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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
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Modeling the impact of surface emissivity on the military utility 78
13 of attack aircraft 79
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15 a,b,∗ 81
Kent Andersson
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17 a 83
Swedish Defence University, Box 27805, SE-115 93 Stockholm, Sweden
b
18 National Defence University, P.O. Box 7, FI-00861 Helsinki, Finland 84
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21 a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t 87
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Article history: An analysis scheme and a mission system model were applied to the evaluation of the military utility of
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Received 5 April 2016 efforts to reduce infrared signature in the conceptual design of survivable aircraft. The purpose is twofold:
24 Received in revised form 2 February 2017 90
Firstly, to contribute to the development of a methodological framework for assessing the military utility
25 Accepted 20 February 2017 91
of spectral design, and secondly to assess the threat from advances in LWIR sensors and their use
26 Available online xxxx 92
in surface-to-air-missile systems. The modeling was specifically applied to the problem of linking the
27 emissivity of aircraft coatings to mission accomplishment. The overall results indicate that the analysis 93
Keywords:
28 scheme and mission system model applied are feasible for assessing the military utility of spectral design 94
Military utility
29 Spectral design and for supporting decision-making in the concept phase. The analysis of different strike options suggests 95
30 Emissivity that LWIR sensors will enhance the military utility of low emissive paint, at least for missions executed in 96
31 Earthshine clear weather conditions. Furthermore, results corroborate and further clarify the importance of including 97
Combat aircraft earthshine when modeling.
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33 © 2017 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved. 99
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1. Introduction susceptibility. Here the signature of a combat aircraft is any charac-
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teristic that makes it detectable with a sensor. A reduced signature
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It is well known that any combat aircraft is a complex compro- leads to shorter detection range from an adversary’s weapon sys-
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mise of attributes, and that features introduced to enhance one of tems, and consequently shorter response times, giving increased
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them risk having penalties for others. Design is always a trade-off survivability and freedom of action. Due to developments in bi-
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between offensive capability, survivability and availability [1]. Re- static and passive radar, and the fact that low-frequency radar
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cently it was suggested [2] that effective solutions to these kinds of systems are becoming operational [5–7], investments in stealth
44 110
problems, while acknowledging that a technical system is but one radar are being questioned. In addition, the cost and size of in-
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of the components of a capability (e.g. [3,4]), benefit from formu- frared (IR) sensors have decreased, while their performance has
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lating the problem to maximize the military utility of the technical increased, and current developments point towards higher spatial
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system in focus. The military utility [2] of a technical system is and spectral resolution [8].
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a compound measure of: the military effectiveness in a specified Research has shown that, for the front sector of an approaching
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context, the assessed technical systems’ suitability to the military aircraft, emission from aerodynamic heating and reflected earth-
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capability system, and affordability to the military actor operating shine are the dominant IR sources [9,10]. Since the intensity peaks
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it. It is anticipated that the concept will support holistic decision- of both sources are in the long wavelength IR (LWIR) atmospheric
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making, but is in need of a framework for performing assessments. transmission window (8–14 μm), LWIR imaging sensors are of par-
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In this study survivability engineering is of particular interest. ticular interest. Early versions of LWIR sensors are already oper-
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Its aim is to decrease an aircraft’s susceptibility and vulnerability ational [11]. This calls for further analysis of the implications for
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to man-made threats, while having minimum impact on other at- the duel between attacking aircraft and defending surface-to-air
56 122
tributes [1]. Considerable sums of money are spent on low observ-
57 missile systems (SAMs); what can be done to increase aircraft sur- 123
ability technology in contemporary combat aircraft development
58 vivability? Since emissivity is the most important surface property 124
programs, like the F/A 35, in order to reduce signature and hence
59 affecting the magnitude of IR radiation [12], it is important, from a 125
60 signature adaption perspective, to study whether an optimum can 126
61 be found. 127
*
Correspondence to: Swedish Defence University, Box 27805, SE-115 93 Stock-
In a first paper from this study [13] a model and method for
62 holm, Sweden. 128
63 E-mail address: kent.andersson@fhs.se. quantitatively assessing signature reduction efforts on aerial plat- 129
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ast.2017.02.017
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1270-9638/© 2017 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
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16 Fig. 1. An illustration of the models necessary at each system level to support analysis, and the variables of interest needed to link them. 82
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forms were developed. It was shown that the LWIR sensors inte- In the first paper from this study [13] an analysis scheme and
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grated with SAMs are indeed an increasing threat to aircraft and a model, adopting the view on capabilities described, were devel-
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that efforts to reduce signature in radar and LWIR need to be bal- oped for assessing the military utility of a low observable aircraft
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anced. The aim of this paper is to use a tailored version of the in attack missions. The model allows for low observable proper-
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same model for assessing the military utility of features to reduce ties to be obtained through varying different parameters, tactical
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LWIR signature in more detail. The focus is on efforts to adapt or technical, and observing responses in mission outcomes. The
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surface emissivity. The purpose is twofold: Firstly, to continue con- first phase of the study concerned the balancing of efforts to re-
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tributing to the establishment of a methodological framework for duce radar and LWIR signature. In this paper the spectral design
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assessing military utility, and secondly, to contribute to the surviv- activity deciding the LWIR signature is of particular interest. Spec-
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ability of combat aircraft. tral design is here understood as the engineering activity to vary
28 surface structure and materials to obtain the desired spectral prop- 94
In the first section the methodological approach using modeling
29 is outlined. The starting point is survivability and the concept of erties [15]. Hence, the methodological approach is to analyze a 95
30 military utility. Then the mission system level model and its tech- tailored version of the mission system model developed earlier, but 96
31 nical sub-models are described, followed by analysis and discus- to focus on responses from varying the surface emissivity. 97
32 sion of the results. Finally, conclusions are drawn and presented. 98
33 2.2. Modeling the military effectiveness dimension, including a surface 99
34 2. The methodological approach 100
35 There are rapid developments in materials for spectral design 101
36 2.1. The military utility concept coatings and it seems safe to assume that there will be suitable 102
37 paints available for surface coatings once the preferred IR emissive 103
38 The interdependent nature of the attributes of combat aircraft properties are known [16,15]. This simplifies the exploratory part 104
39 calls for a system approach to design. Researchers in the field of of the study since it will not be necessary to model the military 105
40 combat aircraft survivability have shown that trade-off studies on suitability or the affordability dimensions of the military utility 106
41 the effectiveness of aircraft design should be at the mission sys- concept in detail. It can be assumed that exchanging the quality 107
42 tem level or higher, to avoid the risk of sub-optimization [1,14]. of paint will not require changes in maintenance concepts, main- 108
43 This approach is compatible with the concept of Military Utility tenance facilities, training facilities etc., which is why the military 109
44 mentioned previously. It is defined [2] as having three dimensions: suitability dimension will not be directly affected. Furthermore, for 110
45 our purposes, the increased life cycle cost for more advanced paint 111
46 • The Military Effectiveness dimension is a measure of the over- is presumably negligible and will not affect affordability for the air- 112
47 all ability to accomplish a mission when the Element of Inter- craft operator. Consequently, any differences between different air- 113
48 est (EoI) is used by representative personnel in the environ- craft concepts in terms of their military suitability or affordability 114
49 ment planned or expected for operational employment of the will only be identified as a direct result of potential differences in 115
50 military force. their military effectiveness. Thus, the problem is reduced to mod- 116
51 • The Military Suitability dimension is the degree to which an eling the military effectiveness dimension in sufficient detail; i.e. 117
52 EoI can be satisfactorily taken into military use in a specified a more survivable aircraft will, for example, allow doctrinal devel- 118
53 context, taking into consideration interaction with other ele- opment, or reductions in the life cycle cost for the aircraft system 119
54 ments of the capability system. as a whole. 120
55 • The Affordability dimension is a measure of compliance with In order to be able to analyze the military effectiveness of spec- 121
56 the maximum resources a military actor has allocated to the tral design at mission level, a functional system model has to link 122
57 EoI in a timeframe defined by the context. surface models to mission measures of effectiveness, MoEs. See 123
58 Fig. 1. 124
59 A military capability is hence viewed as a system composed of var- In the system model developed, see [13] for details, it is suf- 125
60 ious interacting elements, such as doctrine, organization, training, ficient to gauge military effectiveness through probability of suc- 126
61 personnel, materiel, facilities, leadership and interoperability, as in cess and own losses at the mission system level. At the capability 127
62 NATO publications. In this paper a combat aircraft is the element system level the model requires assembly of strike packages and 128
63 of interest in a potential military capability for air to surface oper- selection of a mission profile. Correspondingly, on the defending 129
64 ations. The bottom line is that a component, in this case a combat side, SAM systems, surveillance and firing doctrines have to be 130
65 aircraft, only has military utility if it is seen as a contributory ele- chosen in order to define the air defense capability. The capability 131
66 ment in a capability system [4,2]. measures of performance defined link the capability models to the 132
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1 point target via Path 1 or 2 in Fig. 2. A medium to high altitude 67

2 option is typically chosen if either the aircraft is anticipated to fly 68
3 above the threat ceiling, or if the probability of the threat sensor 69
4 intercepting the aircraft is presumed to be low, e.g. if the strike 70
5 package consists of stealth aircraft. Otherwise a low altitude strike 71
6 option is chosen. The tactical idea behind the latter approach is to 72
7 reduce the probability of detection by staying low, below the hori- 73
8 zon seen by the threat sensor and in the clutter region originating 74
9 from the terrain below. The low altitude option requires a bomb 75
10 drop closer to the point target. 76
11 Both the speed of the aircraft and the altitude influence the IR 77
12 signature and the probability of the aircraft being killed by a SAM. 78
13 For this study, a speed of 300 m/s and altitudes of either 8000 m 79
Fig. 2. The scenario, with planned flight paths and SAM sites.
14 or 100 m were chosen as tactical input parameters to the technical 80
15 modeling. 81
16 MoEs. At the technical system level the aircraft, weapons and sen- 82
17 sors are modeled with response functions based on their respective 3.4. Synthesis and measures of effectiveness 83
18 technical performance. At the lowest system level the aircraft sur- 84
19 face is modeled. In this paper the surface performance is linked to A probabilistic approach makes it possible to design strike pack- 85
20 the aircraft signature via its emissivity. ages for the capability modeled above to precisely accomplish the 86
21 mission, i.e. to achieve a desired probability of mission success. 87
22 3. The mission system model – framing the problem This makes it possible to evaluate the military effectiveness of dif- 88
23 ferent alternatives simply using own losses as the principal MoE. 89
24 3.1. The mission Given the mission stated above, the following success criterion 90
25 was chosen for the study: The objective is to neutralize the point 91
26 The fictitious BLUELAND mission was defined as the neutraliza- target with 75% certainty within X hours at the lowest possible 92
27 tion of a point target defended by short range SAM units in an cost in terms of lost aircraft and crew. 93
28 integrated air defense system, at lowest possible cost, within X This success criterion relates well to measures of military ef- 94
29 hours, using air strikes. The positions of the REDLAND SAM units fectiveness in the military utility concept described [2]; the de- 95
30 and the two alternative flight paths of the planned mission can be sired outcome translates to the point target being neutralized, the 96
31 seen in Fig. 2. cost in losses being minimized, the task being completed within a 97
32 For the analysis it is sufficient to include only one of the SAM schedule of X hours, and, finally, the force being designed so that 98
33 sites, S1, positioned 20 km west of the defended point target. The the risk of failure is less than 25%. 99
34 flight paths are chosen so that the attacking aircraft passes be- In probabilistic terms the criteria can be written as follows 100
35 tween two SAM sites, S1 and S2 (Path 1), or directly above S1 (see [1] for details) 101
36 (Path 2). 102
A
37 Since the LWIR signature is dependent not only on target prop- MoE 1 = P Success = (1 − P kill ) P N | S > 0.75, (1) 103
38 erties, but also on the physical environment, some assumptions 104
39 had to be made. All missions were presumed to be conducted where P kill denotes the probability of one aircraft being killed in 105
40 in the Baltic Sea region, at midsummer, at midnight and in clear an engagement with a SAM unit, A denotes the number of aircraft 106
41 weather conditions. in the strike package, and P N | S denotes the probability that one 107
42 aircraft neutralizes the target, given that it survives the engage- 108
43 3.2. The air defense model – the threat ment. The number of lost aircraft is then given by 109
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MoE 2 = Losses = A P kill = A P D P E | D P K | E , (2) 110
45 Each SAM unit on the REDLAND side was presumed to be con- 111
46 figured with a short range SAM launcher, a combined reconnais- where P D is the probability of the aircraft being detected, P E | D is 112
47 sance and firing radar and a LWIR imaging sensor. The normal doc- the probability of the aircraft being engaged by a SAM unit, given 113
48 trine is arguably scan–detect–track using radar, with the IR sensor that it is detected, and finally P K | E is the probability of the aircraft 114
49 to support identification. However, since the focus is on IR sensing, being killed, given that it is engaged. 115
50 the IR sensors in this scenario were used to detect and track while 116
51 the radar was only used during engagement. Given current devel- 4. Technical models – producing input to the mission level 117
52 opments in IR sensors, this is not an unlikely scenario in the near 118
53 future, especially in the event of air defense facing stealth aircraft Technical models were developed for the aircraft, the bombs, 119
54 and radar homing missiles. Single SAMs give the bearing to the tar- the radar, the IR sensor and the surface-to-air missile. However, 120
55 get. Two or more SAMs in an integrated air defense system (IADS) since this paper focuses on the impact of emissivity on measures 121
56 also produce range by triangulating bearings. Furthermore, a firing of military effectiveness, only the IR modeling is reproduced in 122
57 doctrine of detect, track for twenty seconds, then fire one missile, detail. For detailed information on previous models see Marcus 123
58 was presumed. The delay is chosen to summarize all delays in the et al. [13]. 124
59 command and control system of the SAM system, including clas- 125
60 sification, identification and the decision to engage. Several targets 4.1. The aircraft and weapon models – in brief 126
61 could be engaged simultaneously. 127
62 The attack aircraft is modeled as a large “shoe box” moving in 128
63 3.3. The air strike capability model level flight along a straight line at constant speed. The size cor- 129
64 responds to a small attack aircraft with a front/side/top area of 130
65 BLUELAND air strikes were executed using a strike package of a 6/25/50 m2 . The surface of the platform is approximated by having 131
66 number of aircraft armed with guided bombs (GBU) attacking the a perfectly diffuse gray body appearance (no gloss). The emissivity, 132
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1 Table 1 67
2 The parameter set. 68
3 Air strike parameters Air defense parameters 69
4 70
Altitude 8000/100 m Missile range 20 km
5 Speed 300 m/s Ceiling 15 km 71
6 Size 6 × 25 × 50 m2 Missile vel. 1000 m/s 72
7 Emissivity 0.1–0.9 Ang. track. err. 0.25 mrad (bas.) 73
Load 4× GBU Guidance. err. 5 m (baseline)
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Drop range 25/10 km P H | I (proximity) 1.0(<6 m)/0.6(<9 m)
9 75
CEP 13 m P K |H 0.8
10 Doctrine Maneuver Doctrine Detect, track 20 s, 76
11 After drop One shot 77
12 78
13 79
εs , the independent variable in this study, is varied in the range
14 Fig. 3. The IR signature level model (adopted from [13]). It comprises radiance from 80
0.1–0.9. The higher value is considered the baseline. Note that this
15 internal sources in the target, reflected earthshine, and from the ambient atmo- 81
approximation of aircraft geometry and surface is assumed suffi- sphere. The target aerial platform is modeled as a large “shoe box”.
16 82
cient only for evaluation in the development concept phase.
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One aircraft is presumed to carry four GBUs with a 13 m circu-
18 IRSL8–12 μm [W/m2 ] = E t gt − E bgnd = (4) 84
lar error probable (CEP), if dropped at a range of 25 km to target,
19
for medium to high altitude strike options, or if dropped at 10 km   A proj 85
20 τt gt-de ( L ie ( T s , εs ) + L re (εs )) − L bgnd (5) 86
for low altitude options. With these input parameters the proba- S2
21 87
bility of the point target being neutralized, if the aircraft survives where τt gt-de is the average atmospheric path transmittance be-
22 88
to bomb drop, P N | S , is estimated to be 0.97. tween the target and the detector for the wavelength band of
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The surface-to-air-missile model is based on the lead angle tra- interest; L ie denotes the radiance from the target due to inter-
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jectory principle, which is why the missile has a direct path with nal sources and L re denotes the radiance due to reflections from
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a constant bearing to the target trajectory, from launch to inter- external sources. The former is a function of the aircraft surface
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cept. Both the missile and the target are assumed to have constant temperature T s and both are functions of the surface emissivity εs .
27 93
velocities during the engagement phase. The probability that the L bgnd is the absolute radiance from the sky background and finally,
28 94
aircraft is killed by the SAM, given engagement, is obtained from
29 A proj / S 2 is the solid angle corresponding to the target seen from 95
our version of the kill chain:
30 the sensor. Here A proj is the projected area of the target and S is 96
31 P K |E = P I |E P H |I P K |H , (3) the slant range between the target and the sensor. In this study 97
32 the IR sensor model was used to analyze the IRSL in the front 98
where the probability the target is hit, given intercept, P H | I , and
33 sector of the aircraft; therefore, contributions to L ie from the rear 99
the probability the target is killed, given a hit, P K | H , are estimated
34 fuselage of the aircraft, heated by the engine, could be neglected. 100
from tabulated values. The probability of intercept, given engage-
35 Furthermore, the contribution from the aircraft plume is limited to 101
ment, P I | E , is modeled as a function of the SAM system tracking
36 relatively narrow bands in the 4 μm range and, therefore, outside 102
error and the missile control & guidance error [1]. Thus, the alti-
37 the sensitivity range of the 8–12 μm detector modeled. The con- 103
tude, the velocity and the size of the aircraft have an impact on
38 tribution from aerodynamic heating was calculated using Planck’s 104
the probability of the aircraft being killed – as one would expect.
39 law with skin temperature T s and with emissivity εs [12]. The skin 105
In this setting the resulting P K | E is in the 0.6–0.8 range, if the air-
40 temperature was, in turn, modeled as a function of aircraft veloc- 106
craft is within range. If the maximum range or the ceiling of the
41 ity, 107
missile is exceeded, P K | E is zero.
42   108
A summary of the tactical and technical parameters influencing
43 T s [ K ] = T 0 1 + 0.164M 2 , (6) 109
the modeling results are presented in Table 1. The weapon param-
44 110
eters are based on tabulated data [11,17]. where T 0 is the temperature at the aircraft’s altitude and M is
45 111
the target velocity in Mach numbers [19]. In LWIR the contribu-
46 112
4.2. The sensor model – including atmosphere and IR signature tion from reflected emission, L re , is dominated by earthshine [10],
47 113
and since the missions were assumed to be executed at night, the
48 In this scenario the imaging LWIR sensor is used for detection 114
contributions of sunshine and skyshine were neglected. The earth-
49 and tracking, not identification, which is why only the unresolved 115
shine contribution, L es , was in turn calculated using the approach
50 case, i.e. signal level of one pixel, is developed. The detection range 116
described in detail by Mahulikar et al. [10]. It can be written
51 in the model is limited by the curvature of the Earth [18]. Further- 117
52 more, attenuation of the IR signal in the atmosphere is significant. 118
(1 − εs ) 
N 2
τi L ed h 2R i dR
2
53 Rainy or cloudy weather has a huge limiting effect. IR transmit- L es [W/m /sr] = E earth-t gt = (1 − εs ) 119
54 tance to the sensor for points along the scenario flight paths, τ , π i =1
( R 2i + h2 )2 120
55 was calculated using the Modtran® software package, assuming a 121
56
(7) 122
sub-arctic summer climate. Values for arbitrary target–sensor con-
57 figurations were obtained from interpolating between data points. where E earth-t gt is the irradiance originating from the earth disc at 123
58 the aircraft at altitude h, see Fig. 3. The irradiance can be written 124
59 4.2.1. IR signature as the sum of the radiation reaching the aircraft from N circu- 125
60 The contrast signature level was modeled (see Fig. 3) in the lar strip increments of the earth disc. In Fig. 3 it is shown how 126
61 8–12 μm wavelength band as the apparent effective difference be- an increment’s area is defined by the width of the strip dR and 127
62 tween the irradiance at the sensor from the target aerial platform, the radius R i . The earth disc radiance L ed from each increment is 128
63 E t gt , and that from the sky background, E bgnd . If the sky back- attenuated with its corresponding mean transmittance to the air- 129
64 ground is treated as a source at target range, the path radiance craft τi . In this scenario L ed is approximated to the radiance from 130
65 can be eliminated [12]. The contrast signature level is then given a gray body with emissivity of 0.98 (water). L bgnd in (5) was cal- 131
66 by: culated assuming gray body behavior at the temperature of the 132
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16 Fig. 4. The composition of the LWIR signal, from an aircraft on Path 2, with surface Fig. 5. The composition of the LWIR signal, from an aircraft on Path 2, with surface 82
emissivity 0.9, at an altitude of 100 m, detected by a sensor at SAM Site 1. emissivity 0.9, at an altitude of 8000 m, detected by a sensor at SAM Site 1.
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19 target’s ambient air and with emissivity of 0.8 [20]. Finally, solving 85
20 (5) for the IR detection range yields 86
21  87
22   A proj 88
R det = τ p ( L ie ( T s , εs ) + L re ) − L bgnd . (8)
23 I R S L det 89
24 90
25 The sensor threshold contrast, I R S L det was estimated as 4.5 · 91
26 10−7 W/m2 , assuming an approaching aircraft in excellent detec- 92
27 tion conditions and by calibrating against tabulated data [11]. Us- 93
28 ing this model, the probability of detection, P D , is presumed to be 94
29 unity, if the range to the engaging SAM is less than R det ; otherwise 95
30 it is presumed to be zero. 96
31 97
32 5. Analysis 98
33 99
Fig. 6. The composition of the LWIR signal, from an aircraft on Path 2, with surface
34 The mission model was implemented and simulated using pa- emissivity 0.3, at an altitude of 8000 m, detected by a sensor at SAM Site 1.
100
35 rameter values from Table 1. Firstly, the IR signature response to 101
36 changes in surface coating emissivity was analyzed in some detail. 102
37 Then the resulting impact of the IRSL on the mission measures of 103
38 effectiveness was investigated. 104
39 105
40 5.1. The signature response to varying altitude and emissivity 106
41 107
42 In our model the contrast signature level from an aircraft de- 108
43 tected by a LWIR sensor comprises three components: the irradi- 109
44 ance from the airframe due to aerodynamic heating, the reflected 110
45 earthshine, and lastly the contrasting apparent irradiance from the 111
46 sky background at the target position. When the baseline aircraft, 112
47 with a normal high emitting surface coating of 0.9 [16], is first de- 113
48 tected in the low altitude strike option, at a range of 15 km, the 114
49 irradiance from aerodynamic heating is the dominant component, 115
50 while earthshine is negligible, as shown in Fig. 4. Note that the 116
51 IRSL has been normalized with the estimated detection threshold Fig. 7. The radiance from the airframe due to aerodynamic heating as a function of 117
52 value. emissivity and altitude. 118
53 However, at higher altitudes, e.g. 8000 m, the earthshine can 119
54 no longer be neglected, as can be seen in Fig. 5. Furthermore, if paths, and around 23 W/m2 /sr for the high altitude strike paths. 120
55 the emissivity is reduced, to 0.3, for example, as seen in Fig. 6, Instead, emissivity dependence is determined by the gray body ap- 121
56 the reflected earthshine then becomes the larger component. The pearance of the components, and the radiance from aerodynamic 122
57 range to detection increases with altitude to about 26 km, but does heating is simply proportional to the surface emissivity. In Fig. 7 123
58 not seem to change with emissivity. the component is plotted as a function of emissivity for both a 124
59 This impact of altitude on the relative importance of the com- low and high altitude strike option. The corresponding radiance 125
60 ponents of the IRSL can partly be understood by examining equa- from the modeled background at target altitude is also indicated. 126
61 tion (6). At low altitude the skin temperature is relatively higher By looking only at these graphs, thereby omitting earthshine, it 127
62 than at high altitude because of the different temperatures of the is deceptively easy to draw the conclusion that the aircraft should 128
63 ambient air. Consequently, thermal radiance from the airframe is always be coated with a low emitting coating in the range 0.4 to 129
64 relatively high at low altitudes. For the baseline aircraft, with emis- 0.5, in order to minimize contrast with the background. Instead, 130
65 sivity of 0.9, the modeled radiance from aerodynamic heating is however, the earthshine component is proportional to (1 − εs ), as 131
66 estimated to be in the 50 W/m2 /sr range for the low altitude strike given by equation (7), and the altitude behavior of the reflected 132
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15 Fig. 8. The reflected earthshine radiance from the underside of an aerial platform as 81
16 a function of emissivity and altitude. Fig. 9. The detection range, from a LWIR sensor at SAM Site 1 to an aircraft on flight 82
17 Paths 1 and 2, as a function of the aircraft surface emissivity. 83
18 earthshine component is not as intuitive. The size of the illumi- 84
19 nating earth disc increases with altitude and, at the same time, 85
20 attenuation due to the atmosphere between the earth and the 86
21 aircraft also increases. In Fig. 8 the apparent earthshine radiance 87
22 reflected from a surface parallel to and facing the earth disc is 88
23 plotted as a function of altitude and emissivity. These results are 89
24 consistent with earlier research [10]. 90
25 The bottom graph in Fig. 8 can be seen as representing reflected 91
26 earthshine radiance from the underside of the baseline aircraft. In 92
27 general the reflected earthshine component increases with reduced 93
28 altitude and emissivity. By comparing Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 it can be 94
29 95
seen that for high altitude flight paths, and emissivity around 0.4,
30 96
the two IRSL components are of comparable strength and, if emis-
31 97
sivity is reduced further, earthshine becomes dominant.
32 98
However, since the sensor is situated close to the horizon, there
33 99
is also the shape of the aircraft to consider. The irradiance at the
34 Fig. 10. The detection range, from a LWIR sensor at SAM Site 1 to an aircraft on 100
sensor due to aerodynamic heating originates from the entire pro-
35 flight Paths 1 and 2, as a function of the aircraft surface emissivity. 101
jected area of the aircraft, while the earthshine component orig-
36 102
inates from terrestrial reflections. It seems reasonable to assume
37 reflected earthshine compensates for reduced aerodynamic heat- 103
that the front and side of the platform emit proportionally less
38 ing. 104
than the underside of the aircraft. This contribution has been in-
39 105
cluded in the model using a geometrical factor. For a shoe box
40 5.1.2. The response in mission measures of effectiveness 106
shaped aircraft, as in this case, the geometrical factor should be
41 The analysis of the response at the mission system level is 107
0.5, since the side or front of an aircraft in level flight only sees
42 based on the diagram in Fig. 10. It shows the modeled normal- 108
half of the earth disc. This affects the impact of altitude on the rel-
43 ized IRSL of different attacking aircraft, and the probability of the 109
ative importance of the earthshine component in the IRSL. At low
44 aircraft being killed, integrated into one diagram. The probabil- 110
altitude the area projected towards the ground sensor is mainly
45 ity of the aircraft being detected is presumed to be zero, if the 111
the front or sides, while at higher altitude, and closer to the sen-
46 normalized IRSL is below unity, and one if it is above. The proba- 112
sor, the underside becomes the more prominent reflecting surface.
47 bilities are given as a function of the aircraft ground track distance 113
Arguably, the geometrical factor for a real aircraft should be some-
48 to the point target. The planned bomb drop points are indicated 114
what lower, assuming that part of the surfaces seen by the sensor
49 with their associated air defense windows of opportunity, which 115
will be in shadow from earthshine.
50 are illustrated with arrows. After bomb drop the aircraft are free 116
51 to maneuver and P kill is assumed to decrease considerably. 117
52 5.1.1. The response in capability measures of performance The two left-hand IRSL curves in Fig. 10 originate from an air- 118
53 In order to synthesize results at the capability system level, craft with a surface emissivity of 0.9 at different altitudes in strike 119
54 detection range was calculated and plotted as a function of emis- Path 2. They are detected 70 s and 95 s, respectively, before their 120
55 sivity, altitude and flight path, see Fig. 9. planned bomb drop points. Reducing this window of opportunity 121
56 It can be seen that, irrespective of emissivity, as long as the air- by a 20 s delay in the SAM command and control system still gives 122
57 craft is above the horizon, the detection range is greater for the considerable time to engage. Hence P kill is assumed to be 0.79 for 123
58 Path 1 option. This should be expected, since the aircraft projects both scenarios. The third IRSL curve from the left shows that de- 124
59 more of its area towards the sensor on Path 1 than it does on tection can be significantly delayed, if the aircraft is coated with 125
60 Path 2. Furthermore, while it seems possible to minimize the de- a low emissive paint. Nevertheless, the effort is not good enough 126
61 tection range to aircraft at low altitude, by reducing surface emis- to improve the mission measures of effectiveness. The air defense 127
62 sivity below 0.4, the detection range to corresponding aircraft at window of opportunity is still too wide. However, the fourth curve 128
63 medium altitude seems to increase slightly. These results are con- from the left shows that by combining a reduction in emissivity 129
64 sistent with the analysis of the IRSL above. At low altitude aerody- with tactical selection of a flight path between SAM sites (Path 1), 130
65 namic heating dominates the IRSL; consequently, detection range a tipping point is identified. The window of opportunity is now 131
66 is reduced with decreasing emissivity. At higher altitude, however, only 37 s wide. This equals the sum of the delay in the command 132
 JID:AESCTE AID:3927 /FLA [m5G; v1.204; Prn:3/03/2017; 10:08] P.7 (1-8)
K. Andersson / Aerospace Science and Technology ••• (••••) •••–••• 7

1 Table 2 signature in the front sector of an aircraft. However, the results 67

2 The results at mission system level expressed in the chosen measures of effective- do show that low emissive paint has the intended effect at low 68
ness.
3 altitude, where earthshine has little influence in relation to aero- 69
4 Scenario P kill P N|S A P Succ ( MoE 1 ) Losses ( MoE 2 ) dynamic heating. 70
5 1–3 0.79 0.97 7 0.77 5.6 The limitations of the model raise some uncertainties, in partic- 71
6 4 <0.74 0.97 5 >0.75 <3.7 ular in the analysis of the low altitude options. For aircraft flying 72
7 extremely low, or far away, the results indicate that the earthshine 73
8 contribution is dependent on the geometry of the aerial platform. 74
and control system and the missile fly-out time. Consequently, any
9 Nevertheless, in our investigation, even if the earthshine contri- 75
further efforts to enhance survivability from this point can be ex-
10 bution in the IRSL from the low flying aircraft were doubled, it 76
pected to have significant effects on mission measures of effective-
11 would make no significant difference. In this setting, perhaps, the 77
ness. Hence, the P kill value, 0.74, read from the diagram 20 s after
12 assumption of a perfect scattering surface is more important. Real 78
detection can be considered a conservative estimate.
13 surfaces usually emit less at high angles to the surface normal, 79
Table 2 shows the synthesized results for the scenarios ana-
14 which implies that the model used overestimates radiance picked 80
lyzed. The MoEs were obtained by inserting the results into equa-
15 up from aerodynamic heating. On the other hand, in a more real- 81
tions (1) and (2).
16 istic background model these phenomena might drown in clutter 82
The preferred strike option has significantly lower expected
17 originating from the terrain. In conclusion, background and geome- 83
losses. Because the aim of this paper is to study the impact of
18 try are important; therefore, more detailed background, shape and 84
efforts to reduce IR signature at the mission level, this difference
19 surface models are needed for effective assessment of the military 85
in MoEs is satisfactory. If the goal had been to find a strike option
20 utility of specific aircraft designs. 86
that minimizes losses, the models would have to be complemented
21 The results are also only valid for sub-arctic conditions in clear 87
with other means to increase survivability, such as suppression of
22 weather at mid-summer. To get a more generally accepted value 88
enemy air defense capability or active counter measures etc. Note
23 of measures of effectiveness, one might have to take results from 89
however, that when analyzing results at mission level it is impor-
24 different conditions into consideration. However, this should be 90
tant to remember that the model is only valid for the front sector
25 straightforward, assuming availability of weather statistics for the 91
of the attacking aircraft. As the aircraft approaches the SAM site,
26 operational area of interest. On the other hand one might also 92
at some point, hot parts of the rear airframe, due to heat from the
27 consider optimizing the system for specific weather conditions, in- 93
engine bay, will become visible and thus enhance the IRSL, even in
28 corporating tactical considerations into the capability design. 94
LWIR.
29 95
Finally, the requirements for the level of detail in the techni-
30 96
6. Discussion cal models used seem to be modest for our purposes. They do,
31 97
however, need to incorporate possible responses from important
32 98
The results show that use of the proposed mission system signature variables such as speed or size. Otherwise it will be im-
33 99
model, with its current level of technical detail, is feasible for possible to identify potential penalties to other attributes of the
34 100
quantitative assessment of the military effectiveness of spectrally aircraft, and the purpose of the system approach will fail.
35 101
designing aircraft coatings. If the results reported previously by
36 102
Marcus et al. [13] are included, the overall results from the study 7. Conclusions
37 103
suggest that the model and analysis scheme support the concep-
38 104
tual analysis of aircraft survivability. Such assessments are usually An analysis scheme and model proposed in earlier research was
39 105
important elements of, for instance, trade-off analysis in studies of used to evaluate the military utility of efforts to reduce LWIR sig-
40 106
various military capabilities or in technology forecasts. nature in the conceptual design of survivable aircraft for strike
41 The importance of evaluating technical signature reduction ef- 107
missions. The model was specifically applied to the problem of
42 forts at a mission system level has been demonstrated because it 108
linking aircraft coating emissivity to mission accomplishment. The
43 has been shown how changes in technical variables, such as sur- 109
overall results, taking uncertainties into consideration, support the
44 face emissivity, might very well decrease detection range, without 110
use of the proposed system model and analysis scheme for as-
45 significantly changing the military outcome. If the reduction is not 111
sessing the military utility of spectral design, in the development
46 large enough, there is no change in the outcome measures of mili- 112
47
concept phase. In some situations, such as assessing the military 113
tary effectiveness at mission level. It was also shown that by using utility of paint with tailored emissivity for aircraft surface coat-
48 the procedure demonstrated, it is possible to find tipping points 114
49
ings, the results suggest that it is sufficient to assess its military 115
in military effectiveness, i.e. those efforts that really make a differ-
50
effectiveness. The results indicate that low emissive paint on the 116
ence to mission outcome.
51
front sector of an attack aircraft has significant military utility in 117
We have reason to believe that the impact of the emissivity of
52
low altitude missions, but its utility is uncertain in high altitude 118
paint on military suitability or affordability is negligible. Therefore,
53
missions. Furthermore, in some situations earthshine constitutes a 119
assessment of its military utility only involves military effective-
54
significant part of the LWIR signature and should not be ignored 120
ness. However, when modifying the IR signature of an aircraft by
55
in the analysis. 121
tuning other technical variables, such as size or shape, it is likely
56 that changes will also have unwanted effects on affordability or 122
57 Conflict of interest statement 123
military suitability. Hence, when comparing concepts, any analysis
58 of alternatives would generally be more fruitful if overall military 124
59 utility is compared. None declared. 125
60 The more detailed analysis of the impact of emissivity on IR 126
61 signature corroborates earlier results regarding the importance of Acknowledgements 127
62 earthshine as a phenomenon to consider. Its influence on LWIR sig- 128
63 nature, and thereby on detection range, is further clarified in this This research was financially supported by the Swedish Defence 129
64 study. The results indicate that earthshine cannot be ignored for University. The model used was initially developed in cooperation 130
65 aircraft at medium or high altitudes. At these altitudes earthshine with Carina Marcus, Saab Aeronautics AB, and Christina Åkerlind, 131
66 seems to nullify the use of low emissive paint to reduce LWIR Swedish Defence Research Agency. The author would like to thank 132
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