MANANTAN vs CA
Manantan was in a state of
GR no. 107125 January 29,2001
FACTS:
On the 25th day of September 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio
invited Ruben Nicholas to catch shrimps at his farm and ordered
him to borrow the Ford Fiera of Manantan. When Ruben went to
Manantan, the latter wanted to come along. Ambrocio and
Ruben Nicolas went to Manantan Technical School and they
drank beer. Thereafter, they went to the farm and consumed
one case of beer. At 12 noon, they went home. After two to
three hours, Tabangin, Nicholas and Manantan went to
Ambrocio with a duck and consumed another case of beer. At
about 8:30, Manantan invited them to go bowling and while
they were waiting for a vacant alley, they again drank beer.
Thereafter, they went to LBC Night Club and after 1 hour they
left to eat arrozcaldo. As they went home that was the time
when they figured into an accident, causing the life of Nicholas.
The petitioner Manantan was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of
Isabela with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The
provincial fiscal filed this information on June 1, 1983 within the
Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The accused was the driver and
person-in-charge of an automobile with the Plate No. NGA-816.
Manantan willfully and recklessly drove the vehicle in a negligent
manner which ended up sideswiping a passenger jeepney.
Which caused the Jeepney to turn turtle twice that ultimately
ended with the death of Ruben Nicolas, a passenger of the
jeepney. On a decision dated June 30, 1938 which was later
promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court reached a
decision in favor of Manantan. With the subsequent turn of
events the private respondent spouses Nicolas filed their notice
of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court’s judgment. The
spouses Nicolas prayed that the decision appealed from be
modified and that the appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and
damages. The court reached a decision wherein the Court of
Appeals decided in favor of the private respondents. With
regards to the civil liability the court a quo stated that during the
time that the accident occurred.
heavily inebriated after consuming at least twelve bottles of
beer between 9 a.m. to 11 p.m. The petitioner opted for
reconsideration but the appellate court denied it vehemently.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused also
extinguished his civil liability.
RULING:
No, it is quite evident that the law recognizes two
different kinds of acquittal, with entirely different effects
regarding the civil liability of the accused. First and foremost, the
grounds pertaining to the acquittal of the accused is not the
main reason for the act or omission complained of as a felony. In
this particular instance this relinquish the civil liability for a
person who has been found not to be the perpetrator of any act
or omission shall not be and should never be held liable for such
an act or omission. This surmise that there is no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is entirely out of the question and therefore
the civil action if there is any. Which will be instituted should be
based on the grounds other the delict that was complained of.
The secondary instance is an acquittal that was based
on reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused has not
been duly established. In this case at hand the acquittal was
primarily based on reasonable doubt. It was clearly stated that
the accused was recklessly imprudent or negligent. Which
evidently prompted the court to acquit him on the main
contention of a reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not
extinguished in a criminal case if the accused is acquitted on
reasonable doubt. The decision of the Court of Appeals states
that the defendant is civilly liable for negligent and reckless of
driving his automobile which was the proximate cause of the
vehicular accident and to indemnify the plaintiff for a sum of
money due to the death of Ruben Nicolas.
NUGUID VS. NICADAO
G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006
Facts:
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the
crime of Violation of BP 22 in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal
complaints allege that respondent and her husband approached
petitioner and asked her if they could borrow money to settle
some obligations. Having been convinced by them and because
of the close relationship of respondent to petitioner, the latter
lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was
persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the total
amount reached P1,150,000.00.
As security for the P1,150,000.00, respondent gave petitioner
open dated checks with the assurance that if the entire amount
is not paid within one (1) year, petitioner can deposit the checks.
Subsequently, petitioner demanded payment of the sums
above-mentioned, but respondent refused to acknowledge the
indebtedness. Thereafter, petitioner deposited all
aforementioned checks in the bank totaling P1,150,000.00. The
checks were all returned for having been drawn against
insufficient funds.
A verbal and written demand was made upon respondent to pay
the amount represented by the bounced checks, but to no avail.
Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the
respondent. The trial court convicted the defendant. The CA
reversed the decision, thus acquitting Nicdao. Petitioner now
contends that the civil liability of the defendant was not
extinguished by the acquittal.
Issue:
Whether respondent remains civilly liable to petitioner despite
her acquittal.

Ruling:
No. From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual
character: (1) as an offense against the State because of the
disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the
private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime
of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein
no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because
there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private
person injured by the crime.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of
everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by
law.
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication
of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration
in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
The basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five
sources of obligations under the Civil Code. A person acquitted
of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free
because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution
(proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required
for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to
be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must
be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If the
acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may
still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not
commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts
proved did not constitute the offense charged.
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1)
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where
the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only
civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from
or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was
acquitted.
In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to
respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had
already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The
statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that
respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her,
had already been completely relieved of civil liability.
PEOPLE V. AGACER
G.R. No. 177751 January 7, 2013
Facts:
In preparation for the rice seedlings intended for the coming
planting season, Cesario Agacer was clearing and preparing the
soil bedding section of his farm. Genesis Delanter, his brother
Andy, Rafael, and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field
harvesting the palay that Cesario had raised. Suddenly,
Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, and Eric, all surnamed Agacer,
came out of the nearby banana plantation and went in the
direction of Cesario. The group of men then surrounded Cesario
and intimidated him. Cesario felt the hostilities and tried to get
away. But the accused started fire on Cesario’s harvest which
prompted Cesario to return for his burning crops. While Cesario
was trying to put the fire out, Florencio ordered to go near
Cesario. Eddie did what was told and pulled out a shotgun from
the rice sack that he was holding and shot Cesario on the left
portion of his chest. As Cesario fell, they fired then another shot
inflicting mortal wounds on Cesario. The gang of men then fled
the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed the guilt of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the brothers have is civil liability arising from the
final judgment of the Supreme Court of their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, civil action for damages was deemed instituted in the
criminal action. According to Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Also, Article 20 of the Civil Code states that every person
who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same. Further, Article
1161 of the Civil Code states that civil obligation arising from
criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws. The Court
ordered for the victims death resulting from the crime, the heirs
are entitled to the following awards: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages. Civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00 is mandatory and is granted without need of
evidence other than the commission of the crime. Moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00 shall be awarded despite the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the
victims heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional
pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. Also under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances, like treachery, as in this case. Thus,
the award of P30,000.00 for exemplary damages is in order. As
regards actual damages, the son of Cesario, Neldison, testified
that the sum of P40,000.00 was spent for the coffin of his father
but was unable to present receipts to substantiate such claim.
Where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses
cannot be ascertained due to the absence of receipts to prove
them, temperate damages in the sum of P25,000.00 may be
granted, as it is hereby granted, in lieu thereof. Under Article
2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as
it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered
pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.
Sonny Romero v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 167546 July 17, 2009
Facts:
Romero was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical
injuries with damage to property for the collision of the bus he
was driving and a taxi. MTC acquitted Romero since it could not
ascertain with moral certainty the wanton and reckless manner
by which Romero drove the bus. Romero was, however, held
civilly liable to the heirs of the victims of the collision. Romero
contended that his acquittal should have freed him from
payment of civil liability. MTC, RTC and CA dismissed his petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Romero can be held civilly liable even if he was
acquitted.
Held:
Yes, Romero can still be held civilly liable. Every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable. A civil action is instituted for
the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses. Acquittal of an accused of the
crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability,
unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Romero was
acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. However, his civil liability for the
death, injuries and damages arising from the collision due to his
negligence was established by preponderance of evidence.
G.R. No. 210148 December 8, 2014
ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, Petitioner, vs.
MARLA OLIVA, Respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated June 28, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated
November 22, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 125113 finding petitioner Antonio L. Daluraya
(Daluraya) civilly liable for the death of Marina Arabit Oliva
(Marina Oliva) despite having been acquitted for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information4 for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in connection with
the death5 of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the
afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the
street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172
and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon
City, ran her over.6 While Marina Oliva was rushed to the
hospital to receive medical attention,she eventually died,
prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla),
to file a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.7
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness
Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-witness to the incident, who
testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA
heading towards the island near the flyover and that the latter
was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number UPN-
172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla,
who testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a
result of her mother’s death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who
presented his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body
of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI
Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the incident
and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being
driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.8
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent
Motion to Dismiss (demurrer)9 asserting, inter alia, that he was
not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as
the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was
no clear and competent evidence of how the incident
transpired.10
The MeTC Ruling
In an Order11 dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC) granted Daluraya’s demurrer
and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It found
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting
in material details and that they failed to sufficiently establish
that Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon him.12
Deconstructing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
individually, the MeTC found that: (a) Marla merely testified on
the damages sustained by her family but she failed to identify
Daluraya as the driver of the vehicle that hit her mother; (b)
Serrano also did not identify
Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz merely
testified on the autopsy results; and (d) PSI Gomez, while he did
investigate the incident, likewise declared thathe did not witness
the same.13
Marla moved for reconsideration,14 which the MeTC denied in
an Order15 dated November 4, 2010, clarifying that the grant of
Daluraya’s demurrer had the effect of an acquittal and that
reconsideration of its Order granting Daluraya’s demurrer would
violate the latter’s right against double jeopardy.16 With respect
to the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the
same, holding that no civil liability can be awarded absent any
evidence proving that Daluraya was the person responsible for
Marina Oliva’s demise.17
Aggrieved, Marla appealed18 to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 76 (RTC), insisting that the MeTC failed to
make any finding as to the civil liability of Daluraya,19 which
finding was not precluded by the dismissal of the criminal aspect
of the case.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision20 dated September 8, 2011, the RTC dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the MeTC’s ruling,declaring that "the act
from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all
exist."21
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration22 which, although filed
beyond the reglementary period, was nonetheless accepted.
However, the RTC found the same without merit and thus,
sustained the factual findings and rulings of the MeTC in its
Order23 dated May 10, 2012. Dissatisfied, Marla elevated the
case to the CA via petition for review, maintaining that Daluraya
must be held civilly liable.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated June 28, 2013, the CA granted the petition
and reversed the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla
the amounts of ₱152,547.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.25 In so
ruling, the CA held that the MeTC’s Order showed that
Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such,
Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability.26
Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces of evidence to
support its finding that Daluraya must be held civilly liable: (a)
the inadmissible sworn statement executed by Daluraya where
he admitted that he drove the subject vehicle which hit Marina
Oliva; (b) the conclusion derived from Serrano’s testimony that
the woman he saw crossing the street who was hit by a Nissan
Vanette with plate number UPN-172, and the victim who
eventually died, are one and the same; (c) the Philippine
National Police Referral Letter of one Police Chief Inspector
Virgilio Pereda identifying Daluraya as the suspectin the case of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the death
of Marina Oliva, and stating that he brought the victim to the
Quezon City General Hospital for treatment but was declared
dead on arrival; and (d) the subject vehicle was registered in the
name of Daluraya’s aunt, Gloria Zilmar,27 who authorized him to
claim the vehicle from the MeTC.28
Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration,29 which the CA
denied in a Resolution30 dated November 22, 2013,hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Court’s resolution is whether or
not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for
Marina Oliva’s death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not
necessarily extinguish his civil liability.31 In Manantan v. CA,32
the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by
our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the
accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects
on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the
ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a
person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act
or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of
the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of.
This is the situation contemplated inRule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.33
In Dayap v. Sendiong,34 the Court explained further:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case.1âwphi1
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is
only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. However, the civil action based on delictmay be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the
court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence,
he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence
for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an
order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial
for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way
of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the
civil aspect of the case.35
(Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the
judgment state "whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist."36
A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s Order, which the RTC
sustained, will show that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the
conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able
to establish that he was the author of the crime imputed against
him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC
declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish
that the accused precisely committed the crime charged against
him."37 Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the
MeTC’s Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and
firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to establish
that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which
bumped Marina Oliva"38 and that "there is no competent
evidence on hand which proves that the accused was the person
responsible for the death of Marina Oliva."39
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the
MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya’s acquittal was
anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for
a remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of
Daluraya’s evidence on the civil aspect.1âwphi1 Records disclose
that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in
view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish
that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him.
Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as non-existent
by the nature of such acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June
28, 2013 and the Resolution dated November 22, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated September 8,2011 and the Whether or not the Court erred in deciding a question of
Order dated May 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon substance in a manner not in accordance with law
City, Branch 76 are REINSTATED.
HELD:
The Court agrees with Go's contention that, as alleged in the
Information filed against him, which is deemed hypothetically
People of the Philippines vs. Go
admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he conspired with
Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
G.R. 168539 March 25, 2014
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal
liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other
FACTS:
co-conspirators.
The Information filed against Henry T. Go in Agan, Jr. v.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the
policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of
various contracts awarded by the Government, through the
public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
or corrupt practices," would be frustrated if the death of a public
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction,
officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who
operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International
conspired with such public officer in violating the AntiGraft Law.
Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L.
Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. CALANG vs PEOPLE
Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the
G.R. No. 190696 August 3, 2010
Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Facts:
Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
Rolito Calang was driving Philtranco Bus along Daang Maharlika
disadvantageous to the government.
Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita, Samar when its
rear left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
from the opposite direction. As a result of the collision,
for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, Go for
Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeepney driver, lost control of the
violation of Section 3(g) ofR.A. 3019. While there was likewise a
vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who
finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no
was standing along the highway shoulder. The jeep turned turtle
longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the
three (3) times before finally stopping at about 25 meters from
resolution finding probable cause.
the point of impact. Two of the jeeps passengers, Armando
ISSUE: Nablo and an unidentified woman, were instantly killed, while
the other passengers sustained serious physical injuries
Calang was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, multiple physical
injuries, and damage to property. Further, the RTC ordered
Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay P50,000.00 as
death indemnity to the heirs of Armando; P50,000.00 as death
indemnity to the heirs of Mabansag; and P90,083.93 as actual
damages to the private complainants.
Issue:
Whether or not Philtranco be held liable jointly and severally
with Calang.
Ruling:
No, Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause
of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and
the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable
with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain
to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an
employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply
to civil liability arising from delict.
Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. represented by Rafael A.
Poblador Vs. Rosario L. Manzano
G.R. No. 192391 June 19, 2017
FACTS:
On May 1996 Elsa A. Poblador was authorized by the Probate
court as the administratrix of certain properties of petitioner
including his shares in Wack-Wack golf course. Elsa instructed
Rafael, heir of Honorio Poblador to look for potential buyers.
Rafael engaged the services of Rosario Manzano, a broker of
Metroland Holdings Incorporated. The property was sold to
Metroland Holdings for the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 which it
paid ₱15,200,000.00 through a check and the balance of
₱2,800,000.00 was allegedly given to Manzano for the payment
of the taxes.
On October 1996 the sale of the shares were annulled by the
Probate Court. Thus, Elsa returned to Moreland the
₱15,200,000.00 and asked the BIR for a refund of the paid taxes.
Meanwhile, Rafael, through an accountant allegedly requested
Manzano for an accounting of the ₱2,800,000.00 she received
on behalf of petitioner. In response, Manzano faxed documents
requested by petitioner but when examined, there was a
discrepancy in said documents as it was found that the amount
paid was only ₱80,000.00 instead of ₱1,480,000.00. This led to
the filing, on December 8, 1999, of an Information for the crime
of estafa against Manzano.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manzano is guilty of Estafa.
HELD:
No, Manzano is not guilty of Estafa.
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable
of pecuniary estimation through estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. In general, the elements of estafa are: (1)
That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence,
or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) That damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party
or third person.
In the case at hand, prosecution failed to establish that fraud or
bad faith was present. Petitioner failed to show that Manzano
personally received the ₱2,800,000.00 from petitioner with the
duty to hold it in trust for or to make delivery to the latter. In
fact, Rafael admitted that he did not even know who actually
paid the taxes to the BIR, and that Manzano's name did not
appear in the documents pertaining to the payment of the
capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.
CIVIL ACTION BASED ON SOURCES OF OBLIGATION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102207       September 2, 1994
Facts: Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on
February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest.
The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the
death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability
(supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs
Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the
accused claimed that in the Supreme Court’s decision in People
vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before the final judgement is rendered.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.
Held:
The Court decided on this case through stating the
cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court
said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the
accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan
further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will
be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil
liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court
stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that
the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same
can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than
delict.
In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8,
1977 where it states that civil liability will only survive if death
came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan.
However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could not possibly lend
support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is
on appeal. The Court also gave a summary on which cases
should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his
criminal and civil liability based solely on the act complained of.
CANCIO vs. ISIP
G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002
Facts:
The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of
violation of B.P. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law and
3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to
it being deposited before 90 days from the date written on the
check. The other two cases of B.P. 22 were filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then
dismissed due to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the
crime.
Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga. After failing to present its second
witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The
prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil action from
the said criminal cases. The court granted the reservation. The
criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice to
the civil action. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the
instant case for the collection of the sum of money, seeking to
recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases.
Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of
Res Judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action
regardless of the dismissal of the criminal case of estafa.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The
reservation for civil action was made by the prosecution on time.
According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the
criminal case unless there is a reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action.
In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa
contractual. The cause of action was the breach of the
respondent‘s breach of the contractual obligation. Evidently, the
petitioner was seeking to make good the value written on the
checks in exchange for cash. The case was not anchored the
criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa
contractual. As such, it is distinct and independent from the
estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed
regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.
HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., AND ANGELES
CUEVAS
GR No. 108395 March 7, 1997
Facts:
An unfortunate vehicular accident transpired on November 7,
1987 along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico,
Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer
who was heading north at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per
hour and was driven by Teodoro Guaring Jr., aPhilippine Rabbit
Bus No. 415 driven by Angeles Cuevas who was following the
Lancer, and a Toyota Cressida who was cruising on the opposite
lane. Teodoro Guaring Jr. died from this incident.
Due to this, the petitioners filed an action for damages, based on
quasi-delict, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Based on
the evidences presented by the petitioners, it showed that the
Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guaring’s car. In doing so, it hit the
right rear portion of Guaring which led to its collision with the
Toyota Cressida coming from the opposite direction. The private
respondents, on the other hand, claimed that it was Guaring
who tried to overtake. As he was attempting to do it, he
encroached on the the south-bound lane and collided with the
oncoming Cressida. The result of this collision was that the
Lancer was thrown back to its lane where it crashed into the
Rabbit Bus.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment favouring the
petitioners. The private respondents were ordered to pay
damages to the heirs of the deceased. However, the driver was
acquitted of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property and double homicide. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the decision. It contends that since the basis of
petitioners’ action was the alleged negligence of the bus driver,
the latters acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case
based on quasi-delict untenable.
Issue:
Whether or not the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case
would extinguish the civil liability of the private respondents for
the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr.
Ruling:
It would not. The filing of civil case for damages by the
petitioners was not barred since their cause of action was based
on quasi-delict, as cited by the court in their ruling in the Tayag
v. Alcantara case. Also, even if the cause of action was based on
delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of
damages since he was only acquitted on reasonable doubt.

CIVIL ACTION IN DEFAMATION, FRAUD AND
PHYSICAL INJURIES
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES
(PHIL.), vs.  ARGOS
G.R. No. 130362 September 10, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc.,
hereafter IFFI, is a corporation organized and existing under
Philippine laws. Respondents Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda
are the general manager and commercial director, respectively,
of the Fragrances Division of IFFI. The office of managing director
was created to head the corporations operation in the
Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed
managing director. Consequently the general managers reported
directly to Costa.
Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the
positions of the general managers became redundant,
respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They
signed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.  Costa issued a
Personnel Announcement which described respondents brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability
as persona non grata and urged employees not to have further before the conviction of its employee is premature.
dealings with them.
The respondents tried to rely on Art. 33 to hold IFFI
Respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in primarily liable for its employees defamatory statements. But we
the filing of two Information against Costa and subsequently, also find that respondents did not raise the claim of primary
filed a civil case for damages filed, against Costa and IFFI, in its liability as a cause of action in its complaint before the trial
subsidiary capacity as employer. Herein petitioner IFFI moved to court. On the contrary, they sought to enforce the
dismiss the complaint. alleged subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer of Costa,
the accused in pending criminal cases for libel, prematurely.
The Regional Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss Civil
Case for respondents’ failure to reserve its right to institute a
separate civil action. Respondents filed a motion for
JESUS B. RUIZ vs. ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF
reconsideration, which the trial court granted.
APPEALS
IFFI filed a motion to reconsider said order. This was
denied. Hence, IFFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45404 August 7, 1987
reiterating the same grounds for the dismissal of the civil
complaint. The appellate court dismissed the petition.  Hence, a Facts:
petition for review was filed before the Supreme court.
AgustinaTagaca, a laundry woman to the appellant, filed an
Issue: administrative case against EncarnacionUcol, a midwife in the
health center of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. It was later found out that
Whether or not the private respondents can sue petitioner
AgustinaTagaca was merely used by Atty. Ruiz since the latter
for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil
wanted to get revenge fromUcol. It all started when the husband
action during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against
of Encarnacion filed a case against Ruiz. The administrative case
petitioners employee.
filed by Tagaca was dismissed which prompted Atty. Ruiz to file
Ruling: his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol. The lower court
acquitted Ucol for her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in
doubt, but there was no pronouncement as to the civil liability of
cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
the accused. Subsequently, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
damages based on the same facts. Ucol responded to by filing a
injured party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the
motion to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed
criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of
and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the
evidence.  Article 33 contemplates an action against the
criminal case for libel. The said petition was granted on the
employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an
ground of res judicata.
action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil
liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the Issue:
employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged
Whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred
guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have
by the criminal case of libel.
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties.  Any action
Held:
The court ruled that the right of the plaintiff-appellant under
Article 33 of the New Civil Code, which gives an offended party
in cases of defamation the right to file a civil action separate and
distinct from the criminal proceedings whether or not a
reservation was made to that effect, is not without limitation.
The right of the plaintiff-appellant under the above provisions to
file the civil action for damages based on the same facts upon
which he instituted the libel case is not without limitation. The
court added that the suit was a harassment suit based on the
factual findings of the case. The findings in the criminal case
showed a pattern of harassment. The castigated the petitioner
by denying his petition and him that as a member of the bar he
should set an example in sobriety in trying to prevent false and
groundless suits.
CIVIL ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
COJUANGCO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119398 July2, 1999
Facts:
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) is a known businessman-
sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the
sweepstakes races covering March 6, 1986 to September 18,
1989. Cojuangco sent letters of demand to the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Fernando Carrascoso, Jr.
(Carrascoso) for the collection of the prizes due him. PCSO and
Carrascoso consistently replied that the demand prizes are being
withheld on advice of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) Commissioner, Ramon Diaz.
Cojuangco filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) regarding
the withheld prizes. Before receipt of the summons, PCGG
advised PCSO and Carrascoso that there are already no
objections to the remittance of the prize winnings. Carrascoso
immediately informed the legal counsel of Cojuangco regarding
the said order but the latter refused to accept the prizes since
the matter had already been brought to the RTC.
The RTC ruled that PCSO and Carrascoso had no authority to
withhold the subject racehorse winnings and that their acts
were made in bad faith. The RTC ordered the PCSO and
Carrascoso to pay solidarilyCojuangco’s claimed winnings plus
interest;in addition,Carrascosowas orderedto pay moral and
exemplary damages. While the case was pending with the Court
of Appeals (CA), Cojuangco moved for the partial execution of
the RTC judgment to which PCSO delivered the amount.
The CA dismissed the case and held that Carrascoso was merely
carrying out the instruction of the PCGG and that the following
actuations negated his bad faith: 1) he promptly replied to
Cojuangco’s demand for the release of the prizes, citing PCGG’s
instruction; 2) upon PCGG’s subsequent advice to release
Cojuangco’s winnings, Carrascoso immediately informed
Cojuangco; and 3) Carrascoso interposed no objection to the
partial execution pending the appeal. Hence, the petition before
the Supreme Court (Court).
Issues:
1) Whether or not Carrascosois liable for the payment of
damages and has acted in bad faith in withholding the
prize winnings of Cojuangco.
2) Whether or not Cojuangco was deprived of his rights
when the prize winnings were not released upon his
demand.
Ruling:
1)No, the Court believes that there is sufficient evidence to
support CA’s conclusion that Carrascoso did not act in bad faith
which would amount to payment of damages. There is no
denying that Cojuangco is a very close political and business
associate of the former President Marcos. Under those
equivocalities, Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further
instructions from the PCGG on what to do with the prize
winnings, and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently
given. It was the safest Carrascoso would do in order to protect
public interest, act within the powers of his position, and serve
the public demands then prevailing. It was the surest way to
avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of
office or an anti-graft case against him.
Thus, it cannot be said that Carrascoso, who relied upon the
PCGG’s instructions, acted with malice or bad faith. He is not
liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in
the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing
of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
2)Yes, Cojuangco’s right to the use of his property was unduly
impeded. While Carrrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG’s
instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis
thereof. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the
showing of a prima facie case and due regard of the
requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize
winnings of Cojuangco, without a properly issued sequestration
order, clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without
due process of law.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY -VS- CASTILLO
G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013
Facts:
Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprises (PLME), owned by
respondent spouses Pablito and Guia Castillo, is a business of
manufacturing and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel
cabinets and related metal fabrications.
Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi, Fully Phased Inspectors of
petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco), sought
permission to inspect PLME’s electric meter and was carried out
in the presence of the latter’s employee, Mike Malikay. Said
inspection made Ignacio conclude that the meter was tampered
with, and electric supply to PLME was immediately
disconnected.
PLME agreed to pay the differential bills in order to secure
reconnection of electricity. Meralco replaced the electric meter
which PLME alleged as the cause of significant increase in their
electric bills. Said meter was again replaced anew after it
sustained a crack during testing.
PLME then filed petitions against Meralco and prayed for the
issuance of a permanent injunction to enjoin from cutting their
power supply, refrain from charging them unrecorded electric
consumption, reimbursement of their overpayments, and the
reinstatement of their old meter which they believed accurately
records their electric consumption.
The trial court ruled against Meralco for its failure to observe
due process when it disconnected electricity of PLME and
ordered the reimbursement of overpayments and payment of
attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the decision, held that
Meralco abused its right when it disconnected the electricity and
ordered the payment of temperate damages instead of
reimbursing the overpayments.
Hence, Meralco filed this petition raising the issue of damages.
Issue:
Whether or not PLME is entitled to claim damages for Meralco’s
act of disconnecting their electricity.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article 32 of the Civil Code
provides for the award of moral damages in cases where the
rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of
property without due process of law, are violated. It also held in
Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company that the immediate
disconnection of electricity without notice constitutes a breach
of public policy and a form of deprivation of property without
due process of law, which entitles the subscriber aggrieved to
moral damages.
And considering the discovery of the tampered meter, Meralco
could have disconnected electricity to prevent fraud but was still
obliged to furnish PLME with a 48-hour notice of disconnection
pursuant to the Revised Terms and Conditions of Service vis-a-
vis Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21. Having failed in this
regard, the Court found basis for the award of moral and
exemplary damages in favor of PLME for the unceremonious
disconnection of electricity.
Moral damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury. Jurisprudence has established the
following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is
an injury whether physical, mental or psychological, which was
clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on
any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
In addition to moral damages, exemplary damages are imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good. In this case,
to serve as an example that before disconnection of electric
supply can be effected by a public utility, the requisites of law
must be complied with, hence, the Court sustained the award of
exemplary damages to PLME.
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the
injured party in the position where it was before the injury. They
pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and
susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation only
for such pecuniary loss as is duly proven. Basic is the rule that to
recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be
capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof
or the best evidence obtainable.
The Court did not award actual damages and held that actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty on which PLME
failed to adduce. The award is dependent upon competent proof
of the damage suffered and the actual amount thereof. The
award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the
personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy,
remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof.
Nonetheless, in the absence of competent proof on the amount
of actual damages suffered, a party is entitled to temperate
damages. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty. The amount thereof is usually
left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be
reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be
more than nominal but less than compensatory.
Lastly, the Court deleted the award of attorney’s fees for lack of
basis. An award of attorney’s fees has always been the exception
rather than the rule. Attorney’s fees are not awarded every time
a party prevails in a suit. The policy of the Court is that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. The trial court
must make express findings of fact and law that bring the suit
within the exception. What this demands is that factual, legal or
equitable justifications for the award must be set forth not only
in the fallo but also in the text of the decision, or else, the award
should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural. In
this case, the award of attorney’s fees in favor of PLME appeared
only in the fallo of the trial court’s decision; neither did the
appellate court proffer any justification for sustaining said
award.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court DENIED the petition filed by
Meralco and AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals.
QUASI-DELICT/TORTS
BARREDO V. GARCIA
GR NO. 48006
Facts:
On May 3, 1936 in the province of Rizal, a head-on collision
occurred between a taxi and a carretela. The taxi was operated
by Malate Taxicab and was driven by Pedro Fontanilla
(Fontanilla) while the carretela was guided by Pedro Dimapalis
(Dimapalis). One of the passengers of the carretela – 16-year-old
Faustino Garcia (Faustino) – suffered injuries which eventually
caused his death.
A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal. CFI granted the petition that a separate
civil action be reserved. The CA affirmed the decision. On March
7, 1939, the parents Faustino (Garcia) brought an action in the
CFI of Manila against Barredo – the sole proprietor of the Malate
Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla. CFIawarded damages in
favor of Garcia. The CA modified the decision by reducing the
amount of damages.
The CA found that Barredo was careless in employing Fontanilla
who had been caught violating the Automobile Law several
times. He must therefore indemnify Garcia under the provisions
of Article 1903 of the Civil Code providing for the obligation
arising from the negligence of employers in the selection of their
employees.
Barredo maintains that Fontanilla's negligence is punishable by
the Revised Penal Code, hence, his liability as an employer is
only subsidiary. However, Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil
action and his property has not been exhausted.
Issue:
Whether or not Barredo is subsidiary liable.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held Barredo primarily liable under Article
1903. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He
reserved his right to file a separate civil action. It was also
proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because
it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions
already before he hired him. Had Garcia not reserved his right to
file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been
subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for
damages arising from a criminal act (his employee’s negligence)
but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee.
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC. vs. TANGCO
G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006
FACTS:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50p.m., Evangeline Tangco
(Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon
City, to renew her time deposit as per advise of the bank's
cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly
licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo,
who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm
from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping.
Suddenly,Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun
hitting her int the abdomen instatantly causing her death.
Evangelines's husband, LauroTangco, together with his 6 minor
children filed with the RTC of QC a criminal case against Pajarillo,
where they likewise reserved their right to file a separate civil
action on the said criminal case. Pajarillo was subsequently
convicted of homicide in January 19, 2000 by the RTC and the CA
upheld the decision with modification with modification on the
penalty on July 31, 2000. On January 14, 1998, respondents filed
with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages
against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against
Safeguard Security Agency Inc. for failing to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
committed by its security guard. Lauro et. al. Prayed for actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Petitioners
denied the allegations, that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family and that Pajarillo acted only in self-
defense. The RTC ruled that Pajarillo did not act in self-defense.
The RTC likewise found Safeguard to be jointly and severally
liable with Pajarillo since there was no sufficient evidence to
show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family by simply showing that it required its guards to attend
trainings and seminars which is not the supervision as
contemplated under the law. It includes the duty to see to it that
such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed, the appealed decision said that Safeguard
in only subsidiary liable. A motion for reconsideration was
subsequently filed and denied by the CA, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
Should Safeguard Security Agency be held solidarily liable for the
damages awarded to respondents in relation to Article 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines?
RULING:
Yes. Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held liable for the
damages awarded to the respondents. The nature of the
respondents' cause of action is determined in the complaint
itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. In the complaint, the
respondents are invoking their right to recover damages against
Safeguard for their indirect responsibility for the injury caused
by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article
2176. Thus, civil action filed by respondents was not derived
from the criminal liability of Pajarillo but one based on culpa
aquiliana or quasi delict which is separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from crime. As the employer of Pajarillo,
Safeguard Security Agency is primarily and solidarily liable for
the quasi-delictcommited by Pajarillo and is presumed to be
negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by
operation of law. The Court agrees with the RTC's finding that
Safeguard had exercised diligence in the selection of Pajarillo
since records show that he underwent psychological and
neuropsychiatric evaluation, pre-licensing training course for
security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances. However,
Safeguard Security Agency was not diligent in providing
trainings, classroom instructions and continuous evaluation f the
security guards's performance. Thus, the SC affirms with
modification that the civil liability of Safeguard Security Agency
Inc. is solidarily and primary under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973.
After 24 years of marriage and having four children, petitioner
filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour.
To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal
complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal
case on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the
nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under
psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.
Ruling:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid
two conflicting issues. Its requisites are 1) that a civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines
whether or not the criminal action will proceed. In the present
case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring
his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal
case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a final
judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no such
final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists forall
intents and purposes. Therefore he who cohabits with a woman
not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.
MERCED vs. DIEZ
G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960
Facts:
On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced filed a complaint for
annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. The
complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her
relatives forced, threatened and intimated him into signing an
affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living
together as husband and wife for over five years, which is not
true; that this affidavit was used by defendant in securing their
marriage of exceptional character, without the need for
marriage license; that he was again forced, threatened and
intimated by defendant and her relatives into entering the
marriage with her on August 21, 1957 before Municipal Judge
Medardo A. Conde; that immediately after the celebration of the
marriage plaintiff left defendant and never lived with her; that
the defendant wrote him on October 29, 1957, admitting that he
was forced into the marriage and asking him to go to Cebu to
have the marriage annulled, but he refused to go for fear he may
be forced into living with the defendant. Merced prays for
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages in the
amount of P2,000. On March 3, 1958, Elizabeth Ceasar filed her
answer to the complaint. In her answer, she denies the material
allegations of the complaint and avers as affirmative defenses
that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's previous
marriage to Eufrocina Tan. Elizabeth subsequently filed a
criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been previously
married to one Eufrocina Tan. Merced now files a petition for
the suspension of the criminal case on grounds of prejudicial
question.
Issue:
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a
prejudicial question in prosecution for bigamy.
Ruling:
The civil case presents a prejudicial question which must first be
resolved before the criminal case for elements of prejudicial
question is present: it is determinative of the case before the
court and jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal. In order that a person may be held liable for
the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage must have all the
essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. One of the essential elements
of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting
parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a
marriage would be illegal and void. Since the validity of the
second marriage is in question, subject of the action for bigamy,
cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution
for bigamy does not lie unless all the elements concur, it is
necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be
secured.
DONATO V. LUNA
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
Facts:
An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was
filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila.  This
was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. 
Before the petitioner’s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz
filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil
action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner
contracted on September 26, 1978.  Said civil case was based on
the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage
which was Donato’s second since she had no previous
knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain
Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978.  Donato defensed that his
second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain
petitioner's consent to the marriage.  Prior to the solemnization
of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years
proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26,
1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was
dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code.  Donato
continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left
their home upon learning that Donato already previously
married.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of bigamy.
Ruling:
The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not
determinative of petitioner’sguilt or innocence in the crime of
bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for annulment ofthe
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit was filed by PazAbayan, the second wife. He who
contracts a second marriage before a judicial declaration
ofnullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. The case for annulment ofmarriage can only be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accusedonly if it is proved that the petitioner‘s consent to
marriage was obtained through duress, violenceor intimidation.
Such is not the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of
prejudicialquestion to evade the prosecution of the criminal
case. Records reveal that prior to petitioner‘ssecond marriagehe
had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for
more than five years. He onlycame up with the story that his
consent to the marriage was secured through force, threat
andintimidation one year from the solemnization of the second
marriage.
Consing vs People
GR no. 161075 July 15, 2013
Facts:
Consing , together with his mother, Cecilia De la Cruz, obtained
loans from Unicapital in the amount of 18 million. This was
secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land. When the
two decided to sell the parcel of land subject to mortgage, it was
initially offered to Unicapital but the latter only bought half of
the property for P21,221,500.00, offsetting such amount to the
amount owed by the former. The other half was sold to Plus
Builders. However, when the two buyers were about to develop
the property, it came to their knowledge that the property was
registered to other persons, namely Willy Yu and Juan Tan Teng.
Discovering that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the
two buyers was spurious , they filed several cases against
Consing and his mother.
Consing, then, filed a civil case before the Pasig Trial
Court, asking for an injunctive relief. He alleges that he only acts
as an agent of his mother and was not privy to the transactions
entered into by the latter.
Unicapital filed criminal complaint for estafa for falsification of
public documents against Consing and De la Cruz before the
Prosecutor’s office. It also filed civil case to recover from the
latter the purchase price of the property, including damages
sustained by Unicapital from the transaction made to defraud
the former.
Issue:
Whether or not there exists a prejudicial question in the case.
Ruling:
There is no prejudicial question to speak of. Among the
requisites of prejudicial question, that the issue raised in the civil
action must be similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action and that the resolution of which would
determine whether the criminal action is proceed, both is not
satisfied. The issue raised in the pending criminal and civil cases
were of different facts. Also criminal complaint for estafa is
covered by Article 33 of the New Civil Code, that is, fraud. As
such, it can therefore be construed that an independent civil
action may proceed notwithstanding the pendency of the civil
case filed by Consing (Rule 111, Sec 3 of the Rules of Court).
Pimentel vs. Pimentel
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
Facts:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial
and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and
the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil
case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him
before the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before
the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals
ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to
the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had
already been committed.
Issue:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage
is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
Ruling:
No. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the
filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person
“who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse.” However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and
the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused
killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent
were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will
have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals that “the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date
of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned x xx.” First, the issue in
Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue
of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in
Tenebro that “[t]here is x xx a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in that
case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”
CITY OF PASIG V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999
Facts:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan
Village that they be separated from its mother Barangay
Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and
separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay
Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance
No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig
City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter
set for June 22, 1996. Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of
Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating Barangay Napico
in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15,
1997.Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the
Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the
respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the
COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In
both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of
the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. According
to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed
barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute
subject of said pending case. Hence, the scheduled plebiscites
should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall
have been finally decided by the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of
Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or
cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the
two local governments which is a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
Yes precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in
the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed
barangays would only be an exercise in futility. The Supreme
Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of
prejudicial questions and that the suspension or cancellation of
the plebiscite be granted. While it may be the general rule that a
prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and
does not come into play where both cases are civil, in the
interest of good order, the SC can very well suspend action on
one case pending the outcome of another case closely
interrelated to the first. A requisite for the creation of a
barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified
by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries
of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise
of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the
people’s welfare.
G.R. No. 203287
RENATO S.D. DOMINGO on his own behalf and on behalf of his
coheirs of the late SPOUSES FELICIDAD DE DOMINGO and
MACARIO C. DOMINGO, Petitioners vs.
SPOUSES ENGRACIA D. SINGSON and MANUEL F. SINGSON,
Respondents
Facts
The spouses Macario C. Domingo (Macario) and Felicidad S..D.
Domingo (Felicidad) (Spouses Domingo) ate the parents of
respondent Engracia D. Singson (Engracia) and petitioners
Renato S.D. Domingo (Renato) and his co-heirs whom he
represents herein, namely: Consolacion D. Romero
(Consolacion), Josefina D. Borja, and Rafael, Ramon, and Rosario,
all surnamed Domingo (collectively, the petitioners).5
During their lifetime, the Spouses Domingo owned a parcel of
land, situated in F. Sevilla Street, San Juan, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TC1) No. 32600 (23937)
845-R,6 and the house built thereon (subject property). Macario
died on February 22, 1981, while Fel.icidad died on September
14, 1997.7
It appears that on September 26, 2006, Engracia filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila a complaint8 for
ejectment/unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 9534,
against Consolacion, Rosario, Rafael, and Ramon. Engracia
claimed that she is the absolute owner of the subject property,
having bought the same from the Spouses Domingo as
evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale9 dated June 6, 2006. She
likewise averred that TCT No. 32600 (23937) 845-R was already
cancelled and TCT No. 1257510 covering the subject property
was already issued under her name. The petitioners only learned
of the supposed sale of the subject property when they received
the summons and a copy of Engracia's complaint in Civil Case
No. 9534.
Consequently, on July 31, 2006, the petitioners filed a
complaint11 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
which sought the nullity of the sale. They alleged that the
Absolute Deed of Sale dated June 6, 2006, upon which Engracia
bases her ownership of the subject property, was a nullity since
the signatures of their parents appearing thereon as the
supposed vendors were forged. 12 The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 70898 and was raffled to Branch 160 of the RTC.
Meanwhile, on February 28, 2007, Renato, Consolacion, and
Ramon filed a Joint Affidavit Complaint13 with the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City, claiming that Engracia
falsified the signatures of their parents in the Absolute Deed of
Sale and, thus, charging her with the crimes of falsification of
public document, estafa, and use of falsified documents.
Consequently, on May 6, 2008, the OCP filed an Information14
with the RTC, charging Spouses Engracia and Manuel Singson
(Spouses Singson) with the crime of estafa through falsification
of public documents. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 137867 and was raffled to Branch 264 of the RTC.
On July 11, 2008, the Spouses Singson filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings Due to Prejudicial Question15 with the RTC in
Criminal Case No. 137867. They alleged that the validity and
genuineness of the Absolute Deed of Sale, which is the subject of
Civil Case No. 70898 then still pending with the RTC Branch 160,
are determinative of their guilt of the crime charged. 16
Accordingly, they prayed that the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 137867 be suspended pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court. 17 The private prosecutor filed an opposition
to the motion, stating that Criminal Case No. 137867 can
proceed independently from Civil Case No. 70898 pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court.18
On February 12, 2010, the RTC Branch 264, issued an Order19 in
Criminal Case No. 137867, which granted the motion to suspend
the proceedings filed by the Spouses Singson. The private
prosecutor sought a reconsideration20 of the Order dated
February i2, 2010, but it was denied by the RTC in its Order21
dated June 7, 2011.
Unperturbed, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari22 with
the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 122054, claiming that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion when it directed the
suspension of the proceedings in · Criminal Case No. 137867 on
the ground of prejudicial question. They pointed out that the
bases of their respective claims in both Civil Case No. 70898 and
Criminal Case No. 137867 are the forged signatures of their
deceased parents.23 They claimed that where both a civil and
criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in court, the
criminal case takes precedence. 24
On August 31, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision25 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 122054, which denied the petition for certiorari. The CA
opined that all the elements of a prejudicial question under
sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are present;
hence, the RTC did not abuse its discretion when it directed the
suspension of Criminal Case No. 137867.26
Meanwhile, Civil Case No. 70898 was initially set for pre-trial
conference on February 7, 2008.27 However, upon motion28 of
Engracia, the pre-trial was reset on March 6, 2008.29 During the
pre-trial conference on · March 6, 2008, Engracia moved that
Rafael be substituted by his heirs since he had already died on
Oc;tober 15, 2007.30 Thus, the RTC issued an Order31 dated
March 6, 2008 directing the petitioners to comment on
Engracia's motion to substitute Rafael as plaintiff in the case
below. On April 8, 2008, Engracia filed a Motion to Dismiss32 the
case on the ground that the petitioners failed to substitute the
heirs of Rafael as plaintiff in the case. The motion to dismiss was
consequently denied by the RTC in its Order33 dated November
12, 2008 for lack of merit.
The continuation of the pre-trial conference, which has been
sidelined pending the resolution of Engracia's motion to dismiss,
was· then set on March 19, 2009.34 On March 12, 2009,
Engracia's counsel, with her conformity, withdrew his
appearance as counsel in the case.35 During the pre-trial
conference on March 19, 2009, the petitioners and their counsel
appeared. Engracia was likewise present although without her
new counsel. Accordingly, pre-trial was again reset on June 1,
2009 to afford Engracia time to secure the services of a new
counsel. 36
Thereafter, Atty. Tristram B. Zoleta entered his appearance for
Engracia and moved that the pre-trial conference on June 1,
2009 be reset on July 13 or 20, 2009.37 However, Judge Amelia
A. Fabros (Judge Fabros) was reassigned to Muntinlupa City and
Judge Myrna V. Lim-Verano (Judge Lim-Verano) was named to
replace Judge Fabros as Presiding Judge of· Branch 160.38 On
June 17, 2010, Judge Lim-Verano, having previously presided
over Criminal Case No. 137867, recused herself from
adjudicating Civil Case No. 70898.39 'Civil Case No. 70898 was
subsequently raffled to Branch 264 of the RTC then presided by
Judge Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. (Judge Janolo). On July 15, 2010,
Judge Janolo issued an Order,40 setting the pre-trial of the case
on August 25, 2010.
On August 12, 2010, the petitioners' counsel moved to reset the
pre-trial on September 15, 2010 due to previously scheduled
hearings in the trial courts of Malolos City and Parañaque City.41
Accordingly, the pre-trial was reset on October 6, 2010.42 On
October 6, 2010, the respective counsels of the parties jointly
agreed to reset the pre-trial on December 9, 2010.43 However,
the pre-trial scheduled on December 9, 2010 was again reset on
January 24, 2011.44
On December 27, 2010, the petitioners filed a motion,45 which
sought to exclude Rafael as being represented by Renato. They
averred that they were unable to effect a substitution of the
heirs of Rafael as plaintiffs in the case since they could not locate
them.
On January 27, 2011, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear
and the pre-trial was reset on March 24, 2011.46 In the morning
of March 23, 2011, the petitioners' counsel informed Renato
that he would not be able to attend the pre-trial conference
since he was indisposed and asked the latter to go to the RTC
and request for a resetting of the hearing. When the case was
called, the petitioners and their counsel failed to appear, which
thus prompted Engracia's counsel to move for the dismissal of
the complaint and be given time to file the proper pleading.
Thus, the RTC gave Engracia's counsel 10 days within which to
file a motion to dismiss. The continuation of the pre-trial was
reset on May 26, 2011. 47
On April 5, 2011, Engracia filed a motion to dismiss48 in
compliance with the RTC's directive.49 During the pre-trial on
May 26, 2011, the RTC gave the parties' respective counsels,
upon their request, five days to file a comment on the motion to
dismiss and a reply to such comment, after which time the
motion to dismiss is deemed submitted for resolution.50
On July 29, 2011, the RTC Branch 264 issued an Orders' in Civil
Case No. 70898, dismissing the petitioners' complaint due to
their and their counsel's repeated failure to appear during the
scheduled pre-trial hearing dates.
The petitioners then filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 98026, insisting that the RTC erred in dismissing
their complaint on a mere technicality. They also claimed that
Engracia's motion to dismiss is but a mere scrap of paper since
the same did not comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court. The CA, in its Decision52 dated June 28, 2013
in CA-G.R. CV No. 98026, affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the
petitioners' complaint.
Issues:
Essentially, the issues set forth for the Court's resolution are:
first, whether the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 were
properly suspended on the ground of prejudicial question; and
second, whether the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in
Civil Case No. 70898 due to failure · to prosecute was proper.
Ruling of the Court
The petitions are denied.
First Issue: Suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
137867 on the ground of prejudicial Question
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which
arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question
comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal
actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are
similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively
resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed.
53 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflict decisions. 54
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case
as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the
final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must
-be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2)
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal. 55
Based on the issues raised in both Civil Case No. 70898 and
Criminal Case No. 137867 against the Spouses Singson, and in
the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question,
there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at
bar. The defense of the Spouses Singson in the civil case for
annulment of sale is that Engracia bought the subject property
from her parents prior to their demise and that their signatures
appearing on the Absolute Deed of Sale are true and genuine.
Their allegation in the civil case is based on the very same facts,
which would be necessarily determinative of their guilt or
innocence as accused in the criminal case.
If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed
of Sale are genuine, then there would be no falsification and the
Spouses Singson would be innocent of the offense charged.
Otherwise stated, a
conviction on Criminal Case No. 137867, should it be allowed to
proceed ahead, would be a gross injustice and would have to be
set aside if it were finally decided in Civil Case No. 70898 that
indeed the signatures of the Spouses Domingo were authentic.
The petitioners' reliance on Section 356 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, in relation to Article 3357 of the Civil Code, is
misplaced. Section 3 provides that a civil action for damages in
cases provided under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, which may also constitute criminal offenses, may proceed
independently of the criminal action. In instances where an
independent civil action is permitted, the result of the criminal
action, whether of acquittal or conviction, is entirely irrelevant
to the civil action. 58
The concept of independent civil actions finds no application in
this case. Clearly, Civil Case No. 70898 is very much relevant to
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867. To stress, the main
issue raised in Civil Case No. 70898, i.e., the genuineness of the
signature of the Spouses Domingo appearing in the Absolute
Deed of Sale, is intimately related to the charge of estafa
through falsification of public document in Criminal Case No.
137867; the resolution of the main issue in Civil Case No. 70898
would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the Spouses Singson.
Accordingly, the RTC Branch 264 correctly suspended the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 on the ground of
prejudicial question since, at the time the proceedings in the
criminal case were suspended, Civil Case No. 70898 was still
pending.
Second Issue: Dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case
No. 70898
Under the Rules of Court, the parties and their counsel are
mandated to appear at the pre-trial. 59 Pre-trial cannot be taken
for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for
it serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and
expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. 60 Thus,
the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse
consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case
shall be dismissed, which shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. If it is the defendant who fails to
appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex
parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.
61
Civil Case No. 70898 was initially set for pre-trial on February 7,
2008. In July 2010, after more than two years, Civil Case No.
70898, which was still in the pre-trial stage, was re-raffled to
Branch 264 presided by Judge Janolo; the latter immediately
scheduled the pre-trial on August 25, 2010. What transpired
thereafter is a series of resetting of the hearing due to the failure
of the petitioners and/or their counsel to appear during the
scheduled pre-trial dates. During the scheduled pre-trial on
March 23, 2011, the petitioners and their counsel again failed to
appear without informing the RTC of the reason for their non-
appearance. Clearly, the petitioners' wanton disregard of
scheduled pre-trial indeed justified the dismissal of their
complaint.
It should be stressed that procedural rules are not to be
disregarded or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.
Like all rules they are to be followed, except only when for the
most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.62
The petitioners have not shown any persuasive reason, which
would justify a relaxation of the rules on pre-trial. That the
petitioners' counsel was supposedly indisposed during the pre-
trial on March 23, 2011 does not excuse the petitioners
themselves from attending the pre-triaL Moreover, the·
petitioners have failed to advance any valid justification for their
and their counsel's failure to attend the previously scheduled
pre-trial hearings. Accordingly, the trial court could not be
faulted for dismissing the complaint under Section 5 of Rule 18
of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners' claim that the motion. to dismiss filed by
Engracia with the RTC is a mere scrap of paper for her failure to
comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is without merit. Said sections
provide that:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court
may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and .the notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date
of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on
shorter notice.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be
addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time
and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10)
days after the filing of the motion.
Sec. 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for
hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service
thereof.
That the notice of hearing is addressed to the petitioners'
counsel and not to the petitioners directly is immaterial and
would not be a cause to consider the same defective. The
requirement under Section 4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
that the notice be addressed to the opposing party is merely
directory; what matters is that adverse party had sufficient
notice of the hearing of the motion. 64 Further, even if the
notice of hearing in the motion to dismiss failed to state the
exact date of hearing, the defect was cured when the RTC
considered the same in the hearing that was held on May 26,
2011 and by the fact that the petitioners, through their counsel,
were notified of the existence of the said motion.65
Anent the supposed lack of proof of service of the motion to
dismiss upon the petitioners, suffice it to state that a copy of the
said motion was served upon and received by the petitioners'
counsel on April 15, 2011.66 The petitioners were duly given the
full opportunity to be heard and to argue their case when the
RTC required them to file a comment to the motion to dismiss
during the hearing on May 26, 2011, which they did on May 30,
2011. 67 "What the law really eschews is not the lack of previous
notice of hearing but the lack of opportunity to be heard."68
Considering, however, that the complaint in Civil Case No. 70898
had already been dismissed with prejudice on account of the
petitioners' and their counsel's persistent failure to appear
during the scheduled pre-trial hearings, the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 137867 should now proceed. There is no
longer. any prejudicial question in Criminal Case No. 137867 ·
since the complaint in Civil Case No. 70898 had been dismissed
without definitely resolving the question of whether the
signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of
Sale .are genuine. Thus, it is up for the RTC Branch 264, in
Criminal Case No. 137867, to resolve the said issue.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petitions
in G.R. Nos. 203287 and 207936 are hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 122054 and
the Decision dated June 28, 2013 in C
A-G.R. CV No. 98026 issued by the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 264, is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with Criminal Case
No. 137867 with dispatch.