G.R. No.

148083
COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS BICOLANDIA DRUG
July 21, 2006

This case should remind all heads of executive agencies which are given
the power to promulgate rules and regulations, that they assume the roles
of lawmakers. It is well-settled that a regulation should not conflict with
the law it implements. Thus, those drafting the regulations should study
well the laws their rules will implement, even to the extent of reviewing
the minutes of the deliberations of Congress about its intent when it
drafted the law. They may also consult the Secretary of Justice or the
Solicitor General for their opinions on the drafted rules. Administrative
rules, regulations and orders have the efficacy and force of law so long as
they do not contravene any statute or the Constitution. It is then the duty of
the agencies to ensure that their rules do not deviate from or amend acts of
Congress, for their regulations are always subordinate to law.

G.R. No. L-1276.

ROSARIO VALERA VS MARIANO TUASON, Jr.
April 30, 1948

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PROVISIONS OF A LAW OR OF

TWO LAWS TO BE HARMONIZED; IMPLIED REPEAL. — Endeavor
should be made to harmonize the provisions of a law or of two laws so that
each shall be effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal another
law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. (U.S. v. Palacios, 33
Phil., 208.) Merely because a later enactment may relate to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an
implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a
continuation of the old one. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 634.)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; DISQUALIFICATION;

TRANSFER OF CASE TO NEAREST JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; SECTION
73 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND SECTION 211 OF REVISED
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE BOTH IN FORCE. — By a fair and reasonable
construction, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may
be said to apply to disqualifications under section 8 of that Act, and section
211 of the Revised Administrative Code to disqualifications or disabilities
not embraced in the Code of Civil Procedure. Both provisions can stand
together.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW WHEN REPEALED BY
GENERAL LAW; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW;
GENERAL LAW AND SPECIAL LAW DEFINED. — A special law is not
regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the
intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant.
And this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to
include the matter in the special statute. (Manila Railroad Company v.
Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.) At any rate, in the event harmony between
provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the
specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirely,
indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. Granting
then that the two laws cannot be reconciled, in so far as they are
inconsistent with each other, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
being a specific law, should prevail over, or be considered as an exception
to section 211 of the Administrative Code, which is a provision of general
character. A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places
and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class,
while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a
class. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 265.)

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 73 OF CODE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE NOT REPEALED OR ABSORBED BY RULES OF
COURT. - There is less reason to hold that section 73 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has been impliedly repealed or absorbed by the Rules of Court
than that it has been abrogated by section 211 of the Revised
Administrative Code; for the authority of a judge to try a case is a matter of
substantive law, not embraced by the purposes and scope of the Rules of
Court which concern "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the
Philippines, and the admission to the practice of law therein." (Introductory
section of the Rules of Court.)

G.R. No. 141309

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO vs FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION
June 19, 2007

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and

does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A
special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to
particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of
the state only.[19]

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari
materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if
possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there
are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general
which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict
with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not be
taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of
the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to
give its words any meaning at all.[20]

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general
act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be
regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and
where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as
remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by
necessary implication.

LICHAUCO V. APOSTOL, 44 PHIL 138

If the general law was enacted first, the special law is considered the
exception to the general law. Therefore the general law remains a good
law, and there is no repeal except insofar as the exception or special law is
concerned. However if there are inconsistencies with the general law it is
considered as a repeal to the general law.

G.R. No. 14205

THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY vs. JAMES J. RAFFERTY
September 30, 1919

In view of the foregoing facts, the question presented above may be stated
more concretely: May a special law or charter be amended, altered or
repealed by a general law, by implication?
That question has been answered in the negative so many times that,
except for the fact that it has not been raised here before, it would scarcely
be necessary to cite authorities.

Repeals of laws by implication are not favored; and the mere repugnance
between two statutes should be very clear in order to warrant the court in
holding that the later in time repeals the other, when it does not in terms
purport to do so. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations [6th Ed.], p. 182, and
cases cited; Sutherland Stat. Construction, Vol. 1, p. 465 [2d Ed.]; Kinney vs.
Mallory, 3 Ala., 626; Banks vs. Yolo County, 104 Cal., 258; People vs. Pacific
Import Co., 130 Cal., 442; Reese vs. Western Union etc. Co., 123 Ind., 294; 7
L.R.A., 583; Cope vs. Cope, 137 U.S., 682.)

In the case of McKenna vs. Edmundstone (91 N.Y., 231) the court said: "It is
well settled that a special and local statute, providing for a particular case
or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its
terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include
the cases embraced in the special law." That rule is but the application of
the larger rule that a statute is not to be deemed repealed, by implication,
by a subsequent Act upon the same subject unless the two are manifestly
inconsistent with, and repugnant to, each other, or unless a clear intention
is disclosed on the face of the later statute to repeal the former one.

It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its

terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not
affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. (Steamboat Company
vs. Collector, 18 Wall. [U.S.], 478; Cass County vs. Gillett, 100 U. S., 585;
Minnesota vs. Hitchcock, 185 U.S., 373, 396.)

Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the
terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the
special — the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case. (State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. [U.S.], 425.)