony of Corazon that she gave to appellant the amount of P15,000.00, ten
thousand pesos of which amount Corazon borrowed from Avelina, and that some time in April 1991, Corazon
withdrew P25,000.00 from the bank which she likewise paid to appellant. 12

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428

Arthur Juan, a 30-year-old farmer from Dumulpot, Tublay, Benguet, first met appellant in her house at
Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet, when he, together with Maxima Gomez, Tirso Gomez and Francisco
Labadchan, went to see appellant who was said to be recruiting workers for Korea. Juan promptly submitted
his bio-data form after being told that he could work in a factory in Korea at US$400.00 a month. Appellant
quoted a processing fee of P40,000.00. Juan initially paid the amount of P6,500.00 in April 1991. On 09
October 1991, the scheduled date of the flight, Juan went to the airport and gave appellant another
P15,000.00; the final balance of the fees were, by their agreement, to be remitted to appellant on a salary
deduction basis. Appellant then told Juan that he could not leave on that day (09 October 1991) because the
airplane was already full. Appellant took back Juan's passport, telling Juan that he should be able to depart
in a few days. Appellant, however, kept on rescheduling the flight for about five more times until it became
clear to Juan that he had been deceived. Juan paid out a total amount of P24,200.00, including the
US$100.00 that would have been his pocket money, to appellant. The latter executed receipts for the
amounts.

Juan executed a sworn statement narrating the unfortunate incident. 13

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652

Adeline Tiangge, a 43-year-old housekeeper from Bangao, Buguias, Benguet, learned that appellant was
recruiting workers for abroad. Adeline, accompanied by her sister, went to see appellant at her house in
Buyagan some time in December 1991. There were others, like her, who also went to see appellant. When she
produced the required identification pictures and P1,500.00 for passport processing, appellant told Adeline
that she could be a factory worker in Korea with a monthly salary of US$350.00. Appellant agreed to be paid
by Adeline the additional P35,000.00 balance by installment. The first installment of P17,000.00 was paid on
15 February 1992, evidenced by a receipt signed by "Antonine Saley," with the remaining P18,000.00 being
payable before getting on her flight for abroad.

Adeline waited in Baguio City for word on her departure. Adeline, together with some other applicants,
thrice went to appellant's office at the Shopper's Lane to check. She also went to Dimasalang, Manila, in
front of the Dangwa terminal, for a like purpose. Appellant informed her that she just had to wait for her
flight. Adeline, exasperated, finally demanded a refund of the amount she had paid but appellant merely
gave her P100.00 for her fare back to
Benguet. 14

—0—

The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale had
been submitted to likewise constitute the evidence to establish the People's case, respectively, in —

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644

Alfredo Arcega, a 42-year-old hotel employee from 16 Q.M. Subdivision, Baguio City, heard from a former
co-worker, Fidel Opdas, that appellant was recruiting workers for overseas employment. Interested, he, in the
company of his nephew, Peter Arcega, went to appellant's house in Buyagan, La Trinidad. There, he met job
applicants Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog and Brando Salbino. Appellant assured the group that they
could get employed in Taiwan for a monthly salary of P12,000.00 to P15,000.00. She told them that the
processing and placement fees would amount to P40,000.00 each. Arcega and his companions agreed.

On 17 August 1992, Arcega paid appellant P10,000.00 in Dimasalang, Manila. Appellant issued a cash
voucher for the amount. She told Arcega to just wait "for the results." On 30 September 1992, appellant
asked Arcega for another P15,000.00 which amount he paid. With him at the time were his nephew Peter
Arcega, as well as Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog, Lorenzo Belino and Brando Salbino. Appellant issued a
receipt and affixed thereon her signature. Appellant told Arcega that with the payment, his employment
abroad was assured. She stressed, however, that the balance of P15,000.00 should be paid before his
departure for Taiwan. After following up the matter with appellant in October 1992 and then in December
1992, he finally gave up. Arcega went to the POEA office in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, and when he
learned that appellant had pending cases for illegal recruitment, he also filed his own complaint and
executed an affidavit before Atty. Justinian Licnachan. 15

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646

Brando Salbino, a 36-year-old resident of East Quirino Hill, Baguio City, used to be a "forester" of the DENR.
In July 1992, he met appellant at her Buyagan residence after his brother-in-law, Fidel Opdas, had said that
she was recruiting workers for abroad. Appellant told him that she could help him get employed in Taiwan
with a P12,000.00 monthly salary. Salbino submitted various documents required by appellant. On 11 August
1992, Salbino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang "temporary office" so that,
according to her, his travel papers could be processed. The payment was receipted. On 30 September 1992,
he paid her another P15,000.00, for which appellant again issued an acknowledgment receipt.

Appellant told Salbino to merely wait in Baguio City. When she failed to show up, he went to appellant's
house in Buyagan to verify. She was not there. The following week, he went to Manila with Fidel Opdas
hoping to see her. Appellant's where abouts could not be determined. Having failed to locate her, Salbino
and his companions went to the POEA office in Magsaysay, Baguio City. It was at the POEA office that they
were to learn that appellant was not in the list of licensed recruiters. He, along with the others, then executed
an affidavit-complaint before Atty. Licnachan. 16

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647

Mariano Damolog, a 33 year-old farmer from 26 P. Burgos Street, Baguio City, went to appellant's residence
in Buyagan in July 1992 when informed by Fidel Opdas, his co-worker at the MIDO Restaurant, that appellant
was recruiting workers for Taiwan. Appellant herself later told Damolog that she was licensed to recruit
workers. He forthwith applied for a position at a factory in Taiwan with a salary of between US$400.00 and
US$500.00 a month. He, after being required to pay a processing fee, paid the amount of P10,000.00 to
appellant at her Manila office. Appellant gave him a cash voucher. Damolog was then supposed to just wait
in Baguio City for a telegram.

When he did not receive word from appellant, Damolog went to Manila to see what had happened to his
application. Appellant was again told to simply stand by in Baguio City. After several days, Opdas, who had
meanwhile gone to Manila, told Damolog to see appellant in Manila. In Manila, appellant told Damolog to
sign a bio-data form for "screening purposes." Like Peter Arcega, Fred Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo
Belino, he was also asked to pay another P15,000.00. The group went back to Baguio City to raise the amount
of P15,000.00 each. On 30 September 1992, he, together with Fred and Peter Arcega, Brando Salbino and
Lorenzo Belino, returned to Manila. Damolog handed over his P15,000.00 to appellant who issued an
acknowledgment receipt, signed by "Annie Saley" which, according to appellant, was her name. Appellant
assured him that he would be among the first to go to Taiwan by December 1992.

December 1992 came but no word was received prompting Damolog and his companions to repair to
appellant's house in Buyagan. She was not home. Damolog proceeded to Manila where appellant told him to
wait a few more days. When still "nothing happened," Damolog and his companions went to the POEA office
where Atty. Licnachan issued a certification stating that appellant was not authorized to recruit workers.
Damolog and his companions filed a joint affidavit-complaint executed before Atty. Licnachan 17 against
appellant.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649

Lorenzo Belino, a 37-year-old farmer from Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet, was in Manila in August 1992
looking for employment. Fidel Opdas, a companion in his trip to Manila, mentioned that perhaps appellant
could help. Belino saw appellant who then told him about the prospect of getting employed in Taiwan.
Appellant invited him to see her on 20 September 1992 in Buyagan.

On the appointed date, Belino found Mariano Damolog, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon, Alfredo
Arcega and Peter Arcega already in appellant's residence in Buyagan. Appellant asked P10,000.00 from each
of them if they wanted her to be "responsible for representing" them to get themselves employed in Taiwan
with a monthly income of P15,000.00. When the group agreed, appellant made them fill up and sign a bio-
data form. Appellant also made them understand that they would each have to pay her the total amount of
P40,000.00, P10,000.00 of which was to be forthwith paid and the balance to be paid as and when everything
would have been arranged for their flight to Taiwan.

On 23 September 1992, Belino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang office. Appellant
issued a cash voucher therefor. Belino returned to Baguio City. Five days later, Belino went down to Manila
after appellant had sent word that he had to come to Manila. On 30 September 1992, Belino paid in Manila
the amount of P15,000.00 demanded by appellant. Appellant signed her name as "Annie Saley" on the
receipt. Appellant informed Belino that he should wait for her telephone call regarding the schedule of his
flight. He waited but when no calls came, Belino and Opdas decided to visit appellant in her house in
Buyagan. Appellant asked to be given until January to deploy them in Taiwan. February 1993 came, and still
there was no news from appellant. In March 1993, Belino and others, namely, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino,
Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega, 18 decided to file a complaint against appellant with the POEA in
Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, where their sworn statements were taken.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651

Peter Arcega, a 27-year-old cashier from 317 Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, also paid the amount of
P10,000.00 to appellant for a promised job overseas. A cash voucher was signed by appellant to acknowledge
the payment. Peter, subsequently, also paid the amount of P15,000.00 to appellant for which the latter
issued a receipt signed by "Annie Saley." He was among those who signed the affidavit-complaint before the
POEA.

Testifying in Criminal Case No. 93-CN-1645, 19 as a corroborative witness, Dembert Leon, a 25 year-old
unemployed from 52-F Tandang Sora Street, Baguio City, said that he, desiring to get an employment
abroad, likewise went to see appellant at her residence in Buyagan. Accompanied by Fidel Opdas, Leon was
told by appellant to complete the necessary papers, including his bio-data, barangay clearance, ID and NBI
clearance. Leon applied to be a factory worker in Taiwan. He was assured a monthly salary of P12,000.00, but
first, appellant told him, he should commit to pay a placement fee of P40,000.00 of which amount
P10,000.00 had to be paid forthwith. Leon paid and a cash voucher, dated 08 September 1992, was issued by
appellant. On 30 September 1992, he paid appellant another P15,000.00 for which another acknowledgment
receipt was issued. The remaining P15,000.00 was agreed to be paid at the airport before his flight to Taiwan.
No further word came from appellant. Finally, in December 1992, when he and the others called her up,
appellant informed them to wait until January 1993. January came and still nothing happened. In March
1993, Leon and the others went to the POEA office to lodge a complaint against appellant. 20

Jose B. Matias, an Attorney II at the POEA Regional Station Unit in Baguio City, received a request for
verification on whether or not appellant was a licensed recruiter. In response, he advised that appellant was
not authorized to recruit "in the City of Baguio and in the region" from 1989 "to the present." Atty. Matias
issued a certification to that effect.

—0—

The Case for the Defense. —

The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the complainants in applying for overseas
employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and from which she derived a commission. 21

According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the liaison officer of the Friendship Recruitment
Agency from 1983 to 1986. In that capacity, she would submit to the POEA "contracts for processing job
orders for applicants" and assist applicants prior to their departure at the airport. When the licensed agency
closed in 1986, she went to Baguio where she engaged in the purchase and sale of vegetables and flowers.
Even then, however, she would not hesitate extending help to applicants for overseas employment by
recommending licensed agencies which could assist said applicants in going abroad. She named the Dynasty
Travel and Tours and the Mannings International as such licensed agencies. She had, in the process, been
able to help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan and Francisco Labadchan to name
some, sent abroad. 22

Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry went to see her again, this time asking for
assistance in getting an employment in Korea. She accompanied Cherry to the Dynasty Travel and Tours in
Manila that enabled her to get a tourist visa to Korea. Appellant herself later gave Cherry her tourist visa. For
Cherry's visa and plane ticket, appellant received from Cherry P15,000.00 and US$250.00. Appellant issued a
receipt therefor and delivered the amounts to the Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, issued her a
receipt. The CIS men who arrested her in Manila confiscated that receipt. In August 1991, Cherry came back
and asked her to look for another travel agency saying she did not like the work she had in Korea. 23

Norma Bao-idang, a former client of the Friendship Recruitment Agency, introduced Corazon del Rosario to
appellant. Since the agency had already been closed, appellant referred Corazon to Mannings International in
Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila. Corazon was able to leave for Abu Dhabi where she worked as a domestic
helper. In 1991, Corazon again sought appellant's assistance in getting an employment in Korea. Appellant
introduced her to Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, helped Corazon get a tourist visa for Korea. She
did ask for P15,000.00 and US$250.00 from Corazon but these amounts, being for Corazon's ticket and hotel
accommodation, were turned over to Dynasty Travel and Tours. She also knew that Corazon was able to
leave for Korea because she herself handed over to Corazon her tourist visa and ticket. Appellant received
P2,000.00 from Dynasty Travel and Tours by way of commission. She was also issued a receipt by that travel
agency showing that she had turned over to it the amounts received from Corazon but the CIS men took the
receipts and other documents from her. When Corazon returned home in 1991 after going to Korea, she
again sought appellant's help in looking for a travel agency that could assist her in going back to that
country. 24

Appellant came to know Arthur Juan through a vegetable vendor named Maxima Gomez. He asked her for
help in securing a tourist visa. Appellant was able to assist him and others, like Francisco Labadchan, Tirso
Gomez and Romeo Balao, by referring them to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked from them the
amounts of P15,000.00 and US$250.00 which she turned over to the travel agency. Again, she was issued a
receipt by that agency but that, too, was confiscated by the CIS agents who arrested her. Of the men who
sought her help in going abroad, seven "were able to leave." The others had been re-scheduled to leave but
they failed to arrive at the airport.

Labadchan and Juan met appellant during the first week of January 1993. She gave them back the plane
ticket and the amount of US$250.00 so that they could ask for a refund from the travel agency. The next time
she saw Labadchan was at the NBI office when NBI Director Limmayog invited her for questioning. Appellant
tried her best to look for a job for Labadchan but the transaction she had with Fast International failed to
push through. 25

Appellant helped Victoria Asil secure a tourist visa. The latter's sister was a former client at the Friendship
Recruitment Agency who was able to work in Saudi Arabia in 1985. She introduced Victoria to the Dynasty
Travel and Tours. Appellant asked Victoria to advance P15,000.00 and US$250.00 for her ticket and hotel
accommodation. Victoria gave appellant the amount, and the latter issued corresponding receipts. She
turned over the amount to the travel agency which, in turn, issued a receipt to appellant. The CIS, however,
confiscated all the documents in her attache case. 26 Appellant was able to process Victoria's visa for Korea
but when someone informed the latter that she could have a visa for Taiwan, Victoria opted to change her
destination. Appellant told Victoria that her visa and ticket for Korea had already been obtained but Victoria
insisted on a refund of her money. Appellant returned to her P15,000.00 that was supposed to be the amount
to be exchanged into dollars for her "show money." Victoria issued a receipt for the amount but appellant
entrusted it to her former lawyer. Appellant handed over the plane ticket to Victoria. 27

Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to Adeline Tiangge. When Adeline said that she was
interested in securing a tourist visa for Korea, appellant took her to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant
asked from Adeline the amount of P17,000.00 for her plane ticket. Appellant was able to buy a plane ticket
and to get a passport for Adeline. The latter, however, later said that she was no longer interested in going
to Korea and that her passport application should, instead, be "diverted to Hongkong." In fact, Adeline was
able to leave for Hongkong. Adeline filed a case against appellant because when Adeline sought a refund
from Dynasty Travel and Tours, the agency only gave her P5,000.00 or just a half of the P10,000.00 she
wanted. 28

Fidel Opdas was appellant's client at the Friendship Agency who was able to leave for Saudi Arabia. He asked
her if she could find a job for him in Taiwan. When appellant told him that she knew someone who could
help, Opdas brought along Mariano Damolog. Appellant introduced them to Marites Tapia and Carol
Cornelio of Dynasty Travel and Tours who told Opdas and Damolog to submit the necessary documents for
their application for work in Taiwan. In May 1993, Opdas returned with Brando Salbino who also talked to
Marites and Carol. Opdas submitted to appellant the documents required by Marites and Carol. Appellant, in
turn, gave the papers to Marites and Carol. When, later, Opdas went to see appellant, he brought along
Dembert Leon and Lorenzo Belino. Appellant requested Opdas to accompany the two to Marites and Carol
with whom they discussed what would be necessary "for their application for Taiwan. Still later when Opdas
came back with Peter and Alfredo Arcega to see appellant, she again referred them to Marites and Carol. The
job applicants each gave appellant P10,000.00 which the latter turned over to Marites and Carol. The two
gave her receipts but these were in the same attache case that was seized by the CIS agents and never
returned. The group subsequently withdrew their applications although it was only Opdas who received a
P15,000.00 refund. 29

In a bid to prove that CIS agents indeed took away her attache case containing documents that could bail her
out of the charges, appellant presented Danilo A. Deladia, one of the three policemen who arrested her.
Equipped with a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Luis Dictado of Branch 8, the policemen went to the house
of appellant's cousin at 2320-B San Antonio, Sampaloc, Manila at 3:00 p.m. of 25 August 1993. According to
Deladia, however, they did not get anything from appellant because their mission was only to arrest her. At
the counter intelligence branch of the CIS, he did not even hear appellant requesting for the return of a brief
case. 30 Apparently because of what had turned out to be Deladia's adverse testimony, the defense presented
George Santiago who claimed to be at the boarding house when appellant was arrested. Santiago said that
he had allowed the CIS agents to enter the boarding house. Santiago did not see what might have happened
in appellant's room but what he did see was that when the agents all came out, they had with them an
attache case. Santiago, accompanied by his cousin Atty. Lomboan, went to the CIS in Camp Crame where one
of the men asked P50,000.00 for the release of appellant. Santiago did not see any brief case in the office but
one of the men told them that they would "produce" appellant and the attache case if they could "produce"
the amount of P50,000.00. 31

On cross-examination, however, Santiago admitted that the P50,000.00 was meant for "bonding purposes"
and that they did not make a formal request for the release of the brief case. 32

The defense next attempted to shift, albeit unsuccessfully, the responsibility for the crime from appellant to
Maritess and Carol. Presented at the witness stand was Oscar Gaoyen, a 30-year-old farmer, who testified
that appellant had failed to assist him in going to Korea to work "because it was difficult." While following
up his application in Manila, he met Marites and Carol in front of the Dangwa station in Dimasalang and he
was told that they knew someone who could "transfer his application to Taiwan." He said that even after he
had paid appellant P50,000.00, nothing happened constraining him to file charges against her. Appellant
returned P15,000.00 of the money to him. 33

Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its decision, a "Motion to Reopen Trial" with an
urgent motion to defer promulgation on the ground of newly discovered evidence. 34 In its order of 03 March
1995, the trial court, noting that the "newly discovered evidence" consisted of affidavits of desistance of
seven complainants, found no merit in the motion. It held that "presentation of the same does not give valid
ground for possible amendment of the decision as the private complainants had already testified." It agreed
with the prosecutor that "the affidavits of desistance only (had) the effect of satisfying the civil liability." 35
The Judgment of the Trial Court. —

On 03 March 1995, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged. It found implausible appellant's claim that she was merely an agent of Dynasty Travel
and Tours and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If what she claimed were true, said the court, appellant
could have presented her principals; instead, that failure exposed her to the "adverse inference and legal
presumption that evidence suppressed would be adverse if produced." It also found "hard to believe," the
"self-serving" claim of appellant that her brief case, supposedly containing receipts of her remittances to the
travel agencies, was confiscated by the CIS and remained unaccounted for. The trial court concluded:

In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit false, that she had the ability to send the
complainants abroad for work deployment, thereby employing false pretenses to defraud
them. This was despite her knowing very well that she was not legally authorized. The
complainants willingly parted with their money in the hope of overseas employment
deceitfully promised them by the accused. What makes matters worse is that these amounts
given to the accused come from hard-earned money, or worse, could have been borrowed
from money lenders who have no qualms about collecting usurious interest rates.
Complainants who faithfully relied on the accused did not hesitate to painstakingly raise or
even beg or borrow money just so they could give a decent future to their families even to the
extent of leaving them for far-off lands. But now, all their dreams are gone, their hopes
shattered. Some may not have even been able to pay back what they borrowed nor recoup
their losses. Now, more than ever, their future appears bleaker. But this time, a glimmering
light appears at the end of the tunnel as the Court steps in to lay down the iron fist of the law
so as to serve the accused a lesson, a bitter one, with the hope that those who are trekking or
those who are about to trek the same pilfered path that the accused took will reconsider their
pursuits before it would be too late, and in the end, this form of fraud which invariably
victimizes the poor will forever be stopped. 36

All given, the trial court then decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in all the above-mentioned cases, the Court finds accused Antonine B. Saley, also
known as Annie B. Saley, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the corresponding crime as
charged in the informations and hereby sentences her in each case, except in Criminal Case
NO. 93-CR-1645 where an indeterminate sentence is not applicable, to suffer an indeterminate
sentence for the duration hereunder given, and to pay the costs, as well as the damages due
the private complainants, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396

Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM
and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397

Imprisonment from Three (3) Years, Six (6) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Seven (7) Years, Four (4) Months and
One (1) Day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan
P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413

 Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM
and to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria As-il
P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Cherry Pi-ay
P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416

Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM
and to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425

Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM
and to pay Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Seven (7) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del Rosario
P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427

Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM
and to pay the costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay the costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo C.
Arcega P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645

To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. She shall also pay Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) each to Peter Arcega, Lorenzo Belino, Mariano Damolog, Brando
Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando B.
Salbino P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano
Damolog P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo
Belino P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline
Tiangge y Marcos P17,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

With respect to accused Conchita Tagle in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-CR-1396 and 92-CR-1397, let
these cases be sent to the files without prejudice to their revival as soon as she shall have been
arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.

In order that Conchita Tagle may not escape the clutches of the law, let Alias Warrants of
Arrest issue addressed to the PNP Chief of Police, La Trinidad, Benguet and the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila and in Baguio City. Further, the Commission of
 Immigration and Deportation (CID), Manila is ordered to include her name in the its Hold-
Departure List.

SO ORDERED. 37

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that the trial court had erred in giving
credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty of the crimes charged
despite the "failure" of the prosecution to fully establish the elements of the crimes beyond reasonable
doubt. 38 Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court, on 03 April 1995, denied a reconsideration of its
decision. 39 The following day, appellant filed a notice of appeal. 40 The trial court gave due course to the
appeal on 17 April 1995. 41

The Instant Appeal. —

Appellant continues to profess before this Court her innocence of the accusation. She reiterates her assertion
that the trial court has erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in
finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the various offenses she has been charged with by the
prosecution. 42 She avers that her transactions with the complainants have been "limited to her assisting them
secure their respective travel visa specifically for tourist" and that "her assistance to them (has been) only to
refer them to travel agencies" such as the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings International. She
insists that she has remitted the amounts solicited from the complainants to the travel agencies, or to
Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio, earning only the commissions "for bringing in clients interested in getting
tourist visas." 43

At the outset, it might be explained that this appeal involves the conviction of appellant not only for the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale for which the penalty of life imprisonment is imposed but also for
other offenses for which lesser penalties have been meted by the trial court upon appellant. This Court has
appellate jurisdiction over ordinary appeals in criminal cases directly from the Regional Trial Courts when the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher. 44 The Rules of Court, allows, however, the appeal of criminal cases involving penalties lower
than reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment under the circumstances stated in Section 3, Rule 122, of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus —

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment,
or where a lesser penalty is imposed but involving offenses committed on the same occasion
or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death or life imprisonment is imposed shall be by filing a notice of appeal in
accordance with paragraph (a) of this Section.

In giving due course to the notice of appeal filed by appellant, the trial court has directed that the
"entire records of the seventeen cases" should be forwarded to this Court. 45 It might be observed that
this appeal, which has been assigned only one docket number, involves cases, although spawned
under different circumstances could be said to somehow be linked to the incident giving rise to the
case for illegal recruitment in large scale. The cases have thus been correctly consolidated and heard
jointly below. The appeal made directly to this Court of the seventeen cases, each of which
incidentally should have been assigned a separate docket number in this Court, is properly taken.

Art. 38 (a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment activity "undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority." Recruitment is defined by Article 13, paragraph (b), of the same Code as referring —
 . . . to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:

1) That the offender has no valid license or authority required by

law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; and

2) That the offender undertakes either any activity within the

meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article
13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34. 46

Any person who commits the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code shall be
liable under Article 38(a) thereof. 47 The proviso in Article 13(b) "lays down a rule of evidence that
where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more
prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the
act of recruitment and placement." 48 The article also provides that recruitment includes the act of
referral or "the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial
interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or
bureau." 49

The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed, violated the law against illegal recruitment.

The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that appellant did represent herself as being in
a position to get for the aspiring overseas contract workers good-paying jobs abroad. Appellant was thus
able to demand and receive various amounts from the applicants. The latter would then be briefed by
appellant on the requirements for employment overseas. Appellant herself testified, thus:

Q From 1986 when separated from Friendship Recruitment Agency and before
you were put to jail did you have any occupation?

A Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to Manila for resale.

Q Aside from buying and selling vegetables down in Manila did you have any
other source of income?

A Sometimes I helped some applicants who are interested to go abroad and

asked if I know some agencies who can assist them to go abroad.

Q Were you able to assist some people to look for an agency to assist them to
go abroad?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were you being paid when you assist these people applying for overseas
employment?
 A Yes, sir.

Q By whom?

A The travel agencies give me some amount of commission.

Q What are the names of these agencies which you know?

A Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Do you know also if this Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings
International is duly licensed by the government to recruit applicants abroad?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you have any document to prove that it is registered?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where is that?

A Mannings International is a licensed agency and Dynasty Travel and Tours is

licensed to issue tickets for applicants to go abroad.

Q You said that Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets for
applicants going abroad what do you mean by applicants going abroad?

A Those applicants to work as a contract worker and who are ready to leave for
abroad and they are being issued tickets.

Q Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas worker-applicants?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you remember some of them?

A Cherry Piay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan, Francisco Labadchan and
others." (Emphasis supplied.) 50

Appellant at one point claimed that she had helped complainants only in acquiring for them plane
tickets and tourist visas. On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she had made referrals of
job applicants to recruitment agencies. 51 She evidently knew all along that the persons she was
dealing with were applicants for employment abroad.

The law requires that the above activities of appellant should have first been authorized by the POEA. 52
Rule
II, Book II, of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment provides:

Sec. 11. Appointment of Representatives. — Every appointment of representatives or agents

of licensed agency shall be subject to prior approval or authority of the Administration.
 The approval may be issued upon submission of or compliance with the following
requirements:

a. Proposed appointment or special power of attorney;

b. Clearances of the proposed representative or agent from NBI;

c. A sworn or verified statement by the designating or appointing

person or company assuming full responsibility for all acts of the
agent or representative done in connection with the recruitment
and placement of workers.

Approval by the Administration of the appointment or designation does not authorize the
agent or representative to establish a branch or extension office of the licensed agency
represented.

Any revocation or amendment in the appointment should be communicated to the

Administration. Otherwise, the designation or appointment shall be deemed as not revoked or
amended.

The claim that appellant did not categorically represent herself as a licensed recruiter, or that she merely
helped the complainants secure "tourist visas," could not make her less guilty of illegal recruitment, 53 it
being enough that he or she gave the impression of having had the authority to recruit workers for
deployment abroad. 54

The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving Cherry Pi-ay and Corazon del Rosario, only the
complainant in each of the cases, have testified against appellant in the illegal recruitment cases does not
thereby make the case for the prosecution weak. The rule has always been that the testimony of witnesses is
to be weighed, not that the witnesses be numbered, and it is not an uncommon experience to have a
conclusion of guilt reached on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. 55 Corroborative evidence is
necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness has perjured himself or that
his observations have veered from the truth. 56

The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not
warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's cause. As long as the
prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the accused has involved himself
in an act of illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can very well be justified. 57

Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any discernible shadow of doubt that
appellant is indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on various counts. Being neither a licensee nor a holder of
authority to recruit, appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code the penalty of imprisonment
of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than
P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. In imposing the penalty, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the application of the circumstances that could modify the criminal
liability of an accused cannot be considered, these provisions being inapplicable to special laws. 58

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 59 whenever the offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall
impose on the accused an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same." 60 Accordingly, in imposing the penalty of four (4) years to six (6) years on appellant for each of the
five cases of illegal recruitment, the trial court has acted correctly.
Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is perpetrated against three or more persons "individually
or as a group." Its requisites are that: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken
recruitment activities as so defined by law, (2) the same person does not have a license or authority to do
that, and (3) the questioned act is committed against three or more persons. 61 The prosecution has been able
to successfully show that, for a fee, appellant, not being authorized to recruit workers for abroad, did so in
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 against seven complainants. For this offense, Article 39(a) of the Labor Code
imposes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). This
penalty was thus likewise aptly meted out upon appellant by the trial court.

Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the offender for
estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to warrant
conviction. 62 Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the offense
(estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2)
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person. 64 Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been shown in the cases under review.

The penalty for the crime is prescribed by Article 315, first to fourth paragraphs, of the Revised Penal Code
as follows:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of
the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos,
provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following
means: . . . .

In the case of People vs. Gabres, 65 the Court has had occasion to so state that —

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed" for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed
by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant
to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to
the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.
 The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter
should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with
the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then
be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months . . . . 66

The Court reiterates the above rule, however, in fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty
of prision correccional maximum period to prision mayor minimum period should be divided into
"three equal portions of time," each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period; hence —

Minimum Period Medium Period Maximum Period

From 4 years, 2 months From 5 years, 5 months From 6 years, 8 months

and 1 day to 5 years, and 11 days to 6 years, and 21 days to 8 years

5 months and 10 days 8 months and 20 days —

in consonance with Article 65, 67 in relation to Article 64, 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

When the amount involved in the offense exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the
Code "shall be imposed in its maximum period," adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 although
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. The maximum penalty should then be
termed as prision mayor or reclusion temporal as the case may be. In fine, the one year period, whenever
applicable, shall be added to the maximum period of the principal penalty of anywhere from 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years.

Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed by the complainants who individually charged appellant
with illegal recruitment, the applicable penalties would, respectively, be, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 where appellant defrauded Francisco T. Labadchan in the amount of
P45,000.00, two years for the additional amount of P23,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article
315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years). As such,
aside from paying Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages, the Court deems it
proper to sentence appellant to the indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional medium to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor medium.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, appellant defrauded Victoria Asil in the amount of P15,000.00. Hence, aside
from paying Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages, appellant shall also suffer the
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional medium to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 where appellant defrauded Cherry Pi-ay in the amount of P18,000.00,
appellant, besides paying Cherry Pi-ay that amount by way of actual damages, shall also suffer the
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 where appellant defrauded Corazon del Rosario in the amount of
P40,000.00, appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional medium to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 where appellant fraudulently solicited the amount of P24,200.00 from
Arthur Juan, appellant shall pay him actual damages in that amount and shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days (imposed by the court a quo)
of prision correccional minimum period to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652 where appellant defrauded Adeline Tiangge the amount of P18,500.00,
appellant shall pay her the same amount as actual damages and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645, the prosecution has successfully established its case against appellant for
illegal recruitment in large scale. Evidently banking on her reputation in the community as a job recruiter,
appellant was able to make the seven complainants believe that they could land various jobs in Taiwan.
Confident of her assurances, each complainant parted with P25,000.00 for supposed processing and
placement fees.

It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal recruitment in large scale, only five 69 of them filed
separate charges of estafa against appellant. Accordingly, appellant was only and could only be held liable
for five counts of estafa arising from the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since appellant collected
the amount of P25,000.00 from each of the five (5) victims, she must be held subject to the penalty in its
maximum period or prision mayor in its minimum period (not any higher on account of the fact that the
amount in excess of P22,000.00 provided for by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is less than
P10,000.00). 70 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no attending circumstances,
appellant shall bear, the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional medium as minimum penalty to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor minimum as maximum penalty for each offense. In addition, appellant should pay the
five (5) victims the amount of P25,000.00 each as actual damages.

The actual damages awarded here shall be subject to diminution or cancellation should it be shown that
appellant had already paid the complainants.

WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment, illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications
hereunder specified, and only to the extent thereof, in the following cases:

1) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of

imprisonment of from three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional medium period as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor medium period as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00
by way of actual damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to
five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM
and to pay Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages.

3) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to
five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM.

4) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of

imprisonment of from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium period
as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM.

5) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to
six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.

6) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to
six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and
to pay Alfredo Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

7) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to
six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and
to pay Brando Salbino the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

8) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to
six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and
to pay Mariano Damolog the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

9) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to
six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and
to pay Lorenzo Belino the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

10) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from
one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as
MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as
MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

11) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from
one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as
MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum period as
MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge the amount of P17,000.00 by way of actual damages.

The awards of damages in Criminal Cases No. 92-CR-1396, No. 92-CR-1413, No. 92-CR-1416, No. 92-CR-1425,
and No. 92-CR-1427, all for illegal recruitment, as well as No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large
scale, except for the award of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages to Dember Leon (no estafa case having
been instituted), are DELETED, either because similar awards have already been provided for by the trial
court, or for insufficiency of proof, in the estafa cases aforenumbered.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on
or about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when
subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape from
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily
waived his right to a pre-trial conference,3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.

The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the
police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto.
Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in
the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money from Bustamante, the team,
together with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities
and barangay officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant to
Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him if he had marijuana. Appellant answered in the
affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter,
handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment.
Lopez then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed
in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was then
brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed under
custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator.4

Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the
appellant. He also averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from
appellant.5

Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed
farthest from the rest of the other members, that is, around two hundred meters away from his companions. He did
not actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant
after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the
latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his
right to counsel.6

Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated" which appellant
signed, admitting therein the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro
likewise informed the court below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf
was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put "two",
instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the correction since they were the ones who were personally
and directly involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant.7

Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's
apprehension, and the results were practically normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also
did not find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant due
to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has a history of peptic
ulcer, which causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant
came back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition remained
normal.8

As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at
around 4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the members of his family in their house when three persons,
whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about
something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going to
Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different route. While on board, he was told that he was a
pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp,
he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt.
Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket
of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure
the maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle,
Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted a
quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca,
Pampanga where he was confined for three days.9

Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga
after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering
from peptic ulcer even before the latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana
Pangan District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her
examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight
or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.11

On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.12

Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower court, contending in his
assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G"
(Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.13

At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant
actually sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated
subsequently from his possession,14 the latter not being in any way connected with the sale, the information alleges
that he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves.15 In view thereof, the issue presented for
resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does not
include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is not
charged herein.16

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. 17 To sell
means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration.18 It must, therefore, be established beyond
doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as
the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.

After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally certain that
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able
to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his testimony was amply
corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and
the bare denials and negative testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more
entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible
to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not
obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance
was conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are
presumed to have regularly performed their official duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been
framed,22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for him to controvert the charge, he
does not appear to have plausibly done so.

When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist
therein,23 confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from
appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime
had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.25

Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags
from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but
in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same.26

Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since such
is not an element of the offense with which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana
was confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an
error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter
and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the
witnesses' honesty.27 Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he
did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he participated in
the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of their unit.

Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered
for finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations.28 This omission has been
satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:

Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting such

operation you do not anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to
determine the thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold of the object?

A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because we are lacking
that kind of material in our office since that item can be purchased only in Manila
and only few are producing that, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, CIS, as well as
the office of NICA?

A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a request for that
powder because they, themselves, are using that in their own work, sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes
can under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act
punishes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions."30 The dusting
of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for identification purposes, which
identification can be supplied by other species of evidence.

Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the
seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or
booked in the custody of any barangay official or police authorities.31 These are absurd disputations. No law or
jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any
other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught
appellant in flagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a
warrantless arrest and seizure.

Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the police in connection with his
apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea
bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried
leaves." Below these remarks was affixed appellant's signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized
property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the
marked bills from him.33

However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's
conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They
were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense,
there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel.34 Although appellant manifested during
the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the
presence of counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him, either
verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can
easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.

Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his
predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller.38 In the present case, and in
light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.

Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total stranger.39 We take this
opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case,
belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place.40 It is not contrary to human
experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger,41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity between the
buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves. 42 While
there may be instances where such sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse circumstances of
person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we can
safely say that those exceptional particulars are not present in this case.

Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by the arresting officers which
caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under custody.43 This he asserts to support his
explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and
coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.44 The evidence on record is bereft of any
support for appellant's allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution45 and the other for the
defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the
person of appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had
been suffering even before his arrest.47 His own brother even corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had a
history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48

Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not
divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention
there.49 Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against
the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to do so50 and with the legal services of counsel being available to
him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure fabrication.

These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated
for the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only
the culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society and it was providential that it came about after he
was caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded on a
note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience necessarily affects the
original disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law which we shall now resolve.

II

The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:

Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited

Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or

Instrument of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if
the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

xxx xxx xxx

 5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana

xxx xxx xxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.

1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total
weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial
inquiry would be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the
previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said
Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes
punished by special laws.54 The execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses since
habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious
physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.55

Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor
invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has
likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:

. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal
laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if
the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the
accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime
and the penalty.

If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659
has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and
pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for
relief under a writ of habeas corpus.56

2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the
drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.

As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall
unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That
penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or
more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of
its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as
the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been
committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such
conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law,57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where
the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in
criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable
range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty
shall be taken from said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said
second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall form a
period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum
period.58

Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which
period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific
mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal
transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20
of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable
penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not altogether
be disregarded. Since each component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as
determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper
period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.

It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon
that, unless there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second
paragraph be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively the
bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof.
Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250
to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death.60

Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision
correccional is consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.

4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three
periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is
whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty of prision
correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability
should be taken into account.

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special
laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be
applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because
the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which
penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then
provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to
determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of
penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter
were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The
suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be
invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such
supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special
law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily,
with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this
case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be
both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.

For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses
under special laws would be necessary.

Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but differently from the
penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of
penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without division
into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time
laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed during the American regime.

Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be
punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance,
Commonwealth Act No. 30362 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein,
provided:

Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by section one of this Act,
shall prima facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer against his employee or laborer
by means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen,
paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same
manner as therein provided.63

Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties
as technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700
(Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto mayor to prision
mayor; and Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision
mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.

Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539

(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not
more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon
things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when committed with violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without
reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the
application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said
rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.

The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the
penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion
temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the
other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to
those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539
and special laws of the same formulation.

On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised
Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have
suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the
fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the
statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding
application to said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold
otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the
Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of Congress.

In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the
Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised
Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein that —

We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely distinct from and
unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of
the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for
penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be
deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large
cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the
Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)

More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic
Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:

. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be
"supplementary" to special laws, this Court held that where the special law expressly grants to the
court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the
application of the provisions of the Code . . . .

The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no explicit grant of
discretion to the Court in the application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court
must be guided by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the application of
penalties which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries of experience in the administration of
criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.)66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting integral
parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more reason should the provisions of said Code on
the appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the
different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would result in
absurdities as will now be explained.

While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying
circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and
applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in
accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of
execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64,
when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall
be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and
68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should
not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20
of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially
provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when
the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty
next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If
this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto
menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which
must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the
corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal
penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the
seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be
adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged
from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.

6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us.
Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put
him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death,
provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment.68 The more
important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.

It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal
Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold that this quoted portion of the
section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is
without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that
the "offense is punished" under that law.

There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special
laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not included or
contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the
illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only
to the first and last examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is
but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.69

We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the
penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects.
In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of
the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in
effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the
first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)

A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim
that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of
Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof
excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we
have held that what is considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law,70 and
that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life imprisonment".

What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles
of literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related contemporaneous legislation; and of
structural interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103
in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall be
the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming ambiguity
in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode of interpretation. 71

The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in
favor of the accused.72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and
not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his confinement.73 It
does not constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence
under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In
fact, his release on parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be
ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence.

It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a
minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the
maximum range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with
fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1
day of prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only one day, is hardly worth the
creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.

ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against
accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby
is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years
of prision correccional, as the maximum thereof.

SO ORDERED.

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where the penalty to be imposed would
be prision correccional pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17
of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as
amended), should be that whose minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b)
the presence of two or more mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstances or of a privileged
mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or two degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into
account the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision correccional.

The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also their technical signification and effects, then what should
govern is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:

in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.

Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses penalized
under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as
punished under the Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by Act. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also
provides that:

if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied).

There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into account in the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other
laws (or special laws).

The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus
appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under the Revised
Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty which is included in the
classification of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.

On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or special law) if it is not defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such other law.

It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor
are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are
found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of
penalties does not make an offense in the special law punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The
reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor, although it
adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the
Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by the
Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal
Code. If that were so, then we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are mala in se and to apply
the Articles of the Revised Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article
16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals, accomplices, and accessories (Article
46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article 61), among others. We cannot do
otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is extremely hard to justify.

I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code
does not make an offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, where the proper penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
is prision correccional, then, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence to be meted on
the accused should be that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum prescribed by the special law (the
Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.

II

The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is
a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion
temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the lightest of
them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that
under the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity of the drug subject of the
criminal transaction, then by way of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the purpose
of Section 20, as amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal penalty
depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty shall then be fixed.

To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the proper principal penalty
should be prision correccional, but there is one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be
imposed should be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It
declares:

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the
periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should
such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph
of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest
penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses.

Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal — if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs involved — by two degrees,
or to prision correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is
present (paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged mitigating circumstances of, say,
minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
Yet, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a reduction by two degrees is
proper, it should only be reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision
correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed.

I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same second paragraph
involving the same range of penalty, we both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68, and
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness
of drug offenses, is unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing quantity as basis for the
determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is
unfair because an accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE dangerous
drugs — say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would be reclusion
temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum because of
privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of possession of only one (1) gram of
marijuana — in which case the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional — would not be entitled to a reduction
thereof even if he has the same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the former has.

Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to the
reduction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age . — When the offender is a
minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next
to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from
liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a
discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than
that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lover
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17
of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.

Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.

# Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where the penalty to be imposed would
be prision correccional pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17
of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as
amended), should be that whose minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b)
the presence of two or more mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstances or of a privileged
mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or two degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into
account the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision correccional.

The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also their technical signification and effects, then what should
govern is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:
 in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.

Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses penalized
under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as
punished under the Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by Act. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also
provides that:

if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied).

There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into account in the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other
laws (or special laws).

The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus
appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under the Revised
Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty which is included in the
classification of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.

On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or special law) if it is not defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such other law.

It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor
are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are
found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of
penalties does not make an offense in the special law punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The
reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor, although it
adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the
Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by the
Revised Penal Code.

Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal
Code. If that were so, then we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are mala in se and to apply
the Articles of the Revised Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article
16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals, accomplices, and accessories (Article
46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article 61), among others. We cannot do
otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is extremely hard to justify.

I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code
does not make an offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, where the proper penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
is prision correccional, then, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence to be meted on
the accused should be that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum prescribed by the special law (the
Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.

II

The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is
a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion
temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the lightest of
them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that
under the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity of the drug subject of the
criminal transaction, then by way of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the purpose
of Section 20, as amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal penalty
depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty shall then be fixed.

To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the proper principal penalty
should be prision correccional, but there is one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be
imposed should be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It
declares:

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the
periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should
such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph
of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest
penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses.

Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal — if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs involved — by two degrees,
or to prision correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is
present (paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged mitigating circumstances of, say,
minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
Yet, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a reduction by two degrees is
proper, it should only be reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision
correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed.

I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same second paragraph
involving the same range of penalty, we both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68, and
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness
of drug offenses, is unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing quantity as basis for the
determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is
unfair because an accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE dangerous
drugs — say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would be reclusion
temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum because of
privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of possession of only one (1) gram of
marijuana — in which case the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional — would not be entitled to a reduction
thereof even if he has the same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to the
reduction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age . — When the offender is a
minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next
to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from
liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a
discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than
that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lover
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17
of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.

Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 141066 February 17, 2005

EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision,1 dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of
Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The
Bouncing Checks Law.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as follows:

That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping with one another,
knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743
postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS
(₱9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient
funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the
aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran
Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated
amount.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2

The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly worded, except for the
allegations concerning the number, date and amount of each check, that is:

(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of ₱12,730.00;3

(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of ₱8,496.55.4

The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two accused pleaded not guilty
to the crimes charged.5

The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in 1989, spouses
Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City,
Bohol;7 sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; 8 sometime in
the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan
of ₱12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of ₱8,496.55,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; 10 the three checks bounced
upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check,
despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.12

While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account
was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an
agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a signatory of
the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.14

On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and
Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand
charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment and fine, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them, and a fine in the
amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;

2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year and a fine of ₱12,
730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
 3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them and a fine of ₱8,496.55
equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;

4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the complainant, Mr.
Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00 representing actual expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant
cases; ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount of ₱30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3)
subject checks which bounced; but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

With Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.15

Adronico applied for probation which was granted.16 On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle
of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and
had no participation in the issuance thereof.17

On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.18 It held that the provisions of the penal
code were made applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs.
Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs. Bruhez.21 It noted that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall
be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P.
Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the
fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not
indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in every act and knows the part which everyone performed.
The Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be the act of the
other.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution dated
November 16, 1999.22

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS
THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTER’S ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD
LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.

2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING

THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:

Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punished
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.23
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no
participation in the drawing and issuance of the three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the
checks themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as
defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy
would enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such
as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance of checks.

The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that
some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are
applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in
a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to
such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can
perfectly be reconciled.

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to
offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that
special legal provisions prevail over general ones.24 Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be
considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the
article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary"
to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.

The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs. Bruhez27 rests on a firm
basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code to special
laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 22 28 of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the
Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved
the application of Article 1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the
commission of the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs.
Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in violation
of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the
absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People,31 the Court applied suppletorily
the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 32 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision
on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design
is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each
of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.33

All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the
accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. 34 The overt act
or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist
of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.35

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was
merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068. 36 With respect to
Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not
specify the nature of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a
direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to
petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to
mean concurrence with the criminal design.

Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. 37 Conspiracy transcends
mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. 38 Even
knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy,
absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.39

As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:40

To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept
that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the
crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device
by which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.

Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always
be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. The Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we
quote:

At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-appellant Franco, merely relied and
pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the
commission of the crime.

The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the evidence for
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The proof against him must survive the
test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied
that on the defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act
but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.

Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of
the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution
has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)41
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of
the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the petitioner’s
innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted. 1a\^/phi1.net

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in
Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B .P. Blg. 22 for failure of
the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft2 for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.

In an information3 dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows:

The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9 th day of January, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused being then employed as one [of] the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an
Operator of several taxi cabs with business address at corner 44 Commonwealth Avenue, iliman ( sic),
this City, and as such has free access to the taxi he being driven, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by
his employer and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry
away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266 worth ₱303,000.00, Philippine Currency,
belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount
of ₱303,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment4 on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is established.

Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his father, hired
appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed that
appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC Transport’s garage
and remit the boundary fee in the amount of ₱780.00 per day.5

On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the
same day as he was supposed to.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you report for work?

A: Yes, sir.
 Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your duties and responsibilities as taxi driver of the taxi
company?

A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the boundary.

Q: How much is your boundary?

A: ₱780.00, sir.

Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what procedure [do] you follow with that company?

A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company and before we leave we also sign something, sir.

Q: What is that something you mentioned?

A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.

Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the end of the day, what is then the procedure reflect ( sic) by
your company when you return a taxi?

A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book and daily trip ticket.

Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record book?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you brought out a taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of taxi?

A: Daewoo taxi, sir.

Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25, 1996?

A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was short of my boundary, sir.6

The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellant’s house to ascertain why the taxi was not
returned.7 Arriving at appellant’s house, he did not find the taxi there, appellant’s wife telling him that her husband
had not yet arrived.8 Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and
reported that his taxi was missing.9

On January 9, 1997, appellant’s wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been
abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City.10 Cipriano lost no time in repairing to Regalado Street where he
recovered the taxi.11
Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi on December 25, 1996 as he was
short of the boundary fee, he claims that he did not abandon the taxi but actually returned it on January 5,
1997;12 and that on December 27, 1996, he gave the amount of ₱2,000.0013 to his wife whom he instructed to remit
the same to Cipriano as payment of the boundary fee14 and to tell the latter that he could not return the taxi as he
still had a balance thereof.15

Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that when she went to the garage to remit the boundary fee
on the very same day (December 27, 1996),16 Cipriano was already demanding the return of the taxi.17

Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed the record book,18 which was
company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and gave his employer ₱2,500.0019 as partial payment for
the boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997.

Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance in the boundary fee, he left his driver’s license with
Cipriano;20 that as he could not drive, which was the only work he had ever known, without his driver’s license, and
with the obligation to pay the balance of the boundary fee still lingering, his wife started working on February 18,
1997 as a stay-in maid for Cipriano, with a monthly salary of ₱1,300.00,21 until March 26, 1997 when Cipriano told
her that she had worked off the balance of his obligation;22 and that with his obligation extinguished, his driver’s
license was returned to him.23

Brushing aside appellant’s claim that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and that he had in fact paid the total
amount of ₱4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft by Decision of May
17, 2001, the dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged, and
he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.

In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the preventive
imprisonment undergone by him there being no showing that he agreed in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAS INTENT TO GAIN WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS GARAGE.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT.25

It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty
of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment even if they have not been specifically
assigned.26
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,27 by Republic Act
No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING."

When statutes are in pari materia28 or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons
or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter,29 or have the same purpose or object,30 the rule
dictates that they should be construed together – interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi
modus.31 Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence,32 as this Court explained in City of Naga v. Agna,33 viz:

. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be
construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the
earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having thus in mind
the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is
deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior
statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together. In construing
them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the new
provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so construed that effect may be
given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision and the old relating to the same
subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative
will . . .34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be
taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.35

Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic
servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5)
the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.36

On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent
to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a
motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. 37

Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle,38 the concept of unlawful taking in theft,
robbery and carnapping being the same.39

In the 2000 case of People v. Tan40 where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People v.
Lobitania41 which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of
motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.

There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery
and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
 intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with the
crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking,
intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter's
consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor
vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain,
without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force upon
things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the
purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said
statute.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted.)

It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it
excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers,
amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors,
trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the theft or
robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the
provisions on robbery, respectively.43

From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-
carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall
within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.

The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for qualified theft notwithstanding,
appellant may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it is necessary that the statutory designation
be stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the
offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information
which determines the real nature of the crime.44

In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the taxi owned by Cipriano
without the latter’s consent.45 Thus, the indictment alleges every element of the crime of carnapping,46 and the
prosecution proved the same.

Appellant’s appeal is thus bereft of merit.

That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he was
supposed to is admitted.47

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. 48

While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was
entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and
against the owner’s consent transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one.49 Appellant himself
admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with Cipriano’s consent as the latter was
already demanding its return.

Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony that when you gave your wife the ₱2,500.00, you also told
her to go to the company to ask the company for permission for you to use the taxi since you were then still
short of the boundary. Alright, after telling that to your wife and after seeing your wife between December
27, 1996 and January 5, 1997, did you ask your wife what was the answer of the company to that request of
yours?
 A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry with me.

Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not agreeable to your making use of the taxicab without
first returning it to the company?

A: Before the new year, sir.

Q: When you said new year, you were referring to January 1, 1997?

A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.

Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew already that the company was not agreeable to your making
use of the taxicab continually (sic) without returning the same to the company, you still went ahead and
make (sic) use of it and returned it only on January 5, 1997.

A: Yes, sir.50 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Appellant assails the trial court’s conclusion that there was intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi without the
owner’s consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to remit the boundary fee,
his earnings that day not having permitted it; and that there was no intent to gain since the taking of the taxi was
not permanent in character, he having returned it.

Appellant’s position does not persuade.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.51 Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.52 The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed.53 Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes
gain.54

In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission55 which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v.
Fieldmen’s Insurance Co, Inc.,56 Justice Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of an
insurance policy, explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the latter’s consent even if
the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully
taken constitutes gain:

Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was "temporary" and for a "joy ride",
the Court sustains as the better view57 that which holds that when a person, either with the object of going
to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging to
another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal
property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom
utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard who
holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it "hurt de uso."58 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)

Besides, the trial court did not believe appellant’s claim that he in fact returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.

The Court can not (sic) believe accused’s assertion that he returned the subject vehicle on January 5, 1997 to the
garage and that he had in fact paid the amount of ₱4,500.00 in partial payment of his unremitted "boundary" for ten
(10) days. He could not even be certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the taxicab owner. On direct-
examination, he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on December 27, 1996 the amount of ₱2,000.00 and it was his
wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on cross-examination, he claimed that he gave ₱2,500.00 to his wife
on that date for payment to the taxicab owner.59

The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered, would alter the result of the
case.60 The reason for the rule being that trial courts have the distinct advantage of having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying or their conduct and behavior during the trial. 61

Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant has not shown any scintilla of evidence that he indeed
returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.

Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5, 1997, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when you returned the taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you have any copy of that record?

A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record book and I even voluntarily left my driver’s license with
them, sir.

Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you were short of (sic) boundary, did you turn over any
money to your employer when you returned the taxi?

A: I gave them [an] additional ₱2,500.00, sir.

Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was your short indebtedness ( sic) or short boundary
(sic)?

A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay ₱4,500.00.

Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of payment for this ₱4,500.00?

A: They were the ones having the record of my payment, and our agreement was that I have to pay
the balance in installment.62 (Emphasis supplied)

While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997 the record book indicating that he returned the taxi on
the said date and paid Cipriano the amount of ₱4,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary fee, appellant did not
produce the documentary evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim. That such alleged record book is in the
possession of Cipriano did not prevent him from producing it as appellant has the right to have compulsory process
issued to secure the production of evidence on his behalf.63

The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping, it erred in the imposition of the
penalty. While the information alleges that the crime was attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same cannot
be appreciated as the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of said
Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal impossibility of application, either by express provision or by
necessary implication.64
Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those
under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under
the said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies
under the Code.65

Thus, in People v. Panida66 which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty imposed was the indeterminate
sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-carnapping law provides for its own penalties
which are distinct and without reference to the said Code.

The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8
months and not more than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the
application of penalties under the Revised Penal Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based
on, or applicable only to, the rules for felonies under the Code. While it is true that the penalty of 14
years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that
penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the
Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same
formulation. For this reason, we hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-appellants is
an indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as
maximum.67 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months, not more than 17 years
and 4 months,68 for, as discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied suppletorily
and, therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence cannot be appreciated.

Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,69 as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the
offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less
than the minimum prescribed by the same – the penalty imposed being a range.70

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-71956,
finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of Fourteen
(14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution1 dated
March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC
Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.3 Out of this union, two
female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage,
petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) 6 against Steven and her
parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in
conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection
Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since,
as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that
respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and
safety of victims of violence.

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the
parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-
known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13

14
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration contending that the doctrine of necessary
implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration15 arguing that petitioner's
liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the
alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262
would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED
IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262
which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on
"conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring
her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that
respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly
provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual
relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by
this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since
their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as
offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering,
or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or
a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC
to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did
not contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of
the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
"Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words "principal,"
"accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in
enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.

In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC
to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express
provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No.
9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general
provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a
criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.23

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and
their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:

xxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to,
the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman
or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the
woman or her child may include

individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of
the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any
of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating
with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24 and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the
present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best
ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety
of victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It
must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application.
Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise
25
manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the
conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her.
However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot
be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. 26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue
evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included
in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the
merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will
no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an
exercise in superfluity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.

SO ORDERED.