DONATION INTERVIVOS vs.

DONATION MORTIS CAUSA

VILLANUEVA vs. SPOUSES BRANOCO (G.R. No. 172804,

January 24, 2011)

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age,

widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of Barrio Bool,
municipality of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del
Norte, Philippines, hereby depose and say:  

Xxx one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces

who also suffered with our poverty, obedient as she was
to all the works in our house, and because of the love and
affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of land
located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax
Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I
give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ,
her heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the
improvements existing thereon, which parcel of land is
more or less described and bounded as follows:

1. (Description of property)  It is now in the

possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since
May 21, 1962 in the concept of an owner, but
the Deed of Donation or that ownership
be vested on her upon my demise.

That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the

land above described, I already devise in favor of
EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs,
assigns, and that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be
inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;

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 That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the
land above described from Inay Alvegia Rodrigo and I am
much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life;
however, I will give one half (1/2) of the produce of the
land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.4

 Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes afterwards.

RULING:

We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title

to Rodriguez upon its execution or is effective only upon Rodrigo’s
death – using principles distilled from relevant jurisprudence. Post-
mortem dispositions typically –

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee

before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while
alive; 

(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer

should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means
of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; 

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor

should survive the transferee.

Further –  

[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes

whereby the act may be revoked by the donor
indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather
than a disposition mortis causa[;] 

[5] That the designation of the donation as

mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect
that the donation is “to take effect at the death of
the donor” are not controlling criteria; such
statements are to be construed together with the

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 rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the
real intent of the transferor[;] [and] 

(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance

should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than
mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the
ownership of the property subject of the deed.

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to

Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo
stipulated that “if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property]
will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of
x x x Rodriguez,” signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to
Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This
transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of
Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the
transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as
only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. Indeed,
had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could
have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that “the
donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the
properties here donated x x x” or used words to that effect. Instead,
Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez
predeceases her.

In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation’s damning effect on

his case, petitioner tries to profit from it, contending it is a
fideicommissary substitution clause. Petitioner assumes the fact he is
laboring to prove. The question of the Deed’s juridical nature, whether
it is a will or a donation, is the crux of the present controversy. By
treating the clause in question as mandating fideicommissary
substitution, a mode of testamentary disposition by which the first
heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to
transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance,
petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will. Neither the Deed’s text nor
the import of the contested clause supports petitioner’s theory.

Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title
to the Property, evident from Rodriguez’s undertaking to “give one
[half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her

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lifetime.” Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that “the ownership shall be
vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise,” taking into account the non-
reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title.

forementioned parcels”] the donor meant nothing

else than that she reserved of herself the
possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land
until her death, at which time the donee would be
able to dispose of them freely. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it

was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.

Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death,

such as the donor’s love and affection to the donee and the services
the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless
“corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos]
transfers.” Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to
Rodrigo’s statement of “love and affection” for Rodriguez, her niece,
as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.

In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as

“mortis causa” dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds,
eventually considered the transfers inter vivos, consistent with the
principle that “the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect
at the death of the donor’ are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to
be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give
effect to the real intent of the transferor.” Indeed, doubts on the
nature of dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivos transfers “to
avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.”

Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the

Property to Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were
the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great
legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give
license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers
of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing
ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels
against licensing such practice.

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Arts. 774 and 776

BALUS vs. BALUS (G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010)  

Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses

Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978,
while Rufo died on July 6, 1984. On January 3, 1979, Rufo
mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he
obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The
said property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
P-439(788). Rufo failed to pay his loan so the mortgaged property
was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole
bidder at a public auction. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of
Sale was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property
was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two
years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed
a Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title
was issued in the name of the Bank. On October 10, 1989, herein
petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the
subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial
Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted
knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject
property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at
the soonest possible time. Three years after the execution of the
Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject
property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of
Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39,484 was
issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued
possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against
petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the
fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the
petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them.
Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact
that the title over the disputed property was already in the name of
the Bank, they still proceeded to execute the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement, having in mind the intention of purchasing back the
property together with petitioner and of continuing their co-ownership
thereof. Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is,
in and by itself, a contract between him and respondents, because it
contains a provision whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-
ownership of the subject property by “redeeming” or “repurchasing”

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the same from the Bank. This agreement, petitioner contends, is the
law between the parties and, as such, binds the respondents. As a
result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed
property from the Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as
to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the property,
comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing respondents the equivalent
1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.

RULING:

Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at

the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject
property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to which
they may lay claim as his heirs. The rights to a person's succession
are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the
inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible
rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as
those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property
during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the
disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which
his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents
never inherited the subject lot from their father.

Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that

they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising
from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested
parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents
as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.

On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial

Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention that
it was his and his sibling's intention to buy the subject property from
the Bank and continue what they believed to be co-ownership thereof.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention
of the parties shall be accorded primordial consideration. It is the
duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon
it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated
and the purpose which it is intended to serve. Such intention is
determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts. Absurd and illogical
interpretations should also be avoided.

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For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an
agreement between him and his siblings to continue what they
thought was their ownership of the subject property, even after the
same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of
the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.

In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk

about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed
part of the estate of their deceased father. Furthermore, petitioner's
contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their
supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the
provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly
manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or
partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a
specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in
common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-
owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and
giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or
interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition
is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates
petitioner's claims in the present case.

Art. 776

INOCENCIO vs. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE (G.R. No. 201787,

September 25, 2013)

The Supreme Court has previously ruled that lease contracts, by their
nature, are not personal. The general rule, therefore, is lease
contracts survive the death of the parties and continue to bind the
heirs except if the contract states otherwise. In Sui Man Hui Chan v.
Court of Appeals, we held that: “A lease contract is not essentially
personal in character. Thus, the rights and obligations therein are
transmissible to the heirs. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs
are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest
except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of
law.

In the subject Contract of Lease, not only were there no stipulations

prohibiting any transmission of rights, but its very terms and
conditions explicitly provided for the transmission of the rights of the

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lessor and of the lessee to their respective heirs and successors. The
contract is the law between the parties. The death of a party does not
excuse nonperformance of a contract, which involves a property right,
and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the successors or
representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not
excused by the death of the party when the other party has a
property interest in the subject matter of the contract.” Section 6 of
the lease contract provides that “[t]his contract is nontransferable
unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in writing.” Section 6
refers to transfers inter vivos and not transmissions mortis causa.
What Section 6 seeks to avoid is for the lessee to substitute a third
party in place of the lessee without the lessor’s consent.

ALVAREZ vs. IAC (G.R. No. 68053, May 7, 1990)

Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely,

Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed a complaint against Fortunato
Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and
possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting
of the produce of the land and that the share or money equivalent
due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be
ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's
fees. During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13,
1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. Alvarez
died but he was adjudged to pay the monetary value of the properties
to Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely,
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus. The heirs of Alvarez complained that
the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made
by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability
of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.

HELD: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general

transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his
legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect of contracts upon the
heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules
of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid
from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs
(Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from
the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since
the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares
that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. Under our law,
therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a

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consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial
rights and duties that, has characterized the history of these
institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to
person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to
patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position,
barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot
escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which
gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not
inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal
fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of
their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts
of the estate. It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are
liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.

GENATO vs. BAYHON (G.R. No. 171035, August 24, 2009)

HELD:

We now go to the ruling of the appellate court extinguishing the

obligation of respondent. As a general rule, obligations derived from a
contract are transmissible. Article 1311, par.1 of the Civil Code
provides:

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their

assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible
by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he
received from the decedent.

In Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety Co., Inc., the Court, through

Justice JBL Reyes, held:

While in our successional system the responsibility of the

heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the
value of the inheritance they receive from him, the
principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not
only to the rights of the deceased but also to his
obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code
(and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly
so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already
quoted.

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 "ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of
acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of
law."
"ART. 776. — The inheritance includes
all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his
death." (Emphasis supplied)

The Court proceeded further to state the general rule:

Under our law, therefore, the general rule is

that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors. The rule is a
consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of
patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio
Polacco, has characterized the history of these
institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from
person to person, the obligation has evolved into a
relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons
occupying only a representative position, barring those
rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is
contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its
performance by a specific person and by no other. The
transition is marked by the disappearance of the
imprisonment for debt. (Emphasis supplied)
 
The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the
case was pending before the Court of Appeals. While he may no
longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists against his
estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be transmitted
to his heirs unless the debt has first been satisfied. Notably,
throughout the appellate stage of this case, the estate has been
amply represented by the heirs of the deceased, who are also his co-
parties in Civil Case No. Q-90-7012.

The procedure in vindicating monetary claims involving a

defendant who dies before final judgment is governed by Rule 3,
Section 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:

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 When the action is for recovery of money arising
from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies
before entry of final judgment in the court in which the
action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not
be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until
entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by
the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims
against the estate of a deceased person.

Pursuant to this provision, petitioner’s remedy lies in filing a claim

against the estate of the deceased respondent.

EASTERN vs. LUCERO (124 SCRA 326)

Lucero, Jr. was appointed by Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., as

master/captain to its vessel. While the vessel was enroute from
Hongkong to Manila where it was expected to arrive on February 18,
1980, Capt. Lucero sent 3 messages to the Company's Manila office,
first, that they encountered boisterous weather with strong
northeasterly winds causing the vessel to roll and pitch violently;
second, that the vessel was laboring violently and that they had to
jettison cargoes; third, that they needed immediate assistance
because seawater was entering inside the hatch and they were
preparing to abandon anytime. Subsequently, the insurer of the M/V
Eastern Minicon confirmed the loss of the vessel. The Company paid
the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members,
except Mrs. Lucero, who refused to accept the same. Mrs. Lucero filed
a complaint for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of
P3,183.00, which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for
continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have
returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of
employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a
voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only
upon the vessel's arrival in Manila.

HELD: It is undisputed that the Company received 3 radio messages

from Capt. Lucero. There is thus enough evidence to show the
circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V
Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts are sufficient to lead
to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons
aboard had perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule on
presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must
yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. Where there are facts,

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known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made,
the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls. Thus, the complaint of Mrs. Lucero was dismissed
and instead, she should receive the death benefits.

RIOFERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. NO. 129008,

JANUARY 13, 2004]

Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate
pending the appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case.

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without

doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the
decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New
Civil Code. The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that
the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others by his will or by operation of law. Even if administration
proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring
the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the
proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the
rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section
2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v.
Young, G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 207, this Court
recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and
properties of the decedent under administration pending the
appointment of an administrator. Thus:

The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or

administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the
deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the
deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special
proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such
instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the
appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to
protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the
meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the
decedent are violated or dissipated.

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Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes
two exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or
refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the administrator is alleged to
have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party
defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief
to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no
appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed
administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the
guilty parties himself.

RODRIGUEZ VS. BORJA (17 SCRA 41)

The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12,
1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan
and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a
purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8,
1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a
petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will;
that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the
same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned
petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging,
among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Para񡱵e,
Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez
be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on
March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a
petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on
March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was
born in Para񡱵e, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic
Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his
death in 1963; that he was buried in Para񡱵e, and that he left real
properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.

The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963
while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in
support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De
Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.

The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the
stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction

13
over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court
on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has
precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of

First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of
the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no
petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will
being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix
the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the
Revised Rules of Court.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR

a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the
court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's
testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where
the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the
petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and
delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners
initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.

The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate

succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since
intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.

Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only

after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an
intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established
action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus
proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is
pending.

We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to

priority in the settlement of the estate in question, and that in
refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said court did not
commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal
Court that should be discontinued.

14
LAWS GOVERNING VALIDITY OF WILLS

*Extrinsic Validity (2 view points)

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA VS. ABAJA (G.R.

NO. 147145, JANUARY 31, 2005)

FACTS: Abada executed his notarial will on 4 June 1932 but he died
when the New Civil Code took effect. The will was not acknowledged
before a notary public. Is the will valid?

HELD:  YES. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889
or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure
which governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the
New Civil Code. The Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of
the Old Civil Code.  Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the
intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.
Therefore, Abada’s will does not require acknowledgment before a
notary public.

*Intrinsic Validity

BELLIS VS. BELLIS (G.R. NO. L-23678, JUNE 6, 1967)

In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So
that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same
would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but
would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application
of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would
arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated,
they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather,
they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.

Where the decedent was a citizen of a foreign country and under the
laws of said country there are no forced heirs, the system of legitimes

15
in Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession to the decedent’s
estate because the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the decedent’s
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined by
the law of such country. A provision in the foreigner’s will that his
properties should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not in accordance with his national law is void being contrary to
Article 16.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs

may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.

LLORENTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 124371,

NOVEMBER 23, 2000)
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen
(he was formerly a Filipino) long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will;
and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as
a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law.

PCIB VS. ESCOLIN (56 SCRA 266)

The question of what is the foreign law governing the matter in issue
is one of fact and not of law. Foreign laws may not be taken judicial
notice of and has to be proven like any other fact in dispute between
the parties in any proceeding except when the said laws are already
within the actual knowledge of the court such as when they are well
and generally known, or they have been actually ruled upon in other
cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim
otherwise.

MICIANO VS. BRIMO (50 PHIL 867 , G.R. NO. L-22595,

NOVEMBER 1, 1927)

With respect to foreign law on the formalities of wills: In the absence

of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that foreign laws on the
formalities of wills are the same as those prescribed under Philippine
Laws. This is the Doctrine of Processual Presumption.

16
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which
are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for
which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the
Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

          Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in

respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of
the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as
he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on
the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON

(G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006)

Spouses Audrey and Richard were American citizens who have resided
in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle.
On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed
her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor.
The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as
executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his appointment. The court
also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria with whom he has two children.

On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. On July 20, 1984, Richard
died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
Candelaria, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to
probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and
James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn,
designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary

17
administrator. Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Atty. Quasha was appointed as
ancillary administrator. Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition of
Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided
interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼
undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G
Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash. The project of partition was
granted and approved by the trial court. Meanwhile, the ancillary
administrator in the second petition also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property
was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to
Richard’s three children. This was opposed by Candelaria on the
ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes
to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property
subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to
Candelaria, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati
property should be given to Candelaria.

Atty. Ancheta contends that that he acted in good faith in performing

his duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time
of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the
relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was
made in accordance with Philippine laws. Atty. Ancheta also imputes
knowledge on the part of Candelaria with regard to the terms of
Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised
Candelaria of the contents of the will and how the estate will be
divided. Candelaria argues that Atty. Ancheta’s breach of his fiduciary
duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate amounted to
extrinsic fraud. According to Candelaria, Atty. Ancheta was duty-
bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of
knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because Atty.
Ancheta is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his
duty to know the relevant laws.

HELD: Atty. Ancheta’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of

Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by
the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision
annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988,
must be upheld. It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an
American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate
of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among
others, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the

18
Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and
Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before
the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly
authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City
and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted
by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and
the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and
the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy. Being a foreign national,
the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who
are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the
State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code. While
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however,
Atty. Ancheta, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-
bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of
Maryland. Atty. Ancheta admitted that he failed to introduce in
evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and
merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the
Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court
peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms
of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair
submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious
appreciation of the evidence presented.

Atty. Ancheta insists that his application of Philippine laws was made
in good faith. The Court cannot accept his protestation. How can Atty.
Ancheta honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as
the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was
already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in
the State of Maryland. Atty. Ancheta is a senior partner in a
prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library." He
had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was
incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary
administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust
reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, he failed to perform his
fiduciary duties.

TESTATE ESTATE OF SUNTAY vs. SUNTAY (G.R. Nos. L-3087

and L-3088, July 31, 1954)

On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the

Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of

19
China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a
house in Amoy, Fookien province, China.

As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in

Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule
provides:

Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the

laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by
the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2 provides:

When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly

authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the
Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the
court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place
for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case
of an original will presented for allowance.

Section 3 provides:

If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the

Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its
allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the
courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be
filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same
effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate
court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate
or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for
the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be
established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.
The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for
the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China set forth
in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are
inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul
General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert
on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be
admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront
and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to
trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in
the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking

20
the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order
of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate
the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of
Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in
probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the
matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a
deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it
does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the
subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such
proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested
parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known
to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice
was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines. The
proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may
be likened toe or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the
Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the
proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, does not
purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the
proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof
cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted
basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate
and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China,
cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to
therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of
this country.

TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD CHRISTENSEN VS. GARCIA ( G.R.

No. L-16749, JANUARY 31, 1963)

If the conflicts rules under the national law of the deceased refer the
matter to the law of the domicile and the foreigner was domiciled in
the Philippines at the moment of death, Philippine courts will have to
apply the Philippine internal law on succession. This is the Doctrine
of Renvoi which is the referring back to the forum of the problem.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the

United States and of the State of California at the time of his death.
But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was

21
domiciled in the Philippines. The law that governs the validity of his
testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. The application of this article in the case at bar
requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law"
is used therein. There is no single American law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of
the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and
in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16
of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or
apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than
the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will
in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where

personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.

Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law.
The principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living
in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens
as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The
conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not
refer the case back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the case will then be
like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and
the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its
own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of
the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as
the application of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and

22
 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY (Arts. 799 and 800)

BALTAZAR vs. LAXA (G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012)

Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the

probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not
executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law;
that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its
execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or
influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by
some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the
Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was
obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the
document to be her Will.

RULING:

A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with
the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia,
her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and
evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the
critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses
attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of
one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of
Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state of
mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said
act. Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was
“magulyan” or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of
testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only “magulyan”
but was actually suffering from paranoia. We agree with the position of
the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person
mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. In this case,
apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness,
there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show
that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the

23
Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s
testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to
Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. “The testimony of
subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is
entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent.” More
importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the
oppositor. Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the
nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty
and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the
CA: 

A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was

aware of the nature of the document she executed. She
specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed
upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the
properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his
two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of
the will and was not included therein as devisee.

LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA VS. ABAJA (G.R.

NO. 147145, JANUARY 31, 2005)

Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray (“Toray”)
died sometime in September 1943.  Both died without legitimate
children. On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed a petition for the
probate of the last will and testament of Abada.  Abada allegedly
named as his testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio and
Rosario Cordova.  Alipio is the son of Eulogio. Caponong, as well as
the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray opposed
the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of
whether the will of Abada is written in a language known to
Abada;
2. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of
the will of Abada.
HELD: Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one
discern that Abada knew the Spanish language.  She alleges that such

24
defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will.  On this
issue, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the
motion to dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the issue on
appeal.  We agree with Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of estoppel
does not apply in probate proceedings. Nevertheless, Caponong-
Noble’s contention must still fail.  There is no statutory requirement to
state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect
used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof
aliunde. Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony,
has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the
contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. 
However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking
people in their place.  In these gatherings, Abada and his companions
would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that
Abada speaks the Spanish language.

FORMALITIES IN EXECUTION OF WILLS (Arts. 805 and 806)

STRICT vs. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE

*Substantial Compliance

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA VS. ABAJA (G.R.

NO. 147145, JANUARY 31, 2005)
1. Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to
state expressly that the testator signed the will and its every page
in the presence of three witnesses.  The English translation of the
first sentence of the attestation clause reads: “Subscribed and
professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and
testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our
presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of
the same.”    The attestation clause clearly states that Abada
signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
2. However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation
clause does not indicate the number of witnesses.  On this point,
the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on
substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. 
While the attestation clause does not state the number of
witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it. We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate
of Abada’s will.  Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that of
Abada and of three other persons.  It is reasonable to conclude
25
 that there are three witnesses to the will.  The question on the
number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will
itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. 
The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal
construction, thus: [T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any
puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
consequences.  The later decisions do tell us when and where to
stop; they draw the dividing line with precision.  They do not
allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the
document or supply missing details that should appear in
the will itself.  They only permit a probe into the will, an
exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or
to determine the existence or absence of the requisite
formalities of law.  This clear, sharp limitation eliminates
uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.
3. Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does
not expressly state the circumstances that the witnesses
witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence of
the testator and of each other.  This Court has ruled: Precision of
language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. 
However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words
of the statute be made.  It is sufficient if from the language
employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause
fulfills what the law expects of it. The last part of the attestation
clause states “en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo
firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador.”  In English, this
means “in its witness, every one of us also signed in our presence
and of the testator.”  This clearly shows that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that
each witness signed the will in the presence of one another and of
the testator.

*Strict compliance

AZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006)

 Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the

Civil Code that “the number of pages used in a notarial will be
stated in the attestation clause” is merely directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as “the
substantial compliance rule.” As admitted by petitioner himself,
the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the
will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this

26
 requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the
number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was
never filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with.
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of
pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite
Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to
state the number of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or
some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in
the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates
with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental
witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the
execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and
subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance
with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many
pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and
Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no
substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805
since there is no statement in the attestation clause or
anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which
comprise the will.

 While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on

the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their
averments before the notary public. Cagro v. Cagro is material
on this point. The petitioner and appellee contends that
signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin
conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because
said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that
the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an
attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the
bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to
add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the
absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses. The
Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article
805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the
requisite that the will be “attested and subscribed by [the
instrumental witnesses].” The respective intents behind these
two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The

27
 signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among
others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are
signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures
to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are
referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause
itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from
the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause
results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses
signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned
attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these
witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that
do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different
avowal. Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have
been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they
failed to sign the attestation clause.

 The requirement under Article 806 that “every will must be

acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses” has also not been complied with. In lieu of an
acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote
“Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic),
1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.” By no manner of
contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra
step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the
notary that the executor of a document has attested to the
notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed. It might
be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it
does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part
of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her,
the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as
a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the
express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
“acknowledged”, and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The
will does not present any textual proof, much less one under
oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses
executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The
acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-
important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made

28
 beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is
not an empty meaningless act. The acknowledgment coerces
the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an
officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the
will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under
oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal
prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of
spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the
testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the
testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.

 There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were
not fully satisfied by the will in question. The provision requires
that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each and
every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and
that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the
decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the
will on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-
called “logical end” of the will on its first page. Also, the will
itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but
instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of
thought that has disabused the notion that these two
requirements be construed as mandatory. Taken in isolation,
these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny
probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive
to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on,
though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due
regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever
executed the will.

*Strict compliance

MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST

WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B.
LOPEZ (G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012)

While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7

pages including the page on which the ratification and

29
acknowledgment are written, it was observed that the will has 8
pages including the acknowledgment portion.

RULING:

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages
used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of
its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. While
Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the
attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The
statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and
testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed
substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including
its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
'. On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the
application of Article 809, to wit: x x x The rule must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of
the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered;
whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are
facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded.
But the total number and whether all persons required to sign did so
in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the
attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate
proceedings.

*Strict compliance

ECHAVEZ vs. DOZEN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY
(G.R. No. 192916, October 11, 2010)

Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in

Cebu City, which includes Lot No. 1956-A and Lot No. 1959 (subject
lots). On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to
petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of Donation
Mortis Causa. Manuel accepted the donation. In March 1986, Vicente
executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen

30
Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In
October 1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the
same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell. On
November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente’s
nephew, filed a petition for the settlement of Vicente’s intestate
estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve
Vicente’s donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to
annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen
Corporation. These cases were jointly heard.

RULING:

A donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed

by law for the validity of wills, “otherwise, the donation is void and
would produce no effect.” Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code
should have been applied. The purported attestation clause embodied
in the Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of pages
on which the deed was written. Even granting that the
Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we
are not prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an
acknowledgment can be merged in one statement. That the
requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two
separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts
that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one
executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that
the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a
will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who
certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to the
manner of its execution. Although the witnesses in the present case
acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa
before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from
the instrumental witnesses to the execution of a decedent’s will. An
attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805
requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses
themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the
Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.

BLIND TESTATOR

ALVARADO VS. GAVIOLA (226 SCRA 317)

The testatrix was suffering from glaucoma by virtue of which, her

vision on both eyes was only capable of counting fingers at three (3)

31
feet. She designated a lawyer to draft her notarial will. After the final
draft was completed, the lawyer distributed copies of the will to the
three instrumental witnesses and to the notary public before whom
the will was to be acknowledged. The lawyer who drafted the will
read the will aloud in the presence of the testarixt, the three
instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. The latter four just
silently followed the reading with their own respective copies
previously furnished them. Upon being asked, the testatrix affirmed
that the contents as read corresponded with her instructions. The
signing and acknowledgment then took place. The probate was
contested on the ground that the reading requirement under Article
808 of the New Civil Code was not complied with.

Held: Article 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those
who, for one reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills.
Hence, the will should have been read by the notary public and an
instrumental witness. However, the spirit behind the law was served
though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance
with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed
aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into
account, may only defeat the testator’s will.

HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS

SEANGIO VS. REYES (G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006)

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the

settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio,
opposed the petition and contended among others that: Segundo left
a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the
decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to
be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will. A petition for the probate of the holographic will
of Segundo was filed by petitioners. They reiterated that the probate
proceedings should take precedence. The document that petitioners
refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted, as follows:

Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

32
 Tantunin ng sinuman

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa

naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay
tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang
mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil
siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng
sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si
Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at
sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon
gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya
nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni
Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta
siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad
at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking
kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China
Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng
kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of
the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si
Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si
Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at
anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi
ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995
sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 1

(signed)
Segundo
Seangio

Nilagdaan sa harap namin

(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi

(signed)
ikatlong saksi
1

33
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to
be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of
the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a
will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private
respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by
the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all
other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee
or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.
Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic
validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic
validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for
probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

HELD: The critical issue to be determined is whether the document

executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. A
holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must
be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundo’s document,
although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of
Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly
deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make
an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of
Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words,
the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence
of Alfredo. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or
the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect. Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by
one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case,
should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert,
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the
Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan

34
ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in
the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the
disinheritance cannot be given effect.

AZAOLA VS. SINGSON (G.R. NO. L-14003, AUGUST 5, 1960)

FACTS: Francisco Azaola, petitioned for the probate of the holographic

will of Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance. The opposition to the probate was
on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously
intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was
actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not
on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will. The probate was
denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the
will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate
being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the
proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was
written in the handwriting of the testatrix."

HELD: We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the
will was not contested, he was not required to produce more than one
witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil
Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation
of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have
been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being
required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that
the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a
matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a
question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be
witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator"
and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so
express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator". There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or
even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a
positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article
811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason
why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that — in the
absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding

35
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may
be resorted to.

The requirement of presenting 3 witnesses can be considered

mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments. Where the will is
holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule
requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely
permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned

by the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what
the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the
will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is
genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence.
On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of
those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it
should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is
to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much
interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be
carried into effect.

- BUT in the case of Codoy vs. Calugay (312 SCRA 333 [1999]), 3
witnesses are mandatory in contested holographic wills. Reasons:

CODOY VS. CALUGAY (G.R. NO. 123486, AUGUST 12, 1999)

Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees

and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda.
de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the holographic will of the
deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. Eugenia Ramonal Codoy
and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate,
alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is
even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an
interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seño Vda. de
Ramonal executed the holographic will. Petitioners argued that the
repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every
disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who
executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature
should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done
and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic
will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue

36
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries,
or through fraud and trickery.

HELD: In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of

Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article
provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic
will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature
in the will is the genuine signature of the testator. We are convinced,
based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have
ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is
mandatory.

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an

evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to
achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to
be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for
their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, we said that "the object of
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore,
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to
attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. However, we
cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as
the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is
contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will
was in the handwriting of the deceased. The will was found not in the
personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents,
who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony
of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as
early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased. There
was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the
handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and
executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison
was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of
petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which
contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic
will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of
the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature

37
in the holographic will. A visual examination of the holographic will
convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other
documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in
some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes,
retracing and erasures on the will. In the letters, there are
continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation
in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be
certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the
deceased.

Note: Although the Supreme Court said in the case of Azaola vs.
Singson that “even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil
Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of having the probate denied”, still in that
case, the authenticity of the will was not questioned. In the case of
Codoy vs. Calugay, however, the will was alleged to be a forgery.
Even the Supreme Court said that “A visual examination of the
holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator. The
signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable.
There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.” This
could be the reason for the different applications of the law in the two
cases.

RIVERA VS. IAC (182 SCRA 322, G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February
15, 1990)

A prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio

Rivera died. Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate
son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Venancio's estate. This petition was opposed by
Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent.
Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die
intestate but in fact left two holographic wills. Adelaido J. Rivera filed
a petition for the probate of the holographic wills. This petition was in
turn opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir
of Venancio's intestate estate.

HELD: We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera. It is true that Adelaido

could not present his parents' marriage certificate because, as he
explained it, the marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat civil
registry were burned during the war. Even so, he could still rely on

38
the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that Venancio
Rivera and Maria Jocson lived together as husband and wife for many
years, begetting seven children in all during that time. By contrast,
although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio
was described therein as the son of Florencio Rivera. Presumably, he
was not the same Venancio Rivera described in his baptismal
certificate, as the son of Magno Rivera. While we realize that such
baptismal certificate is not conclusive evidence of Venancio's filiation
(which is not the issue here) it may nonetheless be considered to
determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno and Florencio are
one and the same person, arguing that it is not uncommon for a
person to be called by different names. The Court is not convinced.
There is no evidence that Venancio's father was called either Magno
or Florencio. What is more likely is that two or more persons may live
at the same time and bear the same name, even in the same
community. If it is true that he was the legitimate son of Venancio
Rivera, why did Jose not assert his right as such when his father was
still alive? If, as he insists, he and Venancio Rivera were on cordial
terms, there is no reason why the father did not help the son and
instead left Jose to fend for himself as a humble worker while his
other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a comfortable life.
Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not
even presented at the trial to support her son's allegations that she
was the decedent's lawful wife. Jose says this was not done because
she was already old and bedridden then. But there was no
impediment to the taking of her deposition in her own house. No
effort was made toward this end although her testimony was vital to
the petitioner's cause. Having alleged that Maria Jocson's marriage to
Venancio Rivera was null and void, Jose had the burden of proving
that serious allegation. Now for the holographic wills. The respondent
court considered them valid because it found them to have been
written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of
presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the
authenticity of the wills had not been questioned. Jose Rivera is not
the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question.
Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the
wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of
requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio
Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and
signed by their father, was sufficient.

JOINT WILLS

39
DELA CERNA VS. POTOT (12 SCRA 576)

A joint will was executed by husband and wife in favor of niece.

Husband died first, will was erroneously probated in 1939. Judgment
became final because no appeal was made. Upon the subsequent
death of wife, another petition for probate was made as far as the
estate of wife is concerned. Lower Court declared will null and void
but reversed by the CA on the ground that the decree of probate in
1939 was conclusive on the due execution of will.

Held: The decision in 1939 which became final has conclusive effect
as the last will and testament of husband. Although erroneous
because joint wills are not supposed to be allowed, it could no longer
be corrected by reason of its finality. However, that erroneous
allowance should only apply with respect to the estate of the
husband. The finality of the 1939 decree should not extend to the
estate of the wife which was then the one under consideration
considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator. Upon
the wife’s death, the joint will presented for probate must be
examined and adjudicated de novo (anew).

PROBATE (Art. 838)

HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM vs. UMENGAN (G.R. No. 168156,

December 6, 2006) 

Sometime in January 2001, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel

Cuntapay by her second husband) filed with the MTCC a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Vicenta Umengan, who was then occupying
the subject lot. In their complaint, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam
alleged that they are the owners of the subject lot, having inherited it
from their father. Rosendo Lasam was allegedly the sole heir of the
deceased Pedro Cuntapay through Isabel Cuntapay. During his
lifetime, Rosendo Lasam allegedly temporarily allowed Vicenta
Umengan to occupy the subject lot sometime in 1955. The latter and
her husband allegedly promised that they would vacate the subject lot
upon demand. However, despite written notice and demand by the
heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta Umengan allegedly unlawfully
refused to vacate the subject lot and continued to possess the same.
Accordingly, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam were constrained to institute
the action for ejectment. In her Answer with Counterclaim, Vicenta
Umengan specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint.
She countered that when Isabel Cuntapay passed away, the subject
lot was inherited by her six children by her first and second marriages

40
through intestate succession. Each of the six children allegedly had a
pro indiviso share of 1/6 of the subject lot.

It was further alleged by Vicenta Umengan that her father, Abdon

Turingan, purchased the respective 1/6 shares in the subject lot of his
siblings Maria and Sado. Prior thereto, Rufo already sold his 1/6
share in the subject lot to Vicenta Umengan and her husband. Also
on June 14, 1961, Abdon donated his 1/6 share in the subject lot to
her daughter Vicenta Umengan. According to Vicenta Umengan, the
children of Isabel Cuntapay by her second husband (Rosendo and
Trinidad Lasam) own only 2/6 portion of the subject lot. She thus
prayed that the complaint for ejectment be dismissed and that the
heirs of Rosendo Lasam be ordered to pay her damages.

The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam

and directed the ejectment of Vicenta Umengan. In so ruling, the
MTCC gave credence to the newly discovered last will and testament
(entitled Testamento Abierto) purportedly executed by Isabel
Cuntapay where she bequeathed the subject lot to her son, Rosendo
Lasam, thus:

  x x x my share 1/5 th (one-fifth) of the Cuntapay

heirs, bordered on the North by Sr. Elia Canapi; to the
South, by Calle Aguinaldo; to the East, by Calle P. Burgos
and the West, by the late Don Luis Alonso; on the
property which is my share stands a house of light
materials where I presently reside; this 1/5 th (one-fifth)
share of my inheritance from the Cuntapays I leave to my
son Rosendo Lasam and also the aforementioned house of
light material x x x

The MTCC reasoned that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam anchored their
claim over the subject lot on the last will and testament of Isabel
Cuntapay while Vicenta Umengan hinged hers on intestate succession
and legal conveyances. Citing jurisprudence and Article 1080 of the
Civil Code, the MTCC opined that testacy was favored and that
intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should
prevail. It observed that the last will and testament of Isabel
Cuntapay was not yet probated as required by law; nonetheless, the
institution of a probate proceeding was not barred by prescription.
With the finding that the subject lot was already bequeathed by Isabel
Cuntapay to Rosendo Lasam, the MTCC held that the siblings Abdon,
Sado, Rufo and Maria Turingan no longer had any share therein.
Consequently, they could not convey to Vicenta Umengan what they

41
did not own. On the issue then of who was entitled to possession of
the subject lot, the MTCC ruled in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam
as it found that Vicenta Umengan’s possession thereof was by mere
tolerance.

RULING:

In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: “[a] will is

essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it
may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has
no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the
law being quite explicit: ‘No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules
of Court.’”
 
Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained that
“[b]efore any will can have force or validity it must be
probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer or
tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the
instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the
deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that
it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and
that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding
to establish the validity of the will.” Moreover, the presentation of the
will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy. The
MTCC and RTC, therefore, erroneously ruled that petitioners have a
better right to possess the subject lot on the basis of the purported
last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, which, to date, has not
been probated. Stated in another manner, Isabel Cuntapay’s last will
and testament, which has not been probated, has no effect whatever
and petitioners cannot claim any right thereunder.
 
Contrary to the claim of petitioners, the dismissal of respondent’s
action for partition in Civil Case No. 4917 before the RTC (Branch 3)
of Tuguegarao City does not constitute res judicata on the matter of
the validity of the said conveyances or even as to the issue of the
ownership of the subject lot. Further, it is not quite correct for
petitioners to contend that the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first
marriage could not have conveyed portions of the subject lot to
respondent, as she had claimed, because until the present, it is still
covered by OCT Nos. 196 and 1032 under the names of Pedro and
Leona Cuntapay. To recall, it was already agreed by the heirs of the
said spouses in a Partition Agreement dated December 28, 1979 that
the subject lot would belong to Isabel Cuntapay. The latter died

42
leaving her six children by both marriages as heirs. Considering that
her purported last will and testament has, as yet, no force and effect
for not having been probated, her six children are deemed to be co-
owners of the subject lot having their respective pro indiviso shares.
The conveyances made by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first
marriage of their respective pro indiviso shares in the subject lot to
respondent are valid because the law recognizes the substantive right
of heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/co-
ownership among the heirs. Contrary to the assertion of petitioners,
therefore, the conveyances made by the children of Isabel Cuntapay
by her first marriage to respondent are valid insofar as their pro
indiviso shares are concerned. Moreover, the CA justifiably held that
these conveyances, as evidenced by the deed of donation and deed of
sale presented by respondent, coupled with the fact that she has been
in possession of the subject lot since 1955, establish that respondent
has a better right to possess the same as against petitioners whose
claim is largely based on Isabel Cuntapay’s last will and testament
which, to date, has not been probated; hence, has no force and effect
and under which no right can be claimed by petitioners. Likewise, it is
therefore in this context that the CA’s finding on the validity of Isabel
Cuntapay’s last will and testament must be considered. Such is
merely a provisional ruling thereon for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to possession de facto.

JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT

ARANAS vs. MERCADO, ET AL. (G.R. No. 156407, January 15,

2014)

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of

properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its
determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties
are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired.
Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory
is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

43
CAMAYA vs. PATULANDONG (G.R. No. 144915, February 23,
2004)

On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes executed a notarized will

wherein she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson
Anselmo Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan). The testatrix’s son Bernardo
Patulandong (Patulandong) was in the will appointed as the executor.
During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate
of her will before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija
where it was docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128. By Order of January 11,
1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.

On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying the

devise in her will in this wise:

“UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na nakalagay sa barrio ng

Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, magsukat 36,384 metro
cuadrados, at nagtataglay ng TCT No. NT-47089, na aking
ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN,
sangayon sa Pangkat IKA-LIMA, pp. 5-6, ng aking HULING
HABILIN (Testamento), ay ipinasiya kong ipagkaloob at
ipamana sa aking mga anak na sina BERNARDO,
SIMPLICIA, GUILLERMA at JUAN nagaapellidong
PATULANDONG, at sa aking apong si ANSELMO P.
MANGULABNAN, sa magkakaparehong bahagi na tig-
ikalimang bahagi bawat isa sa kanila.

IKALAWA. - Na maliban sa pagbabagong ito, ang lahat ng

mga tadhana ng aking HULING HABILIN ay aking
pinagtitibay na muli.”

Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor

Patulandong of the title to Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to heed the
request, however, in view of the codicil which modified the testator’s
will. Mangulabnan thus filed an “action for partition” against
Patulandong with the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija (the
partition case). The trial court rendered a decision in the partition
case ordering the partitioning of the properties and the defendant to
deliver the copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089 and
holding further that in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself,
the partition is without prejudice to the probate of the codicil in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

44
On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Nueva Ecija a petition for probate of the codicil of the testatrix (Sp.
Proc. No. 218). On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the
partition case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the
testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT-215750 was issued in his
name. Mangulabnan later sold to herein the Camayas Lot No. 288-A
by a Deed of Sale dated February 19, 1991. TCT No. NT-215750 was
thus cancelled and TCT No. NT-216446 was issued in the name of the
Camayas.

On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision in Sp. Proc. No.
218 admitting the codicil to probate and disposing as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is

hereby rendered in the following manner:

1. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750

issued by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the
name of Anselmo Mangulabnan dated February 7, 1991
and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in favor of
the intervenors Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo, all
surnamed Camaya on February 19, 1991 and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. NT-216446 under date March 18,
1991 issued in the names of the above-named intervenors
as NULL and VOID and of no force and effect; and,

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to

cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and
NT-216446 and reissue the corresponding Certificate of
Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Filipino, married to
Gorgonia Mariano residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, Juan R. Patulandong, Filipino, widower and residing
at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija; Guillerma R.
Patulandong Linsangan of legal age, Filipino, widow and
residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Simplicia R.
Patulandong Mangulabnan, of legal age, widow, and
residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija and her
grandson, Anselmo Mangulabnan with full personal
circumstances stated herein to the extent of one fifth
(1/5) each pursuant to the approved codicil (will) of
Rufina Reyes dated June 27, 1973.

ISSUES:

45
1. Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it
declared null and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of
petitioners and the deed of sale; and

2. Whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. 552 bars the
allowance of the codicil.

RULING:

In Cuizon v. Ramolete, this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction

of a probate court, to wit:

It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of

proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.

xxx

Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in
the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the
respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the
inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to
deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership
of the property. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it

further declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and
void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and
ownership of the property.

Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which

reads:

46
SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law,

petitioners’ titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null

and void.

As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil

to probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in the partition
case which is not allowed by law; and that petitioner Camayas are
innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption that
the transfer was lawful.

Petitioners’ first argument does not persuade.

Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and
executory as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its
dispositive portion that the decision was “without prejudice [to] ...
the probate of the codicil.” The rights of the prevailing parties in
said case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the
codicil.

The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of
petitioners’ titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the
merits of petitioners Camayas’ claim that they are innocent
purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer
was lawful.

ROMERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 188921, April 18,

2012)

Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate

or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons or the appointment of
executors, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings.

While it is true that a probate courts determination of ownership over

properties which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in
nature, this rule is applicable only as between the representatives of

47
the estate and strangers thereto. Indeed, as early as Bacquial v.
Amihan, the court stated thus:

xxx The rulings of this court have always been to

the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs,
intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed
to do so protect the same, but not for a decision on their
action. In the case of In re Estate of the deceased Paulina
Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia,
et al., 67 Phil., 353, this court held:
 
A court which takes cognizance of
testate or intestate proceedings has power
and jurisdiction to determine whether or not
the properties included therein or excluded
therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased,
although such a determination is not final or
ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to
the right of interested parties, in a proper
action, to raise the question on the ownership
or existence of the right or credit.
 
To this same effect are rulings in various states of
the United States.
 
* * * That the probate court is without
jurisdiction to try the title to property as
between the representatives of an estate
and strangers thereto is too well established
by the authorities to require argument.
 
There is also authority abroad that where the court
is without jurisdiction to determine questions of title, as
for example, as between the estate and persons
claiming adversely, its orders and judgments relating to
the sale do not render the issue of title res judicata.

In any case, there is no merit to petitioners claim that the

issues raised in the case at bar pertain to title and ownership and
therefore need to be ventilated in a separate civil action. The issue
before the court is not really one of title or ownership, but the
determination of which particular properties should be included in the

48
inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed
the properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties
of their parents and, therefore, part of the estate that was illegally
sold to the respondent. Some of these real properties identified seem
to be the same real properties that form part of the inventory of the
estate in the intestate proceedings.

Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory

heirs, they also seek to be the owners, pro indiviso, of the said
properties. To anchor their claim, they argue that the properties are
conjugal in nature and hence form part of their inheritance. For his
defense, Vittorio contends that the lots are the paraphernal properties
of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio subsequently
redeemed.

In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared

that the determination of whether a property is conjugal or
paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the
estate rests with the probate court:

xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between

heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of
properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been
recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so
because the purpose of an administration proceeding is
the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue
among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment
of all the debts and expenses. Thereafter, distribution is
made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the
persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the
nature of an action of partition, in which each party is
required to bring into the mass whatever community
property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a
necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce
proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in
dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of
the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents
necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so
long as no interests of third parties are affected.
 

49
 In the case now before us, the matter in
controversy is the question of ownership of certain
of the properties involved whether they belong to
the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily
has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among his heirs who are all parties to
the proceedings.

In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties

subject of the allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of
their share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory
of the estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus,
only the probate court can competently rule on whether the
properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the
probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and
distribute the same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have
been paid.

JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT; DISINHERITANCE

RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. vs.

RODRIGUEZ (G.R. No. 192828, November 28, 2011)

The Complaint, is captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of

Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with
Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a]
Writ of Preliminary Injunction". In the Complaint, the respondents
alleged, among others, that that Ramon misrepresented himself as
Antonio's (decedent) and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he
was adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. The
decedent died of a stab wound and police investigators identified
Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused
in a criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest
issued against him have remained unserved as he is at large. From
the foregoing circumstances and upon the authority of Article 919 of
the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents concluded that Ramon can
be legally disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share
from the estate of Antonio.

50
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to
determine (a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a
waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d)
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or the exclusive
property of the deceased spouse. Further, the extent of Antonio's
estate, the status of the contending parties and the respondents'
alleged entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA
now in Metrobank's custody are matters which are more appropriately
the subjects of a special proceeding and not of an ordinary civil
action.

RULING:

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a

civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for
in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is
distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and
not a complaint should be filed.

Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only

through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This
Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in
their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of
Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition
of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for
Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of
the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate
court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

REPROBATE; Art. 816 

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE

WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR ( G.R. No.
169144, January 26, 2011)

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will

executed abroad by a foreigner although it has not been probated in

51
its place of execution. Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that
wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated and
allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here.
This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of
the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only
allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the
testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b)
the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the
probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on
probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance
with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution
of a will.

RULING:

Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners

abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed
in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal
effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the
will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if
made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may
take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in
the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any
time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. Our rules require merely
that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as
known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names,
ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters
are prayed; and (e)  if the will has not been delivered to the court,
the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer
to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.
The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

52
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and
allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin
obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before
admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that
probate where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the
Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule
applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the
present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding
the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over
the matter can be established. Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught
with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go
abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them
outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved
and allowed by the proper court.

PROBATE; PRETERITION

MORALES vs. OLONDRIZ, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 198994; February 3,

2016)

Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will,

either because he is not named or, although he is named as a father,
son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of
the estate without expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the
heir of his legitime. Preterition requires that the omission is total,
meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or
advances on his legitime.

In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a

compulsory heir from the testator's inheritance without the heir's
express disinheritance.

Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the

53
direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and
legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired.
Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the
preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total
intestacy.

In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco

Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate
son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales
could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the
conclusion of his preterition.

During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to

present evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and
advances on his legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did not
appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to
present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching
the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.

The remaining question is whether it was proper for the RTC to (1)
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will during probate proceedings
and (2) order the case to proceed intestate because of preterition.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the

court's inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the
will; the probate court will only determine the will's formal validity
and due execution. However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute.
It is not beyond the probate court's jurisdiction to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional
circumstances. When practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even before it is probated,
the probate court should meet the issue.

The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and
Francisco's preterition annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment
effectively caused the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total
intestacy of the inheritance. The decedent's will, no matter how valid
it may appear extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of separate
proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error -
much less grave abuse of discretion - on the RTC for ordering the
case to proceed intestate.

54
LEGITIME; PRETERITION

HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR. vs. HEIRS OF LIBERATO

M. URETA (G.R. No. 165748, September 14, 2011)

Alfonso executed on October 25, 1969, a Deed of Sale in favor of

Policronio, covering six parcels of land, which are the properties in
dispute in this case. Since the sales were only made for taxation
purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued
to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. When Alfonso
died on October 11, 1972, the parcels transferred to Policronio were
tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned over
the produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but to
Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate. Policronio died
on November 22, 1974. Neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took
possession of the subject lands. On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s heirs
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the
lands that were covered by the deeds of sale that were previously
executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s
eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. Believing that the six
parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded
from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession,
Annulment of Documents, Partition, and Damages against the Heirs of
Alfonso before the RTC.

RULING:

Inapplicability of Article 842

The Heirs of Policronio argued that even assuming that the Heirs of
Alfonso have an interest in the Deed of Sale, they would still be
precluded from questioning its validity. They posited that the Heirs of
Alfonso must first prove that the sale of Alfonso’s properties to
Policronio substantially diminished their successional rights or that
their legitimes would be unduly prejudiced, considering that under
Article 842 of the Civil Code, one who has compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate provided that he does not contravene the
provisions of the Civil Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.
Having failed to do so, they argued that the Heirs of Alfonso should be
precluded from questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale.

Still, the Court disagrees. Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:

55
 Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose
by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed.
 One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this
Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.

This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will.

What is involved in the case at bench is not a disposition by will but
by Deed of Sale. Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not first prove that
the disposition substantially diminished their successional rights or
unduly prejudiced their legitimes.

Preterition

The Heirs of Alfonso were of the position that the absence of the Heirs
of Policronio in the partition or the lack of authority of their
representative results, at the very least, in their preterition and not in
the invalidity of the entire deed of partition. Assuming there was
actual preterition, it did not render the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
voidable. Citing Article 1104 of the Civil Code, they aver that a
partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall
not be rescinded, but the heirs shall be proportionately obliged to pay
the share of the person omitted.

The Heirs of Alfonso also argued that all that remains to be adjudged
is the right of the preterited heirs to represent their father, Policronio,
and be declared entitled to his share. They contend that remand to
the RTC is no longer necessary as the issue is purely legal and can be
resolved by the provisions of the Civil Code for there is no dispute
that each of Alfonso’s heirs received their rightful share. Conrado,
who received Policronio’s share, should then fully account for what he
had received to his other co-heirs and be directed to deliver their
share in the inheritance.

These arguments cannot be given credence. Their posited theory on

preterition is no longer viable. It has already been determined that
the Heirs of Policronio gave their consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition and they have not been excluded from it. Nonetheless, even
granting that the Heirs of Policronio were denied their lawful
participation in the partition, the argument of the Heirs of Alfonso
would still fail.

56
Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory
heir from the inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with
regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by
not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the
hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he
is mentioned in the will in the latter case. Preterition is thus a
concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at
bench, there is no will involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.

INSTITUTION/SUBSTITUTION

RABADILLA vs. CA (JUNE 29, 2000)

In the Codicil of testatrix, Dr. Rabadilla was instituted as a devisee of
Lot No. 1392 contained the following provisions, among others:
1. Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to
give to Belleza 100 piculs of sugar until Belleza dies;
2. Should Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No.
1392 shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as
specified to Belleza.
3. In the event that the lot is sold, leased, or mortgaged, the
buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to
respect and deliver yearly sugar to Belleza. Should the
command be not respected Belleza shall immediately seize the
lot and turn it over to the testarix’ near descendants.

HELD:
Not a case of simple substitution. In simple substitutions, the second
heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. The Codicil do not provide that
should Dr. Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him.
What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his
heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution. In a fideicommissary

substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the
property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. Here, the
instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the
property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the
sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a

57
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing
upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its
transmission to the second heir. Also, the near descendants' right to
inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to
them should Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to
deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent. Moreover, a
fideicommissary substitution is void if the first heir is not related by
first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near
descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Rabadilla.

Not a conditional institution. It is clear that the testatrix intended that

the lot be inherited by Dr. Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that
the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest to deliver sugar to Belleza, during the lifetime
of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear,
though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property
shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. Since
testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation
imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the
testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as
modal and not conditional.

The manner of institution of Dr. Rabadilla is modal in nature because

it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however,
affecting the efficacy of such institution. A "mode" imposes an
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy
of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition
suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not
suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.

RESERVA TRONCAL (Art. 891)

MENDOZA, ET. AL. vs. DELOS SANTOS (G.R. No. 176422, March
20, 2013)

Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and

Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children:

58
Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin.
Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and
Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely,
Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentin’s
children. Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido
and Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After
Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died
intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria’s death,
respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these
properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence,
petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by
respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them,
applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.

RULING:

Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on

reserva troncal is not applicable.

The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the

erroneous premise that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in
Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin
of the subject properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine
whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel.

59
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should
be reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where
the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the
properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the
property. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and
he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally
came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received
the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.

Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property
should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant;
rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral relative. Gregoria’s ascendants are
her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, great-
grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s descendants,
if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-
grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s ascendants, both petitioners and
Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives.

Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as

they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom
the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line
from which the property came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are
Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First
cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not
reservees or reservatarios.

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio

and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only
to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable
properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of
nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to
represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the
brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third
degree.

If at all, what should apply in the distribution of Gregoria’s estate are

Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed

60
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference

among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.

SIENES vs. ESPARCIA (1 SCRA 750)

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the simultaneous sales
made by both the reservor and the reservees to two different buyers.
The reservor may alienate the reservable property subject to as
resolutory condition - his death – by virtue of which, the property
shall be transferred to relatives of the prepositus within the third
degree (reservees). In effect, there is a double resolutory condition –
(1) death of the reservoir; and (2) the survival of the reservees upon
the death of the reservor.

IRON CURTAIN BAR RULE (Art. 992)

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA

AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY (G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010)

On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),

married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979,
their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both
Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived
by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay. During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel
Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein
respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-
Suntay. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently
annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio
III and Nenita Suntay Tañedo (Nenita), by two different women,
Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively. Despite the
illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a
mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina
and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an

61
acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by
the spouses Federico and Cristina. Upon the death of Cristina,
Federico adopted Emilio III. During the intestate proceeding over
Cristina’s estate, Federico sought appointment as administrator
thereof. Later on, he nominated Emilio III to act as administrator.

The Court of Appeals (CA) zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as an

illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his
deceased father in the estate of the latter’s legitimate mother, the
decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was
merely nominated by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the
latter’s appointment as administrator of the decedent’s estate, cannot
be appointed as the administrator of the decedent’s estate for the
following reasons:

1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive

condition, i.e., Federico’s appointment as administrator of the
estate, he being the surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent.
The death of Federico before his appointment as administrator
of Cristina’s estate rendered his nomination of Emilio III
inoperative;

2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and

illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of decedent’s son, Emilio I,
respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to share in
the distribution of Cristina’s estate as an heir;

3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the

Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his
grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the
administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent;
and

4. Contrary to the RTC’s finding, respondent is as much

competent as Emilio III to administer and manage the subject
estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications specified
in Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.

The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and
respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent’s estate.

62
RULING:

We cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding Emilio

III in the administration of the decedent’s undivided estate.
Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several undisputed facts and
circumstances:

1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession

is to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the
decedent, absent a valid and effective will;

2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the
iron curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts
obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico
and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin
to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;

3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina,

and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as
their grandchild;

4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate

of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal
partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;

5. Cristina’s properties forming part of her estate are still

commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her
share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her
death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and

6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to

share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir,
one degree from Federico, not simply representing his deceased
illegitimate father, Emilio I.

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding

Emilio III from the administration of the decedent’s estate. As
Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is
as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent,
considering that the CA even declared that "under the law, [Federico],
being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share
in the conjugal partnership." Thus, we are puzzled why the CA
resorted to a strained legal reasoning – Emilio III’s nomination was

63
subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason
of Federico’s death – wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.

COLLATION

ARELLANO vs. PASCUAL (G.R. No. 189776, December 15,

2010)

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs

his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented
by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano and Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. During his
lifetime, Angel donated to Amelia a parcel of land (the donated
property) located in Teresa Village, Makati. In a petition for "Judicial
Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration," filed by respondents on April 28, 2000, respondents
alleged, inter alia, that the donated property located in Teresa Village,
Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent
to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may
be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner. Provisionally
passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property
only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedent's estate, the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid
in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents.

RULING:

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its
purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If
there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary,
secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by
his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not
entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property which he
cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory
heirs. 

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to
any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if
nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as
donation made to a “stranger,” chargeable against the free portion of
the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.

64
 On the second issue:

The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned

equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner
and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants,

ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(underscoring supplied)
 
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers
and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal
shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

ILANO vs. CA(G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994)

In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate
children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other
than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such
successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code
has given these rights to them because the transgressions of social
conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon
them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help
them to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the
misdeeds of their parents. However, before Article 287 can be availed
of, there must first be a recognition of paternity either voluntarily or
by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an
unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from his
parents or to their estate because his rights spring not from the
filiation or blood relationship but from his acknowledgement by the
parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not
because he was the true or real child of his parents but because under
the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

UYGUANGCO versus COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 76873,

October 26, 1989)

65
 "The issue before the Court is not the status of the
private respondent, who has been excluded from
the family and inheritance of the petitioners. What
we are asked to decide is whether he should be
allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of
his claimed father, who is already dead, in the
absence of the documentary evidence required by
the Civil Code.

Xxx

Under the Family Code, it is provided that:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.

The following provision is therefore also available to

the private respondent in proving his illegitimate
filiation:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is

established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register

or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public

document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the

legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the

status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court

and special laws.

While the private respondent has admitted that he

has none of the documents mentioned in the first
paragraph (which are practically the same
documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil

66
Code except for the "private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent himself'''), he insists that he
has nevertheless been "in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child,"
which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation.

Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from

1967 until 1973, receiving support from him during
that time; that he has been using the surname
Uyguangco without objection from his father and
the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma,
a special power of attorney executed in his favor by
Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio
Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the
copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly
family business; that he was a director, together
with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons
Development Corporation, a family corporation; and
that in the addendum to the original extrajudicial
settlement concluded by the petitioners he was
given a share in his deceased father's estate.

It must be added that the illegitimate child is now

also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

The problem of the private respondent, however, is

that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code,
his action is now barred because of his alleged
father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this
Article 175 reads as follows:

The action must be brought within the same period

specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. (Italics supplied.)

67
 It is clear that the private respondent can no
longer be allowed at this time to introduce
evidence of his open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child
or prove his alleged filiation through any of the
means allowed by the Rules of Court or special
laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario
Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer
be heard on the claim of his alleged son's
illegitimate filiation.

PROHIBITION TO PARTITION (Art. 1083) 

IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND

TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO (G.R. No. 179859, August
9, 2010)

Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages-the first to

Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia
Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and
Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion,
Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco. Basilio and his
second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents
Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein
petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago. After
Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the
second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a petition for the probate of
Basilio's will. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the
RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.

The will contained the following provisions, among others:

"Xxx

e) Ang lupa't bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na

nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) na nasailalim ng TCT
No. 131044ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila
Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa
kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan
lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga
anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa

68
 habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung
magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na
mga lunsod x x x."

After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a "Final Accounting,

Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will," the probate
court approved the will by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the
registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila to register the certificates of
title indicated therein. Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837,
7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were
transferred in the name of petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente.

On October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the second marriage filed

before the probate court a Motion for Termination of Administration,
for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of all the heirs
citing that the administration of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente
Santiago over the house and lot in Manila expired on September 16,
1993. Consequently, Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
should have ceased as such administrators way back on September
16, 1993 and they should have transferred the above said titles to all
the heirs of the decedent. Opposing the motion, petitioners Ma. Pilar
and Clemente argued that with the approval of the Final Accounting,
Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and with the
subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the properties
involved, the case had long since been closed and terminated. The
petitioners objected to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila,
covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the
heirs as it would contravene the testator's intent that no one is to own
the same.

RULING:

Petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila,

covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the
legatees-heirs as it would contravene the testator’s intent that no one
is to own the same. The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from
Basilio’s will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to be
transferred in petitioners’ names for administration purposes only,
and that the property be owned by the heirs in common. But the
condition set by the decedent on the property’s indivisibility is subject
to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the appellate court, viz:
 

69
 For this Court to sustain without qualification,
[petitioners]’s contention, is to go against the
provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and
1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that the
prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership
can only last for twenty (20) years x x x x
 
xxxx
 
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the
effect of the indivision of a property for more than
twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to
sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly
mandated by the Civil Code x x x x

VALIDITY OF ORAL PARTITION VALID

PADA-KILARIO vs. CA (G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000)

The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his

heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private
document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and
be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74
of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public
document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then
that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. Without
creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from
which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or
other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition
of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so
as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. The
requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for
their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment
of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public
instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does
not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as
among themselves.
And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New
Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed

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a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a
transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation
or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in
favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.

PRETERITION; PARTITION INTER VIVOS

J.L.T. AGRO, INC. vs. BALANSAG (G.R. No. 141882, March 11,
2005)

The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering 954

square meters, known as Lot No. 63, which was originally
registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian
and Antonia under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203.
When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in
an action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No.
3443 entitled "Josefa Teves Escaño v. Julian Teves, Emilio B.
Teves, et al." Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don Julian,
participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case
entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the
partition of all the properties of Don Julian. On the basis of the
compromise agreement and approving the same, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his two
(2) children of the first marriage. The property was to remain
undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio
likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the electric
plant, the "movie property," the commercial areas, and the house
where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was
retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.

On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a

Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in
favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (JLT). Less than a year later, Don Julian,
Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled
Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the
Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed) dated 31 July 1973.
This instrument which constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed
of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other
properties, in favor of JLT. On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died
intestate. On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor,
JLT caused the registration of the subject lot in its name on 12
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November 1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was issued
in the name of JLT. Since then, JLT has been paying taxes
assessed on the subject lot.

Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken

possession over the subject lot after the execution of the
Compromise Agreement. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her
children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate
dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was
allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn
and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was already
registered in the name of JLT in 1979, spouses Antonio Balansag
and Hilaria Cadayday bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate dated 9
November 1983. At the Register of Deeds while trying to register
the deed of absolute sale, spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria
Cadayday discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of
JLT. Thus, they failed to register the deed. Consequently, as
vendees of Lot No. 63, spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria
Cadayday filed a complaint before the RTC, seeking the declaration
of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name of JLT and
the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus damages.
According to the spouses, in the Compromise Agreement, the
future legitimes were determined, adjudicated and reserved prior
to the death of Don Julian; that Don Julian had no right to dispose
of or assign Lot No. 63 to JLT because he reserved the same for his
heirs from the second marriage pursuant to the Compromise
Agreement; and that the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a
preterition of his heirs from the second marriage.

RULING:

Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the

Compromise Agreement has to be quoted again:

13.     That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties

herein adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaño and Emilio B. Teves,
(excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa
together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood
as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from
their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights
which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their
father, Julian L.Teves.  In other words, the properties now

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selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his
share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be
adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves
and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his
two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and
Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria
Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves.” (Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future
legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the
death of Don Julian. The Court agrees. Our declaration in Blas v.
Santos is relevant, where we defined future inheritance as any
property or right not in existence or capable of determination at
the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by
succession.

Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which
are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract.
The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to
future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition
inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.

For the inheritance to be considered “future,” the succession must not

have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be
classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the
second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites
concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the
inheritance; and

(3)     That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an

expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to

the exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on future
things, reads:

ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act

inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

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In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the
opinion that if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no
formalities are prescribed by the Article. The partition will of
course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily
require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that
is the mode of acquiring ownership.  Neither will the formalities of a
donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring
the ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows
that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the
partition here is merely the physical determination of the part to be
given to each heir.

Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a
testator to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them
among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a
testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui generis,
which is revocable at any time by the causante during his
lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his
death.  It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due
to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors
and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.

The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly

valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would
become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right
of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to
him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It
was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being
the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was
inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it
related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.

Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment

covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the
owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only
pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death.
Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute
right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged
by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already
been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.

Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian

had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime.
The lower court ruled that he had done so through the Supplemental

74
Deed.  The appellate court disagreed, holding that the Supplemental
Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don
Julian’s heirs from the second marriage.  Petitioner contends that the
ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.  The contention is well-
founded.

Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or

all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.  Manresa
defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by
not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by
not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor
assigning to him some part of the properties. It is the total omission
of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It consists in
the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting
him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not
giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly
disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case.
But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant
a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a
forced heir.

In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he
resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced
by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature
if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian
in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime.  Besides,
there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage
could inherit from Don Julian upon his death.  A couple of provisions
in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire
along this line. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don
Julian’s heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition
to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.

OMISSION OF COMPULSORY HEIRS IN THE PARTITION

REILLO, ET AL. vs. HEIRS OF QUITERIO SAN JOSE AND

ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO (G.R. No. 166393, June 18, 2009)

When petitioners admitted that respondents Galicano, Victoria,

Catalina and Maribeth are the children and grandchild, respectively, of

75
the spouses Quiterio and Antonina, they impliedly admitted that they
are not the sole heirs of Quiterio and Antonina. Under the rules, no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. The respondents were
not notified since the petitioners misrepresented themselves as
legitimate descendants and sole heirs of the deceased spouses
Quiterio and Antonina in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. As
such, it is only proper for the court to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement.

LEGAL REDEMPTION (Art. 1088)

Baylon vs. Amador (G.R. No. 160701.   February 9, 2004)

The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. This Court has long
established the rule that, notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-
owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-
owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms
and conditions as well as its efficacy and status.

Private respondent was never given such written notice. He thus still
has the right to redeem said one-third portion of the subject property.
On account of the lack of written notice of the sale by the other co-
heirs, the 30-day period never commenced.

CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 162421, August

31, 2007)

Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a parcel of land to his
surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco,
Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito. On July 26, 1971, brothers and
co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to
Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase
within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of
the sale among themselves equally. On August 18, 1971, Alberto
secured a note ("vale") from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of
P300.00. In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner
Nelson. On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption
period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment each to Dr.
Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale
with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased
son, Alberto, including his "vale" of P300.00. On even date, Saturnina
and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold
the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and
Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00.

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On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed
an affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the
amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the
age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for
the obligation of petitioner Nelson's late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66
for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well
as his "vale" of P300.00. In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson,
then residing in Manila, went back to his father's hometown in
Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his uncle, Rito, of
the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to
redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation process that
he initiated. On January 12, 1995, contending he could not have sold
his share in the subject property when he was a minor, petitioner
Nelson filed a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus
damages. In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that
petitioner was estopped from claiming any right over subject property
considering that he failed to consign to the court the total amount of
the redemption price necessary for legal redemption.

RULING:

The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers
and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to
their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to
repurchasing his share, his rights and obligations were transferred to
and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner
Nelson. But the records show that it was Saturnina, Alberto’s mother,
and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. Saturnina was not
subrogated to Alberto’s or his heirs’ rights to the property when she
repurchased the share. A co-owner who redeemed the property in its
entirety did not make her the owner of all of it. The property
remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did not
provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. But the one who
redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price
and until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for the
amount due. Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed for Alberto’s
heirs who had then acquired his pro-indiviso share in subject
property, it did not vest in her ownership over the pro-indiviso share
she redeemed. But she had the right to be reimbursed for the
redemption price and held a lien upon the property for the amount
due until reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of Alberto, i.e.,
his wife and his son petitioner Nelson, retained ownership over their
pro-indiviso share. Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the
subject property was resold to respondents-spouses by the co-

77
owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then minors and as
indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were held
in trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered to them
upon reaching the age of majority.

With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of

sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or
any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with
judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his
mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the
courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did
not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject
property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and
transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which
pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently,
petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their
undivided share of subject property.

But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-

spouses? Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New Civil Code are pertinent:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his

hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or
all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from
the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor.
 
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor,
or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
 
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that
of adjoining owners.

Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or

co-owners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the
property held in common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the
undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his

78
ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem
subject property.

However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share

of petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid such that they were
not divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may
redeem the subject property from respondents-spouses. But they
must do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by
their co-owners vendors.

In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but
years after the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the
fact that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected.
Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then
of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject property.
Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that petitioner Nelson
was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention to
redeem subject property during a barangay conciliation process. But
he only filed the complaint for legal redemption and damages on
January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty days from learning about
the sale.

In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign

ignorance of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict
proof of written notice of the sale would be to countenance an obvious
false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus commending the letter
of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners. 

The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to
petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period commenced in
1993, after petitioner Nelson sought the barangay conciliation process
to redeem his property. By January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson
filed a complaint for legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the
thirty-day period had already expired.

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