Legal Ethics No.
2Page |1
EN BANC
[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
for members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the
IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon
by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves
to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised Rules for proper
implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout
their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of
the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the
approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee
shall be constituted and shall commence the implementation of the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these
Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not
exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36)
hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee.
Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent
to six (6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial
skills equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute
resolution equivalent to five (5) credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive
and procedural laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9)
credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral
advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and
international conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as
may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6)
credit units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall
begin not later than three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except
for the initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after the
establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36)
months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the
MCLE requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:

(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region
(NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are
assigned to Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are
assigned to Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education
activity wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward
compliance with the MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after
establishment of the program. Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after
the establishment of the program shall be assigned to the appropriate
Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission
or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on
the first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same
day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member is not required
to comply with the program requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member shall be
required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing
legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining
in the compliance period in which the member is admitted or
readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number
of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of
months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours
shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)
SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT
HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement
under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyers participation in
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |2
the MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for computing credit
units and the supporting documents required therefor:
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE
DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED
RULES
1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF
ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH
NUMBER OF HOURS
1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF
RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR
SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS
CERTIFICATION
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION
COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING
COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK
LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS EDITOR
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY
INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED TECHNICAL
REPORT/PAPER
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE
LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER
 Legal Ethics No. 2Page |3

COMPLIANCE PERIOD Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED

LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed
based on actual time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-
quarter hour reported in decimals.
2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF
BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR
LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS

Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of
the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:

(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the
Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or
non-participatory. (b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,

SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent
credit units may be claimed for: members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court
lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, continuing judicial education;
conventions, symposia, in-house education programs, workshops,
dialogues or round table discussion. (d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor,
commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or (e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
facilitator in approved education activities. (f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class. Government Corporate Counsel;

SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory
credit units may be claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published
or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter,
book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of
the author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary
course of the members practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have
teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in accredited law
schools;

(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of
Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial
Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE . The following Members of
the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the
IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement  A
member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such
as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in
law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the requirements,
including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to
be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day
of the month in which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3
of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the
same Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification
of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program.  Subject to the implementing
regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal
education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the
provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the activity
meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically
mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities.  All continuing legal education
activities must meet the following standards:
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |4
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical
content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning
related to legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross
profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that
enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as
subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate
professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive
written materials must be distributed to all participants. Such
materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is
offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and
location so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and
other distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
SECTION 1. Accreditation  of providers.  -- Accreditation of providers
shall be done by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers.  Any person or group
may be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be
renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal education
activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers.
Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers.  -- All approved accredited providers
shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be
maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the

completion date. The provider shall include the member on the
official record of attendance only if the members signature was
obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official
record of attendance shall contain the members name and number
in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location,
subject matter, and length of the education activity. A copy of
such record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of
________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as
appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities
prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the
MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants
identifying the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the
activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved
continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members
of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP
staff Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the
activity, the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors.
The provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE
MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation
Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy
furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this
program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall
be subject to appropriate sanctions.
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |5
SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation.  The accreditation of a
provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider
fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide
satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any
provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE
Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER
SECTION 1. Payment of fees.  Application for approval of an education
activity or accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as
provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE
Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall
complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the
education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the
exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee
not later than the day after the end of the members compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall
maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE
Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the provider
pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a
participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be
maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance.  The following shall
constitute non-compliance:

(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the
compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including
evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence
of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of non-
compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or
intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance.  -
Members failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the
specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification
to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with
the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language near the
beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE),
YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE
PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF
OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may
use this period to attain the adequate number of credit units for
compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement
unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the
excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |6
SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee.  -- A member who, for whatever reason, is
in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-
compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member.  -- A member who fails to comply
with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired,
shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of
the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be
conducted by the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the
MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee.  -- Membership fees shall continue to
accrue at the active rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a
delinquent member.
Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT
SECTION 1. Process.  -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member
shall be terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with the
MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may
attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the period of non-
compliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These
credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement. Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess
of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process.  The
termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it
shall be made by the MCLE Committee.
Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Composition.  The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five
(5) members, namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four
(4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy,
 Legal Ethics No. 2Page |7

a law center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools
and/or law professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity.

They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and
shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the Court.

SEC. 2. Duty of committee.  The MCLE Committee shall administer and

adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of
the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors,
prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee.  Subject to approval by the

Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be
necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other
necessary functions.

SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget.  The MCLE Committee shall submit to

the Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish,
operate and maintain the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000,

following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.

Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,  and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ.,  concur.
Kapunan, J.,  on official leave.

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL
COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-
TRIAL AND USE OF DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY MEASURES
RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of
the Rules of Court submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the
Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of
Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures, the
Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. The said Rule is hereto attached as an
integral part of this Resolution.
The Rule shall take effect on August 16, 2004 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than July 30, 2004.
GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS
OF COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF DEPOSITION-
DISCOVERY MEASURES
The use of pre-trial and the deposition-discovery measures are undeniably
important and vital components of case management in trial courts. To
abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases and decongest
court dockets, and to further implement the pre-trial guidelines laid down in
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 and except as otherwise
specifically provided for in other special rules, the following guidelines are issued
for the observance and guidance of trial judges and clerks of court:
I. PRE-TRIAL
A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint:
1.1 Summons shall be prepared and shall contain a reminder to
defendant to observe restraint in filing a motion to dismiss and instead allege the
grounds thereof as defenses in the Answer, in conformity with IBP-OCA
Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated March 12, 2002. A copy of the
summons is hereto attached as Annex "A;" and
1.2 The court shall issue an order requiring the parties to avail of
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 and request for admission by adverse
party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of dispositions under Rule 23
or other measures under Rules 27 and 28 within five days from the filing of the
answer. 1 A copy of the order shall be served upon the defendant
together with the summons and upon the plaintiff.
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, 2 the plaintiff must promptly
move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. 3If the plaintiff fails
to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of
pre-trial.
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |8
2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before the pre-trial, pre-trial
briefs containing the following: 4
a. A statement of their willingness to enter into an amicable settlement
indicating the desired terms thereof or to submit the case to any of the
alternative modes of dispute resolution;
b. A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
c. The issues to be tried or resolved;
d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose
thereof. (No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the
trial in support of a party's evidence-in-chief other than those that had been
earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the
court for good cause shown);
e. A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail
themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners; and
f. The number and names of the witnesses, the substance of their
testimonies, and the approximate number of hours that will be required by the
parties for the presentation of their respective witnesses. A copy of the Notice of
Pre-trial Conference is hereto attached as Annex "B."The rule on the contents of
the pre-trial brief must strictly be complied with.The parties are bound by the
representations and statements in their respective pre-trial briefs.
3. At the start of the pre-trial conference, the judge shall immediately refer the
parties and/or their counsel if authorized by their clients to the PMC mediation
unit for purposes of mediation if available. 5 If mediation fails, the judge will
schedule the continuance of the pre-trial conference. Before then, the Judge may
refer the case to the Branch COC for a preliminary conference to assist the
parties in reaching a settlement, to mark the documents or exhibits to be
presented by the parties and copies thereof to be attached to the records after
comparison and to consider such other matters as may aid in its prompt
disposition. 6
During the preliminary conference, the Branch COC shall also ascertain from the
parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and due
execution of the documents marked as exhibits. The proceedings during the
preliminary conference shall be recorded in the "Minutes of Preliminary
Conference" to be signed by both parties and/or counsel, the form of which is
hereto attached as Annex "C".
The minutes of preliminary conference and the exhibits shall be attached by the
Branch COC to the case record before the pre-trial
4. Before the continuation of the pre-trial conference, the judge must study all
the pleadings of the case, and determine the issues thereof and the respective
positions of the parties thereon to enable him to intelligently steer the parties
toward a possible amicable settlement of the case, or, at the very least, to help

reduce and limit the issues. The judge should not allow the termination of pre-
trial simply because of the manifestation of the parties that they cannot settle
the case. He should expose the parties to the advantages of pre-trial. He must
also be mindful that there are other important aspects of the pre-trial that ought
to be taken up to expedite the disposition of the case. 7
The Judge with all tact, patience, impartiality and with due regard to the rights of
the parties shall endeavor to persuade them to arrive at a settlement of the
dispute. 8 The court shall initially ask the parties and their lawyers if an amicable
settlement of the case is possible. If not, the judge may confer with the parties
with the opposing counsel to consider the following:
a. Given the evidence of the plaintiff presented in his pre-trial brief to
support his claim, what manner of compromise is considered acceptable to the
defendant at the present stage?
b. Given the evidence of the defendant described in his pre-trial brief to
support his defense, what manner of compromise is considered acceptable to the
plaintiff at the present stage?
If not successful, the court shall confer with the party and his counsel separately.
If the manner of compromise is not acceptable, the judge shall confer with the
parties without their counsel for the same purpose of settlement.
5. If all efforts to settle fail, the trial judge shall:
a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial
proceedings and confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and
admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents;
b. Inquire if there are cases arising out of the same facts pending
before other courts and order its consolidation if warranted;
c. Inquire if the pleadings are in order. If not, order the amendments if
necessary;
d. Inquire if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve the same;
e. Consider the adding or dropping of parties;
f. Scrutinize every single allegation of the complaint, answer and other
pleadings and attachments thereto and the contents of documents and all other
evidence identified and pre-marked during pre-trial in determining further
admissions of facts and documents. To obtain admissions, the Court shall ask the
parties to submit the depositions taken under Rule 23, the answers to written
interrogatories under Rule 25 and the answers to request for admissions by the
adverse party under Rule 26. It may also require the production of documents or
things requested by a party under Rule 27 and the results of the physical and
mental examination of persons under Rule 28;
g. Define and simplify the factual and legal issues arising from the
pleadings. Uncontroverted issues and frivolous claims or defenses should be
eliminated. For each factual issue, the parties/counsel shall state all the evidence
to support their positions thereon. For each legal issue, parties/counsel shall
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |9
state the applicable law and jurisprudence supporting their respective positions
thereon. If only legal issues are presented, the judge shall require the parties to
submit their respective memoranda and the court can proceed to render
judgment; 9
h. Determine the propriety of rendering a summary judgment dismissing
the case based on the disclosures made at the pre-trial or a judgment based on
the pleadings, evidence identified and admissions made during pre-trial; 10
i. Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates for continuous trial in
accordance with Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989; adhere to the case
flow chart determined by the court, which shall contain the different stages of
the proceedings up to the promulgation of the decision and use the time frame
for each stage in setting the trial dates. The One-Day Examination of Witness
Rule, that is, a witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day only, shall be
strictly adhered to subject to the courts' discretion during trial on whether or not
to extend the direct and/or cross-examination for justifiable reasons. On the last
hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to make his formal offer of
evidence after the presentation of his last witness and the opposing party is
required to immediately interpose his objection thereto. Thereafter, the Judge
shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in open court. However the judge
has the discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing in conformity with
Section 35, Rule 132;
j. Determine the most important witnesses to be heard and limit the
number of witnesses (Most Important Witness Rule). The facts to be proven by
each witness and the approximate number of hours per witness shall be fixed;
k. At his discretion, order the parties to use the affidavits of witnesses
as direct testimonies subject to the right to object to inadmissible portions
thereof and to the right of cross-examination by the other party. The affidavits
shall be based on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. The affidavits shall be in question and
answer form, and shall comply with the rules on admissibility of evidence;
l. Require the parties and/or counsel to submit to the Branch COC the
names, addresses and contact numbers of the witnesses to be summoned by
subpoena;
m. Order the delegation of the reception of evidence to the Branch COC
under Rule 30; and
n. Refer the case to a trial by commissioner under Rule 32
During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask questions on issues raised
therein and all questions or comments by counsel or parties must be directed to
the judge to avoid hostilities between the parties.
6. The trial judge shall schedule the pre-trial in the afternoon sessions and set as
many pre-trial conferences as may be necessary

7. All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded. The minutes of each
pre-trial conference shall contain matters taken up therein more particularly
admissions of facts and exhibits and shall be signed by the parties and their
counsel.
8. The judge shall issue the required Pre-Trial Order within ten (10) days after
the termination of the pre-trial. Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of and control the course of the action during the trial. A
sample Pre-Trial Order is hereto attached as Annex "D."
However, the Court may opt to dictate the Pre-Trial Order in open court in the
presence of the parties and their counsel and with the use of a computer, shall
have the same immediately finalized and printed. Once finished, the parties
and/or their counsel shall sign the same to manifest their conformity thereto.
9. The court shall endeavor to make the parties agree to an equitable
compromise or settlement at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of
judgment.
B. Criminal Cases
1. Before arraignment, the Court shall issue an order directing the public
prosecutor to submit the record of the preliminary investigation to the Branch
COC for the latter to attach the same to the record of the criminal case.
Where the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its
records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three days
from the filing of the complaint or information. The accused shall be arraigned
within ten days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial of his case shall be held
within ten days after arraignment unless a shorter period is provided for by
law. 11
2. After the arraignment, the court shall forthwith set the pre-trial conference
within thirty days from the date of arraignment, and issue an order: (a) requiring
the private offended party to appear thereat for purposes of plea-bargaining
except for violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and for
other matters requiring his presence; 12 (b) referring the case to the Branch
COC, if warranted, for a preliminary conference to be set at least three days prior
to the pre-trial to mark the documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties
and copies thereof to be attached to the records after comparison and to
consider other matters as may aid in its prompt disposition; and (c) informing the
parties that no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the
trial other than those identified and marked during the pre-trial except when
allowed by the court for good cause shown. A copy of the order is hereto
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 10
attached as Annex "E". In mediatable cases, the judge shall refer the parties and
their counsel to the PMC unit for purposes of mediation if available.
3. During the preliminary conference, the Branch COC shall assist the parties in
reaching a settlement of the civil aspect of the case, mark the documents to be
presented as exhibits and copies thereof attached to the records after
comparison, ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and admissions on
the genuineness and due execution of documents marked as exhibits and
consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the case.
The proceedings during the preliminary conference shall be recorded in the
Minutes of Preliminary Conference to be signed by both parties and counsel.
(Please see Annex "B")
The Minutes of Preliminary Conference and the exhibits shall be attached by the
Branch COC to the case record before the pre-trial.
4. Before the pre-trial conference the judge must study the allegations of the
information, the statements in the affidavits of witnesses and other documentary
evidence which form part of the record of the preliminary investigation.
5. During the pre-trial, except for violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, the trial judge shall consider plea-bargaining
arrangements. 13 Where the prosecution and the offended party agree to the
plea offered by the accused, the court shall:
a. Issue an order which contains the plea-bargaining arrived at;
b. Proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect of the case; and
c. Render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including the civil
liability or damages duly established by the evidence. 14
6. When plea bargaining fails, the Court shall:
a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial
proceedings, confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and
admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents and list object
and testimonial evidence;
b. Scrutinize every allegation of the information and the statements in
the affidavits and other documents which form part of the record of the
preliminary investigation and other documents identified and marked as exhibits
in determining further admissions of facts, documents and in particular as to the
following: 15
1. the identity of the accused;
2. court's territorial jurisdiction relative to the offense/s
charged;
3. qualification of expert witness/es;
4. amount of damages;
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 11

5. genuineness and due execution of documents;

6. the cause of death or injury, in proper cases;
7. adoption of any evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation;
8. disclosure of defenses of alibi, insanity, self-defense,
exercise of public authority and justifying or exempting circumstances;
and
9. such other matters that would limit the facts in issue.
c. Define factual and legal issues;
d. Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates and adhere to the flow
chart determined by the court which shall contain the time frames for the
different stages of the proceeding up to promulgation of decision and use the
time frame for each stage in setting the trial dates;
e. Require the parties to submit to the Branch COC the names,
addresses and contact numbers of witnesses that need to be summoned
by subpoena; 16 and
f. Consider modification of order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful defense.

7. During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask questions on issues
raised therein and all questions must be directed to him to avoid hostilities
between parties.

8. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference

shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise,
they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters
referred to in Section 1 of Rule 118 shall be approved by the court. (Section 2,
Rule 118)

9. All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded, the transcripts prepared
and the minutes signed by the parties and/or their counsels.

10. The trial judge shall issue a Pre-trial Order within ten (10) days after the
termination of the pre-trial setting forth the actions taken during the pre-trial
conference, the facts stipulated, the admissions made, evidence marked, the
number of witnesses to be presented and the schedule of trial. Said Order shall
bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course
of the action during the trial. 17

A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
Whereas, case congestion and delays plague most courts in cities, given the
huge volume of cases filed each year and the slow and cumbersome adversarial
syste1n that the judiciary has in place;
Whereas, about 40% of criminal cases are dismissed annually owing to the fact
that complainants simply give up con1ing to court after repeated
postponements;
Whereas, few foreign businessmen make long-term investments in the
Philippines because its courts are unable to provide ample and speedy protection
to their investments, keeping its people poor;
Whereas, in order to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of
witnesses in cases under litigation, on February 21, 2012 the Supreme Court
approved for piloting by trial courts in Quezon City the compulsory use of judicial
affidavits in place of the direct testimonies of witnesses;
Whereas, it is reported that such piloting has quickly resulted in reducing by
about two-thirds the time used for presenting the testimonies of witnesses, thus
speeding up the hearing and adjudication of cases;
Whereas, the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
headed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and the Sub-Committee on
the Revision of the Rules on Civil Procedure, headed by Associate Justice Roberto
A. Abad, have recommended for adoption a Judicial Affidavit Rule that will
replicate nationwide the success of the Quezon City experience in the use of
judicial affidavits; and
Whereas, the Supreme Court En Banc finds merit in the recommendation;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and
promulgates the following:
Section 1. Scope. - (a) This Rule shall apply to all actions, proceedings, and
incidents requiring the reception of evidence before:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 12
(1) The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, and the Shari' a Circuit Courts but shall not apply to
small claims cases under A.M. 08-8-7-SC;
(2) The Regional Trial Courts and the Shari'a District Courts;
(3) The Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of
Appeals, and the Shari'a Appellate Courts;
(4) The investigating officers and bodies authorized by the
Supreme Court to receive evidence, including the Integrated
Bar of the Philippine (IBP); and
(5) The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, whose rules of
procedure are subject to disapproval of the Supreme Court,
insofar as their existing rules of procedure contravene the
provisions of this Rule.1
(b) For the purpose of brevity, the above courts, quasi-judicial bodies,
or investigating officers shall be uniformly referred to here as the
"court."
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct
testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse
party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later than five days before
pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing with respect to
motions and incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take
the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any, which
shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and marked as
Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or
the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of
the respondent or the defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or
object evidence in his possession, he may, after the same has been

identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial
affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such affidavit is a
faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or
witness shall bring the original document or object evidence for
comparison during the preliminary conference with the attached copy,
reproduction, or pictures, failing which the latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in
place of the original when allowed by existing rules.
Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. - A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in
the language known to the witness and, if not in English or Filipino, accompanied
by a translation in English or Filipino, and shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of
the witness;
(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises
the examination of the witness and the place where the examination is
being held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of
him, fully conscious that he does so under oath, and that he may face
criminal liability for false testimony or perjury;
(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers,
consecutively numbered, that:
(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired
the facts upon which he testifies;
(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues
that the case presents; and
(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence
and establish their authenticity in accordance with the Rules of
Court;
(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 13
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the
oath or an officer who is authorized by law to administer the same.
Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer. - (a) The judicial affidavit shall
contain a sworn attestation at the end, executed by the lawyer who conducted or
supervised the examination of the witness, to the effect that:
(1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the
questions he asked and the corresponding answers that the
witness gave; and
(2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting
him coached the witness regarding the latter's answers.
(b) A false attestation shall subject the lawyer mentioned to disciplinary
action, including disbarment.
Section 5. Subpoena. - If the government employee or official, or the requested
witness, who is neither the witness of the adverse party nor a hostile witness,
unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause
to make the relevant books, documents, or other things under his control
available for copying, authentication, and eventual production in court, the
requesting party may avail himself of the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules
governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in this case shall be the
same as when taking his deposition except that the taking of a judicial affidavit
shal1 be understood to be ex parte.
Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial affidavit. - The party
presenting the judicial affidavit of his witness in place of direct testimony shall
state the purpose of such testimony at the start of the presentation of the
witness. The adverse party may move to disqualify the witness or to strike out
his affidavit or any of the answers found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The
court shall promptly rule on the motion and, if granted, shall cause the marking
of any excluded answer by placing it in brackets under the initials of an
authorized court personnel, without prejudice to a tender of excluded evidence
under Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 7. Examination of the witness on his judicial affidavit.  - The adverse
party shall have the right to cross-examine the witness on his judicial affidavit
and on the exhibits attached to the same. The party who presents the witness

may also examine him as on re-direct. In every case, the court shall take active
part in examining the witness to determine his credibility as well as the truth of
his testimony and to elicit the answers that it needs for resolving the issues.
Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits. - (a) Upon the termination of
the testimony of his last witness, a party shall immediately make an oral offer of
evidence of his documentary or object exhibits, piece by piece, in their
chronological order, stating the purpose or purposes for which he offers the
particular exhibit.
(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse party shall state
the legal ground for his objection, if any, to its admission, and the court
shall immediately make its ruling respecting that exhibit.
(c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of the judicial
affidavits that describe and authenticate them, it is sufficient that such
exhibits are simply cited by their markings during the offers, the
objections, and the rulings, dispensing with the description of each
exhibit.
Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. - (a) This rule shall apply to all
criminal actions:
(1) Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six
years;
(2) Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits,
irrespective of the penalty involved; or
(3) With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the
penalties involved are.
(b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses
not later than five days before the pre-trial, serving copies if the same
upon the accused. The complainant or public prosecutor shall attach to
the affidavits such documentary or object evidence as he may have,
marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial
affidavit, documentary, or object evidence shall be admitted at the trial.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 14
(c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the
judicial affidavits of the prosecution, he shall have the option to submit
his judicial affidavit as well as those of his witnesses to the court within
ten days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of each on the
public and private prosecutor, including his documentary and object
evidence previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These
affidavits shall serve as direct testimonies of the accused and his
witnesses when they appear before the court to testify.
Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule. - (a) A party who
fails to submit the required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have
waived their submission. The court may, however, allow only once the late submission of
the same provided, the delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the opposing
party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more
than P 5,000.00 at the discretion of the court.
(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear
at the scheduled hearing of the case as required. Counsel who fails to appear
without valid cause despite notice shall be deemed to have waived his client's
right to confront by cross-examination the witnesses there present.
(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform
to the content requirements of Section 3 and the attestation requirement of
Section 4 above. The court may, however, allow only once the subsequent
submission of the compliant replacement affidavits before the hearing or trial
provided the delay is for a valid reason and would not unduly prejudice the
opposing party and provided further, that public or private counsel responsible
for their preparation and submission pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor
more than P 5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.
Section 11. Repeal or modification of inconsistent rules. - The provisions of the Rules of
Court and the rules of procedure governing investigating officers and bodies authorized by
the Supreme Court to receive evidence are repealed or modified insofar as these are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.1âwphi1
The rules of procedure governing quasi-judicial bodies inconsistent herewith are hereby
disapproved.
Section 12. Effectivity. - This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 following its
publication in two newspapers of general circulation not later than September 15, 2012. It
shall also apply to existing cases.
Manila, September 4, 2012.

A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC
EFFICIENT USE OF PAPER RULE
Whereas, to produce 500 reams of paper, twenty trees are cut and 100,000 liters
of water are used, water that is no longer reusable because it is laden with
chemicals and is just released to the environment to poison our rivers and seas;
Whereas, there is a need to cut the judicial system’s use excessive quantities of
costly paper, save our forests, avoid landslides, and mitigate the worsening
effects of climate change that the world is experiencing;
Whereas, the judiciary can play a big part in saving our trees, conserving
precious water and helping mother earth;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates
the following:
Sec. 1. Title of the Rule– This rule shall be known and cited as the Efficient Use
of Paper Rule.
Sec. 2. Applicability. – This rule shall apply to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies
under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 3. Format and Style. – a) All pleadings, motions and similar papers intended
for the court and quasi-judicial body’s consideration and action (court-bound
papers) shall written in single space with one-and-a –half space between
paragraphs, using an easily readable font style of the party’s choice, of 14-size
font, and on a 13 –inch by 8.5- inch white bond paper; and
b) All decisions, resolutions and orders issued by courts and quasi-judicial bodies
under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court shall comply with
these requirements. Similarly covered are the reports submitted to the courts
and transcripts of stenographic notes.
Sec. 4. Margins and Prints  .— The parties shall maintain the following margins
on all court-bound papers: a left hand margin of 1.5 inches from the edge; an
upper margin of 1.2 inches from the edge; a right hand margin of 1.0 inch from
the edge; and a lower margin of 1.0 inch from the edge. Every page must be
consecutively numbered.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 15
Sec. 5.  Copies to be filed. – Unless otherwise directed by the court, the number
of court- bound papers that a party is required or desires to file shall be as
follows:
a. In the Supreme Court, one original (properly marked) and four copies, unless
the case is referred to the Court En Banc, in which event, the parties shall file ten
additional copies. For the En Banc, the parties need to submit only two sets of
annexes, one attached to the original and an extra copy. For the Division, the
parties need to submit also two sets of annexes, one attached to the original and
an extra copy. All members of the Court shall share the extra copies of annexes
in the interest of economy of paper.
Parties to cases before the Supreme Court are further required, on voluntary
basis for the first six months following the effectivity of this Rule and
compulsorily afterwards unless the period is extended, to submit, simultaneously
with their court-bound papers, soft copies of the same and their annexes (the
latter in PDF format) either by email to the Court’s e-mail address or by compact
disc (CD). This requirement is in preparation for the eventual establishment of an
e-filing paperless system in the judiciary.
b. In the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, one original (properly
marked) and two copies with their annexes;
c. In the Court of Tax Appeals, one original (properly marked) and two copies
with annexes. On appeal to the En Banc, one Original (properly marked) and
eight copies with annexes; and
d. In other courts, one original (properly marked) with the stated annexes
attached to it.
Sec. 6. Annexes Served on Adverse Party. – A party required by the rules to
serve a copy of his court-bound on the adverse party need not enclose copies of
those annexes that based on the record of the court such party already has in his
possession. In the event a party requests a set of the annexes actually filed with
the court, the part who filed the paper shall comply with the request within five
days from receipt.
Sec. 7. Date of Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 after
publication in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

Adm. Case No. 2343. July 30, 1982.*
FACUNDO LUBIANO, complainant, vs. JOEL G. GORDOLLA, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Statements in motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC violative of Canons of Professional Ethics they
being beyond the bounds of propriety and civility.—While the aforequoted
paragraph does not constitute sufficient cause for disbarment of respondent, We
are not inclined to disregard the insouciant language used by respondent as
merely trivial and innocuous. The language of a lawyer, oral or written, must be
respectful and restrained, in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. It is
through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best
demonstrates his observance or respect due to the courts and judicial officers, as
mandated by Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Respondent’s choice of words manifestly falls short of this
criterion. In describing the award of separation pay to complainant Lubiano as
“ill-gotten wealth”, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, an
administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, as an “unknowing” one,
and the sheriff’s office as a “partner in ‘crime’ ”, respondent precariously
ventured beyond the bounds of propriety and civility.
Same; Same; Same; Defense of zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of
lawyer’s duty to uphold client’s cause unavailing; First duty of lawyer not to client
but to the administration of justice.—Respondent’s attempt to escape
responsibility by attributing said statements to his zeal and enthusiasm in the
performance of his duty to uphold his client’s cause, is unavailing. x x x
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor
Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-
bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Absolute privileged communication;
Lapses in observance of duty of lawyer as member of the legal profession subject
to Supreme Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers despite rule that
statements made in pleadings are absolutely privileged communication.—We find
no necessity to dwell at length on the issue as to whether or not the statements
in question are relevant, for in either case this Court will not be inhibited from
exercising its supervisory authority over lawyer who misbehave or fail to live up
to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule of
absolute privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 16
criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the
member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability
arising from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in any committee
thereof, but nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the
legislature for said speech or debate, a lawyer equally remains subject to this
Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his
duty as a member of the legal profession.
Same; Same; Same; Fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
imposed on erring lawyer.—Respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla is hereby ordered
to pay a fine of P200.00, payable to the Clerk of this Court within ten (10) days
from notice of this decision, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
He is further warned that a repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
ESCOLIN, J.:
The Canons of Professional Ethics imposes upon the lawyer the duty of
maintaining a respectful attitude towards the court. He is likewise expected to
treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration. As such,
he should never minister to the malevolence or prejudice of a client in a trial or
conduct of a cause1. He should be temperate in acts and words, a paragon in
civility.
For what is claimed as a failure of Atty. Joel G. Gordolla to observe this standard,
his disbarment is sought by complainant Facundo Lubiano.
Complainant describes the following statements contained in a motion for
reconsideration with prayer for restraining order filed by respondent Gordolla, as
counsel for Robina Farms, Inc., in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-22635-78-T:
“Meanwhile, the complainant, very eager to get hold of the illgotten wealth (thru
unknowing award by the Hon. Commission) has used the Sheriff’s Office as his

partner in ‘crime’ and the latter thru Sheriff Juanito Atienza, is now and about to
enforce the terror (sic) of the award thru Writ of Execution.”
While the aforequoted paragraph does not constitute sufficient cause for
disbarment of respondent, We are not inclined to disregard the insouciant
language used by respondent as merely trivial and innocuous. The language of a
lawyer, oral or written, must be respectful and restrained, in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession. It is through a scrupulous preference for
respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance or respect
due to the courts and judicial officers, as mandated by Section 20(b) of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent’s choice
of words manifestly falls short of this criterion. In describing the award of
separation pay to complainant Lubiano as “ill-gotten wealth”, the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission, an administrative body exercising quasi-
judicial functions, as an “unknowing” one, and the sheriff’s office as a “partner in
‘crime’ ”, respondent precariously ventured beyond the bounds of propriety and
civility.
Respondent’s attempt to escape responsibility by attributing said statements to
his zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of his duty to uphold his client’s
cause, is unavailing. As this Court said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer2:
“It is but to repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of
it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if chanelled in
the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of
propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of
government.”
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor
Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-
bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics3.
Respondent would argue that the statements in question, being relevant and
pertinent to the subject of inquiry in said case, are covered by the mantle of
absolute privileged communication; and that, as such, they cannot be used as
basis for any action, however false and malicious the statements may be. We
find no necessity to dwell at length on the issue as to whether or not the
statements in question are relevant, for in either case this Court will not be
inhibited from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 17
fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar. Indeed,
the rule of absolute privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer
from civil and criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings.
But like the member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and
criminal liability arising from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in
any committee thereof4, but nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary
authority of the legislature for said speech or debate5, a lawyer equally remains
subject to this Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the
observance of his duty as a member of the legal profession.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla is hereby ordered to
pay a fine of P200.00, payable to the Clerk of this Court within ten (10) days
from notice of this decision, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
He is further warned that a repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
 Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De
Castro, JJ., concur.
Respondent fined P200.00.
Notes.—The use of intemperate or highly derogatory language in a pleading,
such as “this is not the kind of administration of justice that should be made to
prevail in this court. This is obnoxious to the principle of the New Society,
abhorrent to the elementary principles of fair play,” constitutes direct contempt.
The penalty of suspension from the practice of law imposed by the trial court,
however, is disproportionate to the offense committed. (Calo, Jr. vs. Tapucar, 88
SCRA 78.)
Statements by attorney imputing irregularity in internal procedures of the
Supreme Court and laxity in similar matters are contemptuous. (Borromeo vs.
Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 67.)
Failure of attorney to file comment as required by Supreme Court within the
period provided by the Court and failure to provide satisfactory explanation for
such negligence justify the imposition of disciplinary action. (Luzon Mahogany
Timber Industries, Inc. vs. Castro, 69 SCRA 384.)

Counsel who filed a motion for inhibition by a judge on mistaken motion that a
relative of his client had filed an administrative case against the judge and who
sought forgiveness for such mistakes is admonished. (Mangahas vs. Perez, 72
SCRA 230.)
——o0o——
A.C. No. 3452. June 23, 2014.*
HENRY SAMONTE, petitioner, vs. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, respondent.  rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; In his dealings with his client and with the courts,
every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy.—
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be
honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high
and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the
Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that
every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of
the Law Profession.
Same; Same; Lawyer’s Oath; By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not
only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in
or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.—By the Lawyer’s Oath is every
lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Every
lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law
as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a
coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are
emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: Rule 
10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule  artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the
11.02 — A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings. Rule 18.04 — A
lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
Same; Same; A lawyer ought to remember that honesty and integrity were of
far greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession than his
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 18
transactions with his client.—Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of
honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client,
and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by
superimposing “0” on “4” in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had
already filed the complaint in court on June 10, 1988 as promised, instead of on
June 14, 1988, the date when he had actually done so. His explanation that
Samonte was himself the cause of the belated filing on account of his inability to
remit the correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10, 1988,
as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not
later date. He ought to remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater
value for him as a member of the Law Profession than his transactions with his
client.
Same; Same; Preponderance of Evidence; In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers.—In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers.
Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. In order to
determine if the evidence of one party is greater than that of the other, Section
1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that the court may consider the
following, namely: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same
may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it
does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
Same; Same; Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting
trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to
practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession.—Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that
whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain
faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to
remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception,

including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients
and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of
the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.  1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in the RTC
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Falsification of Documents,
Dereliction of Duty, Gross Negligence and Tardiness in Attending the Scheduled
Hearings, and Dishonesty.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 
BERSAMIN, J.:  had failed to promptly attend court hearings and to do other legal services
A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or
his clients on the status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a
member of the Law Profession. This is because he is always expected to be
honest and forthright in his dealings with them. He thereby merits the condign
sanction of suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this
administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had
represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-6970 entitled Capt. Henry
E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of the Regional Trial Court in
Cebu City.1 In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious
acts of professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:
1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had
filed Civil Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their
agreement, although the complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988;
2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-à-vis the
answer with counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the
case; (b) inform the trial court beforehand that Samonte could not be available
on a scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for the plaintiff’s side an unexplained
absence detrimental to Samonte as the plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit
required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it three months later;
3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings; and
4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by
Samonte for his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 19
To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following
annexes, namely:
and of the cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;2
2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy of the
order issued on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that “[t]he formal
offer of plaintiff’s exhibits is rather very late;”3 and
3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana
required of him as the counsel. In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty.
Abellana noted the motion subject to the reservation that his attorneys fees
should still be paid.4
On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the
administrative complaint.
In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge of
falsification of documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could
be made only on June 14, 1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte
had not given enough money to cover the filing fees and other charges totaling
P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00, contrary to their
agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in
addition to the filing fees. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was
baseless, because he had filed the reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving the
answer with counterclaim of the defendants on August 2, 1988, attaching as
proof the copies of the reply (Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment);6 and that it
was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled the pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7
Anent his nonattendance at the hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he
explained that although he had informed the RTC of his having been either
stranded in another province, or having attended the arraignment of another
client in another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival in
the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of
exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate
originals of the documentary exhibits despite his request because of the latter’s
absence from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had been
dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least
P2,000.00 in contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00
being his acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid

were covered by receipts issued by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were
issued for the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with the practice of most
lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.
Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion to change
counsel,8 stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing
him beforehand on the intention of not meeting his obligation to him as the
counsel; that Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check after the Branch
Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted
upon unless it carried Atty. Abellana’s conformity as the counsel; and that he had
duly acknowledged the check.9
On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samonte’s letter dated May 8, 199010
embodying additional charges of falsification of documents, dereliction of duty
and dishonesty based on the reply and the annexes Atty. Abellana had filed.
Samonte noted in the letter that the reply attached to the comment of Atty.
Abellana was not authentic based on the categorical statement of the Branch
Clerk of Court of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City to the effect that no such
reply had been filed in behalf of Samonte; and that the rubber stamp affixed on
the reply supposedly filed by Atty. Abellana in Samonte’s behalf was not also the
official rubber stamp of Branch 5.11 Samonte denied being the cause of delay in
the submission of the formal offer of exhibits, and reminded that the
documentary exhibits concerned had been shown to the trial court during his
testimony, with the opposing party not even objecting to their authenticity.
Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his
legal services stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the
amount demanded was P1.12 Million;12 that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of
P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus P5,000.00 that he gave as a token payment
for Atty. Abellana’s services after discovering the latter’s inefficiency and
fraudulent practices.
On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the administrative
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
Proceedings in the IBP
On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present their
evidence at 10:00 am on November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties sought
postponements.16 The hearing was reset several times more for various reasons,
namely: on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP Commissioner being out of town,
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 20
but telegrams were sent to the parties on December 6, 1994;17 on April 12,
2002, with the hearing being cancelled;18 and on March 7, 2003, with the
hearing being cancelled until further notice.19
On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005
from Atty. Abellana,20 seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint
because of the lack of interest on the part of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed
therein that Samonte had always sought the postponement of the hearings.
Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion
filed on February 9, 2005,21 declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative
complaint against Atty. Abellana.
On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the
mandatory conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte
appeared;23 hence, the IBP just required the parties to submit their verified
position papers within 30 days from notice. Nonetheless, the IBP scheduled the
clarificatory hearing on August 18, 2005.24
Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August 9, 2005,
Atty. Abellana requested an extension of his period to submit his own position
paper allegedly to allow him to secure relevant documents from the trial court.26
On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case
was thereafter deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper,
reiterating his allegations against Atty. Abellana.27 Also on August 29, 2005,
Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated August 17, 2005,28 in
which he represented that although he had been at times late for the hearings
he had nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte;
that he had not caused any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who had been
unavailable at times because of his work as an airline pilot; that the complainant
had discharged him as his counsel in order to avoid paying his obligation to him;
and that the complainant filed this disbarment case after he lost his own civil
case in the RTC. He attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the
complainant, except the above stated replies.
On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana
negligent in handling certain aspects of his client’s case, like not filing a reply to

the defendants’ answer with counterclaims in order to deny the new matters
raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to make it appear that he had filed
the reply; and being considerably late in submitting the formal offer of exhibits
for Samonte, as noted even by the trial judge in the order dated January 19,
1990. It observed that although the negligence of Atty. Abellana did not
necessarily prejudice his client’s case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as
an attorney, and his resort to falsehood and deceitful practices were a different
matter;30 noted that he had twice resorted to falsehood, the first being when he
tried to make it appear that the complaint had been filed on June 10, 1988
despite the court records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only
on June 14, 1988; and the second being when he had attempted to deceive his
client about his having filed the reply by producing a document bearing a rubber
stamp marking distinctively different from that of the trial court’s; that he did not
dispute the pieces of material evidence adduced against him; that he had
explained that the reason for his delay in the filing of the complaint had been the
complainant’s failure to pay the agreed fees on time; and that he had only stated
that he had filed a reply, without presenting proof of his having actually filed
such in court.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Abellana, observing as follows:
x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said
respondent has shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a
means to cover-up his delay and lack of diligence in pursuing the case of his
client. Taken together as a whole, the respondent’s acts are nothing short of
deplorable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent Atty. Gines Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for
resorting to false and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty
and trustworthiness as befits a member of the bar. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of
law for one year, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex “A,” and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 21
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for resorting to
falsehood and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and
trustworthiness as befits member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.31 (Bold emphasis
supplied)
On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the
following grounds:32
A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned from
the practice of law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical
conduct committed by the respondent;
B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully supported with
evidence;
C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by testimonial
evidence so that it is hearsay and self-serving.
In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous
arguments, and stated that the “enumerations of failures are belied by the
existence of Reply to counterclaims, which were attached as Annexes “8” and “9”
of the Position
Paper of respondent.”33 It is noted, however, that Annex 8 and Annex 9 of Atty.
Abellana’s position paper were different documents, namely: Annex 834
(Manifestation and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Counsel); and
Annex 935 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were
already part of the records of the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo V.
Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court, did not execute any affidavit or certification
to the effect that both documents were inexistent. He reminded that Samonte
had only said that both documents “seemed to be falsified documents” based on
the certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.
The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellana’s motion for
reconsideration.36
In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his allegations
against Atty. Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges
against him; and noted that the reply that Atty. Abellana had supposedly filed in

the case was not even annexed either to his position paper and motion for
reconsideration.
On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to
submit certified true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in
the RTC.38
On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39
On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration.40
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration of Atty. Abellana.41
Ruling
We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of
their being substantiated by the records.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be
honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high
and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the
Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that
every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of
the Law Profession, thus:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the
land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 22
best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by
others.42 It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 11.02 — A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule  18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and
trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as
the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by superimposing “0” on “4” in
order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed the complaint
in court on June 10, 1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date
when he had actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the
cause of the belated filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount
of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not
excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest
and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to
remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him as a
member of the Law Profession than his transactions with his client.
Atty. Abellana’s perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued
misleading Samonte in explaining his mishandling of the latter’s civil case. Worse,
he also foisted his dishonesty on the Court no less. To counter Samonte’s
accusation about his not filing the reply in the civil case, he knowingly submitted
two documents as annexes of his comment during the investigation by the IBP,
and represented said documents to have been part of the records of the case in
the RTC. His intention in doing so was to enhance his defense against the
administrative charge. But the two documents turned out to be forged and
spurious, and his forgery came to be exposed because the rubber stamp marks
the documents bore were not the official marks of the RTC’s, as borne out by the
specimens of the official rubber stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC duly certified by
Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court.43 He defended his
dishonesty by lamely claiming that “court personnel were authorized to accept

filing of pleadings even without the usual rubber stamp.”44 In these acts, he
manifested his great disrespect towards both the Court and his client.
The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s case was
entirely warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil
case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way beyond the
period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the RTC Judge had
himself expressly noted the belated filing in the order issued in the case. Atty.
Abellana was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and
liberality by still admitting the belated offer of evidence in the interest of justice.
In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors,
Atty. Abellana challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by
Samonte, contending that such proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-
serving evidence.
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers.
Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.45 In order to
determine if the evidence of one party is greater than that of the other, Section
1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that the court may consider the
following, namely: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same
may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it
does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
The complainant’s evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of
Atty. Abellana. To start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the “0” on
“4” but justified himself by claiming that he had done so only because the
complainant had not given to him the correct amount of filing fees required.
Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious document by making it appear as one
actually filed in court by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed
because the rubber stamp imprint on his document was different from that of the
official rubber stamp of the trial court. He defended himself by stating that court
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 23
personnel accepted papers filed in the court without necessarily using the official
rubber stamp of the court. He well knew, of course, that such statement did not
fully justify his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty. Abellana did not present any proof of his
alleged filings, like certified copies of the papers supposedly filed in court. His
omission to prove his allegation on the filings conceded that he did not really file
them. And, lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented the papers he had supposedly
filed by stating that he was attaching them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his
comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned out to be papers different from those
he represented them to be.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is
granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the
Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as
members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including
adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the
rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the
privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the
Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client
and the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the
client’s case, were unmitigated. Still, the Court must not close its eyes to the fact
that Atty. Abellana actually finished presenting his client’s case; and that the
latter initiated the termination of Atty. Abellana’s engagement as his counsel only
after their relationship had been tainted with mistrust. Thus, we determine the
proper sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr.,46 the respondent lawyer was
suspended for two months from the practice of law for representing in court that
the complainant had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit when in truth the
complainant had made no such agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity
of his representation, but gave as an excuse his intention to amicably settle the
case. In Molina v. Magat,47 the respondent had invoked double jeopardy in
behalf of his client by stating that the complainant had filed a similar case of
slight physical injuries in another court, but his invocation was false because no
other case had been actually filed. He was suspended from the practice of law
for six months for making the false and untruthful statement in court. For Atty.
Abellana, therefore, suspension from the practice of law for six months with
warning of a more severe sanction upon a repetition suffices.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the
MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6)
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 24

MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon receipt of this decision,
with the stern warning that any repetition by him of the same or similar acts will
be punished more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N.
Abellana as a member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of IBP Board of Governors affirmed with
modification that Atty. Gines N. Abellana suspended for six (6) months from
practice of law, with stern warning against repetition of similar acts. 

Notes.—Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct
and violation of the lawyer’s oath. (Lahm III vs. Mayor, Jr., 666 SCRA 1 [2012])

The privilege to practice law is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. As such,
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with
their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. (Re: SC Decision Dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455
Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court vs. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, 670 SCRA
366 [2012])

——o0o—— 

A.M. No. P-07-2366. April 16, 2009.*

[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 07-2519-P]


OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. MARIA
CELIA A. FLORES, Court Legal Researcher II, respondent.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases;
Definition of Dishonesty.—Dishonesty is defined as “intentionally making a false
statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any
deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or
promotion.” Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or
negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of
a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the
facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent,
but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he
might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the
consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that
moment.
Same; Same; Same; The making of an untruthful statement in the Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document
that warrant dismissal from the service even on the first offense.—The
accomplishment of the PDS is required under Civil Service Rules and Regulations
for employment in the government. The making of an untruthful statement
therein amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document that
warrant dismissal from the service even on the first offense.
Same; Same; Same; Truthful completion of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) is a
requirement for employment in the judiciary, the importance of  answering the
same with candor need not be gainsaid; Concealment of any information in the
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) warrants disciplinary action against an erring
employee.—As emphasized in Advincula v. Dicen, 458 SCRA 696 (2005), the PDS
is an official document required of a government employee and official by the
Civil Service Commission. It is the repository of all information about any
government employee and official regarding his personal background,
qualification, and eligibility. Since truthful completion of the PDS is a requirement
for employment in the judiciary, the importance of answering the same with
candor need not be gainsaid. Concealment of any information in the PDS,
therefore, warrants disciplinary action against the erring employee.
Same; Same; Same; No other office in the government service exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than
in the judiciary.—The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 25
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the
government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. Persons involved in the
dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up
to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the
public service. As the assumption of public office is impressed with paramount
public interest, which requires the highest standards of ethical standards,
persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful
compliance with the law.
Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the
Court lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the
presence of mitigating circumstances such as length of service in the government
and being a first time offender; Court deems it proper to impose the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months without pay.—While dishonesty is considered a
grave offense punishable by dismissal even at the first instance, jurisprudence is
replete with cases where the Court lowered the penalty of dismissal to
suspension taking into account the presence of mitigating circumstances such as
length of service in the government and being a first time offender. Since
respondent has been in the service for fourteen (14) years and since this is her
first offense during employment in the judiciary, the Court deems it proper to
impose the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Dishonesty.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The instant administrative complaint was filed by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Maria Celia A. Flores with dishonesty
for failure to disclose in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) her suspension and
dismissal from previous employment.
An abstract of pertinent facts follows.

Respondent applied for and was appointed as Court Legal Researcher II in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City. She assumed her position on 12
April 1994.
In 2006, the OCA came across a labor case decision docketed as G.R. No.
109362 and promulgated on 15 May 1996, involving respondent as petitioner
therein and the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) as private
respondent. As reported in said case, respondent was employed as clerk of the
PPSTA from August 1973 until her termination in August 1990. She was
dismissed for engaging a fellow employee in a brawl. It was also found that she
was disciplinarily charged six (6) times.1 Respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter who ruled in her favor. On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission declared the dismissal valid. Respondent
elevated the case to this Court through a petition for certiorari. Pending
resolution of said petition, respondent was appointed as Court Legal Researcher
II. Eventually, the validity of her dismissal was sustained by this Court on 15 May
1996.
Upon learning of said case, the OCA looked into the 201 File of respondent but
did not find her PDS. As requested, the Civil Service Commission furnished the
OCA with a copy of the PDS. The significant portions of the PDS are quoted
below, thus:
24. Have you ever been convicted for violating any law, decree, ordinance or
regulations by any court or tribunal? [ ] Yes [ ] No. Have you ever been
convicted for any breach or infraction by a military tribunal or authority, or found
guilty of an administrative offense? [ ] Yes [ √ ] No. If your answer is “Yes” to
any of the questions, give particulars.
25. Do you have any pending administrative/criminal case? If you have any,
give particulars. None
26. Have you ever been retired, dismissed, forced to resign from any
employment for reasons, other than lack of funds or dropped from the rolls?
[ √ ] Yes [ ] No. If “Yes”, give particulars. Petition for Certiorari, pending with
the Supreme Court under G.R. No. L-109362.(Emphasis supplied)2
Following the sketchy lead by respondent’s responses in the PDS, the OCA wrote
a letter to PPSTA requesting a copy of the records of the administrative case
before it.3 As the PPSTA failed to furnish the requested documents, the OCA was
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 26
constrained to rely on the decision dated 15 May 1996 in G.R. No. L-109362 as
basis of this complaint.4
In a 1st Indorsement dated 3 January 2007, the OCA directed respondent to
explain why she failed to disclose her previous suspension, dismissal from the
service, and the administrative charges against her before the PPSTA.5
In her Comment, respondent maintained that she fully disclosed the fact of her
dismissal from PPSTA in the PDS when she cited the pendency of a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court. In invoking good faith, she reasoned that her
failure to indicate the suspension in 1977 was due to an honest mistake
considering that the suspension happened more than seventeen (17) years
before she accomplished the PDS on 11 February 1994.6
In a letter dated 12 April 2007, respondent asked for the inhibition of then Court
Administrator Christopher Lock from further conducting the investigation in light
of his alleged partiality against her for the following reasons, namely: (1) the
Indorsement was issued motu proprio by the Court Administrator despite
absence of any complaint by any party; (2) the Court Administrator disregarded
the standard procedure by causing the personal service of notices and orders
upon respondent; (3) there was no basis for the Indorsement, as no PDS was on
file with the Office of Administrative Services, and the OCA had to obtain a copy
from the Civil Service Commission; and (4) the Court Administrator virtually
made himself a complainant, prosecutor and judge.7
In his Comment on the letter dated 12 April 2007, the former Court Administrator
explained that the charge against respondent for dishonesty was not brought
about by any desire to harass her but by his sense of duty. He reiterated that it
was within his power to initiate investigations against erring employees and
under the circumstances in which the infraction of respondent was discovered, a
private party need not file a complaint. Denying having taken an unusual interest
in the complaint by personally serving the notices andorders upon respondent,
the former Court Administrator maintained that there was nothing irregular in the
OCA obtaining a copy of the PDS from the Civil Service Commission, as it is a
normal procedure in administrative investigations to obtain records from other
offices.
On 4 May 2007, the OCA found respondent guilty of dishonesty and
recommended her dismissal from the service.

In a Resolution dated 10 September 2007, the Court resolved to re-docket the
case as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest
whether they were willing to submit this matter for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed.8
In compliance with our Resolution, both parties filed their affirmative
manifestations on 18 October 20079 and 6 November 2007,10 respectively.
We adopt the findings of OCA.
Dishonesty is defined as “intentionally making a false statement in any material
fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his
examination, registration, appointment or promotion.” Thus, dishonesty, like bad
faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of
intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty,
consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave
rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the
time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for
the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of
reasoning he could have had at that moment.11
In the instant case, respondent admitted that she failed to disclose her previous
suspension but attributed such failure to “human frailty” and “honest mistake.” It
is indeed implausible that respondent could have easily forgotten her suspension
considering that it was one of the grounds cited by PPSTA for her eventual
termination. As aptly observed by OCA:
“The defenses of good faith, human frailty and honest mistake deserve scant
consideration. It is inconceivable that Ms. Flores could have forgotten her
suspension in 1977 when she was accomplishing her Personal Data Sheet in
1994. A suspension is not something that occurs in one’s career regularly that it
can easily be forgotten. It is a blemish in [one’s] career and definitely leaves a
deep and lasting impression in one’s mind which the lapse of seventeen (17)
years can not easily erase. Besides it is not as if the issue of her suspension was
laid to rest after Ms. Flores served it in 1977. The decision in G.R. No.109362
shows that her suspension and other administrative infractions were raised by
the Philippine Public School Teachers Association in order to justify her dismissal.
It appears from the decision that the Association dismissed Ms. Flores in
September 1990 and in dismissing her, the Association sent her a Memorandum
dated August 31, 1990 recounting her previous administrative offenses, including
her suspension. The issue of the legality of her dismissal became the subject of a
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 27
labor case. On December 29, 1992, the National Labor Relations Commission
rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of Ms. Flores as valid. She then filed
a petition before this Court. On February 11, 1994, she accomplished her
Personal Data Sheet. Verily, the proceedings in her labor case, which occurred
just a few years before she accomplished her Personal Data Sheet, could not
have failed to remind Ms. Flores of her employment history when she was still a
clerk in the Philippine Public School Teachers Association. Besides, the fact that
Ms. Flores did not inform this Office of the decision in G.R. No. 109362 for ten
(10) years belies any claim of good faith on her part.”12 
Anent respondent’s claim that she fully disclosed the fact of her dismissal in the
PDS by citing the pendency of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court,
such assertion deserves scant attention. Two questions relating to administrative
charges were asked in the PDS to which respondent explicitly answered in the
negative. While respondent may have mentioned a pending petition for certiorari,
said answer only begged further details, which respondent herself failed to
provide. On its face, an ongoing petition for certiorari does not say much. But
having answered in this manner and having failed to give the requisite particulars
only demonstrated evasiveness on the part of respondent and lent suspicion that
she intended to conceal the pendency of the administrative case against her. On
this point, we quote with approval the observation of the OCA, to wit:
“There is no doubt that Ms. Flores is guilty of dishonesty. Ms. Flores, while she
was still a clerk of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association was charged
with refusing to accept the responsibilities and duties assigned to her; she was
charged administratively six (6) times in 1977 for misconduct, violation of rules
and regulations, absenteeism and tardiness and as a consequence she was
suspended for fifteen (15) days starting on March 29, 1977. She did not reveal
any of these facts and infractions in her Personal Data Sheet. The questions in
the Personal Data Sheet, specifically numbers 24, 25, and 26 are quite clear and
straightforward. Question number 24 asked her if she has been found guilty of
an administrative offense. Her answer is “No” which should have been “Yes”
precisely because she was previously suspended fifteen (15) days in 1977.
Question number 25 asked her if she has any pending administrative case. Her
answer was “None” which should have been “Yes” because at the time she was
accomplishing her Personal Data Sheet on February 11, 1994 her petition for
certiorari questioning her dismissal by the Philippine Public School Teachers
Association was pending before this Court. In Question number 26, she was
asked if she has been retired, dismissed or forced to resign from any
employment for reason other than lack of funds or dropped from the rolls. This

time her answer was “Yes” and she added “Petition for Certiorari pending with
the Supreme Court under G.R. No. L-109362.” Although Ms. Flores revealed the
docket number of her petition and its status, this does not comply with what was
asked for because Ms. Flores was also required to give details if her answer was
“Yes.” The docket number and status of the case are not sufficient to allow the
Selection and Promotion Board for Lower Courts to intelligently assess the fitness
of Ms. Flores to join the Judiciary. Her answer was intended to avoid giving the
essential details of her administrative case, such as the numerous administrative
charges against her and her previous suspension for obvious reasons. If the
Selection and Promotion Board for the Lower Courts knew about these details
then for sure Ms. Flores would not have been recommended to the position of
Court Legal Researcher II.
Interestingly, in a Personal Data Sheet which Ms. Flores accomplished on
February 6, 2007 for the purpose of applying for a lateral transfer to Branch 72,
Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, she disclosed her previous administrative
infractions. She admitted that she was formally charged by PPSTA with tardiness
and/or violation of office rules. She admitted that she was suspended in March
1977. Finally, she stated that she was dismissed from her employment by the
PPSTA as per this Court’s decision in G.R. No. 109362. Nothing can better
illustrate the dishonesty of Ms. Flores than a comparison of the Personal Data
Sheet dated February 6, 2007, wherein she openly admitted that she was
previously suspended, charged administratively and dismissed from service, with
the Personal Data Sheet she accomplished on February 11, 1994 wherein these
facts were completely hidden by Ms. Flores from this Court.”13
The accomplishment of the PDS is required under Civil Service Rules and
Regulations for employment in the government. The making of an untruthful
statement therein amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document
that warrant dismissal from the service even on the first offense.14
As emphasized in Advincula v. Dicen,15 the PDS is an official document required
of a government employee and official by the Civil Service Commission. It is the
repository of all information about any government employee and official
regarding his personal background, qualification, and eligibility. Since truthful
completion of the PDS is a requirement for employment in the judiciary, the
importance of answering the same with candor need not be gainsaid.
Concealment of any information in the PDS, therefore, warrants disciplinary
action against the erring employee.16
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 28
This Court has in the past punished similar infractions pertaining to making
untruthful statements in the PDS with the severe penalty of dismissal such as
failing to state previous employment and the fact of separation for cause
therefrom,17 falsely declaring passing the career service professional
examination when in fact one did not,18 and neglecting to declare the pendency
of a criminal case.19
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an
employee than in the judiciary.20 Persons involved in the dispensation of justice,
from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest
standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As
the assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest,
which requires the highest standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for
public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the
law.21
While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even at
the first instance22, jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court lowered
the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the presence of
mitigating circumstances such as length of service in the government and being
a first time offender.23
Since respondent has been in the service for fourteen (14) years and since this is
her first offense during employment in the judiciary, the Court deems it proper to
impose the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay.24
WHEREFORE, respondent Maria Celia A. Flores, Court Legal Researcher II,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City is found GUILTY of dishonesty and
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that the
commission of similar or graver offense in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998.*
JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG,
respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Immorality; Disbarment; Good moral character is
not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar.—Thus, good moral character is not only
a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral
conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Immoral conduct is that conduct
which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community.—Immoral conduct has
been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but
must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards.—We explained in Barrientos vs.
Daarol that, “as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards.”
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Quantum of Proof; The burden of proof
rests upon the complainant, and the Supreme Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.—Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his
family in order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 29
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Handwritings; Handwriting may be proved
through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by
the respondent as genuine.—Further, the complainant presented as evidence the
love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly
manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his
own. In addition, complainant also submitted as evidence the cards that she
herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be
proved through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or
treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence
were written by one and the same person. Besides, respondent did not present
any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he
merely denied that he wrote them.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; While the burden of proof is upon the
complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court to
show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar.—While the burden of
proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but
also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar.
Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such
that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he must
meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the
Roll of Attorneys. This he failed to do.
Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Parents have not only rights but also
duties—e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right
precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and
understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance.—Respondent may have
provided well for his family—they enjoyed a comfortable life and his children
finished their education. He may have also established himself as a successful
lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to
show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of
law. We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties—
e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts
and good example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as
well as moral and spiritual guidance. As a husband, he is also obliged to live with
his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and
support.
Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; A husband is not merely a man
who has contracted marriage—he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love

and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.—Although respondent
piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A
husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a
partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful
to her until death. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova: “The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.” In Toledo vs. Toledo, the respondent was disbarred from
the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another woman who had borne him a child.
Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; A lawyer may be disbarred for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.—In the present case, the
complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, “a lawyer may
be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Bugaring, Piedad, Oliva and Associates Law Offices for complainant.
     Domingo Cayosa, Jr. for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of
the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral
integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint1
for disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she
accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for
Lawyers.2
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 30
The complainant narrated:
“The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador
M. Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of
Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina
Espita, 17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in subjects handled
by Atty. Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent
member of the legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance
until the student acceded to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the
community, but which they managed to keep from me. It therefore came as a
terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain when my
husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous
circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at
the Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila.
Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty.
Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a
member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag
has abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his
former student in the tertiary level[.]”3
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.4
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received
from complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative
complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her
complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the
respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from
“emotional confusion arising from extreme jealousy.” The truth, she stated, was
that her husband had remained a faithful and responsible family man. She
further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship with
one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family.5 Supporting her letter were an

Affidavit of Desistance6 and a Motion to Dismiss,7 attached as Annexes A and B,
which she filed before the IBP commission on bar discipline.8 In a Decision dated
October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors9 dismissed the complaint of Mrs.
Narag for failure to prosecute.10
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this Court11
received another letter12 from the complainant, with her seven children13 as co-
signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained
that she had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous
threats against her.14
In his Comment on the complainant’s letter of November 11, 1991, filed in
compliance with this Court’s Resolution issued on July 6, 1992,15 respondent
prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that he
had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had
voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance16 and Motion to Dismiss,17 even
appearing before the investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under
oath “that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her
own free will and affirmed the contents thereof.”
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied
abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife
as a person emotionally disturbed, viz.:
“What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and
possessive woman, and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires
off letters or complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all
without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of
her ‘loving’ jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her
jealousy cools off, she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the
Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was
then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy.”18
On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment
of respondent to the IBP.19 In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C.
Jose, respondent alleged the following:20
“2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a
square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and
meaningful education. Complainant comes from what she claims to be very rich
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 31
parents who value material possession more than education and the higher and
nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love,
forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and
raised in an entirely different environment. Her value system is the very
opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in
thirty-eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave
his family sustenance, a comfortable home, love, education, companionship, and
most of all, a good and respected name. He was always gentle and
compassionate to his wife and children. Even in the most trying times, he
remained calm and never inflicted violence on them. His children are all now full-
fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully employed. x x x
x x x      x x x      x x x
Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.
On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant
has been systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their
marriage and their family. Their marriage has become a torture chamber in
which Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED,
TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally,
by the Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a
nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of
his misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve
their family and their marriage. But this is not to be. The Complainant never
mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she
became more fierce and predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not
seem in sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial
landscape.

Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from enslavement.
Paraphrasing Dorfman in ‘Death and the Maiden,’ can the torturer and the
tortured co-exist and live together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind
whose only obsession now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent,
with perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. x x x.
5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your
Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He
preserved the good name and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the
marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for worse, in
sickness and in health . . . Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed
anything derogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all
these things to defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells
everyone, everywhere, that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and
immoral. She goes to colleges and universities, professional organizations,
religious societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil,
bad and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as
Counsel, or any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is
this love? Since when did love become an instrument to destroy a man’s dearest
possession in life—his good name, reputation and dignity?
Because of Complainant’s virulent disinformation campaign against her husband,
employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your
Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and
humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been
mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the Complainant.”21
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent
presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against
him and Gina Espita:
“3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x
3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. x x x
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan. I.S.
No. 89-114. x x x
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 32
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and Concubinage.
OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. x x x
3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061.
DISMISSED.
3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan. I.S.
No. 92-109. DISMISSED. (x x x). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration.
DENIED. (x x x).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (x x x) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (x x x).
DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (x x x). Re-instituted (x x x).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (x x x). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (x x x). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela.
Pending.”22
In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:
“I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (x x x), picture (x x x) are
inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in ‘Cecilia Zulueta
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,’ G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (x x x).
x x x      x x x      x x x
II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina
Espita in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the
employment of said woman in the DTI. He never had or is having any illicit
relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as husband
and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays,
or in any other place. He never begot a child or children with her. Finally,
respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag are false and
fabricated, x x x
x x x      x x x      x x x
III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons
forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty.
Narag tried to return to the conjugal home many times with the help of mutual
friends to save the marriage and the family from collapse. He tried several times
to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment

case, he offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag
refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. x x x
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive,
scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who
incessantly beat, battered, brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and
humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, and
psychologically, x x x.
V. Complainant Julieta Narag’s claim in her counter-manifestation dated March
28, 1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated
February 27, 1996 was obtained through force and intimidation, is not true.
Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and absolutely without
force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimonies of Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador
Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. 12439, People vs. Dominador M.
Narag, et al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. x x x.x x x      x x x
xxx
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man—a senior citizen of 63 years—
sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively
degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His very
physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions render him unfit and
unable to do the things attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the
attached medical certificates, x x x, among many other similar certificates
touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also suffering from
hypertension.”23
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report,24 recommending
the indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material
portions of said report read as follows:
“Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by
the contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case,
namely:
a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of
respondent’s own family and [whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina
Espita;
b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita
(Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 33
respondent’s Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love letters, the due execution
and contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility for being
allegedly forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness stand much less
presented and offered proof to support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses whose testimonies tend to
depict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and
possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did
not present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his
sworn comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to
disprove the adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten their
illegitimate children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N.
Espita. Worse, respondent’s denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for
disciplinary sanction (Marcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to
disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession.”25
In its Resolution26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved
the investigating commissioner’s recommendation for the indefinite suspension of
the respondent.27 Subsequently, the complainant sought the disbarment of her
husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP
granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997,
denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence
presented by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the
imposition of the penalty of disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
“Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.”
“CANON 7—A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03—A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”

Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent28 to the practice of
law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a
lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or
disbarred.29
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant,
or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community.30 Furthermore, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree31 or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.32
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, “as officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer
of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.”
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in
order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.34
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself,35 were: Charlie
Espita,36 Magdalena Bautista,37 Bienvenido Eugenio,38 Alice Carag,39 Dr. Jervis
B. Narag,40 Dominador Narag, Jr.,41 and Nieves F. Reyes.42
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated
complainant’s charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave
to the investigating officer:
“Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?
A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.
Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 34
A Yes, sir. (Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
ATTY. NARAG: Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living
together as husband and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador.
x x x      x x x      x x x”43
During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita
repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with
whom she had two children:
“Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as
husband and wife. You claim that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have
already two children and I know that that is really an immoral act which you
cannot just allow me to follow since my moral values don’t allow me that my
sister is living with a married man like you.
Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them
in the house?
A Yes, si[r].
x x x      x x x      x x x
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?

A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your
family.”44
In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag
the love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried
to dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment proceedings.45
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this
wise:
“Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?A Because he was always going
to the house of my son-in- law by the name of Charlie Espita.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of
Atty. Narag?
A Yes, sir.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living
as husband and wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir.”46
Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified
that she learned from the Narag children—Randy, Bong and Rowena—that their
father left his family, that she and her husband prodded the complainant to
accept the respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when the
respondent “went back to his woman,” and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his
wife.47
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 35
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to
establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman.
Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify
falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent
had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina
and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In addition,
complainant also submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had received
from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a
comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the
respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by
one and the same person.48 Besides, respondent did not present any evidence
to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he merely denied
that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not
only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a
member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character
is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the
satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have
his name in the Roll of Attorneys.49 This he failed to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At
the same time, he depicts his wife as a “violent husband-beater, vitriolic and
unbending,” and as an “insanely and pathologically jealous woman,” whose only
obsession was to “destroy, destroy and destroy” him as shown by her filing of a
series of allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove
his allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence50
and ten (10) witnesses.51
We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not
establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the
profession that would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did their
testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had
abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children.
Some of them testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but
merely relied on information from either respondent himself or other people,
while others were presented to impeach the good character of his wife.

Respondent may have provided well for his family—they enjoyed a comfortable
life and his children finished their education. He may have also established
himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these
accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a
member of the noble profession of law.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties—e.g., to
support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good
example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as
moral and spiritual guidance.52 As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his
wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and
support.53
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from
home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work;
instead, he abandoned his family to live with her paramour, who bore him two
children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good
husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of
their mother, must have scarcely felt the warmth of their father’s love.
Respondent’s son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his father’s
moral frailties in his testimony:
“Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is
there a fault that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the
emotional part of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although I am a
God-fearing person, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or
her to at least realize his mistakes, sir.
x x x      x x x      x x x
COMR. JOSE: I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that
your father is the worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to jail
and have him dis barred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 36
A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be
given a lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to
experience all the pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime.
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is
your flesh, his bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the
worst man on earth, is that what you are saying?
A Sort of, sir.
Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has
sinned, you have no more father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid
because my father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say
that? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure, sir, you did not give me
love.”54 Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating
officer the trauma he went through:
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that
your father is maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable
Commission the effect on you?
A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters,
especially my married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I
and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted ways.
This is one reason that affected us.
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?
A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she
could not face the people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to
a wellknown family in our community.
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are
those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows
so well that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my
mother.
x x x      x x x      x x x

Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your
Honor.
Q In your wife’s family?
A In our family, sir.
Q And what do you mean by that?
A What I meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father
went to the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a “puta” in provincial
government, which my mother-in-law hated him so much for this, which really
affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit
relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your
Honor.”55
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his
acts prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted
marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his
wife and remain faithful to her until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova:56 “The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.”
In Toledo vs. Toledo,57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law,
when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had
borne him a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,58 the respondent was disbarred after the
complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married woman. This Court declared that respondent failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the bar.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 37
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs.
Cabanting,59 “a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.”
WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in
the personal record of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bello-sillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Respondent disbarred, name ordered stricken from Roll of Attorneys.
Notes.—Proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for
administrative discipline against a judge if he is not charged for immorality prior
to his appointment. (Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239 [1993])
Penalty of disqualification from appointment to any public office earlier imposed
on a judge for immorality lifted after he has shown sincere repentance and after
considering his contributions during the period that he was judge. (Castillo vs.
Calanog, Jr., 239 SCRA 268 [1994])
Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part
of the former, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock. (Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr., 276
SCRA 445 [1997])
The act of a court employee of eloping with and getting impregnated by a
married man constitutes gross immorality which the Supreme Court will never
sanction on its employees. (Masadao, Jr. vs. Glorioso, 280 SCRA 612 [1997])

SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997.*
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR.,
respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Gross Immorality; Words and Phrases; A person’s
engaging in premarital sexual relations with another, making promises to marry,
suggests a doubtful moral character but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct; A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.—Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in
1971 because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To
recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia
Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. We find that these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same
does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.” It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.
Same; Same; Same; Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of
whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
deceit on the part of the former, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of
such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.—We find the ruling in Arciga
v. Maniwang quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a
woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on
and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warranT the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him,
even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
Same; Same; Same; Marriages; The Supreme Court cannot castigate a man
for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.—
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were
evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s assertions that she had been
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 38
forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be
respondent’s girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until
1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations
that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an
adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an
innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent
chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a
sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for
any other reason.
Same; Same; Same; Even assuming that a person’s indiscretions are ignoble,
the twenty-six years that he has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute
sufficient punishment therefor.—We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as
an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is
also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually,
sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even
assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be
allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Pablo S. Tolentino for complainant.
     Jose Rome S. Maranon for respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that
respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession.
Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after
unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath,
however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she

had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that
respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in
June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay,
Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies.
Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at
the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with
respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco,
born on December 11, 1964.1 It was after the child was born, complainant
alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the
bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made
more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the
child on the latter’s birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in
1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence, this
petition.
Upon complainant’s motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of
witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant’s failure to
comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to
take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating
that she had justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment required and
that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18,
1974, the Court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the
ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.2
Respondent’s third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court’s Resolution dated
September 15, 1982.3 In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his
election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-
1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the
community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons
to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure
of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to
allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer’s oath upon payment of the
required fees.5
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 39
Respondent’s hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court,
in response to complainant’s opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-
taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and
that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971 because of the
charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent
bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims
that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar
examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a
doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.”6 It is a
willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of the community.7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy
between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is
neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary
sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out
of wedlock.9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were
evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s assertions that she had been
forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be
respondent’s girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until
1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations
that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 40

adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an
innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent
chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a
sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for
any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman

scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make
respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession
he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been
prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During
this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.10
Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit
belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon

Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the
proper fees.

SO ORDERED.

     Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

     Narvasa (C.J.), On official leave.

     Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., On leave.

Petition denied, Respondent allowed to take lawyer’s oath.

Note.—Thirty-two years of having been denied admission to the Bar is sufficient

chastisement for a man who, though morally delinquent in his younger years,
has made up for it by observing a respectable, useful and religious life since then
as attested by prominent citizens and his children from the three women he
married. (In Re: Socorro Ke. Ladrera, 147 SCRA 350 [1987])

——o0o——
EN BANC

[A.C. NO. 7902 : September 30, 2008]
TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, Complainant, v. ATTY. GODWIN R.
VALDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Godwin R. Valdez from the practice of
law for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct.
The complainant alleges that despite receipt of legal fees in compliance with a
Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his obligations
under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainant's requests for a
report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected demands for
return of the money paid to him.
On December 16, 2005, the complainant, Torben B. Overgaard, a Dutch national,
through his business partner John Bradley, entered into a Retainer
Agreement1 with the respondent, Atty. Godwin R. Valdez. For the amount of
PhP900,000.00, the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to
represent him as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed
against him, all pending in Antipolo City; including a dismissed complaint which
was appealed before the Department of Justice. The Agreement stipulated that
fees would cover acceptance and attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, other
legal incidental expenses, and appearance fees.2
The cases filed by the complainant included a complaint for Estafa, Grave
Threats, Coercion, Unjust Vexation and Oral Defamation3pending before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Antipolo and a civil case for Mandamus,
Injunction with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Damages4 which is
on trial at Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. On the other hand,
the cases filed against the complainant included a criminal case for Other Light
Threats at Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, 5 and violation of
Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 20046 before the Family Court of Antipolo City. A complaint
for Illegal Possession of Firearms was also filed against Torben Overgaard which
was dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Antipolo City. This was appealed to the
Department of Justice by way of Petition for Review. 7
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 41
Upon the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the complainant paid the
respondent USD16,854.00 through telegraphic bank transfer,8 as full payment for
the services to be rendered under the Agreement. The respondent then assured
the complainant that he would take good care of the cases he was handling for
the complainant.9
On April 11, 2006, four months after the execution of the Retainer Agreement,
the complainant, through his business partner John Bradley, demanded from the
respondent a report of the action he had taken with respect to the cases
entrusted to him. However, despite his continued efforts to contact the
respondent to inquire on the status of the cases, he was unable to reach him; his
phone calls were not answered and his electronic mails were ignored. 10
The complainant had no knowledge of the developments of the cases that the
respondent was handling for him. Upon his own inquiry, he was dismayed to find
out that the respondent did not file his entry of appearance in the cases for
Other Light Threats and Violation of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Children Act.11The respondent also did not inform him that he was
entitled to prepare a Counter-Affidavit to answer the complaint for Other Light
Threats. The complainant had no knowledge that there had already been
arraignments for the criminal cases against him, and that there were already
warrants of arrest12 issued for his failure to attend the arraignments. He was
constrained to engage the services of another lawyer in order to file a Motion to
Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Other Light Threats, 13 and an Omnibus
Motion to Revive the Case and Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Violation
of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act. 14
The complainant alleges that the respondent did not do a single thing with
respect to the cases covered under the Retainer Agreement. Not only did the
respondent fail to enter his appearance in the criminal cases filed against the
complainant, he also neglected to file an entry of appearance in the civil case for
Mandamus, Injunction and Damages that the complainant filed. The respondent
also did not file a Comment on the complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms
which was dismissed and under review at the Department of Justice. 15
Due to the above lapses of the respondent, on November 27, 2006, the
complainant wrote the respondent and demanded the return of the documents
which were turned over to him, as well as the PhP900,000.00 that was paid in
consideration of the cases he was supposed to handle for the
complainant.16 However, complainant was unable to get any word from the
respondent despite repeated and continuous efforts to get in touch with him.

Hence, on December 28, 2006, Torben Overgaard was constrained to file an
administrative complaint against Atty. Godwin R. Valdez before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, alleging that the respondent engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. 17 Despite the order to submit an
Answer to the complaint against him,18 the respondent failed to comply. A
Mandatory Conference was set on September 21, 2007,19 but the respondent
failed to attend despite being duly notified.20 This prompted the Commission on
Bar Discipline to issue an Order declaring the respondent in default for failure to
submit an Answer and failure to attend the Mandatory Conference. 21 The
investigation proceeded ex parte.
The complainant submitted his position paper on October 5, 2007,22with a prayer
that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, and to be ordered to
return the amount of PhP900,000.00. A Clarificatory Hearing was scheduled on
December 11, 2007,23 and again, it was only the complainant who was in
attendance; the respondent failed to attend the hearing despite notice. The case
was then submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the
complainant and the hearings conducted.24
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Antonio S.
Tria, to whom the instant disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report
and recommendation, found the respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Canon
16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In his Report dated January 29, 2008, he recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-126,
dated March 6, 2008, approved the recommendation of Commissioner Tria, and
further ordered the complainant to return the PhP900,000.00 to the complainant
within 60 days from receipt of the notice.
We agree. We find the respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez to have committed
multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case. Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, viz:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 42
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath;
(6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful
appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
The respondent has indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded of
members of the bar. He did not merely neglect his client's cause, he abandoned
his client and left him without any recourse but to hire another lawyer. He not
only failed to properly handle the cases which were entrusted to his care, he
refused to do a single thing in connection with these cases. He did not file any
pleading to defend his client; he did not even enter his appearance in these
cases. Moreover, he disregarded the complainant's letters and electronic mails
and rejected the complainant's phone calls. All the complainant was asking for
was a report of the status of the cases but the respondent could not be reached
no matter what the complainant did to get in touch with him. After receipt of the
full amount of fees under the Retainer Agreement, he simply disappeared,
leaving the client defenseless and plainly prejudiced in the cases against him.
Warrants of arrest were even issued against the complainant due to the
respondent's gross and inexcusable negligence in failing to ascertain the status
of the case and to inform his client of the arraignment. It was not a mere failure
on the respondent's part to inform the complainant of matters concerning the
cases, it was an unmistakable evasion of duty. To hide from the complainant,
avoid his calls, ignore his letters, and leave him helpless is unforgivable; and to
commit all these acts and omissions after receiving the full amount of legal fees
and after assuring the client of his commitment and responsibility violates the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary

to justice, modesty or good morals.25 It is an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or
to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.26Representing to the complainant that he would take care of the cases
filed against him,27 assuring the complainant that his property involved in a civil
case would be safeguarded,28 and then collecting the full amount of legal fees of
PhP900,000.00, only to desert the complainant after receipt of the fees, were
manifestly deceitful and dishonest.
The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client." Necessity
and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and truthful when dealing with
his client. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.29 However, instead of devoting himself
to the client's cause, the respondent avoided the complainant, forgot about the
cases he was handling for him and ostensibly abandoned him. The client reposed
his trust in his lawyer with full faith that the lawyer would not betray him or
abscond from his responsibilities. By assuring the complainant that he would take
care of the cases included in the Retainer Agreement, and even accepting fees,
the respondent defrauded the complainant when he did not do a single thing he
was expected to do.
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.30 A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.31Respondent should indeed be held liable, for
he was not just incompetent, he was practically useless; he was not just
negligent, he was indolent; and rather than being of help to the complainant, he
prejudiced the client. Respondent's inaction with respect to the matters entrusted
to his care is obvious; and his failure to file an answer to the complaint for
disbarment against him and to attend the hearings in connection therewith,
without any explanation or request for resetting, despite proper notice from the
IBP, is clear evidence of negligence on his part.
The Code of Professional Responsibility further provides that a lawyer is required
to keep the client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information. 32 The respondent did the
opposite. Despite the complainant's efforts to consult him and notwithstanding
numerous attempts to contact him, simply to ask for an update of the status of
the cases, the respondent was able to avoid the complainant and never bothered
to reply.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 43
After months of waiting for a reply from the respondent, and discovering that the
respondent had been remiss in his duties, the complainant demanded the return
of the documents he had turned over to the respondent. He also demanded the
return of the money he had paid for the legal services that were not rendered
and expenses of litigation which were not incurred. However, the respondent
rejected the complainant's demands.
Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that "a
lawyer shall account for all money and property collected or received for and
from the client." The complainant paid $16,854.00 to the respondent via
telegraphic bank transfer. This was considered as complete payment for the
PhP900,000.00 that was stipulated as the consideration for the legal services to
be rendered. However, since the respondent did not carry out any of the services
he was engaged to perform, nor did he appear in court or make any payment in
connection with litigation, or give any explanation as to how such a large sum of
money was spent and allocated, he must immediately return the money he
received from the client upon demand. However, he refused to return the money
he received from the complainant despite written demands, and was not even
able to give a single report regarding the status of the cases.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer
for a specific purpose - such as for filing fees - but not used for failure to file the
case, must immediately be returned to the client on demand.33
In Sencio v. Calvadores,34 the respondent lawyer Sencio was engaged to file a
case, which he failed to do. His client demanded that he return the money which
was paid to him but he refused. Sencio similarly failed to answer the complaint
and disregarded the orders and notices of the IBP on many occasions. 35 The
respondent lawyer was ordered to return the money that he received from the
complainant with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation
of the resolution until the return of the amount.36
The practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of
good moral character.37 The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing.38 Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times,
whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, 39 and a violation
of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.40
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 44

The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of

responsibility to the courts and his client but also a wanton disregard for his
duties as a lawyer. It is deplorable that members of the bar, such as the
respondent, betray not only the trust of their client, but also public trust. For the
practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character.41 Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities
and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege to
practice law. We must protect the administration of justice by requiring those
who exercise this function to be competent, honorable and reliable in order that
the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.

In this case, we find that suspension for three years recommended by the IBP is
not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent.
The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in him as a member of the bar. We could not find any mitigating
circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. For violating elementary
principles of professional ethics and failing to observe the fundamental duties of
honesty and good faith, the respondent has proven himself unworthy of
membership in this noble profession.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED

and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED to
immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of
extra-judicial demand. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu of six
percent (6%), shall be imposed on such amount from the date of promulgation
of this decision until the payment thereof. He is further ORDERED to immediately
return all papers and documents received from the complainant.

Copies of this Decision shall be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, CJ., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona,* Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro, Andbrion, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 7360. July 24, 2012.*
ATTY. POLICARPIO I. CATALAN, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSELITO
M. SILVOSA, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interests; A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts.—Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that “A lawyer
shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.”
Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that “A lawyer shall
not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the
oppressed” and on Canon 14 which provides that “A lawyer shall not refuse his
services to the needy.” We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa
violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail
Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which
provides that “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.”
Administrative Law; Prescription; Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No
matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of
the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.—
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative
complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a
respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time
has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the
time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
Disbarment; Attorneys; Disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any
interested person.—Disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested
person. There can be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention
of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are
incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct the public
might or does suffer undesirable consequences.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 45
Same; Same; Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment; The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.—
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. x x x The crime of direct bribery is a
crime involving moral turpitude.
Same; Same; Atty. Silvosa’s excuse that his conviction for direct bribery was not
in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays
the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character.—Atty. Silvosa’s representation
of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at
least the penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of
direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section
27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction
of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than
suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting
standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse
that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is
unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The
practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to
exercise this privilege.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against
Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action
against Atty. Silvosa: (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the
same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa
bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros. Toribio) for P30,000;
and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for
direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar
Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the
first cause of action and recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of
Governors of the IBP twice modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first, to a
suspension of six months, then to a suspension of two years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor
in Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa
appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, “People of the
Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al.” (Esperon case), for the
complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one
of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner
of prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty.
Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as
private counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor,
hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty.
Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused
are relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest
bias in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of
the Esperon case by arguing against the position of the private prosecutor.
In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s request to
relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered
judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005,
Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to
reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros.
Toribio. In a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a
respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and
downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries.
During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a
public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her
findings and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on
18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa
before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an
affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of
Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in
detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from
Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set
up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television program
Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual entrapment operation. The footage
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 46
was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan.
Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.
Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:
“WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year,
one month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three
years, six months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.”2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned
as prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court
released its decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the
accused’s bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose
of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between
himself and the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations
as “self-serving” and “purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to
pursue persecution.”
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that “conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral
turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to a crime.’” He further
claims that “it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his
capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was
convicted falling under the category of crimes against public officers x x x.”
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found
that:
“As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in

Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said
case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted
himself with the facts of said case and has made himself familiar with the parties
of the case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact
that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file
a Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of
Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery
that occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting
allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of
another. With [Atty. Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.]
Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged
incident occurred more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this
disbarment case was filed on November 2006. Such a long period of time would
undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of
the bribe money could not be ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant
has no personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty.
Silvosa] was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in
said case nor was he ever involved in said case. The findings of the
Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The findings in a criminal
proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been
presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the
First Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
should be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.”3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and
suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another
Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the
penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension from the practice of law to two years. The
Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records
of the case on 1 March 2012.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 47
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that “A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.” Atty. Silvosa,
on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that “A lawyer shall not reject,
except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed” and on
Canon 14 which provides that “A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the
needy.”
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When
he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty.
Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of facts.”
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two
occasions can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as
public prosecutor was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial
conference. He likewise claims his subsequent participation as collaborating
counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa
will do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
“An attorney is employed—that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a
lawyer or counselor—when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of
his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing
his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his
client’s cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of
attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This
stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy,
on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily
one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to
proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves

attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.”
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies
although the attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its
veracity by emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP.
Comm. Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the
facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s
ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe
Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a
day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio
Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for
Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the
other hand, merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When
the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed
in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative
complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a
respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time
has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the
time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding
are not binding in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There
can be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper
authority acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible
with the duties of the office and from which conduct the public might or does
suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 48
“Section 1. How Instituted.—Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of
and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate
and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in
government service.
x x x x”
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No.
27776, and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a
witness in the present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s
judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already
final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence
of the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself
admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9 Section 27,
Rule 138 provides:
“Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” (Emphasis supplied)
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 49

In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved
conviction.10 himself unfit to exercise this privilege.

Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his
v. COMELEC,11 we ruled: name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision
be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
“By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
crime of direct bribery: Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
1. the offender is a public officer; to all courts in the country.

2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by SO ORDERED.

himself or through another; Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,
3.  such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the Villarama, Jr., Perez, Sereno, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, Leonardo-De Castro, J., On Official Leave.
or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
Brion and Mendoza, JJ., On Leave.
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is
connected with the performance of his official duties. Peralta, J., On Official Business. 

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa disbarred.
offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust Notes.—Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar
act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the authority to do so. (Vargas vs. Ignes, 623 SCRA 1 [2010])
offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted
rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.” (Italicization in the original) Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney. (Rodriguez vs.
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at Blancaflor, 645 SCRA 286 [2011])
bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s final
conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence
of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty
more severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to
flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of
the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as
a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in

A.C. No. 6672. September 4, 2009.*
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES
TOLENTINO, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Malpractice; Solicitations;
Advertisements; Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice
of law is a profession and not a business—lawyers should not advertise their
talents as merchants advertise their wares.—Canons of the CPR are rules of
conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s
services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides: CANON 3 —
A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS. Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill
is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service
to which every member of the bar is called.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, an
actuation which constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.—Rule 2.03 of
the CPR provides: RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE
DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence,
lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ambulance Chasing; Words and Phrases;
Ambulance chasing is the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment.—Rule
2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE. This
rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 50
Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or
reduced fees for his services.—With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02
of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s
client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court notes that respondent
never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from
Labiano’s “referrals.” Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his
office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s
legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Same; Same; Lending to Clients; The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money
to his client; Exception.—The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his
client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter
that he is handling for the client.
Same; Same; Solicitations; Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining employment.—As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation
constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment. Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public
from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
Same; Same; Advertisements; Calling Cards; Professional calling cards may only
contain the following details: (a) lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with
which he is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number; and, (e) special
branch of law practiced.—A final word regarding the calling card presented in
evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.
For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional
calling cards may only contain the following details: (a) lawyer’s name; (b) name
of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number;
and, (e) special branch of law practiced.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.

   The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Offices for complainant.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie
Labiano, convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent
promised them financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4
To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them
text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-
client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in
exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling
card:6
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01  Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar                Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City                   Cel.: (0926) 2701719
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 51
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied) 
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing
and circulation of the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in
Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit
a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we
modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the
means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct
themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of
the CPR provides:
CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE
ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or
skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service
to which every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT
DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR
INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S
CAUSE.
This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of
legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.18  free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as
well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later
admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 52
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s
word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule
2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule
that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to
retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his
services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these
seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s “referrals.”
Furthermore, he never denied
Labiano’s connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical,
predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under
Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
“Rule 16.04 — A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.”
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as
filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or
premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the
ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire
devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client
in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in
the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of
these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather
than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his

interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24  2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which
calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-
solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP,
a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A
lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason,
lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable
law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money
was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the
legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his
culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 53
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03,
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this
resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated
to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino suspended from practice of law for one (1) year for
violation of Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 Rules of Court, with stern
warning against repetition of similar acts.
Notes.—The acts of a judge of posting advertisements for restaurant personnel
on the court bulletin board, using his court address to receive the applications,
and of screening applicants in his court constitute involvement in private
business and improper use of office facilities for the promotion of the family
business in violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. (Dionisio vs. Escano, 302
SCRA 411 [1999])
The act of a judge in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02
of the Code of Judicial Conduct where said judge was not motivated by any
corrupt motive but a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition.
Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not
cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the
proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held
to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore
to observe. As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court,
had been announcing in open court his qualifications, such is likewise violative of
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary
publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their
qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 54

might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. (Office of the Court

Administrator v. Floro, Jr., 486 SCRA 66 [2006])

——o0o——

Linsangan vs. Tolentino, 598 SCRA 133, A.C. No. 6672 September 4,
2009

G.R. No. 198075. September 4, 2013.*


KOPPEL, INC. (formerly known as KPL AIRCON, INC.), petitioner, vs.
MAKATI ROTARY CLUB FOUNDATION, INC., respondent.
Civil Law; Mines and Mining; Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 7942); Arbitrators;
Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (PA-MGB); Jurisdiction;
The Supreme Court pointed out to the provisions of R.A. No. 7942, or the Mining
Act of 1995, which granted the PA-MGB with exclusive original jurisdiction only
over mining disputes, i.e., disputes involving “rights to mining areas,” “mineral
agreements or permits,” and “surface owners, occupants, claimholders or
concessionaires” requiring the technical knowledge and experience of mining
authorities in order to be resolved.—Gonzales decided the issue in the negative.
In holding that the PA-MGB was devoid of any jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the complaint for arbitration, this Court pointed out to the provisions of R.A. No.
7942, or the Mining Act of 1995, which granted the PA-MGB with exclusive
original jurisdiction only over mining disputes, i.e., disputes involving “rights to
mining areas,” “mineral agreements or permits,” and “surface owners,
occupants, claimholders or concessionaires” requiring the technical knowledge
and experience of mining authorities in order to be resolved. Accordingly, since
the complaint for arbitration in Gonzales did not raise mining disputes as
contemplated under R.A. No. 7942 but only issues relating to the validity of
certain mining related agreements, this Court held that such complaint could not
be arbitrated before the PA-MGB. It is in this context that we made the
pronouncement now in discussion: Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is
proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as to some
provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the
application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of
that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or
validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in
this case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration
proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are
matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These questions are
legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws and
jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function.
Same; Doctrine of Separability; Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration
agreement is considered as independent of the main contract. Being a separate
contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may thus be invoked regardless of
the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract.—Under the doctrine of
separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as independent of the main
contract. Being a separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may thus
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 55
be invoked regardless of the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract.
Once again instructive is Cargill, wherein this Court held that, as a further
consequence of the doctrine of separability, even the very party who repudiates
the main contract may invoke its arbitration clause.
Same; Arbitration; Mediation; “Mediation” and “Arbitration,” Distinguished.—The
JDR framework is based on the processes of mediation, conciliation or early
neutral evaluation which entails the submission of a dispute before a “JDR judge”
who shall merely “facilitate settlement” between the parties in conflict or make a
“non-binding evaluation or assessment of the chances of each party’s case.”
Thus in JDR, the JDR judge lacks the authority to render a resolution of the
dispute that is binding upon the parties in conflict. In arbitration, on the other
hand, the dispute is submitted to an arbitrator/s — a neutral third person or a
group of thereof — who shall have the authority to render a resolution binding
upon the parties.
Same; Same; It is clear that under the law, the petitioner and the respondent
should have been referred to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the
2005 Lease Contract.—It is clear that under the law, the instant unlawful
detainer action should have been stayed; the petitioner and the respondent
should have been referred to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the
2005 Lease Contract. The MeTC, however, did not do so in violation of the law —
which violation was, in turn, affirmed by the RTC and Court of Appeals on
appeal.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals..
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  JGLaw for petitioner.
  Chavez, Miranda, Aseoche Law Offices for respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
This case is an appeal1 from the Decision2 dated 19 August 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 116865.
The facts:
The Donation

Fedders Koppel, Incorporated (FKI), a manufacturer of air-conditioning products,
was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Km. 16, South
Superhighway, Parañaque City (subject land).3 Within the subject land are
buildings and other improvements dedicated to the business of FKI.4
In 1975, FKI5 bequeathed the subject land (exclusive of the improvements
thereon) in favor of herein respondent Makati Rotary Club Foundation,
Incorporated by way of a conditional donation.6 The respondent accepted the
donation with al its conditions.7 On 26 May 1975, FKI and the respondent
executed a Deed of Donation8 evidencing their consensus.
The Lease and the Amended Deed of Donation
One of the conditions of the donation required the respondent to lease the
subject land back to FKI under terms specified in their Deed of Donation.9 With
the respondent’s acceptance of the donation, a lease agreement between FKI
and the respondent was, therefore, effectively incorporated in the Deed of
Donation.
Pertinent terms of such lease agreement, as provided in the Deed of Donation,
were as follows:
1. The period of the lease is for twenty-five (25) years,10 or until the 25th of
May 2000;
2. The amount of rent to be paid by FKI for the first twenty-five (25) years is
P40,126.00 per annum.11
The Deed of Donation also stipulated that the lease over the subject property is
renewable for another period of twenty-five (25) years “upon mutual agreement”
of FKI and the respondent.12 In which case, the amount of rent shall be
determined in accordance with item 2(g) of the Deed of Donation, viz.:
g. The rental for the second 25 years shall be the subject of mutual agreement
and in case of disagreement the matter shall be referred to a Board of three
Arbitrators appointed and with powers in accordance with the Arbitration Law of
the Philippines, Republic Act 878, whose function shall be to decide the current
fair market value of the land excluding the improvements, provided, that, any
increase in the fair market value of the land shall not exceed twenty five percent
(25%) of the original value of the land donated as stated in paragraph 2(c) of
this Deed. The rental for the second 25 years shall not exceed three percent
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 56
(3%) of the fair market value of the land excluding the improvements as
determined by the Board of Arbitrators.13
In October 1976, FKI and the respondent executed an Amended Deed of
Donation14 that reiterated the provisions of the Deed of Donation, including
those relating to the lease of the subject land.
Verily, by virtue of the lease agreement contained in the Deed of Donation and
Amended Deed of Donation, FKI was able to continue in its possession and use
of the subject land.
2000 Lease Contract
Two (2) days before the lease incorporated in the Deed of Donation and
Amended Deed of Donation was set to expire, or on 23 May 2000, FKI and
respondent executed another contract of lease (2000 Lease Contract)15 covering
the subject land. In this 2000 Lease Contract, FKI and respondent agreed on a
new five-year lease to take effect on the 26th of May 2000, with annual rents
ranging from P4,000,000 for the first year up to P4,900,000 for the fifth year.16
The 2000 Lease Contract also contained an arbitration clause enforceable in the
event the parties come to disagreement about the “interpretation, application
and execution” of the lease, viz.:
19. Governing Law — The provisions of this [2000 Lease Contract] shall be
governed, interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this [2000
Lease Contract] shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted
in accordance with the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the
majority of the arbitrators shall be binding upon [FKI and respondent].17
(Emphasis supplied)
2005 Lease Contract
After the 2000 Lease Contract expired, FKI and respondent agreed to renew their
lease for another five (5) years. This new lease (2005 Lease Contract)18 required
FKI to pay a fixed annual rent of P4,200,000.19 In addition to paying the fixed
rent, however, the 2005 Lease Contract also obligated FKI to make a yearly
“donation” of money to the respondent.20 Such donations ranged from
P3,000,000 for the first year up to P3,900,000 for the fifth year.21

Notably, the 2005 Lease Contract contained an arbitration clause similar to that
in the 2000 Lease Contract, to wit:
19. Governing Law — The provisions of this [2005 Lease Contract] shall be
governed, interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this [2005
Lease Contract] shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted
in accordance with the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the
majority of the arbitrators shall be binding upon [FKI and respondent].22
(Emphasis supplied)
The Assignment and Petitioner’s Refusal to Pay
From 2005 to 2008, FKI faithfully paid the rentals and “donations” due it per the
2005 Lease Contract.23 But in June of 2008, FKI sold all its rights and properties
relative to its business in favor of herein petitioner Koppel, Incorporated.24 On
29 August 2008, FKI and petitioner executed an Assignment and Assumption of
Lease and Donation25 — wherein FKI, with the conformity of the respondent,
formally assigned all of its interests and obligations under the Amended Deed of
Donation and the 2005 Lease Contract in favor of petitioner.
The following year, petitioner discontinued the payment of the rent and
“donation” under the 2005 Lease Contract.
Petitioner’s refusal to pay such rent and “donation” emanated from its belief that
the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract, and even of the 2000 Lease
Contract, cannot be given effect because they violated one of the “material
conditions” of the donation of the subject land, as stated in the Deed of Donation
and Amended Deed of Donation.26
According to petitioner, the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation
actually established not only one but two (2) lease agreements between FKI and
respondent, i.e., one lease for the first twenty-five (25) years or from 1975 to
2000, and another lease for the next twenty-five (25) years thereafter or from
2000 to 2025.27 Both leases are material conditions of the donation of the
subject land.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 57
Petitioner points out that while a definite amount of rent for the second twenty-
five (25) year lease was not fixed in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of
Donation, both deeds nevertheless prescribed rules and limitations by which the
same may be determined. Such rules and limitations ought to be observed in any
succeeding lease agreements between petitioner and respondent for they are, in
themselves, material conditions of the donation of the subject land.28
In this connection, petitioner cites item 2(g) of the Deed of Donation and
Amended Deed of Donation that supposedly limits the amount of rent for the
lease over the second twenty-five (25) years to only “three percent (3%) of the
fair market value of the [subject] land excluding the improvements.29
For petitioner then, the rental stipulations of both the 2000 Lease Contract and
2005 Lease Contract cannot be enforced as they are clearly, in view of their
exorbitant exactions, in violation of the aforementioned threshold in item 2(g) of
the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation. Consequently, petitioner
insists that the amount of rent it has to pay thereon is and must still be governed
by the limitations prescribed in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of
Donation.30
The Demand Letters
On 1 June 2009, respondent sent a letter (First Demand Letter)31 to petitioner
notifying the latter of its default “per Section 12 of the [2005 Lease Contract]”
and demanding for the settlement of the rent and “donation” due for the year
2009. Respondent, in the same letter, further intimated of cancelling the 2005
Lease Contract should petitioner fail to settle the said obligations.32 Petitioner
received the First Demand Letter on 2 June 2009.33
On 22 September 2009, petitioner sent a reply34 to respondent expressing its
disagreement over the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract — calling
them “severely disproportionate,” “unconscionable” and “in clear violation to the
nominal rentals mandated by the Amended Deed of Donation.” In lieu of the
amount demanded by the respondent, which purportedly totaled to
P8,394,000.00, exclusive of interests, petitioner offered to pay only
P80,502.79,35 in accordance with the rental provisions of the Deed of Donation
and Amended Deed of Donation.36 Respondent refused this offer.37
On 25 September 2009, respondent sent another letter (Second Demand
Letter)38 to petitioner, reiterating its demand for the payment of the obligations
already due under the 2005 Lease Contract. The Second Demand Letter also

contained a demand for petitioner to “immediately vacate the leased premises”
should it fail to pay such obligations within seven (7) days from its receipt of the
letter.39 The respondent warned of taking “legal steps” in the event that
petitioner failed to comply with any of the said demands.40 Petitioner received
the Second Demand Letter on 26 September 2009.41
Petitioner refused to comply with the demands of the respondent. Instead, on 30
September 2009, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City a complaint42 for the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of
Donation and Amended Deed of Donation against the respondent. This case is
currently pending before Branch 257 of the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CV
09-0346.
The Ejectment Suit
On 5 October 2009, respondent filed an unlawful detainer case43 against the
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City. The
ejectment case was raffled to Branch 77 and was docketed as Civil Case No.
2009-307.
On 4 November 2009, petitioner filed an Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim.44 In it, petitioner reiterated its objection over the rental
stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract for being violative of the material
conditions of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation.45 In
addition to the foregoing, however, petitioner also interposed the following
defenses:
1. The MeTC was not able to validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant
unlawful detainer case in view of the insufficiency of respondent’s demand.46
The First Demand Letter did not contain an actual demand to vacate the
premises and, therefore, the refusal to comply therewith does not give rise to an
action for unlawful detainer.47
2. Assuming that the MeTC was able to acquire jurisdiction, it may not exercise
the same until the disagreement between the parties is first referred to
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract.48
3. Assuming further that the MeTC has jurisdiction that it can exercise, ejectment
still would not lie as the 2005 Lease Contract is void ab initio.49 The stipulation
in the 2005 Lease Contract requiring petitioner to give yearly “donations” to
respondent is a simulation, for they are, in fact, parts of the rent.50 Such grants
were only denominated as “donations” in the contract so that the respondent —
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 58
a non-stock and non-profit corporation — could evade payment of the taxes
otherwise due thereon.51
In due course, petitioner and respondent both submitted their position papers,
together with their other documentary evidence.52 Remarkably, however,
respondent failed to submit the Second Demand Letter as part of its
documentary evidence.
Rulings of the MeTC, RTC and Court of Appeals
On 27 April 2010, the MeTC rendered judgment53 in favor of the petitioner.
While the MeTC refused to dismiss the action on the ground that the dispute is
subject to arbitration, it nonetheless sided with the petitioner with respect to the
issues regarding the insufficiency of the respondent’s demand and the nullity of
the 2005 Lease Contract.54 The MeTC thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case x x x, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.55
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). This appeal was
assigned to Branch 274 of the RTC of Parañaque City and was docketed as Civil
Case No. 10-0255.
On 29 October 2010, the RTC reversed56 the MeTC and ordered the eviction of
the petitioner from the subject land:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing duly considered, the appealed Decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 77, Parañaque City, is hereby reversed,
judgment is thus rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant and against the
defendant-appellee, and ordering the latter —
(1) to vacate the lease[d] premises made subject of the case and to restore the
possession thereof to the plaintiff-appellant;
(2) to pay to the plaintiff-appellant the amount of Nine Million Three Hundred
Sixty Two Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Six Pesos (P9,362,436.00), penalties
and net of 5% withholding tax, for the lease period from May 25, 2009 to May
25, 2010 and such monthly rental as will accrue during the pendency of this
case;

(3) to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000.00 plus appearance fee of
P3,000.00;
(4) and costs of suit.
As to the existing improvements belonging to the defendant-appellee, as these
were built in good faith, the provisions of Art. 1678 of the Civil Code shall apply.
SO ORDERED.57
The ruling of the RTC is premised on the following ratiocinations:
1. The respondent had adequately complied with the requirement of demand as
a jurisdictional precursor to an unlawful detainer action.58 The First Demand
Letter, in substance, contains a demand for petitioner to vacate when it
mentioned that it was a notice “per Section 12 of the [2005 Lease Contract].”59
Moreover, the issue of sufficiency of the respondent’s demand ought to have
been laid to rest by the Second Demand Letter which, though not submitted in
evidence, was nonetheless admitted by petitioner as containing a “demand to
eject” in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.60
2. The petitioner cannot validly invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract while, at the same time, impugn such contract’s validity.61 Even
assuming that it can, petitioner still did not file a formal application before the
MeTC so as to render such arbitration clause operational.62 At any rate, the
MeTC would not be precluded from exercising its jurisdiction over an action for
unlawful detainer, over which, it has exclusive original jurisdiction.63
3. The 2005 Lease Contract must be sustained as a valid contract since
petitioner was not able to adduce any evidence to support its allegation that the
same is void.64 There was, in this case, no evidence that respondent is guilty of
any tax evasion.65
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 19 August 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed66 the decision of the RTC:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, in Civil Case No. 10-0255 is AFFIRMED.
xxxx
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 59
SO ORDERED. 67
Hence, this appeal.
On 5 September 2011, this Court granted petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order68 staying the immediate implementation of the
decisions adverse to it.
Our Ruling
Independently of the merits of the case, the MeTC, RTC and Court of Appeals all
erred in overlooking the significance of the arbitration clause incorporated in the
2005 Lease Contract. As the Court sees it, that is a fatal mistake.
For this reason, We grant the petition.
Present Dispute is Arbitrable Under
the Arbitration Clause of the 2005
Lease Agreement Contract
Going back to the records of this case, it is discernable that the dispute between
the petitioner and respondent emanates from the rental stipulations of the 2005
Lease Contract. The respondent insists upon the enforceability and validity of
such stipulations, whereas, petitioner, in substance, repudiates them. It is from
petitioner’s apparent breach of the 2005 Lease Contract that respondent filed the
instant unlawful detainer action.
One cannot escape the conclusion that, under the foregoing premises, the
dispute between the petitioner and respondent arose from the application or
execution of the 2005 Lease Contract. Undoubtedly, such kinds of dispute are
covered by the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract to wit:
19. Governing Law – The provisions of this [2005 Lease Contract] shall be
governed, interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this [2005
Lease Contract] shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted
in accordance with the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the
majority of the arbitrators shall be binding upon [FKI and respondent].69
(Emphasis supplied)

The arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract stipulates that “any
disagreement” as to the “interpretation, application or execution” of the 2005
Lease Contract ought to be submitted to arbitration.70 To the mind of this Court,
such stipulation is clear and is comprehensive enough so as to include virtually
any kind of conflict or dispute that may arise from the 2005 Lease Contract
including the one that presently besets petitioner and respondent.
The application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract in this case
carries with it certain legal effects. However, before discussing what these legal
effects are, We shall first deal with the challenges posed against the application
of such arbitration clause.
Challenges Against the Application
of the Arbitration Clause of the 2005
Lease Contract
Curiously, despite the lucidity of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract, the petitioner, as well as the MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals,
vouched for the non-application of the same in the instant case. A plethora of
arguments was hurled in favor of bypassing arbitration. We now address them.
At different points in the proceedings of this case, the following arguments were
offered against the application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract:
1. The disagreement between the petitioner and respondent is non-arbitrable
as it will inevitably touch upon the issue of the validity of the 2005 Lease
Contract.71 It was submitted that one of the reasons offered by the petitioner in
justifying its failure to pay under the 2005 Lease Contract was the nullity of such
contract for being contrary to law and public policy.72 The Supreme Court, in
Gonzales v. Climax Mining, Ltd.,73 held that “the validity of contract cannot be
subject of arbitration proceedings” as such questions are “legal in nature and
require the application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is
necessarily a judicial function.”74
2. The petitioner cannot validly invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract while, at the same time, impugn such contract’s validity.75
3. Even assuming that it can invoke the arbitration clause whilst denying the
validity of the 2005 Lease Contract, petitioner still did not file a formal application
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 60
before the MeTC so as to render such arbitration clause operational.76 Section
24 of Republic Act No. 9285 requires the party seeking arbitration to first file a
“request” or an application therefor with the court not later than the preliminary
conference.77
4. Petitioner and respondent already underwent Judicial Dispute Resolution
(JDR) proceedings before the RTC.78 Hence, a further referral of the dispute to
arbitration would only be circuitous.79 Moreover, an ejectment case, in view of
its summary nature, already fulfills the prime purpose of arbitration, i.e., to
provide parties in conflict with an expedient method for the resolution of their
dispute.80 Arbitration then would no longer be necessary in this case.81
None of the arguments have any merit.
First. As highlighted in the previous discussion, the disagreement between the
petitioner and respondent falls within the all-encompassing terms of the
arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. While it may be conceded that in
the arbitration of such disagreement, the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract, or
at least, of such contract’s rental stipulations would have to be determined, the
same would not render such disagreement non-arbitrable. The quotation from
Gonzales that was used to justify the contrary position was taken out of context.
A rereading of Gonzales would fix its relevance to this case.
In Gonzales, a complaint for arbitration was filed before the Panel of Arbitrators
of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (PA-MGB) seeking the nullification of a
Financial Technical Assistance Agreement and other mining related agreements
entered into by private parties.82 Grounds invoked for the nullification of such
agreements include fraud and unconstitutionality.83 The pivotal issue that
confronted the Court then was whether the PA-MGB has jurisdiction over that
particular arbitration complaint. Stated otherwise, the question was whether the
complaint for arbitration raises arbitrable issues that the PA-MGB can take
cognizance of.
Gonzales decided the issue in the negative. In holding that the PA-MGB was
devoid of any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for arbitration, this
Court pointed out to the provisions of R.A. No. 7942, or the Mining Act of 1995,
which granted the PA-MGB with exclusive original jurisdiction only over mining
disputes, i.e., disputes involving “rights to mining areas,” “mineral agreements or
permits,” and “surface owners, occupants, claimholders or concessionaires”
requiring the technical knowledge and experience of mining authorities in order
to be resolved.84 Accordingly, since the complaint for arbitration in Gonzales did

not raise mining disputes as contemplated under R.A. No. 7942 but only issues
relating to the validity of certain mining related agreements, this Court held that
such complaint could not be arbitrated before the PA-MGB.85 It is in this context
that we made the pronouncement now in discussion:
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a
disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the contract between
them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular
knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper
when one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or
agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of
the contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud
and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of
the ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the
application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a
judicial function.86 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court in Gonzales did not simply base its rejection of the complaint for
arbitration on the ground that the issue raised therein, i.e., the validity of
contracts, is per se non-arbitrable. The real consideration behind the ruling was
the limitation that was placed by R.A. No. 7942 upon the jurisdiction of the PA-
MGB as an arbitral body. Gonzales rejected the complaint for arbitration because
the issue raised therein is not a mining dispute per R.A. No. 7942 and it is for
this reason, and only for this reason, that such issue is rendered non-arbitrable
before the PA-MGB. As stated beforehand, R.A. No. 7942 clearly limited the
jurisdiction of the PA-MGB only to mining disputes.87
Much more instructive for our purposes, on the other hand, is the recent case of
Cargill Philippines, Inc. v. San Fernando Regal Trading, Inc.88 In Cargill, this
Court answered the question of whether issues involving the rescission of a
contract are arbitrable. The respondent in Cargill argued against arbitrability, also
citing therein Gonzales. After dissecting Gonzales, this Court ruled in favor of
arbitrability.89 Thus, We held:
Respondent contends that assuming that the existence of the contract and the
arbitration clause is conceded, the CA’s decision declining referral of the parties’
dispute to arbitration is still correct. It claims that its complaint in the RTC
presents the issue of whether under the facts alleged, it is entitled to rescind the
contract with damages; and that issue constitutes a judicial question or one that
requires the exercise of judicial function and cannot be the subject of an
arbitration proceeding. Respondent cites our ruling in Gonzales, wherein we held
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 61
that a panel of arbitrator is bereft of jurisdiction over the complaint for
declaration of nullity/or termination of the subject contracts on the grounds of
fraud and oppression attendant to the execution of the addendum contract and
the other contracts emanating from it, and that the complaint should have been
filed with the regular courts as it involved issues which are judicial in nature.
Such argument is misplaced and respondent cannot rely on the Gonzales case to
support its argument.90 (Emphasis ours)
Second. Petitioner may still invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract notwithstanding the fact that it assails the validity of such contract. This
is due to the doctrine of separability.91
Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as
independent of the main contract.92 Being a separate contract in itself, the
arbitration agreement may thus be invoked regardless of the possible nullity or
invalidity of the main contract.93
Once again instructive is Cargill, wherein this Court held that, as a further
consequence of the doctrine of separability, even the very party who repudiates
the main contract may invoke its arbitration clause.94
Third. The operation of the arbitration clause in this case is not at all defeated by
the failure of the petitioner to file a formal “request” or application therefor with
the MeTC. We find that the filing of a “request” pursuant to Section 24 of R.A.
No. 9285 is not the sole means by which an arbitration clause may be validly
invoked in a pending suit.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 9285 reads:
SEC. 24. Referral to Arbitration.—A court before which an action is brought in a
matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least
one party so requests not later that the pre-trial conference, or upon the request
of both parties thereafter, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed. [Emphasis ours; italics original]
The “request” referred to in the above provision is, in turn, implemented by
Rules 4.1 to 4.3 of A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC or the Special Rules of Court on
Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules):
RULE 4: REFERRAL TO ADR

Rule 4.1. Who makes the request.—A party to a pending action filed in
violation of the arbitration agreement, whether contained in an arbitration clause
or in a submission agreement, may request the court to refer the parties to
arbitration in accordance with such agreement.
Rule 4.2. When to make request.—(A) Where the arbitration agreement exists
before the action is filed.—The request for referral shall be made not later than
the pre-trial conference. After the pre-trial conference, the court will only act
upon the request for referral if it is made with the agreement of all parties to the
case.
(B) Submission agreement.—If there is no existing arbitration agreement at the
time the case is filed but the parties subsequently enter into an arbitration
agreement, they may request the court to refer their dispute to arbitration at any
time during the proceedings.
Rule 4.3. Contents of request.—The request for referral shall be in the form of
a motion, which shall state that the dispute is covered by an arbitration
agreement.
Apart from other submissions, the movant shall attach to his motion an authentic
copy of the arbitration agreement.
The request shall contain a notice of hearing addressed to all parties specifying
the date and time when it would be heard. The party making the request shall
serve it upon the respondent to give him the opportunity to file a comment or
opposition as provided in the immediately succeeding Rule before the hearing.
[Emphasis ours; italics original]
Attention must be paid, however, to the salient wordings of Rule 4.1. It reads:
“[a] party to a pending action filed in violation of the arbitration agreement x x x
may request the court to refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with such
agreement.”
In using the word “may” to qualify the act of filing a “request” under Section 24
of R.A. No. 9285, the Special ADR Rules clearly did not intend to limit the
invocation of an arbitration agreement in a pending suit solely via such “request.”
After all, non-compliance with an arbitration agreement is a valid defense to any
offending suit and, as such, may even be raised in an answer as provided in our
ordinary rules of procedure.95
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 62
In this case, it is conceded that petitioner was not able to file a separate
“request” of arbitration before the MeTC. However, it is equally conceded that
the petitioner, as early as in its Answer with Counterclaim, had already apprised
the MeTC of the existence of the arbitration clause in the 2005 Lease Contract96
and, more significantly, of its desire to have the same enforced in this case.97
This act of petitioner is enough valid invocation of his right to arbitrate.
Fourth. The fact that the petitioner and respondent already underwent through
JDR proceedings before the RTC, will not make the subsequent conduct of
arbitration between the parties unnecessary or circuitous. The JDR system is
substantially different from arbitration proceedings.
The JDR framework is based on the processes of mediation, conciliation or early
neutral evaluation which entails the submission of a dispute before a “JDR judge”
who shall merely “facilitate settlement” between the parties in conflict or make a
“non-binding evaluation or assessment of the chances of each party’s case.”98
Thus in JDR, the JDR judge lacks the authority to render a resolution of the
dispute that is binding upon the parties in conflict. In arbitration, on the other
hand, the dispute is submitted to an arbitrator/s — a neutral third person or a
group of thereof — who shall have the authority to render a resolution binding
upon the parties.99
Clearly, the mere submission of a dispute to JDR proceedings would not
necessarily render the subsequent conduct of arbitration a mere surplusage. The
failure of the parties in conflict to reach an amicable settlement before the JDR
may, in fact, be supplemented by their resort to arbitration where a binding
resolution to the dispute could finally be achieved. This situation precisely finds
application to the case at bench.
Neither would the summary nature of ejectment cases be a valid reason to
disregard the enforcement of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract.
Notwithstanding the summary nature of ejectment cases, arbitration still remains
relevant as it aims not only to afford the parties an expeditious method of
resolving theiz dispute.
A pivotal feature of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution is
that it is, first and foremost, a product of party autonomy or the freedom of the
parties to “make their own arrangements to resolve their own disputes.”100
Arbitration agreements manifest not only the desire of the parties in conflict for
an expeditious resolution of their dispute. They also represent, if not more so,
the parties’ mutual aspiration to achieve such resolution outside of judicial

auspices, in a more informal and less antagonistic environment under the terms
of their choosing. Needless to state, this critical feature can never be satisfied in
an ejectment case no matter how summary it may be.
Having hurdled all the challenges against the application of the arbitration clause
of the 2005 Lease Agreement in this case, We shall now proceed with the
discussion of its legal effects.
Legal Effect of the Application of the Arbitration Clause
Since there really are no legal impediments to the application of the arbitration
clause of the 2005 Contract of Lease in this case, We find that the instant
unlawful detainer action was instituted in violation of such clause. The Law,
therefore, should have governed the fate of the parties and this suit:
R.A. No. 876
Section 7. Stay of civil action.—If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an
issue arising out of an agreement providing for the arbitration thereof, the court
in which such suit or proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the action
or proceeding until an arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement: Provided, That the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration. [Emphasis supplied]
R.A. No. 9285
Section 24. Referral to Arbitration.—A court before which an action is brought
in a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at
least one party so requests not later that the pre-trial conference, or upon the
request of both parties thereafter, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds
that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed. [Emphasis supplied]
It is clear that under the law, the instant unlawful detainer action should have
been stayed;101 the petitioner and the respondent should have been referred to
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. The
MeTC, however, did not do so in violation of the law — which violation was, in
turn, affirmed by the RTC and Court of Appeals on appeal.
The violation by the MeTC of the clear directives under R.A. Nos. 876 and 9285
renders invalid all proceedings it undertook in the ejectment case after the filing
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 63
by petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim — the point when the petitioner
and the respondent should have been referred to arbi-tration. This case must,
therefore, be remanded to the MeTC and be suspended at said point. Inevitably,
the decisions of the MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals must all be vacated and
set aside.
The petitioner and the respondent must then be referred to arbitration pursuant
to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract.
This Court is not unaware of the apparent harshness of the Decision that it is
about to make. Nonetheless, this Court must make the same if only to stress the
point that, in our jurisdiction, bona fide arbitration agreements are recognized as
valid;102 and that laws,103 rules and regulations104 do exist protecting and
ensuring their enforcement as a matter of state policy. Gone should be the days
when courts treat otherwise valid arbitration agreements with disdain and
hostility, if not outright “jealousy,”105 and then get away with it. Courts should
instead learn to treat alternative means of dispute resolution as effective
partners in the administration of justice and, in the case of arbitration
agreements, to afford them judicial restraint.106 Today, this Court only performs
its part in upholding a once disregarded state policy.
Civil Case No. CV 09-0346
This Court notes that, on 30 September 2009, petitioner filed with the RTC of
Parañaque City, a complaint107 for the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of
Donation and Amended Deed of Donation against the respondent. The case is
currently pending before Branch 257 of the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CV
09-0346.
This Court recognizes the great possibility that issues raised in Civil Case No. CV
09-0346 may involve matters that are rightfully arbitrable per the arbitration
clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. However, since the records of Civil Case No.
CV 09-0346 are not before this Court, We can never know with true certainty
and only speculate.
In this light, let a copy of this Decision be also served to Branch 257 of the RTC
of Parañaque for its consideration and, possible, application to Civil Case No. CV
09-0346.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
We hereby render a Decision:
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 64

1. SETTING ASIDE all the proceedings undertaken by the Metropolitan Trial ——o0o—— 
Court, Branch 77, of Parañaque City in relation to Civil Case No. 2009-307 after
the filing by petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim; **  Per Raffle dated 10 October 2011. Koppel, Inc. vs. Makati Rotary Club
Foundation, Inc., 705 SCRA 142, G.R. No. 198075 September 4, 2013
2. REMANDING the instant case to the MeTC, SUSPENDED at the point after
the filing by petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim;

3. SETTING ASIDE the following:

a. Decision dated 19 August 2011 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No.

116865,

b. Decision dated 29 October 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274, of
Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 10-0255,

c. Decision dated 27 April 2010 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 77, of
Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 2009-307; and

4. REFERRING the petitioner and the respondent to arbitration pursuant to the

arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract, repeatedly included in the 2000
Lease Contract and in the 1976 Amended Deed of Donation.

Let a copy of this Decision be served to Branch 257 of the RTC of Parañaque for
its consideration and, possible, application to Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Abad**  and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

Notes.—No adverse claim, protest or opposition involving mining rights shall be

accepted for filing unless verified and accompanied by the prescribed docket fee
and proof of services to the respondent(s) either personally or by registered mail.
(Pyro Copper Mining Corporation vs. Mines Adjudication Board-Department of OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460
Environment and Natural Resources, 594 SCRA 195 [2009])
Petitioner,  
The panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the
following: a) disputes involving rights to mining areas; b) disputes involving - versus -  
mineral agreements or permits. (Ibid.)
   
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 65

JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.,   JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., CARPIO MORALES,

Respondent.   Respondent. CALLEJO,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x     AZCUNA,

Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF   TINGA,

JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
  CHICO-NAZARIO, and
x------------------------x
  GARCIA, JJ.
LUZ ARRIEGO,
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC Promulgated:
Petitioner,
   
 
  March 31, 2006
 
  x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 
 
  No. 99-812-RTJ)
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI
 
  DECISION
   
Present:
   
 
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
   
PUNO,
   
QUISUMBING,
  Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led
YNARES-SANTIAGO, blameless lives.
 
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, 
 
CARPIO, Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran[1]
 
MARTINEZ,  
 
CORONA, THE CASES
 
 

The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 ( Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge  Florentino  V.  Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-
requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic
Services (SC Clinic) revealed (e)vidence of ego disintegration and developing
psychotic process. Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June
1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed
problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits,
paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and
1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private
practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to
Atty. Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch
73, MalabonCity, on 4 November 1998.
Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted
by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999. [2]
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane
Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator,
Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum [3] to then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other
things, that his report be considered as an administrative complaint against
Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate psychological or
mental examination.Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 66
Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the
investigation against him.
In a Resolution[4] dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc  adopted the
recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460,
in view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as reported by the
audit team:
(a)                The act of circulating calling cards containing
self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications and
for announcing in open court during court session his
qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02,
Canons of Judicial Conduct;
 
(b)               For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping
quarters;
(c)                For rendering resolutions without written orders
in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Procedures;
 
(d)               For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where
he declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary
to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e)                For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case
No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court,
Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5,

Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits
a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;
(f)                 For appearing in personal cases without prior
authority from the Supreme Court and without filing
the corresponding applications for leaves of absence
on the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g)                For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion
for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused
without the presence of the trial prosecutor and
propounding questions in the form of examination of
the custodian of the accused;
 
(h)                For using/taking advantage of his moral
ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the
guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by
persuading the private complainant and the accused
to sign the settlement even without the presence of
the trial prosecutor;
(i)                  For motu proprio  and over the strong objection
of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and
physical examination of the accused based on the
ground that the accused is mahina ang pick-up;
 
(j)                 For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which
varies from that which he issued in open court in
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
 
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 67
(k)               For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of
Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules
of Court and the Philippine justice system;
(l)                  For the use of highly improper and intemperate
language during court proceedings;
(m)              For violation of Circular No. 13 [5] dated 1 July
1987.
 
Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired
Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation,
report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was
directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject
himself to an appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted
by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or
mental institution.In the same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro
under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation of the
administrative charges against him.He was barely eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where
he set forth both affirmative and negative defenses [6] while he filed his
Answer/Compliance on 26 August 1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal
of his case for failure to prosecute. [7] However, on 21 March 2000, he presented

himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez.
[8]
 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a Petition
Inhibition/Disqualification against Justice Ramirez as investigator [9] which was
denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000.[10] Judge Floros
motion for reconsideration [11]suffered the same fate.[12] On 27 July 2000, Judge
Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirezs inhibition/disqualification to this
Court.[13] On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice
Ramirez.[14]
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the
Court to comment on Judge Floros motion to dismiss, [15] recommended that the
same should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001.[16] The day after, Justice
Ramirez came out with a Partial Report recommending the dismissal of Judge
Floro from office by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to
perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73. [17]
  In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against
him and even after Justice Ramirez came out with his report and
recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing
cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 68
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July
for 1999 preventive suspension follows:
1.                  OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary
Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial
Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator[18]
2.                  OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin
Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch
72, Malabon City[19]
3.                  AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo
L. Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.[20]
4.                  AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia,
Court Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-
Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office,
both of the Office of the Court Administrator and Atty.
Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch
73, Malabon[21]
 
5.                  AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against
former Court Administrator Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez,
Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator[22]
6.                  A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro
A. Ramirez[23]
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 69

7.                  A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated  11 May 1999  of
Ramirez[24] Judge  Florentino  V.  Floro, Jr.)

 
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued

On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN In Re:

totaling seven, be dismissed.[25] On 14 February 2006, the Court granted the Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner. The

motion to dismiss.[26] resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the

The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988( Luz  Arriego  v. reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by
Judge  Florentino  V.  Floro, Jr.)
petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.

This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge h in A.M. No. RTJ-
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by
99-1460: (f)or using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
Atty. David S. Narvasa, the petitioners counsel.[28] The OCA, through Court
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the
Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence for inhibition and declared it as null and void. However, he
ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to
of the trial prosecutor. The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the private inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a
chance to have the case be assigned to other judges through
complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
an impartial raffle.

  When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he

should have continued hearing and taking cognizance of the
case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case anew
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer
as this violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation
Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated January
28, 1988 which provides to wit:
Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August
 
2001. On 5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty.
8. Raffle of Cases:
Galang testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge
 
Floro filed a Memorandum in this case.[27]
x x x x

 
8.3 Special raffles should not be
permitted except on verified application
of the interested party who seeks
issuance of a provisional remedy and
only upon a finding by the Executive
Judge that unless the special raffle is
conducted, irreparable damage shall be
suffered by the applicant. The special
raffle shall be conducted by at least two
judges in a multiple-sala station.
xxxx
 
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu
proprio order the special raffle of a case since such is only
allowed upon a verified application of the interested party
seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the Executive
Judges finding that if a special raffle is not conducted, the
applicant will suffer irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge
Floro, Jr.s order is contrary to the above-mentioned
Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even
mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima,
Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship.It is not
unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly of a padrino (who
helped him get his position). Such remark even if made as an
expression of deep gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating
a dubious impression about his integrity and
independence. Such flaunting and expression of feelings must
be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge shall not
allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial
Conduct).
 
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 70
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the
ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial matters
which this Office has no authority to review. The remedy is
judicial, not administrative.[29]
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering
the raffle of the case in violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his
remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x
helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x.
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc  adopted the
recommendations of the OCA.[30] Judge Floro, through his counsel, filed his
Comment on 22 October 1999[31] which was noted by this Court on 7 December
1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which
this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for
inclusion in his report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in
this case as well as in the second case ( i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a
resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as the
other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are
willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on
the basis of the pleadings filed and the evidence so far submitted by them or to
have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two. On 20
February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,
manifested its willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based
on the pleadings and the evidence submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 71

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges (c and g, h

2006, her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the pleadings and j, e and f) will be jointly discussed as they had likewise been jointly

already submitted and on the evidence previously offered and marked. On the discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts and to treat them

other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his preference to have separately will be superfluous.

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-
 
273-RTC.
DISCUSSION 
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme
consolidated cases, we resolve to render as well a consolidated decision. penalty of dismissal against Judge Floro

(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling

But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts cards containing self-
regarding Judge Floros alleged mental illness and its effects on his duties as laudatory statements
regarding qualifications
Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is AND for announcing in
open court during court
indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator session his qualifications in
appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving as violation of Canon 2, Rule
2.02, Canons of Judicial
it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to depend on the findings of Conduct

the mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is

As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing
simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent
his name as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating
in order to determine once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the
therein that he is a bar exams topnotcher (87.55%) and with full second
charges against him. If the evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the
honors from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B. [32] The audit team
next issue is to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
likewise reported that: (b)efore the start of court session, Judge Floro is

Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an introduced as a private law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila

evil mind or because of a psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar

of this question hinges the applicability of equity. Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 72

Holy Bible, particularly the Book of Revelationaccording to Saint John, was proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of

made. The people in the courtroom were given the opportunity to ask Professional Responsibility: a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,

Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were asked; hence the fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement

session commenced.[33] or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. This means that lawyers

and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession,
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, [34] the use
cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their
of professional cards containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and
wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, (i)f
residence is not improper and that the word title should be broad enough to
lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified
include a Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even
or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule
his Law School.Moreover, other lawyers do include in their calling cards their
3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be
former/present titles/positions like President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so
prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not
where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro argues that his cards
actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity.[35]
were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends or by

reciprocity to other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not  

allowed by law to seek other professional employment.

The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional

As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, card, did Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?

Judge Floro counters that it was his branch clerk of court, Atty.
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.,[36] we explained that the use of an ordinary
Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court session, she
and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card may
would briefly announce his appointment with an introduction of his school,
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
honors, bar rating and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into office.
practiced. In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards cannot be considered as

Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his law

terms that a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory. A parallel
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 73

school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in

simplicity and modesty required of judges. circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of

simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial

Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these
Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive
were just given by him as tokens and/or only to a few who requested the same.
[37]
but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable
 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise. An
thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human
eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these
flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial
cards.[38]Worse, Judge Floros very own witness, a researcher from an adjoining
robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for
branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one of these cards. [39]
personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it the confines of the code they swore to observe.
should be measured against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court,
No. 01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140,
had been announcing in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise
before its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial
violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of
Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of Judicial
unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for
Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it may
announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants
amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may simply be
who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the
a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.
public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice confident, competent and
  true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his

capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers approval, definitely
Misconduct is defined as wrong or improper conduct while gross
erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
connotes something out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused;

flagrant; shameful.[40] For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained  

of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent

disregard of well-known legal rules.[41]

 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 74

As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for and his family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial

only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct only. government paying for the electrical bills.

(b) Re: Charge of allowing the use

of his chambers as Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such
sleeping quarters
familiarity from his aide as this becomes fodder for gossip as what had

The audit team observed that inside Judge Floros chamber[s], there is a apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and

folding bed with cushion located at the right corner of the room. A man, who attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were understandably uncomfortable

was later identified as Judge Floros driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing with the uncommon arrangement of a judge allowing his aide easy access to his

the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the room.[42] folding bed.

(c) Re: Charge of rendering

Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual resolutions without written
orders in violation of Rule
basis. The man the audit team saw sleeping on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules
of Procedure
Judge Floros aide or alalay whom he allows to rest from time to time (in between
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with
periods and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J.
the hearing on the Motion
Torralba was not sleeping during that time that the audit team was in Branch 73 for Release on
Recognizance filed by the
as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof. accused without the
presence of the trial
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or prosecutor and
propounding questions in
deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed another person to use his folding bed the form of examination of
the custodian of the
for short periods of time during office hours and while there is no one else in the
accused
room. The situation would have been different if there had been any allegation of
The memorandum report reads:
misuse or abuse of government funds and/or facilities such as in the case
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of
of Presado v. Genova [43]
 wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious the absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still
proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he
 

(c-1) Motion for Release on Recognizance  filed by the
accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and
20442 entitled People vs. Luisito Beltran, People vs. Emma
Alvarez, et al., People vs. Rowena Camino, and People vs.
John Richie Villaluz, respectively. In the hearing of these
motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a form of
direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without
the accused being sworn by the administering officer. (Note:
initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court
Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the start of his
questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the
aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein
the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. After the
reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically
inform the accused that they are qualified to apply for
probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff
to draft the application in behalf of the accused so that a
motion for release on recognizance will immediately be heard
and be consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of
the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes 3 to 6), the
custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad,
barangay tanod or a member of the lupong
tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order granting the motion
for release on recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr.
since according to him neither rules nor circular mandates the
issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting the motion,
Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of
the session. Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4,
1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and
20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes 3 to 5.
 
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN
and 20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion
without issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are
hereto attached as annexes 6 to 7.[44]
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 75
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any
rule of procedure with respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team,
asserting that
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of
Court refers only to final and not interlocutory orders. Only
final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and
entered.
x x x x
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case
at bar, herein respondent faithfully complied with the
requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the
applications for release on recognizance, thus:
a.                   The application for release on recognizance,
although captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE ON
RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of
P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due
course/taken cognizance of by respondent, if on its
face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt
by the Office of the City/Public Prosecutor.
 
c.                   The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO
MANILA (all courts), especially in RTC, MALABON, and
in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from
1985-1998 almost 14 years), [and especially the
practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC,
Malabon, Metro Manila], is to interview the custodian,
in the chambers, regarding his being a responsible
member of the community where the accused
reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the
form of direct and even cross examination questions.

d.                  The accused is not required to be placed on the
witness stand, since there is no such requirement. All
that is required, is to inform the accused regarding
some matters of probation (optional) such as whether
he was sentenced previously by a Court, whether or
not he has had previous cases, etc.
e.                   Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct
Court hearings on application for release on
recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of the
applications, included the interview/hearing on the
applications for release on recognizance, during
criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial prosecutor is
available; at other times, the hearing is held in the
chambers.[45]
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance
of the rules on probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as
amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an accused on
recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the
applicant. Under the Probation Law,[46] and as we explained in Poso v.
Judge Mijares,[47] it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to
ascertain first that the applicant is not a disqualified offender as (p)utting the
discharge of the accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to
pass upon the request for provisional liberty.
Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he
completely did away with the requirement for an investigation report by the
probation officer.Under the Probation Law, the accuseds temporary liberty is
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 76
warranted only during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation
report on the application for probation and the resolution thereon. [48] As we
explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares[49]:
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of
actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on
application for release on recognizance, was prescribed
precisely to underscore the interim character of the provisional
liberty envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated differently,
the temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective
no longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the
investigation report and the resolution of the petition,  which
the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish the
case study and report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve the
application for probation. By allowing the temporary
liberty of the accused even before the order to submit
the case study and report, respondent Judge
unceremoniously extended the pro tem  discharge of
the accused to the detriment of the prosecution and
the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an
accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the
transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of
Appeals[50] wherein we held that no judgment, or order whether final or
interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing,
signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for
filing, release to the parties and implementation. Obviously, then, Judge Floro
was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders
for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384,
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 77

20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, People v. Luisito Beltran, People v. Emma deprived the prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due

Alvarez, et al., People v. Rowena Camino, and People v. John Richie Villaluz. process.[52]

[51]
 From his explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can
 
surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on

his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule. Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be

reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to

In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling
follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [53]
of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the accused

without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand

opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release the law fully and uphold it conscientiously. [54] When the law is sufficiently basic, a

without first requiring the probation officer to render a case study and judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is

investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. [55] True, not every judicial error

accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing. bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not

warrant administrative sanctions.[56] To hold otherwise would be nothing short of

It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on
harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible
recognizance, as well as his eventual probation, was already a done deal even
judgments.[57] This rule, however, admits of an exception as good faith in
before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the
situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable
accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for probation. This,
judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable
Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit team
legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error. [58] Thus,
that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been approving applications for
even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be
release on recognizance hastily and without observing the requirements of the
held administratively liable.[59]
law for said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward

in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a salutary endeavor, but only when the  

situation so warrants . In herein case, however, we cannot countenance what (d) RE: Charge of partiality in
criminal cases where he
Judge Floro did as the unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly declared that he is pro-

accused which is contrary
to Canon 2, Rule 2.01,
Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in
criminal cases, he is always pro-accused particularly concerning detention
prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on
their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
 
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did
impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his
predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose
cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to
his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of detention
prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had not been tried
during the vacancy of his sala from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any
rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by
any litigant or private complainant that he sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand,
categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting,
admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public
Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he
commiserated with them especially those under detention as he, himself, had
been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 78
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible
especially since it is corroborated by independent evidence, [61] e.g.,
Judge Florosunwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on
recognizance as previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: A judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the
law and dispense justice should not only be impartial, independent and honest
but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest as
well.[62] Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion.
[63]
 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-
accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and
judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and
predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and
unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public
confidence in the judiciary. [64] His language, both written and spoken, must be
guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. [65]
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if
an independent judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the
accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for
objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the publics trust in his
ability to render justice.As we held in Castillo v. Juan[66]:
[60]
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 79

In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a
trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended
party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or
even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human
failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from
reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be
deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting
to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net
of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to
the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional
mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with
patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an
unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he
should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential
that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is
that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his
impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of
judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
varies from that which he
issued in open court in
Criminal Case No. 20385-
MN, for frustrated
homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN entitled: People vs. Nenita Salvador, Judge
Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and
considering that the private complainant was not being
represented by a private prosecutor, used his moral
ascendancy and influence to convince the private complainant
to settle and eventually cause the dismissal of the case in the
guise of settling its civil aspect by making the private
complainants and the accused sign the settlement. ( Copy of
the signed stenographic notes is hereto attached as Annex 8).

x x x x
 
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No.
  20385-MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on
record the manifestations of the private complainant and the
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking accused relative to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of
advantage of his moral the case. In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his
ascendancy to settle and ruling on the said settlement until after the public prosecutor
eventually dismiss Criminal has given his comment. However, per report of the court
Case No. 20385-MN (for employees in Branch 73, the aforesaid order was actually a
frustrated homicide) in the revised one or a deviation from the original order given in open
guise of settling the civil court. Actually, the said criminal case was already settled even
aspect of the case, by without the presence of the public prosecutor. The settlement
persuading the private was in the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the
complainant and the accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further
accused to sign the reported that the private complainants signed the compromise
settlement even without agreement due to the insistence or persuasion of Judge Floro,
the presence of the trial Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic
prosecutor. notes (unsigned draft order) and the revised order
(signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order order are hereto attached as Annexes 8, 13, and 14 . (Note:
on 8 March 1999 which

the stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the
case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro
docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit
Complaint[67] dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge
Floro forced them to settle her daughters case against the accused therein
despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on
the amount to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred by
complaining witness, they requested respondent that they be given time to study
the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that the case be
settled immediately, uttering, ngayon na! ngayon na! Moreover, Judge Floro
allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the accused
against the complaining witness would likewise be dismissed, so they agreed to
settle the case. However, the written Order issued by respondent Judge did not
reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the
complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that the hearing on said case was
not only in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the
litigants concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their
differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties
suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge
Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be reduced
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 80
to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and
Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter opined that under Section 27 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in criminal cases is tantamount
to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March
1999 Order of the hearing on even date was superseded by the revised written
Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras stance that he
has no power to revise an Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend
or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of
Appeals[68]  wherein we declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory,
has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing,
signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the
Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and
implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it
does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly
served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is
so even if the order or judgment has in fact been orally
pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof
drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or
acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation (i.e.,
filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the
parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court
rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall
and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion
of any party or even motu proprio,  provided that in the
case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained
finality.  (Emphasis supplied)

In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in
open court ostensibly a judicial approval of a compromise agreement which was
amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the written order
merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the
manifestations of the parties to enter into a compromise agreement after the
public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments thereto. [69]
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to
revise his oral order per the Echaus  ruling and factoring in his explanation for
resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty
(under paragraph j of the complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle
and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in
the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence
of the trial prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The
controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially approved as
reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no
cause for complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order
did not reflect the agreement reached during the hearing and, on the other
hand, claim that this agreement was reached under duress at the instance of
Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio  and over the
strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, ordering the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 81
mental and physical
examination of the
accused based on the
ground that the accused
is mahina ang pick-up
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in
Criminal Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro motu proprio  ordered the physical and
mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong objection of
the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is mahina ang pick-up.[70]
In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the
demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the
manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO
lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor,
Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a.                   Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the
accused opted to enter a plea of not guilty;
 
b.                  But upon query of the Court, the accused
approached the bench and he appeared trembling
and stammering;
 
c.                   Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent,
readily admitted that accused is nauutal, has difficulty
of reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 82

d.                  Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused

often changed his mind regarding the plea, from not
guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;
e.                   Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo,
upon citation by the Court/respondent of the
pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28
(Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116,
and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary
powers to issue orders to conform to justice),
manifested orally that the accused is mahina ang
pick-up;
 
f.                    Hence, respondent exercised his sound
discretion in issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL
EXAMINATION.
 
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support,
since it is well-settled that the court may order a physical or
MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental
condition is material to the issues involved. (27 C.J.S. p. 119,
cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.).[71]
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the
arraignment motu proprio  and over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor. It must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in
February 1999 when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment.  The arraignment shall be
suspended, if at the time thereof:
 
(a)                The accused appears to be
suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders
him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case,
the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
 

PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge
Floro. He testified that he moved for the suspension of the arraignment of the
accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for trial.
[72]
 As reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge
Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused
is mahina ang pick-up.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made
pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the
present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the suspension be
made upon motion by the proper party. [73] Thus, it was well within the discretion
of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio  based
on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the

Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 83

Bulacan in violation of
with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense. [74] As we underscored Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code
of Judicial Conduct which
in People v. Alcalde[75]:
prohibits a judge from
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers engaging in the private
that an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity practice of law
or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the
matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the (f)               Re: Charge of
accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper appearing in personal
defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings cases without prior
and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his authority from the
faculties are recovered. x x x. Supreme Court and
without filing the
x x x x corresponding applications
for leaves of absence on
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause the scheduled dates of
of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries hearing
with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the
accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare
for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While  
not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental
deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully
satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the
 
assistance the law secures or gives. x x x.
i. Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal
cases pending before the lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the
that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these
accuseds mental fitness for trial is already beside the point. If ever he erred, he cases, is just signing the pleadings for him while he (Judge
Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel. When attending the
erred in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the case, is not an hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does
not file an application for leave of absence.
actionable wrong.
 
 
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro,
(e) Re: Charge of appearing and Jr. has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial Court of
signing pleadings in Civil Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court,
Case No. 46-M-98 pending Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is
before Regional Trial appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as party and
Court, Branch 83, Malolos,

counsel for himself and even indicating in the pleadings that he
is the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
 
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that
Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case
No. 46-M-98, entitled: In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr.,
Petitioner - versus Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro. In this
case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission
wherein he signed as the petitioner and at the same time
indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73,
Malabon, Metro Manila. Court stenographer Marissa Garcia,
RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this information.
Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking and
his picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the
aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto
attached as Annex 9.
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court
Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to
appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases
(except the above-mentioned case) pending before lower
courts.[76]
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in
the private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
unequivocally states that: No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as
member of the bar or give professional advice to client. Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: A judge shall not
engage in the private practice of law.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 84
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he
hired lawyers to attend to his personal cases.[77]
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any
concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared as counsel in his personal cases
after he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared a pleading
(Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or
Judicial Admission) jointly with his counsel of record in connection with a habeas
corpus case he filed against his brothers for the custody of their mild, mentally-
retarded brother. He explained, however, that he prepared the said pleading in
the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case.
[78]
 He likewise explained that the pleading was signed by him alone due to
inadvertence and that he had rectified the same by filing an Amended
Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. [79] Finally, during the hearing of this case,
Judge Floro argued that he filed the subject pleading as petitioner and not as
counsel.[80]
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based
on sound public policy, thus:
 
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high
official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a
judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time
and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from
extending special favors to their own private interests and
assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of

their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of
moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. [81]
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is
envisioned by private practice is more than an isolated court appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. [82] In herein
case, save for the Motion for Entry of Judgment, it does not appear from the
records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court
proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude,
therefore, that Judge Floros act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but
an isolated case and does not in any wise constitute private practice of
law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is obviously not
lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of
unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for
signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC,
Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath
with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for
such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on
a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right.
[83]
 Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a
judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 85
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency. By doing what he
did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge
Floro has been attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing for leave
of absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was
incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that
although administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on
evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to
limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process. [84]
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing
the Rules of Court and the
Philippine justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly
improper and intemperate
language during court
proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to
observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court
proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team
was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by
Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of the proceedings
(Annex 15). The tape record of the court proceedings is also
submitted along with this report as Exhibit A.
x x x x

The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A
certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the plaintiff while
Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant.During
the hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were
guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the
Rules of Court, to wit:
 
Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito
ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila
maayos ang Rules of Court natin, hindi
realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on
Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh dahil sa
kanila maraming nagkakaproblema,
masyadong maraming eh ako wala
akong pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa ko
lang yon Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain
kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi
alam yan talo na sa akin except na hindi
papayag kasi marami diyang
In another proceeding conducted on a different day,
Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in open
court, the case involving his brother. He even condemned the
Philippine justice system and manifested his disgust on the
unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:
Sabi ko paano
ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa
korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid
ko napakayaman, ako walang pera.
He continued:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 86
 
Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha
kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung
kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In memory of
my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-
file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa
ako, ganun ganun Sabi ko
paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos
ngayon ang nangyari di
Judge na ako, hindiko pa nakita ang kapatid
ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na
yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong
nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko
ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung
ang isang court eh parehas o may kiling
eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas
doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto
(laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito.[85]
 
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these
are all hearsay fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by
disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives ( i.e., to allegedly cover-
up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties
which were all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the
Philippine judicial system, Judge Floro contends that this recording was done
clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic Act
No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions

thereof.They also made it appear that the conversation took place in a court
proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in
question were submitted to the OCA sans the yellow notes and the official
transcribed copy thereof. [86]
 This means that the transcribed copy that was
submitted by the audit team as Annex 15 is but an unofficial copy and does not,
by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a court proceeding. This being
the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they were taken officially
during a court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the
unauthorized recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act
No. 4200.[87]
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are
thus left with only Judge Floros word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of
Court who testified under oath as to Judge Floros alleged propensity to criticize
the judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving these particular
charges would therefore depend upon which party is more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code
of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the
Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us
in branch 73 the alleged kabulukan ng hustisya. Time
and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He
said that since theory and the practice of law are very
different, the Rules of Court does not always apply to
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 87
different cases. Not only the justice system did he
criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told
us . . . and I quote Dyan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang
corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of
Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan
diyan.
 
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very
institution he is now serving? Where is his respect to
the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he
uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself did
not believe in the justice system?
x x x x
Q What can you say about charge letter L which reads for the
use of highly improper and intemperate language
during court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the
presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal
Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters
regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time
one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, Luka-luka,
talaga yang babaing yan and then he would call even
not during court session, but during office hours our
Court Interpreter malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the
sun. So, it did not surprise us one time when during a
pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No.
25-86-MN Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado, he uttered
offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the
transcription of this court proceeding is already
adapted by the Court Administrator. It was the
content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator.
Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing
what Judge Floro discussed in open Court, before all
of us, the court staff present in the hearing and
before the lawyer and the defendants in the case, we
were in quandary whether or not to attach in the
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 88

record the stenographic notes or even the actual

transcription of the proceedings because it contained intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things
offensive languages against the justice system,
do not go his way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules
against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of
Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct. Verily,
disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit
of the case or the possibility of the amicable in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
settlement between the parties, he integrated this
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept
kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may not
use my discretion whether or not to advise the as adequate to support a conclusion.[89] In this case, there is ample and
stenographer to indeed present the same or attach
the same in the record because it contained offensive competent proof of violation on Judge Floros part.
languages highly improper and intemperate (m) Re: Charge of violating Circular
languages like for example, putang ina, words No. 13-87 dated 1 July
like ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera . 1987
[88]

The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro

The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses
straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of matters involving his personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule
confirming proofs from Judge Floro himself. 3.03 provides that [a] judge shall maintain order and proper
decorum in the court. A disorderly judge generates disorderly
work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence,
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject the need to maintain order and proper decorum in court. When
the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When
utterances are consistent with Judge Floros claims of intellectual superiority for
he is orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must
having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having be conducted formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be
characterized with honor and dignity befitting the seriousness
placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial and importance of a judicial trial called to ascertain the
truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere
system on account of his perception of injustice in the disposition of his brothers
must be avoided. And the judge is supposed to be in control
case are not far removed from his reactions to what he perceived were injustices and is therefore responsible for any detraction therefrom.

committed against him by the OCA and by the persons who were either in Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice)
dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be
charge of the cases against him or had some sort of participation conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the
therein. Consequently, although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said course and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.

what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior,
appearance and movements. He must always keep in mind

that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro,
Jr.s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he
can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of
death and that he has unseen little friends are manifestations
of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his
capacity to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a
judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again
to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to
remain in the judiciary.[90]
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but,
as its title would suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of
justice following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact
that the 13 charges are inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological
illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the
functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that
Judge Floro proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that he can
inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has
unseen little friends in determining the transcendental issue of
mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate
penalty to be imposed for the seven of the 13 charges discussed above. To
recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven
of the 13 charges against him. Thus:
1)                 Charge a - simple misconduct
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 89
2)                 Charges c and g gross ignorance of the law
3)                 Charge d unbecoming conduct
4)                 Charge e unbecoming conduct
5)                 Charges k and l unbecoming conduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule
140 as amended, a judge guilty of a serious charge may be dismissed from the
service, suspended from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but
not exceeding P40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In herein
case, considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was
slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor.
And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad
faith or with corrupt motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty.  The
fine is to be imposed in the maximum, i.e.  P 40,000.00, as we will treat the
his
findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct as aggravating
circumstances.[91]
Judge  Floro  must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch
due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to
discharge the functions of his office
 
As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13
seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental

illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an
appropriate mental or psychological examination and which necessitated his
suspension pending investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true, renders
him unfit to perform the functions of his office notwithstanding the fact that, in
disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of dismissal from the
service against Judge Floro.
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro
when the latter applied for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily
withdrew) way back in September 1995. The psychological report, as prepared
by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C.
Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at
present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious
during the interview. He was argumentative and over solicitous
of questions asked, giving the impressions of marked
suspiciousness. He centered on his academic excellence, an
Ateneo de Manila graduate of the College of Law, rated top
13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his obsessive
and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day
regardless of whether it was school days or vacation
time. Vying for honors all the time and graduated Law as
second honor, he calls this self-discipline and self-
organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements,
tend to be a perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To
emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he
related that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 90
experiencing Psychic vision every morning and that the biggest
secret of the universe are the unseen things. He can predict
future events because of power in psychic phenomenon as
when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in the
sky no. 13-1, and he got the 13 th place. He has been practicing
parapsychology seeing plenty of dwendes around him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be
irrelevant.
 
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego
disintegration are prominent findings, both in the interview
(conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious level).
[92]
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented
himself to the Supreme Court Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship, this
time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D.
(Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista
observed:
 
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and
he takes pride in this. During the interview, he was quite
reluctant to reveal information about his family background
and would rather talk about his work and academic
achievements. However, he failed to integrate his knowledge
into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with the
various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused
and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate with decision-
making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood
swings with the slightest provocation.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 91

From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic

change in his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in for psychological or mental examination, within ten (10) days from notice.
private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of [95]
 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied by the Court on 22
social and interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and
showed discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid February 2000.[96]
ideations, suspiciousness of others motives as well as
perceptual distortions were evident during the interview.
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild
SC Clinic was reiterated by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition
mental retardation (68) which is below the expected cognitive
efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic that Judge Floros failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary
background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and
may have problems with decision-making. His character traits sanctions.[97]
such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation
with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17
detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment,
and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing October 2000 Resolution with a conjunctive special motion for him to undergo
justice. Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and
psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.
emotionally equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a judge
and he may decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking [98]
 This was denied by the Court on 14 November 2000.[99]
and stress-laden situation.[93]
 
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed

Judge Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99- On 10 November 2000,  Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the

1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological capacity to inhibition or disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic

preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July doctors[100] andpsychologist[101] with a manifestation that he filed cases against

1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro to submit to appropriate psychological or them for revocation of licenses before the Professional Regulatory Commission

mental examination. (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP [102] for alleged gross

incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No.

On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, [94] the
2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics.[103]
Court clarified that the appropriate psychological or mental examination being

adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator

Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to submit himself to the SC Clinic Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 92

which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to

refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October make an objective assessment and judgment of his
milieu. Hence, he is apt to misconstrue signals from his
2000 resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of
environment resulting to perceptual distortions, disturbed
administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et al., is an indication of associations, and lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs
in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts
the latters intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the Court. of healing have become incorporated in a delusional (false and
unshakable beliefs) system, that it has interfered and tainted
[104]
 The Court en banc  agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro
his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to
was ordered to submit to psychological and mental examination within 10 days be unfit in performing his court duties as a judge.[108]

from receipt, otherwise, he shall be ordered arrested and detained at the jail of
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x.[105]
Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to

Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000.
[106]
 He likewise sought the services of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T.
Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January 2001.
[107]
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity
is thus substantially supported by evidence. Based on the
three [3] psychological tests and evaluation of the two [2]
psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but to
recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to
discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.

in December 2000, this time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99- Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted

1460. FrancianinaG. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer earlier psychological evaluations conducted by several mental health

reported that (o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with professionals which were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations were in

movement in the paranoid direction. Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that: connection with his application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought

Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro about by him having failed the examination given by the Supreme Court
is basically a cautious, and suspicious individual with a
compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff psychologist, Rowena A.
Despite his status, cognitive assets and impressive educational
Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the
background, his current functioning is gauged along the LOW
AVERAGE intelligence. Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:

He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine

situations. However, his test protocol is characterized by  
disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 93

I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his
testimony here and on every available records of the
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in
cope with everyday demands. He is able to handle both the interview. Would you consider his failure to tell
concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details, you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
he has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship  
between things and ideas.
x x x x
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he
can consider solid facts to arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible  
outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize procedures and
details so as to get things done correctly and on schedule. He A: Yes, Sir.
uses conventional standards to determine personal progress.  
Set in his views, he may not readily accept others ideas and
contributions especially if these oppose his own. Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological
outlook of the patient?
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is
expected of FFJ. Generally, he prefers to control his emotions  
and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and
decisions. A: Yes, Sir.

II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS  

FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected x x x x

for his undertakings. Achievement-oriented, he sets high
 
personal standards and tends to judge himself and others
according to these standards. When things do not develop Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these]
along desired lines, he may become restless and impatient. proceedings and you were here when we were cross-
Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can be examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we
expected to comply with conventional social demands.[109]  mentioned in the course of our cross-examination.
Would you consider his failure to tell you about his
Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross- power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your
assessment of his psychological outlook?
examination that psychologically speaking, Judge Floro was not fit to be a
 
judge.Thus:
x x x x
JUDGE AQUINO:
 
 
A: Yes, Sir.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 94

  Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that
he is capable of having trances in the course of his
Q: Fatal [flaw]? private activities and even in the course of the
  performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you
not agree with that?
A: Yes, Sir.
 
 
A: I agree with you, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview
that he is capable of being in a trance?  

  Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented

person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha
A: He did not. naman na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower
ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa
  ng ibat iba pang bagay at the same time. Yan ay hindi
compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type
letters?  
  A: Yes, Sir.
A: He did not.  
  Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a
Judge.
x x x x
 
 
x x x x
Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one
who will not be pronouncing or making  
pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this
not correct? Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.

   

x x x x x x x x

   

A: Yes sir. A: Yes, Sir.[110]

 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 95

Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floros witness,

Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3 September Dr. Jurilla clarified that the interview had its limitations [113] and he might have

1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro missed out certain information left out by his patient. [114] The following exchange

  is thus instructive:

[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about

current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of topics  
intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview
logical and reality based. He is well oriented, intelligent, that he has little unseen, unheard friends known
emotionally stable, with very good judgment. There is no as duwendes?
previous history of any psychological disturbances. [111]
 
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated DR. JURILLA: He did not.
September 1998, who stated in his report that  

  x x x x

Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-  

spectacled person with graying hair. When interviewed he was Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you
somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his information about his claim to be the number five
answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and psychic in the country?
articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual
disturbances. Stream of thought was logical and goal-  
directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to be
argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, x x x x
thought blocking, looseness of associations or
 
neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and
appropriate but mood was anxious. There were no abnormal A: No, Your Honor.
involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is
good. Cognition is intact. Judgment, insight, and other test for  
higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results.
Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of called, psychic phenomena?
Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his nomination
 
and appointment to the post he is seeking.[112]
A: He did not.

 
x x x x
Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to
another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he used to
ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?
 
A: Not during our interview.
 
x x x x
 
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health
doctor you might have missed some information or it
is possible that our clients or patients might not
[have] told us everything.
 
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as
those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you in
the course of the interview, your opinion of the
patient would be altered a little?
x x x x
A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation
may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of
any corroborative contradiction.
 
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 96
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that
transpired after the interview, would that be correct?
A: The interview has its limitations.
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the
interview are confirmed by events that transpired
after the interview, would you not say you have more
reason to have your evaluation altered?
 
A: Yes.
 
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview
Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as the
number five psychic in the country [where] no one
has called him as a psychic at all?
 
x x x x
 
Q: Would it be really more altered?
A: I would say so.
x x x x
 
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the
interview, which are confirmations of what Judge

Floro did not tell you during the interview, would your
finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will
tell you that he is capable or possessed of the power
of bilocation?
x x x x
Maaba, M.D.,[116] dated 3 January 2001, the relevant portions of which state:
A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of
Judge Floros mental and psychological x x x?
A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
 
Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you
suspect that there was abnormality in the person of
Judge Floro?
A: Given the data.
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would
you also have your evaluation favorable to Judge
Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on
record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance
he is capable of typing a letter?
x x x x
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 97
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998,
probably drastically altered.[115]
 
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T.
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was
observed. Content of thought did not reveal delusional
thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his
profession and expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction
with the way his colleagues are handling his pending
administrative cases. He was observed to be reality-oriented
and was not suffering from hallucinations or abnormal
perceptual distortions. Orientation, with respect to time, place
and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making
capacity were adequately functioning.
x x x x
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic
on December 26, 2000. He talked about his family and
academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for
prophecy and a gift of healing. He also talked about a
covenant made during a dream between him and 3 dwarf
friends named Luis, Armand and Angel. He reported that the
first part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the
second part is to heal and alleviate sufferings/pain from
disease.

A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro
on December 28, 2000. The battery of test consisted of the
following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA
Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language Test (4) Sacks
Sentence Completion Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test
results and evaluation showed an individual with an Above
Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-
compulsive person who is meticulous to details and strive for
perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and
is deemed capable of making day-to-day decisions in his
personal as well as professional decisions. Confusion with
regard to sexual identification, was further observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the
psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.,
was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-
oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic
disorder. He is not deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of
utilizing his superior intellect in making sound decisions. His
belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs
further studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated
that Judge Floro was unfit to be a judge.[117] The relevant exchanges between
Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:
 
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong
with a judge who shall claim that he is possessed with
power of [bi-location]?
xxxx
 
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be
in two (2) places at one time.
 
Q: And that something must be wrong?
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 98
 
A: Yes.
 
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a
judge claiming in the course of his testimony and in
this very case that while [he] was so testifying there
is another spirit, another person, another character
unseen who is with him at the same time or in
tagalog sumapi sa kanya.
 
xxxx
 
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen
companion sumapi to me is unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering
from some delusion?
xxxx
 
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual
distortion, your Honor.
 
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
 
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
A: Both are on the same footing.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a
proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters
would turn out to be fit to become a judge?
 
xxxx
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a
major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an
organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from
hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge,
however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in

a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and
delusions could be transient and short in duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
 
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
 
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you
are practicing with psychiatry.
 
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings
particularly in the course of his testimony that while
he was doing so, he was under trance normal.
 
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually
considered in the Philippines as part of a culture
bound syndrome and it could also be an indication
Basically the phenomenon of trance are often seen in
cases of organic mental disorder. It is also common in
culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is
usually loss of concentration in a particular settings or
situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case
in court would [lose] concentration and would not be
able to follow up testimony of witnesses as well as
arguments given by the counsel for the defense and
also for the prosecution, so I would say that there is
this difficulty in manners of attention span and
concentration if that person sitting as a judge
experience trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this
trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he might
not be able to rationalize or to control expressions or
as well as physical when he is in a trance.
 
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a
proceeding, he was in a trance?
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 99
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one
maybe such claim you will call that person not a
normal person.
 
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of
the proceedings in these cases held on October 10,
2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the
question of Atty. Dizon. Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness,
can you tell us? Are you in trance at this very
precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: Nakalakip
sila. I call it a trance, but I distinguished not
the trance that you see the nag-sa-Sto., Nino,
naninigas. Thats a trance that is created by the
so called Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi
awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind
projection. He is correct in a sense that those
nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind
projection or the hypnosis do come, and there
is a change in the psychological aspect of the
person. But in my case I never was changed
physically or mentally. Only the lights and heat
will penetrate that person.  ATTY. DIZON: That
will do. So at this very moment, Mr. witness,
meron kayong kalakip
ngayon?  Ngayong  oras na ito? JUDGE FLORO:
Yes, they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are
they? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: They cannot be seen
but  ATTY. DIZON: No, can you see them? To
point to us where are they in this room?,  Now
that you have read and seen this portion wherein
Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his

testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would
you still consider him at least insofar as this claim of
his to be a normal person?
A: No.
 
Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these
proceedings also and I will show to you the transcript
of stenographic notes later have claimed that he had,
always had and still had a socalled counter part, his
other side, other self, what can you say to that claim,
would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound
person?
 
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course
not fit to sit as judge?
 
xxxx
 
A: Yes.[118]
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs.
Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla,
respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of
insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 100
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila,
Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his
pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not finish
his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in
his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila,
second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and
include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan
who was involved in a coup detat attempt. So is it strange of
him to make use of his alleged psychic powers in writing
decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is improper and
grandiose of him to express superiority over other judges in
the course of hearings he is conducting and for him to say that
he is very successful over many other applicants for the
position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to
distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such
self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing, irresponsible
and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination
is unfit to be one. So is he who gets into a trance while
presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a
doctor of medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to
determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is
mentally unfit or insane and should not be allowed to continue
discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty
and property of the litigants in the court presided by such
judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he is free
from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue
discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by
reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to
perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 101

Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila,

Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and
and DISMISSED from such office.[119]
independent.[123]

We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as  
RTC Judge because of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable
to perform the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that
man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not
neither the OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro
found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings
is insane as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case
of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate
have never said so.
gross deficiency in competence and independence.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in psychic
from the service due to insanity, he was apparently using the term in its loose
visions, of foreseeing the future because of his power in psychic
sense.Insanity is a general laymans term, a catchall word referring to various
phenomenon. He believes in duwendes and of a covenant with his dwarf friends
mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term [120] as this is
Luis, Armand and Angel. He believes that he can write while on trance and that
the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note
he had been seen by several people to have been in two places at the same
that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological evaluations all reported signs and
time. He has likened himself to the angel of death who can inflict pains on
symptoms of psychosis.
people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only to
and happiness of the people. [121]
 An honorable, competent and independent black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro explained that he
judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers. Finally,
government, and the well-being of the people. [122]
 Carrying much of the weight in Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All
this daunting task of administering justice are our front liners, the judges who these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floros
preside over courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies of uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.
individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will only succeed in their

Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief
system. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are
so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our
judicial system.
 
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a
judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable
rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference to
psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v.
Francisco, Jr.[124]  sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro
discredited the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness by concluding that
the testimony was a fairytale or a fantastic story. [125] He then went to state that
psychic phenomena was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who
transcribed the testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floros
decision is quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL
witness (sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is
INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding
minor points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several
indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the
Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief, assuming ex-
gratia argumenti, that the same may be admissible, and his
Court narrative is hereby declared a FAIRY TALE or a
FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable only for
SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of
the foregoing conclusion:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 102
a.)                NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and
Raul Ineria were sinalubong by Lando/accused on
June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos,
Navotas, and that he saw the nagpambuno between
Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but
HE WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the
nagpambuno; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that
HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco THE
FOLLOWING DAY;
b.)                The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11 th HOUR
CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked to submit
false testimony); for how could have he witnessed the
stabbing by accused when he NOTICED him the
following day? (TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2);
assuming arguendo that the TSN was incorrect due to
typographical error, or maybe the Court Stenographer
III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been SLEEPING
during the testimony, so that the word DAY should
have been corrected to another word SUITABLE to
Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had
synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but
the Court found no reason that the seeming error
DAY should be corrected; the Courts
sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by
PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in
having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY
INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING
DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.);[126] (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro[127]  we held that
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An
independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve
specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit
and explicit limits on the way judges perform their

role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the
explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.[128]
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is
not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming
at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is
to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated
benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by
tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinate to the primordial necessity of order in the social
life.[129]
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his
competence for judicial tasks leaves much to be desired. As reported by the
Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and
achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
problems with decision-making. His character traits such as
suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with
paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to
his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his
primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x[130]
Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he
served as RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of
government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted
and identified himself with large components of the judges
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 103
role. Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is likely
to have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the
fashion of one who is said to have the judicial
temperament. He is likely to have displayed the kinds of
behavior that the judges role demands. A large proportion of
his experiences on the bench develop and reinforce such
conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture
and of court procedure, the honorific forms of address, and
even the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve to
emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most
unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes his position
to a thoroughly corrupt political organization must conform at
least in part to the behaviors expected of him as a judge.[131]
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those
expected of other public officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law and
they must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater degree than
legislators or executives.[132] 
As it has been said, [j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not
according to some abstract ideas of right and justice, but according to the rules
laid down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The
function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but
the exercise of a creative art, whether we call it legislative or not, which requires
great ability and objectivity.[133] We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in speaking
of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve
sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of
self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own
views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not

shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of our
judicial process. They are precisely the qualities society has a
right to expect from those entrusted with judicial power.
x x x x
The judicial judgment must move within the limits of
accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the
idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. [134] 
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental
requirements of competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot
thus be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious
challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic
benefits for a period of three (3) years.
 
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have
joined the judiciary as RTC judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed the
history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such major
and unfortunate faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his
application for judgeship. He went through the entire gamut of tests and
interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic
achievements. As to having failed the psychological examinations given by the SC
Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 104
Floros submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by mental health
professionals from the private sector and which were favorable to him. Nowhere
is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these
evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private
clinic for a second opinion of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing
its functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution which
prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other
requirements, persons of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence. [135]
 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-009,
the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, that the JBC put down in writing
guidelines or criteria it had previously used in ascertaining if one seeking such
office meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of
mind and heart expected of the Judiciary.[136] Rule 6 thereof states:
 
SECTION 1. Good health.  Good physical health and sound
mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant
play a critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the
delicate task of administering justice. x x x
 
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests.  The applicant shall
submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by
the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or
psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on
the evaluation of a private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the
JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological evaluations
of mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.

It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as RTC judge is fait
accompli. What awaits us now is the seemingly overwhelming task of finding the
PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros almost seven years of
suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit
a suspension of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. [137] The Constitution
limits this power through the admonition that such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.[138]
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in
administrative cases against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps
to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended pending
investigation. This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in
its power of administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
[139]
This power -- consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the
Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other things,
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 105
 
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive
suspension resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer
the foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days from
notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez,
Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for investigation,
report and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or mental examination
to be conducted by the proper office of the Supreme Court or
any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge
Florentino Floro, effective immediately under PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the
administrative charges against him.[140]
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floros suspension,
albeit indefinite, was for the duration of the investigation of the 13 charges
against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the
investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that
(t)he investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety
(90) days from the date of its commencement or within such extension as the
Supreme Court may grant[141] and, (w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination
of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation.[142]
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended
not only for the entire period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless

extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the
investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court
may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached
in the administrative case against him or her.[143] This is because
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges
who are charged with a serious offense warranting preventive
suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of
the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court
may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is
reached in the administrative case especially where there is a
strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense
charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public
from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused
by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is
also intended to protect the courts image as temples of justice
where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and
justice solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for
the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil
servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in
the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights
looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and
proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression.
[144]
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present
because of the serious charge of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that
the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much longer period than
90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly
ascribed to Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not only
did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of his cases; he
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 106
likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the
appropriate psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single
case against him ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated into one due
to common questions of fact and law. [145] All in all, Judge Floro filed seven cases
against those he perceived had connived to remove and/or suspend him from
office, the last of which he filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez.[146]
 
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost
compassion in this case considering that the rules on preventive suspension of
judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous
at best. We have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a
judge who was placed under preventive suspension pending
investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for the entire duration
of the preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as
applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the peculiar
circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively
suspended by the Court until further orders. 
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively
suspended for 13 months, during which period he was not paid
his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a
teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake
pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge Iturralde
had no other source of income. He thus incurred several loans
to provide for his familys basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of
his back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for
the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 107

have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension

pending investigation is not a penalty but only a measure not practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers
intended to enable the disciplining authority to conduct an
largesse. And, though he was given donations by those who came to him for
unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90)
days is ample time to conclude the investigation of an healing, obviously, these could not compensate for his loss of income as Judge.
administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive
suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the
determining the extent of back salaries, allowances and other
benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his period of suspension exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of
preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum
period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals,  should likewise be back salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back
applied.
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to
Concededly, there may be instances when an
three of his almost seven years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling
investigation would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such
may not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in Gloria  that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated as
in such a situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries
and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros propensity to delay the resolution
preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of
of his case through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those
the case was not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent
of the administrative charge, his preventive suspension he perceived connived to oust him out of office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the
exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without
basis and would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must investigation was not delayed through any fault of his. More importantly, Judge
be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely
Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of
removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first
place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on just Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90 days was already in the nature of a
and equitable grounds.[147]
penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he

Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as already discussed,

likewise entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic contributed to the delay in the investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge

benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges

themselves preventively suspended by the Court until further orders or, as this against him.

case, for the duration of the investigation. Judge Iturraldes suspension of 13

These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge
months even pales in comparison to Judge Floros suspension of 81 months,
Floro beyond the reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does
more or less. During this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could
not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 108

  Judge  Floros  separation from the service moots the case against him docketed
as  A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz  Arriego  v.
and do complete justice where courts of law, through the Judge  Florentino  V.  Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC 
incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the
letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the service renders moot
the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
courts.[148] the complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of

resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Courts decision to separate
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for
Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and
the delay in the resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to
academic.
award him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period

corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floros separation from A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988

the service is not a penalty as we ordinarily understand the word to

Considering that this case is a replica of charge h in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and
mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a
considering that charge h is without basis, this particular complaint filed by
medically disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at
Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.
least at present, to continue discharging the functions of his office.
Judge  Floros  separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or
part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other
 The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
circumstances. As discussed, if we were to give him more than three years of
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty,
back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his role in
such separation does not carry with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued
delaying the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which
benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including
were only dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own bidding). On the other
government-owned or controlled corporations.
hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years then the same would

only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension he had to live  

through with Damocles sword hanging over his head and with his hands bound

as he could not practice his profession.


In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the
bedrock of the finding of mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used
to disqualify him from re-entering government service for positions that do not
require him to dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge
Floros favor that the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal
consideration. They mention Judge Floros assets and strengths and capacity for
functionality, with minor modification of work environment. Thus:
a.                   High intellectual assets as a result of self-
discipline and self- organization.[149]
 
b.                  (I)mpressive academic achievements with no
drastic change in his personality and level of
functioning as a lawyer in private practice.[150]
c.                   (C)haracter traits of suspiciousness,
seclusiveness, pre-occupation with paranormal and
psychic phenomena not detrimental to his role as a
lawyer.[151]
 
d.                  Everyday situations can be comprehended and
dealt with in moderate proficiency . His concern for
the details that make up a total field represents his
attempts at being systematic and cautious.[152]
e. (E)quipped with analytical power. [153]
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a
judge because of the sensitive nature of said position, he may still be
successful in other areas of endeavor.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 109
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge
Floros current administrative and medical problems are not totally of his
making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now,
appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not
because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but clearly due to
a medically disabling condition.
Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to
genetics[154] and/or adverse environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such
essential information is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty
genes and/or adverse environment factors they have no control over.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1)                 FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of
FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13
charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
2)                 RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and
consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to
discharge the functions of his office, effective immediately;
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 110

3)                 As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro,

Jr. back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits

corresponding to three (3) years;

4)                 DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-

1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr .) for LACK

OF MERIT; and

5)                 DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC ( Re:

Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro,

Jr.) for MOOTNESS.   

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
 
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners, 
 
vs.
  FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and
RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In
Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine
Bar, respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as
respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this
Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance
the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised
in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon.
Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's
resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.

Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively
necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only
justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt
perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the
enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M.
Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a
criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-
28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from
the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court).
Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-
13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid".
Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered
judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral
damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred
pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case
No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O.
Tañada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The
case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by
petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon.
Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and
Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the
ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica
on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that
"some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica".
The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and
instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar
when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate
Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered
through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to
be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in
its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 111
motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it
abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty.
del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court
of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his
second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another
threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the
jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and
205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of
the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that
notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar
to refrain from abusive language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that
the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar
to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should
not be punished for contempt of court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein
he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making
any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he
would follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the
4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the
President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the
Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing
of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on
December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the
Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against
Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a
decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would
not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe
that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers
as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own
opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his
views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally
and individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of
evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice.
The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of
March 5, 1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated
threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into
reconsidering its decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client.

Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the
merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth
Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled
threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by
insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for
knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance.
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5,
1973):
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all
true; any man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is
unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the
offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not
succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New
Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining
against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under
the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for
the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than
abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties,
against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding
even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to
cure in the New.
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that
"counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of
P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9
of Rule 139, let certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable
Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect
to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated
Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all
courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar
from the practice of law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices
Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del
Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R.
No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277)was terminated by
compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his
complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 112
agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is
the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three
Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he
did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in
accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure
conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on
October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law
imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement
reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which
was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate
Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of
frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for
on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter
addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this
Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the
names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for
reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15,
1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating
brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your
Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions
of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case
entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the
Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the
Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr.
Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein
but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our
Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination"
(Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary
to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled
threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts
in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing
on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of
any of our other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973,

respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.
At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G.
R. No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we
might have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar
which drove him to make his contemptuous statements.
The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against
Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on
the occasion in question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done
without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the
statement uttered was the former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter,
he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the
preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence
must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by
Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or
stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No.
L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in
CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing
the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question
of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.
On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R,
became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause
why he should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his
manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1,
1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed
with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil
case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex
"B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G.
Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the
Government needing correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the
fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be
fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to
a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis
supplied).
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 113
This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his
contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its
contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who
voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar
to appear personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On
September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court,
wherein he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are
rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that
convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will
be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to
retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of
human deficiencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down
justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous
contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent
is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice
allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his
contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in
G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly
committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's
logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate
in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to
have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-
consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are
absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial
Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of
Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent
del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us
to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973,
respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a
period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In
view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further
investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We
resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision.

In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973,
respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood
pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his
sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot
readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he
asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court
of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the
same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that
the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified his act of
invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices
liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school
days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has
decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He
hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he
could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients
as regards all his pending cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental
and physical ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of
arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote:
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the
Justices of the Supreme Court a case for damages against
them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was
dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable.
The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in
the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the
American laws. But the Philippines is now independent and
Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated therein
for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any
definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same
time pleading that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may
forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that
he has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of
law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on
him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in
complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 114
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing
contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the
practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to
punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by
resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without
prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second
only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all
attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of
said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A
lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high
privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude
(People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to
uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according
to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our
democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very
shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be
allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's
decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give
due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men
are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods,
perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to
the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the

Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20
SCRA 441, 444-445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge,
imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or
concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and
implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from the accused
on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly
derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an
attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in
a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious
disrespect. We said:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build  and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and
regard towards the court so essential to the proper
administration of justice(Emphasis supplied). (People vs.
Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of
Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R
was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in
turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the
decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding
and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court
exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The
intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled
threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and
the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure
contumely for said tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest
Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case,
he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 115
with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the
case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in
assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are
superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His
pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts
of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his
supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous
statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is
merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to
comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds
of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct
may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that
respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law
of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a
practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in
the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen
perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and
circumstances.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental
ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and
sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not
by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and
dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future
will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder
for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself
to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our
democratic institutions.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R,
dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law,
as implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court,
shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders
of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-
27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 116

The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty.
Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez,

Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

A.M. No. L-363             July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.

GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.

Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to

it on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of
Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former
municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was
sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of
conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty
was changed to reclusion perpetua.  After serving a portion of the sentence
respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19,
1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that
he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the
murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent
be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent
presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant
regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the
case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a
crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The
term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in
disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man.
State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham,  84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-
429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon
extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment
aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The
respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the
Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and
held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a
conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon
operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the
disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In
making it the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to
respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi  of the
case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal.
App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte  Garland, 4 Wall,
380. Thus in Scott vs. State  the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the
record of the felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for
the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when offered in
evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not,
therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any
felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 117
was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon,
according to the judicial construction which that act of executive grace
was received. Ex parte  Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149,
and cases there cited; Young v. Young,  61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte  Garland quoted with approval in the
Lontok case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and
the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of
the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores
him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and
merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the
offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte  Garland, which was "a full pardon and
amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war)
against government of the United States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here.
Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder
without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by
treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time)
and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra.  The
degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to
certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a
candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic
preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These
standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer
must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.
As stated in Ex parte  Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes
and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 118

their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and
override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of
society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example
to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the
crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is
ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125766. October 19, 1998]

FELICIDAD L. ORONCE and ROSITA L. FLAMINIANO, petitioners, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PRICILIANO B. GONZALES
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

The issue of whether or not a Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court may

resolve the issue of ownership of the property involved in an unlawful detainer
case has been discussed by this Court in a number of cases, the more recent of
which is that of Hilario v. Court of Appeals. [1]  Jurisprudence on the matter has in
fact been reflected in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure under Rule 70, to wit:

SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense

of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved

without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession. (4a)
These developments in the law notwithstanding, there remains some
misconceptions on the issue of jurisdiction of inferior courts in ejectment cases
where ownership is raised as a defense that the Court deems proper to clarify in
this petition.
Private respondent Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation was the
registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 2,000 square meters. The
land with improvements, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-54556
(383917), is situated at No. 52 Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
In June 1988, private respondent obtained a four million peso -
(P4,000,000.00) loan from the China Banking Corporation. To guarantee
payment of the loan, private respondent mortgaged the Gilmore property and all
its improvements to said bank. Due to irregular payment of amortization,
interests and penalties on the loan accumulated through the years.
On April 13, 1992, private respondent, through its president, Antonio B.
Gonzales, signed and executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
covering the Gilmore property and its improvements, in favor of petitioners
Rosita Flaminiano and Felicidad L. Oronce. [2] The deed, which states that the sale
was in consideration of the sum of P5,400,000.00,[3] provided inter aliathat
x x x the VENDOR (PBGDC) also guarantees the right of the VENDEES
(petitioners) to the possession of the property subject of this contract without
the need of judicial action; and possession of said premises shall be delivered to
the VENDEES by the VENDOR at the expiration of one (1) year from the date of
the signing and execution of this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
On the other hand, petitioners bound themselves to pay private respondents
indebtedness with China Banking Corporation.
In fulfillment of the terms and conditions embodied in the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, petitioners paid private respondents indebtedness with
the bank. However, private respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver
possession of the premises to petitioners upon the expiration of the one-year
period from April 13, 1992. Almost six months later since the execution of the
instrument or on October 2, 1992, petitioners caused the registration of the Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with the Register of Deeds.  Simultaneously,
they obtained a new title, TCT No. 67990, consistent with the fact that they are
the new owners of the property.[4] Sometime in July 1993, they paid the real
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 119
estate taxes on the property for which they were issued Tax Declarations Nos. C-
061-02815 and C-061-02816.[5]
On November 12, 1993, petitioners sent private respondent a demand
letter asking it to vacate the premises. Said letter, just like three other
consecutive notices sent through the Quezon City post office, was
unclaimed. Hence, on April 11, 1994, petitioners filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint for unlawful detainer against private
respondent. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 8638 was raffled to
Branch 41. Petitioners alleged that by virtue of the Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage, they acquired from private respondent the Gilmore property and its
improvements, for which reason they were issued TCT No. 67990. However, they
added, in violation of the terms of that document, specifically Sec. 3 (c) thereof,
private respondent refused to surrender possession of the
premises. Consequently, they demanded that private respondent vacate the
premises through notices sent by registered mail that were, however, returned to
them unclaimed.
In its answer to the complaint, private respondent raised the issue of
ownership over the property. It impugned petitioners right to eject, alleging that
petitioners had no cause of action against it because it was merely a mortgagee
of the property. It argued that when the parties executed the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, its real intention was to forge an equitable mortgage
and not a sale. It pointed out three circumstances indicative of an equitable
mortgage, namely: inadequacy of the purchase price, continued possession by
private respondent of the premises, and petitioners retention of a portion of the
purchase price.
During the preliminary conference on the case, the parties agreed to
stipulate on the following: (a) the existence and due execution of the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, and (b) the issue of whether or not the
premises in litis are being unlawfully detained by private respondent. [6]
On March 24, 1995, the MTC[7] decided the case in favor of petitioners. It
ruled that petitioners are the owners of the Gilmore property on account of the
following pieces of evidence: (a) TCT No. 67990; (b) petitioners payment to the
China Banking Corporation of P8,500,000.00, the amount of the mortgage
entered into between private respondent and said bank; (c) payment of real
estate taxes for 1993, and (d) Tax Declaration No. 02816 in petitioners
names. The MTC further held that private respondents possession of the
premises was merely tolerated by petitioners and because it refused to vacate
the premises despite demand to do so, then its possession of the same premises
had become illegal. Thus, the MTC decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendant and all persons claiming rights under it to vacate the premises-in-litis
located at No. 52 Gilmore St., New Manila, Quezon City, and to peacefully
surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs; to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P20,000.00 a month as compensation for the unjust occupation of the same
from April 11, 1994 (the date of filing of this case) until defendant fully vacates
the said premises; to pay plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 as and for
attorneys fees plus costs of suit.
Counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. [8]
On April 25, 1995, private respondent interposed an appeal to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 219, of Quezon City that docketed it as Civil Case No. Q-95-
23697. Private respondent stressed in its appeal that it was not unlawfully
withholding possession of the premises from petitioners because the latters basis
for evicting it was the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage that did not
reflect the true intention of the parties to enter into an equitable mortgage.
Clearly in pursuance of that allegation, private respondent filed a motion
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain its appeal. On the other hand,
petitioners filed a motion for the immediate execution of the appealed
decision. The RTC granted the motion on September 21, 1995 and the
corresponding writ of execution was issued on September 25, 1995. The
following day, the sheriff served upon private respondent the writ of execution
and a notice to vacate the premises within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of its appeal, private respondent filed an
action for reformation of instrument with the RTC. It was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-95-24927 and assigned to Branch 227.
In a resolution dated December 7, 1995, RTC Branch 219 asserted
jurisdiction over the appeal. It ruled that the issue of whether or not an action
for reformation of a deed of sale and an unlawful detainer case can proceed
independently of each other has been resolved by this Court in Judith v.
Abragan.[9]  In said case, this Court held that the fact that defendants had
previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale
into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of First
Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment
afforded by law to the plaintiff.
On December 12, 1995, private respondent filed in the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 120
preliminary injunction against petitioners and RTC Branch 219. It assailed the
September 21, 1995 order granting the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal, the writ of execution and the notice to vacate served upon private
respondent (CA-G.R. SP-39227).
On December 13, 1995, RTC Branch 219[10] rendered the decision
affirming in toto that of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Stating that in ejectment
proceedings, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to physical or material
possession of the premises involved, RTC Branch 219 held that:
x x x the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) are vendees of the defendant (PBGDC) by
virtue of a deed of sale where the extent of its right to continue holding
possession was stipulated. In the agreement, the existence and due execution of
which the defendant had admitted (Order, December 16, 1994, Rollo, p. 111), it
was clearly stated that the defendant shall deliver the possession of the subject
premises to the plaintiffs at the expiration of one (1) year from the execution
thereof, April 12, 1992. The defendant failed to do so. From then on, it could be
said that the defendant has been unlawfully withholding possession of the
premises from the plaintiffs.
In any case, this ruling on the matter of possession de facto is without prejudice
to the action for reformation. This is because `the judgment rendered in an
action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the
possession only and in no wise bind the title or effect the ownership of the land
or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving
possession (Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court, 154 SCRA 153; Section 7, Rule 70,
Rules of Court).[11]
On that same date, December 13, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining RTC Branch 219 from enforcing the writ of
execution and the notice to vacate the premises and on January 15, 1996, the
same court granted private respondents application for a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the implementation of both the writ of execution pending
appeal and the decision of RTC Branch 219.
Around six months later or on July 2, 1996, RTC Branch 227 [12] issued an
order declaring private respondent non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-
trial and, therefore, dismissing the action for reformation of instrument in Civil
Case No. Q-95-24927. Private respondent, not having sought reconsideration of
said order, the same court issued a resolution on August 15, 1996 directing the

entry of judgment in the case.[13] The Clerk of Court accordingly issued the final
entry of judgment thereon.[14]
In the meantime, on July 24, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the
herein questioned Decision.[15] It set aside the December 13, 1995 decision of
RTC Branch 219 and declared as null and void for want of jurisdiction, the March
24, 1995 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 41. It
made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioners from
implementing the decision of RTC Branch 219, the writ of execution and the
notice to vacate. In so holding, the Court of Appeals said:
It is quite evident that, upon the pleadings, the dispute between the parties
extended beyond the ordinary issues in ejectment cases. The resolution of the
dispute hinged on the question of ownership and for that reason was not
cognizable by the MTC. (See: General Insurance and Surety Corporation v.
Castelo, 13 SCRA 652 [1965]).
Respondent judge was not unaware of the pendency of the action for
reformation. However, despite such knowledge, he proceeded to discuss the
merits of the appeal and rendered judgment in favor of respondents on the basis
of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage which was precisely the subject
of the action for reformation pending before another branch of the
court.Prudence dictated that respondent judge should have refused to be drawn
into a discussion as to the merits of the respective contentions of the parties and
deferred to the action of the court before whom the issue was directly raised for
resolution.
On whether or not private respondent was in estoppel from questioning the
jurisdiction of the MTC since it voluntarily submitted thereto the question of the
validity of its title to the property, the Court of Appeals said:
This is not so. As earlier pointed out, petitioner (private respondent here) had, in
its answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer, promptly raised the issue of
jurisdiction by alleging that what was entered into by the parties was just an
equitable mortgage and not a sale. Assuming the truth of this allegation, it is
fairly evident that respondents would not have had a cause of action for
ejectment. In other words, petitioner, since the start of the case, presented a
serious challenge to the MTCs jurisdiction but, unfortunately, the court ignored
such challenge and proceeded to decide the case simply on the basis of
possession.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 121
`The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not,
if it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that
it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel (5 C.J.S., 861-863). (La Naval
Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78 [1994]).
Contrary to respondents pretense, the filing by petitioner of an action for the
reformation of contract may not really be an afterthought. As we understand it,
petitioner, to support its allegation that the contract was a mere equitable
mortgage, cites the fact that the price was inadequate; it remained in possession
of the premises; it has retained a part of the purchase price; and, in any case,
the real intention of the parties was that the transaction shall secure the
payment by petitioner of its loan, adverting to Article 1602 of the Civil Code.
Under Article 1604 of the same code, it is provided that the presence of only one
circumstance defined in Article 1602, such as those cited above, is sufficient for a
contract of sale with right to repurchase to be presumed an equitable mortgage.
Without in any way preempting the decision of the court in the action for
reformation, it is our considered view that, under the factual milieu, the action
was initiated for the proper determination of the rights of the parties under the
contract, and not just an afterthought.
No derogatory inference can arise from petitioners admission of the existence of
the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. The admission does not
necessarily dilute its claim that the same does not express the true intent of the
parties.
Verily, since the case at bench involves a controverted right, the parties are
required to preserve the status quo and await the decision of the proper court on
the true nature of the contract. It is but just that the person who has first
acquired possession should remain in possession pending decision on said case,
and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in petty warfare over
possession of property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this will be
highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to the social order.
(Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 795 [1990]).[16]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari where petitioners raise
the following assigned errors allegedly committed by respondent Court of
Appeals:
I.

THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO
THE PROVISIONS OF SEC. 33 (2) OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF
1980 CONFERRING EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ON THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN EJECTMENT CASES AND VESTING IT WITH
AUTHORITY, INDEED MANDATORILY, TO RESOLVE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP TO
DETERMINE ISSUES OF POSSESSION.
II.
THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IS CONTRARY TO CURRENT AND
PREVAILING DOCTRINE AS ENUNCIATED IN WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORP. VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 208 SCRA 108; SY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 200 SCRA 117;
AND ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 229 SCRA 627.
III.
THE FILING OF THE REFORMATION CASE CONFIRMS THE JURISDICTION OF
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OVER THE EJECTMENT CASE; THE
DISMISSAL OF THE REFORMATION CASE CONFIRMS THE FACT THAT IT WAS
FILED MERELY AS A PLOY TO DELAY DISPOSITION OF EJECTMENT
PROCEEDINGS, AND BARES NOT JUST THE ERROR BUT THE UTTER INEQUITY
OF THE RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION ANNULLING THE EJECTMENT DECREE
AND SETTING ASIDE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DECISION OF AFFIRMANCE.
Petitioners argue that the precedent laid down in Ching v. Malaya[17] relied
upon by the Court of Appeals, was based on the old law, Republic Act No. 296
(Judiciary Act of 1948), as amended, which vested in the city courts original
jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer proceedings and the
corresponding power to receive evidence upon the question of ownership for the
only purpose of determining the character and extent of possession. [18] They
claim that since the original complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on April 13,
1992, then the applicable law should have been Section 33 (2) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). That law vests in the city
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases and the corresponding power to receive evidence upon questions of
ownership and to resolve the issue of ownership to determine the issue of
possession.[19]
The history of the law vesting Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts with
jurisdiction over ejectment cases has invariably revolved upon the assumption
that the question of ownership may be considered only if necessary for the
determination of the issue as to who of the parties shall have the right to
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 122
possess the property in litigation.[20] Thus, under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, Section 88 vested municipal and city courts with authority to receive
evidence upon the question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the
property, solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of
possession and damages for detention. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 that
was enacted on June 21, 1969, provided that city courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance over ejection cases where the question
of ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings and that the issue of ownership
shall be resolved in conjunction with the issue of possession. Expounding on that
provision of law, in Pelaez v. Reyes,[21] this Court said:
x x x We are of the considered opinion that the evident import of Section 3
above is to precisely grant to the city courts concurrent original jurisdiction with
the courts of first instance over the cases enumerated therein, which include
`ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the
pleadings. To sustain petitioners contention about the meaning of the last phrase
of paragraph (c) of said section regarding the resolution of the issue of
ownership `in conjunction with the issue of possession is to disregard the very
language of the main part of the section which denotes unmistakably a
conferment upon the city courts of concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first
instance over ejection cases in which ownership is brought in issue in the
pleadings. It is to Us quite clear that the fact that the issue of ownership is to be
resolved `in conjunction with the issue of possession simply means that both the
issues of possession and ownership are to be resolved by the city courts. And the
jurisdiction is concurrent with the Courts of First Instance precisely because
usually questions of title are supposed to be resolved by superior courts. In other
words, this grant of special jurisdiction to city courts is to be distinguished from
the power ordinarily accorded to municipal courts to receive evidence of title only
for the purpose of determining the extent of the possession in dispute.
Upon the approval on August 14, 1981 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, however, the power of inferior courts,
including city courts, to resolve the issue of ownership in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases was modified. Resolution of the issue of ownership
became subject to the qualification that it shall be only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession. In effect, therefore, the city courts lost the
jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership per se  that was theretofore
concurrent with the then Courts of First Instance. Thus, Section 33 of B.P. Blg.
129 provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when in such cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.
Accordingly, the Interim Rules and Guidelines in the implementation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides as follows:
10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. Metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts, and municipal circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try cases of
forcible entry and detainer even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings and the question of possession could not be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, but the question of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
Explaining these provisions of law, in Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals,
[22]
 the Court said:
These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No. 296 which
merely allowed inferior courts to receive evidence upon the question of title
solely for the purpose of determining the extent and character of possession and
damages for detention, which thereby resulted in previous rulings of this Court to
the effect that if it appears during the trial that the principal issue relates to the
ownership of the property in dispute and any question of possession which may
be involved necessarily depends upon the result of the inquiry into the title, then
the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts is lost and the action should be
dismissed. With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts
now retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case even if the question of possession
cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the
express qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession. In other words, the fact that the
issues of ownership and possession de facto are intricately interwoven will not
cause the dismissal of the case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on
jurisdictional grounds.
Another development in the law has emphasized the fact that inferior
courts shall not lose jurisdiction over ejectment cases solely because the issue of
ownership is interwoven with the issue of possession. Under the 1983 Rules on
Summary Procedure, as amended by a resolution of this Court that took effect on
November 15, 1991, all forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases shall be tried
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 123
pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, regardless of whether or
not the issue of ownership of the subject property is alleged by a party. [23] In
other words, even if there is a need to resolve the issue of ownership, such fact
will not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases [24] that
shall be tried summarily.
When the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded, thereby amending Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, by virtue of Republic Act No. 7691 that took effect on April
15, 1994, the jurisdiction of said courts over ejectment cases was retained. Thus,
in Hilario v. Court of Appeals  this Court said:
x x x. As the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment
cases even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing
upon the issue of ownership; but this is subject to the same caveat that the issue
posed as to ownership could be resolved by the court for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of possession.
Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be
regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing
doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material
possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not
possession de jure.
In other words, inferior courts are now conditionally vested with
adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an
ejectment suit.[25] These courts shall resolve the question of ownership raised as
an incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for
a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Considering the
difficulties that are usually encountered by inferior courts as regards the extent
of their power in determining the issue of ownership, in Sps. Refugia v. Court of
Appeals,  the Court set out guidelines to be observed in the implementation of
the law which, as stated at the outset, has recently been restated in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The guidelines pertinent to this case state:
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that
ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may
be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Thus, x x x, the legal provision under consideration applies only where the
inferior court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that a

resolution of the issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution of the
question of ownership.
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the
plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently,
where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly
establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the
recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of
material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for ownership, or
where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, the action
is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property.
x x x x x x x x x,
5. Where the question of who has the prior possession hinges on the question of
who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the
issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending
parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of
possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the
document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is
premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues.  This is
because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made
affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely
as provisional,  hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only
and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.
[26]
 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, petitioners clearly intended recovery of possession over
the Gilmore property. They alleged in their complaint for unlawful detainer that
their claim for possession is buttressed by the execution of the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, a copy of which was attached as Annex A to the
complaint and by the issuance of TCT No. 67990 that evidenced the transfer of
ownership over the property.[27] Because metropolitan trial courts are authorized
to look into the ownership of the property in controversy in ejectment cases, it
behooved MTC Branch 41 to examine the bases for petitioners claim of
ownership that entailed interpretation of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 124
However, while it quoted paragraph (c) of the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage that embodies the agreement of the parties that
possession of the Gilmore property and its improvements shall remain with the
vendor that was obliged to transfer possession only after the expiration of one
year,[28] MTC Branch 41 apparently did not examine the terms of the deed of
sale. Instead, it erroneously held that the issue of whether or not the document
was in fact an equitable mortgage should not be properly raised in this case. Had
it examined the terms of the deed of sale, which, after all is considered part of
the allegations of the complaint having been annexed thereto, that court would
have found that, even on its face, the document was actually one of equitable
mortgage and not of sale. The inferior court appears to have forgotten that all
documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which
are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the
complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon. [29]
Article 1602 of the Civil Code provides that a contract shall be presumed to
be an equitable mortgage by the presence of any of the following:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another
instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is
executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the
parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the
performance of any other obligation.
Article 1604 of the same Code provides that the provisions of Article 1602
shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale. The presence of
even one of the circumstances in Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a
contract as one of equitable mortgage. [30] The explicit provision of Article 1602
that any of those circumstances would suffice to construe a contract of sale to be
one of equitable mortgage is in consonance with the rule that the law favors the
least transmission of property rights.

The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering the 2,000-square-
meter lot located at No. 52 Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City provides as
follows:
3. That the total consideration for the sale of the above-described property by
the VENDOR to the VENDEES is FOURTEEN MILLION (P14,000,000.00) PESOS, in
Philippine currency, payable as follows:
a) The VENDOR shall be paid by the VENDEE the sum of FIVE MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P5,400,000.00) PESOS upon the signing and execution of
this Deed of Sale With Assumption of Mortgage after computation of the
mortgage obligation of the VENDOR with CHINA BANKING CORPORATION in the
amount of ______________________ which the VENDEES agree to assume as
part of the consideration of this sale. The VENDEES hereby assume the mortgage
obligation of the VENDOR with the CHINA BANKING CORPORATION in the total
amount of ___________________.
b) The VENDOR hereby undertakes and agrees with the VENDEES that the first-
named party shall warrant and defend the title of said real property hereby
conveyed in favor of the VENDEES, their heirs, successors or assigns, against all
just claims of all persons or entities; that the VENDOR also guarantees the right
of the VENDEES to the possession of the property subject of this contract without
the need of judicial action; and furthermore, the VENDOR binds itself to execute
any additional documents to complete the title of the VENDEES to the above-
described property so that it may be registered in the name of the VENDEES in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
c) It is hereby expressly agreed and understood by and between the VENDOR
and the VENDEES that the house and other improvements found in the premises
are included in this sale and thatpossession of said premises shall be delivered to
the VENDEES by the VENDOR at the expiration of one (1) year from the date of
the signing and execution of this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
d) It is furthermore expressly provided and agreed by and between the VENDOR
and the VENDEES that the capital gains tax shall be paid by the VENDOR while
any and all fees and expenses incident to the registration and transfer of the title
to the aforementioned property shall be defrayed and borne by the VENDEES.
e) Attached to this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage as Annex `A
thereof is the Certificate of ROSANA FLORES, Corporate Secretary of PRICILIANO
B. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a corporation duly organized and existing
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 125
under Philippine Laws who certified that at a special meeting of the Board of
Directors of said corporation held on December 3, 1991 at which meeting a
quorum was present, the following resolution was adopted and passed, to wit:
`RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the company, PRICILIANO B.
GONZALES DEVELOPMENT is (sic) hereby authorized the President, Mr. Antonio
B. Gonzales to enter into and/or negotiate for the sale of a property described as
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383917 with an area of TWO THOUSAND (2,000)
SQUARE METERS under the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;
`RESOLVED FURTHER, that Mr. ANTONIO B. GONZALES, is hereby authorized to
sign, execute any and all documents relative thereto.
That aforesaid resolution is in full force and effect.
(sgd.)
ROSAN
A FLORES
Corpor
ate Secretary
(
SGD.)
f) Full title and possession over the above-described property shall vest upon the
VENDEES upon the full compliance by them with all the terms and conditions
herein set forth.[31] (Underscoring supplied.)
That under the agreement the private respondent as vendor shall remain in
possession of the property for only one year, did not detract from the fact that
possession of the property, an indicium of ownership, was retained by private
respondent as the alleged vendor. That period of time may be deemed as
actually the time allotted to private respondent for fulfilling its part of the
agreement by paying its indebtedness to petitioners. This may be gleaned from
paragraph (f) that states that full title and possession of the property shall vest
upon the VENDEES upon the full compliance by them with all the terms and
conditions herein set forth.
Paragraph (f) of the contract also evidences the fact that the agreed
purchase price of fourteen million pesos (P14,000,000.00) was not handed over
by petitioners to private respondent upon the execution of the agreement.
Only P5,400,000.00 was given by petitioners to private respondent, as the

balance thereof was to be dependent upon the private respondents satisfaction
of its mortgage obligation to China Banking Corporation. Notably, the MTC found
that petitioners gave private respondent the amount of P8,500,000.00 that
should be paid to the bank to cover the latters obligation, thereby leaving the
amount of P100,000.00 (P5,400,000.00 + P8,500,000.00 = P13,900,000.00) of
the purchase price still unpaid and in the hands of petitioners, the alleged
vendees.
Hence, two of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 are manifest in
the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, namely: (a) the vendor would
remain in possession of the property (no. 2), and (b) the vendees retained a part
of the purchase price (no. 4). On its face, therefore, the document subject of
controversy, is actually a contract of equitable mortgage.
The denomination of the contract as a deed of sale is not binding as to its
nature. The decisive factor in evaluating such an agreement is the intention of
the parties, as shown, not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract,
but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately
after executing the agreement.[32] Private respondents possession over the
property was not denied by petitioners as in fact it was the basis for their
complaint for unlawful detainer.
Neither does the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in petitioners
favor import conclusive evidence of ownership or that the agreement between
the parties was one of sale.[33] In Macapinlac v. Gutierrez Repide,  this Court said:
x x x it must be borne in mind that the equitable doctrine x x x to the effect that
any conveyance intended as security for a debt will be held in effect to be a
mortgage, whether so actually expressed in the instrument or not, operates
regardless of the form of the agreement chosen by the contracting parties as the
repository of their will. Equity looks through the form and considers the
substance; and no kind of engagement can be adopted which will enable the
parties to escape from the equitable doctrine to which reference is made. In
other words, a conveyance of land, accompanied by registration in the name of
the transferee and the issuance of a new certificate, is no more secured from the
operation of the equitable doctrine than the most informal conveyance that could
be devised.[34]
A closer look into the allegations of the complaint would therefore show
that petitioners failed to make out a case for unlawful detainer. By the
allegations in the complaint, private respondent as a mortgagor had the right to
posses the property. A mortgage is a real right constituted to secure an
obligation upon real property or rights therein to satisfy with the proceeds of the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 126
sale thereof such obligation when the same becomes due and has not been paid
or fulfilled.[35] The mortgagor generally retains possession of the mortgaged
property[36] because by mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely subjects
it to a lien but ownership thereof is not parted with. [37] In case of the debtors
nonpayment of the debt secured by the mortgage, the only right of the
mortgagee is to foreclose the mortgage and have the encumbered property sold
to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness. The mortgagors default does not
operate to vest in the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property, for
any such effect is against public policy .[38] Even if the property is sold at a
foreclosure sale, only upon expiration of the redemption period, without the
judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, does ownership of
the land sold become consolidated in the purchaser. [39]
Petitioners tenuous claim for possession of the Gilmore property was
emasculated further by private respondents answer to their complaint. The latter
claimed ownership of the property, alleging that the agreement was one of
mortgage and not of sale. Private respondent alleged therein that in March 1993
(sic), it borrowed money from petitioner Felicidad Oronce alone to redeem the
subject property from China Banking Corporation. She agreed to lend it the
amount on condition that the Gilmore property should be mortgaged to her to
guarantee payment of the loan.However, petitioner Flaminiano took the money
from petitioner Oronce and paid the mortgage obligation of private respondent to
the China Banking Corporation while claiming that 50% of the amount was hers.
Petitioner Flaminianos husband, Atty. Eduardo Flaminiano, forthwith prepared
the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage and, without private respondents
knowledge, had it registered for which reason a new certificate of title was
issued to petitioners. In claiming that the agreement was one of mortgage,
private respondent alleged in its answer, inter alia, that the actual total value of
the property was thirty million pesos (P30,000,000.00); that while it had
possession of the property, petitioners did not then attempt to repossess the
same, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the execution of the
document; that petitioners did not pay the real estate taxes even after the
transfer of title in their favor, and that petitioners did not deliver to private
respondent the alleged purchase price.
Considering these claims of private respondent, MTC Branch 41 should
have passed upon the issues raised on the ownership of the Gilmore property for
the purpose of determining who had the right to possess the same. As it turned
out, it simply accepted the allegations of petitioners without examining the
supporting documents. Had it closely analyzed the documents, it would have
concluded that petitioners could not have validly ousted private respondent from
the property since the basis for its claim of ownership, the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, was actually a document evidencing an equitable

mortgage. It would have accordingly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action.
In fine, had the MTC exercised its bounden duty to study the complaint, it
would have dismissed the same for lack of cause of action upon a provisional
ruling on the issue of ownership based on the allegations and annexes of the
complaint. Or, exercising caution in handling the case, considering petitioners
bare allegations of ownership, it should have required the filing of an answer to
the complaint and, having been alerted by the adverse claim of ownership over
the same property, summarily looked into the issue of ownership over the
property. As this Court declared in Hilario v. Court of Appeals:
It is underscored, however, that the allegations in the complaint for ejectment
should sufficiently make out a case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as the
case may be; otherwise, jurisdiction would not vest in the inferior court.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is, after all, determined by the nature of the
action as alleged or pleaded in the complaint. Thus, even where the defendant
alleges ownership or title to the property in his or her answer, the inferior court
will not be divested of its jurisdiction. A contrary rule would pave the way for the
defendant to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, as he
could easily defeat the same through the simple expedient of asserting
ownership.[40]
As discussed above, even a perusal of the complaint without going over the
claims of private respondent in his answer would have sufficed to arrive at a
provisional determination of the issue of ownership. The importance of such
provisional ruling on the issue of ownership is demanded by the fact that, in the
event that the claim of the plaintiff in an ejectment case is controverted as in this
case, any ruling on the right of possession would be shaky, meaningless and
fraught with unsettling consequences on the property rights of the parties. After
all, the right of possession must stand on a firm claim of ownership.  Had the
MTC made a provisional ruling on the issue of ownership, the parties would have
availed of other remedies in law early on to thresh out their conflicting claims.
Private respondents action for reformation of instrument was in fact a step
in the right direction. However, its failure to pursue that action [41] did not imply
that private respondent had no other remedy under the law as regards the issue
of ownership over the Gilmore property. There are other legal remedies that
either party could have availed of. Some of these remedies, such as an action for
quieting of title, have been held to coexist with actions for unlawful detainer.
[42]
 There is a policy against multiplicity of suits but under the circumstances, only
the institution of proper proceedings could settle the controversy between the
parties in a definitive manner.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 127
Hence, although the Court of Appeals resolved the appeal under the
misconception that the action for reformation of instrument was still viable, it
correctly held that the controversy between the parties was beyond the ordinary
issues in an ejectment case. Because of the opposing claims of the parties as to
the true agreement between them, the issue of ownership was in a sense a
prejudicial question that needed determination before the ejectment case should
have been filed. To reiterate, a decision reached in the ejectment case in favor of
any of the parties would have nonetheless spawned litigation on the issue of
ownership. At any rate, proceedings would have been facilitated had the inferior
courts made even a provisional ruling on such issue.
The contentious circumstances surrounding the case were demonstrated by
an occurrence during the pendency of this petition that cries out for the
resolution of the issue of ownership over the Gilmore property.
After the parties had filed their respective memoranda before this Court,
private respondent filed an urgent motion to cite petitioner Rosita L. Flaminiano
and her husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, in contempt of court. [43] The
motion was founded on an affidavit of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales who resided at the
contested property, deriving his right to do so from private respondent
corporation that is owned by his family. Gonzales alleged that on September 20,
1997, petitioner Flaminiano and her husband entered the property through
craftiness and intimidation. At around 5:30 p.m. on that day, two (2) men
knocked at the gate. When the houseboy, Luis R. Fernandez, opened the gate
for pedestrians tentatively, the two men told him that they would like to visit
Gonzales mother who was ailing.
Once inside, the two men identified themselves as policemen and opened
the gate for twenty (20) men, two (2) trucks and an L-300 van to enter. When
Gonzales went outside the house, he saw thirty (30) to forty (40) men and two
(2) trucks entering the driveway. The person he asked regarding the presence of
those people inside the property turned out to be the brother of petitioner
Flaminiano. That person said, Kami ang may-ari dito. Matagal na kaming
nagtitiis, kayo ang dapat sa labas.  After Gonzales had told him that the property
was still under litigation before this Court, the man said, Walang Supreme Court
Supreme Court.  When Gonzales asked petitioner Flaminiano, who was inside the
premises, to order the people to leave, she said, Papapasukin naminito dahil sa
amin ito. Maglalagay ako ng tao diyan sa loob, sa harap, sa likod. Wala ng
pakiusap.  When a power generator was brought inside the property and
Gonzales pleaded that it be taken out because the noise it would create would
disturb his ailing mother, Emiliana Gonzales, petitioner Flaminiano said, Walang
awa-awa sa akin. Atty. Flaminiano butted in and, referring to Gonzales mother,
said, Ialis mo na, matanda na pala.  When Gonzales prevented the switching on
of some lights in the house due to faulty wiring, Atty. Flaminiano

suggested, Bakit hindi mo ipasunog ito? May insurance pa kayo 5 million, madali
lang yan. Short circuit. Since the Flaminianos and their crew were not about to
leave the property, Gonzales called up his brother, Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and
informed him of what happened. However, instead of confining themselves in the
driveway, the Flaminianos and their group entered the terrace, bringing in food.
Gonzales was all the while concerned about his 81-year-old mother who
had just been discharged from the hospital. However, the Flaminianos stayed
until the next day, September 22, 1997, using the kitchen, furniture and other
fixtures in the house. Gonzales took pictures of Flaminiano and his companions.
When Atty. Flaminiano arrived, he confronted Gonzales and told him, Hindi ako
natatakot kahit kanino ka pa mag-report, kahit pa sa Supreme Court, gusto ko
nga mag-reklamo kayo para matapos ang kaso. Sa September 25, may shooting
dito, gagawin ko ang gusto ko dito.[44]
The affidavits of Renato C. Mola, driver of Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and that
of Luis R. Fernandez, houseboy of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales, as well as the xerox copy
of the sworn statement dated September 21, 1997 of Pria B. Gonzales before the
Philippine National Police in Camp Crame where she filed a complaint against
Atty. Flaminiano for the illegal entry into their house, support the affidavit of Dr.
Gonzales.
In its supplemental motion[45] to cite petitioner Flaminiano and her husband,
Atty. Flaminiano, in contempt of court, private respondent alleged that the
Flaminianos committed additional contumacious acts in preventing another
member of the family, Mrs. Cipriana Gonzales, from entering the property. In her
affidavit, Mrs. Gonzales said that the Flaminianos and their people used the
whole house, except the bedrooms, for their filming activities. [46]
Thereafter, private respondent filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with this Court
to enjoin petitioners, Atty. Flaminiano and their representatives and agents from
preventing private respondent, its agents and representatives from entering the
property and to cease and desist from occupying the property or from
committing further acts of dispossession of the property. [47] On October 13, 1997,
this Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for. [48] In the motion it
filed on October 21, 1997, [49] private respondent informed the Court that the TRO
could not be served upon petitioners immediately because, Atty. Flaminiano,
their counsel of record, had changed address without informing the Court. It was
served upon said counsel only on October 15, 1997. However, instead of
complying with this Courts order, petitioners continued occupying the property.
On October 16, 1997, after receiving a copy of the TRO, petitioners put up a
huge billboard in front of the property stating that it is the national headquarters
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 128
of the Peoples Alliance for National Reconciliation and Unity for Peace and
Progress (PANRUPP).
In their comment on the motion for contempt, petitioners noticeably did not
controvert the facts set forth by private respondent in said motion. Instead, it
reasserted its claim of ownership over the property as evidenced by TCT No.
67990. They alleged that they had mortgaged the property to the Far East Bank
and Trust Company in the amount of thirty million pesos (P30,000,000.00) for
which they are paying a monthly interest of around P675,000.00 without
enjoying the material possession of the subject property which has been
unlawfully and unjustly detained by private respondent for the last four (4) years
as it was used as the residence of the members of the family of its President
ANTONIO B. GONZALES without the said private respondent paying rentals
thereon for the period from January 1995 up to October 5, 1997 when the said
property was voluntarily vacated by the members of the President (sic) of
respondent corporation, ANTONIO B. GONZALES, who has since then been a
fugitive from justice having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of
estafa through falsification of public document and has succeeded in evading his
sentence.
They averred that Tadeo Gonzales erroneously claimed that the rights of
ownership and possession over the property are still under litigation because the
issue of ownership is no longer involved in this litigation when the complaint for
reformation of instrument with annulment of sale and title filed by private
respondent was dismissed with finality by reason of non-suit. Hence, they
claimed that they now stand to be the unquestionable registered and lawful
owners of the property subject of controversy and that the July 24, 1996
Decision of the Court of Appeals has already lost its virtuality and legal efficacy
with the occurrence of a supervening event which is a superior cause
superseding the basis of the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 39227 of respondent court.
They informed the Court that they are now leasing the property to
PANRUPP from October 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998. They alleged, however,
that the property is in a deplorable state of decay and deterioration that they
saw the need to act swiftly and decisively to prevent further destruction of the
property where they invested millions of pesos of their life-time savings to
acquire the same. Hence, they sought the assistance of barangay officials in
Barangay Mariana, New Manila who helped them effect the peaceful entry into
the property of the petitioners without the use of strategy, force and intimidation
contrary to what was alleged in the motion for contempt. They peacefully took
over possession of the property on September 20, 1997 but allowed the
immediate members of the family of private respondents president to stay
on. The family finally agreed to vacate the premises on October 5, 1997 upon
the offer of the petitioners to shoulder partially the expenses for the

hospitalization of the ailing mother at the St. Luke General Hospital where she
was brought by an ambulance accompanied by a doctor at petitioners expense.
Petitioners questioned the issuance by this Court of the TRO on October 13,
1997, asserting that when it was issued, there were no more acts to restrain the
illegal occupants of the subject property (as they) had already peacefully vacated
the premises on October 5, 1997 or more than a week after the said TRO was
issued by the Third Division of this Court. They prayed that the motion for
contempt be denied for lack of merit and that the TRO issued be lifted and set
aside for the act or acts sought to be restrained have already been done and
have become a fait accomplibefore the issuance of the TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER on October 13, 1997.[50]
As earlier discussed, petitioners claim that the dismissal of the action for
reformation of instrument for non-suit had written finis to the issue of ownership
over the Gilmore property is totally unfounded in law. Petitioners should be
reminded that the instant petition stemmed from an unlawful detainer case, the
issue of which is merely possession of the property in question.  The issue of
ownership has not been definitively resolved for the provisional determination of
that issue that should have been done by the MTC at the earliest possible time,
would only be for the purpose of determining who has the superior right to
possess the property. Inasmuch as this Court has resolved that the rightful
possessor should have been private respondent and its representatives and
agents, the TRO issued by this Court on October 13, 1997 should not be
lifted. That the TRO was issued days before private respondent left the property
is immaterial. What is in question here is lawful possession of the property, not
possession on the basis of self-proclaimed ownership of the property . For their
part, petitioners should cease and desist from further exercising possession of
the same property which possession, in the first place, does not legally belong to
them.
The conduct of petitioner Flaminiano in taking possession over the property
as alleged by private respondent through Tadeo Gonzales is deplorably high-
handed. On an erroneous assumption that she had been legally vested with
ownership of the property, she took steps prior to the present proceedings by
illegally taking control and possession of the same property in litigation. Her act
of entering the property in defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the Court of Appeals constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court that should be dealt with accordingly.
Be that as it may, what is disturbing to the Court is the conduct of her
husband, Eduardo Flaminiano, a lawyer[51] whose actuations as an officer of the
court should be beyond reproach. His contumacious acts of entering the Gilmore
property without the consent of its occupants and in contravention of the existing
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 129
writ or preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals and making
utterances showing disrespect for the law and this Court, are certainly
unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar. To be sure, he asserted in his
comment on the motion for contempt that petitioners peacefully took over the
property. Nonetheless, such peaceful take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ
of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force. Notably, he did not
comment on nor categorically deny that he committed the contumacious acts
alleged by private respondent. Through his acts, Atty. Flaminiano has flouted his
duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or abetting activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.[52]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED without
prejudice to the filing by either party of an action regarding the ownership of the
property involved. The temporary restraining order issued on October 13, 1997 is
hereby made permanent. Petitioners and their agents are directed to turn over
possession of the property to private respondent.
Petitioner Rosita Flaminiano is hereby held guilty of contempt of court for
disobeying the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals and accordingly
fined P20,000.00 therefor. Her counsel and husband, Atty. Eduardo B.
Flaminiano, is ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00 for committing contumacious
acts unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to his record at the Office of the Bar Confidant.
This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan,  and Purisima, JJ.,  concur.
Pardo, J.,  no part.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 130

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, 

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION),
CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.

F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.

Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this
case, notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties.
It would indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and
private respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial
atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father
and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony
and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise

but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any
judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein
private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively
employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as
operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as
farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with other allowances covering
housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily
activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation,
planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters
relating to the hacienda  and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to
him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the
upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with
his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November,
1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep
sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was
under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute
gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to
January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of
his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation.
However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay
the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation
for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private
respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary.
Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October
17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent
for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 131
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the
NLRC,1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of
his employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay
petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of
said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as
required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling
in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On
appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was
affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is
entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and
other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The
discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions
presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased
to function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts
received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are in
the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment
by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General
recommended a modification of the decision of herein public respondent
sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB
Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own
comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November
16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its
earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor
arbiter is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the
fact that because of the special relationship of the parties and
the nature of the action involved, this case could very well go
down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of
its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his
father's namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir
against his own father.9

Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2)
observations were noted that may justify why this labor case
deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints
that petitioner and private respondent had with each other,
were personal matters affecting father and son relationship.
And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work,
they allow their personal relationship to come in the way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of
want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due
process. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon
the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not
conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by
petitioner of his functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private
respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It
is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of
the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be
appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of
the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer
to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously
citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],  the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that
want of page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code
that technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling, and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively
ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to
be rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one
who conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not
the judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the
judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care
and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final
dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case. 12
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 132
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo
T. Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July
11, 1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who
eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially
considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a
public officer's functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due
process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure
must be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we
cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial
technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be
hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that
no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by
law and after due process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the
causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit: 
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by
the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses
or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking,
unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of
the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department
of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date
thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided
by law.15Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment
of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's
health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the
prescribed separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that
abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the
former's dismissal from employment. 17

After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent
gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that
petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such
employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or  employee are as follows:
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally
accorded to the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein
public respondent NLRC,18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are
declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point
deserve acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from
October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as
abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr.
Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City
(Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by
medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed
in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to
recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters
of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not
really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda
Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special
circumstances involved and basic human experience,
petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent
Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for
petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the
period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such
absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and
hearing.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 133
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an
(1) failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2)
clear intention to sever the employer-
employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer
in Labor and Social Legislation, 1989 edition,
p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what
constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company
v. NLRC  (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for
abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the
intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be
inferred that the employee has no more interest to work.
Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. NLRC  (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a
valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that
the employee simply does not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no
abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to
leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his
illness and strained family relations. Second he has some
medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to
work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private
respondent of his intention to assume again his employment.
Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for
illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All
these are indications that petitioner had no intention to
abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's
confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical
treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of

petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the
medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until
he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's
ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding
periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of
said illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending
physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on
the part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from
work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume
employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment
as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner
unmistakably may be classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the law
grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when
petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply
being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. His
duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or
to be at the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control
from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he
runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may
definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite
successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during the
time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the
years 1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was
recuperating from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct
involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal, hence the
supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was
necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers
only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not
extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really
was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment
contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his
employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his
employment. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against
him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 134
residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee
relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his
son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept
petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee of the haciendafor social
security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated
deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January,
1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work
that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no
longer listed him as an employee. According to private respondent, whatever
amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until 
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous
doles from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual
deductions were made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private
respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was
angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on
oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, " (h)e quemado
los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as
expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations
of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter
abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent
takes the novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter
abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial
abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly
knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical
bills. The assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further
belied by his continued performance of various services related to the operations
of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his
father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or
allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of having
recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as
expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner
contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are
designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions,
as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm
administrator.27

To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment
may justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the
failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a
clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt
acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his
son's plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-
1982, prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which
private respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to
believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent
neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at
such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence
as even after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became
convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued
to perform services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These
are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm
machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for
additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash
advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities,
Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through  whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate
to the normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's
prerogative to request or even command his child to run errands for him. In the
present case, however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as
the property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private
respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these
matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held
accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other
details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned
his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be
awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern
himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would
then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further
authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him
to continue to perform work-related tasks:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 135
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed 
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating
—
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a
resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as
PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and
a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-
ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks
with BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to
which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these
presents 
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and
lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
ME and in my name, place and stead, my check/checks
aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given
the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place
and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said
check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to
turn the same over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my 
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing
the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a
"CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx

remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have
been terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous
requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and
benefits,33 the issuance of withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence
reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically,
his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has
abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness
for private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative
of the latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the
taking of such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the
failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to
said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to 
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice
thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by
Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates
that at such an important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of
testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and
cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated
as salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to
petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in
his capacity as farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts
contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent
cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view
of the peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly
in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's
welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor37 should be necessary and
required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of
the father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As
we have determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly
sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for
services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were
not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of
parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment
can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act
on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 136
The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of
his employment38 does not square with the elements constitutive of
abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by
private respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for
want of notice and hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that
Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an
employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did
not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly
abandoned his employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are
set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to
dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the
particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his
dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be
served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the
allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal
within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately
notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating
clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker
to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a
complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.

xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a
monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over
the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the
month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers,
the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement
and termination of employment, the positions last held by
them and such other information as may be required by the
Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that
petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any
notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a
chance to be heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of
the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular
case, he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This
fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the
Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of
termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless
cannot be denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to
be dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing
rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address, by
way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's
prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause
therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does
not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it
has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in
favor of the employee.42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the
Solicitor General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the
respondent as to his defense of implied
resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 137
Department of 
Labor and Employment for his sons'
(sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as
required by BP 130. And for this failure, the
other requisite for a valid termination by an
employer was not complied with. This
however, would not work to invalidate the
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for
dismissal. The validity of the cause of
dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be
imposed on the respondent for his failure to
observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-
12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation
v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the
facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must
not be rewarded 
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to
observe procedural due process. The public policy behind this
is that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and
render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be
observed. However, the employer must be penalized for his
infraction of due process. In the present case, however, not
only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his
dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his
employment because he has a justifiable excuse. 43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the
mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally
dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the
imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the
due process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there
was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to
submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional
office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the
implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee
sought to be dismissed by the employer.

Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the
right of every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional
and statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an
employee in case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages
in the absence of just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous
occasions has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code,
recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would
militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and
declares that where there are strained relations between the employer and the
employee, payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead
of reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial employees are
concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore
appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what
the law accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's
ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and to his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his
reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But
in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this
Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement,
differences should be made between managers and the
ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company
which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a
competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 138
difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. It
cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with
the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers
who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not
be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism
between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not
be reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The
present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so
strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
relationship is hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his
dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted
oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further
prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of
unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to
compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries
spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the
proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a
matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated.51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past
allowing recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was
attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,52 and of
exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages
prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the
case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where
moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were
genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers'
capricious exercise of power.

In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can
equally be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately
aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful
settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how their actuations
seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them
negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that
each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this reason, we hold
that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should
be modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case
because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or
such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without
notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of
illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a
period not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in
lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of
service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1)
year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs.
NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be
dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault.54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records,
sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be
reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with  therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It
is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all
reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and
especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties
between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by
advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic
forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 139
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a)
lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell
short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of
the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared
toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their
acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation
even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective
clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable
case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable
settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at
least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this
controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been
obliged to make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members
of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no
truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations.
While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein
squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are
saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about the
reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and
that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the
breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the
parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope,
respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear
to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages
for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or
deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as
one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 140

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-29543. November 29, 1969.]

GLORIA PAJARES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD

SANTOS, MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA and UDHARAM BAZAR
CO., Respondents-Appellees.

Moises C. Nicomedes for Petitioner-Appellant.

Tomas Lopez Valencia for Respondents-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROCEDURE; BILL OF PARTICULARS; DENIAL OF MOTION

THEREFOR IN INSTANT CASE NOT ERROR OF LAW. — It is plain and clear that
no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was committed by
respondent judge in denying appellant’s motion for a bill of particulars in the
collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by respondent-appellee
for the recovery of her indebtedness of P354.85 representing the overdue
balance of her account for ready-made goods ordered by and delivered to her in
1961. Appellee’s complaint precisely and concisely informed appellant of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action against her, in
accordance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENTIARY MATTERS NOT SUBJECT TO BILL OF

PARTICULARS. — Where the particulars sought all concerned evidentiary
matters, the same do not come within the scope of Rule 12, Section I of the
Rules of Court which permits a party to move for a definite statement or for a bill
of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for

trial.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTICULARS INVOLVED IN INSTANT CASE WITHIN
KNOWLEDGE OF ADVERSE PARTY. — Since appellant was engaged in the
business of buying and selling merchandise and appellee was one of her
creditors from whom she used to buy on credit ready-made goods for resale,
appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars sought by her to enable her
to prepare her answer to the complaint or to prepare for trial. These particulars
were just as much within her knowledge as appellee’s. She could not logically
pretend ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check and verify
her own records of her outstanding account with appellee and state in her
answer whether the outstanding balance of her indebtedness was in the sum
claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount. Furthermore, a month before
appellee filed its collection case, it had written appellant a demand-letter for the
payment of her outstanding account of P354.85 within one week and appellant,
through her counsel, wrote appellee acknowledging her said indebtedness.
4. COURTS; CLOGGING OF COURT DOCKETS- COLLECTION CASE INVOLVED IN
INSTANT CASE NEEDLESSLY CLOGGED COURT DOCKETS. — In this case, the
simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven
years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess
judgment and ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge
her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred would
have been much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet,
here she still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated
interests, after having spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in
this worthless cause.
5. ID.; ID.; REMINDER TO LITIGANTS AND ATTORNEYS AGAINST FILING OF
UNMERITORIOUS CASES. — The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is
needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases
may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it
is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."
DECISION
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 141
TEEHANKEE, J.:
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant’s appeal from the lower Court’s Order
of dismissal of her petition for a writ of certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction against respondent judge’s order denying her motion for a bill of
particulars as the defendant in a simple collection case.
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated
August 16, 1968 certifying the appeal to this Court as involving purely questions
of law:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria Pajares from the order dated
July 21, 1962 issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge
Estrella Abad Santos of the Municipal Court of Manila and respondent Udharam
Bazar & Co.
"There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria
Pajares before the Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain sum of
money. The lawsuit was docketed in the inferior court as Civil Case No. 97309
and was eventually assigned to the sala of the respondent Judge Abad Santos.
"In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of ready made
goods and delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but
did not make the full payment up to the present time;
"‘3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85,
representing the balance of her account as the value of the said goods, which is
already overdue and payable.’
"Instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares, however, moved
for a bill of particulars praying the inferior court to require the Udharam Bazar &
Co. to itemize the kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said
company, the respective dates they were taken and by whom they were received
as well as their purchase prices, alleging that without this bill she would not be
able to meet the issues raised in the complaint.
"After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria Pajares for a bill

of particulars. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by the said
court, she then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of
Manila, alleging in support of her petition that in denying her motion for a bill of
particulars, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion.
"But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the petition for a writ of
Preliminary injunction, for the reasons: (1) that the allegations of the complaint
filed by the said company in the inferior court, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3
thereof, are clear, specific and sufficiently appraise the defendant, now herein
petitioner Gloria Pajares, of the nature of the cause of action against her so as to
enable her to prepare for her defenses; and (2) that the things asked for in the
motion for a bill of particulars are evidentiary matters, which are beyond the pale
of such bill. Convinced that the said motion of the company is well founded, the
lower court accordingly dismissed the petition on April 21, 1962.
"Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by the
court below, Gloria Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court,
contending under her lone assignment of error to maintain her such appeal that
the lower court erred in dismissing her petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction, in its order dated July 21, 1962, as amended by its order dated
August 18, 1962.
"The only genuine issues involved in the case at bar are (1) whether the
allegations of the complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of the nature of
the cause of action against her; and (2) whether the items asked for by the said
Gloria Pajares in her motion for a bill of particulars constitute evidentiary
matters. To our mind these are purely legal questions. A perusal of the brief of
the parties has shown that no genuine factual questions are at all involved in this
appeal."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion,
was committed by respondent judge in denying appellant’s motion for a bill of
particulars in the collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by
private respondent-appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness of P354.85
representing the overdue balance of her account for ready-made goods ordered
by and delivered to her in 1961. Appellee’s complaint precisely and concisely
informed appellant of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of
action against her, in accordance with the requirements of the Rules of Court. 1  virtua1aw library
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her
motion that appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in
detail the goods represented by the alleged amount of P354.85, giving the dates
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 142
and invoice numbers on which they were delivered to the defendant, the amount
due on each such invoice and by whom they were received." These particulars
sought all concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of
Rule 12, section 1 of the Rules of Court which permits a party "to move for a
definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred
with sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable him to prepare his responsive
pleading or to prepare for trial."cralaw virtua1aw library
Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of buying and selling
merchandise at her stall at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City, and appellee was
one of her creditors from whom she used to buy on credit ready-made goods for
resale, appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars sought by her to
enable her to prepare her answer to the complaint or to prepare for trial. These
particulars were just as much within her knowledge as appellee’s. She could not
logically pretend ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check
and verify her own records of her outstanding account with appellee and state in
her answer whether from her records the outstanding balance of her
indebtedness was in the sum of P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser
amount.
The record shows, furthermore, that a month before appellee filed its collection
case, it had written appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her
outstanding account in the said sum of P354.85 within one week. Appellant,
through her counsel, wrote appellee under date of March 23, 1962,
acknowledging her said indebtedness but stating that "Due to losses she has
sustained in the operation of her stall, she would not be able to meet your
request for payment of the full amount of P354.85 at once. I would therefore
request you to be kind enough to allow her to continue paying you P10.00 every
15th and end of the month as heretofore."cralaw virtua1aw library
No error was therefore committed by the lower court in summarily dismissing
appellant’s petition for certiorari against respondent judge’s order denying her
motion for a bill of particulars, as pretended by appellant in her lone assignment
of error. Well may we apply to this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in an analogous case, 2 that "the circumstances surrounding this litigation
definitely prove that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and
prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting
as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases."cralaw
Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for
over seven years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to
confess judgment and ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 143

discharge her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has
incurred by way of filing fees in the Court of First Instance, premiums for her
appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, printing of her appellant’s brief, and
attorney’s fees would have been much more than sufficient to pay off her just
debt to appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with the same debt,
burdened by accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly much more than
the amount in litigation in this worthless cause.

As we recently said in another case, 3 the cooperation of litigants and their

attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with
unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to
Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an SECOND DIVISION
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to [G.R. No. L-36138. January 31, 1974.]
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that
"for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO
action."cralaw virtua1aw library ROSQUETA, JR., EUGENIO ROSQUETA and CITONG BRINGAS,
defendants-appellants; ATTY. GREGORIO B. ESTACIO, Respondent.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-appellant’s
counsel shall pay treble costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in the
personal record of the attorney for petitioner-appellant in this Court for future RESOLUTION
reference. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,

FERNANDO, J.:
Fernando and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Every now and then, although there seems to be more of such cases of late, a
member of the bar is proceeded against for failure to live up to the responsibility
owed to a client as well as to this Court. This is another such instance. In our
resolution of May 25, 1973, we required respondent Gregorio B. Estacio, counsel
de parte for appellants to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him for failure to file the brief for appellants within the period which
expired on March 30, 1973. He failed to show cause as thus required, and on
September 7, 1973, we issued a resolution suspending him from the practice of
law except for the purpose of filing the brief which should be done within thirty
days from receipt of notice. Then on October 22, 1973, he filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein it appeared that he did seek to explain his failure to file
the brief on time, but he left it to be mailed on June 9, 1973 with Antonio
Rosqueta, Sr., father of appellants Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and Eusebio Rosqueta,
who, however, was unable to do so as on the 10th of June, his house caught
fire. He would impress on this Court that he was not informed of such occurrence
until the preparation of his motion for reconsideration. At any rate, he would
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 144

stress that both Antonio Rosqueta, Sr. and Salvador Labariento, father-in-law of be designated as counsel de oficio. That way the interest of justice is best
the third appellant, Citong Bringas, informed him they would withdraw the served. Appellants will then continue to receive the benefits of advocacy from
appeal as they could not raise the money needed for pursuing it. He had a one who is familiar with the facts of the case. What is more, there is no undue
supplement to such motion for reconsideration filed on October 25, 1973 wherein delay in the administration of justice. Lawyers of such category are entitled to
he stated that he could not secure the affidavits of appellants themselves as two commendation. They manifest fidelity to the concept that law is a profession and
of them were in the Penal Colony in Davao and the third in the Iwahig Penal not a mere trade with those engaged in it being motivated solely by the desire to
Colony in Palawan. On November 5, 1973, this Court required appellants to make money. Respondent’s conduct yields a different impression. What has
comment on a motion for reconsideration of respondent concerning specifically earned a reproof however is his irresponsibility. He should be aware that in the
their alleged desire to withdraw appeal. pursuance of the duty owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot be too
casual and unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is not enough that he
Then on December 27, 1973, there was a motion of respondent submitting two prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly mailed. Such inattention as
affidavits, one from Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and the aforesaid Citong Bringas and shown in this case is inexcusable. At any rate, the suspension meted on him
the other from Eusebio Rosqueta wherein they indicated their consent and under the circumstances is more than justified. It seems, however, that well-nigh
approval to respondent’s motion to withdraw appeal. The joint affidavit of the five months had elapsed. That would suffice to atone for his misdeed.
first two appellants reads as follows: "1. That we are the same persons named
above who have been charged in Criminal Case No. L-36138 entitled People v. WHEREFORE, the suspension of Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is lifted. The
Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., Et. Al. pending on appeal before the Supreme Court of the requirement to file the brief is dispensed with but Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is
Philippines; 2. That we hereby consent and approve the motion to withdraw the censured for negligence and inattention to duty. Likewise, as prayed for by
appeal filed by our counsel, Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio before the Supreme Court appellants themselves, their appeal is dismissed.
of the Philippines on that Criminal Case No. L-36138 then pending in said Court;
3. That we have given our consent and approval of our own will voluntarily, Zaldivar, Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
without duress, force, threat or fraud or deceit; [In witness whereof], we have
hereunto set our signatures this 4th day of December 1973 in the Municipality of
Panabo, Davao." 1 The affidavit of Eusebio Rosqueta follows: "1. That I am one
of the accused in that case entitled People v. Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., Et. Al. under
No. G.R. L-36138 now pending before the Supreme Court of the Philippines; 2.
That I hereby give my consent and approval to the Motion to Withdraw the
Appeal which has been filed by our counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio before the
Supreme Court on the above-stated case; 3. That I have reached this conclusion
after I have conferred with our counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio and this
statement hereby revokes and nullifies the statement signed by me on December
5, 1973 at the Central Sub-Colony, Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan before
witnesses, namely, Mr. Abencio B. Gabayan and Miss Merle J. Jopida; 4. That I
have executed this affidavit of my own free will, without intimidation, threat,
fraud, deceit, duress or force; [In witness whereof], I have hereunto set my
hand this 13th day of December, 1973 in the City of Puerto Princesa." 2 

Respondent’s liability is thus mitigated but he cannot be absolved from the

irresponsible conduct of which he is guilty. Respondent should be aware that
even in those cases where counsel de parte is unable to secure from appellants
or from their near relatives the amount necessary to pursue the appeal, that
does not necessarily conclude his connection with the case. It has been a
commendable practice of some members of the bar under such circumstances, to
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 145

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-80718. January 29, 1988.]

FELISA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, Petitioners, v. COURT OF

APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL
and LUIS BERNAL, SR., Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; PERIOD FOR APPEALING OR

FOR FILING A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, NON-EXTENDIBLE. — The rule
laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,
1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GROSS PERIOD IN BOCAVA CASE, INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE
AT BAR. — The one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986
of the Court’s Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new
trial or reconsideration may still be allowed cannot be invoked by the petitioners
as their motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than
a year after the grace period on June 30, 1986.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2)
resolutions of the Special Division of the Court of Appeals in the Luis Bernal, Sr.,
Et. Al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, Et Al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first
resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second
Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being
verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if
the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and
substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burnedout building owned
by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family
of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death
of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but
the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial
Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M.
Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on
August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25,
1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion
for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46], that
the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 146
promulgated on May 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and
clarified the rule, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may
be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
(at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
[G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and
went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 16, 1985, 144
SCRA 161], stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the
operation of the grace period, to wit:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In other words, there is one-month grace period from the promulgation on May
30, 1986 of the Court’s Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to
June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions
for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it
is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be
allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court
[G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].
In the instant case, however, petitioners’ motion for extension of time was filed
on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period
on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said
rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of

Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law requiring
the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can
be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty
of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court’s decision holding petitioner liable under
Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse,
if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs."cralaw virtua1aw library
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents
had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning
to vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be
disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant
petition for lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 147
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-38581. March 31, 1976.]
LORENZO JOSE, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Carreon & Carreon and Zosimo D. de Mesa for Petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
Eulogio Raquel-Santos and Solicitor Teodoro G. Bonifacio
for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner was convicted of illegal possession of explosives (handgrenade) that
was found on his person at the time of his notice of appeal and thereafter, a
motion for the reopening of the case to permit him to present, pursuant to a
reservation he made in the course of the trial, permit to possess the
handgrenade in question. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that it
had lost jurisdiction over the case elevated to the Court of Appeals where
petitioner prayed for his acquittal or, in the alternative, for the remand of the
case back to the trial court for new trial. The appealed decision was affirmed.
Motions for reconsideration and/or new trial were filed but were denied, hence,
this petition for review which the Supreme Court at first denied but later
reconsidered and treated as a special civil action.
The Supreme Court ruled that in the interest of justice and in view of the
circumstance of the case, petitioner should be afforded the opportunity of
producing exculpating evidence.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 148

circumstances obtaining in the case at bar justify a reopening of petitioner’s case

Judgment of conviction set aside and case remanded to the court a quo for new
trial.
overriding goals of courts of justice — to render justice where justice is due — to
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; NEW TRIAL; GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE. — It is an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence
was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the
evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(d) it must go to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted.
to afford him the opportunity of producing exculpating evidence. This is a
situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the
secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a
crime of which he is charged. The failure of the Court of Appeals to appreciate
the merits of the situation, involving as it does the liberty of an individual,
thereby closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted,
constitute a grave abuse of discretion which calls for relief from this Court.
DECISION
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

2. ID.; ID.; GROUNDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. — Petitioner does not justify

his motion for a new trial on newly discovered evidence, but rather on broader
Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of explosives
grounds of substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
(handgrenade) and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of five years, seeks a new
Correctly so, the authority of appellate court over an appealed case is broad and
trial which was denied him by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch
ample enough to embrace situations where the court may grant a new trial for
III, and by respondent Court of Appeals.
reasons other than that provided in Sec. 13 of the same Rule, or Sec. 2, Rule 121
of the Rules of Court. While Sec. 13, rule 124, and Sec. 2, Rule 121 provide for
Petitioner thus poses one legal issue for the court to resolve, viz: did respondent
specific grounds for a new trial, i. e., newly discovered evidence and errors of
appellate court commit an error of law and gravely abuse its discretion when it
law or irregularities committed during the trial, Sec. 11, Rule 124 does not so
denied petitioner’s motion for new trial "for the reception of (1) the written
specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the court the determination,
permit of petitioner to possess and use handgrenade, and (2) the written
on a case to case basis, of what would constitute meritorious circumstances
appointment of petitioner as PC agent with Code No. P-36-68 and Code Name
warranting a new trial or retrial.
‘Safari’ (both documents are dated 31 January 1968)" ? 1 
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES ORDERED ON GROUNDS NOT
The following incidents are not in dispute:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR BY LAW. — Admittedly, courts may suspend its
own rules or except a case, from them for the purposes of justice or, in a proper
On February 8, 1968, at the poblacion of Floridablanca, Pampanga, petitioner
case, disregard them. In this jurisdiction, in not a few instances, this Court
Jose was arrested by the local police leading to the filing with the Court of First
ordered a new trial in criminal case on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz:
Instance of Pampanga, Branch III of several criminal cases against him to wit:
retraction of witness (People v. Oscar Castelo, Et Al., Phil. 54), negligence or
illegal discharge of firearm (Crim. Case 6235), robbery (Crim. Case 6236) and
incompetency of counsel (U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74), improvident plea of
illegal possession of explosives (Crim. Case 6237). These three cases were jointly
guilty (People v. Solacito, L-29209, August 25, 1969), disqualification of an
tried after which the trial judge, Hon. Honorio Romero, in a decision dated
attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial (U.S. v. Laranja, 21 Phil.
December 15, 1969, and promulgated on January 15, 1970 2 acquitted accused
500), and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into
Lorenzo Jose of illegal discharge of firearm and robbery, but convicted him for
by both the presection and the defense (U.S. v. Pobre,11 Phil. 51).
illegal possession of the handgrenade that was found on his person at the time
of his arrest.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW TRIAL WARRANTED IN CASE AT BAR. — The

After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day, filed his notice
of appeal. Nine days thereafter or more particularly on January 24, 1970,
petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be reopened to permit him to
present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the course of the trial, a
permit to possess the handgrenade in question. The trial court in its order of
January 30, 1970 denied the motion mainly on the ground that it had lost
jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the appeal by the accused
on the very date the decision was promulgated. 3  result;
The records of Criminal Case 6237 were then elevated to the Court of Appeals
where petitioner as accused-appellant raised the issues of (1) an erroneous
conviction for illegal possession of explosives when there was no proof of an
essential element of the crime, and (2) erroneous denial of his motion to reopen
the case for the reception of his permit to possess the handgrenade. 4 In his
brief, Lorenzo Jose prayed for his acquittal or in the alternative for the remand of
the case back to the trial court for a new trial.
Resolving the appeal, respondent Appellate Court, 5 rendered its decision of
March 8, 1974, affirming the findings of fact and the judgment of conviction of
the court a quo, and declaring that no. reversible error was committed by the
latter when it denied the reopening of the case as the court had lost its "power
to change, modify, or alter its decision." 6  Appeals, L-38071, April 25, 1974; please see Annotation: 52 SCRA 346. . . ." (pp.
A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed with a plea that
"assuming arguendo that the court a quo lacked jurisdiction to act upon
appellant’s motion for new trial because of the perfection of the appeal, this
Honorable Court — before which said motion was reiterated and which has
competence to act thereon — should have granted the same if for no other
reason than to prevent a miscarriage of justice which is the inevitable result of its
denial." 7 This motion for reconsideration was denied in respondent court’s
resolution of April 3, 1974. 8  drew a lengthy reply from petitioner’s counsel.
A second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed by Lorenzo Jose 9
but this was also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution promulgated on
July 24, 1974. 10  Jose both before this Honorable Court and respondent Court of Appeals as to his
Forthwith, appellant Lorenzo Jose assisted by counsel, Atty. Francisco Carreon,
filed with Us this petition for review which We denied outright on September 6,
1974, "the question raised being factual and for insufficient showing that the
findings of facts by respondent court are unsupported by substantial evidence,
and for lack of merit."cralaw virtua1aw library
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner stressing that the following
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 149
grounds should justify this Court to review the ruling of respondent appellate
court, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. petitioner’s plight is of compelling human and legal interest, and his being
imprisoned for five (5) years when there is indubitable exculpatory evidence on
hand is a result — so harsh that the Honorable Court may well undertake a
review of the case just to satisfy itself of the justice and inevitability of such a
"2. a question of substance not heretofore determined by the Honorable Court is
involved, as the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial is, technically,
not newly discovered; and
"3. the denial of a new trial in the circumstances mentioned in his above-quoted
statement of the main legal issue, is contrary to the decisions of this Honorable
Court because under these decisions, the new trial should have been granted
since there is a ‘strong, compelling reason’ in this case for granting the relief
prayed for, such strong compelling reason being the very strong probability of
petitioner’s acquittal if a new trial were granted. (Workmen’s Insurance Co. v.
Augusto, 40 SCRA 123; Sison v. Gatchalian, 51 SCRA 262; Rubio v. Mariano 52
SCRA 338; Montecines v. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 14; Posadas v. Court of
157-158, rollo).
The Solicitor General opposed the granting of the foregoing motion for
reconsideration claiming that there was neither a denial of "substantial justice
nor error of any sort on the part of respondent Court of Appeals, affirming the
judgment of conviction," and that it being admitted by petitioner that the
evidence sought to be introduced by him at the new trial is not newly discovered
evidence, the denial of the new trial "visibly appears as correct." This Opposition
On February 13, 1975, a Manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor General
informing the Court that in view of the "persistence of accused petitioner Lorenzo
alleged existing appointment as PC Agent and/or authority to possess
handgrenade," in the interest of justice, he was constrained to make pertinent
inquiries from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in reply sent his letter
dated December 27, 1974 with enclosures, xerox copies of which are being
attached to the manifestation as Annexes A, B, C, C-1 and D. 11 
Annex A of the above-mentioned Manifestation of the Solicitor General
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza Padre Faura, Manila.
Dear Solicitor General Mendoza:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"With reference to your letter of December 5, 1974, please be informed that
Colonel Pedrito C. de Guzman, who is now Provincial Commander of Sorsogon
Constabulary Command, confirmed that he executed an affidavit on May 4, 1974
at Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that he appointed Mr. Lorenzo Jose of Betis,
Guagua, Pampanga as PC Agent on January 31, 1968.
"The incumbent Provincial Commander of Pampanga Constabulary Command
also confirmed the appointment of Lorenzo Jose as PC agent during the year
1968.
"Attached herewith are the pertinent papers related to the said appointment.
"Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
FIDEL V. RAMOS  upholding the time-honored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this Court
Major General, AFP
Chief of Constabulary"  assure the public that while guilt shall not escape, innocence shall not suffer. (69
(p. 191, rollo)
Inclosure:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Appointment paper  We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals that
of subject person dtd
Jan. 31, 1968 with  a handgrenade — were supposed to be known to petitioner and existing at the
Personal History 
Statement
Annex B is the appointment dated January 31, 1968 of petitioner Lorenzo Jose as
a PC Agent of the Pampanga Constabulary Command with Code Number P-36-68
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 150
and Code Name "Safari" with expiration on December 31, 1968, the pertinent
portion of which We quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This Headquarters will, from time to time, provide you firearms and such other
equipment which it may deem necessary for your personal protection on the
need basis which will be covered by separate written authority." (p. 192, rollo).
In a Resolution of February 21, 1975, the Court resolved to set aside the denial
of this petition for review, to give due course and consider the Petition as a
special civil action. In another Resolution of April 4, 1975, the parties were given
time to submit their respective memorandum.
This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the
overriding goal of courts of justice — to render justice where justice is due — to
secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a
crime of which he is charged. The failure of the Court of Appeals to appreciate
the merits of the situation, involving as it does the liberty of an individual,
thereby closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted,
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion which calls for relief from this Court.
At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for
in Suarez v. Platon, Et Al., that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a
sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to
Phil. 556, 564-565, quoting Justice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme Court in 69
U.S. Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309) The Solicitor General now concedes
that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding this case to the
court of origin for a new trial.
the evidence sought to be presented by the petitioner do not fall under the
category of newly-discovered evidence because the same — his alleged
appointment as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary and a permit to possess
time of trial and not discovered only thereafter.
It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground
of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the
evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and

(d) it must go to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted. 12  to afford human opportunity to establish his innocence of the crime charged.
However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new trial on newly
discovered evidence, but rather on broader grounds of substantial justice under
Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Power of appellate court on appeal. — Upon appeal from a judgment of the
Court of First Instance, the appellate court may reverse, affirm, or modify the
judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand
the case to the Court of First Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the
case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent appellate
court over an appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace situations as
the instant case where the court may grant a new trial or a retrial for reasons
other than that provided in Section 13 of the same Rule, or Section 2, Rule 121
of the Rules of Court. 13 While Section 13, Rule 124, and Section 2, Rule 121,
provide for specific grounds for a new trial, i.e. newly discovered evidence, and
errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, Section 11, Rule 124
quoted above does not so specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the
court the determination, on a case to case basis, of what would constitute
meritorious circumstances warranting a new trial or retrial.
Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to aid and not to
obstruct the proper administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hands that dispense justice,
for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion.
Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them
for the purposes of justice 14 or, in a proper case, disregard them. 15 In this
jurisdiction, in not a few instances, 15 this Court ordered a new trial in criminal
cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, 16
negligence or incompetency of counsel, 17 improvident plea of guilty, 18
disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial
court, 19 and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered
into by both the prosecution and the defense. 20  outcome of the case within a reasonable time. Without pronouncement as to
Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper
the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. 21  So ordered.
Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case now before
Us which may be classified as exceptional enough to warrant a new trial if only
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 151
Thus — petitioner was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a
handgrenade in the court below. He claimed to be an agent of the Philippine
Constabulary with a permit to possess explosives such as the handgrenade in
question. However, he found himself in a situation where he had to make a
choice — reveal his identity as an undercover agent of the Philippine
Constabulary assigned to perform intelligence work on subversive activities and
face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of the dissidents
considering that Floridablanca, the site of the incident, was in the heart of
"Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a possible exoneration or acquittal based on
insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. Without revealing his identity as
an agent of the Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he
had a permit to possess the handgrenade and prayed for time to present the
same. The permit however could not be produced because it would reveal his
intelligence work activities. Came the judgment of conviction and with it the
staggering impact of a five-year imprisonment. The competent authorities then
realized that it was unjust for this man to go to jail for a crime he had not
committed, hence, came the desired evidence concerning petitioner’s
appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent and his authority to possess a
handgrenade for the protection of his person, but, it was too late according to
the trial court because in the meantime the accused had perfected his appeal.
We find and hold that the above circumstances justify a reopening of petitioner’s
case to afford him the opportunity of producing exculpating evidence. An
outright acquittal from this Court which petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is
not proper. As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General, the People is to be
given the chance of examining the documentary evidence sought to be
produced, and of cross-examining the persons who executed the same, as well
as the accused himself, now petitioner, on his explanation for the non-production
of the evidence during the trial.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby set aside the judgment of conviction of the
herein petitioner, Lorenzo Jose, and remand the case to the court a quo for a
new trial only for the purpose of allowing said accused to present additional
evidence in his defense. The trial court shall inform this Court of the final
costs.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Martin, JJ., concur.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 152

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-26222. July 21, 1967.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JUDGE

HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte;
and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO, and RUFINO
BORRES, Respondents.

Dominador L. Padilla for Petitioner.

Narbasa, Tambac Alindo & Borres for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MURDER; SEPARATE SHOTS

KILLING VARIOUS VICTIMS GIVE RISE TO SEPARATE CRIMES; SEPARATE
INFORMATIONS SHOULD BE FILED. — Where the facts alleged are that
defendants fired guns in rapid succession from outside the house of a family,
killing the father, and that defendants then forcibly entered the house, letting
loose several shots, killing all the three minor children and wounding the mother,
the City Fiscal correctly presented five separate informations — four for murder
and one for frustrated murder. When various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.

2. ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; SINGLE ACT, NOT SINGLE IMPULSE, IS DECISIVE. —

To apply the first half of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes as
a complex crime a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave
felonies, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse

is not written into the law.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CASES OF RELATED OFFENSES MAY BE TRIED
JOINTLY. — To obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one is a
laudable purpose but cannot, by itself, justify a trial judge to order the fiscal to
file only one information for multiple murder. Section 15, Rule 119, Rules of
Court, confers upon the judge the power to try these cases jointly.
4. PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; FISCAL NOT COMPELLED TO FILE A
PARTICULAR CHARGE; REASONS THEREFORE. — A prosecuting attorney is
under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the
evidence at hand points to a different conclusion, notwithstanding the possibility
of abuses on his part, because he should not be unduly compelled to work
against his conviction and, in case of doubt, should be given the benefit thereof.
A contrary rule may result in courts being unnecessarily swamped with
unmeritorious cases and, worse still, a criminal suspect’s right to due process
may be transgressed.
5. ID.; FISCAL’S OPINION ON WHAT CRIME IS TO BE CHARGED NORMALLY
PREVAILS. — As the question of instituting a criminal charge is addressed to the
sound discretion of the investigating fiscal, in a clash of views as what crime is to
be charged, between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal’s
should normally prevail.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted
before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5)
separate cases, four for murder and one for frustrated murder, viz:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza;
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 153
Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza; and
Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza.
The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting
attorney from his investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be
tested in the crucible of a full-dress trial on the merits.
The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal
facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo
Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Puga-an. City of Iligan, were
asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and pali-untod (home-made gun)
were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead.
Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein
and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, Epifania Mendoza and
Marcelo Mendoza — all minor children of the couple — and wounding Valeriana
Bontilao de Mendoza.
Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas
Narbasa and Tambac Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1)
criminal case." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and
motivated by one impulse."cralaw virtua1aw library
Giving the nod to defendant’s claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May
13, 1966, directed the City Fiscal to unity all the five criminal cases, and to file
one single information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases,
Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof,
upon the ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was
fired and more than one victim was killed." The defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took
the position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing
acts on the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots,
moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime to the
series of shots killed more than one victim" ; and that only one information for
multiple murder should be filed, to "obviate the necessity of trying five cases

instead of one."cralaw virtua1aw library
Primarily to annul respondent Judge’s orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966,
as having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion, the People came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.
This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.
The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information,
either for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex
crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the
five indictments remain as they are?
1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."cralaw virtua1aw library
Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single
penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other (delito complejo). 1  conspiracy amongst them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all. 10
Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun
results in the death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this
factual setting, the complex crime defined in the first part of Article 48 finds
application. 2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed another and the weapon
pierced the latter’s body through and through and wounded another. The first
died instantaneously; the second, seven days later, This Court convicted the
assailant of double murder. 3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane
and the bomb explodes with the result that a number of persons are killed, that
single act again produces a complex crime. 4  is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number
killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 5 Thus, where
the six defendants, with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also a
submachine gun and Grand rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven and
wounding several others, each of the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 154
murder as there were deaths (eleven)." 6 Again, eleven persons were indicted
for quadruple murder — with the use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a
piece of bamboo — of a man, his common-law wife, and their two children in
cold blood. The accused were found guilty by the trial court of such offense. This
Court, in reversing this ruling below, held that" [t]he four victims were not killed
by a single act but by various acts committed on different occasions and by
different parties" ; that such acts "may not be regarded as constituting one
single crime" ; and that" [t]hey should be held as separate and distinct crimes."
7 And a third. At the commencement exercises of an elementary school, "a shot
suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots" — from a pistol. Two persons
lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died. This Court
there ruled that there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by
appellant Juan Mones. 8 And finally, in People v. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10,
1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule — who were asleep —
were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst of
machinegun fire, two of the couple’s children — also asleep — were killed. The
accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple
murder. On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of
four murders." 9 
The present case is to be differentiated from People v. Lawas, L-7618-20, June
30, 1955. There, on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a
group of home guards. It was held that there was only one complex crime. In
that case, however, there was no conspiracy to perpetrate the killing. In the case
at bar, defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge
Not material here, therefore, is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to
ascertain the individual death caused by each and everyone" of the accused. It is
to be borne in mind, at this point, that to apply the first half of Article 48,
heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of criminal act, singularity of
criminal impulse is not written into the law. 11 
The respondent judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that
consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of
obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed,
try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could
easily be remedied. 12 
Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly
presented the five separate informations — four for murder and one for
frustrated murder.

2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an
affidavit of one of the witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the
culprits was to commit robbery, and that the acts constituting murders and
frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. If true,
this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48,
which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other.
A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been
regularly performed. 13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said
affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal properties (transistor radio
and money) were taken away by the culprits after the shooting, we are not to
jettison the prosecutor’s opinion thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons for
his act. For one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the elements of that
offense — robbery. For another, the act could have been but a blind to cover up
the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the informations
charged evident premeditation. With ponderables and imponderables, we are
reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal’s action. We are not
now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting
attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular
criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up
the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on
the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting
attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case
of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in
our court being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a
criminal suspect’s right to due process — the sporting idea of fair play — may be
transgressed. So it is, that in People v. Sope, 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made
the pronouncement that" [i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being
the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the
information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the offended party. 14  Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., did not take part.
3. The impact of respondent Judge’s orders is that his judgment is to be
substituted for that of the prosecutor’s on the matter of what crime is to be filed
in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the
sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court
must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It
stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did
not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended
party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal’s should normally prevail. In this
regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood
as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 155
relief in equity "may be availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal
law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was ‘held invalid.’" 15 Nothing in the record would as much as
intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just recited.
And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance,
we are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing
separate cases for murder and frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the
complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide under the
provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for
multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal’s
discretion should not be controlled.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted;
the orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966 are hereby
set aside and declared null and void, and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement
of the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is
hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as
they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination
thereof.
Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres. So
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 156

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RAYMUNDO MADERA

@ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO ANDRES @
"Ross", Defendants-Appellants.

Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera.

Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, et al.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General

Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for appellee.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of
the Circuit Criminal Court 1 finding them guilty of the crime of murder, and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost
proportionately.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 20,
1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino Bana in
Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the

first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun
at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on the floor of his house near the stairs.
Two gunshot wounds were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one
that hit him on the abdominal region. Elino Bana did not die immediately. He
stood up and told his wife to call for his brother Conrado who lives not far away
from their house. The victim's wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned,
the wounded man was no longer at home for he was already brought to the
Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco
Viloria, with the assistance of some people. From the Municipal Building, he was
brought to the Nueva Ecija General Hospital, but he died on the way that same
day, April 20,1970.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired the
shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and that
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at the
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire
and saw the appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of their stairs
holding a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw the appellants Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2 meters
from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw
Raymundo Madem as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm,
and appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then with
Madera.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented
the dying, declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino
Bana to the Municipal Building took only about thirty minutes. On the way, they
were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from Gabaldon who was fetched from
his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look into the shooting
incident. Upon reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino
Bana that he would have to take down his written statement regarding the
shooting incident, and the latter agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was
then 3:00 o'clock in the morning. In said dying declaration, he was asked who
shot him and the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he could not
recognize.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of
Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on their way to the Municipal Building,
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 157
Elino Bana told him that he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said
policeman has been an investigator in the police force since 1964. He should
have asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration in the Municipal
Building why he said earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman
Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not only Patrolman Feliciano but
also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful
execution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the
identities of the appellants to the Victim himself and to their relatives Conrado
Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not militate against their credibility. There is no
evidence on record that they were asked by their relatives about the identity of
the appellants. Had they been asked, they would have readily revealed
appellants' identities as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of
Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful incident, during a formal
investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of Police when and where they
executed their respective sworn statements.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and
sworn on the same date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and
Juanito Bana categorically stated that Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera
@ Mundo, while Ross and Totoy Andres were
downstairs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with their
house. He testified on direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their
house. On cross examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That does
not show any inconsistency in his testimony, because on further questioning, he
said that the balcony referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that
after he heard the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back portion of
their house. The falsity of this statement has not been shown by the defense.
The pictures presented by it which apparently show that there was no such
opening, can be explained by the fact that the tall grasses could obscure the
back portion of the house where the kitchen door was
located.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of
gunfire. But that would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.

An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he would
otherwise have observed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the attention to a
keen edge. In some other cases, it has been observed, in effect, that the
emotion incident to the impending peril may not be the kind of excitement which
confuses, but that which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize. the circumstance of
the threatened danger in order to avoid it.2chanrobles virtual law library
The appellants asserted in their briefs 3 that "the evidence on record does not
show that there was a moon shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at
Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a moonless night;"
hence, Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized the
appellants. This position is untenable. Why? chanrobles virtual law library
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature"  4 and, under this rule,
of the time when the moon rises or sets on a particular day. 5 This not
withstanding and for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get a certification
from the Weather Bureau 6 which shows that the moon was bright at the time of
the shooting incident. It reads:
To whom It May Concern: chanrobles virtual law library
This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the
following astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and
correct: chanrobles virtual law library
1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day,
April 20, at 4:27 A.M.; chanrobles virtual law library
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34 degrees
above the western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees West; chanrobles
virtual law library
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full
moon having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April
22,1970.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao Fernandez,
Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Manila.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 158
For the Administrator:
(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong 
SIMEON V. INCIONG Chief, Astronomical Division
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the
appellants for there is no doubt as to their
identities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI,
appellant Raymundo Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra
himself admitted that, the paraffin test having been conducted fourteen days
after the incident, the test could have given a negative result even if the
appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on
his hands could have been washed off by washing or could have been removed
by perspiration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house
of appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the
victim Elino Bana.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito
Andres and Generoso Andres because the Solicitor General recommended their
acquittal. And We agree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when
the latter fired shots at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera
did, there being no proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three
appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to help Madera. Their mere
passive presence at the scene of the crime did not make them liable either as co-
principals or accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court, penned by
Justice Felix Q. Antonio, We held:
It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a
preconceived plan or agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a
circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or
connected with the same be present when the crime was perpetrated. There
must be established a logical relationship between the commission of the crime
and the supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate connection
between and among the latter, such as by their overt acts committed in
pursuance of a common design. Considering the far-reaching consequences, of
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 159

criminal conspiracy, the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.
is required to support a finding of its presence that is, it must be shown to exist
as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the other
hand, as an accomplice, it must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal
intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or
simultaneous acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as aid
thereto whether physical or moral. As aptly stated in People v. Tamayo: "It is an
essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of SECOND DIVISION
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way." ... From our view of the evidence it has not been convincingly established [G.R. No. L-41213-14. October 5, 1976.]
that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally,
through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through external acts JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE, TEOFANIS BONJOC,
indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and MARIANO BARTIDO, Petitioners, v. JUDGE
efficacious way. Such circumstances being absent, his mere passive presence at PEDRO GALLARDO , in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit
the scene of the crime certainly does not make him either a co-principal or an Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and PEOPLE OF
accomplice in the commission of the offense.  7 THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Adriano for petitioner Jorge P. Tan, Jr.

This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the prosecution
of criminal cases that the prosecutor's finest hour is not when he wins a case
K. V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner Cesar Tan.
with the conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the
advocate's natural obsession for victory, he stands up before the Court and
Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. for petitioner Teofanis Bondoc.
pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his
noble task is to prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We,
Amadeo Seno, Artemio Derecho & Manuel Quiambao for petitioners
therefore, commend Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
Librado Isode, Osmundo, Tolentino and Mariano Bartido.
Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly
recommended the acquittal of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia
Andres.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Simpio-Diy and Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko for Respondents.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the Estanislao A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private
appellant Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against prosecutors.
him; and it is hereby reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias
"Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby acquitted of the
crime charged with proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release from
DECISION
confinement is hereby ordered unless they are held for another legal cause.

ANTONIO, J.:
In this Special Civil Action for Certorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek the
annulment of respondent Judge’s Orders in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-XIII-50-L-
S’72 and CCC-XIII-51-L-S’72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21, 1975, denying
petitioners’ y motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to inhibit himself from
hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order of July 23, 1975, denying
petitioners’ Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of the
accused (petitioners herein) from Camp Bumpus, PC headquarters, Tacloban
City, to the National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is
likewise sought, by way of prohibition, to compel respondent Judge to desist
from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases.chanrobles.com
: virtual law library
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge was
required to file his answer within ten (10) days from notice, and in connection
therewith, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent
from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases. The petition
was subsequently amended to include the People of the Philippines and
thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People of
the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition. The Solicitor General
informed this Court, thus: that they are "persuaded that there are bases for
stating that the rendition of respondent Judge’s decision and his resolution on
the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice. . ..
Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges
and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them,
we feel that respondent Judge ‘appeared to have been heedless of the oft-
reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of
the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or
prejudgment’" and, therefore, it was the submission of said official "that the case
should be remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and
with instruction to receive additional evidence proffered by the accused with the
right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as may be warranted" and,
therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned
criminal cases "for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge, after
the parties shall have adduced such additional evidence as they may wish to
make, under such terms and conditions as this Honorable Court may deem fit to
impose." 2  to bring about a just one." Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, Et Al., 4
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 160
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in
justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to
the remand of this case. On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike
out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private
prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the
instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any
personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this
Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention
to that of the Solicitor General.
The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to
intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand
inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings.
There are important reasons which support the view that in the present
proceedings, the private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take
a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General.
To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in
the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975,
thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer
and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to
cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the
private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the
position taken by the Solicitor General. There is no question that since a criminal
offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the
representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution, As
stressed in Suarez v. Platon, Et Al., 3 the prosecuting officer "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor —
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty
to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means
that there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the
court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous

attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their
evidence, to the end that the court’s mind may not be tortured by doubts, that
the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to
all, this is the prosecution’s prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the
state." It is for the purpose of realizing the afore-mentioned objectives that the
prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and responsibility
of the prosecuting officer.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the
offended party with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense. This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or
reserves to institute it separately. 5 Thus, "an offended party may intervene in
the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of offenses which
can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party. 6 The only
exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil action or
expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in
which case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to
have lost his interest in its prosecution. 7 And in any event, whether an offended
party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must
always be subject to the direction and control of the prosecuting official.’ 8 As
explained in Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the "intervention of the offended party or his
attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to
the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the Fiscal." (Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they
are not in control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to those of the
People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. 9 The right which the
procedural law reserves to the injured party is that of intervening in the
prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the criminal
action and not of demanding punishment of the accused. 10 As explained in
People v. Orais: 11  investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. . . . The office of the
"‘. . . the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of the
promotor fiscal because, as the promotor fiscal alone is authorized to represent
the public prosecution, or the People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution
of offenders, and to control the proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to
institute and prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or
not or to refrain from prosecuting it or not, depending upon whether or not there
is, in his opinion, sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt, except when the case is pending in the Court of First
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 161
Instance, the continuation of the offended party’s intervention depends upon the
continuation of the proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from
pressing the charge or asks the competent Court of First Instance in which the
case is pending for the dismissal thereof, and said court grants the petition, the
intervention of the person injured by the commission of the offense ceases by
virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as
the offended party is not entitled to represent the People of the Philippine
Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the proceeding once
it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor
fiscal’s right of control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed
upon petition of the promotor fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his
right to appeal from an order overruling a complaint or information, which right
belongs exclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section
44 of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of
an offense to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court
of First Instance upon petition of the promotor fiscal, would be tantamount to
giving said offended party of the direction and control of a criminal proceeding in
violation of the provisions of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No.
58.’" 
Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining
and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the
offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. 12 
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the
Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of
Appeals or in this Court. Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478,
"Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General",
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) the Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and as such,
shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals In
all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof
in his official capacity is the party.

x       x       x
(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal,
body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion,
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.
x       x       x
It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to
represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private
prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot he allowed to
take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be
tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal
proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the
matter.chanrobles law library
Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the
remand of the case to the trial court is not without any plausible justification.
Thus, in support of his contention that the rendition of the decision and the
resolution on the subsequent motions by the respondent Judge were not free
from suspicion of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor General
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of respondent judge,
petitioners assert that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was illegally influenced by
the Larrazabals in connection with the decision of the two cases against
petitioners herein;
(b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in progress,
respondent judge received, through one of his court stenographers, two bottles
of whisky from Mayor Iñaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle of the deceased victims
Feliciano and Francisco Larrazabal;
(c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk with respondent judge,
after which the latter received from one of the private prosecutors a bottle of
wine wrapped in a newspaper which was ‘thick’ and ‘bulky’ and which allegedly
contained ‘something else inside’;
(d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases based on the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 162
memorandum of the prosecution which was literally copied in said decision
although with some corrections; and
(e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Iñaki Larrazabal, respondent judge
amended his already prepared decision in the two criminal cases involved herein
by changing the penalty of double-life sentence for the double murder charge
against the petitioners to the death penalty.
"The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported by an affidavit
executed on June 26, 1975 by Gerardo A. Makinano, Jr., court stenographer of
the Circuit Criminal Court, Tacloban City (Annex ‘E’, Petition). The truth of the
charges made in such affidavit are denied by respondent judge (in his answer to
the instant petition dated October 11, 1975), who in turn claims that it was
petitioners who tried to bribe him into acquitting them in the aforesaid criminal
cases, after they were illegally furnished a copy of the draft of his decision of
conviction by the same court stenographer Gerardo A. Makinano, Jr. (please see
Answer of respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike in the cases of Mateo v. Villaluz,
50 SCRA 191 (1973), and Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1974) relied upon
mainly by herein petitioners, the facts alleged as constituting the grounds for
disqualifying the respondent judge in the instant petition are disputed.
"Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this Court in support or in
denial of the alleged bribery of respondent judge, we have been informed of
evidence obtained by the National Bureau of Investigation when it cannot
appropriate for us at this time, however, and we are unable to do so, to submit
to this Court definite conclusions on the charges and counter-charges. An
exhaustive inquiry and open hearing should perhaps precede the making of
categorical conclusions. But we are persuaded that there are bases for stating
that the rendition of respondent Judge’s decision and his resolutions on the
motions for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice (See
Martinez v. Gironella, 65 SCRA 245 [July 22, 1975]).
"Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the
charges and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support
them, we feel that respondent Judge ‘appeared to have been heedless to the oft-
reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of
the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or
prejudgment (Fernando, J., Concurring opinion, Martinez v. Gironella, supra, at
252 . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws
uniformly and impartially without regard to persons or their circumstances or the
opinions of men. A judge, according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 163

Court, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and
the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and as to his integrity." 13 Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should
not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a
technical conception. It is a state of mind" 14 and, consequently, the
"appearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality." 15 It must
be obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in
order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more
important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties
before them should have confidence in their impartiality.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, Republic of the Philippines
hence, the question as to whether or not he should be disqualified from further SUPREME COURT
proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has already become moot. Manila

WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby remands the case to the SECOND DIVISION
trial court in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners’ motion for new
trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence. No special A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976
pronouncement as to costs.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur. JOSE MISAMIN, complainant, 
vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and
a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being
the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of
Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant
Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan
Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law.
There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the
Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of

complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non- appearance of
the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the
Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught. Under
the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law
is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof
to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of
the complaints being dismissed, This is one of those instances then where this
Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of
malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having
appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the
NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However,
he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his
profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a
government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court
for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having
conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in
order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid
his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to
members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to
the resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's
Office set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the
complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15,
1975. At the latter date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both
instances, the said counsel did not file written motion for postponement but
merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the
case was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant
failed once more to appear. The complainant who was present explained that his
lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila."
When asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his
counsel, the complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that he
wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the present action
in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part
in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added
that after reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault
and a truly good person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's
practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 164
not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The
respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an
incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be referred to
the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." 3 As a matter
of fact, separate complaints on this ground have been filed and are under
investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police
Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's
counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay
and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why the Report of
the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot
prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re
Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice
Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges
preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance
with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations
there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing
his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police
force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in
the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges
have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member
of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the
suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public
office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal
knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was
inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme
that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the
complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed.
Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from
laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for
the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not
worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care
that his honor remains unsullied
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 165

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San

Juan is dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution
be spread on his record.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.