LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO.
10
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2145. June 18, 2010.*
JUDGE MONA LISA T. TABORA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando
City, La Union, Branch 26, complainant, vs. (Ret.) JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL,
former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union, Branch
27, respondent.
Judges; Pairing Judges; The authority of a pairing judge to take cognizance of matters
of another branch in case the presiding judge is absent can be found in Circular No. 7, effective
23 September 1974, and Circular No. 19-98 effective 18 February 1998 .
—The authority of a pairing judge to take cognizance of matters of another branch in case the
presiding judge is absent can be found in two circulars issued by the Court: (1) Circular No. 7
effective 23 September 1974 and (2) Circular No. 19-98 effective 18 February 1998.
Same; The admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the
appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to lower court judges .—Lower court judges
play a pivotal role in the promotion of the people’s faith in the judiciary. They are front-liners
who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with
litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must
avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to
them.
Same; Pairing Judges; Where the regular presiding judge is already present and performing her
functions in court, it is improper for the pairing judge to still render a decision in a pending case
without the approval of the former .—As correctly observed by the OCA, Judge Carbonell should
have sought the conformity of Judge Tabora in rendering his own decision to the case as a
matter of judicial courtesy and respect. Judge Carbonell tried justifying his act by reasoning that
the act of filing a decision with the clerk of court already constituted a rendition of judgment or
promulgation. We find this explanation unsatisfactory. Judge Carbonell had no authority to
render a decision on the subject civil case. As clearly laid down in Circular No. 19-98, the pairing
judge shall take cognizance of all cases until the assumption to duty of the regular judge. Since
Judge Tabora was already present and performing her functions in court, it was improper for
Judge Carbonell to have rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6840 without the approval of the
regular presiding judge. Also, Judge Carbonell should have extended the same judicial deference
in referring the letter of Tabisula requesting for a copy of his decision to Branch 26 for
appropriate action. Instead, Judge Carbonell directly furnished Tabisula with a copy knowing
fully well that she was the plaintiff in the subject case. Judge Carbonell not only disregarded the
functions of the clerk of court as custodian of court records but also undermined the integrity
and confidentiality of the court.
Same; Administrative Law; Simple Misconduct; Words and Phrases; Simple misconduct
has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of
conduct for public officers .—For violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, we find Judge Carbonell guilty of simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been
defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for
public officers. We adhere to the OCA’s recommendation of a fine of P10,000.00 to be deducted
from Judge Carbonell’s retirement benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the Court’s
Resolution dated 24 September 2008, which granted the payment of his disability retirement
benefits subject to the withholding of P200,000.00 pending final resolution of the administrative
cases against him.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, Violation of Section 1, Canon 3 and Section 2, Canon 5 of AM No. 03-05-01-SC or New
Code of Judicial Conduct, Violation of Republic Act No. 6713, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
1
Abuse of Authority, Oppression, Serious Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, Violation of Articles 226 and 315(3) (c) of Act No. 3815, and Violation of
Sections 5(a), (d), and (e) of Republic Act No. 6713.
  
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October 2006 filed by
Caridad S. Tabisula (Tabisula) against Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora (Judge Tabora), Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, and Alfredo V.
Lacsamana, Jr. (Lacsamana), Officer-in-Charge, Branch Clerk of Court (OIC-BCOC) of the same
court. Tabisula charged Judge Tabora with (1) violation of Section 3(e) 1 of Republic Act No.
30192 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; (2) violation of Section 1, Canon 3 3
and Section 2, Canon 54 of A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC5 or the New Code of Judicial Conduct; (3)
violation of Republic Act No. 6713 6 (RA 6713) or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees; and (4) gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority,
oppression, serious neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Further, Tabisula charged Lacsamana with (1) violation of Sections 3(e) 7 and (f)8 of RA 3019; (2)
violation of Articles 2269 and 315(3)(c)10 of Act No. 381511 or the Revised Penal Code; and (3)
violation of Sections 5(a),12 (d),13 and (e)14 of RA 6713.
The Facts
In her Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October 2006 submitted to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Tabisula stated that she was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6840 entitled
“Caridad S. Tabisula v. Rang-ay Rural Bank, Inc .” for specific performance with accounting and
damages. This case was raffled to the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union,  Branch 26 presided
by Judge Tabora. Tabisula narrated that due to the prolonged absence of Judge Tabora caused
by a serious illness, Judge Antonio A. Carbonell (Judge Carbonell), now retired but then
pairing/vice-executive judge of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27, took over
and heard the case from the beginning up to its termination.
Later, Tabisula found out that a decision had already been rendered by Judge Carbonell so she
requested from Lacsamana a copy of the decision. However, despite several requests,
Lacsamana allegedly refused to furnish Tabisula with a copy of the decision upon the instruction
of Judge Tabora, who at that time had already reported back to work. Tabisula sent a Letter-
Request dated 24 August 2006 addressed to the RTC asking Judge Tabora to direct Lacsamana
to give a copy of the decision rendered by Judge Carbonell. However, instead of granting the
request, Judge Tabora issued an Order dated 30 August 2006, informing Tabisula that an Order
dated 8 August 2006 was issued by the RTC requiring the parties to submit their respective
memorandum within 15 days from receipt of the Order. Also, Judge Tabora informed Tabisula
that even if the pairing judge was the one who heard the case from beginning to end, the
prerogative of rendering the decision still rests entirely on the presiding judge.
On 18 September 2006, Judge Tabora rendered a decision in the case adverse to Tabisula.
Tabisula then wrote a Letter dated 2 October 2006 to Judge Carbonell requesting for a copy of
his decision. On 9 October 2006, Judge Carbonell replied to Tabisula’s letter and attached a copy
of his decision which favored Tabisula.
Tabisula then filed this case against Judge Tabora for maliciously and deliberately changing,
altering and reversing a validly rendered decision of a court of equal and concurrent jurisdiction.
Tabisula added that this has caused her undue injury since the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840,
Rang-ay Rural Bank Inc., represented by its President, Ives Q. Nisce, was allegedly a relative of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
Judge Tabora’s husband.
Tabisula also charged Lacsamana for alleged manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross
inexcusable negligence for refusing to furnish a copy of the decision rendered by Judge
Carbonell despite several verbal and written demands.
In an undated Comment submitted to the OCA, Lacsamana clarified that his official designation
is Sheriff IV and he was only designated as OIC-BCOC by Judge Tabora on 1 August 2006.
Lacsamana explained that Judge Carbonell handed him a copy of his decision in Civil Case No.
6840 on 11 August 2006. However, that day being a Friday, Lacsamana was able to submit the
decision to Judge Tabora only on the next working day, 14 August 2006. Judge Tabora informed
him to just leave a copy of the decision at her table. From then on, Lacsamana had no more
knowledge of what happened to the decision.
Lacsamana added that he was the one who received Tabisula’s Letter dated 24 August 2006
addressed to Judge Tabora. Lacsamana reasoned that he was not the person in charge of
releasing decisions, orders, and other documents relative to a pending case and it was not
within his functions to release a decision without the presiding judge’s authority.
Judge Tabora then filed her Comment dated 26 February 2007 with the OCA. Judge Tabora
indicated that she underwent surgery on 15 May 2006 and was later diagnosed with a serious
illness. Prior to her surgery, she conducted a hearing in Civil Case No. 6840 on 21 April 2006.
However, the same had been reset due to the absence of Tabisula’s counsel.
On 18 May 2006, Tabisula filed a Motion for the pairing judge to hear Civil Case No. 6840 on the
basis of Judge Tabora’s absence. On 26 May 2006, while Judge Tabora was on leave, Judge
Carbonell proceeded to hear the testimony of the lone witness for the defendant in the case
without first issuing an order granting the motion filed by Tabisula.
On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora reported back to work. However, on 19 June 2006, Judge
Carbonell still acted on the formal offer of evidence by the defendants and issued an Order
submitting the case for resolution.
On 8 August 2006, in the course of her inventory of court records, Judge Tabora noticed that
Civil Case No. 6840 had been submitted for decision on 19 June 2006 by Judge Carbonell. Since
the 90-day period for rendering a decision was soon to expire, she immediately issued an Order
dated 8 August 2006 directing the parties to submit their respective memorandum.
Three days later, on 11 August 2006, Judge Carbonell issued in Civil Case No. 6840 a decision
which was received by Lacsamana. On 14 August 2006, Lacsamana turned over a copy of the
decision to Judge Tabora.
After receipt of the decision, Judge Tabora immediately went to Judge Carbonell and informed
him that she issued an Order dated 8 August 2006 requiring the parties to submit their
respective memorandum. Judge Carbonell immediately cut her off and told her to just recall her
earlier order.
Judge Tabora then carefully studied the entire records of the case and found out that Judge
Carbonell’s decision was not in accordance with the facts of the case and the applicable law and
appeared to have unjustly favored Tabisula.
Judge Tabora also wondered how Tabisula came to know of the unpromulgated decision of
Judge Carbonell. Judge Carbonell’s decision was never officially released to any of the parties
and did not form part of the records of the case.
2
Judge Tabora pointed out that it was Judge Carbonell who directly furnished Tabisula with a
copy of his decision a month after the decision of Judge Tabora had already been released to
the parties. Also, Tabisula’s insistence for the release of Judge Carbonell’s decision made her
determined to exercise her judicial independence since such decision would result in a
miscarriage of justice.
Judge Tabora also clarified that the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840 was a bank, a corporate
entity with a distinct personality. She was not disqualified from sitting in the case since under
Section 1, Rule 13715 of the Rules of Court her husband’s relation with the bank’s representative
was remote or way beyond the 6th degree. Thus, the relationship has absolutely no bearing on
the outcome of the case. Judge Tabora prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
On 14 August 2007, the OCA submitted its Report finding no sufficient and factual legal basis to
hold Judge Tabora and Lacsamana liable for any of the charges filed by Tabisula. The OCA
stated that Judge Tabora, in rendering her own decision in Civil Case No. 6840, was well within
her power to decide the case since she had full authority over all cases pending in her official
station. As for Lacsamana, the OCA found that he could not be faulted for his failure to comply
with Tabisula’s request since he was only obeying the lawful order of Judge Tabora, his superior.
Also, Judge Carbonell’s decision in Civil Case No. 6840 was not even promulgated and did not
form part of the official records of the case. Thus, there was no “prior existing valid decision.”
The OCA also found that there is a need to scrutinize the actuations of Judge Carbonell since he
overstepped the bounds of his authority as pairing judge for Branch 26 and has shown unusual
interest in the disposition of Civil Case No. 6840.
The OCA recommended that:
(1) that the instant complaint be DISMISSED as against respondents Judge Mona
Lisa T. Tabora and OIC Branch Clerk of Court Alfredo V. Lacsamana for lack of merit;
(2) that the COMMENT of respondent Judge be considered as a complaint against
Judge Antonio A. Carbonell, and that Judge Carbonell be furnished with a copy of
such comment and, be in turn REQUIRED to COMMENT thereon.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2007, the Court resolved to (1) dismiss the administrative
complaint against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana for lack of merit; and (2) consider the Comment
dated 26 February 2007 of Judge Tabora as a complaint against Judge Carbonell and require
Judge Carbonell to file his Comment within 10 days from notice.
In his Comment dated 29 October 2007, Judge Carbonell admitted the facts of the case as
stated by Judge Tabora in her Comment dated 26 February 2007 from the time he took over
Civil Case No. 6840 until he submitted his decision to OIC-BCOC Lacsamana. However, he
disagreed with Judge Tabora’s contention that the decision he rendered in Civil Case No. 6840
was not validly promulgated and released to the parties. Judge Carbonell maintained that the
act of filing the decision with the clerk of court already constituted a rendition of judgment or
promulgation and not its pronouncement in open court or release to the parties.
Judge Carbonell added that he was not aware of what subsequently transpired after he turned
over the records of the case but admitted that after receipt of the letter-request of Tabisula
asking for a copy of his decision, he immediately responded by furnishing Tabisula with a copy.
Judge Carbonell further stated that the instant administrative matter does not involve him. The
dispute was originally between Tabisula against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana. The only issue
between him and Judge Tabora was a divergence of legal opinion.
Thereafter, Tabisula filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007 on the Court’s
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
Resolution dated 1 October 2007. Tabisula stated that the Court erred in dismissing the
complaint she filed against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana.
In a Letter dated 5 March 2008, Lacsamana and seven other employees of the RTC of San
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, wrote the OCA and narrated their negative experience
toward a co-employee, Olympia Elena O. Dacanay-Queddeng (Queddeng), Legal Researcher II
of the same court. In the same letter, they also gave their support in an unrelated
administrative complaint filed by Judge Tabora against Queddeng.
In a Resolution dated 25 June 2008, the Court referred the case to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
On 18 September 2008, the OCA submitted its Report finding Judge Carbonell guilty of simple
misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA
reiterated that Judge Carbonell overstepped the bounds of his authority as pairing judge of
Branch 26 when he prepared the decision in Civil Case No. 6840 and furnished Tabisula with a
copy of such decision. As a result, Judge Carbonell created the impression that he had taken a
special interest in the case.
The OCA recommended that:
(1) the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 27, 2007 of Mrs. Caridad S.
Tabisula on the Resolution dated October 1, 2007, be DENIED for lack of merit;
(2) this case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and Judge Antonio
A. Carbonell be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be
deducted from the retirement benefits that he may receive; and
(3) the Letter dated March 5, 2008 of Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., Court Sheriff, and
seven (7) other employees of RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando City, La Union, against
Mrs. Olympia Dacanay-Queddeng, Legal Researcher, same court, be DETACHED from
the records of this administrative matter and the same be included in A.M. No. P-07-
2371 (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng, Court
Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union ).
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds the report of the OCA well-taken.
The authority of a pairing judge to take cognizance of matters of another branch in case the
presiding judge is absent can be found in two circulars issued by the Court: (1) Circular No. 7 16
effective 23 September 1974 and (2) Circular No. 19-9817 effective 18 February 1998.
Judge Carbonell, as the pairing judge of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26,
assumed cognizance of Civil Case No. 6840 upon Judge Tabora’s leave of absence in May 2006
due to a serious illness. Judge Carbonell fulfilled his duties by conducting hearings in the said
case from May until June 2006. On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora reported back to work as
presiding judge of Branch 26. However, even though Judge Carbonell knew that Judge Tabora
had already re-assumed her duties, he still issued an Order submitting the case for resolution on
19 June 2006 and even submitted a written decision to OIC-BCOC Lacsamana on 11 August
2006.
Clearly, Judge Carbonell fell short of the exacting standards set in Section 2, Canon 3 18 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct which states:
3
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.” (Emphasis supplied)
Lower court judges play a pivotal role in the promotion of the people’s faith in the judiciary.
They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their
interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that
judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly
applied to them.19
As correctly observed by the OCA, Judge Carbonell should have sought the conformity of Judge
Tabora in rendering his own decision to the case as a matter of judicial courtesy and respect.
Judge Carbonell tried justifying his act by reasoning that the act of filing a decision with the
clerk of court already constituted a rendition of judgment or promulgation. We find this
explanation unsatisfactory. Judge Carbonell had no authority to render a decision on the subject
civil case. As clearly laid down in Circular No. 19-98, the pairing judge shall take cognizance of
all cases until the assumption to duty of the regular judge. Since Judge Tabora was already
present and performing her functions in court, it was improper for Judge Carbonell to have
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6840 without the approval of the regular presiding judge.
Also, Judge Carbonell should have extended the same judicial deference in referring the letter of
Tabisula requesting for a copy of his decision to Branch 26 for appropriate action. Instead,
Judge Carbonell directly furnished Tabisula with a copy knowing fully well that she was the
plaintiff in the subject case. Judge Carbonell not only disregarded the functions of the clerk of
court as custodian of court records but also undermined the integrity and confidentiality of the
court.
For violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, we find Judge Carbonell
guilty of simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior
that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers. 20 We adhere to the OCA’s
recommendation of a fine of P10,000.00 to be deducted from Judge Carbonell’s retirement
benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the Court’s Resolution dated 24 September 2008,
which granted the payment of his disability retirement benefits subject to the withholding of
P200,000.00 pending final resolution of the administrative cases against him.
Further, we adopt the other recommendations of the OCA in its Report dated 18 September
2008. We deny for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007 filed
by Tabisula on this Court’s Resolution dated 1 October 2007. We also direct the OCA to detach
from the records of this administrative matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008 of Lacsamana and
seven other employees of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, against
Queddeng, Legal Researcher of the same court. The Letter is to be included in A.M. No. P-07-
2371 entitled “Office of the Court Administrator v. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng, Court Legal
Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union. ”
WHEREFORE, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007 filed by Caridad
S. Tabisula for lack of merit. We find respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell, former Presiding
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10 4
Judge, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27, GUILTY of simple
misconduct and FINE him P10,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits which have
been withheld pursuant to the Court’s Resolution dated 24 September 2008.

We DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to detach from the records of this
administrative matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008 of Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. and seven other
employees of the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, against Olympia
Dacanay-Queddeng, Legal Researcher of the same court and include the Letter in A.M. No. P-
07-2371 entitled “Office of the Court Administrator v. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng, Court
Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union.”
SO ORDERED.
Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,**  Peralta and Abad, JJ., concur.

Motion for Reconsideration denied, respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell meted with
P10,000 fine for simple misconduct.

Notes.—Grave misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct. A

person charged with simple misconduct is put on notice that he stands accused of misconduct
coupled with any of the elements of corruption or willful intent to violate the law or established
rules. (Civil Service Commission vs. Ledesma, 471 SCRA 589 [2005])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC. October 30, 1998.*
RE: INHIBITION OF JUDGE EDDIE R. ROJAS, RTC-Branch 39, Polomolok, South
Cotabato in Crim. Case No. 09-5668.
Courts; Judges; Inhibition of Judges; Conflict of Interest; No judge or judicial officer shall sit in
any case in which he has been counsel for a party without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.— Judge Rojas contends that, in any case,
he never conducted any full-blown trial in the case, and, therefore, there was no need for his
immediate inhibition from the case. Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court expressly states,
however, that “no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he . . . has been counsel
[for a party] without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.”
Same; Same; Same; The prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence
of the parties but includes as well cases where he acts by resolving motions, issuing orders and
the like.—According to Black’s Law Dictionary, to “sit” in a case means “to hold court; to do any
act of a judicial nature. To hold a session, as of a court, grand jury, legislative body, etc. To be
formally organized and proceeding with the transaction of business.” The prohibition is thus not
limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases
where he acts by resolving motions, issuing orders and the like as Judge Rojas has done in the
criminal case. The purpose of the rule is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the
appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding
where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. He should administer justice impartially
and without delay.
Same; Same; Same; By the acts of a judge in issuing various orders resetting the dates of
hearing and of the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution and for the defense, he
undoubtedly sat in and acted on the case.—In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a
judge in Criminal Case No. 09-5668 from November 12, 1996 to April 13, 1998 without securing
the written consent of both the prosecution and the defense and entering the same upon the
record of the case. For almost one and a half years, he issued various orders resetting the dates
of the hearing and of the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution and for the
defense. Undoubtedly, by these acts, he sat in and acted on the case. The failure of Judge Rojas
to observe these elementary rules of judicial conduct betrays his interest in the case which he
allowed to prevail over his sworn duty to administer the law impartially without any fear or
favor.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the order of inhibition, dated April 13, 1998, which respondent Judge Eddie R.
Rojas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato issued in Criminal Case
No. 09-5668, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rosalina Tauro, et al., a copy of which was
furnished this Court on May 8, 1998. It appears that the case was initially tried in the RTC, with
Judge Rojas as public prosecutor. While the case was pending, respondent was appointed judge
of the trial court on November 12, 1996. As the original counsel for the accused did not
interpose any objection, Judge Rojas tried the case. On April 13, 1998, however, Judge Rojas
decided to inhibit himself from the case. In inhibiting himself, respondent judge explained: 1
When this case is (sic) called for the turn of the defense to present their evidence with their new
counsel Atty. Yolanda Ogena of the PAO, who manifested that she is not ready and she is
5
requesting for (the) postponement of this case, but the Presiding Judge (Rojas) after closed
(sic) reflection of the records, although the previous counsel for the accused, Atty. Rosalie
Cariño, was confronted by the Presiding Judge whether (s)he will interpose objection to the
continuous sitting of this Judge in this case considering that years back when this case was
initially tried, the Presiding Judge was the prosecutor in this case, to avoid legal implications
and/or any doubt, the Presiding Judge has to voluntarily inhibit himself in this case.
Taking note of the aforesaid order of inhibition, this Court of July 7, 1998 required Judge Rojas
to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for sitting in a case in
which he had previously acted as counsel for one of the parties.
In his letter dated July 28, 1998,2 Judge Rojas explains:
The above-mentioned criminal case was inherited by the undersigned upon assumption to office
as Presiding Judge of this sala last November 12, 1996. On February 18, 1997, he issued an
Order addressed to the Stenographic Reporter concerned of Branch 22, Regional Trial Court,
General Santos City (where this case originated) directing said employee to transmit a copy of
the transcript of the stenographic notes (TSN) to this sala (Annex A).
Despite the lapse of four (4) months from the said Order, the TSN was not forwarded to this
Court (Annex B).
In her letter-explanation to the undersigned, Stenographic Reporter Asuncion A. Denaga,
informed the former that her failure to transmit said TSN was due to the fact that the same
were not sent back to her by this Court’s personnel for transcription (Annex C).
It was only after a close scrutiny of the transcribed TSN when herein undersigned discovered
and remembered that he handled the aforecited criminal case as public prosecutor years back.
Thus, the aforementioned Order emanating from this Court dated April 13, 1998 declaring the
undersigned’s inhibition from this case (Annex D).
To clarify matters, there was never a full-blown trial conducted by the undersigned in this case
since the time he assumed as Presiding Judge of this sala up to the present, as the scheduled
hearings of this case were always postponed (the same not being attributable to this Court) (see
Annexes E, F, G, and H).
Hence, for all intents and purposes, from the time he discovered his previous participation in the
above-cited criminal case, up to the present, the undersigned never heard nor tried nor
conducted any full-blown trial in the same.
Thus, Judge Rojas tries to justify his failure to inhibit himself from the beginning by the flimsy
excuse that it was only after a close scrutiny of the TSN that he discovered and remembered
that he had handled the criminal case as public prosecutor years ago and tries to minimize the
seriousness of his breach of judicial ethics by claiming that anyway he did not conduct a “full-
blown trial.”
In his order of April 13, 1998, Judge Rojas stated that he had not inhibited himself because the
previous counsel of the accused, Atty. Rosalie Cariño, did not object to his sitting in the case as
the judge. Certainly, he would not have asked Atty. Cariño for any objection if he had not known
that he could not sit in the case as judge because he had previously acted as public prosecutor
therein. Indeed, the Court is at a loss how Judge Rojas could have missed noticing that the case
was one in which he had appeared as public prosecutor considering that the records indicate the
appearances of counsels.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10 6
Judge Rojas contends that, in any case, he never conducted any full-blown trial in the case, and, The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether or
therefore, there was no need for his immediate inhibition from the case. Rule 137, §1 of the not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial judge based on his
Rules of Court expressly states, however, that “no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him.
which he . . . has been counsel [for a party] without the written consent of all parties in interest, (Gutang vs. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 76 [1998])
signed by them and entered upon the record.” According to Black’s Law Dictionary,3 to “sit” in a
case means “to hold court; to do any act of a judicial nature. To hold a session, as of a court,
grand jury, legislative body, etc. To be formally organized and proceeding with the transaction
of business.” The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of
the parties but includes as well cases where he acts by resolving motions, issuing orders and the
like as Judge Rojas has done in the criminal case. The purpose of the rule is to prevent not only
a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. 4 A judge
should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 5 He
should administer justice impartially and without delay. 6 In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas
sat as a judge in Criminal Case No. 09-5668 from November 12, 1996 to April 13, 1998 without
securing the written consent of both the prosecution and the defense and entering the same
upon the record of the case. For almost one and a half years, he issued various orders resetting
the dates of the hearing and of the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution 7 and for
the defense.8 Undoubtedly, by these acts, he sat in and acted on the case. The failure of Judge
Rojas to observe these elementary rules of judicial conduct betrays his interest in the case which
he allowed to prevail over his sworn duty to administer the law impartially without any fear or
favor.
In Lorenzo v. Marquez,9 a judge was dismissed from the service for sitting in a case in which he
had previously acted as counsel for the plaintiff without the written consent of all the parties in
interest, in violation of Rule 137, §1, and for illegally issuing a subpoena for the appearance of a
prison inmate at the trial of a criminal case before him. In the instant case, the Office of the
Court Administrator recommends that Judge Rojas be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for
violating Rule 137, §1. The Court believes that the penalty recommended is appropriate, given
the fact that unlike the judge in Lorenzo v. Marquez, Judge Rojas’ breach of judicial ethics is
confined to his failure to inhibit himself from the case in which he had previously acted as public
prosecutor.

WHEREFORE, a fine of P10,000.00 is hereby imposed on Judge Eddie R. Rojas for violation
of Rule 137, §1. He is WARNED that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Martinez,
Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
     Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Respondent Judge meted a P10,000 fine for violation of Section 1 of Rule 137, Rules of Court.

Notes.—An appellate court justice should beg off from any participation in the decision
process involving a case in which he previously represented one of the parties in his capacity as
Acting Solicitor General. (Urbanes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 72 [1994])

A judge who had earlier enjoined the preliminary investigation of the accused at the
Regional State Prosecutor’s Office level can not be considered to adequately possess such cold
neutrality of an impartial judge in the trial proper. ( People vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 452
[1996])

A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested

tribunal, for all the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be
meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge. ( Webb vs.
People, 276 SCRA 243 [1997])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
G.R. No. 88105. December 18, 1989.*
NICOLAS FECUNDO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON BERJAMEN, Presiding Judge RTC,
Branch 20 and JULIUS SALCEDO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Inhibition; Motions; Motion to inhibit judge; Three (3) day notice
rule; Failure to comply with the 3-day notice rule renders the motion as worthless piece of
paper; Service of copy of a motion containing notice of the time and place of hearing of said
motion is a mandatory requirement .—We do not, however, find any grave abuse of discretion or
excess of jurisdiction in respondent judge’s denial of the motion to inhibit for non-compliance
with the three (3) day notice rule. Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court requires that notice
of a motion be served by the movant on all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the
hearing thereof. Sections 5 of the same Rule provides that the notice shall be directed to the
parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion. A motion
which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is
considered a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has
no authority to act upon. Service of copy of a motion containing notice of the time and place of
hearing of said motion is a mandatory requirement.
Same; Same; Same; Political Law; Elections; Tardiness or delay in the disposition of election
cases in other courts does not connote partiality of the presiding judge in election cases speedily
disposed of—Tardiness or delay in the disposition of election cases in other courts does not
connote partiality of the presiding judge in election cases speedily disposed of.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Omnibus Election Code provides for the preferential
disposition of election contests within 6 months after filing .—Sec. 258 of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP Blg. 881) provides for the preferential disposition of election contests within six (6)
months after filing. If judges in the four (4) provinces of Panay island hearing election cases are
indeed taking their time in deciding such election cases, as alluded to by counsel, then they are
not certainly complying with the election law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Charge of bias and partiality as grounds for disqualification;
The language of the judge in his order in case at bar manifests an exasperation at petitioner
and his tactics which may unnecessarily cloud his impartiality in deciding the election case .—
While the procedural tactics and/or motives of petitioner’s counsel may not be all too laudable,
as it was, for instance, impossible for him to be unaware of the 10 February 1988 order, yet, the
language employed by the respondent judge in his 10 February 1988 order and even in his
comment on the petition at bar, manifests at the very least an exasperation bordering on
indignation at petitioner and his tactics, which may unnecessarily cloud his impartiality in
deciding the election case at hand. A spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that the
decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must, at all times, maintain
the appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language, both written and spoken, must be
guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To erase any doubt as to the judge ’s bias and prejudice
against the petitioner in the election case, the case is transferred to another branch .—To erase
any doubt whatsoever as to the judge’s bias and/or prejudice against petitioner in Election Case
No. M-944, the Court believes it prudent and better to serve the ends of justice to transfer the
said case to Branch 21, Mambusao, Capiz, presided over by the newly appointed Judge thereof,
Hon. Julius L Abella.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; New judge ordered to terminate the proceedings and decide
the case within 3 months from notice of the decision because this is an election contest —
Considering also that this is an election contest, Judge Abella is hereby directed to terminate the
proceedings and decide the case within three (3) months from notice of this decision.
7
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mambusao, Capiz,
Br. 20.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PADILLA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a restraining order seeking to inhibit
respondent judge, Hon. Ramon Berjamen, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Mambusao,
Capiz from continuing with the trial of an election protest (Election Case No. M-944) filed by
herein private respondent Julius Salcedo against herein petitioner. The grounds invoked for the
inhibition of respondent judge are his alleged partiality and bias against petitioner. Said acts of
alleged partiality and bias may be summarized as follows: 1
a)Use of unbecoming language in the order dated 10 February 1988 stating therein . . .
“that the implementation of the order of this Court is being vehemently opposed by the
municipal mayor (herein petitioner) and his cohorts. Ours is a government of laws and not
a government of rascals. To give in to this kind of behavior of the respondent and his
cohorts, we are just like savages in the jungle where might is might [sic right] .” (italics
supplied)
b)Severely reprimanding and scolding in open court petitioner’s secretary when the latter
filed on behalf of the petitioner a motion to dismiss the election protest, then angrily
adding that non-lawyers/ couriers are not entertained by the court, thereby subjecting the
petitioner’s representative to the mockery and ridicule of private respondent’s supporters
who jampacked the courtroom.
c)Personal interest of respondent judge shown by inquiring from Arcadio Hernandez (one
of the commissioners in the revision of ballots) about the procedural maneuvers of
petitioner’s counsel.
d)Respondent judge, beholden to Congressman Villareal whose life size (half body) picture
is displayed in the former’s office. Villareal is a known supporter of private respondent who
engaged the services of the Villareal law office in the election protest before the
respondent judge. Congressman Villareal allegedly had worked for Judge Berjamen’s
appointment to the Bench.
Statement of respondent judge in open court that a motion for reconsideration (of the denial of
the motion to inhibit him) to be filed by petitioner will be denied.
Petitioner’s recourse to this Court is basically founded on the contention that public respondent’s
above described conduct, particulary in the election case pending before him, involving
petitioner (as protestee) and private respondent (as protestant) is not in consonance with the
standard of cold neutrality of an impartial judge and thus he cannot render a fair and impartial
decision in the case.
The incidents leading to this petition started when petitioner, Nicolas Fecundo, mayoralty
candidate in the Municipality of Dumalag, Capiz, during the 1988 local elections, won over
private respondent Julius Salcedo with a margin of 100 votes. On 29 January 1988, private
respondent Salcedo filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. M-944; a
supplemental petition followed on 4 February 1988. The case was assigned to Branch 20, RTC of
Mambusao, Capiz presided over by respondent judge, Hon. Ramon Berjamen. After the filing of
the answer with counter protest, respondent judge issued an order, dated 1 February 1988,
directing the Municipal Treasurer of Dumalag, Capiz to deliver to the court the ballot boxes
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
subject of the protest. On 10 February 1988, the Municipal Treasurer of Dumalag addressed a
letter to respondent judge stating:
“Sir:
This is to inform you that I cannot execute the order of this court dated February 1, 1988,
because the Municipal Mayor of Dumalag, Capiz, and his cohorts are preventing and threatening
me if I insist to bring the ballot boxes mentioned in your order to your court. My life is presently
in danger so I ask your assistance.
In view of this circumstance, I would like to request that the Provincial Commander of the
Philippine Constabulary, Loctugan Hills, Roxas City, be ordered to secure me or to get by
themselves the ballot boxes in question.
Thank you.”2
The same day, 10 February 1988, respondent judge issued the order already adverted to. On 3
March 1988, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his counter protest. Another order dated 23
February 1988 was issued for delivery of the ballot boxes and keys covered by the supplemental
petition.3
After several hearings before three (3) commissioners, and based on the view that a protestant
must first be required to present and mark his evidence before the opening and revision of
ballots involved in protestee’s counter protest, a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by petitioner with this Court on 27 June 1988 4 seeking to prohibit the
respondent court from proceeding with the election case. A temporary restraining order was
issued on 13 July 1988 by the First Division of this Court but the petition was ultimately
dismissed in a resolution dated 25 January 1989 for failure to show grave abuse of discretion or
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the questioned order of respondent court being in accordance with
law and conducive to the expeditious disposition of the election contest.5
Hearings were resumed before respondent judge.
Petitioner filed a motion for inhibition before the same judge on 18 April 1989 with notice of
hearing set on 20 April 1989. Both parties failed to indicate in the records of this case whether a
hearing actually took place on the motion but an order of 2 May 1989 issued by respondent
judge, denied the motion for noncompliance with the three (3) day notice rule. No motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner due to respondent judge’s statement in open court on 8
May 1989 that:
“If you intend to file another pleadings, [sic] you can do and the Court will cross the bridge
when it comes to it, without considering the merits and demerits of this motion, the Court
resolved to deny said motion. So, if you file another one, the Court will just deny when it
received (sic) it.”6
These manifestations of alleged partiality to private respondent (or perhaps, antipathy to
petitioner) and the fact that petitioner’s counsel was not allegedly furnished a copy of the 10
February 1988 order, having accidentally discovered the same from the records of the case only
sometime in May 1989,7 are cited in support of the present petition.
As prayed for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court in its resolution of 23 May
1989 ordering the respondent judge to cease and desist from hearing Election Case No. M-944,
until further orders from the Court, simultaneously requiring respondents to file their comments
to the petition.8
Private respondent Julius Salcedo contends that petitioner is guilty of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the election contest. This petition, according to private respondent, is his
(petitioner’s) second attempt. The first was also thru a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 83779)
8
which was ultimately dismissed by the Court’s First Division. Now that the probability of his
losing the election case is apparent, petitioner moves for the disqualification of the judge.
Petitioner’s charges are moreover pure inventions, according to private respondent. The
incidents constituting alleged bias or prejudice of respondent judge occurred prior to the filing of
the first petition before the Supreme Court; the present petition is thus a violation of the
omnibus motion rule. Furthermore, according to private respondent, in bad faith, petitioner has
concealed from the respondent judge the procedural remedies he has availed of.
Respondent judge, for his part, denies all the accusations, imputing them to petitioner’s wild
imagination, political immaturity and childish mentality. Some words used in the order (10
February 1988) were merely taken from the letter of the Municipal treasurer; the others were
reminders and advice to petitioner to respect and recognize the authority of the court. This
petition, according to respondent judge, is part of a scheme to delay the disposition of the
election case in violation of the Election Law, which respondent judge is seeking to uphold. He
disclaims any utang na loob (debt of gratitude) to Congressman Villareal, and almost proudly
states:
“x x x. If this fact is true, Cong. Villareal was just paying the favors he owed the undersigned so
that Cong. Villareal could not influence this representation as to how to decide a case no matter
who the parties are. With the almost three years in office of this representation, not even one
case could the petitioner cite an instance where Cong. Villareal had influenced the undersigned
in his decisions. x x x.”9
Petitioner’s reply and supplement to the reply insist that his first petition for certiorari with this
Court had a valid reason, i.e. to prevent private respondent from fishing for evidence with the
tolerance and support of the respondent judge. The present petition arises from the conviction
that there is partiality and bias of respondent judge. There is no objection to the speedy
disposition of the election case provided that due process is observed, according to the
petitioner.
A motion to allow petitioner to file a reply to the comment of public respondent was received on
16 September 1989; the reply was filed on 12 October 1989. Without requiring other pleadings,
the Court treated the comments as answers and gave due course to the petition.
The filing of a previous petition for certiorari with this Court (ultimately dismissed) is raised by
private respondent as an affirmative defense to the present petition. An examination of the
records is thus unavoidable. The prayer of the petition in G.R. No. 83779 reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered it is respectfully prayed that Restraining Order as prayed, be
issued and after hearing an Order be issued declaring the Order dated June 21, 1988 of the
public respondent as null and void, ordering him to require private respondent to formally mark
or identify as exhibits those ballots subject of the protest, present evidence in support of the
petitioner [sic] and further ordering the public respondent, to defer the opening of the ballots
boxes of the counter protested precincts until the private respondent has presented its [sic]
evidence and has rested its [sic] case on the basis of his Petition.”
The present petition, on the other hand, moves for inhibition of the respondent judge, on
grounds of bias and partiality, invoking an alleged gross disregard of the Rules of Court.
Rule 137, Sec. 2 states:
Rule 137—DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS.
xxx
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
SEC. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect.—If it be claimed that an official
is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in
writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall
thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination
of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed
with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of,
his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.
Petitioner submits that respondent judge should have met the issues raised by him, one by one,
in his motion to inhibit, instead of rejecting said motion on a technicality (non-compliance with
three (3) day notice rule).
We do not, however, find any grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in respondent
judge’s denial of the motion to inhibit for non-compliance with the three (3) day notice rule.
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court requires that notice of a motion be served by the
movant on all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof. Section 5 of
the same Rule provides that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state
the time and place for the hearing of the motion. A motion which does not meet the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless
piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority to act
upon.10 Service of copy of a motion containing notice of the time and place of hearing of said
motion is a mandatory requirement.11
Further, we have to correct the statement of petitioner’s counsel in the supplement to his reply
which reads:
“Petitioner is also aware of the fact that although there are several election protests pending in
the various Regional Trial Courts in the four Provinces of Panay, it is only in this election contest
where the revision of the protested ballots were already finished and has reached the stage of
presentation of evidence. In short the proceedings so far reached is way ahead as compared
with the other election contests.”12
This contention or observation is a non-sequitur. Tardiness or delay in the disposition of election
cases in other courts does not connote partiality of the presiding judge in election cases speedily
disposed of.
Sec. 258 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) provides for the preferential disposition of
election contests within six (6) months after filing. If judges in the four (4) provinces of Panay
island hearing election cases are indeed taking their time in deciding such election cases, as
alluded to by counsel, then they are not certainly complying with the election law.
Moving to the issue of bias and partiality as grounds for disqualification, recently, in Genoblazo
v. CA,13 it was enunciated:
“While it is true that partiality and prejudgment may constitute a just or valid reason for the trial
judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case, it is not enough that the same be
merely alleged. It is now settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties
to the case is not enough; there should be evidence to prove the charge (Beltran v. Garcia, G.R.
No. L-30868, September 31, 1971, 41 SCRA 158.)”
But, we still have to heed the sound admonition in Santos v. Gutierrez:14
“Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a
manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge.
9
Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law stated in general terms—that no
judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra) because—
‘x x x However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination but to do
justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed
exparte may still linger to affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved
or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or stated at
the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will can shut out memory; there
is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that the human mind will deliberate and determine
unaffected by that which it knows, but which it should forget in that process.’“ (Ann. Cas. 1917
A, p. 1235)
In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee in Beltran vs. Garcia,15 he said:
“This case should impress upon respondents the intangible imperatives of not only being
actually impartial but also maintaining the appearance of strict impartiality, so as not to arouse
needlessly the suspicions of either of the parties, as in the case of herein petitioners.
While bias and prejudice are not to be presumed especially if weighed against a judge’s sacred
obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person, the Court has
at the same time admonished judges to so conduct themselves and exercise their discretion in a
way that the peoples’ and litigants’ ‘all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary’ is
ever nurtured and upheld.”
While the procedural tactics and/or motives of petitioner’s counsel may not be all too laudable,
as it was, for instance, impossible for him to be unaware of the 10 February 1988 order, until
sometime in May 1989, because on p. 3, par. 1 of his petition in G.R. No. 83779 filed on 27
June 1988, he already alleged:
“The aforementioned Orders for the delivery of the ballot boxes of the 11 precincts subject of
the protest were duly implemented and as a result of which the officials mentioned in the
aforesaid Orders delivered those ballot boxes and the public respondent took custody of the
same.”
yet, the language employed by the respondent judge in his 10 February 1988 order and even in
his comment on the petition at bar, manifests at the very least an exasperation bordering on
indignation at petitioner and his tactics, which may unnecessarily cloud his impartiality in
deciding the election case at hand. A spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that the
decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must, at all times, maintain
the appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language, both written and spoken, must be
guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.
To erase any doubt whatsoever as to the judge’s bias and/or prejudice against petitioner in
Election Case No. M-944, the Court believes it prudent and better to serve the ends of justice to
transfer the said case to Branch 21, Mambusao, Capiz, presided over by the newly appointed
Judge thereof, Hon. Julius L. Abella.
Considering also that this is an election contest, Judge Abella is hereby directed to terminate the
proceedings and decide the case within three (3) months from notice of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The restraining order issued on 23 May 1989 is
made permanent. Let election case No. M-944 be tranferred from Branch 20 to Branch 21,
Mambusao, Capiz, presided over by Judge Julius L. Abella who shall terminate proceedings
therein and decide the case within three (3) months from notice of this decision.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
SO ORDERED.
     Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez Jr ., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
G.R. No. 163155. July 21, 2006.*
ALFREDO HILADO, MANUEL LACSON, JOSE MA. TUVILLA, JOAQUIN LIMJAP, LOPEZ
SUGAR CORPORATION and FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
JUDGE AMOR A. REYES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
BRANCH 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, respondents.
Administrative Complaints; Judges; Judgments; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers; Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies are prerequisites for the taking of, among
other measures, an administrative complaint against the person of the judge concerned. —It is
well settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
and not to the exercise of administrative powers. The non-existence of forum shopping
notwithstanding, this Court proscribes the filing of an administrative complaint before the
exhaustion of judicial remedies against questioned errors of a judge in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies are prerequisites for the taking of,
among other measures, an administrative complaint against the person of the judge concerned.
Right to Information; The right to information on “matters of public concern or of public
interest” is both the purpose and the limit of the constitutional right of access to public
documents.—On the merits of the petition for mandamus, Section 7 of Article III of the
Constitution provides: SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. (Emphasis and italics supplied) The above-quoted constitutional provision
guarantees a general right—the right to information on matters of “public concern” and, as an
accessory thereto, the right of access to “official records” and the like. The right to information
on “matters of public concern or of public interest” is both the purpose and the limit of the
constitutional right of access to public documents.
Judicial or Court Records; Words and Phrases; The term “judicial record” or “court record” does
not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts—it comprises the official
collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and
returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place during the
trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for
purposes of rendering court decisions.—Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial
records, an understanding of the term “judicial record” or “court record” is in order. The term
“judicial record” or “court record” does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the
courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the
parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word
testimony which took place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control
of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been
described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film,
audio or video recording, court reporter’s notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials,
whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with
the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has received in
a case.
Courts; It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to transparency in
the administration of justice, to the end that it will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the
10
judicial proceedings, safeguard the integrity of the fact-finding process, and foster an informed
public discussion of public affairs. —In determining whether a particular information is of public
concern, there is no right test. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case to
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance as it relates to or affect the
public. It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to transparency in the
administration of justice, to the end that it will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the judicial
proceedings, safeguard the integrity of the fact-finding process, and foster an informed public
discussion of governmental affairs. Thus in Barretto v. Philippine Publishing Co. , 30 Phil. 88
(1915), this Court held: x x x The foundation of the right of the public to know what is going on
in the courts is not the fact that the public, or a portion of it, is curious, or that what is going on
in the court is news, or would be interesting, or would furnish topics of conversation; but is
simply that it has a right to know whether a public officer is properly performing his duty. In
other words, the right of the public to be informed of the proceedings in court is not founded in
the desire or necessity of people to know about the doing of others, but in the necessity of
knowing whether its servant, the judge, is properly performing his duty. x x x
Right to Information; Justice requires that all should have free access to the opinions of judges
and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the
earliest knowledge of these from the public. —Decisions and opinions of a court are of course
matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations
of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice
thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it
would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of
these from the public. Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas , 108 SCRA 502 (1981), this
Court found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco
et al. a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private
complainants, the decision being “already part of the public record which the citizen has a right
to scrutinize.”
Same; Unlike court orders and decisions, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a
case need not be matters of public concern or interest. —Unlike court orders and decisions,
however, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public
concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the
court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests. In thus determining
which part or all of the records of a case may be accessed to, the purpose for which the parties
filed them is to be considered.
Same; Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his death and the
manner by which his private estate may ultimately be settled is not a matter of general, public
concern or one in which a citizen or the public has an interest by which its legal rights or
liabilities may be affected; If the information sought is not a matter of public concern or
interest, denial of access thereto does not violate the citizen’s constitutional right to information.
—In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the purpose of
establishing their right to a share of the estate. As for the creditors, their purpose is to establish
their claim to the estate and be paid therefor before the disposition of the estate. Information
regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his death and the manner by which
his private estate may ultimately be settled is not a matter of general, public concern or one in
which a citizen or the public has an interest by which its legal rights or liabilities may be
affected. Granting unrestricted public access and publicity to personal financial information may
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to which an individual may have an interest in
limiting its disclosure or dissemination. If the information sought then is not a matter of public
concern or interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a citizen’s constitutional right to
information.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
Same; Once a particular information has been determined to be of public concern, the accessory
right of access to official records, including judicial records, are open to the public. —Once a
particular information has been determined to be of public concern, the accessory right of
access to official records, including judicial records, are open to the public. The accessory right
to access public records may, however, be restricted on a showing of good cause. How “good
cause” can be determined, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Republican Company
v. Appeals Court, 442 Mass, 218, 812 N.E.2d 887, teaches: The public’s right of access to
judicial records, including transcripts, evidence, memoranda, and court orders, maybe restricted,
but only on a showing of “good cause.” “ To determine whether good cause is shown, a judge
must balance the rights of the parties based on the particular facts of each case. ” In so doing,
the judge “must take into account all relevant factors, ‘including, but not limited to, the nature
of the parties and the controversy, the type of information and the privacy interests involved,
the extent of community interest , and the reason for the request. ’ ” (Emphasis and italics
supplied; citations omitted) And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and
protective powers of every court over its own records and files.
Same; Access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory
and protective powers of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the
request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. —In fine, access to
court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective
powers of the court,after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access
is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. In the exercise of such discretion, the
following issues may be relevant: “whether parties have interest in privacy, whether information
is being sought for legitimate purpose or for improper purpose, whether there is threat of
particularly serious embarrassment to party, whether information is important to public health
and safety, whether sharing of information among litigants would promote fairness and
efficiency, whether party benefiting from confidentiality order is public entity or official, and
whether case involves issues important to the public.”  
11
     Sedigo & Associates for petitioners.
     Dominador Santiago for respondent.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The present petition is one for mandamus and prohibition.
Julita Campos Benedicto (private respondent), the surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto S.
Benedicto, filed on May 25, 2000 a petition for issuance of letters of administration, docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 00-97505, “Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto” (the case), before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 21 presided by Judge
Amor A. Reyes (public respondent).
Private respondent was, by Order 1 of August 2, 2000, appointed Administratrix of the estate of
Benedicto (the estate), and letters of administration were thereafter issued in her favor.
Herein petitioners, Alfredo Hilado, Manuel Lacson, Jose M. Tuvilla, Joaquin Limjap, Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation had, during the lifetime of Benedicto, filed
before the Bacolod City RTC two complaints for damages or collection of sums of money,
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-9137 and Civil Case No. 111718, against Roberto Benedicto et al.2
In the initial inventory of the estate which private respondent submitted on January 18, 2001 3 in
the case before the Manila RTC, she listed, among other liabilities of the estate, the claims of
petitioners subject of the above-said Bacolod RTC cases as follows:
 
LIST OF LIABILITIES
 

DESCRIPTION AMOUNT
Same; As long then as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of
court records and pays court fees, a court may not deny access to such records. —As long then xxxx  
as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court records and
pays court fees, a court may not deny access to such records. Of course as this Court held in A claim of several sugar planters which is P136,045,772.50
Beegan v. Borja, 261 SCRA 474 (1996), precautionary measures to prevent tampering or
alteration must be observed: We are not unaware of the common practice in the courts with presently the subject of Civil Case No. 95- [at P50.00 per US
respect to the photocopying or xeroxing of portions of case records as long as the same are not
confidential or disallowed by the rules to be reproduced. The judge need not be bothered as 9137 entitled Lacson et al. v. R.S. Bene $1.00]
long as the permission of the Clerk of Court has been sought and as long as a duly authorized
dicto et al., pending before Branch 44 of the  
representative of the court takes charge of the reproduction within the court premises if
warranted or if not, the said court representative must bring along the case records where Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City.  
reproduction takes place and return the same intact to the Clerk of Court. In fine, this Court
finds the petition for mandamus meritorious, petitioners being “interested persons” who have a
legitimate reason or purpose for accessing the records of the case. A claim filed by various sugarplanters P35,198,697.40

Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; Parties; Persons who are not parties to a case which is presently the subject of Civil Case [at P50.00 per US
may not seek the inhibition of the presiding judge. —Since petitioners are not parties to the case,
they may not seek public respondent’s inhibition, whether under the first paragraph of above- No. 11178 entitled Lopez Sugar Corpora $1.00]
quoted Section 1 which constitutes grounds for mandatory disqualification, or under the second
paragraph of the same section on voluntary disqualification. tion et al. v. R.S. Benedicto, et al., pending  

before Branch 41 of the Regional Trial  

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition.
Court in Bacolod City.      
4
 
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Ricardo G. Nepomuceno, Jr., Andres H. Hagad and (Emphasis and italics supplied)
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
From January 2002 until November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila
RTC allowed petitioners through counsel Sedigo and Associates to regularly and periodically
examine the records of the case and to secure certified true copies thereof.
By December 2003, however, Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an associate of petitioners’ counsel,
was denied access to the last folder-record of the case which, according to the court’s clerical
staff, could not be located and was probably inside the chambers of public respondent for
safekeeping.5
Petitioners’ counsel thus requested public respondent, by letter 6 of January 15, 2004, to allow
Atty. Paredes to personally check the records of the case. Acting on the letter, the Officer-In-
Charge/Legal Researcher of Branch 21 advised petitioners’ counsel in writing that “per
instruction of the Hon. Presiding Judge[,] only parties or those with authority from the parties
are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case pending in this Court,” and that they may
be “allowed to go over the records of the above-entitled case upon presentation of written
authority from the [administratrix].”7
On February 2, 2004, petitioners’ counsel was served with a notice of hearing of the case on
February 13, 2004.8 Petitioners’ counsel thus attended such scheduled hearing during which he
filed a Motion for Inhibition 9 of public respondent on the ground of gross ignorance, dereliction
of duty, and manifest partiality towards the administratrix. Public respondent, noting that an
error was committed in the service to petitioners of the notice of hearing, ignored the motion of
petitioners’ counsel.10
Intending to compare the list of properties in the estate’s inventory all of which properties were
appraised at a fair value of P100 million with the list of assets valued at P1 Billion said to have
been ceded in 1990 to the decedent under his Compromise Agreement with the Presidential
Commission on Good Government,11 petitioners’ counsel sent the Branch Clerk of Court of
Branch 21 of the Manila RTC a letter 12 requesting to be furnished with certified true copies of
the “updated inventory.”
By still another letter, 13 petitioners’ counsel requested to be furnished with certified true copies
of the order issued by the court during the hearing of February 13, 2004, as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes taken thereon.14
By Order15 of March 2, 2004, public respondent indicated why petitioners had no standing to file
the Motion for Inhibition as well as to request for certified true copies of the above-indicated
documents. Read the Order of March 2, 2004:
“Perusal of the motion shows that the movant is asking this Court to act on their motion despite
the denial of their Omnibus Motion to Intervene which to date remains pending resolution with
the Court of Appeals.
As correctly pointed out by the Administratrix, said motion is filed by persons/entities who have
no legal standing in the above-entitled case, hence they cannot ask anything from this Court,
much more for this Court to act on pleadings filed or soon to be filed.
For the record, the Court received two (2) letters dated February 17 and 27, 2004 addressed to
Atty. Maria Luisa Lesle G. Gonzales, the Branch Clerk of Court…asking that he be furnished with
certified true copies of the updated inventory and Order issued by this Court on February 13,
2004 hearing as well as the corresponding transcript of stenographic notes within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of said letters.
12
Considering that the movants were not allowed to intervene in the proceedings per order of this
Court dated January 2, 2002, copies of all pleadings/orders filed/issued relative to this case may
only be secured from the [Administratrix] and/or counsel.”16 (Italics supplied)
Petitioners thus filed on April 30, 2004 before this Court the present petition for mandamus and
prohibition to compel public respondent to allow them to access, examine, and obtain copies of
any and all documents forming part of the records of the case and disqualify public respondent
from further presiding thereover.
In their petition, petitioners contend that the records of the case are public records to which the
public has the right to access, inspect and obtain official copies thereof, 17 recognition of which
right is enjoined under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 135 and
Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners further contend that public respondent manifested her arbitrariness, malice and
partiality through her blatant disregard of basic rules in the disposition and safekeeping of court
records, and her denial of their right to access the records suffices to bar her from presiding
over the case;18 and public respondent’s incompetence, malice, bad faith and partiality are
underscored by her failure to enforce for more than three years the requirement of the Rules of
Court on the prompt submission by the administratrix of her final inventory and the filing of a
periodic accounting of her administration.19
By Comment20 filed on September 21, 2004, private respondent submits that the petition is
fatally defective since petitioners failed to disclose in their certification of non-forum shopping
that they had earlier instituted an administrative complaint against public respondent which
prayed for the same reliefs 21—for the disqualification of public respondent from presiding over
the case and for the court docket to be opened for examination.
Private respondent further submits that the petition for prohibition should be dismissed since
petitioners are not parties to the case, hence, they have no personality to file a motion for
inhibition.22
As to the alleged denial of petitioners’ right to examine court records and participate in the
proceedings, private respondent submits that this is not unqualifiedly true for petitioners must
have secured a copy of the inventory of the assets and liabilities of the estate, they being aware
of the declared fair value of the estate and their counsel was present during the February 13,
2004 hearing.23
For consideration then are the following issues: (1) whether the present petition is fatally
defective for failure of petitioners to disclose in the certificate of non-forum shopping that they
had priorly instituted an administrative complaint against public respondent which prays for the
same reliefs; (2) whether a writ of mandamus may issue to compel public respondent to allow
petitioners to examine and obtain copies of any or all documents forming part of the records of
the case; and (3) whether a writ of prohibition will issue in favor of petitioners, who are not
parties to the case, to inhibit public respondent from presiding over the case.
As reflected above, petitioners had, before the filing of the present petition, filed an
administrative complaint before this Court against public respondent, “ Alfredo Hilado, Lopez
Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation v. Judge Amor A. Reyes, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 21,” docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-05-1910.
Petitioners subsequently filed a supplemental24 and a second supplemental administrative
complaint25 praying for 1) the imposition of appropriate disciplinary sanctions against public
respondent for, among other things, denying them their right to access the docket of the case,
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
and 2) the disqualification of public respondent from presiding over the case, which latter prayer
was, however, subsequently withdrawn in a motion 26 filed on April 30, 2004, the same day that
the present petition was filed.
Denying the existence of forum shopping, petitioners argue that it “exists only where the
elements of litis pendencia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in the other.”27
It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. 28
The non-existence of forum shopping notwithstanding, this Court proscribes the filing of an
administrative complaint before the exhaustion of judicial remedies against questioned errors of
a judge in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies are prerequisites for the taking of, among other
measures, an administrative complaint against the person of the judge concerned. So Atty.
Flores v. Hon. Abesamis29 teaches:
x x x [T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed
by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature ( i.e., error in appreciation or admission
of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for
new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or
neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
x x x Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in
the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures
against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature.
It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals
have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative
liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
x x x Law and logic decree that “administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof.” Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
performance of their duties and functions; x x x 30 (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations
omitted)
It is thus only after a questioned action of a judge in a pending case has been judicially resolved
with finality that the door to an inquiry into his or her administrative liability may be said to have
opened.
Parenthetically, during the pendency of the present petition or on April 15, 2005, the Second
Division of this Court rendered a decision 31 on the above-said administrative complaint filed by
petitioners against public respondent.
On the merits of the petition for mandamus, Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
13
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The above-quoted constitutional provision guarantees a general right—the right to information
on matters of “public concern” and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to “official
records” and the like. The right to information on “matters of public concern or of public
interest” is both the purpose and the limit of the constitutional right of access to public
documents.
Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial records, an understanding of the term
“judicial record” or “court record” is in order.
The term “judicial record” or “court record” does not only refer to the orders, judgment or
verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed
by the parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word
testimony33 which took place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control
of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been
described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film,
audio or video recording, court reporter’s notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials,
whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with
the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has received in
a case.34
In determining whether a particular information is of public concern, there is no right test. In the
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance as it relates to or affect the public. 35
It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to transparency in the
administration of justice, to the end that it will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the judicial
proceedings, safeguard the integrity of the fact-finding process, and foster an informed public
discussion of governmental affairs. Thus in Barretto v. Philippine Publishing Co.,36 this Court
held:
“x x x The foundation of the right of the public to know what is going on in the courts is not the
fact that the public, or a portion of it, is curious, or that what is going on in the court is news, or
would be interesting, or would furnish topics of conversation; but is simply that it has a right to
know whether a public officer is properly performing his duty. In other words, the right of the
public to be informed of the proceedings in court is not founded in the desire or necessity of
people to know about the doing of others, but in the necessity of knowing whether its servant,
the judge, is properly performing his duty. x x x
The case in Cowley vs. Pulsifer (137 Mass. 392) is so pertinent to the questions presented for
our decision in the case at bar that we cannot refrain from quoting extensively therefrom. x x x
x x x “The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public more than
counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of
such proceedings.” x x x
“The chief advantage to the country to which we can discern, and that which we understand to
be intended by the foregoing passage, is the security which publicity gives for the proper
administration of justice. x x x It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the
public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should act under the
sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his
own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed. ”
From this quotation it is obvious that it was not the idea of the supreme court of Massachusetts
to lay down the proposition that simply because a pleading happened to be filed in a public
office it becomes public property that any individual, whether interested or not, had the right to
publish its contents, or that any newspaper was privileged to scatter the allegations contained
therein to the four corners of the country. The right of the public to know the contents of the
paper is the basis of the privilege, which is, as we have said, the right to determine by its own
senses that its servant, the judge, is performing his duties according to law. x x x”37 (Emphasis
and italics supplied; citations omitted)
Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these
are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which
every citizen is charged with knowledge. 38 Justice thus requires that all should have free access
to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent,
suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public.39 Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v.
Judge Llamas,40 this Court found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they were
even the therein private complainants, the decision being “already part of the public record
which the citizen has a right to scrutinize.”
Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a
case need not be matters of public concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of
establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their
rights and interests.
In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may be accessed to, the purpose
for which the parties filed them is to be considered.
In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the purpose of establishing
their right to a share of the estate. As for the creditors, their purpose is to establish their claim
to the estate and be paid therefor before the disposition of the estate.
Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his death and the manner
by which his private estate may ultimately be settled is not a matter of general, public concern
or one in which a citizen or the public has an interest by which its legal rights or liabilities may
be affected. Granting unrestricted public access and publicity to personal financial information
may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to which an individual may have an interest
in limiting its disclosure or dissemination.
If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or interest, denial of access
thereto does not violate a citizen’s constitutional right to information.
Once a particular information has been determined to be of public concern, the accessory right
of access to official records, including judicial records, are open to the public.
The accessory right to access public records may, however, be restricted on a showing of good
cause. How “good cause” can be determined, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Republican Company v. Appeals Court teaches:41
The public’s right of access to judicial records, including transcripts, evidence, memoranda, and
court orders, maybe restricted, but only on a showing of “good cause.” “ To determine whether
good cause is shown, a judge must balance the rights of the parties based on the particular
14
facts of each case.” In so doing, the judge “must take into account all relevant factors,
‘including, but not limited to, the nature of the parties and the controversy, the type of
information and the privacy interests involved, the extent of community interest, and the reason
for the request.’ ”42 (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted)
And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and protective powers of every court
over its own records and files.43
The Supreme Court of Canada, expounding on the right of the court to exercise supervisory
powers over materials surrendered into its care, held:
“It follows that the court, as the custodian of the exhibits, is bound to inquire into the use that is
to be made of them and, in my view, is fully entitled to regulate that use by securing
appropriate undertakings and assurances if those be advisable to protect competing interests. x
xx
In exercising its supervisory powers over materials surrendered into its care, the court may
regulate the use made of it. In an application of this nature, the court must protect the
respondent and accommodate public interest in access. x x x In an application of this nature the
court must protect the respondent and accommodate the public interest in access. This can only
be done in terms of the actual purpose, and in the face of obvious prejudice and the absence of
a specific purpose, the order for unrestricted access and reproduction should not have been
made.”44 (Italics supplied)
In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion 45 and subject to the
supervisory and protective powers of the court,46 after considering the actual use or purpose for
which the request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. In the
exercise of such discretion, the following issues may be relevant: “whether parties have interest
in privacy, whether information is being sought for legitimate purpose or for improper purpose,
whether there is threat of particularly serious embarrassment to party, whether information is
important to public health and safety, whether sharing of information among litigants would
promote fairness and efficiency, whether party benefiting from confidentiality order is public
entity or official, and whether case involves issues important to the public.” 47
By the administratrix-private respondent’s own information, petitioners are the plaintiffs in two
complaints (against Roberto Benedicto, et al.) for damages and/or sums of money, Civil Case
No. 95-9137 and Civil Case No. 11178, filed before the Bacolod RTC. She contends, however,
that “if the motion to dismiss [these RTC Bacolod cases is] granted, . . . petitioners would have
absolutely no interest of any kind [over] the [e]state of the [d]eceased Roberto S. Benedicto.” 48
Petitioners’ stated main purpose for accessing the records—to monitor prompt compliance with
the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the
completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accounting49—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money
against Roberto Benedicto et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his
estate. They are in fact “interested persons” under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court
reading:
Rule 135, SEC. 2. Publicity of proceedings and records .—x x x x The records of every court of
justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person,
at all proper business hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records,
unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of
morality or decency. (Italics supplied), entitled to be informed of the inventory as well as other
records which are relevant to their claims against Benedicto.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
As long then as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court
records and pays court fees, 50 a court may not deny access to such records. Of course as this
Court held in Beegan v. Borja,51 precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration must
be observed:
“We are not unaware of the common practice in the courts with respect to the photocopying or
xeroxing of portions of case records as long as the same are not confidential or disallowed by
the rules to be reproduced. The judge need not be bothered as long as the permission of the
Clerk of Court has been sought and as long as a duly authorized representative of the court
takes charge of the reproduction within the court premises if warranted or if not, the said court
representative must bring along the case records where reproduction takes place and return the
same intact to the Clerk of Court.”52
In fine, this Court finds the petition for mandamus meritorious, petitioners being “interested
persons” who have a legitimate reason or purpose for accessing the records of the case.
15
Notes.—Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to information is a self-
executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts, though Congress
may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information such as those found in
R.A. 6713, otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees.” The incorporation of the right to information in the Constitution is a recognition
of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy—there can be no
realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems, nor a meaningful democratic
decisionmaking if they are denied access to information of general interest. ( Gonzales vs.
Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733 [2000])
The constitutional right to information is limited to “matters of public concern,” to
“transactions involving public interest.” The negotiation and subsequent sale of a foreclosed
property by the GSIS to a buyer is by no stretch of the imagination imbued with public interest
as it is a purely private transaction. (Vda. de Urbano vs. Government Service Insurance System ,
367 SCRA 672 [2001])

Respecting the prohibition aspect of the petition, the same fails. Nothing can be more empowering than to compel access to all information relevant to the
negotiation of government contracts including but not limited to evaluation reports,
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which govern disqualification of judges recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other
provide: documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to any proposed undertaking.
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which (Bellosillo, J., separate opinion in Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, 403 SCRA 1 [2003])
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
was presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

SECTION 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. —If it be claimed that an
official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may,
in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall
thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination
of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed
with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of,
his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Since petitioners are not parties to the case, they may not seek public respondent’s inhibition,
whether under the first paragraph of above-quoted Section 1 which constitutes grounds for
mandatory disqualification, or under the second paragraph of the same section on voluntary
disqualification.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent is ORDERED to

allow petitioners to access, examine, and obtain copies of any and all documents-part of the
records of Special Proceeding No. 00-97505 bearing on the inventory of assets and liabilities of
the estate and the hearing conducted by the trial court on February 13, 2004, subject to
precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration thereof.
The petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition for mandamus granted; petition for prohibition dismissed.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1195. February 26, 1997.*
Spouses ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELISA A. NAZARENO, complainants, vs. JUDGE
ENRIQUE M. ALMARIO, respondent.
Courts; Judges; Duty of Judges; A public official whose duty is to apply the law and dispense
justice, be he a judge of a lower court or tribunal or a justice of the appellate courts, should not
only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial,
independent and honest.—The time honored rule is that a public official whose duty is to apply
the law and dispense justice, be he a judge of a lower court or tribunal or a justice of the
appellate courts, should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed
and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest.
Same; Same; Same; It is thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any impression of
impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been
the object of criticism and controversy.—It has to be stressed once more to all who are sworn to
render decisions in actual controversies that a decision which correctly applies the law and
jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a
magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and honest. It is thus the duty of
members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity
of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Msconduct and Acts Unbecoming of a
Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint dated 28 February 1994 for gross misconduct or acts unbecoming a judge
filed against Judge Enrique M. Almario, then presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
15, Naic, Cavite, the spouses Romeo P. Nazareno and Elisa A. Nazareno averred:
“We would like to narrate some instances where Judge Enrique M. Almario took advantage of
our situation in order to force us to accede to his demands. They are as follows:
1.—Sometime in the middle of 1990, when Judge Almario was still holding his office in
Trece Martires City, he saw me (Elisa) in the office of his Court and he invited me to his
chamber. After a short conversation, Judge Almario said to me that he was near to retire
(sic) and so he needed plenty of money (Inday malapit na ako magretire, kailangan ko ng
maraming pera). Mrs. Nazareno was surprised and shocked to hear what the judge said,
but could not say anything but just smiled. However, before I (Mrs. Nazareno) left his
chamber, Judge Almario said to her to help him with this, and I (Mrs. Nazareno) assured
him that she will raise some money for him.
2. —Then another incident happened when the Judge saw us (Romeo & Elisa Nazareno) in
the office of his Court, again Judge Almario invited us to his chamber. His office was still in
Trece Martires City Hall. There, he told my husband (Romero Nazareno, the estate
administrator) that he will change him as administrator of the estate because of his
conviction in a criminal case filed against him by his sister Natividad. But Romeo told Judge
Almario that it had nothing to do with the case as it was the same issue the other party
raised even before the former Judge Gustilo of the same sala. Then he said that we have
to be prepared for it. Then we left.
3.—In 1992 when the office of Judge Almario was transferred to Naic, Cavite, I was told
16
that the Judge was at Roschelle Restaurant. Thinking of the incident, I suspected that he
(Judge) was waiting for the money he was asking for. I got P10,000.00 from my husband
Romeo, wrapped it in a newspaper and I personally delivered the money to Judge Almario
at Roschelle Restaurant. He (Judge) asked me (Mrs. Nazareno) how much was the money.
I replied, ‘P10,000.00 Judge.’ Seeing the Judge’s facial expression (not contented). I (Mrs.
Nazareno) promised again to raise some money next time and he (judge) replied. ‘O, sige.’
4.—Sometime in the month of November, 1992, in Naic, Cavite, Judge Almario sent for us
(sic) his employee Joe to our place, Naic Cinema, and told us that the Judge was asking for
food to be taken to the Seaside Beach belonging to Mr. Dualan, because the one who
promised him to bring food did not arrive. At about 6:30 P.M. of that day, my husband
(Romeo) and I went to the Seaside Beach with the food the Judge had asked. We ordered
the food at Roschelle Restaurant and it cost us no less than P2,500.00. There in the beach,
he introduced us to Mr. Dualan and to some of his visitors there. And after a while, silently
handed the Judge the P10,000.00 as I promised him the last time.
 
    The following morning, a woman from Seaside Beach came to our place, Naic Cinema,
and said, ‘Ate Naty, Ate Naty, [n]adala ni Judge Almario yong susi ng cottage, pakikuha
n’yo nalang sa kanya.’ Surprised, I (Mrs. Nazareno) replied, ‘Hindi ako si Ate Naty mo, siya
yong kalaban namin sa kaso, nandoon siya sa Dalisay Theatre.’ Immediately the woman
left. ‘Ate Naty’ refers to Natividad P. Nazareno, the defendant in the case heard by Judge
Almario which was filed by the Estate, through Romeo P. Nazareno, as administrator.
5.—During the month of December, 1992, also in Naic, Cavite, another employee of Judge
Almario, by the name of Roldan, came to our place, Naic Cinema, telling me that the Judge
wanted to see me.
So, I went with Roldan. And when we reached the office of the Judge, he told Roldan to
step out and closed the door. Judge Almario again asked [for] some food, at least three (3)
kinds, for the gathering of his staff at Aroma Beach. He mentioned the time when he
needed the food (lunch time). I told him (Judge) to pick-up the food.
 But before I left, the judge asked to change his salary check because he needed cash on
that day. He asked for the amount of P7,500.00. So I went back to my place and get [sic]
the amount from my husband (Romeo) and returned to the office of Judge Almario. I gave
the P7,500.00 for his check, but Judge Almario did not hand over to me his check. I waited
for the said check, but the Judge seemed to know nothing about the check and did not
bother to say something about the P7,500.00 but just received it. I was then shy to ask
from him the check in exchange of the cash I gave him, so I asked permission to leave
which he okayed.
6.—One time, Judge Almario asked us to change our lawyer because according to him, our
lawyer has no ‘pakikisama’ to him. We did not follow his advice because we believe in our
lawyer. For this reason, Judge Almario always deny our motions and pleadings and he even
dismissed Mr. Romeo Nazareno’s appeal in a criminal case on the ground that the notice of
appeal was filed out of time, but which the court of origin or municipal trial court has
approved and granted by transmitting all the records of the criminal case to his sala. The
criminal case now is pending before the Hon. Supreme Court.
In spite of our compliance of [sic] his personal demands, Judge Almario has repeatedly shown
his bias acts and partiality against us.”1
In his comment, respondent judge denied all the charges against him.2
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
The spouses affirmed the truth of the averments in their complaint in a reply dated 24 May
1994.3 On 14 June 1994, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) based on findings that the
matters/issues raised in the complaint are factual in nature recommended that the charges
against Judge Almario be assigned to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for a full
blown investigation.
On 27 July 1994, the Court approved the OCA recommendation and designated Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales to conduct an investigation and submit a report and
recommendation.
The following persons appeared before Justice Carpio Morales:
1.Elisa Nazareno—she testified and affirmed the truth of the allegations in the complaint.
She first narrated how respondent Judge Almario, on one occasion, asked her to enter his
chamber after which he told Elisa, in the Visayan dialect, how he needed money since he
was nearing his retirement age and that she should help him (“tulungan mo ako”). She told
the judge that she would see what she could do. Elisa then recounted that she later gave
Judge Almario ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) on two (2) separate occasions. 4
She testified having given food for respondent judge on two (2) occasions: first, for a
gathering of respondent judge’s family and friends at the Seaside Beach resort and
another, for the Christmas party of the judge’s court staff at the Aroma Beach resort. 5
Elisa also recounted how Judge Almario asked her to encash his salary check for P7,500.00
which she did but respondent judge did not give her the salary check and she was hesitant
to ask him to give it to her.6
Finally, Elisa testified about the incident when respondent judge talked to them about
replacing her husband (herein co-complainant Romeo Nazareno) as administrator of the
property subject of a pending case before respondent judge.
Romeo Nazareno—he testified that they had at least four (4) pending cases before
respondent Judge Almario.7 Romeo corroborated the testimony of Elisa that Judge Almario
met with them to discuss his decision to replace him as administrator. Romeo added that
respondent judge made them believe that he wanted the spouses to offer something to
him.8
Romeo also affirmed Elisa’s testimony that they were forced to give a total of P20,000.00
to respondent Judge.9
Romeo likewise testified about the incident when they brought food to the Seaside Beach
Resort upon the request of respondent judge as well as her wife having given P7,500.00 in
cash to Judge Almario for the latter’s salary check which he never delivered. 10
3.Remedios Antipuesto—she testified that she worked as a helper for complainant Mrs.
Elisa Nazareno.
     She recalled a time when Mrs. Nazareno asked her to help cook some food which
respondent judge was asking for. She could not remember the exact date but she recalled
that an employee of the court where the judge was assigned, a certain “Joe,” picked up the
food.11
4.Roldan Alcantara—he testified that as a utility worker assigned to the sala of respondent
judge, he sometimes encashed the salary checks of Judge Almario.
17
Alcantara also testified having seen the Nazareno spouses at the Seaside Beach Resort on
at least one occasion when respondent judge and his sister-in-law were there. Alcantara
stated that the Nazareno spouses brought food which they handed over to the sister-in-law
(“hipag”) of respondent Judge Almario.12
Jose R. Salvadora, Jr.—he stated that he worked as a legal researcher in the sala of Judge
Almario.
He recalled an occasion when respondent judge asked him to go with him to the Seaside
Beach Resort. At the resort he saw the judge’s sister-in-law talking with complainant Elisa
Nazareno. He stated that Mrs. Nazareno left but returned after about half an hour with a
“casserola” (cooking pot) apparently containing what he supposed was “pansit.” Mrs.
Nazareno took the “casserola” to the cottage occupied by the family of respondent judge.
Finally, Salvadora admitted having picked up some food from the food stall of Mrs.
Nazareno for the Christmas party of respondent judge’s court staff at the Aroma Beach
Resort.13
6.Respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario—he denied ever receiving any money from the
Nazareno spouses. He maintained that the allegations in the complaint against him are all
fabricated and were filed because the Nazarenos had been receiving adverse rulings and
orders from him in several cases.
Judge Almario stated that he never talked to litigants without the counsel of all other
parties being present. He added that he felt that Atty. Dominguez, counsel of the
Nazarenos, was trying to blackmail him into inhibiting himself from hearing their cases. 14
Finally, Judge Almario denied ever receiving any food from the Nazarenos. He stated that
the food for the Christmas party of his staff at the Aroma Beach Resort was contributed by
friends and relatives of staff members.
7.Jacinto P. Dominguez—he testified that as counsel for the Nazarenos in cases pending
before Judge Almario, there was an occasion when he asked for a meeting with the latter
inside his chambers in the presence of opposing counsel Atty. Roman C. Cabading. The
purpose of said meeting was to inform the judge that his clients (the Nazarenos) had
talked to then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon about the possibility of filing administrative
charges against Judge Almario. Atty. Dominguez specifically referred to charges that Judge
Almario had: a) asked Mrs. Nazareno to encash a check which he did not give to the latter:
b) accepted a total of P20,000, from the Nazarenos; and c) requested for food for a
Christmas party.15
8.Roman C. Cabading—he testified that as counsel for the opposing party in the cases
involving the Nazareno spouses, there was an occasion when opposing counsel Atty.
Jacinto P. Dominguez asked to see Judge Almario in his presence. Atty. Cabading testified
that Atty. Dominguez showed Judge Almario and himself a letter written by the spouses
addressed to then Justice Secretary Drilon about an alleged demand made by respondent
judge for some amount of money.16
After a close and careful study of the records of the proceedings before investigating Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales, the Court finds sufficient evidence to find respondent Judge Enrique M.
Almario liable for gross dishonesty and misconduct. His conduct undoubtedly is unbecoming a
member of the bench.
The time honored rule is that a public official whose duty is to apply the law and dispense
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10 18
justice, be he a judge of a lower court or tribunal or a justice of the appellate courts, should not
only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial,
independent and honest.

It has to be stressed once more to all who are sworn to render decisions in actual controversies
that a decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to
questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than
impartial and honest. It is thus the duty of members of the bench to avoid any impression of
impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been
the object of criticism and controversy.

In the present case, respondent’s denial of the charges leveled by complainants that he had
asked for and accepted food contributions on at least two (2) occasions from litigants (herein
complainants) is contradicted by his own witnesses, Roldan Alcantara and Jose R. Salvadora, Jr.,
who are both employees of the court. Nothing in the testimonies of these two (2) court
employees shows any motivation other than to tell the truth.

On the charge of having accepted P20,000.00 from the Nazareno spouses and receiving cash in
exchange for his salary check which he never gave to Mrs. Nazareno, the Court agrees with the
conclusions of Justice Morales that complainant Elisa Nazareno had convincingly proven having
given: a) P10,000.00 to respondent judge on two (2) occasions and b) cash for respondent’s
salary check. As correctly observed by Justice Morales, the testimony of Mrs. Nazareno was
undented even when subjected to an extended cross examination by respondent judge. 17

In sum, the Court finds the charges of gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a judge as
having been sufficiently substantiated. Judge Enrique M. Almario deserves no less than the
penalty of dismissal from the service.

However, based on the records of this case, respondent judge had already compulsorily retired
in July 1995. The proper penalty, therefore, in lieu of his removal from office, is forfeiture of all
his retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Enrique M. Almario is hereby found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and dishonesty, while in office. The Court hereby ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all
leave and retirement benefits to which he may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment in
the government service, including government owned or controlled agencies or corporations.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Respondent guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.

Notes.—The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice. (Gil vs. Son, 241 SCRA 467 [1995])

A judge’s official conduct should be free and be untainted by the appearance of impropriety, and
his or her personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in performance of judicial duties, but
also in his or her everyday life, should be beyond reproach. ( Panganiban vs. Guerrero, Jr., 242
SCRA 11 [1995])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
Adm. Matter No. 2360-MJ. August 31, 1981.*
SPOUSES TEODORICO MARFIL, and TEODORA ESPAÑOLA, complainants, vs. JUDGE
ORLANDO CUACHON, 5th Municipal Circuit Court of Isabela, MOISES PADILLA,
Negros Occidental, respondents.
Judicial Ethics; Judges; Administrative Complaints; Gross ignorance of the law; Disqualification;
Rule on disqualification of judge on account of relationship, mandatory; Purpose of
disqualification.—The above rule is mandatory. Strict compliance with the stringent rule on
disqualification on account of relationship between the judge and one of the parties serves not
only to protect the rights of the parties and assure an impartial administration of justice but also
to prevent erosion of the people’s confidence in the judiciary It is in the essence of due process
that a judge, sitting in a case, be at all times wholly free, impartial and independent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conduct of respondent judge in taking cognizance of a
criminal case impaired his ability to act as impartial judge; The aggrieved party in the case being
the aunt of respondent’s wife; Case at bar.—It is an admitted fact that the aggrieved party in
Criminal Case No. 449 is the aunt of respondents wife. However, notwithstanding such
relationship and the above-quoted prohibition, respondent took cognizance of the case
conducted a preliminary examination, issued a warrant of arrest by virtue of which complaint
was detained and set the case for hearing on February 12 1980. These actuations of respondent
Judge opened to question his ability to act with the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge.
We cannot, but censure him for these acts. His alleged effort to settle the case amicably could,
therefore, be a mere guise to persuade the complainant to leave the land in question, to favor
the suffered aggrieved party in the Criminal Case, with the added disadvantage on the part of
complainant who was then under detention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Subsequent inhibition of the judge in the case does not
extenuate his culpability; The legal norm that judges should preserve judicial integrity violated.
—The fact that respondent judge subsequently inhibited himself after it became evident that no
possible amicable settlement could be reached by the parties does not extenuate his culpability.
Respondent judge has violated the salutary norm that a judge should always strive to preserve
judicial integrity and discharge his task with deep concern to the cause of justice in accordance
with the legal norms, which is the manifestation of the rule above cited, of which respondent
counsel pretend ignorance of; otherwise such ignorance is inexcusable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reprimand and warning. —Respondent judge is hereby
REPRIMANDED with warning that a repetition of similar act will be dealt with more severely.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Ignorance of the law and acts unbecoming a
Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
DE CASTRO, J.:
In a verified complaint dated March 17, 1980 complainants charged respondent Judge Orlando
Cuachon of the 5th Judicial Circuit Court of Isabela—Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental, with
“gross ignorance of the law and acts unbecoming a Judge.”
The complaint alleged that on December 10, 1979, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, an aunt of the
wife of respondent, filed a criminal complaint against herein complainant Teodorico Marfil, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (AntiSquatting Law), before the sala of respondent
Judge. Respondent allegedly took cognizance of the case, and after conducting the first stage of
19
the preliminary examination wherein the aggrieved party Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales and her
witnesses were investigated respondent on January 8, 1980, issued a warrant for the arrest of
Teodorico Marfil and fixed the bail at P1,000.00; that on the basis of such warrant complainant
Marfil was apprehended on January 18, 1980 and detained. It was also alleged that on February
22, 1980 the accused-complainant hired the services of a counsel who, on the same day, filed a
petition for referral of the criminal case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform due to the tenancy
aspect of the case, with prayer that the accused-complainant who is under detention be
released. For failure of respondent to order the release of accused-complainant, an urgent
motion to quash the criminal action dated March 6, 1980, was filed by the latter’s counsel, which
motion was however, not favorably acted upon by respondent. Complainants prayed that
respondent be removed from his office.
In his comment and answer dated May 16, 1980 respondent Judge averred that when a
complaint is filed in court, it becomes a routinary matter to accept the same and conduct a
preliminary examination for the purpose of the issuance of a warrant of’ arrest; that on January
8, 1980 he issued a warrant of arrest; that on January 23, 1980 he issued a subpoena for the
parties to appear on February 12, 1980, and on the latter date, the aggrieved party and the
Station Commander of’ Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental, were present, but the accused
appeared without counsel. Respondent Judge further alleged that, being aware of’ the
relationship of the wife to the aggrieved party, he announced during the said hearing that the
case was called for a possible amicable settlement; that when he found that there was no
possibility for an amicable settlement, he issued an order on the same date inhibiting himself
from trying the case; that having inhibited himself, he could no longer act on the petition for
referral dated February 22, 1980 and motion to quash, dated March 6, 1980, or order the
release of the accused.
The complaint is meritorious. Paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court
clearly provides:
“No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.”
The above rule is mandatory. Strict compliance with the stringent rule on disqualification on
account of relationship between the judge and one of the parties serves not only to protect the
rights of the parties and assure an impartial administration of justice but also to prevent erosion
of the people’s confidence in the judiciary 1 It is in the essence of due process that a judge,
sitting in a case, be at all times wholly free, impartial and independent.
It is an admitted fact that the aggrieved party in Criminal Case No. 449 is the aunt of
respondent’s wife. However, notwithstanding such relationship and the above-quoted
prohibition, respondent took cognizance of the case, conducted a preliminary examination,
issued a warrant of arrest by virtue of which complainant was detained and set the case f or
hearing on February 12, 1980. These actuations of respondent Judge opened to question his
ability to act with the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge. We cannot but censure him for these
acts. His alleged effort to settle the case amicably could, therefore, be a mere guise to persuade
the complainant to leave the land in question, to favor the suffered aggrieved party in the
Criminal Case, with the added disadvantage on the part of complainant who was then under
detention.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10 20
The fact that respondent judge subsequently inhibited himself after it became evident that no
possible amicable settlement could be reached by the parties does not extenuate his culpability. A judge may not be held liable for ignorance of the law when he acted in good faith in ordering
Respondent judge has violated the salutary norm that a judge should always strive to preserve the immediate execution of the order of the Court of First Instance which resulted in the
judicial integrity and discharge his task with deep concern to the cause of justice in accordance imprisonment of complainant. (Mangaron vs. Bagano, 85 SCRA 1.)
with the legal norms, which is the manifestation of the rule above cited, of which respondent
counsel pretend ignorance of; otherwise such ignorance is inexcusable. Mere errors in the appreciation of law by a judge may not be visited with a penalty rather severe
in character, such as dismissed from the service. (Lopez vs. Corpuz, 78 SCRA 374.)
In the case of Hurtado vs. Judalena and Judge Bonong,2 this Court held that:
Charges against judge for gross misconduct in office and gross ignorance of the law by
“Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates without ambiguity the cases in extending terms of lease contract in defiance of court verdict may be dismissed for lack of merit.
which any judge or judicial officer is disqualified from acting as such. The said section, in no (Escabillas vs. Martinez, 78 SCRA 367.)
uncertain terms, expressly prohibits a judge or judicial officer from sitting in a case where he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity. This is mandatory. In A trial judge is not subject to administrative penalty where he commits a mere error of judgment
the case at bar, it is not denied that the respondent judge is the brother of the respondent and was not actuated by partiality or deliberate malice. (Paulino vs. Guevarra, 76 SCRA 123.)
Isabel G. Judalena and their close relationship notwithstanding, and despite the prohibition
mentioned above, the respondent judge took cognizance of the case and issued the
controversial order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, after which he
inhibited himself from sitting on the case for the same reasons. Such action, to our mind, is
reprehensible as it erodes the all important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.”

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED with warning
that a repetition of similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to his personal record.
SO ORDERED.
     Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
     Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
     Guerrero J., was designated to sit in with the Second Division.
Respondent reprimanded.

Notes.—A judge should make a careful self-examination whether to disqualify himself in a case
or not. (Umale vs, Villaluz, 51 SCRA 84).

A grant of bail by a court in a murder charge which is pending before another court constitutes
usurpation of judicial functions. (Castillo vs. Bullecer, 37 SCRA 122).

The mere participation of a judge in a prior proceeding relating to the subject in the capacity of
an administrative official does not disqualify him from acting as a judge thereon. (Liddell & Co.
vs. Collector of lnternal Revenue, 2 SCRA 632).

The Rules of Court does not prohibit voluntary inhibition by judges. (Del Castillo vs. Javelona, 6
SCRA 146).

A Justice of the Court of Appeals may not be disqualified from sitting in a criminal case although
he as Chief of the Legal Staff of the Office of the President in the administrative investigation of
the accused for his speculation while employed in the Central Bank. (Pulido vs. C.A., 34 SCRA
230).

Administrative complaint against trial judge for ineptitude, gross ignorance of the law, violation
of oath of office and bias is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. (Evangelista vs. Carpio, 86
SCRA 624.)

Members of the bench should refrain from any conduct that would in any way give rise to a
suspicion, whether unfounded or not, that he exhibits more concern for those blessed with
affluence. (Azurpado vs. Buenviaje, 82 SCRA 369).
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045. January 19, 2010.*
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE HARUN B. ISMAEL,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within
the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and is not excusable. —It is settled that
failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency
and is not excusable. It is a less serious charge and is punishable by either suspension from
office without salaries and benefits for not less than one month but not more than three
months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
Same; Same; Code of Judicial Conduct; The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that
a judge shall perform all judicial duties including the delivery of reserved decision, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness.—The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge
shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code admonishes all judges to dispose
of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in Section 15 (1)
and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Attorneys; This administrative case against respondent shall also be
considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar pursuant to A.M.
No. 02-9-02-SC.—Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, this administrative case against respondent
shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar.
Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1
and 12 as well as Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Inefficiency.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
 
RESOLUTION
 
CORONA, J.:  brings it to disrepute. Decision making, among other duties, is the most important duty of a
On April 25 to May 14, 2005, a judicial audit was conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22, presided over by respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael.
The judicial audit resulted in the issuance of a memorandum dated June 9, 2005 by the Office of
Court Administrator (OCA)1 directing respondent to explain his failure to decide and act on
current and inherited cases, as well as to resolve incidents in various cases pending before him,
within the reglementary period provided by law. 2 Respondent was likewise directed to inform the
OCA if cases already submitted for decision or resolution had in fact been decided or resolved
within the reglementary period. 3
Consequently, respondent was ordered to immediately cease hearing cases in his sala and
confine himself to deciding or resolving cases submitted for decision or resolution. In
respondent’s stead, Judge Edilberto G. Absin was directed to handle active cases, other than
cases submitted for decision, until respondent could comply with the directives or until he
retired.
The OCA likewise directed Atty. Insor A. Pantaran to explain the results of the audit, as was
required of respondent. Atty. Pantaran was the clerk of court of the RTC of Pagadian,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22 during respondent’s tenure. Atty. Pantaran complied with the
June 9, 2005 memorandum in a letter dated May 19, 2006. 4
In its memorandum dated February 26, 2007, 5 the OCA noted that respondent failed to fully
21
comply with its directives in the June 9, 2005 memorandum. Neither did he ask for extensions of
time within which to comply with the subject directives.
On examination of Atty. Pantaran’s May 19, 2006 letter/compliance, the OCA found that
respondent had partially complied with the directives of the June 9, 2005 memorandum, having
already decided or resolved some of the cases he was directed to act on. Nonetheless, the OCA
established that respondent committed gross inefficiency when he unduly delayed actions in a
huge number of cases. The OCA recommended that respondent be fined P20,000. Furthermore,
the OCA recommended that Judge Absin be directed to decide and resolve the cases pending in
respondent’s sala. The OCA likewise directed the designation of Judge Loreto C. Quinto 6 as
assisting judge.
The factual findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, we vary the penalty imposed in the
light of the circumstances of the case.
It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period constitutes
gross inefficiency7 and is not excusable. It is a less serious charge 8 and is punishable by either
suspension from office without salaries and benefits for not less than one month but not more
than three months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. 9
The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. 10
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code 11 admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases12 within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of
the Constitution.13
We emphasize that the administration of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the
lawyer.14 As aptly held in Salvador v. Judge Limsiaco:15
“A judge’s foremost consideration is the administration of justice. Thus, he should follow the
time limit set for deciding cases. xxx Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a
serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. It
also undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and
member of the bench.” (citations omitted)
 
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, 16 this administrative case against respondent shall also be
considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar. 17 Violation of the
basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 18 and 1219 as well as
Rules 1.0320 and 12.0421 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael is hereby found GUILTY of gross inefficiency
and violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary for which he is FINED in the amount of P20,000.
Respondent is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03,
10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED in the amount
of P10,000.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of
Administrative Services, the Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2127. September 25, 2008.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2697-RTJ)
CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
respondent.
Courts; Judges; Administrative Complaints; Administrative complaints leveled against judges
must always be examined with a discriminating eye for its consequential effects are, by their
nature, highly penal, such that respondents stand to face the sanction of dismissal and/or
disbarment.—Administrative complaints leveled against judges must always be examined with a
discriminating eye for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that
respondents stand to face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. While the Court will not
shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, neither will it hesitate to
shield them from unfounded suits that disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice. When the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions and fails to
substantiate her claim, such as in the case at bar, the administrative complaint against the judge
must be dismissed for lack of merit.
Same; Same; Evidence; In the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct
cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. —The
Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation. It is settled
that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in
her complaint with substantial evidence, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption is that respondent has regularly performed his duties. Indeed, in the absence of
cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions. As the charges herein being hurled by complainant against
respondent are grave in nature, in order for him to be disciplined therefor, the evidence against
him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. With the failure of complainant to
substantiate her claims, the complaint against respondent should be dismissed for lack of merit.
Same; Same; Bias and Partiality; The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to
public confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice; The admonition
that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more
sternly applied to lower court judges. —The Court has held that a judge must at all times not
only be impartial, but maintain the appearance of impartiality. Thus, it is provided in Canons 3
and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Judiciary, which took effect on June 1, 2004,
that: x x x For indeed, the appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public
confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice. Lower court judges,
such as respondent, play a pivotal role in the promotion of the people’s faith in the judiciary.
They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their
interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that
judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly
applied to them.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Falsification, Partiality, Dishonesty, Gross
Incompetence, Evident Bad Faith, Immorality and Grave Misconduct.
  
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Raymund P. Palad for complainant.
  Lourdes T. Pagayatan for respondent.
RESOLUTION
22
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Cita Borromeo-Garcia (complainant) filed a Complaint before the Court dated June 14,
2007 charging Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan (respondent), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro with falsification, partiality, dishonesty,
gross incompetence, evident bad faith, immorality and grave misconduct.
Complainant avers: Respondent committed falsification when, serving as Register of Deeds
(RD) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, he cooperated with Soledad Ulayao (Ulayao) and Soledad
Ortega Olano (Olano) in transferring 165 titles from the name of her father’s mistress Blandina
Garcia (Blandina) to her father Salvador S. Borromeo, Sr. (Borromeo, Sr.), even though
respondent was fully aware that the signature appearing thereon was falsified. As payment for
their services, Borromeo, Sr. gave Ulayao, Olano and respondent, 20 of the 165 titles which
Ulayao kept until a judge from another branch, pursuant to another case, ordered to have said
titles kept in custodia legis.1
Complainant further claims that: respondent was guilty of falsification and perjury when he
granted the petition of her half-brother, Salvador G. Borromeo, Jr. (Borromeo, Jr.) for the
issuance of owner’s duplicate copies of 62 Transfer Certificate of Title (TCTs) knowing that
Borromeo, Jr., illegitimate son of Borromeo, Sr. with Blandina, was not the owner of the same;
respondent hastily ruled for a commissioner’s hearing, decided for the issuance of new owner’s
certificates of titles, without requiring the production of certified true copies of all the titles being
petitioned or requiring the Officer in Charge (OIC) Registrar to produce the book of titles;
respondent also keeps a mistress, Elsa Aguirre (Elsa), Borromeo, Jr.’s former wife, which could
explain the swift decision in favor of Borromeo, Jr.; Elsa wielded power in the RTC, as acting
clerk of court and sheriff, even though she is not a lawyer; Elsa together with Asst. Prosecutor
Luduvico Salcedo, also acted as respondent’s bagman.2
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the Complaint to respondent for his
Comment in a 1st Indorsement dated June 29, 2007.3
In his Comment4 dated July 30, 2007, respondent denied the charges against him, claiming the
same to be unfounded, hearsay and malicious. He avers that: he does not know complainant
and that the latter is not a resident of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; at the time the first
falsification allegedly took place, respondent was an Asst. Provincial Prosecutor who acted as an
Ex Officio Registrar of Deeds, putting in extra hours to perform his added assignment; the
documents allegedly falsified were “sales” leading to the registration and transfer of TCTs from
Blandina to Borromeo, Sr.; he affixed his signatures to the TCTs after all pertinent documents
were evaluated by Land Examiner Ulayao and were found to be complete and in order; if indeed
signatures were falsified, respondent had nothing to do with the falsification or had any
knowledge of the same; respondent never conspired with Olano and Ulayao and there was no
agreement for them to split the 20 titles among themselves; as to the second charge of
falsification, he rendered the decision on the petition of Borromeo, Jr. after due notice and
hearing and all jurisdictional requirements were complied with; contrary to complainant’s
assertion, certified true copies of the 62 TCTs to be reconstituted were attached to the petition;
Borromeo, Jr. also submitted a certification from the RD stating that the original copies of the
TCTs were intact in said office; there was also no opposition during the hearing, hence, it was
subject to an ex parte hearing before the Clerk of Court as commissioner; he did not declare
Borromeo, Jr. to be the owner of the properties but merely quoted Borromeo, Jr.’s testimony;
moreover, the reconstituted titles are still in the name of Borromeo, Sr.; the allegation that Elsa
is his mistress is false; whatever dealings he has with Elsa, who is the Acting Clerk of Court of
the RTC, is strictly related to their respective official duties; it is also not true that Elsa and
Prosecutor Salcedo are respondent’s bagmen; in all his years as prosecutor and later as judge,
respondent never asked anyone to be his bagman and neither has he resolved or decided any
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
case for any consideration; he has no unexplained or hidden wealth and is living a simple and
modest life.5
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court in the Resolution dated January 23, 2008 referred
the instant case to Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. of the Court of Appeals (CA), Manila, for
investigation, report and recommendation.6
Hearings were conducted and in his Report dated July 31, 2008, Investigating Justice Reyes
found that complainant failed to substantiate her allegations. As stated in his Report:
“x x x [T]he investigating justice finds that aside from bare assertion complainant failed to
present any evidence to substantiate her charges. She even admitted during her testimony that
she had no direct knowledge of the facts constituting her allegations but that she derived her
knowledge from other persons, that is, she had no direct knowledge of the facts constituting the
alleged irregularities.
x x x x
As to the charges of immorality and grave misconduct which stemmed from the alleged illicit
affair of respondent judge with Ms. Aguirre, the undersigned finds that complainant’s own
testimony showed that she based her allegation on what someone else had told her.
x x x x
The charges of partiality, dishonesty, and gross incompetence are all tied up to the petition for
re-issuance of owner’s duplicate certificate of titles filed by Salvador, Jr. From the same petition
arose the allegation of falsification. Complainant claimed that respondent judge was partial,
dishonest and had acted in bad faith because he granted Salvador, Jr.’s petition knowing that he
was not the registered owner. She also claimed that this decision showed that respondent judge
was grossly incompetent because the decision was not supported by facts and the law. By the
same token she claimed that respondent judge was guilty of falsification.
x x x x
[Based on Sec. 109 of Pres. Dec. No. 1529] it is clear that not only the registered owner but any
person in interest may file a petition for re-issuance of the owner’s duplicate title. In the present
case, petitioner Salvador, Jr. is admittedly the illegitimate son of the deceased Salvador, Sr. and
as such is an heir. As explained by respondent judge he believed that an heir has the right to file
the petition. Other than the fact that the case was granted, complainant failed to adduce any
concrete evidence of partiality, dishonesty or bad faith on the part of the respondent judge. It
should be remembered that good faith is always presumed and complainant’s bare testimony
failed to rebut this presumption.
As to the charge of falsification, complainant herself admitted that the misrepresentation was
done by Salvador, Jr. and not by the respondent judge. He cannot, therefore, by any stretch of
imagination be held responsible for such falsification.
The only remaining charge against respondent judge is the falsification regarding the twenty
(20) TCTs held by Ms. Ulayao and now in custodia legis in Branch 45 of the RTC of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. Again, the undersigned finds that aside from complainant's bare testimony
that she was informed by Ms. Ulayao of the falsification she utterly failed to present any
evidence to buttress her assertion. She does not even have a copy of the alleged forged deed of
sale allegedly used to transfer said titles in the name of Salvador, Sr.” 7
23
While Justice Reyes found the complaint to be without merit, he still found respondent liable
however for failing to prevent any appearance of impartiality on his part. Justice Reyes held in
his report:
“x x x the investigating justice finds it necessary to deal on another matter which the respondent
judge himself testified on. The reception of evidence for Spec. Proc. No. R-936 was performed
by Ms. Aguirre. Although the fact that Ms. Aguirre was the former wife of the petitioner, this fact
alone should be considered unprocedural. However, what the investigating justice finds
disturbing is that Ms. Aguirre was not the OIC Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 46 but rather she
was the OIC Clerk of Court. Respondent judge explained that his OIC Branch Clerk of Court
Asuncion Pabellano was busy, hence, unable to conduct the ex parte reception of evidence.
Under the circumstances what respondent judge should have done was to dispense with the ex
parte reception of evidence and to conduct the hearing himself instead of appointing the OIC
Clerk of Court. This would have avoided any appearance of partiality. However, the undersigned
does not find this infraction grave enough to warrant a severe penalty. Considering that
respondent had already filed his application for optional retirement and only to stress that all
judges should at all times be circumspect especially in their official functions, the investigating
justice deems it appropriate to recommend the imposition of a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent
judge.”8
Justice Reyes then recommended that:
“x x x the complaint against respondent Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan be DISMISSED. However,
in view of the finding that Judge Pagayatan failed to prevent any appearance of impartiality on
his part, it is recommended that he be FINED in the amount of P5,000.00.” 9
The Court agrees with the report of the Investigating Justice but finds that the recommended
fine should be modified.
Administrative complaints leveled against judges must always be examined with a discriminating
eye for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that respondents stand
to face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. 10 While the Court will not shirk from its
responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, neither will it hesitate to shield them
from unfounded suits that disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. 11
When the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions and fails to substantiate her
claim, such as in the case at bar, the administrative complaint against the judge must be
dismissed for lack of merit.12
In this case, complainant charged respondent with two acts of falsification. First, for allegedly
authorizing the transfer of titles from the name of Blandina to that of Borromeo, Sr. based on
forged signatures, when respondent was still Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro; and
second, for granting Borromeo, Jr.’s petition for issuance of owner’s duplicate copy of 62 TCTs,
knowing that Borromeo, Jr. was not the owner thereof. She also charged respondent with
having an illicit relationship with Elsa, Acting Clerk of Court and ex-wife of Borromeo, Jr.,
allowing her to exert influence over the decisions of the court, and for keeping Elsa and
Prosecutor Salcedo as respondent’s ‘bagmen.’
Complainant however was not able to present proof of her allegations. As to the first charge of
falsification, she claims that it was Ulayao, former OIC Registrar of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro,
who told her about the circumstances surrounding the transfer of titles from the name of
Blandina to that of Borromeo, Sr. and the supposed agreement among Borromeo, Sr., Ulayao,
Olano and respondent regarding the said transfer. 13 Ulayao however died on July 31, 2007 14 and
could neither refute nor corroborate complainant’s story. When asked by the Investigating
Justice, complainant also could not present copies of the alleged falsified deeds of sale which,
according to her, were the basis for the issuance of the titles in favor of Borromeo, Sr. 15
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
Anent the second charge of falsification, complainant claims that respondent granted Borromeo,
Jr.’s petition even though he knew that Borromeo, Jr. was not the owner of the subject
properties. She agreed however, before the Investigating Justice, that respondent’s decision in
S.P. No. R-936 did not order that new owner’s copies of the 62 titles be registered in the name
of Borromeo, Jr., and that the same were in fact still in the name of Borromeo, Sr. 16
As to the charge that respondent was having an immoral relationship with Elsa, complainant
admits that she has no personal knowledge about the same, and that her basis for alleging such
offense is the “fact” that it is known to everyone in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. 17 Complainant
failed to present any witness, however, to support her charge of immorality. 18 She also failed to
present any evidence to substantiate her charge that Prosecutor Salcedo and Elsa were
receiving money as “bagmen” of respondent.
The Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation. 19 It is
settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint with substantial evidence, and in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the presumption is that respondent has regularly performed his duties. 20 Indeed, in the
absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions. 21 As the charges herein being hurled by
complainant against respondent are grave in nature, in order for him to be disciplined therefor,
the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. 22 With the
failure of complainant to substantiate her claims, the complaint against respondent should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
The dismissal of the charges of complainant against respondent, notwithstanding, respondent
should still be disciplined for failure to avoid the appearance of partiality, which offense the
Investigating Justice correctly appreciated.
When asked during the investigation why Elsa, who is the ex-wife of the petitioner therein,
Borromeo, Jr., was designated to receive evidence ex parte in SP No. R-936, when she was not
the acting Branch Clerk of Court, but the acting Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC), respondent only answered that it had been their practice to refer ex parte proceedings to
the acting clerk of court of the OCC and not to the acting branch clerk of court, because such
proceedings were simple; and the branch clerk of court had too much work, while those in the
OCC had lesser load. 23 Respondent also said that he didn’t see any conflict with the fact that
Elsa was the ex-wife of petitioner in S.P. No. R-936, Borromeo, Jr. 24
The Court has held that a judge must at all times not only be impartial, but maintain the
appearance of impartiality. Thus, it is provided in Canons 3 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Judiciary, which took effect on June 1, 2004, that:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
x x x x
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of
24
a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.”
For indeed, the appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and
the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice. 25
Lower court judges, such as respondent, play a pivotal role in the promotion of the people’s
faith in the judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the
grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts.
Thus, the admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of
impropriety is more sternly applied to them.26
Respondent was previously imposed a fine of P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law in
Domingo v. Pagayatan.27 In the present case, the Court finds that for his failure to avoid the
appearance of impropriety, a penalty of P10,000.00 is proper. 28 Such fine is to be deducted from
his retirement benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No.
12967-Ret. entitled Re: Application for Optional Retirement under R.A. 910, as amended by R.A.
5095 and P.D. 1438, of Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, RTC, Br. 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro ,
dated July 7, 2008 which approved respondent’s application for optional retirement under
Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 5095 and Presidential Decree No. 1438
effective at the close of office hours of December 31, 2007 with the proviso that the payment of
his retirement benefits shall be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the administrative
complaint in AM No. RTJ-07-2089, AM No. RTJ-07-2058, OCA IPI No. 07-2697-RTJ, 07-2698-RTJ
and 08-2482-RTJ. The Court, in the same resolution, also granted Judge Pagayatan’s request for
payment of his terminal leave pay subject to the availability of funds and the usual clearance
requirements.
WHEREFORE, the charges filed by Cita Borromeo-Garcia are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
competent evidence. However, the Court finds Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan, former Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, GUILTY of violating
Canon 3, Section 2 and Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Judiciary
for which he is FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits
which have been withheld pursuant to the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 12967-Ret. entitled Re:
Application for Optional Retirement under R.A. 910, as amended by R.A. 5095 and P.D. 1438, of
Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, RTC, Br. 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro , dated July 7, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Charges dismissed but Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan meted with P10,000 fine for violating
Canon 3, Section 2 and Canon 4, Section 1 of New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Judiciary.
Notes.—The idea that a judge can preside over his own case is anathema to the notion of
impartiality that such was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by
Section 1 of Rule 137. (Oktubre vs. Velasco, 434 SCRA 636 [2004])
The Supreme Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and
partial. (Calo vs. Abul, Jr., 496 SCRA 416 [2006])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189. January 18, 2011.*
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2837-RTJ)
VICTORIANO SY, complainant, vs. Judge OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Koronadal City, respondent.
Code of Judicial Conduct; Judges; Bias and Partiality; Judges shall ensure that his or her
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the
legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and the judiciary. —Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a judge’s impartiality provides, inter alia, as follows:
Sec. 2.—Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and the judiciary. x x x Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received
accommodations from Sy for the building materials he needed for the construction of his house.
Same; Same; Impropriety; Judge Dinopol committed impropriety in talking with litigants
outside court proceedings.—In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol committed impropriety in
talking with litigants outside court proceedings. His improper conduct was further aggravated by
the fact that these conversations took place in the absence of the opposing litigants and/or the
opposing counsel.
Same; Same; Same; Judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that
would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. —Time and again,
we have emphasized that judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would
enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or
partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the Judiciary. These standards apply not only to
the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the
Judiciary and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Jose Frederick P. Florese and Rutillo B. Pasok for complainant.
PER CURIAM:
We resolve in this Decision the Verified Complaint, dated March 11, 2008, 1 filed by
Victoriano Sy against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC), Branch 24,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, for Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary and for
Gross Ignorance of the Law, in relation to Civil Case No. 1403-24, entitled Sps. Victoriano Sy
and Loreta Sy v. Metrobank, for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate
Mortgage, and Misc. Case No. 1440-24, entitled Metrobank v. Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al ., for
Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
The Antecedents Facts
The facts are set out in the memorandum/report, dated May 25, 2009, 2 of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), and are summarized below.
The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company ( Metrobank) was the mortgagee in good faith and
for value of twenty-three (23) parcels of land all located in Koronadal City. The mortgagors were
Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. and/or Sps. Victoriano Sy
and Loreta Cabaies-Sy and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas.
25
Metrobank foreclosed the mortgage for violation of the terms and conditions of the mortgage
agreement. At the public auction on August 31, 1998, the mortgaged parcels of land were sold
to Metrobank as the highest bidder. Metrobank was issued a certificate of sale which was
registered on September 18, 1998 with the Register of Deeds of South Cotabato. The
mortgagors failed to redeem the 23 parcels of land within the redemption period.
Thereafter, Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc.
filed with the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided over by Judge Dinopol, a complaint
against Metrobank for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage,
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings and Certificate of Sale, with Damages and Attorney’s Fees
and with prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 1403-24.
On April 16, 2004, Judge Dinopol inhibited himself from further acting on the case 3 on the
ground that he received a call, on April 12, 2004, from a ranking officer of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, interceding in behalf of the defendant bank and an earlier call (July 2003) from a
ranking personnel of the OCA, appealing in behalf of the plaintiffs. He claimed he wanted to
avoid being charged with partiality either way he acted on the case.
On September 15, 2005, Metrobank filed with the RTC, South Cotabato, a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the parcels of land subject of the foreclosed mortgage
against Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc., and/or Sps.
Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas, docketed as Misc. Case
No. 1440-24,4 and assigned to the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided by Judge Dinopol.
On July 13, 2006, Judge Dinopol issued an Order granting the petition, 5 and issued the writ of
possession on July 21, 2006.6
Meanwhile, or on May 22, 2006, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. filed with the
RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, a petition, entitled In the Matter of: Petition for the Declaration of
State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan , docketed as
Corp. Case No. 1585-06.7
On June 26, 2006, the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, issued an Order 8 staying the enforcement of
all claims against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with the debtor. The
same court subsequently approved the rehabilitation plan.
In the meantime, Sheriff Conrado B. Dapulang, Jr. proceeded to implement the writ of
possession issued by Judge Dinopol, but it was returned unsatisfied in view of the stay order
issued by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, in Corp. Case No. 1585-06.9
Consequently, the respondents in Misc. Case No. 1440-24 filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
due to the issuance of the stay order and the approval of the rehabilitation plan by the
Rehabilitation Court, and a motion for inhibition on grounds of bias and partiality on the part of
Judge Dinopol. Judge Dinopol denied the motions in an Order dated February 11, 2008, and
directed Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Publico to re-implement the writ of execution of July 31,
2006.10
Shortly thereafter, Sy filed the present administrative complaint 11 charging Judge Dinopol of
gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Sy alleged in his complaint that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 (in which he and his wife sought
the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings against Metrobank) was pending before
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
Judge Dinopol’s sala, the judge inhibited himself from acting on the case. This notwithstanding,
and to Sy’s surprise, Judge Dinopol still handled Misc. Case No. 1440-24, a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession filed by Metrobank, a matter closely intertwined with Civil Case
No. 1403-24. Judge Dinopol then issued an order granting Metrobank the right to possess the
foreclosed properties.12
Sy further alleged that despite the issuance by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, of a stay order 13
and the approval of the rehabilitation plan, as well as the pendency of Metrobank’s petition
before the Court of Appeals (CA) Twenty-Third Division in Cagayan De Oro City (CA-G.R. SP No.
01824) assailing the validity of the stay order, Judge Dinopol ordered that the writ of possession
be implemented.14
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
Sy claimed in relation with his charge that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 was pending in Judge
Dinopol’s sala, the judge asked him for commodity loans in the form of construction materials to
be used in the construction of the judge’s house. The transaction was evidenced by delivery
receipt no. 15178 (March 8, 2005), 15 and charge invoices no. 9817 (March 8, 2005) for
P16,000.00,16 no. 9826 (March 9, 2005) for P850.00,17 and no. 9838 (March 10, 2005) for
P780.00.18
Sy further claimed that aside from the commodity loans, Judge Dinopol obtained cash loans
from him on various occasions between December 2, 2005 to July 14, 2006, in the total amount
of P121,000.00, and Judge Dinopol borrowed from him his Suzuki Multi-cab and returned it after
the judge was suspended in September 2007. Sy presented disbursement vouchers, official
receipts and an acknowledgement to prove his claim. 19
Judge Dinopol’s Comment
In a 1st indorsement dated March 18, 2008, 20 the OCA required Judge Dinopol to comment on
the complaint, which he did on April 21, 2008.21
Judge Dinopol denied Sy’s accusations. He stressed that he inhibited himself from Civil Case No.
1403-24 on April 16, 2004 and had not acted on the case since then; nobody intervened and
pleaded in behalf of Metrobank after Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed. He was not aware nor
had he been given notice that Metrobank filed a petition before the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 01824),
nor did he receive any order from the appellate tribunal enjoining him to desist from performing
or acting on the incidents pending in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
Judge Dinopol denied that he committed any breach of procedural rules that could be
characterized as gross ignorance of the basic rules of civil procedures. He maintained that Sy did
not allege any specific actuations of deceit, malice or intent to cause injury to Sy, and that he
had acted fairly and objectively. He added that he observed the requirements of the Code of
Professional Responsibility as a lawyer, relative to his handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
With respect to the alleged accommodations he received from Sy at the time his house was
under construction, Judge Dinopol claimed that when he obtained the commodity loans from Sy
in March 2005, he had already inhibited himself from handling Civil Case No. 1403-24; he did so
on April 16, 2004. He explained that Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed only on September 15,
2005, and was assigned to his sala on September 22, 2005. He denied that he received from Sy
cash loans in the amount of P121,000.00. He also denied borrowing Sy’s Suzuki Multi-cab and
claimed that it was Rogelio Villanueva who borrowed it.
Judge Dinopol countered that it was Sy who acted with sinister design and employed deceit and
cunning to frustrate the administration of justice in the cases he handled.
26
In a Resolution dated July 15, 2009, the Court resolved to: (1) note Sy’s complaint and Judge
Dinopol’s answer/comment; (2) re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative matter; and
(3) require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the matter for resolution
on the basis of the pleadings. The Court also noted the OCA Report dated May 25, 2009, 22 which
found no basis for the charge of ignorance of the law on the part of Judge Dinopol, but found
him liable for conduct unbecoming a judge.
The Court’s Ruling
The OCA evaluation is well-founded. Judge Dinopol cannot be disciplined for ignorance of the
law and of procedure in his handling of Civil Case No. 1403-24 (for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage) filed by Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy against
Metrobank, as he inhibited himself from the case, nor in his handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24
(Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession ) filed by Metrobank against Sps. Victoriano Sy,
et al., because of the essential nature of the proceeding itself.
In issuing the writ of possession and in directing its re-implementation when it was returned
unsatisfied the first time it was enforced, Judge Dinopol acted in accordance with the rules and
jurisprudence on the matter.
As the Court held in Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera, Inc.,23 the proceeding in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary in nature. It is brought
for the benefit of one party only and may be granted even without notice to the mortgagor, in
this case, complainant Sy. Moreover, the duty of the court to grant a writ of possession is a
ministerial function. The court does not exercise its official discretion or judgment. 24 Judge
Dinopol, before whom the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed, had no
discretion on whether to issue the writ of possession or not. It cannot be said, therefore, that
Judge Dinopol exposed himself or exhibited bias in favor of Metrobank when he issued the writ
of possession.
Further, regardless of whether there is a pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to
the eventual outcome of the annulment case. Once the writ of possession is issued, the trial
court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay. 25
From another perspective, a stay order only affects claims filed against the assets and properties
belonging to a debtor.
Properties that have already been foreclosed, and those whose titles have already passed on to
the winning bidder are no longer considered properties of the debtor. 26  In such case, it is a
ministerial duty on the part of the trial court to grant a possessory writ over the foreclosed
properties.27  
Clearly, Judge Dinopol was well within his authority and committed no impropriety in directing
the re-implementation of the writ of execution in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
On the other hand, we cannot say the same thing with regard to Sy’s charge of conduct
unbecoming against Judge Dinopol. The latter’s denial of having committed the acts complained
of flies in the face of indications in the records and documentary evidence that he obtained
commodity loans from Sy in the form of building materials for the construction of his house in
Koronadal City. There was also Sy’s claim of cash loans to Judge Dinopol on various occasions,
between December 2, 2005 and July 14, 2006, amounting to P121,000.00, as well as the loan of
Sy’s Suzuki Multi-cab to the Judge.
The commodity loans were evidenced by receipts 28  indicating delivery of construction materials
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
to Judge Dinopol’s residence. The cash loans appear to have been covered by disbursement
vouchers,29  and the borrowed multicab is the subject of an “acknowledgement” 30  from Judge
Dinopol’s driver Rogelio Villanueva.
There is substantial evidence showing that Judge Dinopol obtained the commodity loans from
Sy. The judge himself admitted that he wrote Sy, on March 4, 2005, regarding the purchase of
materials for his house which was then under construction, although he claimed that it was his
wife who transacted with Sy and it was Sy himself who offered to deliver the materials to his
residence.31  Judge Dinopol pleaded innocence regarding the commodity loans or even the cash
loans saying that the transaction with Sy regarding the construction materials occurred when
there was no case pending in his sala where Sy was a party.
The above disclaimer notwithstanding, we find Judge Dinopol to have committed a serious
impropriety in his or his family’s financial or business dealings with Sy.
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a judge’s impartiality provides, inter
alia, as follows:
“Sec. 2.—Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and the judiciary.
Sec. 3.—Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the
occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.”
Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received accommodations from Sy for the
building materials he needed for the construction of his house. He compromised his position as a
judge. Although at the time he and his family had business dealings with Sy there was no
pending case involving the businessman, he should have been more circumspect in securing the
construction materials. The sphere of Sy’s business operations was within his territorial
jurisdiction. As the OCA aptly noted, “it is neither impossible nor remote that a case might be
filed in his court with complainant as a party. In such a case, his (respondent) business and
financial dealings with complainant would create a doubt about his fairness and impartiality in
deciding the case and would tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the court.” 32
In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol also violated Section 1 of Canon 1, Canon 2 and Canon 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 1 of Canon 1 highlights the independence of a judge in performing his official duties,
thus:
“SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free
of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason.”
Canon 2 requires a judge to promote integrity in the discharge of his official functions:
“Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
27
SEC.  2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.”
Moreover, Canon 4 mandates a judge to observe and maintain proper decorum and its
appearance in his public office:
“Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.”
By his own admissions, Judge Dinopol failed to observe these ethical standards. In his
Answer/Comment, Judge Dinopol admitted that he talked with Sy on several occasions to
discuss Misc. Case No. 1440-24.33 Judge Dinopol also admitted that Sy, in at least two instances,
requested him to delay the resolution of the writ of possession.34 Judge Dinopol’s actions no
doubt created the inference that at some point, he acceded to Sy’s requests to delay the
proceedings. This conclusion, is in fact, bolstered by Judge Dinopol’s knowledge that the counsel
for Metrobank was instructed to immediately secure the order for the issuance of the writ of
possession.35 Regardless of the representations allegedly made to him by Sy, Judge Dinopol
should have immediately issued the writ of possession in Metrobank’s favor.
From these inappropriate actions, we find that Judge Dinopol compromised not only his
impartiality in handling Misc. Case No. 1440-24 but also his independence and integrity as a
judge. His actions no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge. His
actions gave the public the impression and the appearance that he can be influenced by
extraneous factors—other than the legal arguments and the court evidence—in discharging his
judicial functions.
In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol committed impropriety in talking with litigants outside
court proceedings. His improper conduct was further aggravated by the fact that these
conversations took place in the absence of the opposing litigants and/or the opposing counsel.
In Agustin v. Mercado,36 we declared that employees of the court have no business meeting with
litigants or their representatives under any circumstance. In Re: Affidavit of Frankie N.
Calabines,37 the Court minced no words in explaining that such unethical conduct constitutes “a
brazen and outrageous betrayal of public trust.”38 The Court further declared in the said case:
“x x x The Court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all
those who are in the service of the judiciary. x x x
The image of a court as a bastion of justice depends to a large extent on the personal and
official conduct of its employees. Thus, from the judge to the lowest clerk, judicial personnel
have the sacred duty to maintain the good name of the Judiciary.
All employees in the judiciary should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency.
As officers of the court and agents of the law, they must discharge their duties with due care
and utmost diligence. Any conduct they exhibit tending to diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary will not be condoned.”39
Certainly, these responsibilities become more exacting when one occupies the position of a
judge. Time and again, we have emphasized that judges are expected to conduct themselves in
a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. 40 The
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only
maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the Judiciary. 41 These standards
apply not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. 42
Without a doubt, Judge Dinopol is liable for gross misconduct in office and deserves to be
sanctioned under the above findings. His track record as a judge, in this regard, is far from
exemplary. He is a repeat offender, as demonstrated by the following cases where we penalized
him for questionable conduct:
First, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969 decided on June 15, 2006, Judge Dinopol was found guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and was fined P20,000.00. 43
Second, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020 decided on September 20, 2006, he was found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority, and was fined P20,000.00. 44
Third, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2003 decided on August 23, 2007, he was found liable for
undue delay in rendering a decision or order and for violating the clear provisions of A.M. No.
01-1-07-SC, and was fined P11,000.00.45
28
and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Perez, J., No part. Acted on the matter as OIC, OCA.
Judge Oscar E. Dinopol dismissed for gross misconduct, with prejudice to his re-
employment in government service.
Note.—It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to suggest to a litigant what to do to
resolve his case for such would generate the suspicion that the judge is in collusion with one
party. A litigant in a case is entitled to no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Judges are not only required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. (Pascual vs. Bonifacio, 398 SCRA 695 [2003])

Fourth, in A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2173-RTJ decided on August 28, 2006, he was strongly
admonished, even as the complainant desisted from pursuing the complaint against the judge
for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and discretion. 46

And more recently, in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2052 decided on March 30, 2009, Judge Dinopol
had been reminded and warned against entertaining litigants outside court premises. 47

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct constituting a violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious charge. Under Section 11 of the same Rule, the
respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be meted any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any public office;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but
not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Considering his repeated infractions and numerous breaches of the standard ethical conduct
demanded of judges, we find Judge Dinopol unfit to discharge the functions of a judge. We
impose upon him the severest penalty of dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. 48

Lastly, as we sanction Judge Dinopol, we remind the members of the bench that:

“[a]lthough every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the [J]udiciary.
A magistrate of the law must compose himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct,
official and otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as
the epitome of integrity and justice.”49

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Koronadal City, is declared GUILTY OF GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby DISMISSED from the
service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
his re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including government-owned
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1762. December 17, 2008.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1422-RTJ)
SERGIO & GRACELDA N. ANDRES, complainants, vs. JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, ELMER D. LASTIMOSA, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Provincial Sheriff, RTC-OCC, and NASIL S. PALATI, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, General Santos City, respondents.
Courts; Judges; Raffle of Cases; The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme Court
Circular No. 7 is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended to
ensure the impartial adjudication of cases—by raffling the cases, public suspicion regarding the
assignment of cases to predetermined judges is obviated. —Respondent judge violated the
explicit mandate of the Court when he took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he was
named as one of two defendants and instantly dismissed it without first conducting the requisite
raffle. The Court, enunciating the importance of the raffling of cases, held in the case of Ang
Kek Chen v. Bello, 163 SCRA 358 (1988): The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme
Court Circular No. 7 is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended
to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases, public suspicion regarding
the assignment of cases to predetermined judges is obviated. A violation or disregard of the
Court’s circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not to be countenanced.
Same; Same; An Executive Judge ought to know that raffling of cases is his personal
duty and responsibility—he is expected to keep abreast and be conversant with Supreme Court
rules and circulars that affect the conduct of cases before him and strictly comply therewith at
all times.—Respondent judge cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge by
dispensing with the raffle of the case and dismissing it outright on the pretext that it would be
just a waste of time on his part to raffle and entertain the case. As Executive Judge, he ought to
know that raffling of cases is his personal duty and responsibility. He is expected to keep
abreast and be conversant with Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of
cases before him and strictly comply therewith at all times. Failure to abide by these rules
undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should
therefore administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of law itself,
remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of
law.
Same; Same; Contempt; Penalties; By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court,
sentencing them to pay a fine of 2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten
(10) days, respondent judge exhibited his bias against herein complainants—here, respondent
judge cited complainants in direct contempt of court for filing a complaint based on a deed of
quitclaim that had already been declared null and void, instead of having the said case, wherein
he was one of the defendants, raffled to the court which could properly act on the case; A judge
should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties.—By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court,
sentencing them to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten
(10) days, respondent judge exhibited his bias against herein complainants. Contempt of court is
a defiance of the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially, or such conduct
as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of justice into disrepute or
disrespect. Here, respondent judge cited complainants in direct contempt of court for filing a
complaint (Civil Case No. 7066) based on a deed of quitclaim that had already been declared
null and void, instead of having the said case, wherein he was one of the defendants, raffled to
the court which could properly act on the case. While the power to punish in contempt is
inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due
administration of justice, still, judges must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic
power must be used judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved
by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.
29
Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Authority; Besides the basic equipment of possessing the
requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge; Respondent
judge’s act of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct contempt is a clear evidence of his
unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law. —The salutary rule is that the power to
punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish
for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard
not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. It has time and again
been stressed that besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a
magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint
which are indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge should be the last person to be
perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Indeed, Section 6 of Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that: Judges shall maintain order and decorum in
all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Respondent
judge’s act of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct contempt is a clear evidence of his
unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.
Judges; Bias and Partiality; A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent—he has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of
doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to its integrity. —
Respondent judge violated the above canon when he dispensed with the raffle and took
cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 as well as ordered its outright dismissal and cited the
complainants in contempt of court. He thus created the impression that he intended to favor his
former clients, Melencio and Dominga. His actuations gave ground for the parties to doubt his
impartiality and objectivity. A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. He has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of
doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to its integrity. Well-
known is the judicial norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial. A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, for all the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be
meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.
Same; Same; It is basic that a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce the slightest doubt on his honest
actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination.—We take this occasion once more to impress upon a trial judge that
he must at all times maintain and preserve the trust and faith of litigants in the court’s
impartiality. When he exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias,
such faith and confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit himself voluntarily. It
is basic that a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when
circumstances appear that will induce the slightest doubt on his honest actuations and probity in
favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.
He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired. The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself. Respondent judge was a party
defendant in Civil Case No. 7066 which was enough reason not to act on the same and just
leave the matter to the Vice-Executive Judge. His reluctance to let go of the case all the more
induced doubts and suspicions as to his honest actuations, probity and objectivity. Evidently,
respondent judge violated the clear injunction embodied in the aforecited Canon of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
order, decision or actuation must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but,
most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, and corruption.—We rule that there is no merit in complainants’ charge of gross
ignorance of the law leveled against respondent judge. For liability to attach for ignorance of the
law, the assailed order, decision or actuation must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and
a person who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the grounds for the
accusation.
Same; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; It is well-settled that when an order is placed in the
hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it
in accordance with its mandate.—It is well-settled that when an order is placed in the hands of a
sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it in
accordance with its mandate. The primary duty of sheriffs is to execute judgments and orders of
the court to which they belong. It must be stressed that a judgment, if not executed, would be
an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. It is said that execution is the fruit and the
end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. It is also indisputable that the most
difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Hence, the officers charged with
this delicate task must act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the
administration of justice, otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of
justice would be futile.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of SC Circular No. 7, Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Ferdinand F. Andres and Gracelda N. Andres for complainants.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This administrative case arose from the complaint-affidavit 1 dated February 21, 2002 of
Sergio N. Andres, Jr. and Gracelda N. Andres charging respondents Judge Jose S. Majaducon,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), General Santos City, and Presiding Judge, Branch
23, with violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave
Misconduct, and both Elmer D. Lastimosa, Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of South Cotabato, and
Nasil S. Palati, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, with Abuse of
Authority, Ignorance of the Law and Grave Misconduct.
The complaint stemmed from the Special Order of Demolition 2 issued by Judge Majaducon on
August 22, 2001 in connection with the consolidated Civil Case Nos. 1291 3 and 4647,4 an action
for declaration of nullity of documents and recovery of possession of real property with writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages. The said order directed the provincial sheriff of
General Santos City to demolish the improvements erected by the heirs of John Sycip and Yard
Urban Homeowners Association on the land belonging to spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap
Matualaga. Pursuant to the Order of Demolition, a Notice to Vacate 5 dated September 12, 2001
was issued by Sheriff Palati and noted by Provincial Sheriff Lastimosa. The said notice was
addressed to the heirs of John Sycip, all members of Yard Urban Homeowners Association, and
“all adverse claimants and actual occupants” of Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, the land subject of Civil
Case Nos. 1291 and 4647.
To forestall the demolition of their houses, complainants, who claimed an interest over Lot No.
2, Psu-135740, filed a Special Appearance with Urgent Ex Parte Manifestation6 informing the
court of the pending protest between them and the heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap
30
Matualaga before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), docketed as
RED Claim No. 3735.7 In the Ex Parte Manifestation, complainants alleged that they and their
predecessor-in-interest Concepcion Non Andres introduced improvements and authorized the
construction of several improvements on Lot No. 2, Psu-135740. They also averred that they are
not bound by the judgment rendered in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 because neither they nor
their predecessor-in-interest were impleaded as parties therein. They prayed that the provincial
sheriff or any of his deputies be enjoined from implementing the special order of demolition on
the improvements they made. They also wrote a letter 8 addressed to respondents Lastimosa and
Palati enjoining them from executing the order of demolition under pain of administrative
sanction.
On February 6, 2002, notwithstanding complainants’ manifestation and letter, Lastimosa and
Palati proceeded with the demolition of the improvements erected by the complainants and their
predecessor-in-interest.
Thus, on February 18, 2002, complainants instituted, with the RTC of General Santos City, Civil
Case No. 7066, an action for Specific Performance, Reconveyance and Damages against the
heirs of Melencio Yu and impleaded Judge Majaducon, Lastimosa and Palati as co-defendants.
The complaint alleged that complainants’ title over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740 was valid, that they
had been occupying the property since 1957 and that the reckless and arbitrary demolition of
their improvements had unlawfully disturbed their peaceful occupation of the property. 9
Complainants also filed an Urgent Motion for Special Raffle of said Civil Case No. 7066.
In an Order10 dated February 18, 2002, Judge Majaducon, acting as the Executive Judge of RTC,
General Santos City, denied the Urgent Motion for Special Raffle and dismissed outright Civil
Case No. 7066. On the same day, respondent judge issued another Order 11 declaring
complainants in direct contempt of court for allegedly filing a complaint based on a quitclaim
that had already been pronounced null and void by the Supreme Court. Accordingly,
complainants were ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for ten (10) days.
This prompted complainants to file the instant administrative complaint. They averred that the
actions of herein respondents constitute bad faith, malicious motive, serious partiality, grave
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. They also alleged that prior to his appointment in
the judiciary, Judge Majaducon was the former counsel of Melencio Yu and his mother Dominga
Pinagawang.
In his Comment12 dated April 16, 2002, respondent judge vehemently denied the accusations
hurled against him. He explained that he issued the special order of demolition in the
consolidated Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 after a decision 13 was rendered and a resolution 14
was issued by the Supreme Court affirming the judgments of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
(CA) declaring spouses Melencio Uy and Talinanap Matualaga as the rightful owners of Lot No.
2, Psu-135740 and ordering all occupants to vacate the premises. This was also the reason why
he ordered the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 7066 filed by herein complainants. He
believed that complainants had no cause of action because the courts had already decided that
the quitclaim upon which complainants based their action was null and void. Thus, to entertain
the complaint would be just a waste of time on the part of the court. Anent the contempt order,
he maintained that the same was justified because complainants had instituted an unfounded
suit based on a falsified document, thereby demonstrating an obvious defiance and disrespect of
the authority and dignity of the court.
As to the charge of partiality, respondent judge denied being the former counsel of Melencio
Yu’s mother, Dominga Pinagawang. He explained that his real client was Cesar Bañas who
requested him to write a letter demanding the squatters to vacate the lot owned by Dominga.
He asserted that after writing the letter, another counsel took over the case.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
Respondents Lastimosa and Palati filed their own Comment 15 on April 9, 2002 and averred that
they faithfully observed the correct procedure in the implementation of the order of demolition,
including the twin requirements of notice and hearing. According to them, they were extra
careful in implementing the same especially because it was, by far, the biggest demolition
undertaken by their office as it involved a 12-hectare property and about 1,500 persons. It also
generated interest among the media, thus they made sure that they consulted with respondent
judge all issues and questions relative to its implementation.
In the Agenda Report16 dated December 12, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for violation of the
rules governing the raffle of cases, and that the administrative case against him be redocketed
as a regular administrative matter. The OCA, however, found that respondents Lastimosa and
Palati did not abuse their authority in the implementation of the order of demolition and
accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint against them.
In the Resolution dated March 5, 2003, the Court required the parties to manifest their
willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. 17 Pursuant to
respondents’ manifestation,18 they filed their memorandum with additional exhibits on April 22,
2003.19 Complainants, on the other hand, manifested that they would no longer file a
memorandum and that they were submitting the case for resolution.
 Complainants assailed the respondent judge’s issuance of a special order of dismissal in
connection with Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 despite their pending protest before the DENR.
To complainants, the issuance of said order of demolition constituted gross ignorance of the law.
We are not persuaded. The evidence on hand shows that respondent judge issued the special
order of demolition only after carefully determining that there was no more hindrance to issue
the same. For one, the trial court, in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, had already adjudged that
the land in question belonged to spouses Yu and Matualaga and even nullified the quitclaim and
all documents of conveyance of sale in favor of complainants’ predecessor-in-interest. 20 In fact,
the records of the case disclosed that the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA in
CA-G.R. No. 6900021 and CA-G.R. CV No. 54003 22 and ultimately by this Court via its decision
dated November 9, 1990 in G.R. No. 76487 23 and resolution dated July 19, 1999 in G.R. No.
138132.24
It is thus beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 had already
attained finality. The special order of demolition was issued by respondent judge so that the
final judgment could be fully implemented and executed, in accordance with the principle that
the execution of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party, and
mandatory and ministerial on the part of the court or tribunal issuing the judgment. 25 To be
sure, it is essential to the effective administration of justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict.26
However, respondent judge abused his authority in dealing with Civil Case No. 7066 which cast
serious doubt as to his impartiality. Respondent judge’s outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 7066
entitled “Heirs of Concepcion Non Andres, namely Sergio, Sergio Jr., and Sofronio and Gracelda,
all surnamed Andres v. Heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga, namely Eduardo,
Leonora, Virgilio, Vilma, Cynthia, Imelda and Nancy, all surnamed Yu, and represented by
Virgilio Yu and Cynthia Yu Abo, Atty. Elmer Lastimosa, in his capacity as Ex Officio Provincial
Sheriff of South Cotobato, Mr. Nasil Palati, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, and Hon. Jose S. Majaducon, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City ” was irregular. As correctly found by the
31
OCA, respondent judge completely ignored the procedure for the raffling of cases mandated by
Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, which we reproduce hereunder:
I. RAFFLING OF CASES
All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are two or more branches
shall be assigned or distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to
any branch without being raffled. The raffle of cases should be regularly conducted at the hour
and on the day or days to be fixed by the Executive Judge. Only the maximum number of cases,
according to their dates of filing, as can be equally distributed to all branches in the particular
station or grouping shall be included in the raffle. x x x
Clearly, respondent judge violated the explicit mandate of the Court when he took cognizance of
Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he was named as one of two defendants and instantly dismissed it
without first conducting the requisite raffle. The Court, enunciating the importance of the raffling
of cases, held in the case of Ang Kek Chen v. Bello:27
“The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 is of vital
importance to the administration of justice because it is intended to ensure the impartial
adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases, public suspicion regarding the assignment of cases
to predetermined judges is obviated. A violation or disregard of the Court’s circular on how the
raffle of cases should be conducted is not to be countenanced.”
Respondent judge cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge by dispensing with
the raffle of the case and dismissing it outright on the pretext that it would be just a waste of
time on his part to raffle and entertain the case. As Executive Judge, he ought to know that
raffling of cases is his personal duty and responsibility. He is expected to keep abreast and be
conversant with Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of cases before him
and strictly comply therewith at all times. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom
behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should therefore administer their
office with due regard to the integrity of the system of law itself, remembering that they are not
depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law. 28
By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing them to pay a fine of
P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) days, respondent judge
exhibited his bias against herein complainants.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting
judicially, or such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of
justice into disrepute or disrespect.29 Here, respondent judge cited complainants in direct
contempt of court for filing a complaint (Civil Case No. 7066) based on a deed of quitclaim that
had already been declared null and void, instead of having the said case, wherein he was one of
the defendants, raffled to the court which could properly act on the case. While the power to
punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to
uphold due administration of justice, still, judges must be slow to punish for direct contempt.
This drastic power must be used judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to
be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. 30
The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are
impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for
the functions that they exercise.31
It has time and again been stressed that besides the basic equipment of possessing the
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge
should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his
domain.32
Indeed, Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
“Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity.”
Respondent judge’s act of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct contempt is a clear
evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.
Respondent judge also took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 despite the fact that prior to his
appointment as judge, respondent served as counsel for Melencio Yu and his mother, Dominga
Pinagawang.
Respondent’s explanation that it was Cesar Bañas who was his client and not Melencio and
Dominga was belied by the demand letter33 dated June 20, 1980, which was signed by him.
Respondent judge clearly acted as counsel not only for Cesar Bañas but for Melencio and
Dominga as well. Section 2 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct specifically provides
that “judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.” Section 5 of the same Canon further states that “ judges shall
disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide
the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable
to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances
where (b) the judge previously served as lawyer in the matter in controversy. ”
Respondent judge violated the above canon when he dispensed with the raffle and took
cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 as well as ordered its outright dismissal and cited the
complainants in contempt of court. He thus created the impression that he intended to favor his
former clients, Melencio and Dominga. His actuations gave ground for the parties to doubt his
impartiality and objectivity. A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. He has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of
doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to its integrity. 34
Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial. A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, for all the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be
meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge. 35
We take this occasion once more to impress upon a trial judge that he must at all times
maintain and preserve the trust and faith of litigants in the court’s impartiality. When he exhibits
actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are
eroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit himself voluntarily. It is basic that a judge may not
be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce
the slightest doubt on his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such
state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in
a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the
judge is to disqualify himself.36
Respondent judge was a party defendant in Civil Case No. 7066 which was enough reason not
to act on the same and just leave the matter to the Vice Executive Judge. His reluctance to let
32
go of the case all the more induced doubts and suspicions as to his honest actuations, probity
and objectivity. Evidently, respondent judge violated the clear injunction embodied in the
aforecited Canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Be that as it may, we rule that there is no merit in complainants’ charge of gross ignorance of
the law leveled against respondent judge. For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the
assailed order, decision or actuation must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence
but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, and corruption.37 Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a person
who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the grounds for the
accusation.
The violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 by respondent judge is classified as a less serious
charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Section 11(B) of the same Rule
provides the following sanctions for less serious offenses:
“Sec. 11. Sanctions.
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.”
Finally, as regards the charge against Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff Elmer Lastimosa and Sheriff IV
Palati, complainants maintain that they abused their authority when they enforced the order of
demolition against complainants even though they were not impleaded as parties in Civil Case
Nos. 1291 and 4647 where the order of demolition was issued.
The dispositive portion of the order of demolition issued by respondent judge reads:
“NOW THEREFORE, we command you to demolish the improvements erected by the defendants
HEIRS OF JOHN SYCIP (namely: NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, JOSE SYCIP, JR., ALFONSO SYCIP II,
ROSE MARIE SYCIP, JAMES SYCIP & GRACE SYCIP), Represented by NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, in
Civil Case No. 1291 and the plaintiffs YARD URBAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.
in Civil Case No. 4647, on that portion of land belonging to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1291 and
defendants in Civil Case No. 4647, MELENCIO YU and TALINANAP MATUALAGA, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. (V-14496) (P-2331) P-523, located in Apopong, General Santos
City.
This Special Order of Demolition shall be returned by you to this Court within ten (10) days from
the date of receipt hereof, together with your proceedings indorsed hereon.” 38
Clearly, respondent judge neither ordered the eviction of any other person occupying the
property of spouses Yu and Matualaga other than the parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647,
nor directed the Ex-Officio Sheriff to demolish the houses or structures of any person other than
the said parties. However, the notice to vacate issued by Palati and noted by Lastimosa was
addressed not just to the parties but to “all adverse claimants and actual occupants of the land
subject of the case.” It directed that the houses and improvements of the parties, as well as
those of adverse claimants including complainants who were not parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291
and 4647, would be demolished.
Worth quoting here is the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 54003, which decided the appeal
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10 33
of the decision in Civil Case No. 4647, viz.:

“Finally, the appellants’ assertion that they are not bound by the decision in Civil Case No. 1291
because they are not parties therein and that the appellees should first institute an action for
ejectment in order to acquire possession of the property is without merit. The appellants’ failure
to establish a vested and better right, either derivative or personal, to the land in question as
against the appellees, forecloses any posturing of exemption from the legal force and effect of
the writ of execution issued by the trial court to enforce a final judgment under the guise of
denial of due process. A judgment pertaining to ownership and/or possession of real property is
binding upon the defendants and all persons claiming right of possession or ownership from the
said defendant and the prevailing party need not file a separate action for ejectment to evict the
said privies from the premises.” (Emphasis supplied) 39

Evidently, the decision in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, which had long become final and
executory, can be enforced against herein complainants although they were not parties thereto.
There is no question that complainants merely relied on the title of their predecessor-in-interest
who was privy to John Sycip, the defendant in Civil Case No. 1291. As such, complainants and
their predecessor-in-interest can be reached by the order of demolition. 40

Respondent sheriffs cannot be faulted with grave misconduct and abuse of authority in
implementing the order of demolition. The records before us are simply bereft of any indication
supportive of the allegation. Quite the contrary, we find Lastimosa and Palati to have faithfully
observed the correct procedure in the implementation of respondent judge’s order. In fact, they
were extra careful in the enforcement of the same knowing that a lot of attention was given to it
by the media, involving as it did a 12-hectare property and about 1,500 persons. Despite the
controversy, they were able to carry out the demolition peacefully and successfully.

It is well-settled that when an order is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial duty
to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandate. The
primary duty of sheriffs is to execute judgments and orders of the court to which they belong. It
must be stressed that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the
prevailing party. It is said that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is very aptly
called the life of the law. It is also indisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is
the execution of judgment. Hence, the officers charged with this delicate task must act with
considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice, otherwise, the
decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of justice would be futile. 41

We take note of the fact that respondent judge had compulsorily retired from the service on
February 24, 2001.42

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Jose Majaducon GUILTY of abuse of his
authority for which he is meted a fine of P20,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
For lack of merit, the charge of grave abuse of authority against Elmer Lastimosa and Nasil
Palati is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Carpio, Azcuna and Chico-Nazario,** JJ., concur.
Judge Jose Majaducon meted with P20,000.00 fine for abuse of authority.

Note.—No matter how urgent a case may be, this fact cannot justify procedural shortcuts of
dispensing with the raffle of the same in violation of Circular No. 7. ( Re: An Undated Letter with
the Heading “Exposé” of a Concerned Mediaman on the Alleged Illegal Acts of Judge Julian C.
Ocampo III of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Naga City , 359 SCRA 1 [2001])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452. April 6, 2005.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1119-MTJ)
EDITHA O. CATBAGAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE FELIX-BERTO P. BARTE, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Tobias Fornier, Antique, respondent.
Courts; Judges; Due Process; Grave and Serious Misconduct; Words and Phrases; “Conduct
Unbecoming a Judge”; The Office of the Court Administrator could not be faulted for describing
the charge as “conduct unbecoming of a judge” (instead of “grave and serious misconduct”)
where the allegations pointed to none other but that offense, and the administrative case
cannot be dismissed outright on that ground alone, considering that respondent judge knew
fully well what he was being charged with; The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. —Despite the apparent confusion
brought about by the charge of (1) “grave and serious misconduct” in the complaint and (2)
“conduct unbecoming of a judge” in the OCA indorsement, the dismissal of the complaint is not
warranted. The records show that respondent refuted both charges in his comment and
manifestation. The OCA could not be faulted for describing the charge as “conduct unbecoming
of a judge” (instead of “grave and serious misconduct”) because the allegations pointed to none
other but that offense. Noticeably, in complainant’s reply and letter-request for early resolution,
she consistently described her charge against respondent as “conduct unbecoming of a judge.”
We therefore cannot dismiss outright the administrative case on this ground alone, considering
that respondent knew fully well what he was being charged with. In fact, he defended himself
against the charges. In a long line of cases, we have held that the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.
Same; Same; Same; The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain from
financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere
with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or
persons likely to come before the court. —The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “[a] judge
shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement
with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments
and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for
disqualification.” Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics also cautions a judge from “x x x
making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court
x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; A judge, by allowing himself to act as an agent in the sale of properties,
increased the possibility of his disqualification in the event that a dispute involving the contracts
of sale arose.—As observed by the OCA, respondent judge should have refrained from
participating in the transaction. By allowing himself to act as an agent in the sale of the
properties, respondent increased the possibility of his disqualification in the event that a dispute
involving the said contracts of sale arose. Moreover, the possibility that the parties in the sale
might have appeared before his court was not remote and his business dealings with them
would have then created a doubt about his fairness and impartiality.
Same; Same; Judges must not only be “good judges” but must also “appear to be good
persons”; In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue—it is a necessity. —
Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of
the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise,
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice. We acknowledge that respondent has been in judicial service since 1990 up
to the present. We find his declaration that no criminal or civil case has ever been filed against
him to be true. However, the present administrative case and an earlier decided case with
34
similar facts are too glaring to ignore. In that case, we reminded him that judges must not only
be “good judges” but must also “appear to be good persons.” In the judiciary, moral integrity is
more than a cardinal virtue; it is a necessity.
Same; Same; Public interest in an adept and honest judiciary dictates that notice of future
harsher penalties should not be followed by another forewarning of the same kind, ad infinitum,
but by discipline through appropriate penalties. —In Poso v. Mijares, we held that “public interest
in an adept and honest judiciary dictates that notice of future harsher penalties should not be
followed by another forewarning of the same kind, ad infinitum, but by discipline through
appropriate penalties.” As already mentioned, respondent was previously sanctioned for an
identical infraction involving the sale of land to the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day
Saints, Inc. We ordered him to pay a fine of P2,000, admonished him to be more discreet and
prudent in his private dealings and warned him that a similar infraction would be sanctioned
more severely. This second administrative case therefore reveals a certain kind of ava-rice on
the part of respondent. Hence, we are constrained to impose upon him a heavier penalty than
the OCA-recommended fine.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Grave and Serious Misconduct.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint1 dated September 17, 2001 addressed to the Honorable Chief
Justice, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), complainant Editha O. Catbagan
charged respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC),
Tobias Fornier, Antique with “grave and serious misconduct.”2
In the first week of May 1999, complainant received information that the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints, Inc. (Church) was interested in buying land in the Province of Antique. She
immediately approached respondent judge and requested him to assist her in the prospective
transaction. Together with a certain Abraham Pedriña, the three agreed that in case they
succeeded in brokering the sale of the properties to the Church, their commission would be
divided in this manner:
x x x the three of us agreed in the house of Judge Barte that for every sale transaction if the
purchase price exceed One Million Pesos, the two of us will receive a commission of P100,000.00
each while the remaining amount or net gain be retained by Judge Barte as his commission
based on his agreement with the vendors.3
When requested to put their agreement in writing, respondent judge allegedly answered: “A
municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is the closest inreach to the
public he serves and he must accordingly act atall times with great constancy and utmost
probity.” Complainant did not insist on her request after hearing this.
The three of them subsequently conferred with Bobby J. Villalobos, the district president of the
Church. They offered the parcels of land owned by Bitoon Cezar and Aurea Clarin in Sibalom,
Antique.4
Thereafter, on January 18, 2001, the Church agreed to purchase lots 336-A and 336-B owned
by Bitoon Cezar for P1,120,300.5
Lot 334 owned by Aurea Clarin was also sold for P2,199,000 on February 19, 2001. 6
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
Meanwhile, lot 5555 located in Hamtic, Antique owned by Eleanor M. Checa-Santos was sold on
February 12, 2001 for P2,300,000.7
For the first two sales, complainant claimed she was entitled to a P300,000 commission.
Since the Church transacted with respondent only, it paid the price of the properties to him.
Respondent then delivered the amount due to the vendors.
When complainant heard that the vendors had been paid, she demanded her commission from
respondent. However, respondent offered her only P25,000 for the two transactions, excluding
the one in Hamtic.
Complainant later learned that respondent received a P435,226.55 commission from the Aurea
Clarin transaction alone.8
Complainant reminded respondent of their agreement but respondent challenged complainant
“to go to court.” Instead of pursuing her claim in a civil suit, however, complainant opted to file
the present administrative case against respondent on September 17, 2001.
In a 1st Indorsement9 dated October 18, 2001, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
referred the complaint to respondent for his comment on the charge of conduct unbecoming of
a judge.
In his comment,10 respondent denied the charge against him and asked for the dismissal of the
administrative case on the following grounds:
First, there was ambiguity in the charge of grave and serious misconduct in the complaint and
conduct unbecoming of a judge in the OCA indorsement. Because of this confusion, he was
deprived of his right to be informed of the real charge against him. Consequently, he was not
able to properly prepare his defense.
Second, complainant’s allegations were baseless and designed merely to harass and dishonor
respondent. According to him, complainant and Pedriña went to his house and told him about
the intention of the Church to buy land in Antique. Subsequently, he informed the chapter
president of the Church that there were several parcels of land in the Municipality of Sibalom
that met their requirements. For two years, he spent after-office hours and weekends to
consummate the transaction. He labored hard because the transaction could augment his
meager income and enable him to send his three children to good colleges in Iloilo City. He
admitted that Pedriña assisted him but maintained that complainant had no involvement in the
transaction other than attending the initial meeting with the chapter president. He claimed that
it was he, not the complainant, who looked for the land to be sold to the Church. He submitted
the sworn affidavit11 of the vendor’s lawyer, Atty. Francisco Javier, who never met the
complainant nor transacted with her. Respondent also claimed that the agreement was for him
to shoulder all the expenses relative to the transaction, including its documentation. Pedriña’s
affidavit supported respondent’s claim that they never agreed on a commission scheme,
contrary to complainant’s assertion. If ever respondent gave money for any information or
assistance in the transaction, the amount depended entirely on his discretion.
In a report and recommendation12 dated June 13, 2002, the OCA found respondent not guilty of
the charges against him but recommended a fine of P5,000 for violating Canon 5, Rule 5.02 13 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. It also warned respondent against directly engaging in any private
business even outside office hours, otherwise a more severe penalty would be imposed upon
him. The OCA further noted that another administrative case, entitled Jose Berin and Merly
Alorro v. Judge Felixberto P. Barte,14 had been filed against respondent. It involved a transaction
35
similar to the one in this complaint.
Initially, we will discuss respondent’s assertion that this administrative case should be dismissed
for being ambiguous. According to respondent, the confusion denied him the opportunity to
properly defend himself.
Despite the apparent confusion brought about by the charge of (1) “grave and serious
misconduct” in the complaint and (2) “conduct unbecoming of a judge” in the OCA indorsement,
the dismissal of the complaint is not warranted. The records show that respondent refuted both
charges in his comment and manifestation.15 The OCA could not be faulted for describing the
charge as “conduct unbecoming of a judge” (instead of “grave and serious misconduct”)
because the allegations pointed to none other but that offense. Noticeably, in complainant’s
reply16 and letter-request17 for early resolution, she consistently described her charge against
respondent as “conduct unbecoming of a judge.” We therefore cannot dismiss outright the
administrative case on this ground alone, considering that respondent knew fully well what he
was being charged with. In fact, he defended himself against the charges.
In a long line of cases, we have held that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. 18
The question of whether complainant was or was not entitled to a commission for her efforts in
the sale of the parcels of land to the Church should be threshed out in a proper civil case.
What is therefore left for us to thresh out is respondent’s administrative liability for his admitted
financial and business dealings.
We note the OCA’s observation that this is not the first time an administrative case of the same
nature has been filed against respondent. In Jose Berin and Merly Alorro v. Judge Felixberto P.
Barte,19 respondent judge was also charged with grave and serious misconduct for refusing to
give the complainants therein their respective commissions in the sale of land to the Manila
Mission of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. The Court, in that case, found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
By allowing himself to act as agent in the sale of the subject property, respondent judge has
increased the possibility of his disqualification to act as an impartial judge in the event that a
dispute involving the said contract of sale arises. Also, the possibility that the parties to the sale
might plead before his court is not remote and his business dealings with them might not only
create suspicion as to his fairness but also to his ability to render it in a manner that is free from
any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and also as to the judge’s integrity.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “[a] judge shall refrain from financial and business
dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper
performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come
before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to
minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification.” 20
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics also cautions a judge from “x x x making personal
investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court x x x.”
As observed by the OCA, respondent judge should have refrained from participating in the
transaction. By allowing himself to act as an agent in the sale of the properties, respondent
increased the possibility of his disqualification in the event that a dispute involving the said
contracts of sale arose. Moreover, the possibility that the parties in the sale might have
appeared before his court was not remote and his business dealings with them would have then
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10 36
created a doubt about his fairness and impartiality. Notes.—Inefficient, indolent and neglectful judges are as equally impermissible in the
judiciary as the incompetent and dishonest ones. (Yu-Asensi vs. Villanueva, 322 SCRA 255
Respondent submits that the jurisdiction of the 1st MCTC covers the Municipalities of Tobias [2000])
Fornier, Hamtic and Aniniy. The 2nd MCTC, on the other hand, covers Sibalom, San Remigio and The acts of a judge in demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court
Belison. Hence, since the parties and subject matter involved in the controversy were not within constitute serious misconduct in office. (Virata vs. Supnet, 393 SCRA 12 [2002]) Court
the jurisdiction of the 1st MCTC, his judicial authority could have never been invoked had a case employees should never use their office as residence or for any other purpose than for court or
arisen from the transaction. judicial functions. (Re: Loss of Extraordinary Allowance Check No. 1106739 of Judge Eduardo U.
Jovellanos, 393 SCRA 22 [2002])
We find, however, that his claim is not exactly correct. Respondent himself emphasized to this
Court in his manifestation21 dated February 23, 2004 that, aside from his duties in the 1st MCTC,
he was also designated as Acting Presiding Judge of the 5th MCTC and in several cases in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Jose, Antique. Considering this, the likelihood that he could
have also been designated in the 2nd MCTC (with jurisdiction over Sibalom) was neither remote
nor impossible. Had any of the parties in the subject transaction filed suit, his inhibition would
have been called for because of his aforecited business dealings.

Given these circumstances, respondent judge ought perhaps to seriously consider leaving the
judiciary and becoming a full-time real estate broker instead. The latter calling appears to have
a special appeal to him.

Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.

A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as
the epitome of integrity and justice.22

We acknowledge that respondent has been in judicial service since 1990 up to the present. We
find his declaration that no criminal or civil case has ever been filed against him to be true.
However, the present administrative case and an earlier decided case with similar facts are too
glaring to ignore. In that case, we reminded him that judges must not only be “good judges” but
must also “appear to be good persons.” 23 In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal
virtue; it is a necessity.24

In Poso v. Mijares,25 we held that “public interest in an adept and honest judiciary dictates that
notice of future harsher penalties should not be followed by another forewarning of the same
kind, ad infinitum, but by discipline through appropriate penalties.”

As already mentioned, respondent was previously sanctioned for an identical infraction involving
the sale of land to the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints, Inc. We ordered him to
pay a fine of P2,000, admonished him to be more discreet and prudent in his private dealings
and warned him that a similar infraction would be sanctioned more severely. 26 This second
administrative case therefore reveals a certain kind of avarice on the part of respondent. Hence,
we are constrained to impose upon him a heavier penalty than the OCA-recommended fine.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte is hereby found guilty of violating Canon
5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering that this is his second offense, he is hereby
SUSPENDED for six (6) months. He is hereby warned that another complaint of this kind will
merit a penalty beyond mere suspension from public office.
SO ORDERED.
     Panganiban (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Judge Felixberto P. Barte suspended from office for six (6) months for violating Canon 5.02 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1833. June 28, 2005.*
ALEXANDER B. ORTIZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE IBARRA B. JACULBE, JR., REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF DUMAGUETE CITY, BRANCH 42, respondent.
Courts; Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; A judge’s failure to inhibit himself
when his son-in-law appeared as counsel in a case he was trying is a patent violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Court. —The prohibition against the Judge’s sitting in
the case is found in the Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as quoted above
and in Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which states: SECTION 1. Disqualification of
judges.—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The prohibition under the rules is clear.
Therefore, Judge Jaculbe’s failure to inhibit himself when his son-in-law appeared as counsel in
a case he was trying is a patent violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Court.
In Sales v. Calvan, the Court found that Judge Calvan violated the rule on disqualification of
judges as set out in the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Court when he conducted the
preliminary investigation of a criminal case where his wife was the niece of the private
complainant.
Same; Same; Same; A violation of Supreme Court rules falls under a Less Serious Charge. —
Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation of Supreme Court rules falls
under a Less Serious Charge. Section 11 of the same rule states that the following sanctions
may be imposed for Less Serious Charges: “1. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.” In the present case, since Judge Jaculbe was earlier
reprimanded by the Court in RTJ-97-1393, the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator to impose a fine of P11,000 is appropriate.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court and Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Alexander B. Ortiz against Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe,
Jr.1
In a verified letter-complaint2 dated March 20, 2003, Ortiz averred the following: That he is a
respondent in a case filed before the sala of Judge Jaculbe; that Atty. Richard Enojo, who is the
son-in-law of Judge Jaculbe, represents the plaintiff in the same case; that a compromise
agreement was entered into by the parties; that pursuant to the compromise agreement,
plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution; and that the motion was hastily
granted by Judge Jaculbe without holding a hearing to prove the failure of defendants to comply
with the compromise agreement.
Complainant cites Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which reads, as follows:
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
37
...
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or
to counsel within the fourth degree.
Complainant further claims that the relationship between Judge Jaculbe and Atty. Richard Enojo
is within the third degree of affinity and thus covered by the rule.
In his Comment,3 Judge Jaculbe alleges that it has been his practice to voluntarily inhibit himself
when a case handled by his son-in-law is raffled to his sala or, alternatively, for his son-in-law to
withdraw his appearance. In support of his assertion, he attached as annexes to his Comment
some orders of inhibition he issued and some withdrawals of appearance filed by his son-in-law.
The Judge further claims that there is only one exception to his above-stated practice and that is
the case now subject of this complaint. He contends, however, that:
. . . there is no legal, equitable and reasonable necessity to inhibit himself and the case can be
counted as a disposal from his court, in view of the following cogent and valid grounds:
1.No factual and legal issue [had] been resolved by the undersigned in rendering the
judgment based on the compromise agreement, and, there was no issue being resolved by
the undersigned in issuing the order for the Writ of Execution, for which issue undersigned
could have possibly been biased in favor of his son-in-law;
2.Atty. Richard Enojo (son-in-law of undersigned) participated and appeared very much
later and ONLY AS ADDITIONAL COUNSEL for plaintiff, because, Atty. Jose Arbas since the
start of the case consistently appeared as the only counsel for plaintiff for several years;
3.During the FIRST court appearance of Atty. Richard Enojo, he immediately manifested
that his client is accepting and willing to sign the pending and proposed compromise
agreement already submitted by the defendants, which compromise agreement was
eventually finalized and submitted to the court for approval; therefore, the appearance of
his son-in-law was instead favorable to the defendants and [is] without [the] possibility of
partiality and undue influence by the judge;
4.The Judgment was rendered in accordance with the Compromise Agreement, no more[,]
no less;
5.The order for issuance of a Writ of Execution as a ministerial duty only of the court was
in accordance with the procedure of the Rules of Court, after hearing the same with no
opposition and no motion for reconsideration and/or other legal remedies availed of by the
defendants; and
6.The appearance of his son-in-law as additional counsel for plaintiff, has long been with
the express conformity and acquiescence by the defendants; therefore, the defendants are
in estoppel [and] thus cannot now question and complain as to the conduct of this
Presiding Judge.
In a Manifestation and Comment,4 Judge Jaculbe likewise takes exception to the narration of
facts by the complainant, as follows—
The apparent and deliberate misrepresentation of facts briefly states that: undersigned Judge “x
x x immediately granted the motion and as a matter of fact, issued [a] writ of execution on April
29, 2002 without conducting a hearing x x x.” “Worst is the fact that Hon. Ibarra B. Jaculbe had
ordered for the issuance of a writ of execution not in conformity to its decision.” “[T]he only
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10
reason why the same was expedited by the court is the fact that Atty. Richard Enojo, plaintiff’s
counsel is his son-in-law.” Also, complainant falsely alleged that undersigned Judge “ordered for
the issuance of a writ of execution not in conformity to its decision.”
Upon referral of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator made the following evaluation
and recommendation:
Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically provides that “a judge should
take no part in any proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
Paragraph (d) of said Rule provides [as an instance thereof] the following:
“(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or
to counsel within the fourth degree.”
Clearly, respondent violated the above canon by deciding Civil Case No. 12320 since his son-in-
law, who is related to him in the first degree of affinity, was a counsel for the plaintiff. At least
respondent does not pretend to be ignorant of the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and he can not deny that he had violated the same. However, his excuse that his son-in-law was
not an original counsel but had only entered his appearance after the case had been pending for
over a year and only to announce that his client was ready to sign the compromise agreement is
unacceptable. What he should have done the moment his son-in-law entered his appearance
was to forthwith disqualify himself and have the case reraffled to another branch. His reluctance
to let go of the case, according to him, was [due to] his desire to include the same case among
his disposals and considering that it was nearly finished he preferred not to unload it. This[,]
again, is a poor excuse for violating the clear injunction written in the Code.
Under Rule 140, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may be classified as simple
misconduct which is punished by suspension from office without salary for not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended that this case be redocketed as a regular
administrative matter and considering that respondent had earlier been reprimanded in RTJ-97-
1393, he should be made to pay a fine [of] P11,000.00 for simple misconduct. 5
As indicated by the Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Jaculbe does not dispute the fact
that Atty. Richard Enojo is his son-in-law and is, therefore, related to him by affinity in the first
degree.
The prohibition against the Judge’s sitting in the case is found in the Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct as quoted above and in Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,
which states:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in
any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
The prohibition under the rules is clear. Therefore, Judge Jaculbe’s failure to inhibit himself
when his son-in-law appeared as counsel in a case he was trying is a patent violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Court. In Sales v. Calvan,6 the Court found that Judge
38
Calvan violated the rule on disqualification of judges as set out in the Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Rules of Court when he conducted the preliminary investigation of a criminal case where
his wife was the niece of the private complainant. The Court articulated therein, as follows—
In Garcia v. De la Peña, we explained the rationale for this disqualification:
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case,
the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not
wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a
just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to his
fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or
impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to
hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to
preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
The disqualification is mandatory, and respondent has no option other than to inhibit himself
from the criminal case. The appropriate step for respondent to take would have been to
immediately desist from hearing the case, even at the preliminary investigation stage. His failure
to do so is a glaring violation not only of the Rules of Court but also of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which mandates in Canon 3, Rule 3.12:
Rule 3.12—A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
...
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or
to counsel within the fourth degree;
...
Even in Perez v. Suller, which respondent cites in support of his arguments, we ruled that
respondent Judge Suller should have refrained from handling the preliminary investigation of the
case involving his nephew, a relative by consanguinity within the sixth degree and thus covered
by the prohibition in Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. We further held:
While conducting preliminary investigation may not be construed strictly as “sitting in a case,”
the underlying reason behind disqualification under Rule 3.12 [of Canon 3] of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and Section 1 of Rule 137 is the same.
We have time and again reminded judges of their obligation to keep the image of the judiciary
unsullied and worthy of the people’s trust. Respondent clearly failed to uphold this duty.
In that case, the Court imposed a fine of P10,000 on Judge Calvan for violation of Section 1 of
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and of Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation of Supreme Court rules falls
under a Less Serious Charge. Section 11 of the same rule states that the following sanctions
may be imposed for Less Serious Charges: “1. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.”
In the present case, since Judge Jaculbe was earlier reprimanded by the Court in RTJ-97-1393,
the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator to impose a fine of P11,000 is
appropriate.
WHEREFORE, Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 10 39
Dumaguete City, Branch 42, is found GUILTY of violating Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court and Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and a FINE of P11,000 is hereby
imposed on him.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe, Jr. meted with P11,000 fine for violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court and Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Notes.—Where the regular judge who has been disqualified revokes the order of
disqualification, and objection is made to such revocation, it is not sufficient for the judge to
enter an order merely saying that he or she is not disqualified—the record should clearly reveal
the facts upon which the revocation is made. (Garcia vs. Burgos, 291 SCRA 546 [1998])

A judge’s reliance on an erroneous order is not sufficient to point to a conclusion that he is

manifestly partial to the defense—to allow the disqualification of a judge on the mere allegation
of partiality with nothing more would open the floodgates to forum shopping. ( People vs. Gako,
Jr., 348 SCRA 334 [2000])