Sun Zi Oct 2010 Notes

UNIVERSITI TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN
FACULTY OF BUSINESS & FINANCE (FBF)
UBMM1011
Sun Zi’s Art of War
&
Business Strategies
NOTES
(Including Translation according to Professor Wee Chow-Hou, 2003)
Compiled by:
Dr. Wong Kee Luen EdD
UBMM1011 Sun Zi Art of War and Business Strategies
Introduction
Sun Zi’s Art of War is the oldest known military classic in Chinese literature. It is also
the most revered and well-known Chinese military text outside of China. While its exact
origin and authorship have been debated, military historians are unanimous that the book
existed and was probably written in 400-320 B. C., about 100 years after the birth of
Confucius and Lao Tzu, two well-known Chinese philosophers. Thus the book is over
2,400 years old today. It is amazing to note that its contents have continued to intrigue
modern scholars and writers.
The significance and importance of Sun Zi’s Art of War in influencing military thought
and political thinking has seldom been questioned. All the top military academies of the
world would vouch to have copies of the book in their libraries. Many of them have also
included Sun Zi’s Art of War as part of the curricula for the training of top military
commanders.
It may surprise readers that Sun Zi Art of War is a short book. It contains about only
6,200 words written in classical Chinese. The book has 13 chapters, with each chapter
barely a page long. The longest chapter is Chapter 11 on the Nine Battlegrounds and has
less than 1,100 words. The shortest chapter is Chapter 8 on Variations and Adaptability
has less than 250 characters. It is remarkable that so much thought and wisdom can be
contained in such a short piece of work.
As the original work was written in classical Chinese, there have been many problems
with capturing the full meaning and implication of Sun Zi’s thought. This is largely
attributed to the complexity of Chinese language, writing and culture. To understand the
exact meaning and implication of the work, one has to be familiar with the circumstances
prevailing at that time.
Sun Zi’s Art of War is a book on military philosophy and not a book on military science.
He proposed principles, concepts and approaches that targeted more on winning the
“heart” of the enemy; he preferred the holistic approach in dealing with military conflicts.
For example, he favoured capturing the whole intact instead of destroying it and would
advocate winning without using a single soldier.
A close study and examination of Sun Zi Bingfa will reveal that Sun Zi was never an
advocate of war. From his opening chapter and in many parts of his other chapters, Sun
Zi recognized the high costs of going to war. The costs were not restricted to financial
burdens on the state. It included heavy taxes on the people, depletion of national
resources, sufferings of the people, etc. As such war was to be a measure of last resort to
be used only after exhausting all other alternatives. In other words, it should be avoided
at all cost.
2
Chapter 1
Detailed Assessment and Planning
1.1 Sun Zi said: The conduct of war is a matter of vital importance to the nation.
1.2 It determines the survival or death of the country.
1.3 It is a matter of life and death (of the people and their ruler).
1.4 It must be studied and examined thoroughly.
1.5 Thus, analyze and study the five factors carefully.
1.6 Compare them against (those of the enemy) so as to understand the changing
conditions and circumstances (of war) and to assess the chances of victory.
1.7 These five factors are moral influence, the weather, terrain, generalship, and
doctrine and law.
1.8 Moral influence refers to measures and policies that align the people with the
sovereign so as to be in complete agreement and harmony with each other.
1.9 In this way, the people will be prepared to co-exist with as well as die for the
sovereign without any fear of dangers.
1.10 Weather refers to the contrasting changes of night and day, the coldness of winter
and the heat of summer, and seasonal changes.
1.11 Terrain refers to whether the route to be taken is long or short, whether the ground
is treacherous or safe, wide or narrow with regard to ease of movement, and
whether the ground will determine the death or survival (of an army).
1.12 The generalship of a commander refers to his qualities of wisdom,
trustworthiness, benevolence, courage and discipline.
1.13 Doctrine and law refer to organization and control, management systems and
procedures, and the command and control structure for the deployment of
resources.
1.14 Every general must know these five factors.
1.15 Those who can master them will win.
1.16 Those who do not understand them will not win.
1.17 Thus, in planning, there are (seven) dimensions which a general must analyze and
compare with those of the enemy so as to understand the changing conditions and
situations during war and assess the chances of victory.
1.18 Thus, which ruler has greater moral influence?
1.19 Which general is more able and has greater abilities and skills?
1.20 Which side (army) is able to better exploit the weather and terrain?
1.21 Which side (army)is able to execute and implement law and order more
effectively?
1.22 Which side (army) has more and stronger troops?
1.23 Which side (army) has better trained officers and men?
1.24 Which side (army) is more enlightened in the administration of rewards and
punishments?
1.25 From these (seven) dimensions, I will be able to diagnose and predict victory and
defeat.
3
1.26 The general who adopts my strategies and plans will win when he is deployed (for
battle); he should be retained.
1.27 The general who does not adopt my strategies and plans will be defeated when he
is deployed (for battle); he should be removed.
1.28 Besides adopting the effective proposed plans and strategies, the general must
create and take advantage of situations that are beyond the normal rules of
military engagement.
1.29 Creating situations demands that one (the general) must act advantageously so as
to control the balance of power.
1.30 All warfare is based on the principle of deception.
1.31 Thus, when you are capable, feign that you are incapable.
1.32 When you are able to deploy your forces, feign that you are unable to do so.
1.33 When you are near the objective, feign that you are far away; and when you are
far away from the objective, feign that you are near.
1.34 When the enemy is greedy for small advantages, offer baits to lure him.
1.35 When the enemy is in a state of chaos and disorder, launch an attack and capture
him.
1.36 When the enemy is strong and effective, be well-prepared and ready to confront
him.
1.37 When the enemy is far superior and highly ferocious, it is best to avoid him.
1.38 When the enemy is easily angered, seek ways to provoke and irritate him.
1.39 When the enemy has a low opinion of you, encourage his arrogance even more.
1.40 When the enemy is well rested, use methods to tire him.
1.41 When the enemy is in harmony and united, use schemes to divide him (and his
troops).
1.42 Attack the enemy when he is not prepared.
1.43 Move, appear and strike at areas where the enemy least expects you.
1.44 These are the secrets and principles for winning wars.
1.45 However, they cannot be discussed, decided nor divulged beforehand.
1.46 Thus, those who carry out planning in the temple prior to the outbreak of war will
win if the plans are thorough and detailed.
1.47 Those who carry out planning in the temple prior to the outbreak of war will not
win if the plans are neither thorough nor detailed.
1.48 With thorough and detailed planning, one can win.
1.49 With less thorough or detailed planning, one cannot win.
1.50 How much more certain is defeat when one does not plan at all!
1.51 By observing how planning is done, I can predict victory and defeat.
4
Chapter 2
Waging War
2.1 Sun Zi said: As a general rule, for a military campaign, one would need 1,000 speedy
four-horse chariots, 1,000 heavy wagons, and 100,000 fully equipped and combat-
ready soldiers.
2.2 Food and supplies will have to be transported for 1,000 miles.
2.3 There is a need to provide for expenses incurred at home and at the battlefront; for the
entertaining of guests, visitors, advisors and emissaries; for procuring of materials
and supplies such as glue and paint; and for maintaining the armament, chariots
and troops.
2.4 The expenses incurred will amount to 1,000 pieces of gold daily.
2.5 An army of 100,000 can only be raised when such an amount is available.
2.6 The purpose of raising such a large army is to achieve swift and decisive victories.
2.7 When victory is long overdue, weapons will be blunt and the morale (and motivation)
of the troops will be adversely affected.
2.8 Thus, when they attack cities (surrounded by high walls), they would be greatly
exhausted.
2.9 When an army is engaged in and exposed to protracted military campaigns, the
resources of the nation will be insufficient to support the effort.
2.10 When military weapons are blunt, the morale of the troops is low, the army very
exhausted and supplies of the state are depleted, the neighbouring warlords will
capitalize on such misfortunes and vulnerabilities by launching attacks (against
you).
2.11 Thus, even if there are capable and wise strategists (and advisors), they will not be
able to deal with the inevitable consequences.
2.12 While the blunders are known to occur when military operations are conducted
swiftly, one has yet to witness a skilful military operation where there are long
delays.
2.13 There has never been a case where a nation has gained from protracted military
operations.
2.14 Therefore, generals who do not thoroughly comprehend the inherent dangers of
deploying troops are unlikely to understand the advantages of using troops.
2.15 He (the general) who is adept in warfare does not require additional conscription
of soldiers nor multiple replenishments of food and supplies.
2.16 Military weapons and equipment should be obtained from the home country while
food and provisions should be obtained from the enemy.
2.17 In this way, the army will have ample supplies of food and provisions.
2.18 A nation (involved in a military campaign) may be poor because it tries to
transport all its provisions over long distances.
2.19 Transportation (of food and supplies) over long distances will impoverish the
people.
2.20 Where the army is located, the prices (of food and supplies) in that area will rise.
2.21 When prices are high, the wealth of the ordinary people will be eroded.
5
2.22 When wealth is eroded, harsher tolls and taxes will be imposed on the people.
2.23 When the strength (of the army) is exhausted and wealth (of the state) is depleted,
each household within the state will also be emptied of provisions.
2.24 The income of the ordinary people would be reduced by seventy percent.
2.25 The state could incur expenses for loss of equipment and livestock: chariots,
horses, breastplates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective
mantles, oxen and heavy wagons.
2.26 These losses will amount to sixty percent of public assets.
2.27 Hence, the wise general would ensure that his troops commandeer the food and
supplies of the enemy.
2.28 Consuming one cartload of provisions of the enemy is tantamount to twenty
cartloads of your own.
2.29 Similarly, consuming one picul of the enemy’s fodder is tantamount to twenty
piculs of your own.
2.30 In order to kill the enemy, the troops must hate him.
2.31 For the troops to plunder the resources of the enemy, they must be motivated by
material rewards.
2.32 Therefore, the first person who succeeds in capturing ten chariots in a chariot
battle should be rewarded.
2.33 Subsequently, remove and replace the banner of the enemy with yours and use the
captured chariots together with yours.
2.34 Treat the captured soldiers well (so that they can be used).
2.35 This is what is meant by conquering the enemy and becoming stronger in the
process.
2.36 In war, it is better to go for swift victories rather than engage in prolonged
military campaigns.
2.37 Thus, the general who is knowledgeable in military matters is the controller of the
fate of the people and the guardian of peace or advocate of crisis for the nation.
6
Chapter 3
Strategic Attacks
3.1 Sun Zi said: In general, when waging war, capturing a whole nation intact is a better
strategy; to shatter and ruin it is a weaker option.
3.2 Capturing a whole division intact is a better strategy; destroying it is a weaker option.
3.3 Capturing a whole battalion intact is a better strategy; destroying it is a weaker
option.
3.4 Capturing an entire company intact is a better strategy; destroying it is a weaker
option.
3.5 Capturing an entire section intact is a better strategy; destroying it is a weaker option.
3.6 Thus, to fight a hundred battles and to win a hundred victories is not a reflection of
the most supreme strategy.
3.7 The ability to subdue the enemy without any battle is the ultimate reflection of the
most supreme strategy.
3.8 Thus, the most supreme strategy is to attack the plans and strategies of the enemy.
3.9 The next best strategy is to attack his relationships and alliances with other nations.
3.10 The next best strategy is to attack his army.
3.11 The worst strategy of all is to attack walled cities.
3.12 Attack walled cities when there are no other alternatives.
3.13 The preparation of large shields, attacking wagons, and various other assault
equipment and weapons will need at least three months to complete.
3.14 The building of observation ramps would take an additional three months.
3.15 (Under such a situation), the general in-charge may lose his cool and be unable to
control his patience.
3.16 Thus, even if he (the general) orders his troops to assault the walls like ants, one-
third of them will be killed and the city will still not be conquered.
3.17 This is the disastrous consequence of embarking on such an attack.
3.18 Thus, the adept in warfare is able to subdue the army of the enemy without having
to resort to battles.
3.19 He (the adept in warfare) is able to capture the cities of others without having to
launch assaults.
3.20 He (the adept in warfare) is able to destroy and damage the states of others
without waging protracted campaigns.
3.21 He (the adept in warfare) will focus on using effective policies and strategies to
keep all his resources intact and yet be able to contest for world supremacy
against the other states.
3.22 Thus, his troops are not worn out and his victories and gains are complete.
3.23 This, in essence, is the art of strategic attacks.
3.24 Thus, the principle for the deployment of troops is as follows: When
outnumbering the enemy ten to one, surround him.
3.25 When outnumbering the enemy five to one, attack him.
3.26 When outnumbering the enemy two to one, divide him.
3.27 When comparable in numbers to those of the enemy, it is possible to engage him.
7
3.28 When lesser in numbers to the enemy, be capable of escaping.

3.29 When greatly inferior in numbers to those of the enemy, be capable of avoiding
him.
3.30 No matter how stubborn, resilient and determined a smaller and weaker force is, it
will eventually become captive to a larger and stronger force.
3.31 Now, the general is like the guardian of the nation.
3.32 If the guardian is a thoughtful and detailed person, the nation will be strong and
mighty.
3.33 If the guardian is full of character flaw, the nation will be weak and vulnerable.
3.34 Thus there are three ways in which the ruler can create disasters for his army.
3.35 When not knowing that the army should not advance, to order an advance.
3.36 When not knowing that the army should not retreat, to order a retreat.
3.37 This is tantamount to interference with military command and movement.
3.38 When ignorant of the affairs of the enemy to participate and interfere with the
army’s administration.
3.39 This causes the officers and men to be confused and perplexed.
3.40 When ignorant of matters pertaining to the exercise of military authority, to
interfere in the execution of responsibilities.
3.41 This causes apprehension and skepticism in the minds of officers and men.
3.42 If the army is confused and perplexed as well as apprehensive and skeptical, the
warlords of neighbouring states will surely create trouble.
3.43 This is like the saying: A confused and chaotic army provides victory for the
enemy.
3.44 Thus, there are five ways to predict victory.
3.45 He who knows when he can engage in battle and when not to do so will win.
3.46 He who understands how deploy large and small forces (according to the battle
situation) will win.
3.47 He who is able to unite himself with his officers and men as one mind, spirit and
purpose will win.
3.48 He who is proactive and well-prepared and awaits his unprepared enemy will win.
3.49 He (the general) who is capable and does not have to contend with interference by
the ruler will win.
3.50 These five factors provide the key and the rationale for predicting and
understanding victory.
3.51 Thus it is said: He who knows the other side (the enemy) and knows himself
will not be defeated in a hundred battles.
3.52 He who does not know the other side (the enemy) but knows himself will have an
even chance of victory or defeat.
3.53 He who does not know the other side (the enemy) and himself is bound to be
defeated in every battle.
Chapter 4
Disposition of the Army
8
4.1 Sun Zi said: In ancient times, those who were skilful in warfare ensued that they
would not be defeated and then waited for opportunities to defeat the enemy.
4.2 The ability to prevent defeat depends on oneself, while the opportunity for victory
depends on the enemy.
4.3 Thus, those who are skilful in warfare can ensure that they will not be defeated by the
enemy, but will not be able to ensure victory over the enemy.
4.4 As such, it is said that one may be able to foretell victory, but may not necessary be
able to achieve it.
4.5 Those who are not able to win must defend.
4.6 Those who are able to win must attack.
4.7 Defend when forces and resources are inadequate.
4.8 Attack when forces and resources are more than abundant.
4.9 The adept in defence is able to conceal his forces in the most secretive ways and
places on earth.
4.10 The adept person at offence is able to deploy his troops in ways that are beyond
the imagination of anyone.
4.11 As such, he is not only able to ensure the greatest security for himself, but is able
to secure the most complete victory (against the enemy).
4.12 To predict a victory that cannot surpass what can be known by any ordinary
person is not the hallmark of a great military strategist.
4.13 To win a hard-fought battle that is praised by the masses is also not the hallmark
of a guru of warfare.
4.14 This is like lifting a hair in autumn – it is no indication of great strength.
4.15 To be able to see the sun and the moon is no indication of clear vision.
4.16 To be able to hear the roar of the thunder is no indication of sharp hearing.
4.17 What the ancient sages meant by an adept person at warfare was someone who
excelled in securing victories by choosing those enemies who could easily be
conquered.
4.18 Thus, the person adept at warfare wins without being known for his wisdom and
reputation nor for his courage and merit.
4.19 Thus, he wins battles with confidence and without making mistakes.
4.20 He does not make mistakes because he adopts measures, policies and strategies
that are certain to lead to victory.
4.21 He wins because he chooses to engage an enemy that is already in a position of
defeat.
4.22 Therefore, the person adept at warfare places himself in a position where defeat is
impossible, and he does not miss any opportunity to defeat the enemy.
4.23 As such, a victorious army ensures that it will win before going into battle.
4.24 A defeated army engages in battle first and then looks for victory.
4.25 The person adept in warfare not only cultivates his moral code but maintains law
and order.
4.26 In this way, he is able to develop policies that determine victory and defeat in
war.
4.27 Now in warfare, evaluation must be made as follows: First, estimating the degree
of difficulty; second, assessing the scope of operation; third, calculation of own
9
forces; fourth, comparison of forces; and fifth, establishing the chances for
victory.
4.28 Based on the characteristics of the terrain, the degree of difficulty (for the military
campaign) is estimated.
4.29 Based on the estimation of the degree of difficulty, the scope of operation (for
military movement) is assessed.
4.30 Based on the assessment of the scope of operation, the calculation of one’s own
forces (to be committed to the military campaign) is made.
4.31 Based on the calculation of own forces, comparisons are evaluated against those
of the enemy.
4.32 Based on the comparison of forces from both sides, the chances for victory can
then be established.
4.33 Thus, a victorious army is like a super-heavyweight matched against a
microweight.
4.34 A defeated army is like a microweight matched against a super-heavyweight.
4.35 The person adept at warfare is able to command and direct his troops to fight like
the accumulated gush of water that plunges down mercilessly from thousands of
feet high. Such is the disposition of a powerful and victorious army.
Chapter 5
Forces
5.1 Sun Zi said: To manage a large force is similar to managing a small force.
10
5.2 It is a matter of organization and structure.

5.3 To direct and control a large force is similar to directing and controlling a small
force.
5.4 It is a matter of formations, communication and signals.
5.5 The fact that the whole army can withstand the attacks of the enemy without
suffering any defeats is due to the use of the direct and indirect strategies, forces,
and approaches.
5.6 When forces are concentrated to attack the enemy, it must be like solid stones
hurled against eggs.
5.7 This is applying the principle of using strengths to strike weaknesses.
5.8 In battle, use the direct force to engage the enemy, and the indirect force to win.
5.9 Thus, the person adept at warfare is able to use indirect approaches, strategies and
troops in such infinite ways like the ever-changing forces and elements of nature
and the ceaseless flowing water of rivers and streams.
5.10 They end and begin again like the ever-changing roles of the sun and moon.
5.11 They perish and resurrect just like the changes of the four seasons.
5.12 There are only five basic musical notes but their combinations and permutations
produce music scores so varied that it is impossible to hear all of them.
5.13 There are only five primary colours but their mixes and matches produce so many
visuals that it is impossible to view all of them.
5.14 There are only five basic flavours but their blends and mixtures produce so many
tastes that it is impossible to savour all of them.
5.15 In any battle situation and condition, there are only the direct and indirect
approaches and forces.
5.16 However, the possible combinations, changes and manoeuvres between the direct
and the indirect (approaches and forces) are limitless and beyond comprehension.
5.17 The direct and indirect (approaches and forces) mutually support and reinforce
each other.
5.18 Their interactions and combinations are like two never-ending interlocking rings
where the possibilities of their beginnings and endings can never be determined.
5.19 When gushing torrential water tosses stones and pushes boulders, it is because of
the force created by its momentum.
5.20 When the ferocious strike of an eagle breaks the body of its prey, it is because of
the exact moment and timing of its engagement.
5.21 Thus, the force and momentum of the adept in warfare are so overwhelming and
ferocious, and his timing of engagement highly precise and swift.
5.22 His stance and (potential) force is like that of a fully-stretched crossbow, and his
timing is exact like that of the release of the trigger (of the crossbow).
5.23 In the midst of disorders and turmoil in war, while the troops have to fight under
chaotic situations, they must remain orderly and in control.
5.24 In the midst of confusion and chaos in fighting, one (the general) must still be
able to marshal the troops from all directions and deploy them such that they
cannot be defeated.
5.25 To feign disorder (to the enemy in battle), one must possess strict discipline.
5.26 To feign cowardice (before the enemy), one must possess great courage.
11
5.27 To feign weakness and vulnerability (before the enemy), one must have great
superiority of forces.
5.28 Order or disorder depends on organization and structure.
5.29 Courage or cowardice depends on postures and circumstances.
5.30 Strengths or weaknesses depend on the formations and dispositions of the army.
5.31 Thus, the person adept at warfare manipulates the movements of the enemy by
creating circumstances and situations such that the enemy will conform
accordingly.
5.32 Entice the enemy by giving away something that he would certainly want to have.
5.33 Lure the enemy to move with benefits that he desires and then use concealed
troops to await and ambush him.
5.34 Thus the person adept at warfare seeks victory from the battle situations and
conditions and does not rely solely on the efforts of his officers and men.
5.35 As such, he is able to select the right men (officers and soldiers) and trust them to
exploit the battle situations and conditions.
5.36 The person who knows how to exploit battle situations and conditions is able to
command his troops in battle like rolling logs and boulders.
5.37 The characteristics of logs and boulders are such that when they are on level
ground, they remain still; when they are on uneven and slopping terrain, they
move.
5.38 If they are square, they cease to move; if they are round, they roll on.
5.39 Thus, the person adept at warfare creates situations, postures and momentum that
resemble rolling boulders falling from the great heights of mountains; this is what
is meant by the forces created by a well-commanded army.
Chapter 6
Weaknesses and Strengths
6.1 Sun Zi said: Those who arrive first at the battleground will have sufficient time to rest
and prepare against the enemy.
12
6.2 Those who arrive late at the battleground will have to rush into battle when they are
already exhausted.
6.3 Thus, the person adept in warfare seeks to control and manipulate his enemy instead
of being controlled and manipulated.
6.4 He can cause his enemy to arrive on his own accord by luring him with advantages.
6.5 He can deter his enemy from coming by creating (potential) dangers and harm.
6.6 Thus when the enemy is well rested, distress and tire him.
6.7 When he is well-stocked with food, starve him out.
6.8 When he is well-encamped and comfortable, provoke him to move.
6.9 Attack places where the enemy must rush to rescue.
6.10 Move quickly along routes where the enemy least expects.
6.11 An army can travel for a thousand miles without being distressed and exhausted
because it moves along places where there is no enemy.
6.12 To be certain to capture what you attack is to attack a place where the enemy does
not defend or where his defence is weak.
6.13 To be certain to hold on to what you defend is to defend a place where the enemy
does not have the courage to attack or where the defence is invulnerable to
attacks.
6.14 Thus, the expert in offence attacks places where the enemy does not know how to
defend.
6.15 The expert in defence protects places where the enemy does not know how to
attack.
6.16 Such is the intricacy and sublety of the expert in warfare that he appears to be
invisible and without trace.
6.17 Such is the mystery and myth of the expert in warfare that he is not heard nor
detected.
6.18 Indeed, he can be the one who determines the fate of the enemy.
6.19 He is able to advance without any resistance because he accelerates along areas
(and routes) that are not defended by the enemy.
6.20 He is able to retreat without being pursued because he withdraws at much faster
speed than that of the enemy.
6.21 Thus, when I desire to go into battle, the enemy, despite being behind high walls
and deep moats, will have no choice but to engage me.
6.22 This is because I choose to attack areas where he must rescue and protect.
6.23 When I desire not to fight, even though I may be occupying any ground and not
erecting any defences (like merely drawing a demarcated line on the ground to
defend it), the enemy will still be unable to wage battle against me.
6.24 This is because I (use schemes and ploys that) contradict the normal rules of
engagement and prevent him from reaching his desired destinations.
6.25 Thus, if I can uncover the dispositions of the enemy while remaining concealed
myself, I can keep my forces concentrated and united, and force those of the
enemy to be divided and dispersed.
6.26 If I can concentrate and unite my entire troop at one place while those of the
enemy are scattered at ten different places, then I can use my entire force against
one-tenth of his.
13
6.27 Thus, I will be the numerically superior and stronger force and he will be the
smaller and weaker force.
6.28 If I can use a larger and stronger force to attack a smaller and inferior one, those
enemies who engage in battles against me will surely be defeated easily.
6.29 The enemy must not know the place (battleground) where I intend to attack.
6.30 If the enemy does not know where I intend to attack, he must defend many places.
6.31 The more places the enemy defends, the more scattered are his forces, and the
weaker is his force at any one point where I am attacking.
6.32 If he strengthens the front, he will weaken the rear.
6.33 If he defends the rear, his front will be fragile.
6.34 If he prepares to his left, he will weaken his right.
6.35 If he reinforces his right, he will weaken his left.
6.36 If he tries to defend everywhere, he will be vulnerable everywhere.
6.37 Inferiority or weakness in numbers means that you have to be prepared against the
enemy.
6.38 Superiority or strength in numbers means that the enemy will have to prepare
against you.
6.39 If you know the place of the battleground and the exact date of engagement of
battle, your army can travel a thousand miles and still be ready for battle.
6.40 If you do not know the location of the battleground and exact date of the battle,
then the forces on your left flank cannot rescue the forces on the right flank (when
they are in trouble).
6.41 The right forces will not be able to help the left forces (when they are in trouble),
the front forces cannot reinforce the rear, and the rear cannot relieve the front.
6.42 This problem is compounded even more considering that the farthest force may be
tens of miles away, and the nearer ones, several miles apart.
6.43 According to my analysis and evaluation, the people of the kingdom of Yue may
have a very large army, but does this superiority in numbers necessarily mean that
it will have the definite advantage in winning battles?
6.44 Thus I say: Victories can be created by us.
6.45 Although the enemy may have a much larger and stronger force, he can be
prevented from engaging me.
6.46 Therefore, scheme to discover the plans and strategies of the enemy so as to know
their likelihood of success (against us).
6.47 Provoke him so as to know his reasons and basis for movements and actions.
6.48 Uncover his dispositions so as to know the vulnerability of the ground (that he is
occupying).
6.49 Throw some contests against the enemy so as to know the areas of his strengths
and weaknesses.
6.50 The ultimate skill in the deployment of troops is to ensure that it has no fixed or
constant formation and disposition.
6.51 Without ascertainable formations, even the most infiltrated and observant spy will
not be able to probe and comprehend, and the wisest strategist will not be able to
uncover your plans or plot against you.
6.52 The victory gained as a result of adapting to the circumstances of the enemy will
never be understood by the troops (even when it is witnesses by them).
14
6.53 Everyone may know the formation that I used to secure victory.
6.54 However, no one will know the ways, methods, and reasons behind how I went
about creating that victory.
6.55 Therefore, the victory gained from each battle comes about because strategies and
tactics are never repeated.
6.56 Rather, they (the strategies and tactics) vary according to the circumstances with
countless possibilities.
6.57 The principle underlying military deployment may be likened to water.
6.58 It is the inherent characteristics of flowing water to escape from high ground and
hasten its movement downwards.
6.59 In the same way, the disposition and deployment of an army should be to avoid
strengths and attack weaknesses.
6.60 Just as water controls its flows according to the characteristics of the terrain, an
army should create its victory according to the situations of the enemy.
6.61 So, in the conduct of war, there is no fixed situation and condition, just like water
has no constant shape and configuration.
6.62 The person who gains victories by adapting to the changing conditions and
situations of the enemy can be considered a legend in warfare.
6.63 Thus there is no guaranteed victory among the five elements of nature.
6.64 There is no permanency for each of the four seasons.
6.65 There are days which are short and days which are long.
6.66 There are changes in the shape of the moon throughout a month.
Chapter 7
Military Manoeuvres
7.1 Sun Zi said: In any military campaign, the general will first receive his orders from
his rulers.
7.2 He then assembles the troops and mobilizes the citizens (people).
15
7.3 He must harmonise (the interests of) these diverse groups and build their relationships
and comradeships by encamping them together.
7.4 However, none of these are more difficult than military manoeuvres (that are aimed at
gaining victories against the enemy).
7.5 The difficulty about the art of manoeuvring is to convert difficult and torturous routes
into direct accesses (to the enemy), and to turn disastrous circumstances into
advantageous situations.
7.6 Thus, advance by using indirect routes, and lure the enemy by offering small gains as
bait.
7.7 As such, while you may set off later than the enemy, you will arrive earlier than him.
7.8 The one who knows how to do this understands the use of indirect and direct
strategies.
7.9 Thus, in manoeuvring there are advantages to be gained and there are dangers and
calamities as well.
7.10 One who attempts to mobilize a complete and fully equipped army so as to go
after advantages and gains will be late in seizing them.
7.11 One who sends a lightly equipped army to go after advantages and gains is likely
to suffer losses of stores and supplies (at the base camp).
7.12 An army may bundle up and keep the armour wear of the soldiers (and replace it
with light uniforms) in order to rush its movement forward through nights and
days without rest so that double the distance can be covered.
7.13 It can travel 100 miles to contend for advantages against the enemy.
7.14 However, such an army is likely to risk having the generals of its three divisions
captured.
7.15 This is because the stronger and fitter man will be in front while the weaker and
tired ones will be far behind.
7.16 As a result, only one-tenth of the troops will reach the destination.
7.17 It can also travel 50 miles to contend for advantages against the enemy.
7.18 In this case, the general of the vanguard will be humiliated and defeated.
7.19 This is because only half the troops will arrive at the destination.
7.20 If the army has to travel 30 miles to contend for advantages against the enemy,
then only two-thirds of the troops will arrive at the destination.
7.21 It follows that an army without heavy equipment and supplies will perish.
7.22 An army without sufficient food and grain will die.
7.23 An army without sufficient stockpiles and reserves will not survive.
7.24 Thus, if the schemes and ploys of the neighbouring warlords are not known, one
should not be keen to enter into any alliances with them.
7.25 Those who do not know the conditions of the forested mountains, the dangerous
terrain of mountain paths, and the treacherous nature of swamps and marshes will
not be able to conduct the movement of troops.
7.26 Those who do not use local guides will not be able to gain the advantages of the
terrain.
7.27 Thus, war is based on applying deception to be successful.
7.28 Move when there are advantages to be gained.
7.29 Create changes in situations through the dispersion and concentration of forces.
7.30 Thus, when in movement, be as swift and invisible as the wind.
16
7.31 When in slow matches, be as majestic as the forest.

7.32 When raiding and plundering, be as ferocious as the fire.
7.33 When not in movement (as in encamping), be as steady as the mountains.
7.34 When in concealment (of forces and positions), be as inscrutable as the darkness
of night.
7.35 When attacking and assaulting, be as overwhelming and merciless as the roar of
thunder and the strike of lightning.
7.36 When looting and plundering villages, towns and cities, share the bounty with the
troops.
7.37 When occupying conquered territories, share the gains (with those generals who
have contributed significantly to the campaign).
7.38 Consider and deliberate (these matters) carefully before deciding on any action.
7.39 Those who can master beforehand the skill of using the indirect and direct
approaches, strategies and schemes will win.
7.40 Such is the art behind the manoeurvring of military forces.
7.41 According to the Book of Military Administration, “In battles, as verbal
communication cannot be heard clearly, cymbals and drums are used as
commands.
7.42 As visual communication and eye contact are hampered, banners and flags are
used as signals.
7.43 Now the purpose of using cymbals, drums, flags and banners is to draw the
attention of the troops and focus them for combat under the direction of the
commander.
7.44 Once the troops are united as a body, the courageous ones will not advance by
themselves.
7.45 The cowardly ones will also not retreat by themselves.
7.46 This is the art of directing large forces in combat.
7.47 For battles at night, use more torches and drums.
7.48 For battles in the day, use more banners and flags.
7.49 These different means of communication (cymbals, drums, flags and banners) are
designed to influence the senses and judgement of the enemy.
7.50 Thus, they (the lighted torches and beating drums at night and the innumerable
flags and banners during the day) serve to destroy the morale of the army (of the
enemy).
7.51 With regards to the generals of the enemy, they (the lighted torches and beating
drums at night and the innumerable flags and banners during the day) serve to rob
them of their decisiveness.
7.52 At the beginning of a military campaign, the spirits of the forces are high.
7.53 As the campaign progresses, the spirits of the forces become sluggish and
lethargy creeps in.
7.54 Towards the tail-end of the campaign, thoughts of returning home (base camp)
will set in.
7.55 Therefore, the person adept in warfare avoids engaging the forces of the enemy
when their spirits are high.
7.56 He only attacks them when their spirits are sluggish and the soldiers homesick.
7.57 This is control of the morale factor.
17
7.58 Use orderliness and stability to confront chaos and disorder.

7.59 Use calmness and steadfastness to deal with noisiness and clamour.
7.60 This is control of the psychological factor.
7.61 Use proximity (of troops) to the battlefield to counter enemies that come from
afar.
7.62 Use well-rested troops to counter tired and exhausted enemies.
7.63 Use well-fed and nourished troops against enemies who are short of food and
rations.
7.64 This is control of the physical factors.
7.65 Never engage an approaching enemy who displays orderly flags and banners.
7.66 Never attack an advancing enemy who shows an impressive and well-organized
formation.
7.67 This is control of the change factor.
7.68 Thus, the art of applying military manoeuvres includes the following:
7.69 Do not advance against an enemy who is encamped on high grounds.
7.70 Do not engage an enemy who is assaulting downwards from high ridges.
7.71 Do not pursue an enemy who pretends to retreat in desperation.
7.72 Do not attack the agile and highly motivated elite force of the enemy.
7.73 Do not fall for bait offered by the enemy.
7.74 Do not intercept an enemy who is returning to his home country.
7.75 In surrounding an enemy, always leave him an escape route.
7.76 Do not pursue a desperate enemy too relentlessly.
7.77 These are the ways and art of manoeuvring and deploying troops.
Chapter 8
Variations and Adaptability
8.1 Sun Zi said: In a military campaign, the general will first receive his orders from his
ruler.
8.2 He then assembles the troops and mobilizes the citizens.
8.3 When on treacherous grounds, you must never encamp.
8.4 When on focal ground, you must attempt to ally with neighbouring states.
8.5 When on isolated ground, you must not stay there.
18
8.6 When on constricted ground, you must plan and strategize.

8.7 When on death ground, you must fight relentlessly.
8.8 There are some routes and paths that must not be taken.
8.9 There are some armies and troops that must not be assaulted.
8.10 There are some cities that must not be attacked.
8.11 There are some grounds that must not be contested.
8.12 There are some military orders that need not be obeyed.
8.13 Thus, the general who knows how to vary and adapt to changing situations so as
to gain advantages is one who is skilful in applying the art of war.
8.14 The general who is familiar with the terrain but does not know how to vary and
adapt to changing situations will not be able to take advantage of what that terrain
has to offer.
8.15 In military command, if the general cannot master the art of variations and
adaptability, he will not be able to deploy his troops to maximum advantage
despite understanding the five strategic considerations.
8.16 Thus, the wise strategist will always weigh and consider the favourable and
unfavourable factors in his deliberations.
8.17 By factoring the favourable factors (within the unfavourable ones), the mission
can be accomplished with confidence.
8.18 By factoring the unfavourable factors 9within the favourable ones), disasters and
crises can be averted.
8.19 Thus, succumb the neighbouring warlords through the use of intimidation and
threats.
8.20 Harass and wear down the neighbouring warlords through incessant creation of
troubles and activities.
8.21 Hasten and direct the movements of the neighbouring warlords through the offer
of benefits and baits.
8.22 Thus, in the conduct of war, one must not rely on the failure of the enemy to
come, but on the readiness of oneself to engage him.
8.23 One must not rely on the failure of the enemy to attack, but on the ability of
oneself to build an invincible defence.
8.24 Thus, there are five dangers that will plague any general.
8.25 If he is reckless, he can be killed.
8.26 If he is cowardly and desperate to live, he can be captured.
8.27 If he is quick-tempered and easily angered, he can be provoked.
8.28 If he is sensitive to honour, he can be insulted.
8.29 If he is overly compassionate to people, he can be disturbed and harassed.
8.30 These five characteristics are the greatest pitfalls and mistakes of a general and
the cause of disasters in any military operation.
8.31 The destruction of an army and the deaths of generals are caused by these five
dangers.
8.32 They must be studied and examined thoroughly.
19
Chapter 9
Movement and Deployment of Troops
9.1 Sun Zi said: In the deployment of troops (for combat) and in the analysis and
assessment of the enemy, certain principles must be kept in mind.
9.2 After crossing the mountains, move and stay close to the valleys.
9.3 For a commanding view and to ensure better chances of survival (against the enemy),
occupy the high grounds.
9.4 When the enemy has occupied high grounds, do not attempt an assault.
20
9.5 These are the principles for deploying troops in mountainous terrain.
9.6 After crossing a river, get as far away from its bank as possible and move on.
9.7 When an invading force of the enemy is crossing a river, never engage it in the midst
of the river itself.
9.8 Rather, let half of its force cross the river first, then attack it so that you can gain the
advantage.
9.9 If you are eager to attack an invading enemy, never engage him at the point where he
plans to cross a river.
9.10 For a commanding view and to ensure better chances of survival (against the
enemy), occupy the high grounds.
9.11 Never move upstream to engage the enemy.
9.12 These are the principles for deploying troops in marine battles.
9.13 When crossing salty swamps and marshes, move away quickly; never linger there.
9.14 If you need to engage the enemy in salty swamps and marshes, stay close to areas
that are lush with grasses and have your rear to the forest.
9.15 These are the principles for deploying troops in salty swamps and marshes.
9.16 On level terrain, occupy positions that allow you ease of manoeuvres.
9.17 By ensuring that the right flank and support forces are on higher grounds, the
danger is confined to the front as the rear is secured and safe.
9.18 These are the principles for deploying troops on level terrain.
9.19 By mastering the principles of the four different situations for deployment of
troops, the Yellow emperor was able to conquer the other warlords of the
surrounding areas.
9.20 In general, an army prefers to take up positions on high ground and detests
occupying low ground.
9.21 It favours positions that are bright and sunny and detests places that are dark and
unhygienic.
9.22 It prefers to nourish its troops by locating in areas where food and supplies are
abundant.
9.23 An army that does not suffer from disease and sickness is bound to win in all
battles.
9.24 When in hilly areas, you need to be cautious and alert by camping on the sunnier
side and have the right flank and rear guard on higher ground.
9.25 In this way, the troops will benefit because you are able to exploit the advantages
of the terrain.
9.26 When there is rain upstream and the river is foaming, you must wait for the water
to subside before trying to ford the river.
9.27 In any terrain, there are treacherous gullies, natural wells, natural prisons, natural
nets, natural traps and natural crevices.
9.28 Move quickly away when encountering them and never even be close to them.
9.29 I will keep a far distance from them but will force the enemy near them.
9.30 I will face them directly but will force the backs of the enemy towards them.
9.31 The surrounding areas along the route that an army takes may have treacherous
paths, ponds covered with grasses and reeds, marshlands, forested mountains and
areas with thick undergrowth and vegetation.
21
9.32 (In moving through such areas), it must be vigilant and embark on detailed and
thorough searches.
9.33 As such areas are likely to have ambushes laid by the enemy or be where his spies
are hidden.
9.34 When the enemy is nearby and yet is able to remain silent, he is relying on the
strategic advantages conferred by the terrain.
9.35 When the enemy attempts to provoke you into battle from a distance, he is trying
to lure you forward to engage him.
9.36 When the enemy camps on a level and accessible ground, there must be
advantages and reasons for doing so.
9.37 When forest trees show signs of movement, the enemy is approaching.
9.38 When there are many obstacles of bundled grasses and hay along the way, the
enemy is trying to arouse your suspicion.
9.39 When birds suddenly rise in flight, there are likely ambushes nearby.
9.40 When frightened animals rush out from the forest, the main force of the enemy is
at hand.
9.41 When the dust rises high and is concentrated, the enemy chariots are arriving.
9.42 When the dust rises low and is widespread, the infantry of the enemy is
approaching.
9.43 When the dust shows signs of scattering in different streaky directions, the enemy
is sending troops to cut and gather firewood.
9.44 When the dust rises and settles occasionally in small patches, the enemy is setting
up camp.
9.45 When the envoy (of the enemy) speaks very humbly and lowly while preparations
are being intensified, the enemy is planning to attack.
9.46 When the envoy (of the enemy) speaks arrogantly and aggressively with threats to
attack, the enemy is actually preparing to withdraw.
9.47 When the envoy (of the enemy) asks for truce when there is no prior agreement
nor understanding, the enemy is scheming.
9.48 When the light chariots leave the main force to take up positions on both flanks,
the enemy is gearing up formation for battle.
9.49 When there is much movement among the soldiers and chariots of the enemy,
rushing to take positions, his reinforcement troops from afar have arrived.
9.50 When half the troops (of the enemy) are advancing while the other half are
withdrawing, he is attempting to lure you.
9.51 When soldiers (of the enemy) lean against their weapons, they are hungry and
short of food.
9.52 When enemy soldiers who are assigned to collect water start to drink first, they
are in extreme thirst and lack water supplies.
9.53 When the enemy sees an obvious advantage but is unable to seize it, he is severely
tired and exhausted.
9.54 When birds gather around the camp of the enemy, the side is already vacated.
9.55 When enemy soldiers scream and yell at night, they are in great fear.
9.56 When the army (of the enemy) is disorderly and chaotic, the authority of the
general is not respected.
22
9.57 When the banners and flags (of the enemy) are shifted around frequently, the
troops are in confusion and disarray.
9.58 When the junior officers (of the enemy) are short-tempered and easily angered,
they are tired and detest their responsibilities.
9.59 When the enemy kills horses for food, there are no provisions in his camp.
9.60 When the cooking utensils are hung away and the soldiers refuse to return to
camp, the enemy is in a desperate situation.
9.61 When the officers and men gather in small groups to speak softly and in subdued
tones, the general has lost their support.
9.62 When rewards are given out excessively, the general is lacking ideas.
9.63 When punishments are carried out excessively, the general is in great distress.
9.64 A general who behaves ruthlessly at the initial stage and then begins to fear his
own troops subsequently is one who is neither intelligent nor capable.
9.65 When the envoy of the enemy arrives with praises and gifts, they are signs that the
enemy desires a truce.
9.66 When the enemy arrives with much anger and ferocity and yet for a long time
refuses to engage in battle or to withdraw, one must be very vigilant and study his
behavior and motives carefully.
9.67 The strength of an army does not depend on superiority of numbers.
9.68 Do not advance compulsively based on having large forces.
9.69 Concentrate the strengths of your forces sufficiently and judge the moves and
motives of the enemy accurately so as to capture him.
9.70 He who lacks strategic foresight and insight and underestimates his enemy will
definitely end up being captured.
9.71 When the men are punished before their loyalty is secured, they will be rebellious
and disobedient.
9.72 If disobedient and rebellious, it is difficult to deploy them.
9.73 When the loyalty of the men is secured, but punishments are not enforced, such
troops cannot be used either.
9.74 Thus, the general must be able to instruct his troops with civility and humanity
and unite them with rigorous training and discipline so as to secure victories in
battles.
9.75 When orders are regularly enforced and used to train the soldiers, they will be
obedient.
9.76 When orders are not regularly enforced nor used to train the soldiers, they will not
be obedient.
9.77 When orders are regularly enforced, it is because of the mutual trust and
confidence between the commander and his men.
Chapter 10
Terrain
10.1 Sun Zi said: There are different kinds of terrain, such as: communicative ground,
entrapping ground and indifferent ground.
10.2 Other types of terrain are constricted ground, key ground and distant ground.
10.3 An area that is easily accessible to me and to the other side (the enemy) is
considered as a communicative ground.
23
10.4 On a communicative ground, the priority is to occupy a high and sunny position
that is convenient and beneficial for over-seeing the supply routes for food and
rations.
10.5 In this way, advantages in battle are gained.
10.6 An area that is easy to enter but difficult to retreat from is called an entrapping
ground.
10.7 On an entrapping ground, when the enemy is ill-prepared in defence, one can
launch attacks to capture it successfully.
10.8 However, if the enemy proves to be well prepared and the assault fails, one is
hard put to beat a retreat, and is thus placed in a very disadvantageous position.
10.9 An area that is not advantageous for occupation by either side is called an
indifferent ground.
10.10 On an indifferent ground, should the enemy throw out a bait, one must never take
it, nor launch an attack.
10.11 Instead, one should pretend to retreat and, in turn lure the enemy out.
10.12 When half of his troops have been drawn out, it is when advantageous to launch
an attack.
10.13 On a constricted ground, one must be the first to occupy it; one should then fortify
the strategic access points with one’s troops and await the arrival of the enemy.
10.14 If the enemy occupies the constricted ground first and has already fortified the
strategic access points, refrain from attacking him.
10.15 Only attack the strategic access points when they are weak and not fortified.
10.16 On key ground, first occupy it and then camp on higher, sunny ground to await
the arrival of the enemy.
10.17 If the enemy occupies the key ground first, he has to be lured away.
10.18 One must not follow (to attack) him.
10.19 On distant ground, if both forces are equally matched, it be comes difficult for one
to provoke the other into battle as there is no advantage to be gained in a direct
battle.
10.20 The natural laws of terrain underlie these six types of ground.
10.21 A general’s greatest responsibility is to study and examine their characteristics
thoroughly.
10.22 An army may suffer from flight, insubordination or collapse.
10.23 It may also suffer from ruin, disorganization and rout.
10.24 The six calamities mentioned are not due to natural causes.
10.25 They are the faults of the general.
10.26 Even when all other conditions and characteristics are comparable, if an army
insists on attacking an enemy force ten times its size, the result will be flight.
10.27 When the soldiers are strong and courageous while the officers are weak and
cowardly, the result will be insubordination.
10.28 When the officers are strong and brave but the soldiers are weak and timid, the
result will be collapse.
10.29 When the senior officers are angry and insubordinate because of the general’s
failure to recognize their capabilities, and they engage the enemy in a spirit of
resentment and act out of their own will, the result will be ruin.
24
10.30 When the general is weak and lacks discipline, when his orders and instructions
are not enlightened, when his officers and men do not have clear lines of
responsibilities, and when the command structure and formations are confusing,
the result is disorganization.
10.31 When the general, unable to assess the enemy’s character, allows a smaller force
to strike a larger one, pitting its weaknesses against the enemy’s strengths, and
having no elite troops at the front, the result will be rout.
10.32 The above six situations are definite causes for defeat.
10.33 It is the greatest responsibility of the general to study these situations thoroughly
(in order to prevent such calamities from occurring).
10.34 Advantages of terrain are exploited to complement the deployment of troops.
10.35 (The general must be able) to assess the enemy so as to secure victories.
10.36 He must be able to determine the characteristics of a terrain to understand its
dangers, distance, scope and coverage in the use of battle.
10.37 That is the moral responsibility of the supreme commander.
10.38 He who knows these factors and applies them in battle will win.
10.39 He who does not know these factors nor applies them will be defeated in battle.
10.40 If an assessment of the battle situation is one of definite victory, the general must
engage even though the ruler has issued orders not to do so.
10.41 If an assessment of the battle situation is one of definite defeat, the general must
not engage in battle, even though the ruler has issued orders to do so.
10.42 The (loyal) general is thus able to advance in battle without thought of seeking
personal fame or glory.
10.43 He retreats without fear of punishment.
10.44 His concerns are always on protecting the welfare of the people and the upholding
of the interests of the ruler.
10.45 He (such a general) is a precious talent favoured by the nation.
10.46 When the general regards his troops as infants, they will be willing to follow him
through the greatest threats and gravest dangers.
10.47 When the general treats his troops liked beloved sons, they will be willing to
support and die with him.
10.48 An army may be so overly pampered (by the general) that it cannot be useful, so
excessively loved that it cannot be commanded and so disorderly that it cannot be
disciplined.
10.49 Such an army is like a bunch of spoilt brats, and cannot be deployed.
10.50 If I know that my troops are capable of attacking the enemy, but do not know that
the enemy cannot be attacked, then the chance of victory is only half.
10.51 If the enemy is vulnerable to attack, but I am unaware that my troops are
incapable of the task, the chance of victory is only half.
10.52 (In war), I may know that the enemy is vulnerable to attack and my troops are
capable of attacking.
10.53 However, if I do not know that the terrain is not favourable for the conduct of
such an assault, then the chance of victory is only half.
10.54 Thus, he who is adept in warfare, when deploying his troops for battle, is never
confused or misguided.
10.55 When he mounts a military campaign, he never runs out of strategies or plans.
25
10.56 Thus it is said: Know the other side (the enemy), know yourself, and your victory
will not be endangered.
10.57 Know the weather, know the terrain, and your victories will be limitless.
Chapter 11
The Nine Battlegrounds
11.1 Sun Zi said: In the deployment of troops, there is dispersive ground, frontier
ground, and key ground.
11.2 There are also communicative ground, focal ground, serious ground, treacherous
ground, constricted ground and death ground.
26
11.3 When various warlords fight over the occupation of the same territory, it is
considered dispersive ground.
11.4 When a force has just made a shallow penetration into the territory of the enemy,
it is considered to be on frontier ground.
11.5 A terrain that is equally advantageous for me and the other side to occupy is
considered key ground.
11.6 An area that is easily accessible to me and to the other side (the enemy) is
considered communicative ground.
11.7 When a territory is surrounded by three other states, and when its seizure by any
of the other states is crucial to the determination of supremacy over the rest, then
it (the surrounded territory) is considered focal ground.
11.8 When an army has penetrated deep into the territory of the enemy, leaving behind
many hostile fortified cities and towns, it is considered to be on serious ground.
11.9 When an army is moving along forested mountains, dangerous mountain passes,
swamps, marshlands, difficult paths and roads, it is considered to be on
treacherous ground.
11.10 An area that can only be reached through narrow passes, that allows retreat only
through dangerous and crooked paths and where a small force of the enemy is
sufficient to strike a larger force of yours, is classified as constricted ground.
11.11 An area in which one can only survive through fearless fighting and will
definitely perish if one does not fight relentlessly is called death ground.
11.12 Therefore, when on dispersive ground, do not engage in battle.
11.13 When on frontier ground, do not stop (the advancement of troops).
11.14 When the enemy is occupying key ground, do not launch assaults.
11.15 When on communicative ground, ensure that your forces are not separated.
11.16 When on focal ground, you must attempt to befriend and ally with neighbouring
states.
11.17 When on serious ground, forage on the supplies and resources of the enemy.
11.18 When on treacherous ground, hurry the movement of the troops.
11.19 When on constricted ground, plan and strategize.
11.20 When on death ground, fight relentlessly.
11.21 It is said that the skilful military strategists of the past were able to ensure that the
front and rear troops of the enemy could not reinforce each other on time.
11.22 They ensued that the larger and smaller forces of the enemy would not be able to
support nor rely on one another.
11.23 They ensued that the officers and men (of the enemy) would not be able to rescue
each other.
11.24 They ensued that the commands and orders (of the enemy) from top to bottom
would not be accepted nor obeyed.
11.25 As a result, the troops of the enemy would be scattered and unable to concentrate.
11.26 Even when they manage to gather together, they could never have a complete and
orderly army.
11.27 Move only when there are advantages to be gained.
11.28 Cease when there are no advantages to be gained.
11.29 When I am asked: What can be done to an approaching enemy that is superior in
numbers, orderly and well-commanded?
27
11.30 I would suggest: be first to capture something that the enemy treasures most and
he will accede to your demands.
11.31 Speed is the essence in the use and deployment of troops in war.
11.32 Exploit the unpreparedness of the enemy.
11.33 Travel by routes that he does not expect nor is concerned about.
11.34 Attack where the enemy least expects.
11.35 The principles governing an invading force are as follows: when you have
penetrated deep into the territory of the enemy, your forces must be highly
focused and concentrated so that the enemy will not be able to overwhelm you.
11.36 You must be able to forge and live off the resources of the enemy so that your
troops will have adequate food and supplies.
11.37 Nourish and nurture the troops prudently and do not tire them unnecessarily.
11.38 Unite the spirit and morale of the troops and conserve and accumulate their
combat prowess.
11.39 When it comes to the deployment of troops, use strategies and plans that are
beyond the predictions of the enemy.
11.40 Place your troops in positions where they cannot escape and they will fight
fearlessly unto death with no thought of fleeing.
11.41 This is because when they are not afraid to die, the officers and men will give
their utmost for battle.
11.42 When the troops are trapped in dangerous and treacherous situations, they will
lose their sense of fear.
11.43 When they have nowhere else to flee, they will be firm and resilient in their
fighting spirit.
11.44 When they have penetrated deep into the hostile territory, they will be extra
cautious in action.
11.45 When there is no other choice left, they will fight fearlessly.
11.46 Thus, such an army requires no instruction to be vigilant and alert to combat.
11.47 The troops require no asking to do what is expected of them.
11.48 No discipline is needed to gain their close rapport and support.
11.49 No orders are needed to obtain their trust and reliance.
11.50 Such an army forbids superstitious practices and casts away doubts and rumours,
thus enabling it to confront death without any fear.
11.51 My officers and men do not have excess wealth; but it is not because they detest
the accumulation of material possessions.
11.52 They do not fear for their lives not because they do not yearn for longevity.
11.53 On the day when the orders for war are issued, the troops will weep; those sitting
down will have their tears and mucus wetting their garments.
11.54 Those lying down will have their tears streaming down their cheeks.
11.55 However, when thrown into positions of no escape, they will display the fearless
courage of Zhuan Zhu and Cao Gui.
11.56 Thus, the army adept in warfare may be likened to the snake, Shuai Ran.
11.57 The Shuai Ran is a snake found in the Chang Mountain.
11.58 When you strike its (Shuai Ran) head, its tail will attack you.
11.59 When you strike its tail, its head will attack you.
11.60 When you strike its body, both its head and tail will attack you.
28
11.61 When I am asked: Can the deployment of troops have the same capability as the
Shuai Ran? My answer is: It is possible.
11.62 It was said that the people and soldiers of the kingdoms of Wu and Yue hated one
another tremendously.
11.63 However, if they were placed in the same boat facing strong and threatening
winds, they would cooperate and help one another like a left hand and a right
hand.
11.64 Thus, it is not sufficient to rely on tying up the horses and burying the wheels of
the chariots as a means to control the army.
11.65 To ensure that the troops are united as one body and courageous depends on the
government and organization of the army.
11.66 The effective deployment of both the strong and weak forces depends on the
understanding and exploitation of the terrain.
11.67 Thus the adept in warfare leads his army as if he was leading a single person; this
is inevitable.
11.68 The art of generalship is to be calm and somber in thought, inscrutable and
comprehensive in strategizing; and strict, just and fair in the management of
military affairs.
11.69 He must be able to keep information away from the knowledge of his officers and
men so that they will not know his plans.
11.70 He changes his methods of doing things and alters his strategies so that no one
can see through his plans and schemes.
11.71 He changes his campsites and travels by unexpected routes so that no one can
guess his motives.
11.72 The (shrewd and capable) general on a specific military mission is like someone
who leads his men to scale great heights and, at the most crucial moment,
removes the ladder that leads them up.
11.73 He would lead his army deep into the hostile territory of the enemy and then
reveal his real intention (secrets) after burning the boats and breaking the cooking
pots.
11.74 He would lead the army like a flock of sheep, herding them in one direction, and
then switching back to another without them understanding what he is trying to
accomplish.
11.75 To assemble all the divisions of the army and expose them to great danger is what
a general is expected to do.
11.76 The variations and changes of the various types of ground, the advantages
pertaining to defensive and aggressive actions, and the understanding of human
nature are all important aspects that must be carefully studied.
11.77 The principle governing occupation of hostile territory is: When an army
penetrates deep into hostile territory, it will be more focused and united in battle;
when it makes only a shallow penetration, its fighting spirit is likely to be
threatened and diluted.
11.78 When the army leaves its own country behind and crosses the border into another
country for battle, it is on isolated ground.
11.79 When an area is highly accessible and communicative to various parties, it is focal
ground.
29
11.80 When an army penetrates deep into hostile territory, it is on serious ground.
11.81 When an army makes only a shallow penetration into hostile territory, it is on
frontier ground.
11.82 When the area to the rear of the army is highly dangerous and the area before it is
very narrow, it is on constricted ground.
11.83 An area from which there is no escape route is called death ground.
11.84 On dispersive ground, the general must unite the determination of the army.
11.85 On frontier ground, the general must keep the forces in close contact.
11.86 When encountering key ground, the general must rush his forces forward to
occupy it before the enemy does.
11.87 On communicative ground, the general must be vigilant in defence.
11.88 On focal ground, the general must strengthen his alliances with neighbouring
states.
11.89 On serious ground, a general must ensure a continuous supply of food and
provisions.
11.90 On treacherous ground, a general must push his forces quickly forward so as to
pass it.
11.91 On constricted ground, a general must seal the points of entry and exit.
11.92 On death ground, the general must fight as if he does not wish to live.
11.93 It is the intuitive nature of the soldiers to resist when they are surrounded, to fight
until death when they do not have any alternative, and to obey when they are in
highly dangerous situations.
11.94 Thus, if the schemes and ploys of the neighbouring warlords are not known, one
should not be keen to enter into any alliances with them.
11.95 Those who do not know the conditions of forested mountains, the dangerous
terrain of mountain paths and the treacherous nature of swamps and marshes will
not be able to conduct the movement of troops.
11.96 Those who do not use local guides will not be able to gain the advantages of the
terrain.
11.97 If one fails to understand and exploit even one of the nine types of ground, one
cannot claim to be the supreme commander (emperor) of an all-conquering army.
11.98 When a supreme commander (emperor) attacks a large state, he ensures that it is
impossible for the enemy to assemble all his forces against him.
11.99 He will overpower his enemy convincingly and overawe the other states so much
that none of the allies (of his enemies) would dare unite against him.
11.100 Thus, he (the supreme emperor) does not have to contend with securing alliances
with other states.
11.101 He does not have to foster or cultivate the power of other states.
11.102 Rather, he relies on his supreme ability to overpower the enemy to achieve his
own agenda and goals.
11.103 Thus, he is able to conquer cities and overthrows the states of his enemies.
11.104 (In a war situation), bestow rewards that do not adhere to conventions and norms.
11.105 Implement orders that do not conform to customary law and regulations.
11.106 Direct the various forces of the army as if instructing one person.
11.107 Order the officers and men to carry out tasks, but do not tell them the reason or
intention.
30
11.108 Order them to go after advantages and gains, but do not divulge the dangers
involved.
11.109 Throw the officers and men on dangerous ground and they will attempt to survive.
11.110 Place the troops on death ground and they will strive to be alive.
11.111 When the troops are thrown into situations of grave danger, they are capable of
turning defeat into victory.
11.112 Thus, the art of warfare is to pretend to accommodate the motives and desires of
the enemy.
11.113 Concentrate your forces on a single position of the enemy.
11.114 Thus, even coming from a thousand miles, you can still kill the generals of the
enemy.
11.115 This is what is meant by the art of accomplishing tasks in a skilful and capable
manner.
11.116 Thus, when the date for war is decided upon, close all border exits, cancel all
travel permits and disallow the movement of emissaries from other states.
11.117 Finalize and oversee closely all final preparations, plans and strategies (for war)
in the temple of the ancestors.
11.118 When the enemy provides an opening, move in swiftly to exploit it.
11.119 Capture first what the enemy treasures most, and do not let the enemy know the
date of the attack.
11.120 Military strategy must be adapted to the circumstances of the enemy so that
actions and decisions can be determined accordingly.
11.121 Thus, at the beginning of a battle, be as coy as a virgin girl so as to lure the enemy
into providing an opening.
11.122 As the battle progresses, be as swift as an escaping hare so as to catch the
unpreparedness of the enemy.
Chapter 12
Attacking with Fire
12.1 Sun Zi said: There are five ways to use fire for attacking the enemy.
12.2 The first way is to burn the soldiers (of the enemy) in their camp.
12.3 The second way is to burn the provisions and stockpiles (of the enemy).
12.4 The third way is to burn the heavy military equipment and supplies of the enemy.
12.5 The fourth way is to burn the armoury and warehouses of the enemy.
31
12.6 The fifth way is to burn the transportation trains of the enemy.
12.7 To launch attacks by fire, one must possess the necessary factors.
12.8 The materials and equipment for starting and using fire must be available at all
times.
12.9 There are opportunistic times for launching attacks by fire.
12.10 There are suitable days to start a fire.
12.11 Opportunistic times refer to periods of dry and hot weather.
12.12 Suitability of the day refers to the location of the moon in relation to the four
positions of the stars among the constellation.
12.13 These four positions of the moon and stars among the constellations signal the
days on which strong winds will arrive.
12.14 In assaults by fire, one must use the five ways of attacking interchangeably,
depending on the circumstances at hand.
12.15 When fire breaks out within the camp of the enemy, prepare quickly to attack the
enemy from the outside.
12.16 When fire breaks out within the camp of the enemy and there is no confusion nor
commotion among the soldiers, wait patiently and do not be eager to attack.
12.17 When the fire is burning ferociously with opportunities to be gained, follow
through quickly with your attacks.
12.18 When there are no opportunities to be gained and followed through, cease
immediately.
12.19 Fire can be started from outside the camp of the enemy.
12.20 There is no need to wait for the fire to start from within the camp of the enemy.
12.21 Fires can always be started (and used as a form of attack) at suitable times and
occasions.
12.22 When fire is burning in the windward direction, do not assault the leeward
position.
12.23 When winds blow strongly and continuously in the day, they tend to cease in the
night.
12.24 The adept in warfare knows the five interchangeable methods of attacking with
fire and would plan and prepare for their usage with vigilance.
12.25 Thus, those who use fire as a means to support attacks are wise and shrewd.
12.26 Those who use water as a means to support attacks are powerful.
12.27 Water can be used to cut off and isolate an enemy, but it cannot be used to destroy
and deprive him of his equipment, provisions and supplies.
12.28 Now in warfare, those who are able to win battles and secure land and cities but
are unable to exploit the gains swiftly and expediently will jeopardize their
interests.
12.29 This is tantamount to a waste of time and resources.
12.30 Thus it is said that it is the enlightened leader who deliberates on the plan while
the capable general implements it.
12.31 Move only when there are advantages to be gained.
12.32 Strike only when there are definite chances of success.
12.33 Fight only when there are definite dangers.
12.34 A warlord must not embark on a military campaign simply out of anger.
12.35 A general must not go into battle out of rage.
32
12.36 Move when there are advantages to be gained.

12.37 Cease when there are no advantages to be gained.
12.38 Anger can return to happiness.
12.39 Rage can return to joy.
12.40 A destroyed nation cannot be reinstated.
12.41 A dead person cannot be resurrected.
12.42 Thus, an enlightened ruler must always be prudent in matters of war and a capable
general must always be cautious and attentive.
12.43 This is the way to ensure security for a nation and to preserve the strengths and
entirety of the army.
Chapter 13
Intelligence and Espionage
13.1 Sun Zi said: Raising an army of 100,000 for a distant military campaign will
impose severe strains on the incomes of the people.
13.2 This, together with the drain on the state treasury, will amount to a daily
expenditure of 1,000 piece of gold.
33
13.3 There will be great commotion and disruption of peace at home and abroad, and
people will be exhausted (from transporting military supplies) along supply routes.
13.4 The disruption to work, jobs, and various professions will affect households.
13.5 Two opposing armies may be at war with each other for many years, seeking the
ultimate day of victory.
13.6 However, if one is reluctant to part with honour and ranks, money and gold (for
espionage purposes) and remain ignorant of the situation of the enemy, he is extremely
inhumane.
13.7 Indeed, such a person can never be a general of men, can never be a good
assistant to the ruler, and can never be a master of victories.
13.8 Thus, the enlightened ruler and the capable general are able to secure victories for
their military campaigns and achieve successes that surpass those of many others.
13.9 The reason is because of foreknowledge.
13.10 This foreknowledge cannot be obtained from the spirits nor from the gods.
13.11 It cannot be obtained by comparing with similar present nor past events and
situations.
13.12 Neither can it be obtained from the study of astrology.
13.13 This foreknowledge must be obtained from men (and women) who have
knowledge of the situation of the enemy.
13.14 Thus, there are five kinds of secret agents or spies that can be used.
13.15 There are local agents, inside agents, double agents, doomed agents, living agents.
13.16 When these five types of agents are deployed simultaneously, their complex
modes of operation will be beyond comprehension (of the enemy).
13.17 They are like mythical and divine schemes that can be deemed the most precious
treasures and weapons of the ruler.
13.18 Local agents are ordinary people recruited from the homeland of the enemy and
used as spies by us.
13.19 Inside agents are officials of the enemy who are recruited and employed by us.
13.20 Double agents are spies of the enemy who have been recruited to work for us.
13.21 Doomed agents refer to our own spies who are unable to keep secrets and are then
deliberately fed with false information to leak to the spies of the enemy.
13.22 Living agents are our spies who have returned safely from the territory of the
enemy with information.
13.23 Thus, among all military relationships, none can be more intimate than that
maintained with spies and secret agents.
13.24 There can be no bigger rewards than those showered on spies and secret agents.
13.25 There can be no greater secretive operations than those pertaining to espionage.
13.26 Only those who are sagacious and wise will be able to use secret agents and spies.
13.27 Only those who are benevolent, caring, just and loyal will be able to deploy and
use secret agents and spies.
13.28 Only those who are thorough, sharp and ingenious will be able to decipher the
truth embedded in espionage reports.
13.29 Such is the intricacy and sublety of espionage!
13.30 Indeed, there is no place where espionage cannot be used.
34
13.31 When espionage activities and secret operations have been leaked before their
implementation, then the agents concerned and those whom they are in contact with must
be put to death.
13.32 There may be armies that you wish to strike, cities that you wish to conquer, and
key people that you wish to assassinate.
13.33 For such cases, there is a need to know beforehand detailed information on the
identities of the garrison commander, his supporting officers, the visiting consultants, the
guards and patrols, and the various attendants.
13.34 Your agents must be ordered to investigate these matters in great detail.
13.35 The secret agents of the enemy who are spying among us must be actively sought
out.
13.36 Use incentives to bribe them, guide and counsel them, and then pardon and
release them.
13.37 Thus, they can become double agents and be used and employed by us.
13.38 It is through information gained from double agents that the situation of the
enemy can be known, and local and inside agents can be recruited and deployed as well.
13.39 It is through the intelligence gained from the double agents that we are able to use
doomed agents to carry fabricated and false information to the enemy.
13.40 It is through the efforts of the double agents that our living agents are able to
return as scheduled with needful reports on the enemy.
13.41 The ruler (general) must know fully how to use and operate the five different
kinds of spies and espionage activities.
13.42 However, to know the situation and condition of the enemy, the ruler (general)
must depend on double agents.
13.43 Thus, double agents must be treated most generously.
13.44 In ancient times, the rise of the Shang Dynasty over the Xia Dynasty was because
its military advisor, Yi Yin, had served as an official in the kingdom of Xia.
13.45 Similarly, the rise of the Zhou Dynasty over the Yin Dynasty was because its
military advisor, Lu Ya, had served as an official in the kingdom of Yin.
13.46 Thus, it is the enlightened ruler and the capable general who are able to use the
most intelligent ones from within their ranks to be deployed as spies and secret agents so
as to achieve the greatest victories in war.
13.47 Secret operations and espionage activities form an integral part of any military
campaign as the planning of strategies and the movement of troops depend heavily on
them.
35

Sun Zi Oct 2010 Notes

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sun Zi Oct 2010 Notes

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

UNIVERSITI TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN

FACULTY OF BUSINESS & FINANCE (FBF)

3.28 When lesser in numbers to the enemy, be capable of escaping.

5.2 It is a matter of organization and structure.

7.31 When in slow matches, be as majestic as the forest.

7.58 Use orderliness and stability to confront chaos and disorder.

8.6 When on constricted ground, you must plan and strategize.

12.36 Move when there are advantages to be gained.

You might also like