Crim1 - Art 12 - 14 Cases 50 - 70

CRIM1 PALOMERA
50 People v. Sarcia ARTICLE 12
People v. Sarcia,
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
Rape, Backyard
In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the accused.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other playmates], was
playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree. Suddenly, appellant appeared and
invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling Crisologo’s house. She agreed. Unknown
to appellant, [AAA’s cousin] followed them. Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA’s]
shorts and underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to
lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAA’s] private organ.
Appellant made an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside
her private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA’s cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed
appellant’s dastardly act. Horrified, [AAA’s cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA’s]
mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAA’s] mother answered that they
(referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her clothes.
Appellant then left.
CRIME CHARGED: Acts of lasciviousness which was upgraded by the prosecutor to rape
RTC: GUILTY OF RAPE; RECLUSION PERPETUA; CA: GUILTY OF RAPE; DEATH PENALTY
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the death penalty imposed by CA should be modified on the ground of minority.
RULING:
Yes, it should be modified. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted
that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial
court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since
the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it
is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age
in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in
several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of
the accused regarding his age. Thus the proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
51 People v. Dela Cruz ARTICLE 12
People v. Victoriano Dela Cruz,

G.R. No. 187683 February 11, 2010
Wife Beating
Before an accused may be exempted from criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12
(paragraph 4) of the RPC, the following elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a
lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident and (4)
without any fault or intention of causing it. For an accident to become an exempting
circumstance, the act that causes the injury has to be lawful.
A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity
of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of
obfuscating reason. In short, the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual, and not
subsequent to a plan to commit a felony, and that the accused's drunkenness affected his
mental faculties.
FACTS:
Joel Song (Joel) testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he and two others,
including the aunt of Victoriano, were playing a card game known as tong-its just three to four
arm’s length away from the latter’s house.
While playing, Joel saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife, herein victim Anna Liza
Caparas-dela Cruz (Anna), in front of their house. Joel knew the wife’s name as Joan.
Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latter's hair, then slammed the door.
Joel overheard the couple shouting while they were already inside the house. Suddenly,
Victoriano and Anna came out of the house, together with their young daughter. Victoriano was
behind Anna, with his arms wrapped around her. He asked for Joel’s help. Joel noticed blood
spurting out of Annas mouth. He took the couple’s daughter and gave her to Victoriano's aunt. He
then went with them to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle. However,
Anna died. As shown in the Death Certificate, Victoriano’s wife died of hemorrhagic shock as
a result of a stab wound, trunk.
Victoriano averred that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong against his wife,
evident from the facts that he carried the injured body of his wife; that he sought for help after the
accident; and that he brought her to the hospital for medical treatment. Furthermore, Victoriano
asseverated that he was very drunk at the time. Thus, he prayed that these mitigating
circumstances be appreciated in his favor.
Lower Court: Parricide; CA: Parricide

CRIM1 PALOMERA
51 People v. Dela Cruz ARTICLE 12
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the defendant is entitled to the exempting circumstance under Art. 12 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code.
2. Whether the defendant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
RULING:
1. No, the crime of Parricide is defined and punished under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse
of the accused. The key element in Parricide ― other than the fact of killing ― is the
relationship of the offender to the victim. Clearly, it was established that Victoriano and
Anna were husband and wife by his own testimony.
Even if, for the sake of argument, we consider Victorianos claim that the injury sustained
by his wife was caused by an accident, without fault or intention of causing it, it is clear
that Victoriano was not performing a lawful act at the time of the incident. Before an
accused may be exempted from criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12 (paragraph
4) of the RPC, the following elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act
(2) with due care, and (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident and (4) without
any fault or intention of causing it. For an accident to become an exempting circumstance,
the act that causes the injury has to be lawful. Victoriano's act of physically maltreating his
spouse is definitely not a lawful act. To say otherwise would be a travesty -- a gross affront
to our existing laws on violence against women.
2. No, a person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having
taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime,
sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. In short, the defense must
show that the intoxication is not habitual, and not subsequent to a plan to commit
a felony, and that the accused's drunkenness affected his mental faculties. In this
case, the absence of any independent proof that his alcohol intake affected his mental
faculties militate against Victoriano’s claim that he was so intoxicated at the time he
committed the crime to mitigate his liability.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
52 Ty v. People ARTICLE 12
Ty v. People,
G.R. No. 149275 September 27, 2004
Hospitalized, bouncing checks
A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must
be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
FACTS:
Petitioner Vicky Ty’s mother, Chua Lao So Un, and sister, Judy Chua, were confined at the Manila
Doctors Hospital. To cover their hospital bills amounting to more than P1million, Ty executed a
promissory note and drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital.
Despite being deposited on their due dates, however, the checks were all dishonored by the
drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the
Account Closed advice. As the demand letters to Ty were not heeded, complainant is now
charged for seven (7) counts of violation of BP 22.
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of
a greater injury. She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her
mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless
the bills are paid. Aside from the inconveniences during her mother’s stay, Ty also bewailed the
hospital’s debasing treatment of her mother. The debasing treatment, she pointed out, so
affected her mother’s mental, psychological and physical health that the latter
contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst
for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a
promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mother’s
immediate discharge.
ISSUE(S):
Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant petitioner’s exemption from
criminal liability.
RULING:
NO, for this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites
must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence
that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or
reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not
be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must
CRIM1 PALOMERA
52 Ty v. People ARTICLE 12
show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not
only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity
to the accused for escape.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims
that she was compelled to issue the checks – a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her
before her mother could be discharged for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further
due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such
that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would
induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say
that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother
might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as
to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by
the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a
crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing
one. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior
to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed
she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the
opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Apart from petitioners bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and
bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the
hospitals demands.
Another defense (not related): the justifying circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art.
11. Requisites: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be
greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means
of preventing it. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime.
By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of
postdated checks to secure her obligation. Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be
availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or
imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced
checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mother’s hospital bill.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
53 Del Poso v. People ARTICLE 13
Del Poso v. People,

G.R. No. 210810, December 7, 2016
Photocopy, Iron, child abuse
The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong can be taken into
account only when the facts proven show that there is a notable and evident disproportion
between the means employed to execute the criminal act and its consequences.
The mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation only applies if the act of the victim is both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind.
FACTS:
The victim, VVV was given by her biological mother to the petitioner when she was 7 years
old and the latter then acted as her guardian. On September 10, 2005, when VVV was 9 years
old, petitioner ordered her to attend to petitioner's photocopying business. While attending the
business, VVV fell asleep. When petitioner saw VVV asleep, the former became furious and
laid VVV on top of an ironing board and placed a heated flat iron on her. When VVV tried to
evade the heat emanating from the flat iron, her forehead, right elbow, left cheek, left buttock and
back got burned. Thereafter, petitioner got her down from the ironing board and ordered her to
sleep. The following morning, petitioner's wife saw the burns on VVV and told petitioner not to do
it again. Later on, VVV went to her Lola Ma. Luisa to watch TV and the latter, and several other
people, saw the burns prompting Lola Ma. Luisa to bring VVV to the Barangay Hall where the
incident was put on blotter. Thereafter, VVV was brought to the hospital and then to the police
station.
ISSUE(S):
1. May the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong be

appreciated in this case?
2. May the mitigating circumstance of passion and/or obfuscation be appreciated in this
case?
RULING:
1. No. It is a hornbook doctrine that this mitigating circumstance can be taken into account
only when the facts proven show that there is a notable and evident disproportion
between the means employed to execute the criminal act and its consequences. In
this case, when petitioner pressed the hot iron upon the body of the victim, it must be
presumed that his intention was to physically abuse her since such act was
sufficient to produce the evil which resulted from such act is also worth noting.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
53 Del Poso v. People ARTICLE 13
2. No. The mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation only applies if the act of
the victim is both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind. A child
who fell asleep while attending to a business establishment is not an offense at all
and could not give rise to an impulse sufficiently powerful to naturally produce a justified
diminution of an adult's self-control.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
54 Urbano v. People ARTICLE 13
Urbano v. People,
G.R. No. 182750 January 20, 2009
Barfight, Hot-headed Victim, Lucky Punch
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential

element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the
wrongful act and should immediately precede the act.
FACTS:
Victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the compound of the Lingayen Water District
(LIWAD) where they drank beer in a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two had a
heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner.
Reacting, petitioner asked why Tomelden, when drunk, has the penchant of insulting petitioner.
The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the
fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued throwing
fist blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," on Tomelden’s face,
which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on the
ground had their companions not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused
Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious.
Petitioner and his other co-workers brought Tomelden to the office of the LIWAD general manager
where he spent the night. He remained in the compound the following day. Upon arriving home,
Tomelden informed his wife, Rosario, of the fight the previous night and of his having been
rendered unconscious. He complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which impelled
Rosario to immediately bring him to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy Arellano
examined him and treated his lacerated left index finger, contusions, and hematoma at the right
cerebrum.
On October 2 and 7, 1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of dizziness,
headache, and other pains. The attending doctors observed the patient to be in a state of
drowsiness and frequent vomiting. On October 8, 1993, Rosario brought Tomelden to the Sison
Memorial Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, where the attending physician, Dr. Ramon Ramos,
diagnosed Tomelden suffering from "brain injury, secondary to mauling to consider cerebral
hemorrhage."
Tomelden again complained of extreme head pain, prompting his wife to bring him back to the
Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Arellano again attended to him. This time, things turned
for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to be semi-conscious, sleepy,
uncooperative, and not responding to any stimulant. Tomelden died at 9:00 p.m. of that day due,
per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with
resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill, asserting that
hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter’s death.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
Crime charged: HOMICIDE
RTC: GUILTY of HOMICIDE; CA: AFFIRMED RTC.
The appellate court held that the commission by petitioner of the crime of homicide, as defined
and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), had been proved beyond
moral certainty of doubt, pointing to the lucky punch as the proximate cause of Tomelden’s
hospitalization and ultimately his death. And like the RTC, the CA found no qualifying
circumstance to increase or lower the penalty.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the victim should
be appreciated.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong should be
appreciated.
RULING:
1. Yes. When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an

essential element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the
offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the
provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite
one to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede the act. This third
requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the
aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if
the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4)
when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not
proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.
In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered
immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to
mention other irritating statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in
Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.
2. Yes, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to
kill may be presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still
be considered when attendant facts and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case.
Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried
CRIM1 PALOMERA
to parry the blows of Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky
punch that ended the fight. And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his
unconscious co-worker to the office of the LIWAD’s general manager. Surely, such
gesture cannot reasonably be expected from, and would be unbecoming of, one intending
to commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bareknuckle fight as a means to parry
the challenge issued by Tomelden was commensurate to the potential violence petitioner
was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that lucky punch, an
eventuality that could have possibly been averted had he had the financial means to get
the proper medical attention.
Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in favor of petitioner while finding him
guilty of homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch at Tomelden’s face while their co-
workers were trying to separate them is a compelling indicium that he never intended so
grave a wrong as to kill the victim.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
55 People v. Ignas ARTICLE 13
People v. Ignas,
G.R. Nos. 140514-15, September 30, 2003
Bakery, Affair
The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the
accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity. Thus, in this case, we hold that the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be considered in
appellants favor
FACTS:
Appellant is an elementary school graduate. He resided at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, where he

operated a bakery. He is married to Wilma Grace Ignas, by whom he has a son of minor age.
Wilma Grace used to be the cashier of Windfield Enterprise, which is owned by Pauline Gumpic.
Pauline had a brother, Nemesio Lopate. It was he whom appellant fatally shot.
Sometime in September 1995, appellants wife, Wilma Grace Ignas, confided to her close friend,
Romenda Foyagao, that she was having an affair with Nemesio Lopate. On the evening of
October 16, 1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda, and Nemesio went to Manila. Romenda and Nemesio
were sending off Wilma Grace at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as she was leaving for
Taiwan to work as a domestic helper. Upon arrival in Manila, the trio checked at Dangwa Inn, with
Nemesio and Wilma Grace sharing a room. All three of them stayed at the inn until October 18,
1995, when Wilma Grace left for Taiwan.
Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan four letters written by Wilma Grace on various dates.
Although all the letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them were meant by Wilma Grace to
be read by her paramour, Nemesio. In the other two letters, Wilma Grace instructed Romenda to
reveal to appellant her affair with Nemesio. It was only sometime late in February 1996 that
Romenda, following her bosom friends written instructions, informed appellant about the
extramarital affair between Wilma Grace and Nemesio. Appellant became furious. He declared
Addan to aldaw na dayta nga Nemesio, patayek dayta nga Nemesio (There will be a day for that
Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio). Appellant then got all the letters of Wilma Grace from
Romenda.
At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, according to another prosecution witness, Annie
Bayanes, a trader in vegetables, she was at the Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet. Witness
Bayanes said she was at the unloading area (bagsakan), conversing with another dealer at the
latters booth, when suddenly two gunshots shattered the quiet evening.
Bayanes turned towards the place where the sound of the gunshots came from. She testified that
she saw a person falling to the ground. Standing behind the fallen individual, some 16 inches
away, was another person who tucked a handgun into his waistband and casually walked away.
Initially, she only saw the gunmans profile, but when he turned, she caught a glimpse of his face.
She immediately recognized him as the appellant June Ignas. She said she was familiar with him
as he was her townmate and had known him for several years.
Also at the bagsakan area that night was prosecution witness Marlon Manis. He testified that on
hearing gunshots from the Trading Post entrance, he immediately looked at the place where the
CRIM1 PALOMERA
gunfire came from. He saw people converging on a spot where a bloodied figure was lying on the
ground. Witness Manis saw that the fallen victim was Nemesio Lopate. Manis then saw another
person, some 25 meters away, hastily walking away from the scene. He could not see the persons
face very well, but from his gait and build, he identified the latter as his close friend and neighbor,
June Ignas.
Prosecution witness Mona Barredo, a bakery worker, testified that she knew appellant. She
said they were co-workers formerly at the Annaliza Bakery. Barredo declared that at around 10:30
p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant came to her residence at Pico, La Trinidad. After being served
refreshments, appellant took out a handgun from his jacket and removed the empty shells from
the chamber. Appellant then told her to throw the empty cartridges out of the window. Because of
nervousness she complied. Barredo also said that appellant disclosed to her that he had just
shot his wifes paramour. According to witness on the scene, responding policemen immediately
brought the victim, Nemesio Lopate, to the Benguet General Hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival.
On March 14, 1996, police investigators accompanied by one of appellants brother as well as
prosecution witness Julio Bayacsan, a friend of appellant, went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya, to
invite appellant to shed light on the slaying of Nemesio. Witness Bayacsan testified that shortly
after they arrived from Kayapa, he had an opportunity to talk with appellant at the La Trinidad
Police Station. There, appellant disclosed to this witness that he shot and killed Nemesio.
Prosecution witness Pauline Gumpic, the victim’s sister, testified that she and appellant had a
private talk, while the latter was in police custody, and appellant admitted to her that he killed her
brother. Gumpic declared that appellant revealed to her that he shot Nemesio for having illicit
relations with appellants wife and failing to ask for his forgiveness.
SPO4 Arthur Bomagao of the La Trinidad police, who headed the team that investigated
the fatal shooting of Nemesio, declared on the stand that appellant voluntarily admitted to
him that he shot the victim with a .38 caliber handgun. Bomagao further testified that appellant
surrendered to him the letters of Wilma Grace, wherein the latter admitted her affair with Nemesio.
Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. Sometime during the last week of February 1996, he
said, he entered into a partnership with a friend and fellow baker, Ben Anoma, to operate a bakery
in Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya.
Appellant claimed that he was having a hard time operating his bakeshop in La Trinidad
as he had no helpers. When Anoma proposed a business arrangement, he added, he
immediately seized the opportunity. He averred that he was baking bread with Anoma in Kayapa
on the night Nemesio was killed. Defense witness Ben Anoma corroborated appellants alibi. The
trial court disbelieved appellants defense and sustained the prosecutions version. CRIME
CHARGED: Murder aggravated especially by the use of an unlicensed firearm. RTC: Murder and
considering the aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime and the special aggravating
circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm,
CRIM1 PALOMERA
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the mitigating circumstance mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a

grave offense should be appreciated.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation should be appreciated.
3. Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated.
RULING:
1. No, the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to apply, the

vindication must be immediate. This view is not entirely accurate. The word immediate
in the English text is not the correct translation of the controlling Spanish text of the
Revised Penal Code, which uses the word proxima. The Spanish text, on this point, allows
a lapse of time between the grave offense and the actual vindication. Thus, in an earlier
case involving the infidelity of a wife, the killing of her paramour prompted proximately
though not immediately by the desire to avenge the wrong done, was considered an
extenuating circumstance in favor of the accused. The time elapsed between the offense
and the suspected cause for vindication, however, involved only hours and minutes, not
days. Hence, we agree with the Solicitor General that the lapse of two (2) weeks
between his discovery of his wife’s infidelity and the killing of her supposed
paramour could no longer be considered proximate. The passage of a fortnight is
more than sufficient time for appellant to have recovered his composure and assuaged
the unease in his mind. The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication
of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity. Thus, in
this case, we hold that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave
offense cannot be considered in appellants favor.
The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and
passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the
same facts or motive. In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate
vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion
and obfuscation also blinded him.
2. No, for passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition
of mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator
might recover his moral equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which
spanned the discovery of his wife’s extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover
was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
3. No. On this point, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender has not
actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
(3) the surrender was voluntary. Records show, however, that leaflets and posters were
circulated for information to bring the killer of Nemesio to justice. A team of police
investigators from La Trinidad, Benguet then went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya to invite
appellant for questioning. Only then did he return to Benguet. But he denied the charge
of killing the victim. Clearly, appellants claimed surrender was neither spontaneous nor
voluntary.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
56 Nizurtado v. Sandiganbayan ARTICLE 13
Nizurtado v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 107383 December 7, 1994
Barangay Captain, Malversation of Funds
Voluntary Surrender (Article 13 par 7) may be treated as modifying circumstance independent

and apart from restitution of the questioned funds by petitioner (Article 13, par 10) which is any
other circumstance which is similar in nature from the first to ninth paragraph. Restitution-
voluntary returned the public funds, is akin to voluntary surrender.
FACTS:
An information, accusing Felix Nizurtado of having committed the complex crime of

malversation of public funds through falsification of public document was filed. The
accused, a public officer, being then the Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon falsify and attest
Resolution No. 17 Series of 1983 by making it appear that the Barangay Council of Panghulo
met and identified T-shirt manufacturing as its livelihood project, when in truth and in fact,
as the accused fully well knew, no such meeting was held.
Thereafter, accused submitted the falsified resolution to Secretariat which endorsed the same to
the Land Bank of the Philippines, which on the basis of said endorsement and the falsified
resolution, encashed LBP check No. 184792 in the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00),
which check was earlier received by him as Barangay Captain of Panghulo in trust for the
Barangay for its livelihood project and for which fund accused became accountable, and upon
receipt thereof herein accused, with deliberate intent and grave abuse of confidence did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) out of the funds for
which he was accountable, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount.
When arraigned by the Sandiganbayan, Nizurtado pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.Solicitor
General: Agrees in all respects with Sandiganbayan, malversation of public funds except of the
crime of falsification of public document.
Prosecution and the Defense Stipulation
That sometime in 1983 and 1984, accused Felix Nizurtado was the Barangay Captain and
discharged his functions as such; That sometime in 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlements, the
Metro Manila Commission and Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) undertook a Livelihood
Program for Barangays in Metro Manila consisting of loans in the amount of P10, 000.00 per
barangay. That he received a check in the amount of P10,000.00 for said barangay's livelihood
program; That the check, to be encashed, had to be supported by a project proposal to be
approved by the KKK; That the accused encashed the check received by him in the amount of
P10,000.00 with the Land Bank of the Philippines; and That the accused distributed the amount
of P10,000.00 in the form of loans of P1,000.00 each to members of the barangay council.
Furthermore, a few days after the meeting wherein the check was received, Nizurtado got back
the check from Romero(the treasurer), saying that he would return it because, as admitted by
Nizurtado during the trial, the Councilmen could not agree on any livelihood project. Nizurtado
signed a receipt dated August 4, 1983, for the check "to be returned to the Metro Manila
Commission."
CRIM1 PALOMERA
After a few more days, Nizurtado asked Romero to sign an unaccomplished resolution in
mimeograph form. All the blank spaces in the form were unfilled-up, except those at the bottom
which were intended for the names of the Barangay Councilmen, Secretary, and Captain, which
were already filled-up and signed by Councilmen. In asking Romero to sign, Nizurtado said that
the MMC was hurrying up the matter and that the livelihood project to be stated in the resolution
was that proposed by Romero — barangay service center. Trusting Nizurtado, Romero affixed
his signature above his typewritten name. When he did so, the blank resolution did not yet
bear the signatures of Councilmen Santos Gomez and Ceferino Roldan.
Unknown to Romero and Gomez, the blank but signed resolution was later on accomplished by
writing in the blank space below the paragraph. The word "none" was inserted in the space
intended for the names of the Councilmen who did not attend.
Nizurtado encashed the check on the same day, October 18, 1983, and re-lent the cash
proceeds to himself, Sandel, Aguilar, Bautista, Dalmacio, and Roldan at P1,000.00, and to
Manalang and Oro Soledad, Barangay Court Secretary and Barangay Secretary, respectively, at
P500.00 each.
On April 25, 1984, Nizurtado who was then on leave wrote Sandel, then acting Barangay Captain,
informing him that per record, he, Romero, and Gomez had not made any remittance for the
account of their P1,000.00 loans from the barangay livelihood fund of P10,000.00 and advising
him to collect, through the Secretary or Treasurer.
Since Romero and Gomez had not borrowed any amount from the said fund, they told Sandel to
ask Nizurtado if he had any proof of their alleged loans. So Sandel wrote Nizurtado on May 2,
1984, but the latter did not answer.
This attempt to collect from Romero and Gomez prompted them to make inquiries. They learned
that the check for P10,000.00 was indeed encashed by Nizurtado and that the blank
resolution which they had signed was filled-up to make it appear that in a Council meeting
where all councilmen were present, T-shirt manufacturing was adopted as the livelihood project
of Panghulo. But no such meeting occurred on that day or on any other day. Neither was Nizurtado
authorized by the Council to submit T-shirt Manufacturing as the livelihood project of Panghulo.
On August 9, 1984, Romero and Gomez lodged their complaint against Nizurtado with the Office
of the Tanodbayan.
As of September 7, 1984, the members of the Council who had received P1,000.00 each, as well
as Bacani (also referred to as Manalang) and Soledad who had received P500.00 each had paid
their respective loans to Nizurtado who, in turn, remitted the payments to the MMC.
In June 1987, after demands for payment, Dalmacio remitted the balance of P2,000.00 from his
pocket because, as acting Barangay Captain, he did not want to leave the Barangay with an
indebtedness.The entire P10,000 was fully remitted.
CRIME CHARGED: complex crime of malversation of public funds committed through falsification
of public document.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
SANDIGANBAYAN: convicted the accused of the offense charged with two mitigating
circumstances.
ISSUE(S):
Whether there are mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
RULING:
Yes, the following mitigating circumstances may be appreciated: (1) voluntary surrender;
(2) restitution; and no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
Voluntary surrender may be treated as a modifying circumstance independent and apart

from restitution of the questioned funds by petitioner.
The Court is convinced, furthermore, that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed, entitling him to three distinct mitigating circumstances.
Aside from the penalty imposed for the said crime; in addition, the offender shall be sentenced to
suffer perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed.
The actual attendance of two separate mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
restitution, also found by the Sandiganbayan and uncontested by the Solicitor General, entitles
the accused to the penalty next lower in degree. For purposes of determining that next lower
degree, the full range of the penalty prescribed by law for the offense, not merely the imposable
penalty because of its complex nature, should be considered.
The presence of the third mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem (lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed) would result in imposing a period the court may
deem applicable. Considering, however, that the penalty has to be imposed in the maximum
period, the only effect of this additional mitigating circumstance is to impose only the minimum
portion of that maximum period, that is, from eight years, eight months and one day to nine years,
six months and ten days, from which range the maximum of the indeterminate sentence shall be
taken
CRIM1 PALOMERA
57 People v. Genosa ARTICLE 13
People v. Genosa,
G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004
Battered Woman Syndrome
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants
her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of
intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman."
The existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the
woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense. Crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of
the offense -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly
believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
The one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to
be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary
FACTS:
Marivic Genosa was charged with parricide for killing husband, Ben Genosa. As a defense, she
raised the justifying circumstance of self-defense, as supported by the circumstance of being
subject to the “Battered Woman Syndrome” and that she was 8 months pregnant at the time
of the killing.
Suspecting that Ben Genosa was about to spend his recent earnings on gambling, Marivic
followed Ben and his friends. Ben went home drunk and was confronted by Marivic. However,
Ben got angry after finding out that Marivic followed him, and thus he kept yelling at her taunting
her into a quarrel. Marivic ignored him and went to the room of her children instead, on fear that
he would physically attack her. Disappointed at the lack of confrontation, he switched off the lights
inside the room while she was attending to their homework. Marivic confronted him, but
nevertheless receded to the living room and watched television. Thus, Ben went to the kitchen,
obtained a bolo, and cut the antenna wire to stop her from watching television. He switched off all
the lights, and the children were then screaming as Ben was still armed with the 1 ½ feet bolo.
Marivic ran to the room. She screamed for help, and thus, Ben left the house for another drinking
spree. Marivic, wanting Ben to permanently leave the house, packed his clothes. Consequently,
Ben came back, saw Marivic packing his belongings, got angry, gripped her neck, and dragged
her off outside the bedroom towards a drawer. At this point, Ben uttered, “You might as well be
killed so there will be nobody to nag me.” Marivic was frightened, aware that the drawer contained
a gun. However, Ben could not open it because he did not have the key. Thus, he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade 3 inches long. Marivic scared that he might use the blade instead to cut
her throat, picked up the 3 feet and six inch long metal pipe beside her and smashed Ben’s arm,
causing him to drop the blade and his wallet, and ran into the bedroom. After some time, while
Ben was lying in bed with just his briefs, Marivic ‘distorted’
CRIM1 PALOMERA
the drawer, retrieved the gun, and shot Ben resulting to his death by 'cardiopulmonary
arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the
occipital bone.'
The police found Ben’s lifeless body decomposing for 2-3 days. Ultimately, Marivic admitted to
his killing. The trial court ruled that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping.
Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because
was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed
him with a pipe at the back of his head.
To support her case of Battered Woman Syndrome, she provided the following testimonies:
(1) Dr. Caing, testifying for her physical beatings as shown in her history of the tension
headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate occasions and six
(6) incidents of physical injuries;
(2) Dr. Dayan, as an expert witness testified, “What I remember happened then was it was
more than ten years, that she was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of
instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse.
The husband had a very meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread
earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas,
drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry and
which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting
from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the
husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very
angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware, almost
like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out.”
“This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which
broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that
she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed
continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part.
(3) Dr. Pajarillo corroborated Dr. Dayan’s findings, alleging, “He explained that the effect of
"repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as
the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress
disorder”
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not Marivic is suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS).
2. Assuming arguendo that Marivic suffers from BWS, whether or not the same necessarily result
to the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
3. Whether or not Marivic is entitled to any mitigating circumstances

CRIM1 PALOMERA
RULING:
1. NO. The Supreme Court held that the Marivic’s evidence fell short of the essential
elements of the Battered Woman Syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering
cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man
once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman."
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low selfesteem, traditional
beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon
the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and
false hopes that the relationship will improve.
It has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident;
and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight
physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the
batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way.
What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are
comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited
by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory"
and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first
place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually
successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the
imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the
persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she
becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and
abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control" and leads
to an acute battering incident.
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness

and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet
also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the
CRIM1 PALOMERA
batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of
its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes
that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although
she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute
violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger
physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight
back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that
innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one
hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He
knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her
forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered
woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her
partner will change for the better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real
person whom she loves. A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of
the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels
responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or
seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him.
Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting
her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly
tormented psychologically. The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in
a battered woman's psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally
dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness.
Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner may
believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel
independent, capable of functioning without the other.
In this case, the defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of
violence" supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa.
No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal
incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-
building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical
characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of
the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode
in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.
She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house;
that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that
believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and
thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the
syndrome.
2. No, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the
legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered
in the context of self-defense. The Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense
is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense -- she must have
actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need
to kill him in order to save her life. Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that
the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one's life; and the peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.
In this case, following the requisites of a justifying circumstance of self-defense,

unlawful aggression is lacking. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of
the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented
an actual threat on her life or safety. Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came
out of their children's bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great
probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the
imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized
person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable
pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can
defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" Still, impending
danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the
defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication
can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the
existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
3. Yes, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant
resulted in "cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control," "psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in
concentrating or impairment of memory." Based on the explanations of the expert
witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise
by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her
acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent.
Pursuant to paragraphs 974 and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
58 Manuel v. Sandiganbayan ARTICLE 13
Manuel v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 158413, February 8, 2012
Malversation, Personal Loans
The full restitution of the amount malversed will not in any way exonerate an accused, as
payment is not one of the elements of extinction of criminal liability. Under the law, the refund of
the sum misappropriated, even before the commencement of the criminal prosecution, does not
exempt the guilty person from liability for the crime. At most, then, payment of the amount
malversed will only serve as a mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary surrender, as provided
for in paragraph 7 of Article 13 in relation to paragraph 10 of the same Article of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan charging Melchor M. Mallare (Mallare) and Elizabeth M.

Gosudan (Gosudan), Mayor and Treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Infanta,
Pangasinan with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, defined and penalized under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information ascribed to Mallare and Gosudan (accused) the following acts of alleged
unlawful disbursement, constituting the elements of the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds, to wit:
1) ₱ 995,686.09 for unlawful personal loans to several municipal officials and employees
including themselves;
2) ₱ 291,421.31 for payments without the requisite appropriation; and
3) ₱ 200,000.00 for withdrawals recorded as cash disbursements.
CRIME CHARGED: MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
SANDIGANBAYAN: GUILTY
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the full restitution of the lent public funds can exonerate Mallare and Gosudan
from the crime charged because payment does not extinguish criminal liability.
RULING:
No, the full restitution of the amount malversed will not in any way exonerate an accused,
as payment is not one of the elements of extinction of criminal liability. Under the law, the
refund of the sum misappropriated, even before the commencement of the criminal prosecution,
does not exempt the guilty person from liability for the crime. At most, then, payment of the
amount malversed will only serve as a mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary
surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13 in relation to paragraph 10 of the same
Article of the Revised Penal Code.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
59 Dorado v. People ARTICLE 14
Dorado v. People,
G.R. No. 216671, October 3, 2016
Sumpak, Bully, Minor
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond

reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
circumstances of his act. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered, it is
indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had
elapsed before it was carried out.
FACTS:
On April 15, 2004, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronald was talking to his friends Raniel,
Delon Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a certain Erwin (Ronald's group) along A. Reyes
Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig. At that very time, Dorado, carrying a sumpak, and his
friends, Confessor and Cabiaso (Dorado's group), arrived and threw stones and bottles at
Ronald's group. Ronald's group scampered for shelter toward the talipapa and hide inside to avoid
being hit by the stones and bottles. When Ronald thought that Dorado's group was no longer-in
the vicinity, they came out of hiding. Dorado's group, however, was out there waiting for them.
When they finally surfaced, Dorado's group resumed throwing stones at Ronald's group.
During the commotion, Dorado fired his sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell
unconscious for about ten (10) minutes while Dorado's group ran away. Thereafter, Ronald was
brought to the Rizal Medical Center by Raniel and Delon Busan.
CRIME CHARGED: Frustrated Murder & violation of RA 7610
RTC: Guilty, murder qualified by evident premeditation; Acquitted of violation of RA 7610 due to
prosecution’s failure to establish Ronald’s minority.
CA: Affirmed.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not Ronald should be acquitted due to minority.

2. Whether or not there was a qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
RULING:
1. Yes. After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution did
not make an effort to prove that Dorado, then a sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with
discernment at the time of the commission of the crime. The RTC decision simply
stated that a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must be
appreciated as it was proven that he was a minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly,
there was no discussion a tall on whether Dorado acted with discernment when he
committed the crime imputed against him. Discernment cannot be presumed even if
Dorado intended to do away with Ronald. Discernment is different from intent. Considering
CRIM1 PALOMERA
59 Dorado v. People ARTICLE 14
that there was no determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court cannot rule
with certainty that Dorado was criminally responsible.
2. No, there was none. The For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. For this aggravating circumstance to be
considered, it is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how
much time had elapsed before it was carried out.
Court is of the view, however, that the prosecution was unable to establish the element of
evident premeditation to qualify the crime to frustrated murder.
In this case, evident premeditation was not established because, first, the prosecution
evidence only referred to the matters that happened during the incident, and not to
the preparations undertaken by Dorado beforehand to kill Ronald. There was no
evidence on record which would indicate how and when Dorado hatched his plan
to kill Ronald. The mere fact that Dorado was seen with a sumpak at the beginning of the
. altercation does not unequivocally establish that he earlier devised a deliberate plot to
murder Ronald. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance
must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation."
Second, the prosecution failed to show a sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow Dorado to reflect upon the circumstances of
his act. The prosecution witness did not testify on how long they hid at the back of
the talipapa or how long Dorado's group waited for them to come out. As the lapse of time
between the determination until the execution of the unlawful deed was unclear, it cannot
be established that Dorado had sufficient time to reflect on his actions.
Lastly, Dorado did not have a cool thought and reflection when he shot Ronald. The
RTC observed that there was an ongoing feud between Dorado's group and Ronald's
group. Certainly, Dorado would not have a calm and reflective mind - from the time
Ronald's group hid inside the talipapa market until they moved out of hiding - as he was
obscured by the heat or anger of the moment. The essence of evident premeditation is
that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
60 People v. Macaspac ARTICLE 14
People v. Macaspac,
G.R. No. 198954, February 22, 2017
Drinking, Stabbing, Went Into Hiding
The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to
his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of time between
the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
FACTS:
On July 7, 1988, Macaspac was having drinks with Surban, Barcomo, Reyes, and Jebulan on
Pangako Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In the course of their drinking, an argument
ensued between Macaspac and Jebulan. It became so heated that, Macaspac uttered to the
group: Hintayin nyo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo, and then left. After around three minutes
Macaspac returned wielding a kitchen knife. He confronted and taunted Jebulan,
saying: Ano? Jebulan simply replied: Tama na. At that point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed
Jebulan on the lower right area of his chest, and ran away. Surban and the others witnessed
the stabbing of Jebulan. The badly wounded Jebulan was rushed to the hospital but was
pronounced dead on arrival. The case was archived for more than 15 years because
Macaspac had gone into hiding and remained at large until his arrest on July 28, 2004.
Upon his arraignment on August 31, 2004, he pleaded not guilty to the foregoing information.
CRIME CHARGED: Murder
RTC: Guilty.
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not evident premeditation must be appreciated in the case instead of treachery.
RULING:
No. The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had
clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.
The first and second elements of evident premeditation were thereby established, but the
third requisite is absent in this case; such that by quickly returning to the group with the knife,
Macaspac let no appreciable time pass to allow him to reflect upon his resolve to carry out
his criminal intent. It was as if the execution immediately followed the resolve to commit
the crime. Accordingly, we cannot appreciate the attendance of evident premeditation in the
killing. Without the Prosecution having sufficiently proved the attendance of either
treachery or evident premeditation, Macaspac was guilty only of homicide for the killing of
Jebulan.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
61 People v. Macariola ARTICLE 14
People v. Macariola,
G.R. No. L-40757, January 24, 1983
Bilibid Gambling, Stabbing
Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods or forms which tend directly and
specially to insure the execution of the offense without risk to the accused arising from the
defense which the victim might make.
FACTS:
On September 21, 1971, at around 9:30 am, Romeo Dela Pena who was an inmate at the New
Bilibid prison was standing in his cell (Brigade No. 2D) when he was stabbed by Ricarte
Macariola, who was a fellow inmate, with an improvised weapon called “MATALAS” after which
the victim ran to a certain “kubol” to hide but the appellant pursued him along with other inmates.
Fernando Gomez who was the cell’s MAYOR went inside the cell when he heard the victim shout
and saw appellant on top of the victim and continued stabbing him even after he is already in a
lying position. The prison keepers then arrived and appellant surrendered his bloody weapon.
On the same day, an investigation was made and the sworn statements of Fernando Gomez and
Romeo Sato, while the appellant in his statement admitted having stabbed the victim. On the
autopsy report, Dr. Garcia found that there was a total of 16 stab wounds and stab wound 11
(left lobe of the liver which penetrated the heart) and stab wound 12 (5 in number and penetrated
the lungs) were considered fatal. Dr. Garcia noted that the five wounds found in stab wound No.
12 were very near each other, hence, they could have been delivered while the victim was in a
lying position.
The appellant on his part interposes SELF-DEFENSE. He alleges that he and the victim was
playing “HONG CHANG” (gamble) for about 4 hours and the victim lost around P6.00, and while
the appellant was holding the money he won the victim snatched them from him, and when he
was trying to get them back he was kicked by the victim on the chest, that when he stood up he
held his MATALAS (12 inches long) and upon seeing such the victim also reached under his
pillow to get his own MATALAS, the appellant stabbed him once and the victim failed to get it
because it fell down. They both fell down and the victim was holding him in his neck when he
stabbed him again. Appellant alleges that given the fact the deceased was bigger than him in
terms of height and huskier, that the deceased was a boxer and he has nowhere to go because
their cell was enclosed, he had to use his MATALAS in order to disable the victim and thinking
that his life was in imminent danger, and that upon the arrival of the prison keepers he surrendered
his MATALAS.
CRIME CHARGED: MURDER, qualified “with treachery and evident premeditation, and armed
with improvised deadly weapon.
RTC: GUILTY of MURDER with aggravating circumstance of Treachery, Evident Premeditation

and Recidivism.
CA: Automatic review due to death penalty.

CRIM1 PALOMERA
61 People v. Macariola ARTICLE 14
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not self-defense should be appreciated.
2. Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation should
be appreciated.
3. Whether or not the accused is a recidivist.
RULING:
1. NO, there is no self-defense. Self-defense should be established by clear, satisfactory

and convincing evidence, the victims act of kicking him in his chest did not amount to
unlawful aggression as would justify the killing. It was not of such a nature that posed
actual or imminent and real danger to the accused's life. As per the witness, it was narrated
that both of them “nagpormahan na” meaning they were getting ready to fight which only
shows that the action of the accused is more of a retaliation and not self-defense. Besides
even if the deceased’s act of kicking be considered as unlawful aggression, the same is
not continuous because the deceased ran to a “kubol” when the accused still pursued him
and stabbed him many times. The primal requisite of unlawful aggression is therefore
absent in this case which would not constitute self-defense.
2. YES, with regard to treachery. The commission of the crime was attended by treachery.
Even though an attack may be begun under conditions not exhibiting the feature of
alevosia yet if the assault is continued and the crime consummated with alevosia, such
circumstance may be taken into consideration as a qualifying factor in the offense of
murder. Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods or forms which tend
directly and specially to insure the execution of the offense without risk to the accused
arising from the defense which the victim might make. There are 2 conditions necessary
for treachery to exist 1) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which
would insure the offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the party of the
offended party, which means that no opportunity is given the latter to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously chosen.
NO, with regard to evident premeditation. As what can be seen from the evidence and
testimonies of witnesses there is none, on the contrary a quarrel precipitated the stabbing
incident.
3. YES, there is quasi-recidivism. The accused committed this new felony while serving
sentence for Robbery imposed upon him by maximum period of the Penalty prescribed by
law for this new offense should thus be imposed. The presence of the mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation is of no consequence as quasi-recidivism cannot
be offset by any ordinary mitigating circumstance.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
62 People v. Nazareno ARTICLE 14
People v. Nazareno,
G.R. No. 196434, October 24, 2012
Wake, Brawl
There is abuse of superior strength when: (1) The aggressors purposely use excessive force
rendering the victim unable to defend himself; (2) The notorious inequality of forces creates an
unfair advantage for the aggressor.
FACTS:
On November 10, 1993 David Valdez, Magallanes and Francisco attended the wake of a friend.
While there, they liquor with accused Nazareno and Saliendra. A heated argument ensued
between Magallanes and Nazareno but their companions pacified them. On the next day,
David, Francisco and Magallanes returned to the wake. Nazareno and Saliendra also arrived and
told the three not to mind the previous altercation. At around 9:30pm while David, Francisco and
Aida Unos were walking on the street, Nazareno and Saliendra blocked their path,
Nazareno boxed Francisco who fled but Saliendra went after him with a balisong. Francisco,
who succeeded in hiding saw Nazareno hit David on the body with a stick while Saliendra struck
David’s head with a stone. David ran towards the gasoline station but Nazareno and Saliendra,
aided by some tanods, caught up with him. As David fell, the tanods took over the assault. This
took place as Magallanes stood about 5 meters across the highway unable to help his friend.
Afterwards, Unos brought David to the hospital. Dr. Rebosa performed surgery on David’s head
but the latter died on Nov 14 due to massive intracranial hemorrhage.
Accused’s Defense
Nazareno claimed that he left his house at around 930pm on Nov 11, 1993 to buy milk. While on
a street near his house, he noted a commotion taking place nearby. He then bumped into
Saliendra, Nazareno proceeded home and went to bed. His wife supported his testimony claiming
that she asked her husband to buy milk for their children. When Nazareno returned home, he
informed her of the commotion outside and someone bumped into him. Unos testified that she
saw Saliendra chasing David as the latter hang on the rear of a running jeepney. She claimed
that she did not see Nazareno around the place.
CRIME CHARGED: Murder
RTC: Guilty of murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength and aggravated by treachery;
CA: Affirmed, but no aggravating circumstance of treachery.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present.

CRIM1 PALOMERA
62 People v. Nazareno ARTICLE 14
RULING:
Yes, there is abuse of superior strength.

There is abuse of superior strength when: 1) The aggressors purposely use excessive force
rendering the victim unable to defend himself; 2) The notorious inequality of forces creates an
unfair advantage for the aggressor.
Here, Nazareno and Saliendra evidently armed themselves beforehand, Nazareno with a stick
and Saliendra with a heavy stone. David was unarmed. The two chased him even as he fled from
them. And when they caught up with him, aided by some unnamed tanods, Nazareno exploited
their superior strength and knocked on the defenseless David unconscious. He died from the skull
fracture he sustained.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
63 People v. Dulin ARTICLE 14
PEOPLE VS. DULIN
GR NO. 171284, JUNE 29, 2015
FIGHTING COCK, SELF-DEFENSE
Unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, should not be appreciated, for the two other essential elements of self-
defense would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or
repel.
Unlawful aggression has two kinds:

(a) actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon,
an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury; and
(b) imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening. Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim
FACTS:
A young man came running from the house of Vicente Danao towards the house of Batulan,
shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had been stabbed. Alexander Tamayao rushed towards
Danao’s house, which was about 30 meters from his own house, and there he saw Alfredo Dulin
stabbing Francisco Batulan who was already prostrate face down. Dulin was on top of Batulan,
as if kneeling with his left foot touching the ground. Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair with his
left hand, and thrusting the knife at the latter with his right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran towards
Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the victim’s wife who was his aunt, about the incident.
Tamayao mentioned of the long-standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of
seeing them fighting in April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two occasions: He will soon have
his day and I will kill him.
DEFENSE:
He was in his house when Nicanor Annariao and Raymund Soriano arrived at his house to see
the fighting cocks being sold by Alberto Eugenio (Alberto); that Alberto was not yet around,
arriving only at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening to talk with Raymund and Nicanor about the
price of the fighting cocks; that after their transaction, Alberto served Nicanor and Raymund food,
and he (Dulin) and Jun Danao thereafter accompanied Raymund and Nicanor to the highway to
get a tricycle ride, but on their way, they passed Angel Bancud who called out to him: that he
(Dulin) asked the others to go ahead, and he would just catch up with them; that as he (Dulin)
approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his (Dulin) mother, stabbed him on the right side of
his body and in the left hand; that he complained to Batulan: Uncle, you hit me (Dinisgrasya
nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill you; that he (Dulin) ran to the upper level of Carolina
CRIM1 PALOMERA
Danao’s house, pursued by Batulan who stabbed him again several times; that they grappled for
the weapon until he (Dulin) was able to wrest it from Batulan; that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan with
the weapon, and they struggled until he (Dulin) felt weak, eventually falling to the ground; and that
he (Dulin) regained consciousness only the next day at the hospital. Dulin insisted that there was
no grudge between him and Batulan, but interjected that the barangay captain would summon
him to bring Batulan home each time the latter got drunk at night.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON there was Self-Defense?

2. WON there was treachery present?
RULING:
1. NO, There was no Self-Defense. The most important of all the elements of self defense
is unlawful aggression, which is the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as
a justifying circumstance. Unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the
accused, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, should not be appreciated, for
the two other essential elements of self-defense would have no factual and legal bases
without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.
Unlawful aggression has two kinds:

(a) actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or
with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury; and
(b) imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the
point of happening. Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening
attitude of the victim
Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying circumstance of self- defense
in his favor because all its elements had been present in the commission of the crime. In rejecting
Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had initiated the attack against Dulin
the unlawful aggression from Batulan effectively ceased once Dulin had wrested the weapon from
the latter. Appellant testified that after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able to take
possession of the weapon and ran towards the second level of the house of Vicente Danao, away
from FRANCISCO. At that point, the unlawful aggression against him effectively ceased. When
FRANCISCO and appellant again grappled for possession of the weapon, appellant now became
the armed protagonist, and FRANCISCO’s act of trying to wrest the weapon cannot be considered
as unlawful aggression. At that moment, appellant no longer faced any imminent or immediate
danger to his life and limb from FRANCISCO.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to have
sustained twelve stab wounds25 confirmed the cessation of the attack by Batulan. The numerosity
and nature of the wounds inflicted by the accused reflected his determination to kill Batulan, and
the fact that he was not defending himself.
Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by Batulan did not cease because the
latter followed him into Danao’s house with the singular purpose of ending his life; and that there
was no gap in the aggression initiated by Batulan.24 The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin
admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan and then running away from him. With the
aggression by Batulan having thereby ceased, he did not anymore pose any imminent threat
against Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not committing any aggression when Dulin fatally stabbed him.
2. NO, there was no treachery present. Dulin and Batulan grappled for control of the
weapon Batulan had initially wielded against Dulin, who divested Batulan of it and ran
with it into the house of Danao, with Batulan in immediate pursuit. They continued to
grapple for the weapon inside the house of Danao, and it was at that point when Dulin
stabbed Batulan several times. Under the circumstances, treachery should not be
appreciated in the killing of Batulan because the stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan
by surprise due to his having been sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s impending
assault, and being thus afforded the opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or
even to recover control of the weapon from Dulin.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
64 Fantastico v. Malicse ARTICLE 14
PEOPLE VS. MALICSE
GR NO. 190912, JANUARY 12, 2015
TOMAHWAK AXE, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur:
(1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to
defend themselves or retaliate; and
(2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime.
FACTS:
Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the house of his sister Isabelita Iguiron (Isabelita)
when all of a sudden, he heard Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio
confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him, which prompted the former to slap the latter. On
that occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of alcohol.
The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the commotion was
taking place in order to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was eventually persuaded to go
home where he drank some coffee. Thereafter, Elpidio went back to the house of Isabelita to offer
reconciliation.
Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus) and her son-
in-law Gary Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find their parents. Titus and Gary
responded, "putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas ka, punyeta ka."
In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and saw Isabelita's
elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a rattan stick or arnis. Salvador hit
Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced the latter to bow his head but Salvador delivered
a second blow that hit Elpidio on the right eyebrow. Salvador attempted to hit Elpidio for the third
time but the latter got hold of the rattan stick and the two wrestled on the floor and grappled for
the possession of the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two and sprayed something
CRIM1 PALOMERA
on Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches of Salvador and to extricate
himself, Elpidio bit Salvador's head.
Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter was about to
go out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to take the tomahawk axe from
Gary. Elpidio walked away from Titus but Gary, still armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador,
with his arnis, including Titus, chased him. Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit
Elpidio on the back of his head with a lead pipe which caused the latter to fall on the ground.
Elpidio begged his assailants to stop, but to no avail. Salvador hit him countless times on his
thighs, legs and knees using the rattan stick.
While he was simultaneously being beaten up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene
and Tommy, he tried to cover his face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his
right leg, between the knees and the ankle of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and
knees. Rolly hit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe, while Tommy hit him with a piece of wood on the
back of his shoulder.
Thereafter, a certain "Mang Gil" tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted at him: "Huwag
makialam, away ng mag-anak ito" and the two continued to maul Elpidio. The people who
witnessed the incident shouted "maawa na kayo" but they only stopped battering him when a
bystander fainted because of the incident. Elpidio then pretended to be dead. It was then that
concerned neighbors approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).
Attempted Murder was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse
Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballestero
ISSUE/S:
1. WON there was treachery present?

2. WON there was abuse of Superior Strength?
RULING:
1.NO, there was no presence of treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without
a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
From the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous, thus, the second
element of treachery is wanting. The incident, which happened at the spur of the moment,
negates the possibility that the petitioners consciously adopted means to execute the crime
committed. There is no treachery where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted
but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the
provocative act of the victim.
2. YES, there is abuse of superior strength in this case. Abuse of superior strength is present
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming
a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime." "The fact that there were two persons who
attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim." The
evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage. "To take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and
strength of the parties.
In the case at bar, the attack was a lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed, while his attackers
were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This
establishes the element of abuse of superior strength.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
65 People v. Bokingco ARTICLE 14
PEOPLE VS. BOKINGCO
GR NO. 187536, AUGUST 10, 2011
Construction Worker
For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it is indispensable to show how and when the plan
to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the presumption
that there was evident premeditation.
To warrant a finding of abuse of confidence there has to be showing of evidence that he took
advantage of said trust to facilitate the commission of the crime.
FACTS:
The victim, Noli Pasion is the employer of the construction workers, Michael Bokingco and
Reynante Col. Vitalicio, one of the lessees in the aparttment owned by Pasion, heard a commotion
and checked Apartment No. 3 on what was happening. He peeped through a screen door and
saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor.
Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly attacked him and a struggle ensued where Vitalicio was
hit several times. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker.
Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the
kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying
flat on the kitchen floor. Col was allegedly at the second floor of the house where he instructed
Elsa, Pasion’s wife, to open the vault of the pawnshop. Subsequently, Elsa saw Bokingco open
the screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay na siya." Col immediately let her go and ran
away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband, bathed
in his own blood.
ISSUE:
WON the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of
confidence properly appreciated to convict appellant of murder?
CRIM1 PALOMERA
65 People v. Bokingco ARTICLE 14
RULING:
NO, the aggravating circumstances were not proven by the prosecution.
Treachery
There was no proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For treachery to be
appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him. Nobody witnessed the commencement and the
manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on
the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.
Evident Premeditation
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it is indispensable to show how and when the plan
to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In the instant case,
no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted in court
that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. Despite the fact that Bokingco
admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco
planned the attack. It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and
Col’s plan to kill Pasion. However, Bokingco’s confession was admittedly taken without the
assistance of counsel and hence, inadmissible against him.
Nighttime
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the presumption
that there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident premeditation has not
been proved, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There
was no evidence to show that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission
of the offense.
Abuse of confidence
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
Taking into account that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed
the trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there was no showing that he took advantage of
said trust to facilitate the commission of the crime.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
66 People v. Tabarnero ARTICLE 14
PEOPLE VS. TABARNERO
GR NO. 168169, FEBRUARY 24, 2010
Live-in Partner, Stoppage of Planned Marriage
FACTS:
Gary, a 22-year-old construction worker at the time of his testimony in June 2001, testified
that he stayed in Ernesto’s house from 1997 to 1999, as he and Mary Jane were living together.
Mary Jane is the daughter of Teresita Acibar, the wife of Ernesto. However, Gary left the house
shortly before the October 23, 1999 incident because of a misunderstanding with Ernesto
when the latter allegedly stopped the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was
pregnant at that time.
On October 23, 1999, Gary was allegedly in his house in Longos, Malolos, Bulacan at around
11:40 p.m. with his friend, Richard Ulilian; his father, co-appellant Alberto; his mother, Elvira; and
his brother, Jeffrey. Overcome with emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, Gary then
went to Ernesto’s house, but was not able to enter as no one went out of the house to let him in.
He instead shouted his pleas from the outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong
that caused Ernesto to break him and Mary Jane up, and voicing out several times that he
loved Mary Jane and was ready to marry her. When Gary was about to leave, the gate opened
and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead pipe. Ernesto was aiming at Gary’s head, but the
latter blocked the blow with his hands, causing his left index finger to be broken. Gary embraced
Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At that point, Gary felt that there was a bladed weapon
tucked at Ernestos back. Losing control of himself, Gary took the bladed weapon and stabbed
Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many times he did so.
According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, saklolo, tulungan niyo po ako three
times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father, co-appellant Alberto, coming. Alberto
asked Gary, anak, ano ang nangyari? To which Gary responded nasaksak ko po yata si Ka
Erning, referring to Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, allegedly out of fear.
Gary denied that he and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto. Gary claims that it was he and Ernesto
who had a fight, and that he had no choice but to stab Ernesto, who was going to kill him.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
66 People v. Tabarnero ARTICLE 14
ISSUE:
1. WON there is treachery present?
RULING:
YES. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. In People v. Alvarado, the accused and his companions shouted to the victim:
Lumabas ka kalbo, kung matapang ka. When the victim went out of the house, the accuseds
companions held the victims hands while the accused stabbed him. Despite the yelling which
should have warned the victim of a possible attack, the mere fact that the accuseds companions
held the hands of the victim while the accused stabbed him was considered by this Court to
constitute alevosia.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that treachery should not be appreciated, the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength would nevertheless qualify the killing to
murder. Despite being alleged in the Information, this circumstance was not considered in the trial
court as the same is already absorbed in treachery. The act of the accused in stabbing Ernesto
while two persons were holding him clearly shows the deliberate use of excessive force
out of proportion to the defense available to the person attacked.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
67 People v. Vilbar ARTICLE 14
PEOPLE VS. VILBAR
GR NO. 186541, FEBRUARY 1, 2012
Urinated on Table
While it appears that the attack upon the victim was sudden, the surrounding circumstances
attending the stabbing incident, that is, the open area, the presence of the victims’ families and
the attending eyewitnesses, works against treachery.
FACTS:
On May 5, 2000, 7:00 o’clock in the evening, at the public market, the accused, Vicente
Vilbar, without warning suddenly stabbed Guilbert Patricio with a knife after Guilbert tried
to admonish him for urinating in one of the table of their store. Because of the degree of
injury, the victim sustained, he died hours later. On July 31, 2000, the accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty to the criminal charge against him. During the trial, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of Maria Liza, widow of the deceased, and Pedro Luzon, an eye witness at the scene.
Both were consistent with their accounts that it coincided with the stabbing incident. Whereas the
accused witness, Cerilo Pelos, testimony showed to be incoherent and elusive in giving particular
details of the crime. Thus, the trial court gave credibility to Maria Liza and Pedro Luzon’s
testimonies in positively identifying Vilbar and convicted him.
ISSUE:
WON treachery is present in this case?

CRIM1 PALOMERA
67 People v. Vilbar ARTICLE 14
RULING:
NO. Treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and
unexpected. While it appears that the attack upon the victim was sudden, the surrounding
circumstances attending the stabbing incident, that is, the open area, the presence of the
victims’ families and the attending eyewitnesses, works against treachery. If accused-
appellant wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another
time and place to stab the victim. Yet, accused- appellant nonchalantly stabbed the victim in a
public market at 7:00 o’clock in the evening. In fact, the attack appeared to have been impulsively
done, a spur of the moment act in the heat of anger or extreme annoyance. There are no
indications that accused-appellant deliberately planned to stab the victim at said time and place.
Thus, we can reasonably conclude that accused-appellant, who at that time was languishing in
his alcoholic state, acted brashly and impetuously in suddenly stabbing the victim. Treachery just
cannot be appreciated.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
68 People v. Matibag ARTICLE 14
PEOPLE VS. MATIBAG
GR NO. 206381, MARCH 25, 2015
Unlicensed Fire-arm, Sub-division Altercation
FACTS:
In the evening of March 27, 2005, Enrico Duhan who just came from a meeting with the other
officers of the homeowners’ association of Twin Villa Subdivision, was walking along Iron Street
in Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City when Matibag confronted Duhan, and asked, “ano bang
pinagsasasabi mo?” Duhan replied “wala,” and without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow
hitting Duhan on the left cheek and causing him to teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out his
gun and shot Duhan, who fell face-first on the pavement. While Duhan remained in that position,
Matibag shot him several more times.
PO2 Tom Falejo, a member of the PNP, positively identified Matibag and stated on record that he
arrested the latter on the night of March 27, 2005.
Defense: Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida party of his neighbor when
Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the homeowners’ association. Wanting to settle
a previous misunderstanding, Matibag approached Duhan and extended his hand as a gesture
of reconciliation. However, Duhan pushed it away and said, “putang ina mo, ang yabang mo,”
thereby provoking Matibag to punch him in the face. Matibag saw Duhan pull something from his
waist and fearing that it was a gun and Duhan was about to retaliate, Matibag immediately drew
his own gun, shot Duhan, and hurriedly left the place.
The RTC ruled that the crime was murder. CA affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.
ISSUE:
WON the CA upheld the proper conviction?

CRIM1 PALOMERA
68 People v. Matibag ARTICLE 14
RULING:
NO. Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The prosecution was able to
prove that Matibag, who was armed with a gun, confronted Duhan, and without any provocation,
punched and shot him on the chest. Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected
manner by which it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too that
he was unarmed. Matibag also failed to prove that a heated exchange of words preceded the
incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any impending attack from his assailant. The
deliberateness of Matibag’s act is further evinced from his disposition preceding the moment of
execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out, Matibag was ready and destined to effect such dastardly
act, considering that he had an axe to grind when he confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact that
he did so, armed with a loaded handgun. Based on these findings, the Court concludes that
treachery was correctly appreciated.
Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information, should be appreciated in the imposition of
penalty. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, treats
the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder
as a special aggravating circumstance. Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm,
the use thereof was unauthorized under the purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a
special aggravating circumstance. As a result, the imposition of the maximum penalty of death,
which is reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA 9346, stands proper.
To this, the Court adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
69 People v. Feliciano, Jr ARTICLE 14
PEOPLE VS. FELICIANO JR.
GR NO. 196735, MAY 5, 2014
Fraternity Attack
FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity (SRF) who were
eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the UP Diliman, were attacked
by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries
that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina died on Dec 10.
Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, found that Venturina had "several
contusions located at the back of the upper left arm and hematoma on the back of both hands,"
"two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the head, generalized hematoma on the skull," "several
fractures on the head," and "inter-cranial hemorrhage." According to Dr. Victoria, the injuries could
have been caused by a hard, blunt object; he concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head
injuries.
An information for murder was filed against 12 members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely,
Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,
Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund
E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the RTC
QC, Branch 219.
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of SRF members
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Cristobal Gaston, Jr., and Leandro Lachica, and the frustrated murder of
SRF members Mervin Natalicio and Amel Fortes. Only 11 of the accused stood trial since one of
the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at large. The informations alleged conspiracy.
The accused, in their defense, presented their respective alibis. For the accused Feliciano, his
mother testified that he was in Pampanga on Dec 8, 1994.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
ISSUE/S:
1. WON accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the information

against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite
the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off; and
2. WON the CA correctly ruled that there was no treachery involved.
RULING:
1. NO. It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be
stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven
at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to
state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in
the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by
the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like

nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he
carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the
accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise
as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an
aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the
accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently
apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with,
they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing
masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses. The information
charges conspiracy among the accused. This would mean all the accused had been one
in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some
of them might not have done so.
2. NO. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where
they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity
men. The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball
bats.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
In a situation where they were unnamed and outnumbered, it would be impossible

for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a
minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them
until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to
retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
As correctly found by the RTC and CA, the offense committed against Dennis Venturina
was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of
armed men. But CA erred in ruling out treachery
CRIM1 PALOMERA
70 People v. Naelga ARTICLE 14
PEOPLE VS. NAELGA
GR NO. 1171018, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009
Drug Pusher
The general rule is that it is no defense that a decoy solicitation was used to facilitate the
entrapment. Mere deception by the detective will not shield the defendant if the offense was
committed by him free from the influence or instigation of the detective.
In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and
conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted
In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of
the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal.
FACTS:
Naelga was apprehended for selling shabu through a buy-bust operation. PO2
Sembran, posing as a buyer, approached Naelga and asked if he was a security guard and what
he could suggest so that he could keep himself awake and not be caught sleeping in his post.
Naelga passed his finger under his nose as if sniffing something and PO2 asked what he meant,
Naelga said bato or shabu. PO2 Sembran said he was willing to try it and asked to buy P500
worth. He initially gave P400 in marked bills which Naelga used to get the shabu he was about to
sell PO2 Sembran. Naelga was then apprehended during their exchange of the shabu and the
P100 balance. Naelgainitially denied the accusation claiming that he was selling CDs when PO2
Sembran approached him asking for shabu. Naelga then claimed that he was not certain that
what he bought for PO2 Sembran was shabu but that he gave it to PO2 and then the latter
handcuffed him.
ISSUE:
WON the police officers regularly performed their function upon the apprehension of Naelga?
CRIM1 PALOMERA
RULING:
NO. The general rule is that it is no defense that a decoy solicitation was used to facilitate
the entrapment. Mere deception by the detective will not shield the defendant if the offense
was committed by him free from the influence or instigation of the detective. In this case,
the law enforcers already received reports that accused was engaged in illegal drug trade. There
is no instigation as PO2 Sembran merely pretended to buy. In an entrapment, ways and means
are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their
criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the
commission of the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to
prosecution and conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted.
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved.
CRIM1 PALOMERA
CRIM1 PALOMERA
CRIM1 PALOMERA
CRIM1 PALOMERA

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CRIM1 PALOMERA

50 People v. Sarcia ARTICLE 12

People v. Victoriano Dela Cruz,

Lower Court: Parricide; CA: Parricide

Del Poso v. People,

1. May the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong be

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential

Crime charged: HOMICIDE

RTC: GUILTY of HOMICIDE; CA: AFFIRMED RTC.

1. Yes. When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an

Appellant is an elementary school graduate. He resided at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, where he

1. Whether the mitigating circumstance mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a

2. Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation should be appreciated.

3. Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated.

1. No, the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to apply, the

Voluntary Surrender (Article 13 par 7) may be treated as modifying circumstance independent

An information, accusing Felix Nizurtado of having committed the complex crime of

Prosecution and the Defense Stipulation

Whether there are mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.

Voluntary surrender may be treated as a modifying circumstance independent and apart

1. Whether or not Marivic is suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS).

3. Whether or not Marivic is entitled to any mitigating circumstances

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness

In this case, following the requisites of a justifying circumstance of self-defense,

The Sandiganbayan charging Melchor M. Mallare (Mallare) and Elizabeth M.

2) ₱ 291,421.31 for payments without the requisite appropriation; and

3) ₱ 200,000.00 for withdrawals recorded as cash disbursements.

CRIME CHARGED: MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS

For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond

CRIME CHARGED: Frustrated Murder & violation of RA 7610

1. Whether or not Ronald should be acquitted due to minority.

CRIME CHARGED: Murder

RTC: GUILTY of MURDER with aggravating circumstance of Treachery, Evident Premeditation

CA: Automatic review due to death penalty.

1. Whether or not self-defense should be appreciated.

3. Whether or not the accused is a recidivist.

1. NO, there is no self-defense. Self-defense should be established by clear, satisfactory

CRIME CHARGED: Murder

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present.

Yes, there is abuse of superior strength.

PEOPLE VS. DULIN

GR NO. 171284, JUNE 29, 2015

FIGHTING COCK, SELF-DEFENSE

Unlawful aggression has two kinds:

1. WON there was Self-Defense?

Unlawful aggression has two kinds:

PEOPLE VS. MALICSE

GR NO. 190912, JANUARY 12, 2015

TOMAHWAK AXE, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur:

(2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

1. WON there was treachery present?

For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur:

(2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

PEOPLE VS. BOKINGCO

GR NO. 187536, AUGUST 10, 2011

NO, the aggravating circumstances were not proven by the prosecution.