CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

A “crime against person” is a crime committed against the person of the

victim – that is, the individual themselves. There are no special or restrictive
conditions before a criminal complaint may be initiated because in these
cases, any person may initiate a criminal charge against an offender with or
without the knowledge or consent of the victim.

A crime against a person may involve first, the destruction of life or

second, the infliction of physical injuries without the taking of life or having
the intention to take a life.

Destruction of Life

To constitute a crime against person involving the destruction of life,

the following must be taken into consideration:

1. The victim must lose their life for the crime to be consummated;

2. If the victim does not die but suffers a non-lethal or a non-mortal

wound, the crime is only at its attempted state because an essential
requisite for its accomplishment, which is the infliction of a lethal or
mortal wound that should cause death, is not present;

3. If the victim suffers a lethal or mortal wound but does not die because of
timely medical intervention without the participation of the offender,
the crime is at its frustrated state. It is essential that the offender should
not contribute to the survival of the victim because to be a frustrated
felony, the crime must not be produced by causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator;

4. The infliction of the injury by the offender must include an intention to

kill – that is, an intention to take the life of the victim, or to take the life
of any person in case of an indiscriminate infliction of injury;

5. The use of a weapon for the purpose of inflicting an injury upon another
is evidence of an intention to kill, for the reason that a weapon can make
more effective an attack against another, such that the use of a weapon
is logically interpreted as proof of the intent of the offender to ensure
the success of the attack;

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 6. If there is no proof of an intention to kill, the crime is not a crime against
persons. It may constitute criminal negligence or some other crime
depending on the circumstances.

The crimes against persons involving the destruction of life are:

Parricide

It is the killing of the offender’s father, mother, or child, whether

legitimate or illegitimate, or any of their ascendants, or descendants, or their
spouse.

The enumeration of relatives to constitute parricide is exclusive to

ascendants and descendants, and one’s lawful spouse. Consider the following:

1. The killing of a common-law spouse by the other is not parricide;

2. The killing of a person by another, where the couple was married not in
accordance with the Family Code of the Philippines, is not parricide;

3. The killing of collateral relatives – siblings, cousins, aunts, uncles – is not

parricide;

4. In the killing of a parent or child, the relationship may be legitimate or

illegitimate;

5. In the killing of any other descendant or ascendant, the relationship

must be legitimate1;

6. In the killing of an ascendant or descendant, the relationship must be

biological because the basis of classification between murder or
homicide on one hand and parricide on the other, is blood relationship
in the direct ascending or descending line

When the Person Killed is a Child

In crimes against persons, a child is any person aged below eighteen

(18) years. When the victim is a child, the following matters must be taken
into consideration in determining the proper felony, first, the child’s age,
second, the child’s relationship with the offender; and third, the attending
circumstances of the killing.

If the victim is less than three (3) days old, the crime committed is
infanticide, not parricide even if the victim is the child of the offender,

1 People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Macal; GR No. 211062, January 13, 2016.

2
whether legitimate or illegitimate. While technically “parricide” because of the
presence of blood relations in the direct line, the law specifically defines the
killing of a person below three (3) days old as infanticide, such that the proper
felony for which the offender should be charged and convicted must be
infanticide.

If the victim is at least three (3) days old, the crime committed is
parricide if the offender is a parent or a legitimate ascendant. Where the
relationship between the parties is adoptive where the child was lawfully
adopted by the offender, or if there is no relation between the victim and the
offender, the crime may be murder, if the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength is alleged and proved.

When the Person Killed is the Spouse

As an exception to the rule, the killing of a spouse is punished as

parricide even if there is no blood relation between the victim and the
offender. The law requires that the marriage be lawful, in that the marriage
should have been entered into in accordance with the Family Code of the
Philippines.

Where non-Filipinos of the same sex are validly married abroad, and
while in the Philippines one spouse kills the other, the crime committed
should be parricide. While the Philippines does not have laws allowing same-
sex marriage, the principle of lex loci celebrationis requires Philippine law to
respect the fact of marriage if the marriage is validly celebrated abroad. But if
one or both spouses are citizens of the Philippines, the marriage is not valid
here on the basis of national law even if it may have been validly celebrated
abroad. This is because Filipinos of the same sex are currently not allowed by
law to marry each other. In case one is killed by another, the crime would be
murder or homicide as the case may be.

In case of Muslim spouses where a man is validly married to more than

one woman under Shari’a Law, it is the killing of the first wife which is
punished as parricide. The dispositive portion in People of the Philippines vs.
Subano2 reads:

“We are, however, of the opinion and so hold that the

crime committed is homicide and not parricide. From
the testimony of the father of the deceased, it appears
that the defendant has three wives and that the
deceased was the last in point of time. Although the
practice of polygamy is approved by custom among
these non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not
sanctioned by the Marriage Law which merely

2 GR No. L-48143, September 30, 1942.

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 recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased,
under the law, is not thus the lawful wife of the
defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime
of parricide.”

Parricide is an Intentional Felony

For an act to be punished as parricide, there must be an intention on the

part of the offender to kill the victim despite the knowledge that the victim is a
parent or a biological child or a legitimate other descendant or ascendant.

Where intent to kill is absent or not proved with sufficient evidence, the
killing is still considered parricide. This is because of the relationship between
the offender and the victim. With the lack of intent, the felony becomes
culpable, not intentional and as such, the act must be punished as “reckless
imprudence resulting in parricide.”

Knowledge of Relationship is Immaterial

The special circumstance that leads to parricide is the blood

relationship between the offender and the victim. The law does not concern
itself with the knowledge of the offender of such relationship.

The following may best prove the fact of relationship:

1. Marriage Certificate;

2. Certificate of Live Birth;

3. DNA evidence;

4. Testimonies proving relationship, where the testimony is not

controverted;

5. Other circumstances proving relationship, where the circumstantial

evidence is not disputed.

But where the offender does not know that their victim is their spouse,
parent or child, or legitimate other ascendant or descendant, the crime
committed is still parricide because of the fact of relationship.

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Conspiracy and Parricide

The fact of relationship for the purpose of being charged and convicted
for parricide is unique to the offender who is actually related to the victim.
Thus in a case where the victim is the spouse of only one of the accused who
acted in conspiracy, it is that accused who will be charged and convicted for
parricide because of the fact of relationship. The other accused will be charged
and convicted for homicide or murder as the case may be because of absence
of the fact of relationship.

This is an exception to the rule in conspiracy that the liability of one shall
be the liability of all.

Aberratio Ictus, Error in Personae and Honest Mistake of Fact

Where the offender dealt a killing blow against his intended victim but
instead hit their parent, the offender is liable for parricide. The penalty to be
imposed will be governed by Article 49.

Where the offender intended to kill a person but misidentified the latter
and instead, killed their illegitimate son, the offender should be liable for
parricide because the intent to kill their original victim is transferred to the
actual victim. The rule is different if the offender killed a stranger while
thinking that it was their spouse; the liability should be that for murder or
homicide as the case may be because the essential element of relationship is
lacking.

But where a spouse is killed by the other by an honest mistake of fact,

there is no liability for parricide because an act committed under this
circumstance is not a crime.

Impossible Crime of Parricide

An offender who, with intent to kill burned the body of their spouse,
believing them to be alive but who already turned out to have died in their
sleep should be charged and convicted for an impossible crime of parricide
because of the following matters:

1. The fact that the offender knew that the (supposed) person they are
killing is their spouse;

2. The fact that there is an inherent impossibility of accomplishing the act

because their spouse was already dead.

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Criminal Procedure; the Fact of Relationship must be Alleged

Where the victim is a spouse, child, parent, other legitimate ascendant

or descendant of the offender, the fact of relationship must be alleged in the
criminal complaint filed by the offended party, any peace officer or any public
officer in charge of enforcing the law violated. After the finding of probable
cause by the investigating prosecutor the fact of relationship must also be
alleged in the criminal Information which the prosecutor signs and files with
the court to initiate the trial of the criminal case.

If the fact of relationship is not alleged in the complaint or Information,

the accused may only be convicted of homicide or murder as the case may be.
If the fact of relationship was subsequently proven during trial even if it was
not alleged in the Information, the accused should still be convicted for
homicide or murder as the case may be, and the fact of relationship must be
treated as a generic aggravating circumstance.

As stated in People of the Philippines vs. Jumawan, et.al.:3

“Presentacion should have been accused of parricide

but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is
not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can
be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of
superior strength.

Although not alleged in the information, relationship

as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned
against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent
in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of
murder. And as to the others, the relationships of
father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime.
(Aquino, Penal Code, Vol. I. p. 406 [1976].)”

The Jumawan case must not be interpreted to mean that the accused
will suffer an aggravating circumstance that is proven during trial but which
was not alleged in the complaint or information, because adopting such a
conclusion violates the right of the accused to due process of law and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. If any at all,
the Jumawan principle should be applied only in cases involving the same or
similar facts, unless the Supreme Court adopts a contrary position in a
subsequent case.

3 GR No. L-50905, September 23, 1982.

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Infanticide

Infanticide is the killing of a person below three (3) days of age. It is a

specific designation of the law such that, although the crime also constitutes
parricide if the infant is a child or a legitimate descendant of the offender, and
possibly murder because of an abuse of superior strength, the crime is still
defined and punished as infanticide.

Homicide

Homicide is the killing of another person, where the offender had the
intention to kill the former.

But to constitute homicide, it is essential that:

1. The offender must have intentionally killed the victim, otherwise the
crime is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, a culpable felony;

2. The victim must not be the parent or child of the offender, or any other
legitimate ascendant or descendant, otherwise the crime is parricide;

3. The victim must not be less than three (3) days old, otherwise the crime
is infanticide;

4. The killing must not be attended by any qualifying aggravating

circumstance under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise
the crime is murder;

5. The killing must involve a person who is actually born in accordance

with the Civil Code, otherwise the crime is abortion.

Murder

In other jurisdictions, homicide and murder may be interchangeable

terms and refer to the same act of unlawful killing of another. In Philippine
jurisdiction the two crimes are entirely separate and distinct.

Murder is the unlawful killing of a person by another, while being

attended to by an intention to kill and at least one qualifying aggravating
circumstance without constituting parricide or infanticide as the case may be.

It is an intentional felony which cannot be a culpable one committed by

criminal negligence. This is so because criminal negligence presupposes the
lack of intent to commit the crime, such that the basis of the criminal liability
is not the result of the act, but the negligence of the offender that caused
damage, injury or death. As such, there is no such crime as “reckless

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imprudence resulting in murder,” even if the circumstances that caused the
death of the victim appeared to be a qualifying aggravating circumstance.

Illustration:

Jose was driving home while under the influence of

alcohol. Having his senses impaired, he ran over
Jacinto who was crossing a pedestrian lane. Jacinto
died as a result.

Jose is not liable for murder although the law treats

the killing of a person using a motor vehicle as a
qualifying aggravating circumstance. He is liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, where the
term, “homicide” is to be used in its generic sense,
which is the unlawful killing of a person.

On the other hand, if Jose intended to kill Jacinto and

thereby ran over him, causing his death, Jose is liable
for murder.

Circumstances that Qualify the Killing of a Person to Murder

1. Treachery or Alevosia

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes

against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make (Article 14, par.16)

That there is treachery when the attack is made from behind or

when the mortal wound is located behind the victim is a misconception.
The location of the mortal wound or the direction from where the attack
came from do not by themselves establish treachery, although they may
be considered evidence to prove treachery, among other available
circumstances.

The nature of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is that the

manner by which the attack was made is done in such a way as to
ensure success. This means that the offender will employ means to
minimize risk to them without sacrificing the probability that the attack
will be successful.

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 In People of the Philippines vs. Bugarin4 the Supreme Court
declared:

“The qualifying circumstance of treachery or alevosia does

not even require that the perpetrator attack his victim from
behind. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when
unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no
position to repel the attack or avoid it. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning
and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow.
Indubitably, Cristito was unarmed and had no inkling that
an attack was forthcoming. He neither had a chance to
mount a defense. In such a rapid motion, Bugarin shot
Cristito, affording the latter no opportunity to defend
himself or fight back. The deliberate swiftness of Bugarin's
attack significantly diminished the risk to himself that may
be caused by the retaliation of the victim.”

But in People of the Philippines vs. Petalino5 the Supreme Court

clarified the concept of a “sudden and unexpected attack:”

“Secondly, the finding of the attendance of treachery,

assuming the sufficiency of the allegations thereon in
the information, should be based on clear and
convincing evidence. The attendance of treachery
cannot be presumed. The same degree of proof to dispel
any reasonable doubt was required before treachery could
be considered either as an aggravating or qualifying
circumstance. In short, such evidence must be as
conclusive as the fact of killing itself.

For treachery to be properly appreciated, the State

must show not only that the victim had been unable to
defend himself, but also that the accused had
consciously adopted the mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. The
fact alone that the attack mounted by the accused-
appellant against the victim was sudden and
unexpected, and did not afford the latter any
opportunity to undertake any form or manner of
defense or evasion did not necessarily justify a finding
that treachery was attendant without any showing that
the accused-appellant had consciously and deliberately
4 GR No. 224900, March 15, 2017.
5 GR No. 213222, September 24, 2018.

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 adopted such mode of attack in order to insure the
killing of the victim without any risk to himself arising
from the defense that the latter could possibly adopt.
That showing was not made herein. For one, the stabbing
was committed when the victim was walking together with
Bariquit, whose presence even indicated that the victim had
not been completely helpless. Also, Bariquit's testimony
indicated that the encounter between the victim and the
accused-appellant had been only casual because the latter
did not purposely seek out the victim. In this connection,
treachery could not be appreciated despite the attack being
sudden and unexpected when the meeting between the
accused and the victim was casual, and the attack was done
impulsively.”

2. Taking advantage of superior strength

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a

notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in
the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who
attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was
committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the
relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must
establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that
they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.6

In People of the Philippines vs. Cortez and Bagayawa7 the Supreme

Court declared:

“As to the killings of Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn, the courts a

quo opined that abuse of superior strength attended their
killings, considering that Cezar and Froilan used deadly
weapons, i.e., knives, in killing them. Although there have
been cases where abuse of superior strength was
appreciated where a male equipped with a deadly weapon
attacked an unarmed and defenseless woman,
jurisprudence nonetheless provides that for abuse of
superior strength to be appreciated, "the evidence must
establish that the assailants purposely sought the
advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use
this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the
6 People v. Villanueva, 807 Phil. 245, 253 (2017), citing People v. Beduya, 641 Phil. 399, 410 (2010).
7 GR No. 239137, December 5, 2018.

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 person attacked." In this case, it does not appear that Cezar
and Froilan specifically sought the use of deadly weapons so
as to be able to take advantage of their superior strength
against Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn. In fact, their criminal
design to raid the house and consequently, to use deadly
weapons in killing whomever they encounter therein was
applied indiscriminately, regardless of whether their
victims were male (Mario and Efren) or female (Minda,
Baby, and Jocelyn). Therefore, there is reasonable doubt as
to whether abuse of superior strength may be appreciated
in this case. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery may be appreciated in this case,
considering that Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn - similar to Mario
- were attacked in the middle of the night while they were
sleeping, unarmed, and defenseless. As such, their killings
were still correctly classified as Murders.”

3. Commission of the crime with the aid of armed men

The term, “men” must be understood in its generic sense, in that

the crime should have been committed with the aid of an armed person,
whether that person is a man or a woman.

The concept of being armed does not necessarily require that the
person assisting the offender whether as accomplices, accessories or co-
principals be armed with a firearm, blade or any conventional weapon.
By definition, a “weapon” is anything that is used to inflict injury or to
destroy or damage a thing. Thus, usual objects when used to inflict
injury or damage, may be considered weapons.

In the early case of People of the Philippines vs. Pinca8 the Supreme
Court found:

“The crime was committed with the aid of armed men.

At least, two of the accused, the appellants herein, were
armed with carbine and bolo, when the five accused
perpetrated the crime. From which We may deduce that as
far as the evidence in the case at bar is concerned, there
exists three aggravating circumstances, to wit: dwelling,
treachery and the crime was committed with the aid of
armed men.”

The mere presence of armed men does not constitute the

qualifying aggravating circumstance. It must be proved that the armed
men either directly took part in the commission of the crime or afforded

8 GR No. L-16595, February 28, 1962.

11
 some support to the point that the offender must avail themselves of
their aid or rely upon them to ensure the success of the commission of
the crime.

4. By employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons

to insure or afford impunity.

The following may be considered as means to weaken the defense

of an intended victim:

i. Rendering the victim unconscious;

ii. Casting a cover over the head of the victim to disorient

them;

iii. Throwing dirt at the eyes of the victim;

iv. Intoxicating the victim.

“Impunity” refers to being able to avoid punishment, retaliation or

other injurious consequences of an illegal act. By adopting means or
employing persons to insure or afford impunity, the offender plans the
commission of the crime without any injurious consequence to them, or
with a good chance of escaping arrest or prosecution after its
commission.

5. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

In People of the Philippines vs. Hipolito and Malagamba9 the

Supreme Court ruled:

“The record shows that the accused Feliciano Hipolito made

arrangements with his coaccused Cirilo Malagamba relative
to the killing of Concepcion Bustamante Ang and not with
Vicente Ang, although Cirilo Malagamba said that he was
acting at the instance of the said Vicente Ang, and it was
the accused Cirilo Malagamba who paid him the amount
of P2,800.00. Accordingly, whether or not Vicente Ang was
prosecuted in connection with the slaying of Concepcion
Bustamante Ang is of little importance.

The trial court, therefore, did not commit an error in finding

the accused Feliciano Hipolito guilty of the crime of
MURDER for the killing of Concepcion Bustamante Ang,
qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by the

9 GR No. 31402, August 17, 1981.

12
 circumstance that the crime was committed in
consideration of a price, reward, or promise.”

To be considered a qualifying aggravating circumstance the price,

reward or promise must be the motivating factor that caused the
offender to commit the crime, placing the offender in the position of a
principal by direct participation and the person who promised or gave
the price or reward, as principal by inducement.

If the price, reward or promise was made or given after the crime
is accomplished, the circumstance cannot be appreciated as qualifying
since it existed after the fact, that is, after the crime was committed. In
this case, the price, reward or promise was not the reason for the
commission of the crime. In simpler terms, the promise to give the price
or reward must be made before the crime is committed, although the
actual price or reward be given after its commission.

6. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,

stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or
locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with
the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin

The offender should cause any of the foregoing means to kill their
victim. To be a qualifying circumstance these should not be a
consequence of the killing or used to conceal the crime.

On the use of an explosion to kill, it must be clarified that an

explosion to be used as a means to kill a person may be created with the
use of an explosive or with the use of any other object than can produce
an explosion.

The enactment of R.A. 8294 considered the illegal possession of an

explosive as a generic aggravating circumstance, when the illegally-
possessed explosive is used to kill a person. But it must be clear that R.A.
8294 did not amend the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
murder as regards the qualifying circumstance of using an explosion to
kill a person. Because if an offender uses an explosion, not caused by an
illegally-possessed explosive, in killing his victim, the crime committed
is still murder.

The Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Comadre, et.al.10

discussed:

“When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by

means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a

10 GR No. 153559, June 8, 2004.

13
qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence
support this view but also, since the use of explosives is the
principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant
circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery
which will then be relegated merely as a generic
aggravating circumstance.

Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic

Act No. 8294 which also considers the use of explosives as
an aggravating circumstance, there is a need to make the
necessary clarification insofar as the legal implications of
the said amendatory law vis-à-vis the qualifying
circumstance of "by means of explosion" under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code are concerned. Corollary thereto
is the issue of which law should be applied in the instant
case. R.A. No. 8294 was a reaction to the onerous and
anachronistic penalties imposed under the old illegal
possession of firearms law, P.D. 1866, which prevailed
during the tumultuous years of the Marcos dictatorship. The
amendatory law was enacted, not to decriminalize illegal
possession of firearms and explosives, but to lower their
penalties in order to rationalize them into more acceptable
and realistic levels.

This legislative intent is conspicuously reflected in the

reduction of the corresponding penalties for illegal
possession of firearms, or ammunitions and other related
crimes under the amendatory law. Under Section 2 of the
said law, the penalties for unlawful possession of explosives
are also lowered. Specifically, when the illegally
possessed explosives are used to commit any of the
crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which result in
the death of a person, the penalty is no longer death,
unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall be considered only
as an aggravating circumstance. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866
as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 8294 now reads:

‘Section 2. Section 3 of Presidential

Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:

Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,

Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Explosives. The penalty of prision mayor
in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person who shall

14
 unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal
in, acquire, dispose or possess hand
grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other
explosives, including but not limited to
"pillbox," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire
bombs," or other incendiary devices
capable of producing destructive effect on
contiguous objects or causing injury or
death to any person.

When a person commits any of the crimes

defined in the Revised Penal Code or
special law with the use of the
aforementioned explosives, detonation
agents or incendiary devises, which
results in the death of any person or
persons, the use of such explosives,
detonation agents or incendiary devices
shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.’ (shall be punished with the
penalty of death is DELETED.)

xxx xxx x x x.

With the removal of death as a penalty and the insertion of

the term "xxx as an aggravating circumstance," the
unmistakable import is to downgrade the penalty for illegal
possession of explosives and consider its use merely as an
aggravating circumstance.

Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to reduce the

penalty for illegal possession of firearms and explosives.
Also, Congress clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as
aggravating circumstance, instead of a separate offense,
illegal possession of firearms and explosives when such
possession is used to commit other crimes under the
Revised Penal Code.

It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did

not amend the definition of murder under Article 248,
but merely made the use of explosives an aggravating
circumstance when resorted to in committing "any of
the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code." The
legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives
as a separate crime and to make such use merely an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime
already defined in the Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No.
8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives as one

15
 of the aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code. Like the aggravating circumstance
of "explosion" in paragraph 12, "evident premeditation" in
paragraph 13, or "treachery" in paragraph 16 of Article 14,
the new aggravating circumstance added by RA No. 8294
does not change the definition of murder in Article 248.

7. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding

paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive
cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity

Unlike the preceding circumstance which the offender causes in

order to kill their victim, the means under the above circumstance are
definitely not caused by the offender. Rather, the offender commits the
unlawful killing while any of the foregoing calamities is present.

8. With evident premeditation

In People of the Philippines vs. Ordona,11 for evident premeditation

to qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, the following
must be established by the prosecution with equal certainty as the
criminal act itself:

i. The time when the offender determined to commit the

crime;

ii. An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his

determination; and

iii. A sufficient interval of time between the determination and

the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the.
consequences of his act.

It is indispensable for the prosecution to establish "how and when

the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was
carried out." In People v. Abadies12 the Supreme Court underscored this
requirement, thus:

“Evident premeditation must be based on external facts

which are evident, not merely suspected, which indicate
deliberate planning. There must be direct evidence
showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the
accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to

11 GR No. 227863, September 20, 2017.

12 436 Phil. 98 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].

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 kill the victim. Criminal intent must be evidenced by
notorious outward acts evidencing a determination to
commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation
of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be
‘premeditation’ but must be "evident premeditation."

The date and, if possible, the time when the malefactor

determined to commit the crime is essential, because the lapse of time
for the purpose of the third requisite is computed from such date and
time.

9. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the

suffering of the victim

The qualifying circumstance of cruelty requires that the offender

must deliberately and inhumanly augment, prolong or enhance the
suffering of the victim before killing them, unless it is that suffering that
leads to the victim’s death.

In the old case of People of the Philippine Islands vs. Aguinaldo13

the Supreme Court stated:

“The Attorney-General holds that the number of wounds

found upon the corpse does not, by itself alone, justify
the acceptance of the circumstance of cruelty, it being
necessary to show that he deliberately and inhumanly
increased the sufferings of the victim, and this has not
been proved in the present case.”

10. With an act of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim

An act of “outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim” refers to

a further act of destroying the victim’s corpse after the killing.

In People of the Philippines vs. Stephen Mark Whisenhunt,14 the

accused was charged for murder following the death of one Elsa Castillo.
In the criminal information it was alleged:

“That on or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality

of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of
superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence
13 GR No. L-33843, February 11, 1931.
14 GR No. 123819, November 14, 2001.

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 upon the person of one Elsa "Elsie" Santos Castillo by then
and there stabbing her with a bladed weapon in different
parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her
death and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by
then and there chopping off her head and different
parts of her body.”

In convicting the accused the Supreme Court ruled:

“However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing

at the corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by the
trial court. The mere decapitation of the victims head
constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the
victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder. In this
case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He
further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he
strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a
deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on
the ground. The sight of Elsa’s severed body parts on the
ground, vividly depicted in the photographs offered in
evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time,
the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human
manner of disposing of her remains.

In a case15 with strikingly similar facts, we ruled:

‘Even if treachery was not present in this case,

the crime would still be murder because of the
dismemberment of the dead body. One of the
qualifying circumstances of murder under
Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code is
"outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse"
of the victim. There is no question that the
corpse of Billy Agotano was outraged when it
was dismembered with the cutting off of the
head and limbs and the opening up of the body
to remove the intestines, lungs and liver. The
killer scoffed at the dead when the intestines
were removed and hung around Victoriano’s
neck as a necklace, and the lungs and liver were
facetiously described as "pulutan."’

15 People v. Carmina, 193 SCRA 429, 435 [1991].

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