LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT CASES

1. TOBIAS vs. ABALOS 239 SCRA 106

ISSUE/S:
a. Whether R.A. No. 7675 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
Constitution;
b. Whether the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law
has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of
the Constitution.
c. Whether section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts.

LAW: Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be
elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same
election.

Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution:

. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article
VI, Section 5(3), Constitution)

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in this section.

APPLICATION:

a. Sumulong v. Comelec  (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section
26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

Lidasan v. Comelec  (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit: Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of
an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis
supplied)

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. 

b. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration
by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is
not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of
said laws.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless
otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

c. It was Congress itself, which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right, which pertains to itself.

2. MARCOS vs. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

ISSUE: Whether IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS was a resident, for purposes of the First District of Leyte for period of one year at
the time of the May 9, 1995

LAW: Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Consitution. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Article 50, New Civil Code. For the exercise of civil rights and fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place
of their habitual residence.

APPLICATION: Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is
or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would
be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his
or her disqualification.

CONCLUSION: First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This
domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.

*As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question

3. BANAT vs. COMELEC GR 179271 APRIL 21, 2009

ISSUES:
a) Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory
or is it merely a ceiling?
b) Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
c) Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one-seat constitutional
d) How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
e) Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major
political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

LAW: Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress
enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
 (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the
total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)

APPLICATION/ CONCLUSION:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat
allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the
lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives.
However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence, (220  ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall
not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2%
of the votes cast a be qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
elections.   A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.”

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is  guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”.
This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING:  1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
LIMITATION.  4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2%
of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55
seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats
for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product,
which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall
still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list
elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed
one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats
shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from
participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by
7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people
who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate
in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

CONCLUSION:
SEC. 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. - The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the
total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
The following are the procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

As to the allocation of additional seats on the second round, after deducting the guaranteed one seat each, for those who obtained 2%
of the total votes cast for party-list, from the number of available party-list seats, it was further held that - In computing the additional
seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a
rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by
each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. 

There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation.

First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of
the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available seats. 

Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed.  We
distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine
the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

4. ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. COMELEC GR 147589 JUNE 26, 2001

ISSUE: Whether the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all.

LAW:
a. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

b. Sections 7&8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution

Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the
voters’ registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

c. Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. d. "x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

d. Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.

APPLICATION:
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list
system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack of well-defined
constituencies."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation
of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation
is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become
members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life,
but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing
law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied
according to its express terms

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is,
without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would
create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.

CONCLUSION: Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

1. The political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of
its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it
has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
2. While even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground
that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented.
3. Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
4. A party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification
as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and
regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of
Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, which does not comply with this policy, must be disqualified.
5. The party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By
the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by
citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list
candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.

6. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as
follows:

"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of
the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office
until the expiration of his term."

a. Not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a
retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State
policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
b. As previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained
during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a
particular district x x x."

5. ATONG PAGLAUM vs. COMELEC GR 147589 APRIL 20, 2013

ISSUE: What are included in the party-list system under Section 5 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?

LAW: The Party-List System

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to
democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House
of Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and
another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list
system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters’
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in the
Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the
coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes
or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or
election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

APPLICATION: The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two
criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors,
and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been
disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have
been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its
nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of
petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941

CONCLUSION: The COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those
who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
6. AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA vs. COMELEC 758 SCRA 587
ISSUE: Whether the proclamation of initial winners for party-list groups with additional seats was invalid, as it was based on an
incomplete canvass/consolidation of only 110 Certificates of Canvass (COCs), some of which were not electronically transmitted in
gross violation of Section 27, R.A. No. 8436 (as amended by Section 22, R.A. No. 9369). National Canvass Report No. 10 7 likewise did
not state the total votes cast for party-list

LAW: Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code authorizes the board of canvassers to proclaim winning candidates in cases of
delayed or lost election returns if the missing returns will not affect the results of the election. Said provision reads:

SEC. 233. When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed. - x x x The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact
that not all the election returns have been received by it, may terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on
the basis of the available election returns if the missing election returns will not affect the results of the election.

APPLICATION: COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in allocating the party-list seats in the 2013 elections and
proclaiming the winners after distributing the guaranteed and additional seats in accordance with our ruling in BANAT.

COMELEC based its ruling on its national canvass reports for party-list. As of May 28, 2013, AKMA-PTM garnered 164,980 votes and
ABANTE KA had 111,429 votes. In Party-List Canvass Report No. 11 as of July 18, 2013, AKMA-PTM's total votes slightly increased to
165,784 votes while ABANTE KA had a total of 111,625 votes. There was no significant change in the rankings as per the latest
canvass and therefore COMELEC had sufficient basis for proclaiming the initial winners on May 28, 2013 and reserving only five buffer
seats.

CONCLUSION: COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the remaining uncanvassed election returns will not
affect the result of the elections

An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the true
vote of the electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and omits none. However, this is true only where the election
returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election.

7. LIGOT vs. MATHAY 56 SCRA 823

ISSUE: When does the salary increase upon the expiration of the full term of all members of Congress that approved on such increase
take effect?

LAW: Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" was
enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and
congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said
increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution." (section 1)

APPLICATION: Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:

1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act 4134 could be operative
only  from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress (House and Senate)
that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the
1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969
such as petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as provided by law" and the Constitution
during their term of office.

2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office)
would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner's
colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited
result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly."3

The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape notice that during his entire tenure as Congressman (Dec. 30,
1965 to December 30, 1969) comprising the last four years of his government service, the herein claimant-retiree was unable to receive
the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for Members of Congress precisely because of the ,constitutional ban. To allow him now
to collect such amount in the guise of retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand to reason that while he could not legally receive
such rate as salary while still in the service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his retirement."4

3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was already operative when his retirement took
effect on December 30, 1969, his retirement gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be sustained as far as he and
other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason
that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their
compensation and "other emoluments" to their salary as provided by law.

CONCLUSION: This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez.5 In striking down Republic Act No. 3836 as null and void insofar
as it referred to the retirement of members of Congress and the elected officials thereof for being violative of the Constitution, this Court
held that "it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a  part of compensation for
services of one possessing any office" and that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement
benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, section 14 of the
Constitution."6

It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what
he could not obtain directly."

8. SARMIENTO vs. MISON 156 SCRA 549

ISSUE: Whether Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of it not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

LAW: Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

APPLICATION: In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude
presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the
word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may
be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in
the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.

Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress
may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short,
the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3,
section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And,
this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments,
except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers
whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately
excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.

CONCLUSION: The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article
VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read as follows:

Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis supplied].
9. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADO 227 SCRA 703
ISSUE: The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and
does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its
final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary.

LAW: Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265,
Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular
No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse
or unauthorized use thereof.

APPLICATION: R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same
for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the
Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the
filing of complaints against public offices and officers.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of
justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of
Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we
may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not
greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank
mail as the Judiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to
operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse
itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and
the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain
offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the
Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It
is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking
privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves,
should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the
judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive
Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is allotted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to
imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of
their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the
Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the
duty and power to correct.

CONCLUSION: R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance
with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing
that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in
this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is
inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As
judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our
own conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No.
92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail
Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said
privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.

10. COMELEC vs. JUDGE QUIJANO PADILLA, ET.AL. GR 151992 SEPTEMBER 18, 2002
ISSUE: May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the
amount appropriated by Congress for the project?

LAW: Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 47 Thus, in the execution of government contracts, the precise import of this constitutional
restriction is to require the various agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.

Complementary to the foregoing constitutional injunction are pertinent provisions of law and administrative issuances that are designed
to effectuate the above mandate in a detailed manner. 48 Sections 46 and 47, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title 1, Book V of Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as "Administrative Code of 1987," provide:

"SEC. 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. — (1) No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into
unless there is an appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed
expenditure; and . . .

"SEC. 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. — Except in the case of a contract for personal service, for supplies for
current consumption or to be carried in stock not exceeding the estimated consumption for three (3) months, or banking transactions of
government-owned or controlled banks, no contract involving the expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be
entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into
the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for
the current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor concerned. The certificate
signed by the proper accounting official and the auditor who verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed
contract, and the sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other purpose until the obligation of the
government agency concerned under the contract is fully extinguished.chanrob1e

APPLICATION: In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as the bidding stage. The first
step of a Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to determine whether the bids comply with the requirements. The BAC shall rate a bid
"passed" only if it complies with all the requirements and the submitted price does not exceed the approved budget for the contract."

Extant on the record is the fact that the VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on account of its bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion
Pesos. However, under Republic Act No. 8760, 53 the only fund appropriated for the project was P1 Billion Pesos and under the
Certification of Available Funds 54 (CAF) only P1.2 Billion Pesos was available. Clearly, the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover
the cost of the entire VRIS Project. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted
bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by law for the project. This being the case, the BAC should have rejected the bid for
being excessive 55 or should have withdrawn the Notice of Award on the ground that in the eyes of the law, the same is null and void.

CONCLUSION: The constitutional mandate cited above constrains us to remind all public officers that public office is a public trust and
all public officers must at all times be accountable to the people. The authority of public officers to enter into government contracts is
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. In the exercise of their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of
the legality, propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must exercise a high degree of caution so that the
Government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action. 64

In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since
PHOTOKINA’s bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the
COMELEC and is considered void; and that in issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in
not dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be
compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where
disbursement of public funds is concerned.
11. BENGZON vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE 203 SCRA 767
ISSUE: Whether (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation;
(2) the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.

LAW: Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:

Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative, by consanguinity or affinity,
within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the
Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the Government: Provided, that this section shall not apply to any person who prior to the
assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along
the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not discretionary
on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully
performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.

APPLICATION: The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited.
Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection
with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the
Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.

As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any
Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature
of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was published in various
newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a
consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over "
the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr.
Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a
"takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into
a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the
purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President
Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.

CONCLUSION: Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3)
stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the
alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to
Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the
herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.

It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related
to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the
President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears
more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa
died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held held:
 ... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses
inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of
defects in our social, economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends
probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad as is this power of
inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms
of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a
law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an
end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the
personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)

It cannot be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No.
0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action
against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue
sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In
short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue
already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence
being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted.

In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan,
would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States,
21 it was held that:

Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may
potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other
branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the
concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...

12. EVARDONE vs. COMELEC 204 SCRA 464

ISSUE: Whether Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC on 23 May 1990 by virtue of its powers under the
Constitution and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) is constitutional.

LAW: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be
enacted by Congress. Said Section 3 provides:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization operation of the local units.

APPLICATION: Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone
contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.

Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall
remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991,
approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But
the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.
337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P.
Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337, which states:
Sec. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall May not be Held.— . . .
(2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the official's assumption of office or one year immediately
preceding a regular local election.

The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in
Article XVIII, Sec. 5 — on the second Monday of May, 1992. 11 Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months
before the regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337)

ACCORDINGLY, both petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic

CONCLUSION: The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on
the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that
a public office is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people holding public offices are simply agents or
servants of the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices.
"Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his office previously
bestowed on him by the same electorate. 10 The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall the incumbent mayor
(Evardone) has already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 in
Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect.

13. SENATE vs. ERMITA GR 169777 APRIL 20, 2006

ISSUE: Whether EO 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of the executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the
information in the possession of these officials; such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the general
power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power to inquiry.

LAW: Sections 21 and 22, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either
House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.

APPLICATION:

Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is "covered by the executive privilege," such
official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. This
requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the President. The proviso
allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by
virtue of E.O. 464.

Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized by the President under E.O. 464,
or by the President herself, that such official is in possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This determination
then becomes the basis for the official’s not showing up in the legislative investigation.

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a
declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested
information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without
mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by
authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.

While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the
particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very
nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3
of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military
or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by
the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive.
The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or
classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order."

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to
merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not
overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as
privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more
pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the
information that it has requested.

The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to
be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter,
after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the
claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. 92 (Underscoring
supplied)
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one
of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected. 93 These, in substance, were
the same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez 94 and, more in point,
against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive
branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must
be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of
clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid.
Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have
given up something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.

Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive

Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution,
and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

CONCLUSION:

A. The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)

This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests the power of
inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its committees.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno, 58 a case decided in 1950 under that
Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and
exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of
inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate. 60 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation
and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject
for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper exercise of the
power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court
held, "also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish."

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of
inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative
process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that
subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review
pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that
the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional
infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights.

These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the
executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern
of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of
the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the
Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under
the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its
preambular clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

B. Executive privilege

The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986
Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the
United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the
Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information
from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."65

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims of varying kinds.67 Tribe, in fact,
comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive
privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations,
and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations."

The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements
applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to
documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’ domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those
documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications. 70 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all
instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested
information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.71

In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. 77 Almonte used the term in
reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the
privilege:

"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of
judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those
values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly
stated in the decision, the right of the people to information. 78 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of
information which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive
privilege may be claimed against citizens’ demands for information.

In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters." 80 The same
case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information.

Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as
"privileged information under the separation of powers," 82 by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national
security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were
exempted from the right to information.

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear
principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to
certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid
or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.

Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the Congress has the right to obtain
information from any source – even from officials of departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is,
unlike the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and
executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if
the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The absence of close
rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system,
and the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the Congress
upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress
possesses the right to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power
devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the
executive.89 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the
same reasons stated in Arnault.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is
vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal
autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker
Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.