Part VII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

A. Concepts
Judicial Power
i. Includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
• The second clause is the basis of the so-called expanded certiorari jurisdiction
of the SC;
Echegaray vs. Sec. of Justice, GR 132601, Jan. 19, 1999;
Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape
of the 10 year old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of
the death penalty for the said crime. He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising
for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death
penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions. In the meantime, Congress had seen it
fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against
him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being
violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international
covenants,  an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise
by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of
delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal
injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional,
lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and
easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent
Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing
rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as
Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to
the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not
pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty
obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being
discriminatory.

Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to
be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered,
and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and
its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification,
the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain
and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes
in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution.  It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life."  Would the lack in particularity
then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel,
degrading or inhuman"?  The Court believes not.  For reasons discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the
competence and expertise of administrative officials.

Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix
the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the
death convict.  As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of
execution is the trial court which convicted the accused.  The procedure is that the
"judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the
records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for
execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of
notification.  As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be
read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides
that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then
eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became
final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen
(18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and
executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and
spiritual affairs.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and
untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is
concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.  This is
unsubstantiated.

First.  Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection
required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the
drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in
the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged
and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.

Second.  Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which
requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior
to the performance of such task.  We must presume that the public officials entrusted
with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel
punishment.

Third.  Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.  "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which
is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to
the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel.  But of course the Constitution
does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against
which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish
life humanely.

What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.  This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered
by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most
serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was
adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989.  The Philippines neither
signed nor ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative
policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will
apply it.  It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be
carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring
so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the
lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection
to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The
legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal
injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see
that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised
is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out
the penalty already imposed by the Courts.  In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently
definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is,
canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer
serious flaws that could not be overlooked.  To begin with, something basic appears
missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the
execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.

The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a
vacuum.  The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate
the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by
not providing for a mode of review and approval.  Being a mere constituent unit of the
Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that
would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as
the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177.  Such apparent abdication of
departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is

unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the
power to legislate by respondent Secretary.  Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends
the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment
of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17.  SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. 
Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years
next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person
over seventy (70) years of age.  In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40
of the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as

well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. 
Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be
suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be
inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor
upon any person over seventy years of age.

While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of

Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a
woman is pregnant or within  one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing
rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death
sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found
under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year
reprieve after a woman is sentenced.  This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to
a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an
impermissible contravention of the applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but
instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. 

• On the concept of “grave abuse of discretion”

ITF vs. Comelec, GR 159139, Jan. 13, 2004;

FACTS:
In Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (lnfotech) v. Commission on Elections, the
Supreme Court (SC) nullified the COMELEC's award to Mega Pacific Consortium of the procurement
contract involving the automated counting machines (ACMs) for the 2004 national elections. SC found
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it awarded the contract to an entity which failed to
establish itself as a proper consortium, and despite the ACMs' failure to meet certain technical
requirements.

On January 13, 2004, SC promulgated the Decision in lnfotech declaring as null and void: (a) COMELEC
Resolution No. 6074 which awarded the contract for Phase II of the Comprehensive Automated Electoral
System to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC); and (b) the procurement contract for ACMs executed
between the COMELEC and Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI). They found that the COMELEC's
failure to follow its own rules, policies, and guidelines in respect of the bidding process, and to adequately
check and observe financial, technical and legal requirements constituted grave abuse of discretion. As a
result of the foregoing lapses of the COMELEC, they also directed the Ombudsman to determine the
criminal liability, if any, of the public officials and private individuals involved in the nullified resolution and
contract.
As mandated by the Infotech Decision, the Ombudsman initiated a fact-finding investigation. On January
21, 2004, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. also filed criminal and administrative complaints against
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and other COMELEC officials with the Ombudsman.
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation later filed a related complaint with the
Ombudsman against COMELEC officials and stockholders of MPEI on September 19, 2004. The Field
Investigation Office (FIO) of the Ombudsman filed a supplemental complaint on October 6, 2004. These
cases were later on consolidated by the Ombudsman.

In the meantime, the petitioners in the Infotech case filed a Manifestation and Motion dated December 22,
2005, as well as a Supplemental Motion dated January 20, 2006, alleging that the Ombudsman has yet to
comply with SC directive in the Infotech Decision. Thus, on February 14, 2006, SC issued a Resolution
directing the Ombudsman to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for its failure to comply
with the Court's directive. In compliance with the foregoing Resolution, the Ombudsman filed its Comment
contending that it should not be held in contempt of court because it has "long acted on the referral, or
complied with this Court's 'directive' in this case, to its full extent." In a Resolution dated March 28, 2006,
SC directed the Ombudsman, under pain of contempt, to submit quarterly reports to the Court starting
June 30, 2006.

On July 13, 2006, the investigating panel of the Office of the Ombudsman reconvened to carry out further
investigation and clarificatory hearings. In all, the investigating panel conducted a total of 12 public
hearings between July 13, 2006 and August 23, 2006, interviewed 10 witnesses, and received no less
than 198 documents.

Following these public hearings, the Ombudsman issued a Supplemental Resolution dated September
27, 2006 which reversed and set aside the June 28, 2006 Resolution, and dismissed the administrative
and criminal complaints against both public and private respondents for lack of probable cause. The
Supplemental Resolution stated that the Investigating Panel "cannot find an iota of evidence to show that
the acts of [the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC)] in allowing MPC to bid and its subsequent
recommendation to award [the] Phase II Contract to MPC constitute manifest [] partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence" and that it cannot establish that any "unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference was extended to MPC or MP[E]I by [the] BAC in the exercise of its administrative function in
the determination [of] MPC's eligibility and subsequent recommendation made to [the] COMELEC." In
sum, the Ombudsman opined that a finding of grave abuse of discretion in the lnfotech case cannot be
considered criminal in nature in the absence of evidence showing bad faith, malice or bribery in the
bidding process.
The dispositive portion of the Infotech decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec
Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the AES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC).
Also declared null and void is the subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific
eSolutions (MPEI). Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or
agreement entered into with regard to this project.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman which shall determine the criminal
liability, if any, of the public officials (and conspiring private individuals, if any) involved in the subject
Resolution and Contract. Let the Office of the Solicitor General also take measures to protect the
government and vindicate public interest from the ill effects of the illegal disbursements of public funds
made by reason of the void Resolution and Contract.

The Ombudsman maintains that it has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given the facts
of the case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, should be filed. The respondents in G.R. No.
159139, the COMELEC and MPEI, support the Ombudsman's position. They point to the plain text of the
dispositive portion, i.e., the use of the phrase "if any," which clearly demonstrates the Court's intent for the
Ombudsman to conduct its own investigation and render an independent assessment based on whatever
evidence the Ombudsman gathers.
ISSUE:

This case presents the question of whether the SC conclusion in lnfotech that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion is tantamount to a finding of probable cause that the COMELEC officials
violated penal laws, thereby making it the ministerial duty of the respondent Ombudsman to file the
appropriate criminal complaints.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that:

In view of the constitutional delineation of powers, we reject the petitioner’s contention that we already
made a determination in the Infotech case that a crime has been committed. We could not have made
such determination without going beyond the limits of our judicial power and thereby unlawfully impinging
the prerogative of the constitutionally created Office of the Ombudsman. In Infotech, we only exercised
our mandate to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC. However, a finding of grave abuse of discretion is not
necessarily indicative of probable cause. To determine the latter, the constitutive elements of the crime
must first be considered. In the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction in Infotech, we only resolved whether
the COMELEC acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. We never decided whether
the facts were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondents were probably guilty thereof.

xxx

Having ruled that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion, it is no longer necessary to
belabor the issue on contempt. Suffice it to say that our directive to the Ombudsman was simply to
determine if there was any criminal liability on the part of the public and private respondents in G.R. No.
159139. The Ombudsman sufficiently complied with this directive when she found that, based on the
hearings conducted and documents gathered, probable cause did not exist.

WHEREFORE, the petition docketed as G.R. No. 174777 is DISMISSED. The Motion dated October 17,
2006 filed by the petitioners in G.R. No. 159139 is DENIED.

Judicial Review
It is the power of courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light
of their conformity with the Constitution; This is not an assertion of superiority by the
courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the
Constitution (Angara vs. Electoral Commission); Constitutional bases:

Doctrine: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of check and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
FACTS:

In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province
of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number
of votes. On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent
Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other-things, that
said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified/

Petitioner Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before
the Electoral Commission a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”, alleging (a) that Resolution
No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the
protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period

Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an “Answer to the Motion of Dismissal” alleging that
there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against
the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation.

The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936,

denying herein petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss the Protest.

ISSUE:

1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and if in the
affirmative

2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly

RULING:
1. Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and
while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach
of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental
law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.

In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will
determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would
not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run
prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them.
Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system.
Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”

2. No. The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution
which provides:

“SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the

Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose
was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through
their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and
minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations
was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership
three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary

authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned
to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of
government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department
than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled “Legislative Department” of our Constitution is very
indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of
members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.

If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may
regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of
power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case
would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all
times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of
the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative
body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable
clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the
Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases
referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective
whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse
than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to
regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead
to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is
obvious that this result should not be permitted.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral
Commission may abuse its regulatory authority by admitting protests beyond any
reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members
of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the
concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the
second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy.
All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission
reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified
cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases
entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the
Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within
its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with
the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created
by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave
much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human
institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts,
however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over
which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election
of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on
December 3, 1935, cannot be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of
election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice
of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power
to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority
incidental to its constitutional power to be “the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly”, to fix the
time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the
returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not
required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to
entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to
any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted
December 6, 1935).

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A.
Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not
in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest
within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral

Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority
under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine
whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person
within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied,
with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Inherent in the Judicial Department by virtue of the doctrine of Separation of Powers;

Sec. 1(par. 2) Art. VIII – to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of Government;

Sec. 4(2) Art. VIII – all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement or law x x x presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations x x x;

Who may exercise the power? Supreme Court

How about lower courts? Yes – Sec. 5(2) Art. VIII

- Family Courts/RTCs –
Garcia vs. Drilon, GR 179267, June 25, 2013;

FACTS:

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She
claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO effective for thirty
(30) days.

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children,
private respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.
The RTC issued a TPO, effective for thirty (30) days.

Petitioner filed before the CA challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being
violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified
TPO issued in the civil case for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his
pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the
same.

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod
City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
“inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Family Court has jurisdiction on the issue of constitutionality of a statute.

RULING:

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,”
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key
cities identified.

To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In
the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in
the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
the complainant.

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,
“this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what
are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.” The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or
validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that, “plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could
have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order
before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the
review of this Court.

i. Requisites
Actual case or controversy o Case illustrations:

Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS:  On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is
an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women’s health and population control. Petitioners assail its
constitutionality because according to them, it violates the right to health of women and
the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. The proponents
of the RH law, however, assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the
subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is
not a speech regulating measure. 
ISSUE:  Whether or not the RH Law cannot be challenged “on its face” because it is not
a speech regulating measure
 
RULING:  While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free
speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S.,
this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Consequently, considering that the foregoing
petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of the petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. 

Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013

ISSUE:  Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislation.

FACTS:  The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers
for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged
in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the
heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents
of the NGOs set up by Napoles. Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from
royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended
for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were
lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional 

DECISION:  The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional

violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one

which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can
be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to
the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness,"
meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for
adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something
had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will
decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are
of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions." Based on these principles, the
Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions
of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in
these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910
for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential
Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate
or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public
funds. 

Must be ripe for judicial determination

- Pacu vs. Sec. of Education, GR L-5279, OCT. 31, 1955
Facts:
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities assailed the constitutionality of Act
No. 2706, known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools
and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction.”

As contended by PACU,  the Act is unconstitutional because of the following reasons: 1)

The act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents
of liberty and property without due process of law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of
their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and 3) its provisions
conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe
rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of legislative powers.

Additionally, the association contended that the Constitution guaranteed every citizen
the right to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental
approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right.

On the contrary, the Department of Education maintained that 1) the matters does not
contain justiciable controversy and thus does not need court decision or intervention; 2)
petitioners are inestoppels to challenge the validity of the said act; and 3) the Act is
constitutionally valid.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706 provides that “It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public
Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and
colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the
public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this
purpose said Secretary or his duly-authorized representative shall have authority to
advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency of instruction given in the same.”

Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional.

Held:
No, Act No. 2706 is constitutional.

The organic law provides that the state has the power to regulate private schools for the
development of morals, civic efficiency, and scientific aptitude of students. The court
found no justiciable controversy. The power of the courts to declare a law
unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, judicial power is
limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. Thus, the court does not sit to
adjudicate a mere academic question, such as that provided by the petitioner. On this
phase of the litigation, the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of
legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda
issued by the Department of Education.

- Montesclaros vs. Comelec, GR 152295, July 9, 2002

Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to
Sangguniang Kabataan and limited its membership to youths “at least 15 but no more
than 21 years of age.” On 18 February 2002, Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded
from COMELEC that SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC
Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the House of Representatives and the Senate on
20 February 2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections
and expressed support to postpone the SK election on November 2002. On 11 March
2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456,
resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age to at least
15 but no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of
Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002 respectively and signed by the
President on 19 March 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for
temporary restraining order seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election
and reduction of age requirement on 11 March 2002.
Issue: Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.
Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition presents no actual
justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be
unconstitutional. Petitioner’s prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a
proposed bill does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to
judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no
duty legally enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional
right or duty. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted
into law. After its passage petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that
could be unconstitutional.

Must not be moot and academic

- Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, GR 152774, May 27, 2004;

Facts:
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 48 entitled “ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION” which was later renamed as the LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF). The program was
established to “facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of local government
units (LGUs) in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the
National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government
Code.” The Oversight Committee constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No.
7160 or The Local Government Code of 1991, has been tasked to formulate and issue
the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effective implementation. 
Thereafter the Oversight Committee issued Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-
005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001. The petitioner
submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they
earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and
2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release thereof.

Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the individual
members of the Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of Resolution No.
OCD-2002-001. He also wrote to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said
resolution as it violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved Resolution No. OCD-2002-

001.
The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the
General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos
(₱5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government
Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Named as respondents are Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia Boncodin of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and Secretary Jose Lina of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).

Whether the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

Yes, the assailed provisos infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991.

Under Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, Local government units shall have a just
share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released
to them. Also, in Section 284 of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning
the third year of its effectivity, the LGUs’ share in the national internal revenue taxes
shall be 40% and Section 285 on the allocation to Local Government Units in the
internal revenue allotment.

In the case at bar, the respondent put on hold the distribution and release of the five
billion pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules and regulations,
including the guidelines and mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight Committee from
time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy
enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck down.

Therefore, the provisos violate’s the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
 
Not moot and academic

David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 3, 2006;

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the

Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out
power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: The President whenever it becomes necessary, may call
out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress rebellion and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for
the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from
“illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP
1017. 

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5
have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full
discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the
armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PP 1017  and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Article VII … do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any
act of insurrection or rebellion”

Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws  and  to  all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”

Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.

First Provision: Calling Out Power.

The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.” 
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest. Are these conditions present in the
instant cases? The Court said, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President
Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP1017. Owing to her office’s vast intelligent
network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.  This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: 

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

The President can only issue Executive Orders, Administrative Orders, Proclamations,
Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circulars, General or Special Orders.

President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot
issue decrees similar to

those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are
laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were
issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of
Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature.  Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
“[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”  To be sure, neither Martial Law
nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise
of legislative power by issuing decrees. 

This is an area that needs delineation.

A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare "a state of
national emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by
the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues
arise.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a
state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.

It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only
to war but also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of
national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it
to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers
could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize
the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical
conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of
national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires
a delegation from Congress.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor
of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that
during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet
and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions,
thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another
facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section
17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the
President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable
terms thereof.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has
no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers
of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress. 

---

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is
CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of
PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well
as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In
addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not
authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts
of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

However, courts will still decide cases otherwise moot and academic if:
- There is a grave violation of the Constitution
- There is an exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest
is involved
- The constitutional issues raised require formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public
- The case is capable of repetition yet evasive of review
- Take note of the concept of: Supreme Court as a Republican Schoolmaster,
Teacher in Vital National Seminar
 Almario vs. Executive Secretary, GR 189028, July 16, 2013;

FACTS: On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 1001and, upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the
Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the category of Award and
Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have made distinct
contributions to arts and letters. In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was
declared as the first National Artist.

On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating
the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It
established the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it
an extensive mandate over the development, promotion and preservation of the
Filipino national culture and arts and the Filipino cultural heritage.

CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote,
develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized
to give awards to deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies decided to team up
and jointly administer the National Artists Award.

On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87 nominees were
considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist of 32 names was
compiled.

On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel shortlisted 13 out of the 32
names in the preliminary shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was
conducted by the 30-member Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP
Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the living National
Artists.From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a final list of four names was
agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.

CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation to the President. According to

respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the
President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President
allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and
individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo
Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Masa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on
Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited resource persons to
validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.

Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde

a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009,
Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico
AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to
the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.

Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of

Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be
conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry into that
select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari and
injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order of National
Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of
National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno be
enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely

abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and
selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own
choice for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners, the
Presidents discretion to name National Artists is not absolute but limited. In
particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the absence of or
against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.

ISSUE: Was there grave abuse of discretion committed by former

President Arroyo?

HELD: Legal Standing. The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality

of a statute or an official act must have a direct and personal interest. They must
show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that they
sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite
way.

In this case, the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or privilege
to which they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a result
of the conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa
and Moreno. In particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive
membership in the Order of National Artists.

Equal Protection. It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez

was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at
that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary
shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet,
the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they
were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP
and conferred the Order of National Artists.

The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa

and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction
between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify
deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing
respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification was not
germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-
established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect.
While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists,
he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the
foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an
interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.

Limits of the President's Discretion. The "power to recommend" includes

the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made."

Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the
President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and
the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to
the President's discretion.

Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered,

nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The Presidents power
must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President

The President's discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists

should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant
laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on
the President, not a separate grant of power.

In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in
connection with the conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive
issuances were institutionalized by two laws, namely, Presidential Decree No.
208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No. 7356. In particular, Proclamation
No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board as the National Artists
Awards Committee and tasked it to "administer the conferment of the category of
National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the
rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists".

By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the

conferment of the National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to work
together and jointly administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed the
guidelines for the nomination, selection and administration of the National Artist
Award. An administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and
effect of law. Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of
National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA
pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of law.
Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative
agencies,including the President himself/herself as chief executor of laws.

In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a

consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion
of the President in the matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the
names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that
the President could not have considered conferment of the Order of National
Artists on any person not considered and recommended by the NCCA and the
CCP Boards. That is the proper import of the provision of Executive Order No.
435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on the
conferment of the Order of National Artists." Applying this to the instant case,
the former President could not have properly considered respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by
the NCCA and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection
and meticulous screening process be rendered futile, the respective mandates of
the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer the
conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide
its deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and undertake any
and all necessary measures in that regard will also become meaningless.
Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming
respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Masa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists
are declared INVALID and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.

The constitutional question must be raised by the proper party

- Proper party is one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of. He must have legal standing or locus
standing.

Previous requirements:
Direct injury test – must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result;

Material interest – an interest in issue affected by the challenged official act, as

distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest;

SC’s liberal approach (particularly in recent rulings):

David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra. – petitioners may be accorded standing to sue
provided that the following requirements are met:

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case
covers the seven consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of
PP1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion and that
respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom
guaranteed and protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives”. To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With
respect to “laws”, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws such
as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and
contracts, and the like. She can only order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws
pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

The case involves constitutional issues

For taxpayers – there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional
Abaya vs. Ebdane, GR 167919, Feb. 14, 2009

FACTS:
On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was approved by
DPWH Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez. This resolution recommended the award to
China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works
for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of
the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the
island province of Catanduanes.

This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the
Philippine Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and between
Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the
Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective
governments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the Philippine
Government is a kind of a treaty.

HELD:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes
dated December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine
Government is an executive agreement.

An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities

with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other.
…treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of
understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to international
instruments binding at international law.

Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all have common
features and international law has applied basically the same rules to all these
instruments. These rules are the result of long practice among the States, which have
accepted them as binding norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded
as international customary law.

That case was dismissed by the SCORP last Feb. 14 2007.

What the petitioners wanted was that Foreign funded projects also undergo the
procurement process.

The dismissal of the case somehow gave justification for the delay of the implementing
rules for foreign funded projects (IRR-B) of the procurement law If we recall the decision
of the Abaya vs Ebdane was used by the DOJ when the DOTC Secretary was asking
for an opinion from the former, during the ZTE controversy.as ruled by the Supreme
Court in Abaya v. Ebdane, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive
agreement, which becomes binding through executive action without need of a vote by
the
Senate and that (like treaties and conventions, it is an international instrument binding
at international law,

The second issue involves an examination of the coverage of Republic Act No. 9184,
otherwise known as the “Government Procurement Reform Act”. Section 4 of the said
Act provides that it shall
apply to: … the Procurement of infrastructure Projects, Goods and Consulting Services,
regardless of source of funds, whether local or foreign, by all branches and
instrumentalities of government, its departments, offices and agencies, including
government-owned and/or -controlled corporations and local government units, subject
to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138. Any treaty or international or executive
agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is
a signatory shall be observed.

Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints
are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional
 G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking
that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:
1.       Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2.       Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1.       Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to:  (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

2.       Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional . IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND
THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME
FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖.
VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE
TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
in question

For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early
For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of encroaches
on their prerogatives as legislators

Related principles:
A party’s standing in court is a procedural technicality, which may be set aside by the
Court in view of the importance of the issues involved;
- Matter of public concern and imbued with public interest
- Paramount public interest
- Transcendental importance

A taxpayer is a proper party to question the validity of a law appropriating public funds
Can the Government of the Philippines be a proper party? Yes! People vs. Vera,
GR L45685, Nov. 16, 1937

FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a
motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then
elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The
SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial   and
thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of
Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for
hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng,
alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed
by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power
to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void.

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act
shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided
for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether
the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards.
If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has
to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole
context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative
action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for
probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without
such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed
by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the
provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for
the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There
can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer
without the probation system.

Intergenerational responsibility
- Oposa vs. Factoran, GR 101083, July 30, 1993

Facts: The Respondent Judge, Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, the Secretary of the DENR,
was alleged to have had exercised a grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements which the plaintiffs, Oposa et. al., representative to the minors and
minors who assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn, opposed as they complained that it violates their right to a sound environment
based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR to safeguard the people’s right to a
healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man’s inalienable right to self-preservation
and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. On the defense of the respondents, they
aver that failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary and that their complaints are nothing but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an “environmental right” which supposedly entitles the petitioners
to the “protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae.” And such allegations do
not reveal a valid cause of action. Further, they claim that the complaint is a matter of a
political jurisdiction and not a subject matter for the court. The trial court however
dismissed the allegations of the petitioners, and thus the case was brought before the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the state policy concerning the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology has been violated, amongst the other allegations.

Ruling: The instant Petition is hereby GRANTED by the court and the challenged Order
of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set
aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants
the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

Reason/Ratio Decidendi: Article II, of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides in

Section 16 that “the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.” It is
the petitioners’ right to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that
right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Wherefore when the respondent-Judge granted
the Timber License Agreements, it had been on the violation of the said policy.
Moreover, the TLA’s are not contracts and the non-impairment clause that the
respondents used as defense cannot be invoked.

- Arigo vs. Swift, GR 206510, Sept. 16, 2014

ACTS:

                The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US

Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines
and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

                On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu
Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

                Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations
of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

 HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

                Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls
for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

                In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right”
of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution
for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to
exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.

                On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa,
this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations.

Second issue: YES.

                 The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding

officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed
to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.
                During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted
area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings
the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply
with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

                 In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they

continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention
or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes

                With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and

31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized
entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is
one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the
US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing
out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international
rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
“international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the
country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation
to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters.
Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international
affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in
the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article
197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly
or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is

beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s
territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and
they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

                 The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately.

                The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application
of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
                The Court also found  unnecessary at this point to determine whether such
waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages
which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the
recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No.
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.

The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

- The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the
pleadings (Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR 149036, April 2, 2002)

Facts:

Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director
IV” of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity.
Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners,
respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the
pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to act
upon the confirmation of their appointments.

Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a

memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner
filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
herein respondents, claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on
temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.

Issue:

(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the
Constitution

(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character

Ruling: NO.

(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this
provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear
intent of the framers of the Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution – on the nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad interim appointments. The
original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad
interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session
throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of
the need to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the
Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad
interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad
interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions
in vital government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in
government offices, including the three constitutional commissions.

Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to
make ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be
avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This
power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by
her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in appointing officials who
are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress
is in session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending
consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume
office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad
interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify and assume
office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend
an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because
the Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the
choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not
been shown in the instant case.

In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not
constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution.

(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides
as follows:

“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress.”

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next

adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by

law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn
or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee
does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of
appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three
independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess
of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

However –
In criminal cases, the question can be raised at any time at the discretion of the
court;
In civil cases, the question can be raised at any stage of the proceeding if
necessary for the determination of the case itself;
In every case, except when there is estoppel, it can be raised at any stage if it
involves the jurisdiction of the court.

The decision on the constitutional question must be determinative of the case itself
- Constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case;
Lis mota – literally “cause of the suit of action”

Rationale:
Principle of Separation of Powers
- Which demands that proper respect be accorded to other departments and
thus, courts are loathe to decide constitutional questions as long as there is some other
basis that can be used for a decision;
 - Offshoot of presumption of validity accorded executive and legislative acts;
Kalipunan ng Damay ang Mahihirap vs. Robredo, GR 200903, July 22, 2014;

FACTS: Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus

Homeowners’ Association as well as the individual petitioners, Fernando Sevilla,
Estrelieta Bagasbas, Jocy Lopez, Elvira Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are occupying
parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon
(collectively, the LGUs). These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and
demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the
implementation and construction of infrastructure projects2 in the areas illegally
occupied by the petitioners.

Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any
court order when: (1) persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and (2) persons or entities
occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are
about to be implemented.

On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, et al. (the public respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or
demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and
(b) of RA 7279.

The petitioners justify their direct recourse before this Court by generally averring
that they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

ISSUE:  Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts

RULING: Yes, The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts

when they directly filed the petition before the Court.

The petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly
to the Court with their petition for prohibition and mandamus. The petitioners
appear to have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort, not a
court of first instance. The hierarchy of courts should serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions. The concurrence of
jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction does not give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of
choice of forum.  By directly filing Rule 65 petitions before us, the petitioners have
unduly taxed the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to matters
within our exclusive jurisdiction. Worse, the petitioners only contributed to the
overcrowding of the Court’s docket. We also wish to emphasize that the trial court
is better equipped to resolve cases of this nature since this Court is not a trier of
facts and does not normally undertake an examination of the contending parties’
evidence.

Petition dismissed.

ii. Operative Fact Doctrine

• Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Orthodox view
– it is inoperative, as if it had not been passed at all;

Modern view –
- Court may refuse to recognize the law;
- But the actual existence of the statute, prior to such a determination of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences, which cannot
justly be ignored (otherwise it will result in inequity and injustice).

Operative Fact Doctrine:

Araullo vs. Aquino, GR 209287, July 1, 2014

In a Decision dated July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court partially granted the consolidated petitions
for certiorari and prohibition and declared the following acts and practices under the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular No. 541 and related
executive issuances unconstitutional for violating Section 25(5), Article  VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the
declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings
prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings
contained in the General Appropriations Acts;

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of
other offices outside the Executive; and

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation
in the General Appropriations Acts.
The Court further declared void the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a
certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue
targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations
Acts (GAAs).

Remedial law; Certiorari and prohibition. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are

necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued
to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.
Remedial law; Locus standi. Citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, the Supreme Court ruled
that the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or
unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner
represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by
the action complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in
his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public
right. The Court likewise cited Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., to
explain that “[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits
are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
public interest.”
Transcendental importance as a ground to waive locus standi. Each of the petitioners
has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus
standi on each of them. In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of
the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether appropriated
by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire
Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the determination of such important issues call for
the Court’s exercise of its broad and wise discretion “to waive the requirement and so remove
the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.”
Administrative law; Budget process; Implementation and funding of the Disbursement Allocation
Program (DAP). Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget
Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability.

The DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring “savings” coming from the various
departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing
unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the “savings”
and unprogrammed funds to augment existing [program, activity or project] or to support
other priority PAPs.

Administrative law; Nature of the DAP.  The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to
stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during
the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws,
including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Constitutional law; The DAP  is not an appropriation measure and does not contravene Section 29(1),
Article VI.  The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s
economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the
savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to
the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public
treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power
vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law].
Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI.  The transfer of
appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the Constitution], must be
made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer
funds within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from
the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to
augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for
which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds
had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation
prevents the Executive from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the purse.

Savings, defined.  The definition of “savings” under the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs refer to
portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or
encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance
or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized;
(ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs
pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations
balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and
efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets.

The Court agreed with petitioners that respondents were forcing the generation of savings in
order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending. Respondents, by withdrawing
unobligated allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs
with existing appropriations under the GAAs.

The mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code is to revert to the
General Fund balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal
year. The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations
and unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.
Augmentation is valid only when funding is deficient. The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a
condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be
deficient, to wit: – x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or
project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of
needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program,
activity, or project, be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of
appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.
The President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress.  The Court held that the “savings”
pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in
the pertinent GAAs. Although the [Office of the Solicitor General] rightly contends that the
Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws
(which included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that
allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to
remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the
GAAs was but a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth
resided in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the
Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers.
Cross-border transfers or augmentations are prohibited.  By providing that the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to
augment any item in the GAA “for their respective offices,” Section 25(5) has delineated borders
between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing
over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we
call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text
of Section 25(5) disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers,
whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited under Section 25(5).

No violation of equal protection.  Petitioners claim that the Executive discriminated against some
legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant
a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any
law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these
cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in
the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected
legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal
protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was
not met here.
Operative fact doctrine. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it
nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects.  It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be
subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an
unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play.
It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.
The operative fact doctrine applies to the implementation of the DAP.  To declare the
implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation
constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds
of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to
apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients
could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the
DAP. That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates
such burden.

- Beneficiaries cannot be asked to return what they received;

- But the doctrine cannot be applied to the authors, implementors and proponents
of DAP, if it should be found in the appropriate tribunals that they did not act in
good faith;

iii. Political Question Doctrine

B. Judicial Independence and Autonomy
- Constitutional safeguards to insure the independence of the Judiciary
i. The SC is a constitutional body, it may not be abolished by the legislature;
ii. The members of the SC are removable only by impeachment (take note of
another way – quo warranto proceedings, Republic vs. Sereno, GR 237428, May 11,
2018
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act
or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions,
even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the
subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to
2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international
arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on
Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record
on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of
her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
(SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth
SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The
Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the
existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief
Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among
which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and
“SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement
further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will
not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since
she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming
from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she
became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her
government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC
should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite
this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012,
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno,
alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of
Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said
that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs
of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were
not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs,
failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in
representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG,
invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in
relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition
for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s
appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yo
urlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing
actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of
Representatives.

Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to
question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of
committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office,
citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG
maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than
impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section
11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment
proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo
warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”)
or prescription does not operate against the government. The State has a continuous interest in
ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the
one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG
will have no other means by which to know the disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which
created a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate
complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and
contending that this is not a political question because such issue may be resolved through the
interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that
she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the
Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because
OSG failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains
unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified
Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot
be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are
special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or
criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v.
Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for
Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be
removed only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of
removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that
will prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of
government. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies
the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that
the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case
because the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than
impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court
the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and
the Vice-President. There is no such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the
rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such
would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised
disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher
in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon
the SC disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated
by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a
petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not
from the “discovery” of the disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs
because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was
regular. OSG failed to overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO
that she had been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a
political question which can only be decided by the JBC and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot
give rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give
an inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she
possessed the integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or
not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a
constitutional requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors
likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable
while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere
subjective considerations.

ISSUES:
Preliminary issues:
1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention
2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five
Justices
Main Issues:
3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition
for quo warranto.
4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the
fact that an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is
impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle
of separation of powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a
political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position
of Chief Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as
mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed
properly and promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs
to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether
the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such
ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.

HELD:
Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a
right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a
matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first
requirement on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should
result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and
uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’
intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the
articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken
away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material,
direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo
warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private
individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of
governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to
inhibit in the case.
It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a
manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the
right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be
wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with
the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with clear
and convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment proceedings were
armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify
only on matters within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not
enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or
conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma
of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on distortions
of the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn
witnesses in the proceedings before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in
entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds
of mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are
beholden to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the
Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met
consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be
received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates
without fear or favor. The best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the
magistrate sought to be disqualified. [yo
urlawyersays]
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC
has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs,
including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs
is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to
SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the
petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is
empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal
of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a
clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo
warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies.
This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any
other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court
through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the

eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined
rules while impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust.
In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the
legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only
directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong
and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo
warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at
hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is

not forum shopping and is allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the
controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno
legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first
place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable
offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto
proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office
and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed
impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be
adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover,
impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of
the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to
impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot
legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House
is not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The
impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the
Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process
before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may be
reasonably charged with a crime.
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed
or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal
of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and
cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision
for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other
methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be
criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are
required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be
charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public
officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for
the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility
of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If
other causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To
subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial
review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the
Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment
proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined
to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or
she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.
Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo
warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who
would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative
of the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and
decided by the Senate. Again, the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be
emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment
offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The
Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress
from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its
constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear
out the conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position
immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To
abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of perceived availability of another
remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically
intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to
momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the
possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing
laws and case law.
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that
the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if
it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot
be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes
an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.
The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the
petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has
been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant
case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the
government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the
qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed
by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to
believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by
proof must commence such action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or
penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is
no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for
the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a
defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action
for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of
limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an
unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary.
Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only
upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid
on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was
therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that
the JBC complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means
“overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their
duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions
beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the
JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither
absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to
place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective
powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the
same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements.
Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place
the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred from
resolving. [yourlawyersays]
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]
With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person
of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if
not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise
imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the
Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court
must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement
.
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration
under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019
and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of
unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a
clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the
SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with
such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal
liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that  non-compliance with this requirement
is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to
hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to
perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in
her dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a
burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits.
They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto,
and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the
performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not
merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect
Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum
prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by
the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the
Constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno
could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by
presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such
evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied,
because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the branch of the
court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the
repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the records
of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository
agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by
direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of
the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for
calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to
conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from
UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her
burden of evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when
it is filed by the State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing
her SALN because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that
Sereno did not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government
worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [y
ourlawyersays]
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the
period when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the
President or the Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of
SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The
ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came about only on 2006 from
the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty
of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time.
Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited
only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the
shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement.
Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor
supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset.
Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it
does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body.
Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not
estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises
where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance
founded upon an innocent mistake
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in
violation of the Constitutional and statutory requirements    .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if
the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The
suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN
only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which
were the years when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later
on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious
increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first five months as Associate
Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act
of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The
Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose
SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination
pursuant to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less
been considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that
Sereno was singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece
of SALN for her years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN
requirement, but still required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only
Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of
complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why she should no longer be required
to file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service
only in 2009, thus her government service is not continuous; that her government records are
more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic
and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3
SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s
part to comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs
during the course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the
concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of
the Supreme Court.
 [yourlawyersays]
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs
but there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of
which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must
observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties
with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons,
the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.
Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false
representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was
counsel for the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her
compliance with SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully
declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land
Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public
bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La
Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s
internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute
cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of
survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses
of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen,
now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security
against the latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years
means that her integrity was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the
position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero
proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid
what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that
the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or
propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the
confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that she failed to
submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries indicated in
the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by
her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of
appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing
requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s
finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief
Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample
jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial
notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto
proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment determining the respective rights
in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an
office constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination
process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While
the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such
discretion is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all
other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to
attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de
facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position
of Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never
attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is
proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY
HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and
Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.
Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not
be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial
Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

iii. The SC may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate
jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice and
concurrence;

iv. The SC has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel;

v. The SC has the exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts;

• Take note: while the power to appoint belongs to the President, the
power to remove belongs to the SC

vi. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure;

vii. The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions;
 viii. Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy;

ix. The SC alone, may initiate and promulgate the Rules of Court (SC’s exclusive
rule-making authority, Estipona vs. Lobrigo, GR 226679, Aug. 15, 2017;

FACTS: Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the

constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this
Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No.
13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs).

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs)
with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal
quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the
three equal branches of the government.

In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the
denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to
be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea
bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that
it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the
intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with
the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is
left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion.

ISSUE: Is Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes, Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for

being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the 1987

Constitution. Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the
exclusive domain of the Supreme Court and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.

The trias politica principle prevents Congress from promulgating rules

regarding pleading, practice and procedure. The separation of powers among the
three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact
laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of
the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority
to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to

issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive
rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. "Substantive
law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts
are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."
It is towards the aim of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a
way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is
considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate"
component of the administration of justice.

Plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." There
is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement
is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.
Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of
the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party,
the prosecution, and the court.

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed
by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that
is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor
has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow
the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in
mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed
to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the
accused.

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-
trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
thereof. "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or
after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.
The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing
change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the
evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or
against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of
plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. The ruling on
the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent
any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the
defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.

x. The SC alone, may order temporary details of judges; xi. The SC can appoint
all officials and employees of the Judiciary;
C. Appointments to the Judiciary
Qualifications of the Members of the Judiciary – of proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence; Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR 213181, Aug. 19, 2014;

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said
vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic
was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ
Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s
integrity is in question.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which

characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious.  Jardeleza answered that he would defend
himself provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied and he
was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the
JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with
grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number
of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC
proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.

RULING: Yes.  While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not
automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. 
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self
is availing. 
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of
due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This
holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its
adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its
discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is
afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the
situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious
assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply
the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the
same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness
because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included
in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice
Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of
procedure and the basic tenets of due process.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the
fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.

De Castro vs. JBC, GR 191002, March 17, 2010;

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes”
and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated
the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done
only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done
only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer
only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the
rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.
that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have
easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section
4 (1) thereof.

i. Supreme Court – Natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of

age, for 15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of
law in the Philippines;

ii. Lower Collegiate Courts – Natural born citizen of the Philippines, member of
the Philippine Bar, but Congress may prescribe other qualifications;

iii. Lower courts – Citizen of the Philippines, member of the Philippine Bar, but
Congress may prescribe other qualifications;

Judicial and Bar Council

i. Composition
Ex-officio members:
- Chief Justice as Chairman
- Secretary of Justice
- A representative of Congress; Chavez vs. JBC, GR 202242, July
17, 2012
Facts: 

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the
crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory
that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term
of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,”
it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.
Issue:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been met in this case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

Held: 

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an
act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to
sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true
that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say
that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and
question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the
JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land.
A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the
Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the
positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for
a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2.  Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that
the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a
JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its
composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative
from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of
Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of
the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one
(1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words
of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
“Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House
of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into
half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is
reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise
mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to
expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume
that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
“Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded
because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended
a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually
adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in
the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable
when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration
of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)

Regular members
- A representative of IBP
- A professor of law
- A retired Justice of the SC o A representative of the private sector

ii. Powers
• Principal function of recommending appointments to the Judiciary. May
exercise such other functions and duties as the SC may assign to it.

The Supreme Court

i. Composition
– a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices

ii. Powers and Functions

• Original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.

• Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or

the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
- All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
- All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
- All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
- All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
- All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

 Temporary assignment of judges of lower courts to other stations as public

interest may require, but the assignment shall not exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned;
 Order change of venue or place of trail, to avoid miscarriage of justice;
 Rule Making Power. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged;

Razon vs. Tagitis, GR 182498, Dec. 3, 2009

Syllabus: 

We review in this petition for review on certiorari the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.  This CA decision confirmed the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the
petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that
this is an "enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as
used in the Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr.
Morced Tagitis.

Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief,
Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should
order his men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP,
(b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR.
SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response,
to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts,
not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend
the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a
monthly report of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this
Court to monitor the action of respondents.

This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO,
Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-
Terror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate
and distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of
command and budget.

This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo – a protective remedy against violations
or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy,
the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt
nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at
least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance.

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.

Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed
to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified
by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his liberty and security are restored.
FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last
seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in
Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket
for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand,
Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at
around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for
Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of
Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim

studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the
Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what
he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.

More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The
petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army;
Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief,
Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police
Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and
Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.

Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land
Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their
friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of
her efforts did not produce any positive results except the information from persons in the
military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed
men. According to reliable information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the
different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.

She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo,
seeking their help to find her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her
husband was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is
a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police assistance in locating her
missing husband.

Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters namely
Police Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the
National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City but her efforts produced no positive
results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for financial help
from friends and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his captors, their
intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.

On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the
case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return
within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.

In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of
the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were
baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. In addition, they
all claimed that they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to
investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons responsible for his
disappearance.

THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision  confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was
an "enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried
"great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent
and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in
the abduction of Tagitis.

The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police
theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous
brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money
entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain
that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory
that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the
respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim
faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to
marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by
the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance, since the respondent, the police
and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for
payment of ransom – the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.

Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his
family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task
Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and
security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At
the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt.
Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not
the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the
motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

RULING:

The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.

Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any

other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law."  Under this
definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:

(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.

There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct
evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing
his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed
conclusion, however, from all concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police
authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen
again.

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in
terms of the portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed
in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well
as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;(e) The
actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.

The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading,
the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details.76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of
the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the
petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or
who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision
that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token
gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details
available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing
a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.
The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated
component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the
State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or
security – are present.

The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’
disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the
State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as
the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in
its statement of a cause of action.

If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit,
as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the
proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule
incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be
used as the affiant’s direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an
absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed.
Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by
submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the
sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to
attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs.
Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008
to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition
cannot be faulted.

The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in
Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.  The Third
Reich’s Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories
"endangering German security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where they
disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy
prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted
persons.

In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, and
855 cases were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number,
595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President
Corazon C. Aquino’s term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612
cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were
found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V.
Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former President
Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental
organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193
victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration.
The Commission on Human Rights’ records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced
disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive,
62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined status.Currently, the United Nations
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance reports 619 outstanding cases of
enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30,
2008.

Under Philippine Law

The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof."We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of
the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of
the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of
enforced disappearance:

Justice Puno stated that, “as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component
criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now
penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. ”

Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very
meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and
thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of
constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference – even if
only procedurally – in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have
had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.

The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation
are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are
less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so
that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these
senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly
terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the
complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the
disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper
case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (in Paris, France on February 6, 2007,  "enforced disappearance" is considered
to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law.

In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque
III, we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such
as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. 

The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
"guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional
guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.

Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the

government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in
a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.

Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance

The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties
form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter. These
difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party whose involvement is alleged –
investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the
evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.

First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. In
addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually
afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives.

Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct

possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance

Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the
enforced disappearance ever occurred. "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced
disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the
application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s human rights.

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to
the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. 

We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all
novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an exception to the
hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child
describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by
the adverse party.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY

Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded
moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The
consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this
conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of
concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance?
Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of
Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the circumstances of the disappearance?
From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already
establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the
prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, evidence at hand and the
developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government
complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and
haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection
of the law – a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.

Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were
remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral.'

To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate
proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and
actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to
conduct. 

Estipona vs. Lobrigo, GR 226679, Aug. 15, 2017;

TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal protection

clause

PONENTE: Peralta
 FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the
same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and
the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all
violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon

the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of
the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches
of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.  The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of
the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court
(Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman

in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
 provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as
provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from
Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the
National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep.
of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS,
BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by
Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme
Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it
contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of
the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority
to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt
any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a

qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the
prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive
or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates

substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on
plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of
the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly
desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.  The
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions
to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea

bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed
by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial.  Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that
is necessarily included in the offense charged.  The reason for this is that the prosecutor
has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of
discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing
or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.
The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing
change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the
evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of
the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand,
the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.

• Power of Appointment. The SC appoints all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law;

• Power of Administrative Supervision. The SC shall have administrative supervision

over all courts and the personnel thereof;

• Annual Report. The SC to submit, within 30 days from the opening of each regular
session of Congress, to the President and to Congress an annual report on the
operations and activities of the Judiciary