Arzadon-Crisologo v.

Ranon (Case mentioned in the book)

FACTS:
Ranon and her family had enjoyed continuous, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession
and ownership over the subject property since 1962 and had religiously paid the taxes
thereon. They had built a house on the subject property where she and her family had
resided. Unfortunately, in 1986, when her family was already residing in Metro Manila,
fire razed and destroyed the said house. Nonetheless, they continued to visit the
subject property, as well as pay the real estate taxes thereon. However, later on, her
daughter, Zosie Rañon, discovered that the subject property was already in the
name of the spouses Montemayor which was purportedly issued in their favor by
virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership and Possession which the spouses
Montemayor executed themselves. The Affidavit was alleged to have created a cloud
of doubt over Rañon’s title and ownership over the subject property. The spouses
Montemayor, for their part, alleged that they acquired the subject lot by purchase
from Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon who are the heirs of its previous
owners for a consideration of P100,000.00. They averred that there existed no liens
or encumbrances on the subject property in favor of Agrifina Rañon; and that no
person, other than they and the spouses Montemayor, has an interest in the
property as owner or otherwise.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Notice of Adverse Claim filed by the petitioners constitute an
effective interruption since 1962 of respondents possession of the subject property; and
2. WON the respondents had acquired ownership over the subject property through
uninterrupted and adverse possession for 30 years, without need of title or of good
faith
RULING:
Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of
civil interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have
received judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse
Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim
which did not effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. The open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by respondents of the subject property for a period
of more than 30 years in repudiation of petitioners’ ownership had been established.
During such length of time, respondents had exercised acts of dominion over the
subject property, and paid taxes in their name. Jurisprudence is clear that although
tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. As is well known, the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the
land covered by the tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership. Possession
in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on
every square meter of the ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
(Ramos v. Dir. Of Lands) Nothing was done by petitioners to claim possession over the
subject property from the time their predecessors-in-interest had lost possession of
the property due to their deaths. Plainly, petitioners slept on their rights. Vigilantibus
sed non dormientibus jurasubveniunt. The law comes to the succor only to aid the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Respondents occupied without
interruption the subject property in the concept of an owner, thereby acquiring
ownership via extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Tanyag v. Gabriel
FACTS:
The subject of controversy is two adjacent parcel of land located at Ruhale, Barangay
Calzada, Municipality of Taguig.
Petitioners claimed that the first parcel of land was owned by someone named Benita
Gabriel as part of inheritance. Petitioners then took possession of the property, paid the
real estate taxes due on the land and declared the same for tax purposes in the name
of Bien venido’swife, Araceli C. Tanyag.
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli
Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed on October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took
possession of said property and declared the same for tax purposes. Petitioners
claimed to have continuously, publicly, notoriously, and adversely occupied both Lots
1and 2 through their caretaker Juana Quinones; they fenced the premises and
introduced improvements on the land
Petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that respondents never occupied the 1 st
property and fraudulently caused the inclusion of 2 nd property in a tax declarion.
Respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of action against them for they
have not established their ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens
title in respondent’s name.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription
RULING:
NO. Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor
through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be
in theconcept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession is open when
it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional.
Petitioner’s adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 which tax declaration
cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel. Tax receipts and declaration are
prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of property for which such taxes have
been paid. Petitioner has also let their caretaker plant vegetable and put up pig farm on
the land.
It was only in 1979 that respondent began to assert a claim over the property by
securing a tax declaration in the name of Jose Gabriel. These acts of respondents
effectively interrupt the possession of petitioners for purposes of prescription. Civil
interruption takes place with the service of JUDICIAL SUMMONS to the possessor and
not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim.
 For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial
summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was
filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not
effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. Such a notice could not have produced
civil interruption. The execution of the Notice ofAdverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a
necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was merely a
notice.
There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is
that no action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence,
no judicial summon was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals
in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place
of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law. In
the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession
since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in
respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim
The court uphold petitioners’ right as owner only with respect to Lot 1 consisting
of 686 square meters. Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of
a deed of sale from the original declared owner, Agueda Dinguinbayan. Respondents
asserted that the 147 square meters covered by the tax declarations of Dinguinbayan
being claimed by petitioners is not the same lot included
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS
CHILDREN/HEIRS (Case Assigned)

FACTS:
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in Parañaque
City covered by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an
accretion of Cut-cut creek.

Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great
grandfather, Jose Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively
occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring
possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land.

Meanwhile, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. Mario Ebio
secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of
their house within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights over the land
in favor of Ebio.

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed
Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from the City Government of
Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the
said barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez
Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately
opposed and the project was suspended.

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the
barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted
on the said lot.

On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days,or be physically evicted
from the said property. Respondents sent a reply asserting their claim over the subject
property and expressing intent for a further dialogue.

ISSUEl:
WON the state may build on the land in question.

RULING:

NO. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits
that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the
law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil
Code.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks
of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically
belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only
restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register
the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription.

No matter how long the possession of the properties has been,there can be no
prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State. Hence,
while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by
the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form
part of the public domain by clear provision of law.