Shootings and Shamans: Local Civilian Authority Structures and Civil War

Violence in Colombia

Draft. This version: May 1, 2013

Oliver Kaplan
The Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver
Oliver.Kaplan@du.edu 1

Can local organizations give civilians the capacity to protect themselves from the
vagaries of civil war violence? Civilians have traditionally been considered powerless
when facing armed groups but new research suggests organized communities may be able
to promote security through strategies such as resolving disputes between neighbors and
managing relations with macro-armed actors. This paper tests civilian organizations as an
explanation for reduced violence with evidence from Colombia on the experiences of
indigenous group communities. In Colombia there has been great publicity about both
violence against indigenous groups in the armed conflict and about indigenous
movements for autonomy from the conflict. At the same time, there is evidence that
ethnic minority populations have on average suffered relatively less violence compared to
campesino communities. I explore whether the unique organizational forms of
indigenous groups help explain how and why some groups have been better able to
overcome armed conflict violence than others. I develop a theory about the importance
of strong tribal authority structures to regulate the internal order of indigenous
communities and reduce entanglements with external armed groups. To test this theory, I
leverage never used before micro-level quantitative data on the incidence of violence
against members of different ethnic groups and on these groups’ cultural and
organizational characteristics. Interviews and second-hand reports are used as qualitative
evidence to confirm the presence of specific mechanisms through which authority
structures may operate. The findings yield important implications for managing violence
against civilians and protecting human rights in Colombia and in weak states where local
institutions or tribal structures play roles in the provision of local order.

1
I am grateful to Jacob Shapiro and James Robinson for helpful comments. I am also thankful for feedback
from participants of the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, the Human
Rights of Indigenous Peoples conference at Stanford University, May 8, 2012, and the Political Violence
Workshop at the Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, May 28, 2012. I thank Daniela Uribe for excellent
research assistance. I am also grateful for access to data compiled by CECOIN. All translations are by the
author from the Spanish. All mistakes are… my own.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2102751

"The government wants to involve us in their army, in the police, in their informants
network. The guerrillas want us to get involved in the revolutionary story, the fight for
power. But getting involved in war hurts our culture, our language, our ways."
--Indigenous leader, Colombia, 2005 (Forero 2005)

In Colombia there has been great publicity about violence against indigenous
groups in the armed conflict (Romero 2009, Kraul 2009). Indigenous movements for
autonomy from the conflict that seek to avoid entanglements with armed actors have also
gained attention in the press. At the same time, there is also evidence that ethnic minority
populations have on average suffered relatively less violence compared to campesino
communities and are relatively better organized. The role that indigenous organizations,
traditions, and community cohesion play within these ethnic communities for managing
interactions with armed groups is less well understood.
This paper explores whether the unique organizational forms of indigenous
groups help explain how and why some groups have been better able to overcome armed
conflict violence than others. I develop a theory about the importance of strong tribal
authority structures to regulate the internal order of indigenous communities and reduce
entanglements with external armed groups. To test this theory, I leverage novel micro-
level quantitative data on the incidence of violence against members of different ethnic
groups and on these groups’ cultural and organizational characteristics. Interviews and
second-hand reports are used as qualitative evidence to confirm the presence of specific
mechanisms through which authority structures may function to provide protection.
The analysis speaks to the broader question of whether local organizations can
give civilians the capacity to protect themselves from the vagaries of civil war
violence. Civilians have traditionally been considered powerless when facing armed
groups, and traditional societies have been viewed as especially at risk. New research
suggests organized communities may be able to promote security through strategies such
as resolving disputes between neighbors and managing relations with macro-armed
actors. While the tests in this paper are based on indigenous communities’ experiences in
Colombia, the findings hold important implications for managing violence against
civilians and protecting human rights beyond Colombia in weak states where local or
tribal structures are common for the provision of local order. It also has implications for
broader conflict processes as there has been little rigorous integration of culture and tribal

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2102751

traits in studies of counterinsurgency. In more general terms, this research aspires to take
indigenous groups seriously and provide a counterpoint to tendencies to view indigenous
groups according to particular stereotypes (e.g., as uneducated, weak, traditional, leftist,
or uniformly well mobilized).
Colombia is a good country-case in which to study this topic. With 84 indigenous
groups (92 in the 2005 census), 64 language groups, and indigenous populations present
in all regions of the country, there is wide variation in cultural characteristics. The armed
conflict has also been widespread and has varyingly affected these groups. Some groups
have been spared for reasons such as isolation while other groups such as the Awá and
Kankuamo have been massacred to the extent that some have called it “ethnocide” and
genocide (Villa and Houghton 2005).
To date there has been poor measurement of tribal groups in conflict since these
groups pose challenges to study due to cultural sensitivities, cultural diversity, and
geographical dispersion. Accounts are largely based on anthropological impressions
rather than controlled comparisons, leaving them open to charges of conjecture and
selection biases. This paper works to solve this measurement problem by combining new,
standardized data on indicators of characteristics collected across indigenous groups and
the patterns of violence these groups specifically suffer—data that has never before been
used at a micro scale. As key explanatory variables I consider measures of variation in
authority structures, organizational capacity and social cohesion across groups. I devise
an indicator for the variation in the strength of traditional doctors or “shamans” across
indigenous communities.
A key result is that the indicator for the strength of shamans is significantly
correlated with lower subsequent violence against indigenous residents, even after
controlling for armed group actions. The analysis also takes steps to account for the
possibility of reverse causality between civilian authority structures and violence—that
armed conflict can affect and erode indigenous group institutions and cohesion. I find that
levels of violence and guerrilla activity that occurred prior to the measurement of
indigenous traits (in 1993) are not correlated with those traits. Indicators are also included
to account for lurking historical variables that might affect both patterns of indigenous

3
organization and patterns of violence, such as the historical process of Spanish
colonization and encomiendas.
In the sections that follow, I first describe existing theories for violence in civil
wars and offer a theory of how and when tribal authority structures may affect armed
conflict. Second, I provide historical background on indigenous authority structures and
the experiences of indigenous groups in the Colombian conflict. Third, I then statistically
model the effect that indigenous characteristics have on violence. Fourth, I discuss the
possibility of reverse causality between violence and shaman strength and model factors
that explain why some municipios (communities) are likely to have stronger traditional
authorities than others. Lastly, I conclude with a summary of findings, implications for
policy, and avenues for further research.

Literature on Civilians, Ethnicity, and Violence in Civil Wars

In the recent literature on civil wars several explanations for violence have been
offered, including the balance of territorial control (Kalyvas 2006), rebel group resources
and discipline (Weinstein 2007), and “draining the sea” as a last resort counterinsurgency
tactic (Valentino 2001). However, these explanations tend to omit civilians as
autonomous actors and discount their organizational processes to avoid conflicts or as
explanations for violence. The field has primarily examined why civilians join armed
groups (e.g., Humphreys and Weinstein 2006) and support them with resources or
information (Wood 2003, Kalyvas 2006), but an alternative and growing “peace
movement” literature has primarily studied cases of civilian responses to violence
(Hernández 2004, García Durán 2005, Bouvier 2009, Hancock and Mitchell 2007,
Sandoval 2004). Philosophical and anthropological work has identified organizational
forms such as “peace communities” as a local collective strategy to stay out of or end
conflicts, though they have tended to be either normative or descriptive. These works
have therefore not risen to challenges from scholars like Kalyvas that civilians’ actions
are either rarely long effective or do not have independent effects.
This study builds on prior research by Kaplan (2010), which focuses on the role
of campesino organizations in the Colombian conflict. Kaplan shows that well organized
campesino communities tend to fare better and that it is important to account for the

4
existing explanations of violence in such analyses. This study continues to probe this
hypothesis about civilian protection by focusing on the role of ethnic and identity-based
social cooperation and therefore also relates to the literature on ethnic conflict and
cooperation. Ethnicity usually enters the literature on civil conflict by viewing ethnic
nationalism as a cause of insurgency (see Horowitz 1987, Brubaker and Laitin 1998).
There are ethnic separatist (secessionist or irredentist) rebellions as well as mobilizations
of particular ethnic groups or tribes on one side or another of a nationalist insurgency.
Although Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not find cross-national evidence for ethnic
fractionalization as a cause of insurgency, many roles have still been identified for
ethnicity in conflict processes. For instance, some ethnic minority groups have been
argued to face greater risks of suffering violence (Gurr 2000). Traits correlated with
ethnicity and strong intra-ethnic ties, such as superior local informational networks, can
also undergird conflict resolution institutions (Fearon and Laitin 1996) and provide
advantages to units in counterinsurgency (Lyall 2010).
Theories about ethnicity have largely not been deployed to examine ethnic groups
that neither have nor want any part in macro-conflicts between organized armed groups.
However, empirically, some isolated cases have been identified where populations have
leveraged their local cohesion and institutions through strong intra-ethnic ties to avoid
entanglements with macro-actors in conflicts. Doughty and Ntambara (2005) explore
how Muslims in Rwanda were largely able to avoid the conflict between the Hutu and
Tutsi majority ethnic groups during the genocide. Ethnic based tribal structures have also
been the basis of protective collective actions in The Philippines (Santos 2005), Mexico,
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The successes of these kinds of examples still remain to be
systematized and rigorously tested.
In Colombia there has been qualitative research on many indigenous communities
and cultures (e.g., Jackson 1995, Rapport 2000). But, the few studies by western scholars
from anthropological traditions on indigenous organizations and traditional authorities,
such as shamans, have tended to focus on them more as keepers of spiritual knowledge
(Taussig 1987) or on hallucinogenic substances rather than on governance or conflicts
with outsiders. As Arocha (1998) observes, in Colombia there have been few studies on
ethnicity and conflict and no controlled studies of how indigenous traits correlate with

5
conflict outcomes. Scholarship on indigenous groups in Colombia’s conflict has
advanced with works by Houghton and Villa 2005 and Hernández 2004 but such studies
remain largely descriptive and have not specified or tested causal mechanisms.

Theory and Mechanisms of Indigenous Authority Structures and Cohesion

Beyond existing structural explanations for violence, there are several possible
reasons why variation in the strength of traditional authorities and civilian
organizations—variation across characteristics of communities—might also affect armed
actor decisions. The capabilities of indigenous groups’ leaders to protect their
populations stem from the benefits gained through social cohesion, which either allow for
collective decision-making to deal with armed groups, provide moral dissuasion from
joining outside armed groups, or help reduce intra-community conflicts. 2 When
community leaders have the broad support of their members they are frequently
emboldened to advocate for their community’s interests and their positions also likely
carry the most weight with armed groups (and leaders themselves may shape residents’
incentives to support the common good).
For instance, indigenous leaders may be able to better align their residents with
dominant armed actors when a region is completely controlled, or manage a collective
displacement to safety. Since I focus on civilians’ attempts to protect themselves while
avoiding displacement, I consider civilians’ collective pursuit of “autonomy” strategies to
remain independent from the conflict when under violent threat from multiple armed
actors. I do this in part because while some civilian mechanisms are not easily testable
with large-n quantitative data, enumerating these strategies helps illustrate how civilian
organizations can influence outcomes and they have testable observable implications. In a
later section I discuss how particular indigenous group strategies have been put into
practice.
As a first mechanism, community cohesion reflected in the respect for indigenous
traditional authorities may proxy naturally peaceful relations among a community’s

2
I concentrate on non-violent strategies for autonomy because they are more prevalent than armed local
strategies in Colombia (it can also be ambiguous whether armed civilians are still “civilians”). Noteworthy
examples of civilians arming for self-defense and autonomy (in a more apolitical manner than Colombia’s
paramilitaries) include the indigenous Quintín Lame movement in Colombia and the Kamajoi/ CDF
militias in Sierra Leone (Muana 1997).

6
residents that can reduce armed actors’ inroads into a community. More actively, leaders
can inculcate norms of non-participation (and non-violence) among residents to avoid
getting caught-up in cycles of denunciation among armed actors (the so-called “culture of
peace”). They may play special roles in engaging youths to prevent their recruitment into
armed groups (or the military). Second, the leaders can help manage local justice
procedures, such as providing conciliation services or sanctioning violators of social
norms (e.g., joining or aiding armed groups, a capacity absent non-indigenous
communities). They can also help keep residents from resolving their disputes through
armed actors and sparking cycles of violence (see Boaventura 2001, Van Cott 2006).
Third, leaders can dialogue and negotiate procedures with armed groups to avoid hurting
civilians, including investigating cases of suspected collaboration and vouching for a
resident’s non-involvement in the conflict to armed actors or creating “early warning”
systems and networks to avoid episodes of combat. An important variant found in some
communities is the use of rhetorical traps based on indigenous groups’ spirituality and
moral authority to persuade armed groups to improve their behavior (as documented by
Guerra Curvelo 2004). Fourth, indigenous authorities can link with outside actors that can
assist in protecting human rights through such mechanisms as boosting transparency and
information reporting, “boomerang effect” pressure, 3 and shaming armed actors by
leveraging sensitivities about their reputations and relations with other political actors.
Lastly, some groups use the raw non-violent manpower of public protests or the
mobilizing large numbers of community members to surround armed groups (a fait
accompli to massacre an enormous number of civilians, which armed groups are usually
unwilling to do).
By making killing more difficult or even costly and by reducing mistakes in
targeting and costs of governance, civilian cohesion and the strategies it enables should
reduce violence. It becomes more difficult for competing armed groups to seed violence
through social divisions as theorized by Kalyvas or for commanders to tolerate
organizational abuses as theorized by Weinstein. Accounting for existing theories of
violence also helps put appropriate bounds on the scope of the effectiveness of civilian

3
This “boomerang effect” entails pressuring human rights violators by lobbying their international allies
(Keck and Sikkink 2001).

7
mechanisms. Civilians’ collective responses are expected to most likely affect violence
and civilian livelihoods under a broad though still limited set of conflict conditions: in
areas where armed groups might have incentives to commit violence but their preferences
are relatively more flexible and can be persuaded to change their behaviors. This may
occur, for instance, when armed groups are mostly concerned about limiting civilians’
defections rather than winning their full-fledged support or when armed groups do not
completely depend on civilians for their resource bases. In contrast, civilians should be
less likely able to avoid violence in cases where groups are highly resolute in killing or
winning, such as cases of genocide or “draining the sea.”4 These scope conditions can be
found to varying degrees in Colombia and in several other country-conflicts.

Indigenous Groups in Conflict and Traditional Authorities

In Colombia, the indigenous groups’ history of exclusion and resisting Spanish
and colonial institutions and the later indigenous rights movements in the Twentieth
Century helped them become the earliest sub-population to advocate for autonomy from
the armed conflict. The formation of the Regional Indian Council of Cauca (CRIC) in
1971 was a key antecedent to the Nasa/ Paez group later issuing the Declaration of
Ámbalo in 1985, demanding respect of their autonomy from the guerrillas and other
armed groups (Houghton and Villa 2005). This early advocacy established autonomy
rights for indigenous in the 1991 constitution and an ideal that other communities in the
country would later emulate.
Since that time, indigenous groups have drawn on their organization and cohesion
to carryout an assortment of protective actions. They have rescued kidnap victims from
armed groups, resolved internal conflicts through systems of indigenous justice, and
protested en masse against the taking of towns by guerrillas by encircling them with sheer
numbers of people. The non-violent Indigenous Guard of the especially well organized
Nasa Indians in Cauca, composed of thousands of volunteers who carry symbolic staffs,
have rescued kidnap victims from the FARC, including the kidnapped Nasa leader and
mayor of the town of Toribío (Forero 2005). 400 members of the guard marched two

4
Resistance groups during the Holocaust and other genocides are noteworthy exceptions.

8
weeks over the Andes mountains to the rebel camp where he was being held and
persuaded the FARC to release him.
The mobilization of many of these and other similar strategies to deal with armed
groups are often believed to depend on traditional authorities. The book Desecrated Land
(Ghk 1996), a broad study of indigenous groups and the exploitation of natural resources,
provides some general insights into the varying roles of traditional authorities across
indigenous groups. Although traditional authorities are healers, their roles often transcend
the realm of medicine. The authors observe that, “Control of society is very often
exercised using witchcraft, confessions, social ostracism, ridicule.” It is no wonder then
that social control and the roles of shamans commonly spring from broad and sometimes
mystic conceptions about the causes of and treatments for illnesses:

Illness is perceived as being caused by social transgression (excessive hunting,

improper sexual relations, consumption of symbolically contaminated food, etc.).
The actions taken by most of the traditional authorities should be seen within this
context. The Wayuu look to their palabrero to arbitrate in cases of conflict. The
mamas of the Sierra Nevada exercise their authority through ceremonial practices,
prophecy, and personal advice. The mamas are the true source of authority,
although there are comisarios in the Sierra Nevada who deal with police matters.

As Desecrated Land shows, authority in many social domains resides with the
traditional leaders. The “traditional doctor,” or shamans, go by various different names in
different indigenous groups, including “tegua,” “curandero,” “jaibaná,” and “taita”
(Umbral del Nuevo Milenio). Despite the different names, dual medical and legal roles
are common and suggest the importance of shamans in maintaining group cohesion in the
midst of threats to the community, including threats of armed conflict (e.g., Rapport
2011). Though less common, in some cases shamans may also play political roles or be
political leaders in certain groups.

Empirical Analysis

To test the effects of indigenous group characteristics on violence, I analyze data

on violence by armed groups during the inter-censal period from 1993 through 2005.
Beyond reasons of data availability, these years are also the most relevant time period for
study since many social organizations and autonomy strategies appeared during or

9
immediately prior to this period. This era also saw an apex of violence and combat that
affected much of Colombia. It encompasses the height of paramilitary violence with the
AUC expansion and the Plan Colombia counternarcotic and counterinsurgency program.
The later years then saw a de-escalation beginning around 2003 with the gradual
repulsion of guerrillas and demobilization of paramilitary blocs. Some of the
paramilitaries then quietly remobilized and new “emergent” bands began to appear
(CNRR 2007). These years are therefore a tough test but are also likely when an effect of
indigenous authorities on violence would be detectable.
I use the municipio, or county, as the relevant unit of analysis.5 Lower levels of
geographical division in Colombia might more aptly represent indigenous “communities”
and capture important ethnic or urban-rural differences within municipios. However, the
municipio is the smallest unit with broad, reliable data and allows a finer-grained analysis
than Colombia’s thirty-two departments, 84 indigenous groups or 600-plus reserves. It
has the additional advantage of allowing one to control for armed group actions, a proxy
of conflict intensity, since such indicators are only available at the municipio level and
unfortunately are not accurately collected for the geographic territories of specific
indigenous groups. Within municipios I compile data on the characteristics of indigenous
populations, to the exclusion of residents of other ethnicities. However, some of the
covariates, such as armed group actions, are not calculable for only indigenous areas and
instead pertain to entire municipios (which should not present measurement problems as
long as these general characteristics also on average pertain to indigenous populations).
In municipios that contain multiple groups (identities) or reserves the traits of indigenous
groups are pooled together.
The sample of municipios is heterogeneous. Some are greatly populated, some
are nearly empty. Some are vast, some are small. The mean area of the municipios is
1,174 sq. km and the mean total population in 2005 is 38,530.
The indigenous population in 1993 was 492,738 and grew to 1,389,758 in 2005.
The population is predominantly rural with approximately 90 percent living in rural
areas. Although Colombia’s indigenous population comprises a relatively small share of

5
Slightly less than 10% of municipalities in the sample split into new jurisdictions during the period of
study. I minimize how changing geography may affect results by merging variable values for “mother” and
“daughter” municipalities (DANE 2000).

10
the country’s total population compared to other countries in Latin America, it comprises
14 percent of rural population and indigenous groups have rights to approximately 25
percent of the country’s land area. The sample of municipios with members of indigenous
groups includes 223 municipios, about a quarter of all municipios, which vary in
population from 313 to 29,467 with a mean of 4,816.6

The Dependent Variable

To measure the dependent variable of violence against indigenous civilians, I use
the annual civilian homicide rate for municipios, measured as homicides per 100,000
residents.7 I use two sources for this data. First, I use data from the Bogotá think tank
Center for Indigenous Cooperation (CECOIN) on homicides of individuals identified as
members of indigenous groups collected from a variety of sources.8 This is the most
comprehensive data source on violence against indigenous groups in Colombia (and
perhaps the world). Data are collected on a variety of types of events of armed conflict
violence. I focus my analysis on “political” homicides attributed to armed actors (and not
due to common criminal violence). I also test a broader, alternate measure of the number
of victims of any kind of act of violence by an armed group, including killings,
displacements, injuries, threats, and detentions.
There are 6,745 total violations of (personal integrity) rights recorded in the
CECOIN database from 1974-2004. Of these violations, 1,889 were political homicides.
A relatively large proportion of all violations—53 percent—are attributed to state actors
such as the police or military forces (e.g., especially detentions). However, state forces
were presumed responsible for a smaller share of the homicides. When the data is
broken-down by presumed responsible actor, 36 percent of cases (688 cases) are
attributed to paramilitaries, 22 percent (416 cases) are attributed to insurgents, and 9.2
percent (174 cases) are attributed to state actors (the responsible actors are not identified

6
Approximately 175 municipios have coverage on all variables. Many of the municipios that do not enter
in the analysis due to missing data have extremely small indigenous populations of just a handful of
residents.
7
Annual average homicide rates can be computed by dividing the homicide rate for the period by twelve.
8
These sources include national and local indigenous organizations, government institutions, international
NGOs, the United Nations, periodicals and church reports. Cases are cross-checked for repetition across
these sources.

11
in the remaining cases). Figure 1 displays the variation in killings of indigenous group
members over time.
As a second data source for my dependent variable, I also use the homicide rate
for members of indigenous groups reported by the Colombian government (a large
portion of which likely overlaps with the CECOIN figures). The government’s Human
Rights Observatory compiles data on violence by municipio on an annual basis beginning
in 1998, so the sample for this variable includes only data from 1998-2005. The summary
statistics in Table 1 show violence is fairly widespread, but that there are also areas of
calm.

Independent and Control Variables

The main independent variables for indigenous population characteristics come
from the Colombian Indigenous Census of 1993. Collecting broad data is difficult
because it can be culturally sensitive to enter indigenous (or tribal) communities and ask
questions, the groups are geographically dispersed, and they speak many different
languages. The use of census data therefore has several advantages.
First, the census provides standard measures with coverage across the entire
universe of indigenous communities in Colombia (the government negotiated entry with
groups and trained local and culturally sensitive enumerators across the country). Such
breadth of measurement is rarely available for tribal groups in developing countries, and
yet it is key for minimizing selection biases. Second, census data aids the comparability
of groups, allowing for comparisons with standardized units of analysis (for which other
indicators are available). Third, the survey instrument and questions and data collection
procedures are the same from population to population. Fourth, since the data permits the
calculation of characteristics of sub-populations below the group and tribe level—within
identified indigenous groups, language groups, or tribes—one can explore variation in
characteristics (such as in social cohesion) in additional communities, expanding the
possible number of units of observation and possibilities for counterfactual comparisons.
I use the census data to calculate several direct and indirect measures of social indigenous
population cohesion and organizational capacity (prior to the subsequent spike in conflict
intensity in the 1990s).

12
 Shaman visits. Since more direct measures of participation and organizational
authority prior to the conflict are not available, I use a measure of visits to “traditional
doctors” or shamans. As noted, shamans play medical roles but often also political and
legal roles and also help maintain group cohesion in the midst of threats to the
community, including threats of armed conflict (e.g., Rapport 2011).
I use responses to the following question, asked in the month of September 1993,
to construct an indicator of the percent of reported medical visits that were with shamans,
“In the past month, were you ill? Did you see a doctor? What kind?” 18 percent of the
population, or 84,885 respondents, reported being ill (or having an injury) during
September 1993. Of these, 26 percent, or 33,703 respondents, visited traditional doctors
(shamans; and of those, 11,128 were not sick), 25 percent saw no one, 24.5 percent went
to a western doctor, 8.8 percent went to a nurse, and 2.4 percent when to a pharmacy
(herbs dealer; the rest answered “did not know/ no response”). The variable is fairly
normally distributed with a mean of .41. The geographic variation in shaman visits is
displayed in the map in Figure 3, which indicates there is ample variation in shaman
visits even within particular regions.9
Although an effect of shaman visits could be attributed to the powers of charms
and spells, I take shaman visits to indicate organization. More shaman visits indicate the
strength of traditional leaders, and may also be correlated with the strength of a group’s
political leadership. This indicator has the advantageous property of being a reported
behavior rather than a report of affect or opinion, and is reported apart from measures on
the armed conflict. Changes in the proportion shaman visits over time may indicate the
recuperation or disintegration of traditional sources of authority. As hinted earlier,
shaman visits for illnesses may be an especially plausible measure for authority and
social cohesion since certain groups hold beliefs that illnesses can be caused by the
transgression of social norms, which can only be atoned for by visiting a shaman.

9
I consider potential biases and underestimation of shaman visits due to missing data for the Caribbean
department of Guajira and the Wayuu indigenous group, one of the largest and most traditional and
cohesive groups with their clan-based social structure and traditional palabrero mediators (either because
they were counted in a separate census in 1992 or simply because of undercounting). In robustness tests, I
varyingly omit Guajira department from the analysis, include a Guajira fixed-effect, and substitute the
mean percent of Shaman visits for indigenous populations in the department as estimated by DANE for the
three municipalities with sizable Wayuu populations that enter into the analysis. The results are
substantively similar.

13
 As discussed below, I also control for a number of other factors that might be
correlated with both violence and cohesion and organizational capacity as reflected by
shaman visits. Failing to account for such factors could cause the correlation between
visits to traditional doctors and reduced violence through the hypothesized mechanism of
political authority to be spurious. For instance, in addition to reflecting strong political
authority that can help indigenous groups survive periods of armed conflict, the shaman
visits variable could also reflect such factors as traditionalism and levels of assimilation
into mainstream Colombian society (and related access to public goods, western
knowledge or political integration), lack of access to medical care, and different mixes of
prevalent illnesses (for which certain indigenous groups may have stronger or weaker
beliefs about whether traditional doctors can provide effective cures). To help account
for these explanations, I include various indicators related to traditionalism, assimilation
and public health.10
Demographic variables. I include variables for the total indigenous population
and logged population, and population density from the 1993 census. A variable for the
indigenous share of each municipio’s total population helps account for the degree of
exposure to and contact with non-indigenous populations.
Indigenous language. The percent of the indigenous population that speaks an
indigenous language is used as an indicator of assimilation into mainstream culture and
integration into the national economy, educational system and other benefits provided by
the state. Low use of indigenous languages could also correlate with urbanization.
Preservation of language or bilingualism could also be related to group cohesion to the
extent that group strength is correlated with their ability to preserve their language
(extinction of languages is a growing problem among groups in Colombia and other
countries across the globe). An indicator for the percent of the indigenous population that
speaks Spanish is also tested.

10
Tests are robust to the inclusion of indicators for public health and access to medical care such as the
distribution of medical facilities and hopsitals, percent of population that reported having been ill, access to
health insurance (2005), altitude, paved road access, and region effects. I also verified how the distribution
of medical facilities correlates with shaman visits across municipios (DANE 1992). According to Figure X,
there is little relationship, as both low and high shaman visit municipios have small and large numbers of
medical facilities.

14
 Traditional homes. In many communities, indigenous populations live in what are
considered to be traditional homes, such as “Malokas,” or large, open, circular huts with
thatched dome roofs. As an additional way to account for assimilation, modernization and
the maintenance of indigenous customs and identity I construct a variable for the percent
of families that live in “traditional,” indigenous-style houses.
Indigenous reserves. The indigenous population in Colombia lives in various
types of communities. I calculate an indicator for the percent of indigenous residents
living in “resguardos,” or collective reserves with legal titles within each municipio (as
opposed to untitled “asentamientos” or simply living among the mestizo population).
These reserves may have stronger communal organizations and legal protections but may
also be more isolated or traditional.
Colonial history. I use a variable for the year a municipio was founded as an
indicator of experiences with Spanish colonial influence related to distinct eras of
colonization. Colonization differences could affect indigenous communities’
development, assimilation, and later levels of violence suffered. Areas that were
colonized early are thought to have greater levels of assimilation and development today.
Communal labor. This indicator reflects the percent of respondents who identified
their occupation as “community worker.” Greater communal labor could indicate more
cohesive, egalitarian communities with greater organizational capacity. It could
alternatively indicate agriculture-based economies and low levels of economic
development.
Socio-economic status and poverty. The percent of houses with zinc or cement
roofs and the percent of households with electricity are used as measures of socio-
economic status and poverty. Access to electricity may also indicate the provision of
public goods and services (either by the national government or by indigenous
authorities).
Conflict intensity and the balance of military control. I account for structural
explanations of violence such as armed actors’ strategic incentives to target civilians
when contesting territory since the ability of civilians themselves to affect violence is
most likely observable after variables for structural conflict hypotheses are controlled for.
Any relationship found between civilian organization and violence could also be spurious

15
if highly organized communities suffered relatively less violence solely because they
faced less pressure from armed groups. To help account for armed actors’ strategic
incentives, I include variables for the number of total offensive actions and variables for
the number of actions disaggregated for particular armed groups. Civilian denunciations
and therefore selective violence are argued to be most common where armed actors have
dominant but incomplete territorial control (Kalyvas 2006).
I use existing data on armed actor actions graciously provided to me by the Jesuit
think tank CINEP, the Colombian Vice-presidency’s Human Rights Observatory and
Fabio Sánchez (see Sánchez 2007). The actions are summed for the period of 1993-
2005.11 The measures exclude more blatant kinds of violence and transgressions against
civilians such as homicides, displacement, massacres, and kidnappings. While the data
include actions that occurred in the entirety of each municipio and not necessarily only
those in or near indigenous regions they are still likely good indicators of the overall
threat different indigenous groups faced from the conflict. The data from CINEP, which
is based on press and church reporting, may suffer from relatively greater absolute under-
reporting. However, there is reason to believe it is relatively more representative than the
government-reported data for the sample of indigenous municipios since by law state
institutions have greater limitations to operating in indigenous territories. An alternate
indicator of only actions in indigenous regions collected by CECOIN is also tested but it
appears to suffer from greater missing data. To more accurately incorporate the
curvilinear predictions of the balance of control theory, I also test a squared term of total
offensive actions.
Lootable resources. Variables for economic resources are also controlled for as an
explanation for violence. Resources may represent strategic interests for armed groups

11
Sánchez’ data comes from the Colombian Government. The measure combines the following categories
of events: confrontations, ambushes, attacks on installations, terrorist bombings, incursions on populations,
assaults on private property, roadblocks, harassment, and robberies. The activities plausibly reflect
offensive initiative of and control by armed groups through the ability to act freely (and activities aimed
more at civilians—incursions, robberies, and roadblocks—are relatively few). Actions by government
forces only include attacks. These measures, based on total observed “active presence” events, may be
partially endogenous to control to the extent that armed groups use actions to consolidate control but
roughly map to Kalyvas’ zones—areas with few attacks should largely be completely controlled by a given
group (e.g., either the state or the guerrillas), moderate attacks should reflect dominant but contested
control, and many attacks likely reflect the front-lines (where violence is more indiscriminate than
selective).

16
and therefore the intensity of contestation and incentives to commit violence against
civilians. Resources may also be associated with abusive, undisciplined armed actor
organizations (Weinstein 2007). As Colombia is known for its drug cartels and cocaine
production, I include a variable for the area of coca cultivated in each municipio in
hectares (composed of an average of data from Thoumi (1997) for 1994 and from the
United Nations aerial survey for 1999.12
Geographic variables. To account for geography and rough terrain where rebels
can hide (Fearon and Laitin 2003), I include a measure of the elevation above sea level of
the county seat of each municipio in meters as well as each municipio’s area (DANE
1987). 13 To account for isolation and state strength, I include measures of each
municipio’s distance from its departmental capital and lengths of rivers and paved roads
(DANE 2000, 2008). Six region dummies are included to account for region-specific
variation.
To account for serial auto-correlation in violence within municipios, I control for
historical violence with a variable for the summed homicide rate for the period from
1974, when the CECOIN data begins, through 1993, the year of the indigenous census.

Modeling and Results

I test OLS cross-sectional models where independent variable data primarily from
1993 is used to predict outcomes from 1993-2005. These models include the lagged
dependent variable of the CECOIN homicide rates from 1974-1993.
Since illnesses and doctor and shaman visits are relatively rare events in the data,
larger measurement error is to be expected for communities and municipios with smaller
populations. By chance these communities were likely to have had fewer possible events
(or visits that were randomly not related to the dimension of “organization”). For this
reason and for possible error in reporting of violence, I variously restricted the sample in
the regression analyses to municipio cases with more than 100 sick people (reported here),
populations of greater than 1,000 residents, or more than five reported shaman visits.

12
In additional models (not shown) I also control for oil infrastructure, since armed groups have been
known to siphon and sell oil on the black market, and the number of mines in each municipio (DANE
2008). These natural resources are frequently found and disputed in indigenous territories (Ghk 1996).
13
Tests that use standard deviations of elevation calculated for each municipio for rough terrain yield
similar results (not shown).

17
 An initial bi-variate regression between shaman visits and homicide rates in
Model 1 in Table 3 shows a significant and positive relationship (p<.05) in municipios
where more than 100 residents reported having been ill. This would at first appear to
reject the hypothesis about violence-reducing roles of traditional authorities. However,
additional tests indicate that it is crucial to control for socio-economic status,
development, access to public goods with the variables of zinc or cement roofs and
electricity, and region effects. As the controls are added, the sign on the shaman variable
flips negative, suggesting that it is conditional on (and correlated with) levels of
development, assimilation, and region-specific factors. All these factors help parse-out
the effect of assimilation and traditionalism that could also be captured in shaman visits
(see the comparison of bi-variate and multi-variate regression line plots in Figure 4).
The inclusion of the controls for conflict activities helps move the sign on
shamans negative, but they alone are not sufficient to make the effect significant.14 Once
variables for guerrilla, military, and paramilitary actions are included with the full set of
demographic and geographic controls (Model 4), the shaman effect is significant at the
p<.01 level for specifications with municipios with fewer than five shaman visits or 100
sick people and at the p<.1 level for municipios with greater than 1,000 residents (the loss
of precision perhaps due to the greater reduction in the sample size).
The magnitude of the shaman variable is also substantively significant. Moving
from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in shaman visits leads to a reduction in the
homicide rate from 490 to 191, or a 157 percent average reduction in the homicide rate.
This finding suggests that, all other things equal, indigenous populations have suffered
less violence where residents still view traditional authorities as playing important roles
for the community.
Few other variables are significantly correlated with violence. Population (logged)
is negative and near conventional levels of significance in most models, suggesting that
smaller communities are less targeted than large ones. The Community workers variable
is positively related with violence, suggesting either that communities do not gain
protection from raw manpower or that agriculture-based communities are more

14
A test for an interaction effect between the shaman variable and conflict actions is not significant,
suggesting the protective effects are not attenuated or amplified by the intensity of conflict.

18
susceptible to violence. The percent of houses with zinc or cement roofs is also
significant and positive at or near conventional levels in most models, suggesting that
wealthier communities or those that are more economically integrated with the rest of the
country suffer greater violence. Other variables such as guerrilla attacks positively predict
violence at the p<.1 level while paramilitary actions are positively but not significantly
related (actions by the military are negatively associated but not significantly). The
homicide rate of the pre-1993 period is not significantly correlated with later violence in
the full model. Other variables such as those for languages, foundation date of the
municipio, indigenous homes, and access to electricity are not found to be predictors of
violence.

Robustness
The results for the violence-reducing effect of shamans are robust to a number of
additional tests. Results remain when using robust standard errors to account for
heteroskedasticity and are largely similar when using negative binomial or Poisson
models with counts of homicides or total victims as the dependent variables (at the <.05
to <.1 level depending on the specification). They are robust to removing observations
with extremely high homicide rates and are similar in alternate specifications that use the
broader dependent variable of rates of any and all kinds of violence. The results are also
found to not depend on the inclusion of municipios in the department of Cauca where the
Nasa Indians have faced both some of the gravest conflict conditions and have
undertaken some of the strongest indigenous collective actions. Lastly, the results also
persist when the sample is restricted to only those municipios that registered some
amount of armed group contestation as reflected by having at least one conflict event
from 1993-2005—conditions where, out of necessity, civilian collective action is most
likely to be translated into the strategies to pursue autonomy from armed groups and
where these strategies are most likely to be effective.
There are also not reasons to believe that reporting biases correlated with
indigenous community traits are influencing the results. It is conceivable that a
“traditionalism” reporting bias could cause communities with stronger shamans and
authorities to have less contact with the outside world and thus report fewer events to the

19
press, national political authorities or the police (or these institutions have less presence
in these rural zones). However, this seems unlikely since the effect of the shaman visits
variable persists even with the inclusion of control variables that account for
traditionalism. A more plausible bias in the data is a bias correlated with levels of
organization, where communities with stronger organizations report relatively more
incidences of violence. Such a relationship would bias against a negative effect of the
strength of traditional authorities on violence that is observed. Further study is required to
more completely adjudicate these possibilities.
To understand the characteristics of indigenous communities that are associated
with a greater tendency of shaman visits, I constructed a shaman visits selection model.
According to the models in Table 4, Shaman visits appear to be as-if random with respect
to most variables. Most crucially for the purposes of assessing possible endogeneity
between violence against indigenous groups and the strength of indigenous authority
structures, the cumulative homicide rate prior to 1993 (when census variables are
measured) and guerrilla actions registered in 1985 are not found to be a significant
predictor of shaman visits. The few factors that do appear to be significantly correlated
with shaman visits are community workers (p<.07), churches (p<.001), and standard
deviation of elevation (p<.01) while zinc and cement roofs (p<.05) and distance to cities
(p<.05) are negatively related. Shaman visits are more prevalent in the Andean and East
Andean regions (speaking indigenous languages and living in reserves are only
significant only at p<.1 without region effects).
Overall, these results for the effect of shamans on violence could be consistent
with several interpretations, but it is especially plausible that they reflect the important
roles of shamans and local authorities in managing their communities and maintaining
social cohesion in the midst of the trying circumstances of armed conflict.

Conclusions
Tribal and traditional communities are found in many parts of the developing
world where armed conflict is prevalent yet we know little about how different authority
structures of these communities affect conflict processes. This study has examined the
possible protective effects of traditional authorities with a rigorous approach. Colombia’s

20
diverse ethnic and conflict landscapes and available data on these landscapes present a
unique opportunity to learn about the interplay between tribal characteristics and
processes of conflict. The analysis highlighted that some indigenous communities are
especially set apart from campesino communities. It also showed that even indigenous
groups situated in the same region do not all face the same conditions and are not
structured equally. This variation was leveraged in empirical tests.
The main focus of the testing of explanations for violence was on the role of
shamans. Greater shaman visits were associated with less subsequent violence by armed
groups. This result is consistent with the shamans’ role as authorities that enable
communities to implement strategies to work toward retaining their autonomy, such as
encouraging residents to stay out of macro-level conflicts and advocating for the
community and bargaining with armed actors.
A broad variety of additional indicators included in the tests helped guide the
interpretation of the results. These controls suggested the shamans effect does not likely
simply reflect levels of assimilation or traditionalism. Concerns of endogeneity were
allayed by the timing of the measurement of indigenous population characteristics prior
to the increase in the intensity of conflict and by selection models that accounted for
historical factors that might have determined selection into strong authority structures.
The findings in their totality suggest that even tribes using non-violent and authority-
based strategies can provide protection when the state is unable to consistently ensure
broader security. Similarly, even within the already highly organized and cohesive
indigenous population of Colombia (relative to the mainstream population), stronger
traditional authorities are beneficial.
The study also contributed a new perspective on the role of ethnicity and identity
in conflict settings. By taking indigenous groups and tribal cultures seriously with precise
measurement and a clear articulation of decision-making calculus and causal mechanisms
their valuable lessons and trying experiences are made more accessible to broader
audiences. While Houghton and Villa (2005) noted that there are many unique responses
across indigenous groups, this study suggests that these groups at a more basic level
nevertheless do share in the importance of strong authority structures for protection. A
policy implication is that activities such as ethno-education and cultural fortification

21
could merit renewed consideration. Some positive examples of these kinds of activities
give hope that they can be strengthened where they are currently weak (see Jackson
1995). These conclusions may hold lessons for the broader trend of organization around
identity sweeping Latin America as documented by Yashar (2005).
The study beckons a broad agenda of further research on tribal groups in
Colombia and beyond. First, although the data used is quite unique, analysis could be
improved with more direct and repeated measurement of concepts such as the social
power of shamans and other indigenous authorities. Second, additional levels of analysis
such as reserves could be used to increase the number of units and limit ecological
inference problems. Third, there could be further study of the strange possibility that,
rather than reflecting an organizational process, the shamans variable could indicate the
power of shamans’ spiritual charms to protect group members from evil and evildoers.
While it is open to debate whether shamans actually channel supernatural powers, this
“placebo effect” of shamans could still produce the desired result of protective cohesion
through ideational influence over group members. In this case, even if members pledge
allegiance to their tribal leaders only because they believe in magic and rituals, it could
be fair to say that shamans’ charms work after all.

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25
 Participation in Community Organizations by Ethnicity (2005)

Author’s calculations
 Table 1
Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Indigenous population 133 4,816.37 5,600.80 313.00 29,467.00
Number of Shaman Visits 133 306.86 559.63 4.00 5,385.00
Number homicides 1993-2005 133 10.77 28.44 0.00 260.00
Homicide rate 1993-2005 133 325.61 666.38 0.00 3,500.63
Victim rate 1993-2005 133 2,398.89 12,289.69 0.00 109,861.20
Number homicides 1998-2005 133 163.50 318.18 0.00 1,567.40
Homicide rate 1998-2005 133 5.04 15.81 0.00 163.00
Homicide rate 1974-1993 133 91.92 317.25 0.00 3,289.17
Percent Shaman Visits 133 0.40 0.22 0.01 0.98
Log population 133 7.94 1.04 5.75 10.29
Percent Traditional House 133 0.49 0.37 0.01 1.00
Percent Speak Indigenous Language 133 0.51 0.37 0.01 0.99
Percent Community Workers 133 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.52
Percent Zinc/ Cement Roofs 133 0.44 0.33 0.00 1.00
Percent Electricity 124 0.20 0.23 0.00 0.91
Distance to Department Capital 117 156.85 141.50 0.00 850.00
Altitude 114 933.96 999.37 0.00 3,087.00
Year founded (municipio) 118 1,896.41 112.48 1,525.00 1,996.00
Military actions 121 14.16 16.83 0.00 93.00
Guerrilla actions 121 2.73 4.46 0.00 22.00
Paramilitary actions 121 0.83 1.73 0.00 9.00
Caribbean region 122 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Pacific region 123 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Andean region 121 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
East Andean region 121 0.02 0.16 0.00 1.00
Eastern region 125 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
For municipios with more than 100 sick people
 Figure 1
Number of Indigenous People Killed by Armed Actors, 1974-2005 (CECOIN)

Table 2

Total Had an illness No illness No

Information
No medical visit 267,324 21,208 245,430 686
Traditional doctor 33,703 22,179 11,128 396
Western doctor 27,068 20,809 5,909 350
Nurse/ clinic 11,431 7,483 3,909 39
Pharmacist 2,847 2,003 835 9
Don’t know 13,573 639 12,863 71
No information 128,983 10,564 115,436 2,983
Total 484,929 84,885 395,510 4,534
 Figure 2
Histogram of the Shaman Visits (%) Variable
 Figure 3
Map of the Shaman Visits (%) Variable (1993) by municipios
(blank municipios reported no shaman visits or have no indigenous population)
 Table 3
Models of Indigenous Homicide Rates from 1993-2005

(1) (2) (3) (4)

CECOIN CECOIN CECOIN CECOIN
Indigenous Indigenous Indigenous Indigenous
Homicide Rate, Homicide Rate, Homicide Rate, Homicide Rate,
1993-2005 1993-2005 1993-2005 1993-2005
Shaman Visits (%) 537.116* -45.737 -628.408^ -795.159*
(2.08) (0.13) (1.83) (2.30)
CECOIN Pre-1993 1.273* 1.089* 0.891
Homicide Rate
(2.10) (2.19) (1.40)
Population (Log) -112.966* -128.036* -104.861*
(2.05) (2.52) (2.16)
Altitude -0.125* -0.058 0.026
(2.47) (0.93) (0.34)
Distance to -0.148 -0.057 0.129
Department Capital
(0.52) (0.18) (0.39)
Year Founded 0.328 0.630 0.527
(0.44) (0.81) (0.68)
Traditional Homes (%) 401.604 200.101
(1.46) (0.76)
Indigenous Language (%) -24.536 25.039
(0.11) (0.13)
Community Workers (%) 2,521.239* 3,683.088**
(2.61) (3.41)
Zinc/ Cement Roof (%) 596.135^ 571.524^
(1.68) (1.68)
Electricity (%) -339.702 -277.518
(1.35) (1.01)
Military actions -0.496
(0.09)
Guerrilla actions 31.792^
(1.70)
Paramilitary actions 95.419
(1.55)
Constant 111.467 205.739 -566.666 -547.393
(1.08) (0.13) (0.35) (0.34)
Region effects No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 133 114 106 106
R-squared 0.03 0.29 0.43 0.51
Sample includes municipios with more than 100 illnesses among the indigenous population.
Robust t statistics in parentheses
^ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 Figure 4
Shaman Visit Added Variable Regression Line Plots
Bivariate regression of Homicide Rate on Shaman Visits (Model 1)
(labels are for majority indigenous groups)

Multivariate regression of Homicide Rate on Shaman Visits (Model 4)

Indigenous Civilians Killed per 100,000 residents, 1993-2005 (CECOIN)

 Table 4
Models of Shaman Visits (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shaman Shaman Shaman Shaman
Visits (%) Visits (%) Visits (%) Visits (%)
CECOIN Pre-1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Homicide Rate
(0.29) (0.07) (0.15) (0.21)
Population (Log) 0.005 0.005 0.026 0.023
(0.24) (0.29) (1.12) (1.15)
Traditional Homes (%) 0.099 0.010 0.024 -0.028
(1.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.31)
Indigenous Language (%) 0.147^ 0.118 0.151^ 0.103
(1.71) (1.60) (1.72) (1.33)
Community Workers (%) 0.646 0.552 1.153^ 0.994^
(0.85) (0.94) (1.74) (1.84)
Zinc/ Cement Roof (%) -0.162^ -0.127 -0.297** -0.257*
(1.97) (1.50) (2.72) (2.60)
Electricity (%) -0.214* -0.226* -0.124 -0.174
(2.27) (2.43) (1.03) (1.50)
Altitude 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.02) (0.29) (0.13) (0.09)
Distance to -0.000^ -0.000^ -0.000 -0.000^
Department Capital
(1.69) (1.75) (1.21) (1.80)
Year Founded -0.000^ -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(1.98) (0.01) (0.14) (1.30)
% in Reserve -0.118^ -0.073
(1.87) (1.20)
% Sick 0.302 0.301
(1.02) (1.00)
Gov’t Officials per capita 0.001 0.001
(1995)
(1.20) (1.18)
Churches (urban, 1995) 0.002** 0.002**
(3.08) (4.59)
Std. Dev. Elevation 0.000** 0.000**
(3.07) (2.95)
Caribbean 0.173^ 0.069
(1.71) (0.71)
Pacific 0.080 0.012
(1.20) (0.15)
Andean 0.239** 0.181*
(3.44) (2.16)
Eastandean 0.419** 0.270^
(3.68) (1.99)
Eastern -0.026 -0.094
(0.42) (1.37)
Constant 1.054** 0.320 0.213 -0.378
(2.71) (0.81) (0.41) (0.81)
Observations 106 106 90 90
R-squared 0.40 0.55 0.54 0.65
Omitted region is Amazon
Robust t statistics in parentheses
^ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%