ROBERT V. TOBIAS, petitioners, vs. HON.

CITY MAYOR ABALOS

respondents.
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

FACTS:

Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, petitioners

assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong

and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the
incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill
which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into
law. Petitioners contends that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49
thereof, is unconstitutional.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after
the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first
representative to be elected at the same election.

ISSUES and RULING:

1.) The inclusion of Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 resulted in the latter embracing
two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts violative of the "one subject-one bill"
rule. Is there a violation of the "one subject-one bill" rule?

No. The "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The court agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less
than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-
one representative" proviso in the Constitution:

. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution). Hence, it is in compliance with the constitutional mandate that the
creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed
under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district

for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, R.A. No. 7675 necessarily
includes and contemplates the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted the court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in
Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), the court ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction.

2) Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution which provides that: “Within three
years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section. Petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census
showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements. Is the absence of census makes the division ineffective?

- No. R.A. No. 7675 enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress
of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts.
At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must
contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

3) Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution provides: “the House of Representatives shall be

composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts ..” Petitioners argue that the
division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts has
resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond
that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Is there a violation of
this constitutional provision?

-No. A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted,
shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution
clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of
the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if
Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the
increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to
have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be
allowed to stand.

4) As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts

the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument
borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.

5) Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made
to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change
in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal
subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary
thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.

6) Petitioners argued that the subject law has resulted in

"gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a
particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of
the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing
San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished,
which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMELEC, respondents.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the election — seeks to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with
the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."

FACTS:

The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, applied as a candidate for elections to

the House of Representatives in the district of Leyte. The incumbent representative
of the constituency of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo (a candidate for the same position)
filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency—particularly the one-year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representatives.

The purpose of the provision was to prevent the possibility of strangers or

newcomers who were unacquainted with the needs of a community standing for
office.

In her original application form, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos had stated that she had
resided in Leyte for seven months. In response to the complaint filed by Cirilo Roy
Montejo she amended the time of residency in her application from seven months
to “since childhood”.

She claimed that the entry of the word “seven” in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an “honest misinterpretation”, which she now sought to
rectify. She further stated that she had always maintained Tacloban (in the district
of Leyte) as her domicile or residence. COMELEC, after considering the petition of
Cirilo Roy Montejo to have the candidacy of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos rejected,
found the claim meritorious and refused the petitioner’s original application for
candidacy and her amended version.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But
the COMELEC suspended her proclamation, thus, Imelda appealed to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was a resident for election purposes?

RULING:

Yes, it was determined that the petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications.

Residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective

position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile
to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently.

Domicile and Residence, Distinguished.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in
law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice.

Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily
so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our
election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile".

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy

which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual
has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The
said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or
her disqualification.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual

residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner
had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence
and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should
not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First
District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a
mere entry on a piece of paper.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest

mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to
write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for
various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature
does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she
filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places"
flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.

Domicile of Origin;

A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is

retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's
being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of
law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back
to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Requisites for a change of domicile.

Domicile of origin is not easily lost.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for
a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time.

In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's
former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of
her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between
the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the
wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article
110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two
concepts are well delineated.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of
domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage
yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically
loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence
upon marriage.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or
transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in
order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art.
110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be
faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the
husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various)
residences.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,

petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that
time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan,
Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos
did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of
these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage
was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

The common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been

incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the
drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore
the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code
drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an
entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that
found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept
of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a
product of mutual agreement between the spouses.

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing
in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political
law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the
rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from
this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married
the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
BANAT, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

FACTS:
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives.
The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List
System.

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections
which was held in May 2007.

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or

coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent
(2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be
determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered
the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while
the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI,
1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list
which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be
entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at
least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the
Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if it garners more
than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election.

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a

party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because
its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at
least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the
20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is

mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it
would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation which shall be discussed in the
ruling of the court.
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the
validity of the 3-seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of
whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a

mere ceiling.
2) How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
3) Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
4) How are party-list seats allocated?
5) Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
6) Whether or not the three-seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

RULING:

1) The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning,

the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number
of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.

2) The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from
legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the
Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the
lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem
appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative District Representatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number
of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
3) No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis
to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a
seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2%
threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get
a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

It is therefore clear that the 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the

full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution:
“(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list… .”
and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

4) How are party-list seats allocated?

The 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is
guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less
than 2% to also get a seat.

The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.

2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two

percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one guaranteed seat each.

ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the

ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats”
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No.
7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the
first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the
two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to
these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-
lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55
seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please
refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of
the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives.

How?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the
remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall
still be observed.

Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234
which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) =
number of additional seats
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is
a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats
or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it
will still get 3 seats because the 3-seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than
3 seats.
Now after all the two-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats,
and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the
remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until
all the seats are occupied.

5) Major political parties to be allowed to participate in the party-list elections?

No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form
coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There
should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-
list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth
wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a
fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can
field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the
same for the urban poor.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties
from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate
opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in
concurring with this ponencia.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition
either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and
that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed
major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation),
Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that
the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely
because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the
people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.

6) Yes, the three-seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party
shall dominate the party-list system.

G.R. No. 147589            June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
Party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections.

FACTS:
Bagong Bayani and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
issued by the COMELEC.

The resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the 2001
party list elections.

Petitioners seek disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.

Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to address the problem of ineffective representation of
underprivileged sectors of society and enhance direct peoples action and participation in the decision-making
process to counter-balance the territorial representation of 80% of the House of Representatives, and that to allow
participation in the party-list system of respondent political parties and parties/coalitions would be to defeat this
purpose because these parties do not represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow, and they do not prohibit, the participation of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations to participate in the party-list system, whether
or not said parties or organizations represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.

It cites the proviso of Art. VI, 5(2) of the Constitution that For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector, as proof that marginalized sectors are
not entitled to permanent seats in the House of Representatives. In any event, it is contended that petitioner’s
recourse is not to this Court but to the COMELEC because whether a party, organization, or coalition represents
marginalized and underrepresented sectors is a question of fact, and this Court is not a trier of facts.

ISSUE:
a. WON political parties may participate in the party-list elections. YES

b. WON the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations. NO

RULING:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people
who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now
dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this
lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. Under the
Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
“Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be
registered under the party-list system. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a
party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties."

b. Political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any
political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution. The provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was
thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941
was enacted.

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:

"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."\

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law
to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear:
"to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is
clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before
the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-
list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates
the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with
which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified
or specialized by those in immediate association.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203766)

FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in
an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them
from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November
and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” their nominees do not come from a
“marginalized and underrepresented sector,” and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly
representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.

Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the
petitioners’ application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest. They also
lamented the poll body’s “denial” to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.

The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was tasked as the
Member-in-charge of the case.

Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quo prior to the
disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to
secure a mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to include their names in the printing of official
ballots.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party list
elections? (NO, COMELEC MERELY FOLLOWED THE SC’S RULING IN BAGONG BAYANI AND
BANAT)

(2) WON the criteria for participating in the party list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party list elections. (NO,
A NEW SET OF PARAMETERS IS PROVIDED BY THE SC)

RULING:

SUMMARY OF THE NEW PARAMETERS MODIFYING ANG BAGONG BAYANI AND BANAT.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent partylist elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:

(1) Three different groups may participate in the party list system: (i) national parties or organizations,
(ii) regional parties or organizations, and (iii) sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.

(3) Political parties can participate in party list elections provided they register under the party list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

(4) Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.

(5) A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well -defined political
constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona fide members of such parties or organizations.

(6) National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

Political parties need not align themselves with sectoral groups or organizations, and the nominees

thereof need not come from that sector itself, provided that he can show that he has a proven track
record for advocating the cause of the organization he seeks to represent.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies" a chance to
win seats in the House of Representatives.

On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor,
peasant, fisher folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
“marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.

Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must “wallow in
poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class
or those who fall in the low-income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.

GR No. 207134, Jun 16, 2015

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner was among the accredited candidates for party-list representative during the national and
local elections held on May 13, 2013. On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers (NBOC), under NBOC Resolution No. 0006-13, proclaimed fourteen (14) party-list
groups, which obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system and were thus
entitled to one (1) guaranteed seat each, pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941.
Petitioners filed for a TRO but the same was dismissed.

Petitioner’s contention:

1. Allocation of additional seats – prejudicial to the interest of the parties

2. It was hasty and premature because there were still uncanvassed and untransmitted results
from Mindanao and absentee votes.

3. It was invalid as it was based on an incomplete canvass/consolidation of only 110 Certificates of

Canvass (COCs), some of which were not electronically transmitted in gross violation of Section 27, R.A.
No. 8436 (as amended by Section 22, R.A. No. 9369).

4. Allocation of additional seats did not conform to Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 and this Court's
ruling in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.

Comment of the Solicitor General:

1. COMELEC faithfully adhered to the procedure prescribed in BANAT in the allocation of party-list
seats (14 guaranteed seats were first allocated to those who obtained 2% of the total votes cast for
party-list and thereafter 44 additional seats were completely distributed). It was explained that party-list
groups with products of less than one was still allocated seats depending on their rank and availability of
seats. As to the uncanvassed votes at the time, COMELEC had reserved five "buffer" seats to
accommodate possible changes in the ranking.
2. The Solicitor General further contends that COMELEC's proclamation of initial winners under
NBOC Res. No. 0008-13 is valid as the votes yet to be canvassed did not materially affect the results of
the election.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in allocating the additional seats for the 38 party-
list candidates proclaimed as winners in the May 13, 2013 elections. (No)

RULING:

NO. Both petitions are dismissed.

1. COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the remaining

uncanvassed election returns will not affect the result of the elections

A canvass of votes will only be illegal if the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results
of the election. In this case, COMELEC based its ruling on its national canvass reports for party-list. As of
May 28, 2013, AKMA-PTM garnered 164,980 votes and ABANTE KA had 111,429 votes. In Party-List
Canvass Report No. 11 as of July 18, 2013, AKMA-PTM's total votes slightly increased to 165,784 votes
while ABANTE KA had a total of 111,625 votes. There was no significant change in the rankings as per
the latest canvass and therefore COMELEC had sufficient basis for proclaiming the initial winners on May
28, 2013 and reserving only five buffer seats.

2. OMELEC's allocation of additional seats for party-list in accordance with our ruling in BANAT

In BANAT v. COMELEC, we laid down the following procedure in determining the allocation of seats for
party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections; (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each; (c) Those garnering
sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated; (d) Each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the
remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under
the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until
all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second
round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

It is clear from the foregoing that party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet
qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats depending on their ranking in the second round. In
sum, we hold that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in allocating the party-list seats in
the 2013 elections and proclaiming the winners after distributing the guaranteed and additional seats in
accordance with our ruling in BANAT.

G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974

BENJAMIN T. LIGOT,  vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of
the Philippines, 

Salaries of Representatives – Retirement

FACTS:

 Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the

Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from
December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.

During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 “fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government” was
enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964.

The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under
said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that
said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for
retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at
least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis
therein provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of
elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.”

HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so
issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The
thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not
applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court
held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for
members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should
not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for
members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was already
P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00

per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of
office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly.

Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly
situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple
reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the
purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other
emoluments” to their salary as provided by law.

To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on

December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their
term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase
the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during
their incumbency.

As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner’s

colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, “(S)uch a scheme would contravene the
Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative
authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”
Sarmiento v. Mison (G.R. No. 79974)
December 17, 1987 
FACTS:

In 1987, then President Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison as Commissioner of

the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments. Herein petitioners, both of whom happened to be lawyers and
professors of constitutional law, filed the instant petition for prohibition on the ground
that the aforementioned appointment violated Section 16, Art. VII of the1987
Constitution. Petitioners argued that the appointment of a bureau head should be
subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of bureau heads should be subject to the approval of
the Commission on Appointments.

HELD:

No, construing Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution would show that the
President is well within her authority to appoint bureau heads without submitting such
nominations before the Commission on Appointments. In its ruling, the SC traced the
history of the confirmatory powers of the Commission on Appointments (which is part
of the legislative department) vis-a-vis the appointment powers of the President.

 Under Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential
appointments required the consent or confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. As a result, the Commission became very powerful, eventually
transforming into a venue for horse-trading and similar malpractices.
 On the other hand, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive amendments, the 1973 Constitution placed
the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the
part of the legislature.

Under the current constitution, the Court held that the framers intended to strike a
"middle ground" in order to reconcile the extreme set-ups in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions. As such, while the President may make appointments to positions that
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution also
grants her the power to make appointments on her own without the need for
confirmation by the legislature.

Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution enumerates four groups of public officers:
 heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this constitution;
 all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
 those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
 officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
GR No. 105371, November 11, 1993 (227 SCRA 703) 

FACTS:

This is a petition raised by the members of the lower courts who assails the
constitutionality of Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. Philippine Judges Association vs.
Prado

It is alleged that the said law is discriminatory per se to withdraw the franking privilege
of the Judiciary but not on other offices of the government, such as:  the President of the
Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines;
the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of
complaints against public offices and officers.

However, the respondents contend that there is no discrimination since the law is based
on the valid classification in accordance of the equal protection clause. In addition, not
only the Judiciary department will be affected with it but also other offices like Office of
Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office;
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission;
etc. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD:

The Court held Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 unconstitutional, thus violates the equal
protection clause. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

In Ichong vs. Hernandez, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars. 

The Court finds its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly
situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege. P

[G.R. No. 151992. September 18, 2002.]

 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, COMELEC
COMMISSIONERS RESURRECCION Z. BORRA and FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., Petitioners, v.
JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-PADILLA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH
215 and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORP., Respondents.
FACTS:
The case at bar provides us with another occasion to stress that with respect to government contracts,
statutes take precedence over the public officers’ freedom to contract.

In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189 known as the "Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization and computerization of the voters’ registration
list and the appropriation of funds therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and
updated list of voters."
COMELEC then promulgated Resolution No. 00-0315 approving in principle the Voters’
Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS Project for brevity). The VRIS Project envisions a
computerized database system for the May 2004 Elections.
The idea is to have a national registration of voters whereby each registrant’s fingerprints will be
digitally entered into the system and upon completion of registration, compared and matched with other
entries to eliminate double entries. A tamper-proof and counterfeit-resistant voter’s identification card will
then be issued to each registrant as a visual record of the registration.
On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to prequalify and bid for the supply and
installation of information technology equipment and ancillary services for its VRIS Project. PHOTOKINA
pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders.
After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA’s bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos
garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder. Thus, on September 28,
2000, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252 approving the Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA, which,
in turn, immediately accepted the same.
The parties then proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner Sadain and Atty. Sta.
Ana, acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.
However, under Republic Act No. 8760 the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELEC’s
modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the
Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2
Billion Pesos.
In December 2000, then COMELEC Chairman Demetriou issued a memorandum to the
COMELEC en banc expressing her objections to the contract. Commissioner Sadain, for his part,
submitted a draft of the contract providing a price that would not
exceed the certified available appropriation but covering only Phase I of the VRIS Project.
On February 2, 2001, the term of former Chairman Demetriou and those of Commissioners Julio
F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores expired.
Meanwhile, PHOTOKINA, as the winning bidder, wrote several letters to the COMELEC
requesting the formal execution of the contract, but to no avail.
Then Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public statements, announced that the
VRIS Project has been "scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside."
On October 2, 2001, Senator Angara directed the creation of a technical working group to "assist
the COMELEC in evaluating all programs for the modernization of the COMELEC which will also consider
the PHOTOKINA contract as an alternative program and various competing programs for the purpose
Unsatisfied with the adverse turn of events, PHOTOKINA filed with the RTC a petition for
mandamus, prohibition and damages (with prayer for temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction) against the COMELEC and all its Commissioners.
On December 19, 2001, respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first assailed
Resolution granting PHOTOKINA’s application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
On February 8, 2002, respondent judge issued the second assailed Resolution denying the
COMELEC’s Omnibus Motion and, this time, granting PHOTOKINA’s application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the OSG in behalf of then COMELEC Chairman
Benipayo and Commissioners Borra and Tuason, Jr..
ISSUE:
Whether a successful bidder can compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project

RULING: NO
No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual
obligations.
Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Thus, in the execution of government
contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to require the various agencies to limit their
expenditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.
The existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre requisites to or
conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such
conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed contract. Using this as our premise, we
cannot accede to PHOTOKINA’s contention that there is already a perfected contract.
To hold otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a binding contract that would obligate the
government in an amount in excess of the appropriations for the purpose for which the contract was
attempted to be made.
In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as the
bidding stage. The first step of a Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to determine whether the bids
comply with the requirements. The BAC shall rate a bid "passed" only if it complies with all the
requirements and the submitted price does not exceed the approved budget for the contract."
Extant on the record is the fact that the VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on account of
its bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos. However, under Republic Act No. 8760, the only fund
appropriated for the project was P1 Billion Pesos and under the Certification of Available Funds (CAF)
only P1.2 Billion Pesos was available. Clearly, the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of
the entire VRIS Project. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA
whose accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by law for the project. This being the case,
the BAC should have rejected the bid for being excessive or should have withdrawn the Notice of Award
on the ground that in the eyes of the law, the same is null and void.
Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them
not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available funds.
Fund availability is, as it has always been, an indispensable prerequisite to the execution of any
government contract involving the expenditure of public funds by all government agencies at all levels.
Such contracts are not to be considered as final or binding unless such a certification as to funds
availability is issued. Antecedent of advance appropriation is thus essential to government liability on
contracts.
Section 48 of E.O. No. 292 explicitly provides that any contract entered into contrary to the
above-mentioned requirements shall be void, and "the officers entering into the contract shall be liable to
the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same as if the transaction
had been wholly between private parties." So when the contracting officer transcends his lawful and
legitimate powers by acting in excess of or beyond the limits of his contracting authority, the Government
is not bound under the contract. It would be as if the contract in such case were a private one,
whereupon, he binds only himself, and thus, assumes personal liability thereunder. Otherwise stated, the
proposed contract is unenforceable as to the Government.
Since PHOTOKINA’s bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project,
the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void.
Petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the
exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.
The petition is GRANTED.
 G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR.,
LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA,
AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the
CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.
FACTS:
Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the
Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations
to the group of Lopa,  a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and
Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know"
regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice"
the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose.   One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan,
Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the respondent
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.

ISSUE:
Whether the inquiry was in aid of legislation

RULING: NO
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore,
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected."
It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in
Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or
necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a
member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees
any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid
of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to
the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
The speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as
"The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Mr. Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved.
The contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it
is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find
out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019,
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature.
The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power
is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or
possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the
purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not
unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in
terms of the functions of congress. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are
functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must
be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress.
Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to
"punish" those investigated are indefensible.
Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective
answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which
jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that
court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the
Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative
commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the
Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the
Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy
already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial
jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.
Since congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other
branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into
mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what
exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...
It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all relevant
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill
of Rights'."
The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the
Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that
every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights
affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to
insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge
his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly.
If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to
appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is
not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between
the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
The petition is GRANTED and the Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and
intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.
DISSENTING:
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties now being
claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to
ascertain if and how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to
investigate the disposition of the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure
of all public money is an indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a possible
violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct or strengthen that law.
G.R. No. 95063 December 2, 1991
ALEXANDER R. APELADO, VICTORINO E. ACLAN and NOEL A. NIVAL, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MAYOR FELIPE EVARDONE, respondents.
FACTS:
Evardone is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position
during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation.
On 14 February 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival (hereinafter referred to
as Apelado, et al.) filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar,
Municipality of Sulat.
In a meeting held on 20 June 1990, the respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 90-0557, approving
the recommendation of Mr. Vedasto B. Sumbilla, Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar, to hold on
14 July 1990 the signing of the petition for recall against incumbent Mayor Evardone of the said
Municipality.
On 10 July 1990, Evardone filed before this Court a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for
immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
On 12 July 1990, this Court resolved to issue a TRO, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from the Court, ordering the respondents to cease and desist from holding the signing of the
petition for recall on 14 July 1990. On the same day, the notice of TRO was received by the Central Office
of the respondent COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July 1990 that the field agent of the respondent
COMELEC received the telegraphic notice of the TRO—a day after the completion of the signing process
sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.
COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being violative of the TRO.

ISSUE: Whether or not the signing process of the petition for recall held on 14 July 1990 has been
rendered nugatory by the TRO issued by this court in G.R. No. 94010 dated 12 July 1990 but received by
the COMELEC field agent only on 15 July 1990.

Whether or not the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition
for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272

RULING: NO (both)

The principal issue for resolution by the Court is the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272 promulgated
by respondent COMELEC on 23 May 1990 by virtue of its powers under the Constitution and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code). The resolution embodies the general rules and
regulations on the recall of elective provincial, city and municipal officials.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws not inconsistent
with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked.
Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on
10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the
Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of
the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local elective
officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the
process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations.
We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid and
constitutional.
COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said
petition.
The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election
Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by
Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about
34% signed the petition for recall.
The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It
is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public
functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public office is "burdened" with public interests and
that the representatives of the people holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the people
with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective
offices.

Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a
political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
"Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to
discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The constituents have made a
judgment and their will to recall the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has already been ascertained and must
be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar,
for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P.
Blg, 337, which states:
Sec. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall May not be Held.— . . .
(2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the official's assumption of office or one
year immediately preceding a regular local election.
The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more
specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 — on the second Monday of May, 1992. 11 Thus, to
hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative
of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337)
ACCORDINGLY, both petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M.
FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader,
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S.
CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J.
GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR
ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alterego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and
anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169659 April 20, 2006
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep.
RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by
FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE
DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169660 April 20, 2006
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of
Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169667 April 20, 2006
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner, vs. HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169834 April 20, 2006
PDP- LABAN, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 171246 April 20, 2006
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-
VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V.
GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.
ERMITA, Respondent.

FACTS:
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such
power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005.
On September 28, 2005, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 464[1]. Effective on
the date of its issuance, the said order aims to (a) ensure the observance of the principle of the
separation of powers; (b) ensure adherence to the rule on executive privilege; and (c) respect the rights of
public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.

Section 1 of the said order requires all heads of the departments of the Executive Branch to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either the Senate or the House of Representatives.
Section 2(a) of the same order enumerates the kind of information covered by executive privilege, while
Section 2(b) lists down the list of officials covered by the order. Finally, Section 3 requires all officials
mentioned in Section 2(b) to secure authorization from the President prior to appearing before the Senate
or the House of Representatives. 

Curiously, E.O. 464 was issued at a time when both the Senate and the House of Representatives were
conducting congressional inquiries, to wit: (a) the North Rail Project; (b) the "Hello Garci" wiretapping
scandal; (c) Ginintuang Masaganang Ani fertilizer fund scam; and (d) the Venable contract. With the
issuance of E.O. 464, the public officials invited to attend said inquiries were effectively barred from
attending without consent from the President.

ISSUE:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

RULING:
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution
which reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be
had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from
the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to
legislate.60 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper
subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most
familiar with and informed on executive operations.
The power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the
legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is
necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that
information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

As noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of
legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial
functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon
is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the
possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations,
along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry
is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of
inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly
published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted
without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege."
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress." Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-
level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
public."

Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state
secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government
informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending
investigations.

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would
be considered privileged in all instances.

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in
relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional
concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty
to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of
the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.

Validity of Section 1
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before Congress.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through
the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage
of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any
information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-
vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under
Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the
question hour.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article
VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which
provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation."

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation.

The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries during
the question hour.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the
question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.
To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the
question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a
question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information
from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to
enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes
more imperative.

If the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the Congress
has the right to obtain information from any source – even from officials of departments and agencies in
the executive branch.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty.
In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-
equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the
basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional
independence of the judiciary.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence
of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to
appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22
of Article VI.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances
in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to
appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Validity of Sections 2 and 3

Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all
senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national
security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section AFP, Chief
of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President.

Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of

information and not to categories of persons.

While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be
invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of
the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress.
Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in
the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences,
or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme
Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank
exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions
claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by
the Order to determine whether it is valid.
While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground
invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege,
a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent
Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not
accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded
involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a)
enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order,
Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. The
enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the
phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order.

Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does
not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is
so, and that the President has not overturned that determination.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must,
therefore, be clearly asserted.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is
woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the
circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the
heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It may thus be
construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive
privilege.

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a
certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has
the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express
pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus
allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege.

Pres. may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case
the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he
personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such power.

It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the
President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in
order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the
matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the
President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the
failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to
compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the
President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials appearing in
inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from
Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected."
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied
claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly
motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the
authorization itself.

Conclusion
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By
the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.

Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of
the doctrine.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from
disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is
necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining
governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents
integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’ domestic decisional and policy making functions, that
is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and
deliberative communications

REFERENCE:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall
not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office
and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege covers all
confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order, including:
Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this
executive order;
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not
be divulged;
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements;
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings;
Matters affecting national security and public order;
(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by
the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in
Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.