Jose Leo V. Nastor Jr.

LAW 1–A

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion (A.M. No.
1928, 3 August 1978)

Facts: The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll
of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of
Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to
the organization of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing to
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this, compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no legal force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to the
IBP.

Held: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of a
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers
are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment of
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual
dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional free to associate. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues.

The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the
By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys
of the Court.

Reaction:
In this particular case, there is a specific lawyer who is stubbornly refusing the payment of his
membership. Based on Article 139-A of the Rules of Court, it states that every lawyer must be a member
of a distinguished form of bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary and
required to pay the membership dues. As lawyers, as the forerunner of following the rules of both the
Constitution and any other form of agency or department, must obey to the rules provided. Based on the
Oath of Lawyers, it states that we must obey rules and laws under the Philippine Government. By not
following the rules and laws provided, we are violating such rules disrespecting our profession.
Jose Leo V. Nastor Jr. LAW 1–A

Commissioner of Customs v. Relunia G.R. No. L-11860. May 29, 1959

Facts:
RPS Misamis Oriental, a unit of the Philippine Navy, was dispatched to Japan to
transport contingents bound for Puson, Korea, and carry Christmas gifts for our soldiers there. It
was used for transportation purposes and it made trips between Korea and Japan. While RPS
Misamis Oriental was in Japan, it loaded 180 cases containing various articles which are subject
to customs duties. Upon arrival in the Philippines, these articles were forfeited because of
violations of Customs Law. Commissioner of Customs argued that RPS Misamis Oriental is
subject to Administrative Code Sec. 1363 which says that unmanifested merchandise found in
the vessel shall be forfeited.

Issue: Are Navy vessels, like RPS Misamis Oriental, required to have a manifest?

Held: Yes.
Ratio: Even if Sec. 1221 of the Administrative Code is entitled “Entrance of Vessels in Foreign
Trade,” Sec. 1228 states that it is required that “every vessel from a foreign port or place must
have on board complete written or typewritten manifests of all her cargoes. Also, RPS Misamis
Oriental claimed to have submitted one to a certain Mr. Ysla, but was denied by the latter.

Reaction:
In this case, it is very clear that, even though the ship was owned by the Government and
the orders came from the Philippine Navy, we still need to follow the rules stated in the
Administrative Code. By following the laws or rules given to us, we can have a fair and just type
of country in which the rules are to be followed. By mere following the rules and laws, we, as
lawyers are the perfect example in obeying the rules and laws in the Philippine Government.
Jose Leo V. Nastor Jr. LAW 1–A

Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme GR 52179, 195 SCRA 692 [Apr 8, 1991]

Facts: A dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando was allegedly on its way to get a load
of sand and gravel for the repair of the municipal streets when it collided with a passenger
jeepney. Due to the impact, several passengers died and 4 others suffered physical injuries. The
victims, private respondents herein, sued for damages against the Municipality and the driver of
the dump truck. The Municipality invokes non-suability.

Issue: Is the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union immune from suit?

Held: No. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when
they engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from
suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because
their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. xxx [While municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued] they are generally
not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be
held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity; and We
rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office [as
he was on his way to get materials for the repair of the municipal streets].

Reaction: In this particular case, in this case under the Constitutional Law, it clearly states that
the State is immune from suit, whereas, in the Municipal Level, they have the power to sue and
be sued. Though in this case as to the truck was performing a government function and not as a
proprietary function, they can be sued according to their charter. It clearly states that the
Municipality can be sued according to their charter even though it is performing either a
governmental function or proprietary function.
Jose Leo V. Nastor Jr. LAW 1–A

People v. Rivera G.R. Nos. 38215 & 38216. December 22, 1933

Facts:
Rivera signed and swore to a complaint accusing Vito and Moreno the crime of theft. According
to the information, the items stolen were a white American suit with one eyeglasses amounting to
P30, one buntal hat which costs P3, and to two buttons which cost P3 each, with the total amount
of P39. The justice of the peace dismissed the case. After which, Vito and Moreno filed
complaints against Rivera, charging him with incriminating innocent people, which falls under
Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. Rivera objected and claimed that the facts alleged did not
fall under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, and that, Article 363 of the Codigo Penal does
not appear in the Revised Penal Code. Hence, there is no offense embracing acusacion o
denuncia falsa.

Issue: Whether or not Rivera can be charged guilty of incriminating innocent people under
Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code

Held: No. Not guilty and inapplicable.

Ratio: The crime Rivera was accused of is not explicitly stated in the Revised Penal Code,
although the crime of indictment of the innocent is included in the Old Penal Code. Article 363
of the Old Penal Code talks about punishment for false prosecutions. In the Revised Penal Code,
Article 363 pertains to punishment for any act which may tend directly to cause a false
prosecution. This provision is limited to acts of planting evidence which do not constitute false
prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions.

Reaction: In this particular case, the topic is about statutory construction – even though it the
facts of the case contains criminal law. In this case, the title itself is very clear and concise in
nature, therefore, it may not need to overthink or overanalyze such things. According to our
discussion, if there are problems in the body of the law, we may look in the title and make or
interpret what is being implied in this case.
Jose Leo V. Nastor Jr. LAW 1–A

Festejo v. Fernando No. L-5156, 94 Phil 504 [Mar 11, 1954]

Facts: Defendant Fernando, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without obtaining
authority first from the court and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against
her express objection, unlawfully took possession of portions of 3 parcels of land belonging to
her and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the said parcels of land.
Plaintiff filed a complaint to which the trial court issued an order “to return or cause to be
returned the possession of the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated and to
return the land to its former condition under the expenses of the defendant.” The court directed
also Fernando to pay the plaintiff in the event that said land cannot be returned. Defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the suit was in effect against the Phil govt,
which had not given its consent to be sued.
Issue: Is the case a suit against the State without its consent?
Held: No. Concededly, Fernando committed acts outside the scope of his authority when he
trespassed the plaintiff’s land. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon
plaintiff’s land and damaged it xxx he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties
imposed on him by law. Ordinarily, the officer or employee committing the tort is personally
liable therefor, and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or
damage results from his tortuous act. xxx If an officer, even while acting under the color of his
office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that
he is a public agent.

Reaction: The case talks about Constitutional Law under the Doctrine of State Immunity. As
mentioned earlier in the case of Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme (GR 52179, 195 SCRA
692 [Apr 8, 1991]), the State cannot be sued without its consent. The State can never be sued as
long as it performs its governmental functions of the State and not proprietary functions.
 JURISPRUDENCE REACTION PAPER

By: Jose Leo V. Nastor Jr.

July 27, 2019

Legal Language
Mrs. Sarah Puertollano – Instructor

Dr. Vicente Orestes Romualdez Educational Foundation, Inc.

Tacloban City, Leyte