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71 Ambagan v. People ARTICLE 16 - 20

Ambagan, Jr. v. People,

G.R. No. 204481-82, October 14, 2015
Mayor induced Shootout

The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the inducement be
made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and (2) that such inducement
be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor.

FACTS:

Accused Mayor Ambagan Jr. was charged and convicted by the Sandiganbayan with two counts
of homicide as principal by inducement or the deaths of SPO2 Reynaldo Santos (Santos) and
Domingo Bawalan. The prosecution presented statements from two persons who was said to be
directly present during the shooting.

The first witness (Bawalan) said that the shooting started after he heard the mayor
said “GE, IYAN PALA ANG GUSTO MO, MGA KASAMA BANATAN N’YO NA YAN”.

However, the second witness (Patam) contradicts this when he said that he
instead pushed the mayor out of the road where the shooting incident occurred and that
he did not hear the mayor saying those words which could have provoked and initiate the
shooting of the victims.

Further, evidence provides that Rene Amparo (one of Mayor Ambagan’s men) has
negative paraffin test which would lead to the fact that it is not the Mayor’s men
who initiated the shooting but rather from the deceased Rey Santos.

The Sandiganbayan convicted Ambagan of the crime of double homicide. Aggrieved,

petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforequoted ruling. The Sandiganbayan, however,
would deny petitioner's motion through its assailed October 31, 2012 Resolution. Hence, the
instant petition.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Ambagan can be held guilty for double homicide as principal by inducement.
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71 Ambagan v. People ARTICLE 16 - 20

RULING:

No, the conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the
inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and (2)
that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material
executor.
As applied, the Sandiganbayan would have been correct in holding petitioner criminally liable if
he indeed made the utterance immediately before the shooting incident. However, this
Court is not inclined to believe that petitioner indeed made the declaration that started the
fray.
The court a quo failed to take note of substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of star
prosecution witnesses Patam and Ronnel Bawalan. These contradictions refer not only to minor
details but even to the facts constituting important aspects of the case, seriously eroding the
weight of the evidence of the prosecution, and casting reasonable doubt on the culpability of
petitioner Ambagan.
In the extant case, several circumstances militate against the credibility of Ronnel
Bawalan, the sole witness to the alleged inducement.
First, Ronnel Bawalan claimed that he personally saw the shootout and that he intently
observed the events as they unfolded without blinking. He testified that he saw petitioner
engage Santos in a verbal altercation in the middle of the street, but nevertheless claimed
that he did not see petitioner's whereabouts when the shooting began.
If it were, as Ronnel Bawalan claimed, that he watched the events closely as they unfolded, he
would have noticed that petitioner and Patam walked towards the house of Miling Javier, which
was only about eight (8) meters away from where they were previously situated. For someone
who did not even as much as wink during the ordeal, it is indeed quite curious why he
would miss such a significant detail - the location of one of the main characters in the
spectacle.
Second, it is unfathomable why petitioner, who, according to Ronnel Bawalan, was still in
the middle of the road facing Santos immediately before the shooting, would order his
men to open fire at Santos and Domingo Bawalan given that he himself would have been
caught in the crossfire if they had done so.

Third, Patam's testimony interestingly, is congruent with petitioner Ambagan's version

insofar as petitioner's reaction during the shooting is concerned. As can be recalled,
Patam testified that petitioner wanted to go back to check on his men during the exchange of
gunshots.
So, too, did petitioner claim that he wanted to check specifically on Rene Amparo after he
allegedly saw the latter get shot first.70 The question then is why would petitioner want to traipse
back into the line of fire of a shootout he allegedly initiated? It simply fails to see the light of
reason.

Fourth, if petitioner himself was armed, as Patam claimed him to be, and willing to start a
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71 Ambagan v. People ARTICLE 16 - 20

shootout, according to Ronnel Bawalan, why would he then not draw his own pistol? As
petitioner argued, having his gun tucked to his waist indicated that he himself was not mentally
ready to engage in a gunfight.72 Had he had the mind to start the firefight, he would have

spontaneously drawn his gun. He would not have let Patam, a member of Santos' group and an
easy target given his close proximity, survive the ordeal.

Fifth, Ronnel Bawalan claimed that only Santos, from his group, was wielding a
firearm. He likewise testified that Rene Amparo was the first one to fire his gun, hitting
Santos. If indeed the other victim, Domingo Bawalan, was unarmed, this would have meant that
Santos, by his lone injured self, and before he fell, was able to shoot down three (3) of
petitioner's men: the other casualties Leandro Causaren, Rene Amparo, and Edrelin John
Jamon. Needless to say, this would have been a difficult feat to accomplish in his
wounded state.
Sixth, Ronnel Bawalan's contradicting testimonies as to the details of Ambagan's
bodyguards' demise further damage his credibility. According to Ronnel Bawalan in
his Sinumpaang Salaysay, he personally witnessed the deaths of Leandro Causaren and
Edrelin Jamon as casualties of friendly fire. But on further prodding during trial, Ronnel Bawalan
admitted to not having personally witnessed the deaths of Leandro Causaren and Edrelin
Jamon and that he only learned of such information from other sources.
Lastly, there is, in the case at bar, reason to believe that Ronnel Bawalan is biased
against petitioner, having an axe to grind against the latter for the untimely demise of
Reynaldo Santos and Domingo Bawalan, Ronnel Bawalan's "cousin-in-law" and brother,
respectively.82 Bias is that which excites "a disposition to see and report matters as they are
wished for rather than as they are."83 A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the
cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his
statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false. To warrant rejection
of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the
relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil
motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.
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72 People v. Dulay ARTICLE 16 - 20

People v. Dulay,
G.R. No. 193854 September 24, 2012
Rape, Prostitution in Kubuhan, Speed

Under the RPC, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by

inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable
cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in
criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another
act without which it would not have been accomplished.

FACTS:

Dina Dulay was introduced to AAA, then 12 yrs. old, by the latter’s sister as someone who is nice.
Thereafter, Dulay convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at Parañaque City. Before going
to the said wake, they went to a casino, and thereafter to Sto. Niño, to look for Dulay’s boyfriend,
but he was not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port to ask for some fish, they saw Dulay's
boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, Dulay and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan
located at the back of the fish port. There, Dulay suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a
man known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to Dulay and
heard "Speed" tell Dulay to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife,
tied AAA's hands to the papag, and raped her. AAA asked for Dulay's help when she saw the
latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but Dulay did not do so. After the rape,
"Speed" and Dulay told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back
at her.

Upon going to Laguna, AAA told her sister what happened and the latter informed their mother
about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at the barangay. Thereafter, the barangay
officials referred the complaint to the police station.

Upon conducting physical examination upon AAA, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal Report stating
that there was no evident injury in the body of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual
abuse. During her testimony, Dr. Tan explained that such impression or conclusion pertains to
the ano-genital examination and also stated that she found multiple abrasions on the back portion
of the body of AAA.

RTC: Dulay GUILTY of RAPE as a co-principal by indispensable coopeRation.

CA: Affirmed. Dulay cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by "Speed" by
acts without which the crime would not have been consummated, since she prepared the way for
the perpetration thereof, convinced the victim to go with her under the guise of looking for her
boyfriend and upon arrival at the kubuhan, she pulled the victim inside a room where "Speed"
was waiting, delivered the victim to him, and then after receiving some amount of money from
"Speed" she settled in another room together with her boyfriend so that "Speed" might freely
consummate the rape with violence and intimidation, as he did.
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72 People v. Dulay ARTICLE 16 - 20

ISSUE(S):

Did the RTC and CA err in finding that Dulay was guilty as co-principal of the crime of Rape?

RULING:

NO. Dulay was not guilty as co-conspirator of the crime of rape, but she should be liable
for violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act – To engage in or promote, facilitate or induce
child prostitution.

Under the RPC, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement,
or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in
the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the
acts committed by Dulay are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. Anyone
could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and
AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in
exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the
indispensable aspect of Dulay in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information,
as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by Dulay, thereafter,
she was raped by "Speed."

Sec. 5(a) of R.A. 7610 essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution.
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. Thus, the
act of Dulay in convincing AAA, who was 12 yrs. old at that time, to go with her and thereafter,
offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under the above-mentioned
law.
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73 People v. Gambao ARTICLE 16 - 20

People v. Gambao,
G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013
Fishdealer, Chowking, Ransom

Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the

Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1)
that there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the
execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral
aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation
between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.

FACTS:

Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish deliveries, which
were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August 1998,
two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chan’s
residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been
mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the
two left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as Tony Abao
(Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two returned in the
afternoon, Chan informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to
accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing the passport.
Dilangalen and Abao declined and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.

Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to Chan’s

residence that evening. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs.
Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan
(Levy), and the house companions. As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy
tried to stop the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at
Levy’s head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chan’s feet. Levy thereafter proceeded to the
Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident.

Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about two hours, the group
stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not
to shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two women,
later identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad).
Chan was brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad,
Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol). Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that she would
be killed unless she paid 20 Million Pesos.

On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw
FX" van. After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan
was brought to a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three persons
whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao).
Another woman, later identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived. At about 9:00
o’clock in the evening, a man who was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the
room with a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?” Another man, whom
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73 People v. Gambao ARTICLE 16 - 20

Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed
Chan that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much money she has. Chan was instructed
to talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the ₱75,000.00
she kept in her cabinet. The group then talked to Chan’s son and negotiated the ransom
amount in exchange for his mother’s release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver
₱400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.

Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who
were assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were
informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in exchange for Chan’s release.
During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red
Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s residence. The inspectors observed
that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The inspectors
and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth
Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the cottage
was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue operation.

On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that the
abductors acceded to a ₱400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking"
Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the
team immediately and strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the
restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The
four took the ransom money and headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance
team successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim,
Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was also able to recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.

At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted Cottage No. 1,
resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later
identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.

ISSUE(S):

Did the CA err in affirming the RTC?

RULING:

NO. The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and lied
several times under oath during the trial. Perpenian lied about substantial details such as her
real name, age, address and the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked
why she lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified
with the other accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with people
whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that
there was an ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent that
she was fully aware of the consequences of the unlawful act.
As reflected in the records, the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her
responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had was the testimony
of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was
detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this
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73 People v. Gambao ARTICLE 16 - 20

Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an
accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the Revised
Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be
community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation,
he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or
simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime
in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and
those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability.
Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was
inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she
saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was
wrong and would have reported such incident
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74 People v. Gambao ARTICLE 16 - 20

People v. Cupino,
G.R. No. 125688, April 03, 2000
Three people ganging up on victim with bolo

To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have

performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy, exists
in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions
impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of
the victim.

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered
which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is
therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as
an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation.

FACTS:

In the evening of August 16, 1989 at around 9:45pm, during the celebration of a certain fiesta in
Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, suspect Mr. Ramon Galos & victim Mr. Gromyko Valiente were
having a heated argument. Such incident was happening in front of a particular store called
Dod’s situated at the crossing of the town of Patag.

Suddenly a fist fight occurred between Mr. Galos and Mr. Valiente. During this instance, the
appellants arrived in the scene. Aftewards, all three individuals (Galos, Cupino and Dejoras)
ganged up against and beat up the victim Mr. Valiente. This resulted for the victim to run away
but likewise the three accused pursued him.

When Mr. Galos was able to reach the victim, he suddenly stabbed him twice in his stomach
using a small bolo. This caused the victim to fall down and thus crawl on the floor. Then
afterwards, Mr. Cupino pulled the bolo embedded within the victim’s body and tried to stab
him as well also. But Mr. Dejoras tried to prevent this from occurring by grabbing his
friend’s hand which held the small bolo.

During this process, Dejoras wasn’t able to successfully grab hold of his friend’s hand but
instead caught the knife with its blade. This instantly injured the hand of Mr. Dejoras. But
nonetheless, Mr. Cupino proceeded with his intent of stabbing the victim. Then both Galos and
Cupino immediately fled the scene. The victim, Mr. Valiente, was left lying on the floor soaked
with his own blood. He was eventually brough to the hospital but later died. Mr. Dejoras, on
the other hand, went to a hospital in order to seek treatment upon the hand wound he incurred.

RTC: (1) appellants Dejoras, Galos, and Cupino were guilty of murder, as the killing was qualified
by treachery; (2) conspiracy was proven by the chain of circumstantial evidence submitted; and
(3) the aggravating circumstance of superior strength was absorbed by treachery and may no
longer be used to increase the penalty to its maximum period.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the appellant-accused were guilty as charged.

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74 People v. Gambao ARTICLE 16 - 20

RULING:

RTC’s decision insofar as the conviction of Cupino and Galos, Dejoras should be
acquitted.

In People v. Elijorde, a case with similar facts, we said:

Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral certainty
that he is guilty of murder. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself
through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused
guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy, exists in a
situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly
showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In
a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts
which yielded the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent
or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established
by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference.

Thus, in Elijorde we found one of the accused, a certain Punzalan, innocent under the
circumstances. Similarly, in the present case, we find Appellant Vincent Dejoras not guilty.

Unlike the trial court, we are quite mindful of the testimony of Prosecution Eyewitness Bahian
regarding Appellant Dejoras' participation in that bloody incident on the eve of the fiesta. His
answers to the propounded questions merely established that Dejoras joined Galos and Cupino
when they approached the victim. The prosecution filled, however, to show, what Dejoras
specifically did that proved his participation in the conspiracy. Rather, what the said eyewitness
said was that Dejoras tried to prevent Cupino from stabbing the victim, clearly showing that he
did not support the criminal intent and conspiracy of the other two accused. These incontrovertible
data lead to one conclusion: there is reasonable doubt on whether Dejoras conspired with Galos
and Cupino in killing Valliente. We are therefore constrained to exonerate him. Indeed, guilt must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, there is reasonable doubt on the culpability of
Appellant Dejoras as a principal.

Dejoras cannot be held liable as an accomplice, either. In Elijorde, we said:

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which
cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is
therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation
or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation.

The acts of Appellant Dejoras showed that he was not aware of his companions' intent to
kill Valliente; at the very least, there is reasonable doubt as to his knowledge thereof. In any
event, community of design, the first of the requisite elements that must be present before a
person may be held liable as an accomplice, is lacking. On the prosecution's theory that Dejoras
may have inflicted injury on the victim when he joined in the fray, we have combed the records
and found no basis for this speculation. We note that the eyewitness could not recount the details
of the brawl, but merely provided a general picture, saying that everything happened so fast. 35
Hence, we find no basis for Appellant Dejoras' liability even for physical injuries